Corrigé
Corrected
CR2013/21
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
LAHAYE THE HAGUE
YEAR2013
Public sitting
lteld on Monday 15 July 2013, at 10 a.m., at tite Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in tite case conceminWhaling in the Antarctic (Australiv.Japan:
New Zealand intervening)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNÉE2013
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 15juillet 2013,0 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidencedeM. Tomka, président,
en l'affaire relative Chasse à la baleine dans l'Antarctique
(Australiec. Japon; Nouvelle-Zélande(intervenant))
COMPTE RENDU -2-
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepulveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judge ad hoc Charlesworth
Registrar Couvreur - 3-
Présenls: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepùlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari,uges
Mme Charlesworth, juge ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier -4-
Tite Govemmeut of Au.\·tmlitti.\·repre.\·eutetlhy:
The Honourable Mark Dreyfus Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of Australia,
as Counse/ and Advocate;
Mr. Bill Campbell, Q.C., General Counsel (International Law), Attorney-General's Department,
as Agent, Counse/ and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Neil Mules, A.O., Ambassador of Australia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,
Mr. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Mr. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Australian Government Solicitor,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law at the University ofGeneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Kate Cook, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Dr. Makane Mbengue, Associate Professor, University of Geneva,
as Counsel;
Ms Anne Sheehan, Acting Assistant-Secretary, Attorney-General's Department,
Mr. Michael Johnson, Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Danielle Forrester, Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Stephanie Ierino, Acting Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Clare Gregory, Senior Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Nicole Lyas, Acting Senior Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Erin Maher, Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Mr. Richard Rowe, Senior Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Dr. Greg French, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, - 5-
Le Gouvemement cieI'Austrtllie e.\'lreprésentépllr:
L'honorable Mark Dreyfus, Q.C., M.P., Allorney-Genera/ d'Australie,
cmmne conseil et avocat;
M. Bill Campbell Q.C., General Counsel (droit international), services de l'Attorney-General
d'Australie,
comme agen/, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Neil Mules, A.O., ambassadeur d'Australie auprèsdu Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagenl ;
M. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General d'Australie,
M. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Solicitor du Gouvernement australien,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Genève,
comme conseils el avocats ;
Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Makane Mbengue, professeur associéà l'Universitéde Genève,
comme conseils ;
Mme Anne Sheehan, secrétaireadjoint par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,
M. Michael Johnson, juriste principal, services de l'Attorney-Genera/,
Mme Danielle Forrester,juriste principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Stephanie lerino,juriste principal par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Clare Gregory, juriste hors classe, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Nicole Lyas, juriste hors classe par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Erin Maher,juriste, services de l'Attorney-General,
M. Richard Rowe, juriste hors classe, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce,
M. Greg French, secrétaireadjoint, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce, -6-
Mr. Jamie Cooper, Legal Officer, Department of Foreign Atfairs and Trade,
Ms Donna Petrachenko, First Assistant Secretary, Department of Sustainability, Environment,
Water, Population and Communities,
Mr. Peter Komidar, Director, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and
Communities,
Dr. Bill de la Mare, Scientist, Australian Antarctic Division, Department of Sustainability,
Environment, Water, Population and Communities,
Dr. David Blumenthal, Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,
Ms. Giulia Baggio, First Secretary, Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,
Mr. Todd Quinn, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Ms Mandy Williams, Administration Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
as Assistant.
Tlle Government of Japan is represented by:
Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Yasumasa Nagamine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, President of the
Société française pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,
Mr. Yuji Iwasawa, Professor of International Law at the University of Tokyo, member and former
Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee,
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the Bar ofNew York and the Law Society of Upper Canada,
Mr. Shotaro Hamamoto, Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,
Ms Yukiko Takashiba, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel and Advocates; - 7 -
M. Jamie Cooper, juriste, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce,
Mme Donna Petrachenko, premier secrétaire adjoint, ministère du développement durable,
de l'environnement, de l'eau, des populations et des communautés,
M. Peter Komidar, directeur, ministère du développement durable, de l'environnement, de l'eau,
des populations et des communautés,
M. Bill de la Mare, scientifique, division de l'Antarctique australien, ministère du développement
durable, de l'environnement, de l'eau, des populations et des communautés,
M. David Blumenthal, conseiller principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Giulia Baggio, conseiller principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
M. Todd Quinn, premier secrétaire,ambassade d'Australie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Mandy Williams, administrateur, services de l'Attorney-General,
comme assistant.
Le Gouvernement du Japon est représentépar:
M. Koji Tsuruoka, ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères,
co1mneagent ;
S. Exc. M. Yasumasa Nagamine, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Japon auprèsdu
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
cmmne coagent ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,présidentde la Société
française pour le droit international, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
internationalà l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l'Université d'Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d'Angleterre,
M. Yuji Iwasawa, professeur de droit international à l'Université de Tokyo, membre et ancien
présidentdu Comitédes droits de l'homme,
M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à l'Université
McGill, membre du barreau de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
M. Shotaro Hamamoto, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Kyoto,
Mme Yukiko Takashiba, directeur adjoint à la division chargée de l'affaire de la chasàela baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils et avocats ; - 8 -
Mr. Takane Sugihara, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,
Ms Atsuko Kanehara, Professor oflnternational Law, Sophia University (Tokyo),
Mr. Masafumi Ishii, Director-General, International Legal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel;
Mr. Kenji Kagawa, Director-General, Resources Enhancement Promotion Department, Fisheries
Ageney,
Mr. Noriyuki Shikata, Minister, Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland,
Mr. Kenichi Kobayashi, Director, International Legal Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Joji Morishita, Director-General, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,
Mr. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., Director, Fishery Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Yoko Yanagisawa, Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Naohisa Shibuya, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ken Sakaguchi, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Akiko Muramoto, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Masahiro Kato, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Takaaki Sakamoto, Assistant Director, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Shigeki Takaya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management lmprovement Division, Fisheries
Ageney,
Mr. Toshinori Uoya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Shinji Hiruma, Assistant Director, International Management Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Sadaharu Kodama, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, - 9 -
M. Takane Sugihara, professeur éméritede droit international de l'Universitéde Kyoto,
Mme Atsuko Kanehara, professeur de droit international à l'UniversitéSophia (Tokyo),
M. Masafumi lshii, directeur généraldu bureau des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université Paris
Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils ;
M. Kenji Kagawa, directeur général du département de la promotion de la valorisation des
ressources, agence des pêcheries,
M. Noriyuki Shikata, ministre à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d'Irlande du Nord,
M. Kenichi Kobayashi, directeur à la division des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M. Joji Morishita, directeur généralde l'l:lstitut national de recherche sur les pêcheriesen eaux
lointaines,
M. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., directeur à la division des pêcheries,ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Yoko Yanagisawa, directeur à la division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant
la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Naohisa Shibuya, directeur adjoint à la division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ken Sakaguchi, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
Mme Akiko Muramoto, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Masahiro Kato, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
M. Takaaki Sakamoto, sous-directeur à la division des affaires internationales, agence des
pêcheries,
M. Shigeki Takaya, sous-directeur à la division de l'amélioration de la gestion des pêcheries,
agence des pêcheries,
M. Toshinori Uoya, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion des pêcheries,agence des pêcheries,
M. Shinji Hiruma, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion internationale, agence des pêcheries,
M. Sadaharu Kodama, conseiller juridique à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., premier secrétaire de l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des
Pays-Bas, - 10-
Ms Risa Saijo, LL.M., Researcher, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms HéloïseBajer-Pellet, member of the Paris Bar,
as Advisers;
Mr. Douglas Butterworth, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town,
Ms Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., Researcher Professor Emeritus, University of Washington,
Mr. Dan Goodman, National Research lnstitute of Far Seas Fisheries,
Mr. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., Director, Survey and Research Division, lnstitute of
Cetacean Research,
as Scientific Advisers and Experts;
Mr. Martin Pratt, Professor, Department of Geography, Durham University,
as Expert Adviser;
Mr. James Harrison, Ph.D., Lecturer in International Law, University of Edinburgh,
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
Mr. Jay Butler, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School,
member of the New York Bar,
as Legal Advisers.
Tite Government of New Zealaml is represented by:
The Honourable Christopher Finlayson Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General ofNew Zealand,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Dr. Penelope Ridings, International Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. George Troup, Ambassador ofNew Zealand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Cheryl Gwyn, Deputy Solicitor-General, Crown Law Office,
Ms Elana Geddis, Barrister, Harbour Chambers, Wellington,
as Counsel;
Mr. Andrew Williams, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, - Il -
Mme Risa Saijo, LL.M., chercheur à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme HéloïseBajer-Pellet, membre du barreau de Paris,
comme conseillers ;
M. Douglas Butterworth, professeur éméritede l'Universitéde Cape Town,
Mme Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., chercheur, professeur éméritede l'Universitéde Washington,
M. Dan Goodman, Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheriesen eaux lointaines,
M. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., directeur à la division des enquêtes et de la recherche,
Institut de recherche sur les cétacés,
comme conseillers et experts scientifiques ;
M. Martin Pratt, professeur au département de géographiede l'Universitéde Durham,
comme conseiller expert ;
M. James Harrison, Ph.D., chargéde cours en droit international à l'Universitéd'Edimbourg,
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
M. Jay Butler, professeur associé invité de droit à la faculté de droit de l'Université George
Washington, membre du barreau de New York,
comme conseillers juridiques.
Le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande est représentépar :
L'honorable Christopher Finlayson, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General de Nouvelle-Zélande,
comme conseil et avocat ;
Mme Penelope Ridings, conseiller juridique pour le droit international, ministère des affaires
étrangères et du commerce,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. George Troup, ambassadeur de Nouvelle-Zélande auprèsdu Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
Mme Cheryl Gwyn, Solicitor-General adjoint, Crown Law Office,
Mme Elana Geddis, avocat, Harbour Chambers (Wellington),
comme conseils;
M. Andrew Williams, conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce, - 12-
Mr. James Christmas, Private Secretary, Attorney-General's Office,
Mr. James Walker, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Paul Vinkenvleugel, Policy Adviser, Embassy of New Zealand 111the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Advisers. - 13-
M. James Christmas, chef de cabinet, services de 1'Allorney-Genera/,
M. James Walker, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Paul Vinkenvleugel, conseiller politique, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers. - 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good morning. The sitting is open. The Court meets
this morning to hear Japan begin the presentation of its second round of oral argument. And 1see
Professor Payam Akhavan is ready, so you have the tloor, Sir. Please start.
Mr. AKHAV AN:
ÜVERVIEW OF THE CASE
1.Introduction
1.Good morning, Mr. President, distinguished Members ofthe Court. 1am greatly honoured
to make the opening presentation on behalf of Japan for this second round of pleadings.
2.1will begin our pleadings today with an "overview of the case", setting forth the points of
agreement and disagreement among the Parties on the most important questions of law and fact. 1
will then brietly address the factual context within which, we submit, the Court should consider
and decide this case. Following my presentation, Professor Pellet will address the "Jurisdiction of
the Court and the ICRW framework". Ms Takashiba will then discuss "Japan's full compliance
with the procedural requirements and co-operation" pursuant to paragraph 30. After that,
Professors Boyle and Hamamoto will address our submissions on why "JARPA Il is a Programme
of Scientific Research". Following that, Professor Lowe will discuss "The Standard of Review".
Professor Pellet will then consider the "Remedies requested by Australia" and provide the "General
Conclusions" of our case. Finally, the Agent of Japan, Mr. Tsuruoka, will make "concluding
remarks and final submissions".
3. Mr. President, Members of the Court. You have now heard Australia's second round of
pleadings. What can be concluded at this final stage about its case against Japan? Allow me first
brietly to set forth the evolution of Australia's case from the filing of the Application on
31 May 2010 toits final submissions last week. Australia's case began with what appeared to be a
global case against Japan's special permit whaling . lt then ruled outJARPN Il in the North Pacifie,
and limited its case only to JARPA Il, coinciding in geographical scope with Australia's Antarctic
maritime claims1• Australia's case began with the Convention on International Trade in
1
Application of Australia, 31 May 2010, para. 34; Memorial of Australia, MA, para. 1.5. - 15-
2
Endangered Species and the Convention on•lt now relies solely on the
3 4
WhalinConventiAustralia began with alleging that Japan has acted in bad faith and now
discourages the Court from deciding th• Australia began with extensive
reliance on reports of the Scientific Committeé and now argues that the Court should not rely on
those same relt has ali but dropped any mention of the testimony of its expert witness
Dr. Gales. This in brief is the story of Australia's incredible, shrinking case.
4. Australia's primary evidence now is the testimony of Professor Mangel. Their reliance on
him in second round pleadinProfessor Sands went to great lengths to emphasize
that Professor Mangel is, and 1 quote, "very weil placed to offer totally independent, practical
advice on what does and does not consti•In effect, Australia invites the
Court to decide this case based on his testimony as to what constitutes
Article VIII of thelt would not be an exaggeration to say that Australia's case now
hangs by a thread.
S. Mr. President, Members of the Court. My presentation will focus on four points. First, 1
will address the questions of law and fact on which Australia and Japan agree and disagree.
Second, 1 will address Australia's failure to prove its allegations against Japan in light of the
evidence before the Court. Third, the proper approach to be taken in determining the
fundamental question befornamely, whether in issuing special permits under
Article VIII, Japan reasonably concluded that JARPA II is a programme for the purposes of
scientific research within the meaning oFourth and finally, 1will make
sorne general concluding observations concerning Australia's allegations of bad faith against Japan
in this proceeding. ~ ~
Cltl. f:tlA·l"k~l(l~t~)(dl\" 'J" ""~c"v'.."-~"\c".c+o''.:..".'-d'~"~~-
e._,. -i .--"","-:',.c."c")~'\(tCQ.~,f.;.."..r,...-l:>c~''brJ.--I-lo-c.~,..,.:~._
c--·"i ~ck.r( \)'1,....o,-a1lc:at-. .~~ :fh-S:,. w;.~Woi~.c.
i~u r~~ ~.~,"-~oeHic.'icc-.:..~·')..J:C;l.J'll19'!.a \o(~~(!.-t)
C\o;•'"'"~,.; al"."c.a.'::.~c~:.o-'."'~.c.<=' -·c.~.r"~'"' ~'•""
"~ "-' ~; .~"\."11."~c:-rn.~ c.~tJ~'~ .,.,.~-,..odo.fcr""o
w"-"'~"" h:. Ar..:~"'e.f'lA, ,./trc.Â~(Drc.( .w"f...~"c.c.:....>.'Ç--c..
Application ofAustralia, para. 39. ~.-:.~ ':~...o.., '
3
f2R6QIJI7, ~JFial.fCt 2l/"' )..'rvcJl3 (~cl,.J.ILP!t(11"0~~~~
CR 2013/7, 55(Giecson). ' ' \..-...'._c.~'-"t
5 1
CR 2013119, p. 67, para. 27 (Crawford). reJ""'~c.,...._el.o,.
See, e.g., CR 2013/8, p. 33, para. 27 (Crawfor~-\.f.~.~).. )). - 16-
II. Points of Agreement and Disagreement
6. 1 will now turn to the points of agreement and disagreement in this case. First, on
jurisdiction, there is no disagreement that the geographical scope of JARPA Il coincides
substantially with Australia's claimed exclusive economie zone in the Antarctic and the adjacent
area 8. There is also no disagreement that the Parties disagree as to delimitation of this maritime
area which Japan considers as the high seas. ln the first round pleadings, Mr. Burmester even
argued, remarkably, and only in relation to jurisdiction, that this dispute is not about the
commercial "exploitation" of resources, within the meaning of Australia's reservation, because the
dispute is about scientific rather than commercial whaling 9• lt follows from this imaginative
argument that if JARPA Il is commercial "exploitation" of whales, as Australia contends, then the
Court would have nojurisdiction to decide the merits ofthe case. To the contrary, according to this
theory, if JARPA Il is scientific whaling, then Australia wins on jurisdiction but !oses on the
merits. But we do not agree with this either: if, as we submit, JARPA Il is scientific, it still
"relates to" and "concerns" the exploitation ofthese areas. This was the stillunrebutted submission
of Professor Pellet during the first round 1• Japan notes that having given barely any attention to
jurisdiction in its written pleadings, Australia's arguments in the oral pleadings have been hesitant,
contradictory, and unconvincing. Australia's case clearly falls within its own reservation to the
Court'sjurisdiction.
7. On the applicable law, the Agent of Australia argued, in the first round of pleadings, that
the "whole purpose" of the Convention was "conservation and management"" of whale stocks.
Australia now argues that conservation is an exclusive purpose 12• lt accepts that sorne Aboriginal
13
Subsistence Whaling is permissible • lt also accepts, despite its contrary statements at the IWC,
14
that scientific whaling is permissible, if only in very narrow circumstances • lt does not accept,
however, that sustainable commercial whaling, which it totally opposes, is even one among the
8
CR 2013/18, p. 26, para. 18(Bunnester).
"CR 2013111, p. 48, para. 34 (Bunnestcr).
1See CR 2013/7, pp. 47-48, paras. 24-33 (Pellet).
1CR 2013/7, p. 22, para. 12(Campbell).
1CR 2013/18, p.l9, para. 16 (Ore) fus).
11
CR 2013/19, p.54, para. 79 (Sands).
14
CR 2013/20, p.44, para. 8 (Dreyfus). - 17-
purposes of the Convention 1• ln the words of Professor Boisson de Chazoumes: "C'est un objet
et un but exhaustifs: celui de la conservation et de la reconstitution des peuplements baleiniers." 16
ln this regard, there is a fundamental disagreement between the Parties. Japan maintains its
position that the object and purpose of the Convention is - to quote its Preamble- both
"conservation and development of whale stocks" and, in the words of Article V, the "optimum
17
utilization of the whale resources" • We submit that science-based sustainable whaling is clearly
one of the objectives, if not the fundamental objective, of the 1946 Convention .
8. The parties also disagree on the scope of Article VIII. Australia characterizes this
provision as a very limited exception, an exception subject to collective regulation, an exception
intended for scientific research solely for the purpose of conservation, this being, in its view, the
exclusive purpose of the Convention 1• ln contrast, Japan considers Article VIII to be an
exemption from the Convention, an exemption that permits whaling for the purposes of scientific
research. That includes research for both conservation and management of whale resources.
Article Vlllleaves each State free to decide for itselfwhat should be included within its program of
scientific research, within reason and subject to its duty under the Convention to take into account
reviews and recommendations by the Scientific Committee conceming its proposais.
9. With respect to the sale of whale meat, Australia now concedes first, that Article VIII,
paragraph 2, requires parties to process whale meat, and second, that the sale of such meat
19
incidental to a program of scientific research does not constitute commercial whaling • As
Professor Crawford explained in response to Judge Gaja's question, "any program of scientific
research will have a commercial element" and "[t]he incidental sale of 'by-product' is not enough
to invalidate a genuine program of scientific research ... " 20• 1t must follow inevitably that if
JARPA Il is a program of scientific research, the disposai of whale meat through sale is lawful and
cannot be regarded as commercial, unless there is conclusive proof of bad faith. lt must also follow
15CR 2013/20, p. 41, para. 28 (Gieeson)
16CR 2013/7, p. 41, para. 7 (Boisson de Chazoumcs) .
17Prcamblc, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (cntcred into lorce 10Nov. 1948) 161
United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 72, amended b) Protocol of 19Nov. 1956, 338 UNTS 366; CMJ, Ann. 6.
18CR 2013/20, p. 29, para. 76 (Crawford).
1qCR 2013/20, p. 26, para. 67 (Crawford).
2
°CR 2013/20, p. 27, para. 71 (Crawford). - 18-
that the incidental sale of whale meat under JARPA Il does not change the program's scientific
purpose within the meaning of Article VIII.
JO. The parties are also in agreement that JARPA Il has not succeeded in taking its full
samplesize1• Australia has made no attempt in its second round to rebut Japan's first-round
submissions that the real reason for this reduced catch is the attacks of Sea Shepherd, as recognized
by the Scientific Committee's 2013 Report.
Il. The parties are in disagreement as to the inference that should be drawn from the
statements of Japanese officiais from between 1982 and 1987 regarding the continuation of "the
22
tradition ofwhalin•Australia stiJl claims that these are proofthat at its inception, JARPA had a
23
commercialpurpose• Counsel before this Court must often wish that each and every utterance of
c:.J .c~al.
fl. ever tat~thy repasett ould have been cleared by Jawyers before they were made, to
ensure that they contain no passages which, taken outcontext, have the potential for
misrepresentation in this or that legal proceeding. That, of course, is impossible. The best that can
be done is for the Court to have regard to the context in which such statements are made.
Australia's assertion complete!y disregards that context. ln particular, in 1982, paragraph 10 (e) of
the Schedule specifically provided that the moratorium was not a permanent ban, and Japanese
officiais reasonably anticipated that it would be subject to review no later than 1990, just three
years after the entry into force of the moratorium in respect of Japan, consistent with the express
4
wording of paragraph (e/• lt was only in that context that Japanese officiais referred to the
continuation of "the tradition of whaling" after what they had been led to believe would be a brief
and temporary pause. Furthermore, Japan has never hidden the fact that the objective of JARPA
and JARPA Il has been the resumption of sustainable commercial whaling, based on sound
scientific research.
21
CR 2013/18, p. 19, para. 17 (Dreyfus).
2CR 2013/16, p. 24, para. 29 (lwa~awa).
2CR 2013/20, p.21, para. 56 (Crawford).
24
Para. 10 (e), Schcdulc, ICRW; CMJ, Ann. 6. - 19-
Ill. Evidence of scientific purpose
12. With respect to the evidence, the parties were in agreement until the conclusion of the
first round that the Court can substantially rely on the factual findings of the Scientific Committee
asto whether JARPA Il has scientific merit. In its Memorial, Australia refers to the reports of the
Scientific Committee on no Jess than 100 occasions. ln its first round pleadings, Mr. Burmester
observed that "[t]he Scientific Committee is of particular importance to this case" 25 and
Professor Sands emphasized that these reports constitute the views of a relevant "independent third
26
party bod[y]" • He concluded in the first round that these reports have "never" provided a positive
27
assessment of JARPA or JARPA 11 • ln second round pleadings however, Professor Crawford
insisted that the Court shou1d not rely on these reports because the Scientific Committee is
"increasingly dysfunctional", operating m a state of "division and disarray" 28• Similarly,
Professor Sands emphasized that the Scientific Committee "has been unable to function ... it is at
29
an impasse." This is a truly abrupt volte-face. lt is in stark contradiction with ali of Australia's
prior written and oral pleadings. This dramatic retreat from the most substantial body of evidence
before the Court, is best explained by examining those reports, the contents of which, we submit,
are fatal to Australia's factual case.
13. First, Australia has failed to rebut the fact, evident from the IWC official records, that
scientific data obtained from JARPA and JARPA Il have made useful contributions to the work of
30
the Scientific Committee since at least 1990 • Second, Australia has failed to rebut the fact that
both proposais and results of Japan's scientific research have been consistently submitted to the
Scientific Committee for reviews in accordance with established procedures 31• Third, Australia has
2
~CR 2013/8, p. 15, para. 7 (Bunnester).
26
CR 2013/8, p. 61, para. 16(Sands).
27
CR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19(Sands).
28CR 2013/20, p. 30, para. 80 (Crawford).
29CR 2013/19, p. 31, para. 23 (Sands).
10''Report of the Sub-Committee on Southem Hemisphere Minke Wha1es", Ann. F, Report of the Scientitic
Committee, Rep. int. Whal. Commn .f.l, 1991, pp. 113-131, Ann. 86; "Report of the Scientilic Committee", Rep. int.
Whal. Commn .f.B,1998, p. 103, Ann. 94, ''TheCommittee noted that JARPA is at the ha1f-way point and has provided
substantial improvementin the understanding of stock structure"; "Report orthe Review Meeting of the Japanese Whale
Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA) called by the Govemment of Japan, Tokyo,
18-20 January 2005", SC/57/06 (2005), p. 25, Ann. 102, "fT]he meeting agreed that JARPA work remains relevant for
providing data importantlor management (ofwhales)."; CR 2013/15, p. 40, para. 34 (Takashiba); CR 2013/15, p. 50.
para. 21 (Boyle).
31
CR 2013/15, pp. 32-34, paras. 16-19 (Takashiba). -20-
failed to rebut the fact that JARPA has been modified to take into account the recommendations of
32
the Scientific Committee • Ms Takashiba showed that Japanese scientists have modified and
33
strengthened their research in response to comments from the Scientific Committee • Thus, the
34
Scientific Committee "welcomed the presentation of this report in response to a request last year" ,
noted that methods of data collection had been strengthened "in response to comments from the
35
[Scientific] Committee" and even the IWC, in which the anti-whaling block often commands a
majority, "noted that the programme had been revised to try to take into account comments made
36
by the Scientific Committee" in the previous year • Australia's case is that under the paragraph 30
procedure, this review should be conducted annually rather than periodically in accordance with the
37
temporal scope of a program of scientific research • There is however, no basis for this argument
in either the wording or the practice relating to paragraph 30. Even if Australia's argument that
reviews should be more frequent had any merit, quod non, it would at best be a technical
procedural point rather than proof of bad faith. ln pursuing this argument, Australia is truly
clutching at straws.
14. Australia still maintains that the Scientific Committee has never given a positive
assessment of either JARPA or JARPA tex. lt has failed, however, to rebut the plain and
unambiguous conclusions of both the 1997 and 2006 reviews of JARPA. lt has argued in its
second round pleadings that these two Review Workshops were dominated by Japanese scientists,
without recognizing that the Scientific Committee has adopted these reports. lndeed, the
2008 report of the Scientific Committee confirms that "considerable data have been collected by
the JARPA programme by both lethal and non-lethal methods" and "endorses" the Review's
39
"conclusions and recommendations" • If Australia seeks endorsement of JARPA by the Scientific
Committee, it needs to look no further than this report.
3
~CR 2013/15, p. 37, paras. 28-29 (Takashiba).
Dfbid.
34Rep. /nt. Wlral. Commn. -16,1996, p. 78.
35Rep. /nt. Whal. Commn. -131993, p. 75.
.lRep. /nt. Wlral.Comnm. -121992, p. 13.
17
CR 2013/20, p. 39, para. 19(Giccson).
8
.lCR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19 (Sands).
19
J. Cetacean Res. ManaKe. /0 (Suppl.), 2008, p. 58. -2 1-
15. Australia has also argued in second round pleadings that these two reviews are somehow
irrelevant because they relate to JARPA and not JARPA Il. Australia however, has consistently
linked these as two interdependent phases of the same program of scientific research, and it has
disregarded the Scientific Committee's reliance on JARPA data in its assessment of JARPA Il
in 2005. Australia has also failed to explain, in response to Judge Greenwood's question, why the
views of 63 boycotting scientists in the 2005 review should prevail over the views of the
122 scientists who remained, or how this disagreement is even relevant to determining the
scientific merit of JARPA Il. Australia has failed to explain why the Scientific Committee views
concerning the necessity of lethal sampling with respect to age data, blubber thickness or stomach
contents should be disregarded by the Court. Australia has presented no evidence that Japan was
wrong in 2005 to conclude that whale stocks will not be harmed by lethal sampling. lndeed, with
respect to "stock structure studies", the JARPA Final Review Workshop recognized in 2006 "the
very considerable amount of work undertaken" , "the progress that has and can be made given the
data collected", and the scientific agreement on stock structure in the JARPA research area
"[b]ased on the analyses of the genetic and morphometric data presented'"' 0. Japan's assessment of
JARPA II's impact on whale stocks remains unrebutted. lndeed, Australia's own expert witness
Professor Mangel confirmed before the Court that "that very small take of [minke] whales will not
in any way endanger this stock" 4•
16. Australia has also failed to address the positive assessment of JARPN Il, a research
program substantially similar to JARPA Il, in the 2009 review by the Scientific Committee under
Annex P. For example, it was noted that "[t]he Panel appreciates the notable amount of effort
undertaken and the generally high quality of the sampling programme, resultant data and
information from JARPN Il studies on whale food habits and prey preferences", and added that
"[t]hese efforts have resulted in valuable datasets that have great potential for concerted analytical
work on a broad range oftopics ... '"' Australia has also failed to address the positive comments
40
Report of the lntersessional Workshop to Rcview Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke
Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 4-8 December 2006, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. J()(Suppl.),2008, p. 422; CMJ,
Ann. 113.
41
CR 2013/9, p. 63 (Mangel).
42
Report of the Expert Workshop to Review the Ongoing JARPN Il Programme, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. Il
(Suppl. 2)2010, p. 408, available at: http://iwe.int/index .pho?ciD =workshop-reports&yea r=2009. -22-
of Scientific Committee members on JARPA Il at its most recent meeting in June 2013. For
example, the Committee noted that "the approach and results provide useable input data for
3
Catch at Age Analysis'.4 • This evidence of scientific purpose, from the IWC's own official
records, is credible, unambiguous, and stands unrebutted by Australia.
17. ln short, Australia's best case is that there is some scientific disagreement on aspects of
JARPA Il. Japan agrees with Australia that there is some scientific disagreement. Article VIII
however, does not require scientific consensus. lt merely requires "scientific purpose", and in that
regard, there can be no doubt.
18. Mr. President, Members of the Court. Throughout these proceedings, Australia has
attempted to equate scientific criticism with lack of scientific merit. My colleagues at the
university would say that it takes five researchers to change a light bulb: one to screw in the light
bulb, and four to criticize the methodology. Scientific criticism is the vocation of scientists. lt is
their raison d'être. Even Japan's own expert witness, Professor Walloe, criticized aspects of
44
JARPA, confirming his independence as an eminent expert and scientist • But the question before
the Court is not whether Japan could improve its scientific research. Rather, the question is, as
Australia has alleged, whether it has no scientific merit at ali; the question is whether it is
commercial whaling in disguise.
19. By any measure, the Scientific Committee record concerning JARPA Il does no more
than establish scientific debate and scientific disagreement. lt is debate and disagreement. But it is
scientific. And that is ali the Court needs to satisfy itself that JARPA Il has a "scientific purpose".
The documentary evidence, evidence that Australia relied on extensively until it was abruptly
abandoned in second round pleadings, this evidence fundamentally contradicts Australia's case that
JARPA Il has "no scientific merit". The Scientific Committee reports are simply fatal to
Australia's case.
20. Australia's highly selective use of Scientific Committee reports merits one final and brief
comment. The Court will recall that in Professor Sands's second round pleadings, he referred to
41
SC Report 2013, p. 39, availablc at: http://iwc.int/indcx.3318&cTypc =documcnt&download =l.
4CR 2013/14, p. 44 (Walloc). -23-
45
severa! such reports • These were included in the judges' folder. These documents were copied
upright, as one might expect. But there was one notable, mysterious exception. For example, here
are the upright documents at tab 29 and tab 30 of Professor Sands's presentation, which we have
included in tab 2 and tab 3 of your folder. And here is the next document at his tab 31, which is at
tab 1-2 of your folder. It is suspiciously copied sideways. This document you will recall was
page 426 of the 2009 JARPN Il review. Professor Sands complained that counsel for Japan had
"overlooked page 426'"' 6• He claimed that this page showed that non-lethal alternatives were not
47
"impracticable or unavailable" • Mindful of the brilliant advocacy of my dear friend and
colleague, 1consulted that document. lt quickly became apparent why it had been presented to you
sideways. The upright copy of page 426, at tab 1-3 of your folder, demonstrates why the lower
half, indicated by the red tine, was accidentally eut off. That portion of the review states, and 1
quote: "The Panel recognises that at present, certain data, primarily stomach content data, are only
48
available via lethal sampling."
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 stand accused of "creative lawyering", but
fortunately, 1 am not guilty of "creative photocopying". We urge you to treat with considerable
caution Australia's account of the contents and conclusions of Scientific Committee reports.
22. As previously mentioned, Australia's case that JARPA Il is not scientific now stands or
falls based on the criteria set forth in Professor Mangel's testimony. Unlike Annex P, these criteria
have never been accepted or applied by either the Scientific Committee or the Parties to this case.
If Australia complains that there has never been a positive review of JARPA Il under Annex P, that
is because the review is scheduled for 2014. lt is absurd to suggest that pending this review,
Annex P should be substituted with Professor Mangel's standards as the measure of JARPA ll's
scientific merit.
23. But even the expert testimony of Professor Mangel is inconclusive. For example, he
agreed with Professor Wal10ethat JARPA ll's sample size amounts to "a very small take" ofminke
4CR 2013/19, p. 47, para. 60 (Sands).
46
/bid.
41/bid.
4Report of the Expert Workshop to Revicw the Ongoing JARPN Il Programme, J. Cetacean Res. ManaKe. Il
(Suppl. 2), 2010, 405-449 (SC/61/Rcp.1), availablc at: hllp://iwc.intlworkshop-reports#! ycar- 2009, pp. 426. -24-
49
whales • lt may be recalled that according to Professor Wallee it was "obvious that some of the
objectives for JARPA were not met during the JARPA period, partly because the sample sizes were
50
too small" • There were of course points of disagreement between the two experts in their
appreciation of JARPA II's scientific merit. But, at most, this shows that two equally reasonable
scientists may arrive at differing conclusions based on their respective methodologies and
assumptions. Leaving that aside, the Parties fundamentally disagree on the role of experts in this
case. Having suddenly abandoned the Scientific Committee Reports, Australia now argues that the
case should essentially be decided on Professor Mangel's testimony as to what constitutes
"science". Japan is of the view that it is for the Court to decide that legal question; it is for the
Court to determine whether Japan reasonably concluded that JARPA Il is for the purposes of
scientific research within the meaning of Article VIII. What constitutes science in this case is not
an abstract academie question, it is not a matter for metaphysical speculation. lt is a legal question
to be decided based on the applicable rules. Those rules are Article VIII, paragraph 30, and
Annex P. These are clearly the criteria agreed upon by the Parties as the basis for determining
scientific merit.
24. It is noteworthy in this regard that Australia has said little on the standard of review
under Article VIII of the Convention. lt is Japan's submission that Contracting States have broad
discretion to issue special permits for scientific whaling under that provision. The Court should
only intervene where the exercise ofthat discretion is manifestly unreasonable. That, we submit, is
clearly not the case. The evidence before the Court can leave little doubt that JARPA Il has a
scientific purpose based on the reviews of the IWC Scientific Committee and the objective criteria
set forth in Annex P; it can leave little doubt that for the past 30 years, Japan has pursued this
program of research in good faith and reasonably for a scientific purpose.
25. ln conclusion, taken at its best, Australia has merely established that there is scientific
debate and disagreement over aspects of JARPA Il. It attempts, unconvincingly, to equate Jack of
scientific consensus with Jack of scientific purpose. Even the politicized IWC Resolutions that
Australia invokes do not state that JARPA Il violates Article VIII of the Convention. To the
qCR2013/9, p. 63 (Mange!).
~°C 2R13/14,p.50 (Walluc). -25-
contrary, as indicated in my first round pleadings, despite their serious opposition to JARPA Il,
senior Australian officiais have on severa( occasions admitted that it is within Japan's rights under
Article VIII. Australia manifestly fails to demonstrate that in the exercise of its broad discretion
under that provision, Japan has in any way acted unreasonably or unlawfully. Australia's case that
JARPA Il constitutes commercial whaling in disguise, its case that Japan has pursued a program of
fraudulent pseudo-science, acting in bad faith, for almost 30 years, that case we submit, must fail.
lt is manifestly and wholly without merit.
IV. Japan's Commitment to the IWC
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court. As 1 set forth in our first round pleadings,
Australia's case is fundamentally that Japan has acted in bad faith. To quote from the Agent's
51
speech, Japan has "disguised" commercial whaling "in the lab-coat of science" •
27. Bad faith, of course, is a legal euphemism for intentional deception. ln other words,
Australia's case is that Japan has lied, and that it has done so systematically, as a matter of State
policy, for almost thirty years, before the Scientific Committee, before the IWC, and now, before
this Court. Needless to say, this is a serious accusation, an affront to the dignity of a nation.
Surely, it is not an accusation to be made lightly. My highly-esteemed friend and colleague,
Professor Crawford, rightly noted in his pleadings last week that: "Like-minded States do not
ordinarily accuse each other of bad faith. Counsel appearing for them in international courts and
tribunals are bound not to do so unless they have actual evidence." 52
28. Professor Crawford now contends that the Court should not decide the case "wholly or
primarily" based on what he calls "tluctuating and subjective notions [such] as bad faith" 5• This,
of course, is a significant reversai of Australia's theory, at the eleventh hour. "Lack of good faith"
is at the core of its Memorial, and a central theme of its first round pleadings. Japan would of
course agree that Australia should not have thrown about accusations of bad faith so loosely,
especially in plain disregard of its own evidence. Contrary to his own admonition however,
Professor Crawford's conclusion is that in this case, "a strong presumption of good faith is, in
51
CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18 (Campbell).
52
CR 2013/19, p. 64, para. 20 (Crawford).
5J!bid., p. 65, para. 22. -26-
effect, to allocate [resources in the public domain] to aState good at concealment" 54• What exactly
is meant by "a State good at concealment"? This is clarified by what he called "a cautionary tale"
about the Sou/hern Bluejin Tuna Case: he said that even while it was engaged in those
55
proceedings, Japan was "deliberately and substantially overfishing its quota of tuna" • lt is not
clear what inference he asks the Court to draw from that, unrelated case, from more than a decade
ago. But even if it was somehow relevant, the allegation that Japan engaged in wilful deception in
that case is simply not true. The reference that Professor Crawford gave shows nothing of the kind.
Once more, Japan can only regret the readiness of Australia to make unwarranted accusations of
bad faith, just as it argues that the Court should not base its decision on bad faith.
29. Japan has been placed in the unpleasant situation of having to repeatedly defend itself
against such baseless accusations before this Court. ln his round two opening statement, the
Honourable Mark Dreyfus, Attorney-General of Australia, found Japan's response to these grave
accusations "offensive" 56• He clarified that this case is not about what he called "cultural
imperiali isis a "disagreement between friends"; it is about Japan's bad faith and defiance
57
against collective regulation by the IWC .
30. ln this light, to the extent that collective regulation is at issue, Japan observes that had
Australia not abruptly rejected the IWC Proposed Consensus Decision in 2010, had it not brought
this case just days before negotiations started at the 2010 IWC Annuai Meeting in Morocco, had its
Environment Minister not defiantly said that "it was now time to close the door on the Proposed
Consensus Decision" 58, in other words, had Australia expressed the slightest willingness to
compromise, there would most probably be a collective solution to this dispute today. The IWC
would have overcome its impasse; it would have been saved from the brink of collapse.
31. Japan has noted in this regard the leadership of Sir Geoffrey Palmer- the eminent New
Zealand statesman and IWC Commissioner- who had chaired the Support Group in that
54/bid.
55
CR 2013/19, pp. 64-65, paras. 20-21 (Crawford).
56
CR 2013/18, p. 15, para. 5 (Dreyfus).
5CR 2013118, p. 16, para. ibid.p. 14, para. 4.
5Peter Garrett, "Whales worth more alivc than dcad", availablc at:
http://www.thcagc.eom.au/opinion/politics/whalcs-\\Orth--morc-alivc-th an-dcad-20 100428-tr(las! chcckcd on
1July 2013). -27-
important negotiation process on the "Future of the IWC". lt may be recalled that after the collapse
of the exhaustive three-year long negotiations, Sir Geoffrey paid notable tribute to Japan, and 1
quote, "for their huge commitment and their willingness for compromise" 59• His silence on
Australia's role was equally notable.
32. lt is in this light that Japan notes with regret the role that New Zealand has played in this
proceeding. lt cannot go unnoticed that on severa( occasions, New Zealand made submissions on
the facts of the case, including Japan's "burden of proof' and whether it had properly considered
60
certain scientific evidence • These submissions were in support of Australia's allegations of bad
faith against Japan. They clearly went beyond the matters of treaty interpretation that circumscribe
the proper scope of interventions under Article 63 of the Court's Statute. They were aIso in express
contradiction with the New Zealand IWC Commissioner's views as to whether it was Japan or
Australia that had undermined a consensual solution for the collective regulation ofwhaling.
33. ln this regard, Japan refers the Court to the 15 December 2010 ''joint media release" by
the Honourable Kevin Rudd, then the Foreign Minister of Australia, and the Honourable
Murray McCully, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, conceming New Zealand's intervention in
1
this casé • ln that statement, which appears on the official Government website, the two Foreign
Ministers confirm that "both countries have agreed to work together towards the elimination of
62
whaling in the Southern Ocean through complementary strategies" • The following statement
leaves no doubt as to what that strategy is:
"Australia has indicated that they would prefer New Zealand not to file as a
party. Because New Zealand has ajudge on the ICJ ... thejoining of the two actions
would result in Australia losing its entitlement to appoint a judge for the case. New
63
Zealand's decision to intervene will allow the case to proceed without delay."
34. lt is with great regret that Japan must raise this matter, but it is difficult not to conclude
in light of this statement and the subsequent conduct of oral pleadings that the two parties have
5
''1WCChair's Report of62nd Annual Meeting, p. 8.
bOSc,ce.g., CR 2013117, p. 29, pam. 47 (Finlayson) : discussing the appropriatc part) upon whom to place the
"burdcn of proot"; CR 2013/17, p. 40, para. 18 (Ridings) : commcnting on JARPA Il and obscrving thal Japan has
"failed to lake into account" certain scientitic considerations .
61
"Joint Media Rclca. 1~Dcc".2010 , availablc at: http://forcignministcr.gov.au/rclcasc s/2010/
kr mr 101215.html.
b2/bid.
1
(>/bid. -28-
acted in collusion. lt is difficult not to conclude that they are parties in the same interest. This is
an unfortunate precedent for Article 63 interventions. lt has clearly prejudiced Japan in these
proceedings.
35. What is particularly discouraging for Japan is that, despite the accusations of bad faith
that it has had to answer before this Court, despite the insistence of the Australian
Attorney-General that it is in the spirit of "upholding the rule of law" that Australia has brought
this case, Australia seems to have no intention of ending its campaign against Japan, irrespective of
the Court's decision. lmmediately after his second round opening speech on 10July, in an
interview with Leigh Sales of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, posted on the
Attorney-General's website and that appears at tab 5 of your folders, the Attorney-General was
asked the following question : "If the ICJ rules in favour of Japan, will the Australian Government
64
accept that decision and move on?" The Attorney-General responded: "Weil, we'll accept the
decision just as we would expect Japan to accept the decision, but we're going to keep working
65
with other nations in the International Whaling Commission to get Japan to stop their program."
He further clarified: "but if the International Court of Justice rules against us that the whaling
convention does permit Japan to do what it's been doing for many years, we'll keep arguing in the
whaling commission with other nations" 66•
36. This position is consistent with the earlier statements made by the Attorney-General on
5 July, immediately before he travelled to The Hague to make his submissions. He was asked the
following question from an Australian journalist, a certain Jon Faine, and 1 quote here from the
official transcript that appears on the Attorney-General's website which appears at tab 6 of your
folder:
[Thejournalist asks]: "... ifyou lose, does that ever put an end, for instance, to
the Sea Shepherd battles that we've seen in the Southern Ocean and their cali for
Australia to back their tactics."
[The Attorney-General responds]: "If we are unsuccessful, we will, of course,
abide the decision of the court, but equally, we will continue to use diplomatie means
to argue the point that we are making, the points that we are making within the
64
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Attorney-General accuses Japan of 'commercial whaling dressed up as
science"', 10 July 2013, availablc at: http://www.abc .net.au/7.30/content/20 13/s3800400.htm.
b5/bid.
6/bid. -29-
International Whaling Commission, and that will be arguing with Japan that they
should stop doing what they are doing ... "
[The journalist asks again]: "But if we got to court and we Jose, isn't that the
end ofthe argument? We'vejust got to basically put up with the court's decision."
[The Attorney-General responds]: "On the contrary ... we're talking about
protecting the world's environment ... " 67
A bit later in the same interview, the Attorney-General was asked about Sea Shepherd, and 1quote
once again from the same website:
[The journalist asks]: "So what do we do about Sea Shepherd if, indeed, we go
ahead and Japan wins? What do we do? Do we then heed their calls to take a
different stance, a different attitude, to the activities, then, of Sea Shepherd, which the
court may weil determine are outside international law?"
[The Attorney-General responds]: "Weil, Sea Shepherd, along with other boats,
have got the right to come to Australian ports . . . it's absolutely right that Sea
Shepherd have the right to come to port at Australian ports." 68
37. The Court will recall that in his statement in this proceeding, the Attorney-General
confirmed that: "The fact that Sea Shepherd vessels visit Australian ports or may be registered in
Australia is not indicative of Australian Government support 6".
38. ln light of these unambiguous statements, Japan cannot help but to conclude that
irrespective of the Court's decision, Australia will continue its campaign of confrontation at the
IWC and its toleration of Sea Shepherd attacks on the high seas. lt cannot help but to conclude that
for Australia, this Court is merely one instrument among others to achieve the unyielding purpose
of imposing its will on Japan, one way or another. Australia will stop at nothing. That is what it
means by the international rule of law: we will get what we want, no matter what the Court says.
39. lt cannot go unnoticed that consistent with the statement of the Attorney-General, the
former head of the Green Party, Bob Brown, now the so-called "mission commander" of Sea
Shepherd, acting in collaboration with former Environment Minister lan Campbell who, as 1
mentioned in first round pleadings, is now also with Sea Shepherd. Mr. Brown made it clear in a
10July interview that, and 1quote: "We are preparing as if the outcome doesn't prevent future
67
Attorney-General of Australia, Transeript of interview with Jon Fa774 ABC Melbourne, 5 July 2013,
available at: http://www.attorneygcneral.gov .au/transcripts/Pages/2013/Third%20guarter/5-JulTras cript-ol~
interview-with-Jon-Faine---774-ABC-Mclbourn e.asmc
8
(/btd.
69
CR 2013/18, p. 15, para. 6 (Dreyfus). -30-
70
whaling ... We are standing by to keep up the fight." This leaves little doubt that even as the
Court deliberates on its decision in the coming months, the JARPA Il research vessels will face
another season of violent attacks in Antarctic waters.
40. Mr. President, Members of the Court, even as this case was being argued before the
Court, even as Japan spoke of the intransigence of Australia, the politicization of science and its
policy of "zero tolerance", even as these pleadings were being made, the IWC was unfortunately,
brought one step closer to the brink of collapse. You may recall that Professor Sands made much
of the fact that Australia exempted Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling from its otherwise total
71
opposition to whaling at the IWC • On 1 July, the IWC Commissioner of Denmark,
72
Gitte Hundahl, submitted the following letter to IWC Commissioners and Contracting States •
This letter appears at tab 7 of your folders and was circulated by the IWC Secretariat on
3 July 2013. It states in relevant part that because the IWC could not agree on Aboriginal
Subsistence Whaling catch limits for Greenland for 2013 and beyond, the Government of
Greenland has "decided to unilaterally implement on a temporary basis the proposai on catch limits
put forward by the Kingdom of Denmark at the 64th annual meeting" of the IWC in 2012; that is
to say, catch limits that were rejected by anti-whaling nations, including Australia 73• The letter
continues: "That decision was taken in order to ensure undisrupted whaling in Greenland to meet
74
the needs of the population and to avoid unregulated whaling." The letter further emphasizes
that: "The proposai was consistent with the advice of the Scientific Committee at the time of
submission as not harming stocks. The Government of Greenland has informed that it will
continue to follow the advice of the Scientific Committee in this regard." 75
70http:/lwww.thcaustralian.com.au/ncws/japan8217s-whaling-claims-8216untru
c-and-ollènsivc-tostralia8217-
attomcygcncral-tclls-un-court/story-c6frg6n6-1226676931653.
71CR 2013/19, p. 54, para. 79 (Sands).
72http:/liwc.intlcachc/downloads/c0mgg34ohp4ck8ccko084ko0k/Lcttcr"lo20from
%20Dcnmark%20to%201WC%2
OGrccnland%20asw. pdC
73Rep. /nt. Whal. Commn. 2012, p.23 http:/liwc.intlcachc/download s/
3svgu6d4dlogg0owc8oswswk0/ Annua1Rcport20 12.pdC
74http:/liwc.intlcachc/downloads/c0mgg34ohp4ck8ccko084ko0k/Lcttcr"lo20from
%20Dcnmark%20to%201WC %2
OGrccnland%20asw.pdC
75/bid. - 31-
41. What is particularly alarming is Denmark's indication that: "Should a solution not be
found consistent with the convention, the Kingdom of Denmark intends to submit notification on
withdrawal from the Convention on the Regulation ofWhaling before 1January 2014." 76
42. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the message is clear. If the hijacking of the
Convention continues, if the politicization of science persists, if the traditions and cultures of
people are sacrificed to appease other people's sentiments and selective moral judgment, if
international law continues to be disregarded, saon there will be no whaling nations at the IWC.
Then Australia and its allies can adopt ali the resolutions that they want, and triumphantly ban ali
whaling for ali time in the name of "collective regulation", without the need to negotiate, without
the need to compromise, without the need to listen to the Scientific Committee. But they will
achieve their objectives without the whaling nations, because they will ali have left the IWC to find
viable alternatives elsewhere, for regulation of sustainable whaling. Saon, there will be two
competing international organizations, one for banning ali whaling, and the other for science-based
sustainable whaling. There will be a Whaling Commission and an anti-Whaling Commission, and
nations can choose which organization they wish to join. But there will be no collective forum
where matters of collective interest can be regulated through meaningful co-operation. That is
exactly where Australia's policy of"no compromise" will eventually lead.
43. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this brings me to the supreme irony of this case,
the most obvious fact that completely undermines Australia's conspiracy theory of JARPA Il- its
theory of commercial whaling disguised as science. lt is such a self-evident fact, so fundamental,
that is can be easily overlooked, and we invite the Court to carefully consider it. Australia could
bring this case against Japan, it could accuse Japan of bad faith and commercial whaling in
disguise, only because Japan has elected not to withdraw from the IWC. It could bring this case
only because Japan still respects the moratorium on commercial whaling. How difficult would it
be for Japan to simply withdraw from the IWC as Canada did in 1981, as lceland did in 1992, or as
Denmark may now do in 2014? How difficult would it be to simply remove the legal impediment
to sustainable commercial whaling if indeed that was the policy of intentional deception that
76
http://iwc .int/cachc/downloads/c0mgg34ohp4ck8ccko084ko0k/Lcttcr"lo20from%20D%20to%201WC%2
0Grcenland%20asw. pd1: -32-
Australia attributes to Japan? Why go through the extraordinary trouble of creating a fraudulent
program ofpseudo-scientific research for 30 years as Australia alleges? lt is true that Japan's trust
has been repeatedly betrayed, as the moratorium became a permanent ban despite assurances to the
contrary, as theRMP was followed by the RMS, only to be endlessly discussed and debated. lt is
true that the Proposai for a Consensus Decision was sabotaged at the eleventh hour by a "no
compromise" policy; it is true that the politicization of science has brought the IWC ever closer to
collapse. So why, it may be asked, has Japan remained in the IWC and subjected itself to
harassment, intolerance, insults, and even violence, for so long? Why does it stand before the
Court today to answer baseless accusations of bad faith?
44. The answer is simple. Japan has remained in the IWC, despite this abusive behaviour,
because of its genuine commitment to multilateralism, because of its unyielding commitment to
negotiation, compromise, the rule of international law, and peaceful dispute settlement. And
Australia cornes before this Court to take advantage of that commitment; to unfairly and
unreasonably portray Japan as a rogue State at the IWC; to leve! accusations of bad faith against
what it deems to be a friendly State that it can mistreat with impunity; to cloak itself in the mantle
of the international rule of law, even as the Attorney-General makes clear that it will persist in
harassing and confronting Japan if this Court does not give Australia the decision that it wants.
45. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my submission. 1thank the Court
for its patience and indulgence. It has been a great honour and privilege to appear before you in
this proceeding on behalf of Japan. 1now ask that you give the floor to Professor Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir. J'invite maintenant Je professeur Pellet.
Monsieur Pellet, vous avez la parole.
M. PELLET : Merci, Monsieur le président.
LA COMPÉTENCE DE LA COUR
CONSIDÉRATIONS GÉNÉRALES SUR LA CONVENTION DE 1946
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, le professeur Akhavan ayant
replacénotre affaire dans son contexte,il m'appartient ce matin de répondred'abord aux objections
que l'Australie maintient faiblement, à l'encontre de l'exception d'incompétence qu'a soulevée le -33-
Japon - et qu'il maintientlui~. fortement (1.).Je reviendrai ensuite sur la structure de la )(
convention de 1946 et la place qu'y tient l'article VIII (Il.).
1. L'incompétence de la Cour
2. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, il est toujours un peu embarrassant de venir expliquer à
cette barre que vous n'êtespas compétents... Telle est pourtant notreosition- et, si le Japon
soulève cette objection, ce n'est évidemment pas par méfiance vis-à-vis de la Cour, mais parce
qu'il lui semble que, par sa nature très délicate techniquement, l'affaire que l'Australie vous a
soumise ne se prêtepas à un règlement par la Cour de céans.
3. Notre exception d'incompétence est fondéesur la réserveb) dont l'Australie a assorti sa
déclaration en vertu de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut et qui doit s'appliquer au titre de la
réciprocité,tr~g iippFègneitu.tqesistème de la clause facultative. x
[Projection n° 1 :La deuxième réserveaustralienne.)
4. Dès son discours introductif, l'Attorney-General d'Australie a résuméainsi la thèse du
demandeur: «the reservation only operates in relation to disputes between Australia and another
country with a maritime daim that overlaps with that of Australia- that is, a situation of
delimitation. Australia has no delimitation with Japan and hence the paragraph (b) reservation can
77
have no operation» • Et tel a été,en effet, l'argument quasi unique qu'a développéM. Burmester à
cette barre en faveur de la compétencede la Cour malgréles termes de la réserveet les explications
données à l'époque par les autorités australiennes quant à la portée de cette clause. Toutefois,
avant de m'attacher à réfutercet argument, je souhaite faire deux observations liminaires sur des
points que mon contradicteur n'a abordés qu'en passant: l'étendue ratione loci de la réserve
australienne et la définition du mot exploitation .
5. Monsieur le président, comme je l'ai indiqué le 2juillet, la traduction française de la
déclarationaustralienne est exécrable- à tel point que, en présentantmes excuses aux héroïques
tenants de la francophonie, je me fonderai exclusivement sur le texte anglais -je laisse la
77CR2013/18 , p.l8 , par.I5(Dre)fus).
78CR 2013112. p. 27, par. 9 (Pellet). -34-
traduction à l'écranpour le cas où se trouveraient parmi lesjuges ou dans le public des francophiles
suffisamment enragéspour essayer de lui donner un sens...
6. Dans la langue originale donc, l'Australie écritexclure de la compétence de la Cour les
affaires concernant certaines matières (mais ce n'est pas ce qui nous intéresse dans l'immédiat),
y.. t ~ea:ta i ~tèree!relatives à «any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone».
79
M. Burmester relèveque JARPA Il «extends weil outside any waters claimed by Australia» • Et il
est vrai qu'il n'y a pas coïncidence exacte entre le programme de recherche scientifique contestéet
les zones de l'océan Austral revendiquées par l'Australie et dont l'appartenance à celle-ci est
contestéepar le Japon; mais :
[Fin de la projection n° 1-Projection no2 : Figure no3 : Crimes at Sea Act Cooperative Scheme
Adjacent Areas (lllustrative Map, disponible à l'adresse http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2012C00054/Htmi/Text# Toc316906735).]
la réservevise expressément non seulement les eaux qui font l'objet d'un différend,mais aussi
celles qui leur sonadjacentes, et
l'Australie a de l'adjacence une vision particulièrement large, comme le montre, exemple
parmi d'autres, la carte projetée en ce moment- qui est reproduite à l'onglet n° 8-2 de vos
dossiers- et qui illustre leCrimes of Sea Act australien de 2000 ; ce croquis est annexé à
l'Act,et il est parlant: les «zones adjacentes» qu'il décrits'étendenttrès au-delà de 200 milles
marins des côtes des Etats du Commonwealth d'Australie ... -très au-delà ...
[Fin de la projection n°2- Projection no 1bis:Reprise de la projection no 1.]
7. Pour êtreexclu de la compétence de la Cour, le différend doit porter sur une activité
particulière se déroulant dans une zone maritime contestée ou dans une zone adjacente : il doit
s'agir de1'exploitation- of the exploitation- de ces zones. M. Burmester explique que «[/]or a
dispute arising out of, concerning, or relatinK to the exploitation of any disputed area ... ,
ordinarily requires competing claims by the relevant States to a right to exploit the relevant
resources»80• Sous réservede quelques mots que j'ai omis de ma citation, mais sur lesquels je vais
79CR 2013/18, p. 27, par. 18(Bunnc stcr).
80Ibid., par. 17(Burmcstcr). -35-
revenir, je n'ai pas de querelle avec cela. Mais c'est la suite qui me stupéfie: comment
Henry Burmester peut-il affirmer qu'il n'y a pas, en l'espèce, de différend sur l'exploitation des
zones en question, tout en reconnaissant expressément, dans le mêmemouvement, que «seul le
Japon souhaite se livrer à une telle exploitation» (<<Only Japan wishes such exploitation»). Eh oui,
81
le Japon souhaite se livrer à une certaine forme d'exploitation de ces zones et l'Australie lui
conteste ce droit-je vois mal ce que cela peut êtred'autre qu'un différend «arising out of.
concerning, or relating to the exploitation. ..» !
8. Dès lors, mon contradicteur concentre ses attaques- ou place tous ses espoirs ...-dans
les trois derniers mots de la réserveb) : «pending its delimitation»- mais, au lieu de s'en tenir à
82
cette expression, qui, quoi qu'il en dise , exprime clairement un moment, il transforme cette
expression en une autre et l'on retrouve ici les mots que j'ai omis de ma citation précédente: «in a
delimitation context» 83 ou «in a delimitation situation» 84• Mais ce ne sont pas les mots que
l'Australie a choisis pour libeller sa réserve; elle a utilisé un vocabulaire temporel : «pending
delimitation>>- <<pending»,«en attente de»: c'est bien de quelque chose de momentané qu'il
s'agit; une fois cette condition réalisée,la réservene s'applique plus. Ceci n'a rien d'extravagant
et, en tout cas, c'est ainsi que l'Australie a choisi de rédigersa réserve.
9. Mais, dit en substance, mon contradicteur et ami : «l'Australie et le Japon n'ont pas de
différend impliquant une délimitation». Quelques remarques rapides sur ce point, Monsieur le
président.
1 O.Tout au long de sa plaidoirie, M. Burmester a reconnu (pour écarter l'applicabilité de la
réserveaustralienne) que les situations viséespar celle-ci étaient celles résultant de revendications
concurrentes sur les mêmesespaces marins :
paragraphe 16 de son exposé: «the reservation only applies to exploitation disputes between
Australia and another State with an overlapping claim with Australia»;
paragraph 1 : «This is not a dispute about overlapping claims to sovereign rights»;
31
Voir CR 2013112, p. 35-39, par. 23-33 (Pellet).
82CR 2013/18, p. 26, par. 14 (Burmcstcr).
8·Ibid., p. 27, par. 17 (Burmestcr).
84Ibid., p. 22-23, par. 4 ct 5 (Burmcstcr). -36-
paragraph 15 : «Reservation (b) remains, however, a reservation directed at disputes about
maritime boundaries or exploitation issues arising between Australia and another State with
overlappingdaims ... » ;
paragraph 9 : «The fundamental difference not addressed by Professor Pellet is that Australia
and Timor-Leste are in a delimitation situation with each other -there are overlapping
daims. This is not the case with Japan».
Il. Avec tout le respect dû, c'est tout à fait inexact: l'Australie et le Japon ont des
revendications concurrentes sur la zone maritime baignant le prétendu territoire antarctique
australien. La situation est bien résuméedans un considérantde l'arrêtrendu le 15janvier 2008 par
la Federal Court of Australia dans une affaire concernant une sociétéjaponaise accusée d'avoir
violé- en liaison avec le programme JARPA -le «sanctuaire baleinier australien» établi en
application de l'Act de 1999 pour la protection de l'environnement et la conservation de la
biodiversité(EPBC Act):
«Australia's daim to sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory is
recognised only by four nations (New Zealand, France, Norway and the United
Kingdom), themselves with asserted (and otherwise disputed) daims over various
parts of the Antarctic land mass. Japan rejects Australia's purported exercise of
85
jurisdiction over waters that are considered by Japan to be the high seas.»
Il y a bien là, Monsieur le président, des prétentions maritimes concurrentes des «overlapping
daims»- ceux-là mêmequi, conformément à l'analyse de mon contradicteur, sont visés par la
réserveaustralienne. Et il serait éminemmentartificiel de les écarterde son champ d'application au
prétexte que, dans la zone en question, le Japon ne revendique pas de droits souverains pour
lui-mêmemais conteste ceux auxquels l'Australie prétend. Ce que le Japon conteste c'est la limite
extérieure- une délimitation, donc- de la zone économique exclusive que s'est attribuée
l'Australie. Et, de mêmequ'aux dires de M. Burmester, «[w]ith respect to Timor-Leste and
Australia, the two States have reached no final delimitation agreement and have instead agreed to
freeze their respective daims for 50 years», de mêmeici, l'Australie et le Japon n'ont pas résolule
litige résultantde leurs prétentions concurrentes concernant les eaux baignant l'Antarctique, mais
les deux pays n'en sont pas moins convenus, en ratifiant le traité sur l'Antarctique du
85Humane Society /nternationallncorporatev.Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd,[2008] FCA 3, 15 January 2008,
par. 13 [CMJ, annexe 177]. -37-
1cdécembre1959,de geler eux aussi leurs prétentionsterritoriales 86 ;leur différendn'en subsiste
pas moins.
[Fin de la projection n° 1bis- Projection n°3 : National lnterest Analysis, Australian Declaration
under Paragraph2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945 (par. 12
et 17en sautant les points a) etc))] disponible à l'adresse http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/
ATNIA/2002/20.html.]
12.C'est d'ailleurs bien ainsi que le Gouvernement australien a expliquésa réservedans une
note au Parlement rédigéeau moment du dépôt de la déclaration par le département de
l'Attorney-General. Cette explication, exprimée à deux reprises dans les mêmestermes, dans ce
document officiel, se litainsi :
«The new declaration limits Australia's acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ. This means that an action cannot be commenced against
Australia in the following circumstances:
(b) where disputes involve maritime boundary delimitation or disputes concerning
the exploitation of an area indispute or adjacent to an area in dispute.» 87
13. On ne saurait suspecter le Gouvernement australien d'avoir sciemment trompéson
propre Parlement sur la portéede sa déclarationfacultative en lui communiquant une interprétation
erronéede celle-ci. Elle coïncide avec celle que le Japon vous demande de retenir aujourd'hui,
Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour. Et elle entraîne inévitablementvotre incompétence,car elle
soustrait à votre juridiction les «disputes involving maritime delimitations or disputes concerning
the exploitation of an area in dispute or adjacent to an area in dispute». Le différend que
l'Australie vous a soumis concerne trèsévidemmentun différendconcernant l'exploitation d'une
zone maritime en litige ou adjacente à une telle zone. En conséquence, il échappe à votre
juridiction.
[Fin de la projection n°3.]
86Article IV, par. 1.
87
National Interest AnalysiAustralian Declaration 1mder Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the
InternationalCourt of Justice /945,lodged at New York on 22 March 2002, tabled in the Australian Parliament
18 June 2002, disponibàel'adresse http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dlàtl ATNIA/2002/20.html. -38-
14. Comme nombre d'Etats acceptant la clause facultative, l'Australie a voulu «finasser» en
l'acceptant, en principe, mais en en excluant les différends à propos desquels elle risquait
réellement d'êtreattraite devant la Cour. Elle doit subir les conséquences de ses ... «habiletés».
Monsieur le président,je vais passer à un sujet complétementdifférentet je me demande ...
Le PRESIDENT: Oui, c'est un moment important maintenant pour une pause de
15minutes. The hearing is suspended for 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned.from 11.20 a.m. to 11.40 a.m.
Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. Professeur Pellet, vous avez la parole.
M. PELLET:
II. La structure de la convention
15. Monsieur le président,avant que vous décrétiezla pause, j'ai montréque la Cour n'avait
pas compétence du fait de la réserveb) figurant dans la déclarationaustralienne d'acceptation de la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour dont le Japon peut se prévaloir au titre de la réciprocité. Par
conséquent, tout ce que vont dire dorénavant les avocats du Japon doit s'entendre comme étant
plaidé à titre subsidiaire, dans l'hypothèse seulement où vous écarteriez notre exception
d'incompétence. Cela vaut pour la présentation que je vais faire maintenant de la structure
généralede la convention du 2 décembre 1946 pour la réglementation (pas l'abolition...) de la
chasse à la baleine dont nos amis australiens (et néo-zélandais- mais ils font cause commune)
donnent une description fort trompeuse.
16. Ceci nous oblige à revenir, d'une part, sur l'objet et le but de la convention (A.) et,
d'autre part, sur la manière dont toutes les Parties- et j'inclus la Nouvelle-Zélande dans cette
appellation- s'accordent à considérer que l'article VIII est la clef de l'affaire qui nous occupe
(B.).
A. L'objet et le but de la convention
17. Monsieur le président,je suis tout prêtà admettre que les traitésne sont pas des papyrus
figésdans un éternelhier et qu'ils doivent, dans la mesure où leur texte le permet, êtreinterprétés -39-
en fonction du contexte dans lequel ils s'appliquent et de son évolution. Mais interprétation n'est
88
pas revision et l'on ne saurait, sous couvert d'interprétation, convertir un traité relatif à la
réglementation de la chasse à la baleine en un traité l'interdisant ; ni une disposition d'un traité
autorisant expressément les Etats à subordonner telle ou telle activité aux conditions «qu'il jugera
opportunes», comme les obligeant à se soumettre à une autorisation préalable.
[Projection no4: Article V, paragraphe 2, de la convention pour la réglementation de la chasse à la
baleine.]
18. Cela est d'autant plus évident en l'espèce que les rédacteurs de la convention ont
expressément prévu un mécanisme permettant de l'adapter de manière relativement souple aux
évolutions dans les domaines couverts par l'annexe à la convention. Mais ces modifications sont
expressément limitées aux matières énuméréesau paragraphe 1 de l'article V et doivent respecter
les conditions fixées au paragraphe 2 de cette disposition- une disposition sur laquelle il n'est
89
peut-êtrepas superflu de revenir quelques instants :
le point b) oblige la commission à «sefonder sur des données scientifiques»- se fonder sur,
Monsieur le président, pas seulement «tenir compte» ou «prendre en considération» -je
souligne ceci au passage, bien que ce ne soit pas directement liéau sujet de cette présentation,
car le moins que l'on puisse dire est que, dans maintes décisions concernant l'objet de notre
affaire, la CBI s'est souciée des données scientifiques comme d'une guigne;
le point d) l'invite à «tenir compte», cette fois, «des intérêtsdes consommateurs de produits
tirésde la baleine et des intérêtsde l'industrie baleinière» ; on est loin des intérêtsdes baleines
«en som• 90 ;
et cela est confirmé de manière éclatante par le point a) qui précise que les modifications de
l'annexe devront «s'inspirer de la nécessitéd'atteindre les objectifs et les buts de la convention~
c-.,.......;,., ··~~""'
et d'assurer la conservation, le développement et l'utilisation optimum des ressources x
baleinières».
·,\-. ..,.,..~
88Voir CR 2013/13, p. 68-69, par. 25-26 ct CR 2013114, p. 73, par. 73 (Pellet).
89Voir aussi CR 2013/13, p. 39, par. 3, ct 42, par. Il (Boyle).
90Voir CR 2013118, p. 34-35, par. 23-25 ct p. 36, par. 29 (Boisson de Chazourncs ). -40-
19. Nous sommes d'accord, je pense, sur la conservation ; peut-êtresur le développement
Ct-
X - encore que la Partie australienne n'utilise guère tk!lmo)-f important pour comprendre la
philosophie mêmequi est à la base de la convention ; mais d'«utilisation optimum» il ne saurait
91 92
êtrequestion aux yeux de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande ,qui affichent le plus profond
mépris à l'encontre des intérêtsdes consommateurs et de l'industrie baleinière, pourtant
')( expressément protégéspar le traitéet définiscomme un but\Eiu treit~d lartisle V en particulier.
de.Cc.\...c:.:
[Fin de la projection no4.]
20. Ceci me paraît êtrele bon moment, Monsieur le président, pour répondre à l'une des
questions posées par le juge Cançado Trindade: «How do you interpret the terms «conservation
and development» of whale stocks under the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling ?» 93• Nous avons pris note de la réponse de l'Australie donnée par la voix de la
94
professeure Boisson de Chazoumes ; mais il me semble que réduire la conservation et le
développement des stocks de baleines au Whale watching est un peu court... Et cela appelle un
certain nombre de remarques :
1) il ne s'agit pas de préserver«les baleines en soi» (on l'a abondamment souligné: la convention
95
de 1946 n'est pas un traitéde pure préservation ),mais de conserver «les stockv de baleines» ;
2) cette conservation étant assurée- car c'est évidemment un préalable- il faut «gérer»,
c'est-à-dire éviter toute exploitation des stocks d'espèces réellement menacées et toute
surexploitation de ceux d'espèces qui, comme les petits rorquals, ne sont pas menacées;
3) en d'autres termes, Monsieur le juge, comme l'indique très clairement le préambule, il s'agit
«de protégertoutes les espèces de baleines» contre «l'exploitation excessive d'une zone après
l'autre et ... la destruction immodéréed'une espèce après l'autre», ceci en vue de permettre
«d'augmenter le nombre des baleines pouvant êtrecapturées.sans compromettre ces ressources
naturelles» ; et
1
" Voir CR 2013/18, p. 35, par. 26 (Boisson de Chazournes).
2
" Voir la réponse écrite de la Nouvelle-Zélande en date du 12juillet 2013 à la question du
juge Cançado Trindadc, par. 5 et 6.
91
CR 2013/17, p. 49.
94
Voir 2013118, p. 37, par. 31 (Boisson de Chazournes).
15
' Voir CR 2013113, p. 48-59, par. 30-63 (Boyle). -4 1-
4) cela montre bien que la conservation des baleines - pour important et indiscutable que
constitue cet objectif - n'est pas un but en lui-même; il s'agit infine, de «faire en sorte que les
peuplements baleiniers atteignent leur niveau optimum aussi rapidement que possible», afin de
«donner à l'industrie baleinière la possibilitéde se développerd'une manière méthodique».
21. Au demeurant s'il est exact que l'insouciance qui a marqué les années 1960 et 1970 a
conduit la CBI à adopter des mesures «conservationnistes», dont l'instauration du moratoire et des
sanctuaires porte la marque, il s'agit de mesures provisoires devant êtrelevéesaussitôt que, sur le
fondement «des données scientifiques» (dont la commission s'applique à ne pas tenir compte...),
les conditions d'une chasse commerciale durable seront réunies. Mais il n'ajamais étéquestion de
renoncer à l'objectif- statutaire- d'une telle chasse, non plus que d'interdire la chasse à des fins
scientifiques en vertu de l'article VIII. Ou plutôt si, il en a étéquestion, car l'Australie et la
Nouvelle-Zélande ont présentédes projets en ce sens, mais en reconnaissant que ceci ne pourrait se
faire que par la voie d'un protocole d'amendement formel à la convention, que tous les Etats
parties devraient ratifier 96; ces propositions sont restéessans suite.
22. La Nouvelle-Zélande a repris, lors de l'audience du 8juillet, l'argument qu'elle voudrait
tirer du caractère ouvert de la participation à la convention : «Membership of the Commission is
97
universal. lt is open for ali countries to join, whether they have a whaling industry or not» • Je
vois mal, à vrai dire, ce que cela peut changer à l'affaire :au départ,la convention a éténégociéeet
ratifiée par un petit nombre d'Etats pratiquant la chasse à la baleine. Ces Etats 1'ont rédigéeen
fonction de leurs intérêts et de leurs préoccupations. D'autres Etats, ont, par la suite, adhéréà la
convention conformément à l'article X, manifestant ainsi leur intérêp tour le traitétel qu'il était,et
son but et son objet, tels qu'ils y sont définis. Mais pourquoi leur arrivéeaurait-elle abouti à une
modification de cet objet et de ce but? C'est prendre les choses à l'envers.
23. Dans sa réponse à la question que lui avait posée M. lejuge Bhandari 98, l'Australie a
affirméque tous les Etats parties ont un intérê t commun en vue d'assurer l'intégritédes objectifs et
6
" CR 2013/14, p. 71-73, par. 67-73 (Pellet).
97CR 2013/17, p. 19, par. 16 (Finlayson) ; voir aussi OEN, par. 27 ct 32 ct OEJ, par. 21-22.
98CR 2013/ 13, p. 73. -42-
du régime instaurés par la convention 99• C'est vrai - et ceci veut dire que «chasseurs» ou non,
membres originaires ou non de la CBI, tous les Etats parties sont liéspar la convention telle qu'elle
a étéet demeure conçue- et non telle qu'ils voudraient qu'elle le soit. En d'autres termes, tous
doivent accepter qlle le mécanisme institutionnel que la convention a mis en place se mobilise en
vue des objectifs qu'elle énonce: c'est-à-dire la conservation et la gestion des stocks des
différentes espèces de baleines, afin de permettre le développement «méthodique de l'industrie
baleinière».
24. Reprenant l'idéeclef de ses observations écrites 100, la Nouvelle-Zélande a amorcé un
mouvement de contournement de cet entêtantproblème (entêtantpour elle...) de l'objet et du but de
la convention. Au lieu de s'intéresser à l'objectif suhslanliel de celle-ci, l'Etat intervenant se
polarise sur son aspect procédural: «the object and purpose of the Convention( ... ) is to establish a
101
system of collective regulation for the conservation and management of whales» ; or even more
explicitly :
«The purpose of the Convention was to provide a system through which those
individual interests could be managed and resolved in the light of the greater shared
interest of the parties in the long-term future of whale stocks. That shared interest
would be achieved not through unilateral action, but by a comprehensive system of
102
collective regulation.»
25. Cette analyse est discutable à certains égards, objectivement fausse à d'autres.
26. Elle est discutable car elle confond l'objectif avec le moyen. Certes, la convention crée
un mécanismede régulationpartielle des activitésbaleinières (et en français le mot «régulation»est
sans doute plus adaptéque «réglementation») mais ceci n'est pas 1 'objectif poursuivi par les auteurs
de la convention ; c'est un moyen pour atteindre le but et l'objet de celle-ci, tels qu'ils sont définis
par le préambule et rappelés au paragraphe 2 de l'article V, que j'ai projetétout à l'heure, ou à
l'article VI.
27. Dans une question adressée à la Nouvelle-Zélande, M. lejuge Cançado Trindade a
demandé si «to replace unregulated, unilateral whaling by States with collective regulation as a
'19Voir CR 2013118, p. 33-34, par. 17-20 (Boisson de Chazoumc s).
10Voir OEN, par. 6, 7, 14-32.
101CR 2013117, p. 17, par. 3 a) (Finlayson) ; voir aussi p. 16, par. 9 (Ridings) ct p5(Finlayson).
102
CR 2013/17, p. 18, par. 13(Finlayson). -43-
mechanism to provide for the interests of the parties in the proper conservation and management of
103
whales» as New-Zealand had written in its Written Observations is «a widely accepted
interpretation nowadays of the object and purpose of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling?» 104• Par sa lettre au greffier du 12juillet, l'Etat intervenant donne à la
question une réponse prudente, qu'il ne me paraît pas utile de commenter en détail. Mais j'espère
que l'auteur de cette question, qu'il ne nous a pas non plus adressée, ne m'en voudra pas de
compléter la réponse néo-zélandaiseen citant un passage de la proposition de consensus faite par le
président et le vice-président de la commission, proposition, comme l'on sait, torpillée par
1'Australie en 2010 :
«Le rapprochement des points de vue divergents sur les baleines et la chasse à la
baleine renforcera les actions liées à 1'objectif commun, à savoir le maintien de
populations de baleines saines et l'optimisation de la probabilité de rétablissement des
105
populations appauvries.»
En outre, et c'est peut-être encore plus significatif, dans sa résolution 2006-1, l'importante
déclaration de Saint-Kitts-et-Nevis, la commission a dit comprendre
«that the purpose of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW) is to 'provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry' (quoted from the Preamble
to the Convention) and that the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is therefore
about managing whaling to ensure whale stocks are not over-harvested rather than
protecting ali whales irrespective of their abundance»,
and the Commission noted- it is a resolution of the Commission-
«that the position of sorne members that are opposed to the resumption of commercial
whaling on a sustainable basis irrespective of the status of whale stocks is contrary to
the object and purpose of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling» 106•
A ma connaissance, Monsieur le président, ce sont les prises de position les plus autorisées et
les plus récentes de la commission sur ce qui constitue réellement le but et l'objet de la convention.
10·OEN, p. J6, par. 33.
104CR 2013/17, p. 49-50.
105
Voir décisionde consensus proposéepar Je présidentct Je vice-présidentde la commission afin d'améliorerla
conservation des baleines, présentéeà la commission le 22 avri12010, doc. IWC/62/7rev-FR, disponible à l'adresse:
http:/liwc.int/index.php'!ciD=l740&cType =document (les italiques sont de nous); en anglais, voir «Proposed Consensus
Decision to lmprove the Conservationof Whales from the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission», annexe E, Chair's
Report orthe 62nd Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 20/0 (CMJ, annexe 118).
106CBI, résolution2006-1, déclarationde Saint-Kitts-et-Nevis . Voir aussi CR 2013116, p. 59-655 (Pellet). -44-
28. Et il me semble que ceci n'est pas sans rapport avec l'une des questions qu'a posées de
nouveau M. le juge Cançado Trindade à la Nouvelle-Zélande : «Does the fact that the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling is a multilateral treaty, with a supervisory organ of its
own, have an impact on the interpretation of its object and purpose?» 107• Dans sa réponse, annexée
à sa lettre au greffier en date du 12juillet, l'agent de la Nouvelle-Zélande se borne à revenir à
l'antienne de ce pays selon laquelle la conservation des baleines (la gestion des stocks n'est
mentionnée que tout à fait à la fin de la réponse et comme à regret) est une «entreprise collective»
«collective enterprise»; c'est exact- dans les limites que j'ai indiquées- mais cela ne nous
avance guère et ne répond pas vraiment à la question. Or il me semble qu'elle mérite plus
d'attention. Bien qu'elle ne nous soit pas non plus adressée,je me permets de souligner les points
suivants:
108
1) contrairement à d'autres actes constitutifs d'organisations internationales , la convention
de 1946 ne prévoitpas expressément de mécanisme en cas de divergence sur son interprétation ;
2) la Cour n'en est surement pas empêchéepour autant d'exercer à l'égard de la convention,
«traité multilatéral, une fonction d'interprétation qui relève de l'exercice normal de ses
attributions judiciaires» 109 ;
3) dans le cadre de cette fonction d'interprétation, la Cour peut légitimement prendre en
considération les interprétations données par les organes de l'organisation, y compris lorsque
ceux-ci définissent expressément l'objet et le but de celle-ci, comme c'est le cas des exemples
que je viens de donner ;
4) Ce faisant, la Cour de céans doit tenir le plus grand compte des circonstances dans lesquelles
ces interprétations ont étédonnées- et je me permets de renvoyer sur ce point à ma plaidoirie
du premier tour, dans laquelle j'ai énoncéles précautions à prendre pour conclure à l'existence
110
d'une pratique interprétative- à plus forte raison modificative •
107
CR 2013/17, p. 49.
108
Voir, par exemple, les articles IX du Statut de la BIRD, XXIX des Statuts du FMI, 75 de la Constitution de
l'OMS, 286 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer ou IX, par. 2, de l'accord de Marrakech du
15 avril 1994 créantI'OMC.
109
Conditions de l'admission d'un Etat comme Membre des Nations Unies (article .Jde la Charte), avis
consultatif. 1948,C.I.J. Recuei/1947-1948, p61.
11
°CR 2013/14, p. 64-65, par. 50-53 (Pellet). -45-
29. En outre, Monsieur le président, s'agissant de la définition même du pouvoir de
réglementation collective dont bénéficie la CBI, l'analyse de la Nouvelle-Zélande est inexacte :
il est en effet faux que les Etats aient conféréà la CBI un pouvoir généraliséde décision en
matière de chasse à la baleine ; contrairement à ce que voudraient faire croire la
Nouvelle-Zélande et l'Australie, la commission n'est pas une organisation supranationale
d'intégration pouvant imposer des décisions à la majorité (ni même à l'unanimité) aux
«gouvernements contractants»- une appellation parlante en elle-même;
l'AIIorney-General de la Nouvelle-Zélande a affirmé que «[a]ll decisions of the Commission
are taken collectively by a vote of its members. And the regulations so adopted are binding on x
·.'"-kc;..--
members of the Commission» 111; with ali due respect, il n'en n'est absolument rien: sauf dans
i\....J.;'\-
Ie cadre de l'article V, la CBI ne peut adopter que des recommandations qui ne lient nullement
112,
les Etats • et
même lorsqu'elle peut prendre des décisions, au sens propre du mot, dans le cadre de
l'article V de la convention, il est toujours loisible aux gouvernements contractants d'y faire
objection, sans avoir à donner de raison ;
enfin, fast but not !east, il n'est pas exact que la convention ait promu un système de régulation
complet- a «comprehensive system of collective regulation» 11•
30. En réalité,le système de la convention laisse subsister des domaines dans lesquels le
pouvoir d'appréciation des Etats continue à se déployer largement. Tel est le cas du système
d'opting out de l'article V, que je viens d'évoquer, du droit de libre retrait expressément envisagé
par l'article Xl et, bien sûr, de l'article VIII relatif aux permis spéciaux. J'en arrive donc à la
présentation de la structure de la convention et de la place qu'y tient cette désormais fameuse
disposition.
B. La structure de la convention et le rôle de l'article VIII
31. Monsieur le président, les Etats peuvent, en vertu de leur souveraineté, s'engager par
voie de traités; mais il s'agit là d'une «faculté>> et, sauf circonstance très particulière non
111
CR 2013117, p. 19, par. 16(Finlayson).
112
Voir2013 /14. p. 60-70, par. 38-66.
IJJCR 2013/17, p. 18, par. 13(Finlayson) -46-
pertinente 1c1,en aucune manière, d'une obligation. Au surplus, lorsqu'ils réglementent une
certaine matière par voie de traité, les Etats parties peuvent exclure de cette réglementation
conventionnelle tel ou tel aspect de la matière considéréesoit par une clause spécialedu traitéen
)( question, soit mêmepar l'acte unilatéralque constitue une réserve6ur laquelle je m'abstiendrais de
')(. faire un cours magistral...).
32. Il n'est pas question ici de réserveau sens technique du terme. En revanche, en incluant
l'articleVIII de la convention de 1946, les Etats parties ont entendu se réserver la compétence
d'octroyer -ou non- des permis spéciaux qui implique, par définition même,l'autorisation de
«tuer, capturer et traiter les baleines», «sans qu'il y ait lieu de se conformer aux dispositions de la
présente convention». Ils ont en outre permis aux gouvernements participants de l'assortir de
«restrictions en ce qui concerne le nombre» et de «telles autres conditions que le gouvernement
contractant jugera opportunes» ; et tout ceci «[n]onobstant toute disposition contraire» de la
convention. Monsieur le président, nos contradicteurs ont beau faire : tout leur talent, toute leur
science, toute leur imagination n'y peuvent rien changer: «[c]e serait une singulière interprétation
que de faire dire à un traité exactement le contraire de ce qu'il dit» 115; en l'occurrence que les
permis spéciaux ne peuvent être accordés qu'en conformité non seulement avec les autres
'JC dispositions de la convention (dont l'article VIII exclut par deux fois l'application), mais aussitiRt
')1 ~QAfer~ avtcéd.es recommandations non obligatoires adoptées par les organes de la convention,
dont il résulterait au profit de ceux-ci une compétence d'autorisation ou de refus de ces permis.
Monsieur le président,c'est tout simplement absurde.
33. Certes, «Article VIII forms an integral part of the Convention>>and it must, indeed, «be
interpreted and applied consistently with the Convention's other provisions» 116- consistent/y en
fonction de la manière dont cet article VIII lui-mêmese positionne par rapport à la convention ;
c'est-à-dire comme une exception ou une «exemption» -le mot exempt figure expressément dans
le texte anglais, qui seul fait foi.
114
Vapeur Wimbledon, arrêts,1923, C.P.J.l. séri1,p. 25.
11ibid.
11CR 2013117.p. 21-23, par. 22-27 (Finlayson). -47-
34. M. Finlayson s'est attardé sur les paragraphes 3 et 4 de l'article VIII et sur le
paragraphe 30 du règlement pour défendre son analyse du rôle que joue l'article VIII dans la
convention (de!'~i roe of ArtilerIIawithin the Convention»). Mais ces dispositions sont )(
des exceptions, deleges specialepar rapport au régimedérogatoire généralqui s'applique à la
délivrancedes permis spéciaux,qu'il s'agisse de l'obligation faite aux gouvernements contractants
de communiquer les permis spéciaux et l'ensemble desnseignements de caractère scientifique
dont il disposera sur les baleines et la chasse à la baleine» au comitéscientifique, ou qu'il s'agisse
«de rassembler et d'analyser constamment les renseignements biologiques recueillis à l'occasion
des opérations des usines flottantes et des stations terrTout ceci doit êtrefait car c'est
prévupar la convention ; pour le reste, l'article VIII est exempt des dispositions de la convention
car ... c'est prévupar les dispositions de celle-ci.
35. Bien entendu,e Japon doit agir en conformité avec les obligations spécialescontenues
117
dans l'article VIII ou dans le paragraphe 30 du règle(sur lequel Mme Takashiba reviendra
dans quelques instants). Et il doit aussi se plier aux obligations lui incombant, en liaison avec la
convention, en vertu du droit international général,à commencer par l'obligation de respecter de
bonne foi la convention elle-mêm-pacta sun/ servanda. Mais c'est précisémentparce que,
comme les autres Parties, y compris l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande, il est tenu de respecter la
convention telle qu'il l'a acceptée (et rien de plus), que l'on ne saurait lui imposer d'autres
obligations conventionnelles en important celles-ci dans l'article VIII alors qu'elles n'y figurent
. , Il . . 1 118
pas et, p1s, qu e es en sont, au contraire, expressement exc ues . L'Australie et la
Nouvelle-Zélande en sont tellement conscientes qu'elles n'ont de cesse de vouloir modifier ou
abroger la disposition spécialeque constitue l'articlesi elles y parvenaient, alors, en effet,
il n'y aurait plus de permis spéciaux et les règles applicables à la chasse à la baleine seraient
uniformisées; je le répète:elles n'y sont pas parvenues.
117
Voir CR 2013/17, p. 23-24, par. 29 (Finlayson).
IIVoir CR 2013/15, p. 15-16, par. 6-14 (Lowe).
1qVoir CR 2013117, p. 22, par. 25 (Finlayson): voir aussi CR 2013114, p. 71-73, par. 67-73 (Pellet). -48-
36. Ce n'est pas à dire, Monsieur le président,que JeJapon revendique une «carte blanche»
120
comme Je Solicitor-General de la Nouvelle-Zélande voudrait le faire croire , ou une liberté
d'appréciation purement arbitraire comme l'affirme le professeur Crawford, lorsqu'il caricature ce
qu'il appelle aimablement Je«Pellet void» et la «Lowe vacuity» 12• Ce que nous disons, beaucoup
plus simplement et raisonnablement, c'est qu'à partir du moment où, pour l'essentiel, les
dispositions particulières de la convention ne s'appliquent pas à la délivranceet à la mise en Œuvre
des permis spéciaux, on se trouve sous l'empire des seules règles généralesdu droit international
public, qui reconnaissent aux Etats souverains une très large facultéd'analyser les situations dans
lesquelles ils sont et d'agir en conséquence. Le professeur Lowe reviendra sur cet aspect
fondamental cette après-midi.
37. Je voudrais pour ma part conclure par notre réponse à une question posée par M. Je
juge Gaja-qui ne m'en voudra pas, j'en suis sûr, de le faire en français, langue qu'il pratique
aussi bien que l'Oxbridge, qui lui est aussi naturel ! Je la lirai tout de mêmeen anglais: «If a
whaling programme is both for purposes of scientific research and for commercial purposes, what
122
are the applicable rules according to the ICRW?» •
38. Monsieur le président, la Cour semble avoir considérablement assoupli sa pratique en
matière de questions posées par les juges- mais pas encore au point de laisser les conseils
dialoguer avec eux. Eût-elle été jusque-là,je me serais permis de demander au juge Gaja ce qu'il
entend par programme à finalitéà la fois scientifique et commerciale ... Faute de pouvoir le faire, je
vais envisager plusieurs hypothèses (dont je ne cache pas qu'elles me sont soufflées par notre
espèce):
premier cas de figure : le programme est scientifique par son objectif et ses méthodes de
recherche, mais recourt à des procédés«commerciaux» pour assurer son financement; c'est
une façon très habituelle de procéderpour financer la recherche- ainsi que 1'a fait remarquer
le professeur Walloe dans sa déclaration écrite 123par exemple; ceci ne modifie pas l'objectif
1~°CR 2013117, p. 21, par. 24 (Finlayson) .
1~CR 2013/19, p. 57, par. 2-4 (Crawford).
122
CR 2013/16, p. 63.
121
Lars Walluc, '·Scicntilic rcvicw of issues raised by the Memorial of Australia including its two Appendices",
9 april2013 , p. 9. -49-
mêmede la recherche, qui est et reste scientifique ; les règles applicables sont exclusivement
celles de l'article VIII - je suis heureux de rejoindre sur ce point la position de l'Australie
124
telle que l'a expriméele professeur Crawford en réponseà la question du juge Gaja ;
deuxième hypothèse- qui, probablement, est plus en phase avec la question du juge, un
programme de recherche incluant des permis spéciaux est alimenté par des informations
recueillies en partie à l'occasion d'opérations de chasse commerciale, comme l'étaient les
programmes scientifiques avant l'adoption du moratoire, et comme cela demeure ou peut
demeurer le cas dans les pays qui ne sont pas liéspar le moratoire; mêmeréponse: la finalité
demeure scientifique si les renseignements ainsi acquis sont traités selon des méthodes
scientifiques; l'article VIII doit trouver application;
il en va différemment lorsque des chasses commerciales sont programmées en fonction
d'informations scientifiques: là, l'objectif est commercial par hypothèse; la science ne fait
qu'en faciliter la réalisation; le droit applicable est celui des dispositions de la convention
relatives àla chasse commerciale ;
quatrième et dernier cas de figure- c'est le nôtre à vrai dire : un programme de recherche
scientifique vise à terme un objectif commercial, en l'occurrence, la reprise soutenable de la
chasse commerciale ; il ne me paraît pas douteux que le programme demeure
scientifique- raisonner autrement reviendrait à nier le caractère scientifique de toute
recherche appliquée; l'article VIII s'applique.
Une règle généralepeut êtreénoncée,me semble-t-il : aussi longtemps que la recherche est la
finalité principale et immédiate, le moteur de l'opération, et que la dimension commerciale et
économique demeure «incidente» ou comme un but lointain («incidental» selon le terme employé
125
par James Crawford ),les règles de l'article VIII doivent trouver application et elles s'appliquent
à l'exclusion de toute autre (sous réservebien sûr des principes générauxdu droit international).
39. Et ceci me conduit à une dernière remarque, Monsieur le président: ni l'Australie, ni la
Nouvelle-Zélande n'expliquent comment elles concilient l'affirmation selon laquelle l'article VIII
est soumis aux règles établiespar la CBI (les divers amendements au règlement, en particulier au
124
CR 2013/20, p. 26, par. 66 ct p. 27, par. 71 (Cracontra:CR 2013/17, p. 19, par. 16 (Fin1ayson).
125
CR 2013/20, p. 26, par. 67 ct p. 27, par. 71 (Crawford) -50-
paragraphe 30, dont ces deux Etats invoquent la violation) avec la proposition selon laquelle la
convention établit trois types de chasse et trois seulement : la chasse commerciale, la chasse
aborigène de subsistance, et la chasse à des fins scientifiques, auxquelles des règles spécifiques
s'appliquent 12• Ou bien l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande réussissent à établirque JARPA Il est,
en réalité,de la chasse à des fins commerciales, et, dans ce cas, les règles relatives aux permis
spéciaux ne sont pas applicables ; ou bien il s'agit d'un programme à des fins scientifiques et, au
contraire, seules ces règles s'appliquent. Or, dans ses conclusions finales lues à l'audience,
l'Australie invoque, pêle-mêlel,a violation des règles relatives à la chasse commerciale et de celles
relativesà la chasse scientifique. Le Japon ne peut pas êtretenu pour responsable des unes et des
autres. J'en redirai un mot dans l'ultime plaidoirie que j'aurai l'honneur de faire (dans cette
affaire...) demain.
Merci, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, pour votre attention. Monsieur le président,
auriez-vous la bontéde donner la parole à Mme Takashiba?
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je passe la parole à Mme Takashiba.
Vous avez la parole, Madame.
Ms TAKASHIBA: Thank you, Mr. President.
JAPAN'S FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
AND CO-OPERATION
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. Further to Professor Pellet's
submission on the framework of the ICRW, my task is to clarify Japan's full compliance with the
procedural requirements concerning the issuance of special permits and Japan's record of
co-operation.
1. Binding Schedule
A. Paragraph 30 of the Schedule
2. ln addition to a finding by the Court that JARPA Il is not a program within the meaning of
Article VIII of the ICRW, Australia is also requesting the Court to rule that Japan is in breach of
1bCR 2013117, p. 19, par. 16 (Finla)son) ct Australie, CR 2013/1 1, p. 15, par. 46 (Crawford). -5 1-
the following paragraphs of the Schedule: namely paragraph l0 (e) on the moratorium on
commercial whaling, paragraph 7 (b) on the prohibition of commercial whaling offin whales in the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary, paragraph 10 (d) on the moratorium on the taking, killing or treating of
whales except minke whales by factory ships, and paragraph 30 on the procedural requirements
applicable to special permit whaling 127• 1have two preliminary remarks.
3. First, Australia's allegation that Japan has violated paragraph 30 is nothing but a
"retro-fit", a convenient argument thought up for the purposes of this case alone. lndeed, before
the institution of this case, Australia never claimed that Japan was acting in violation of
paragraph 30. The Scientific Committee never took issue with Japan's compliance with this
provision, nor did any other Contracting Government. lt is curious that this allegation- while its
128
treatment was cursory in its Memorial - has now found its way into Australia's final
submissions for the first time at this late hour of the oral proceedings. lt is worth noting that
Australia started to give significant importance to the provision only after New Zealand filed its x
1-w~"" ':,(1-
Written Observations in which it referred to paragraph 30~ times.
4. Second, this retro-fit addition is damaging Australia's own case. By putting alleged
violations of ali four paragraphs cumulatively together, Australia is revealing the inconsistency of
its case. ln fact, the only provision in the Schedule relevant to special permit whaling under
Article VIII is paragraph 30 adopted by the IWC in 1979. Supposing for the sake of argument that
Australia's case were to stand, it can be either the violation of paragraphs 10 (e), 7 (b) and
10 (d)- except minke whales- based on the prohibition of commercial whaling or the violation
of paragraph 30 pertinent to special permit whaling. lt is logically untenable to hold a State in
breach of ail four paragraphs.
5. ln any case, since Australia alleges Japan's violation of paragraph 30, 1shall now turn to
clearing any doubt that Australia has tried hard to create.
127
CR 2013/20, p. 47 (Campbell).
12MA, para. 5.127. -52-
B. Japan's full compliance with paragraph 30 when the JARPA II proposai was submitted
in 2005
6. Mr. President, Japan's full compliance with paragraph 30 is firmly established by the fact
that the JARPA Il proposai was submitted to the IWC in March 2005 to give the Scientific
Committee the opportunity to review and comment on it before Japan issued special permits based
129
on that proposal •
7. Australia's approach is again artificial. First, it places its hope in the wording of
paragraph 30, "proposed special permits] that need to be provided by the Contracting
Governments, so as to read that unless the permits are submitted annually beforehand to the IWC
130
Secretariat, there is a breach of paragraph 30 • But this interpretation completely disregards how
this review and comment procedure is implemented in practice within the Scientific Committee.
k,..._,tloo::. ~;-
)( The Committee acceptsAthe proposai of special permits as falling within the meaning of
paragraph 30. Otherwise, the Scientific Committee could not have recorded that the multi-year
proposai of research submitted by Japan set out "information required under paragraph 30 of the
Schedule", as it did in its report of2005 13•
8. The proposai being a multi-year research plan is not unique to JARPA Il. The proposais
of JARPN Il, another scientific whaling program in the western North Pacifie, were submitted to
cover research spanning over two years for its feasibility study in 2000 13, and for its full-scale
research in 2002m. The Committee took no issue 134• lt was on this basis that the Scientific
Committee Chair from the United States noted in 2010 "that both JARPA Il and JARPN Il are
continuing on the basis of plans already submitted and reviewed in the Scientific Committee"m.
9. This is also in tine with the most recent guidelines of the Scientific Committee, Annex P.
Annex P sets out guidelines according to which the Scientific Committee performs its rote relevant
to paragraph 30 to review and comment on the proposais for special permits. Under the Annex P
12
'SC/57/0I ; CMJ, Ann. 150.
1°CR 2013/18, p. 19, para. 17(Dreylils); CR 2013/20, pp. 39-40, paras. 19-26(Giccson).
13J.Cetacean Res. Manage. (JCRi\1) 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 50.
13SC/52/0I, <http://www.icrwhale.org/pdi7SC520l.pd l> acccsscd 12Jul) 2013
mSC/54/ 02, <http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC5402.pdl acccsscd 12July 2013
11JCRM 3 (Suppl.), 2001, pp. 61-64; JCRM 5 (Suppl.), 2003, pp. 66-77.
13
~JCR 12 (Suppl.), 2011, p. 57. -53-
review process, only "new proposais" are to be reviewed. The Scientific Committee decided that
ongoing unchanged proposais that have already been reviewed would not be subject to annual
review by the Committee.
1O.This practice, that is now formally recognized in Annex P, has not come about out of the
blue. ln fact, since 2000 when the JARPN Il proposais were submitted, the Scientific Committee
did not find it useful to review the same proposai year after year and instead referred to its
136
comments recorded in its reports ofprevious years • Japan reported to the Scientific Committee
this year that "there was no plan to change the JARPA II programme" 137and accordingly there was
no discussion under the agenda item of "review of new or continuing proposals" 13• The same is
true with the Committee's review of the results of the research. At its 2008 meeting when Annex P
was adopted, the Scientific Committee agreed "it would not discuss ongoing permit results in the
years between periodic reviewsJ it.o~uld me relyrnote short annual reports provided by those x
1
139
undertaking the permit research" •
Il. Against this background, it is ali the more curious that Australia accused Japan of
violating paragraph 30, by referring to the concerns expressed about "a Jack of review and
140
comment outside the periodic reviews under Annex P" • Such concerns were never recorded at
the Scientific Committee up until the last Scientific Committee session in June 2013. But the way
in which Australia referred to this reveals again a tactic deployed by Australia throughout the oral
proceedings, that is: misrepresentation of the findings of the Scientific Committee 14• The
document- at tab 9 of your folders- is the complete report on Special Permits annexed to the
Scientific Committee Report of this year- the title "Annex P" is a mere coincidence that has
nothing to do with the guidelines known as Annex P. What Australia conveniently omits is the fact
that thisis another example of "concerns" expressed by sorne members of the Committee that are
11E.g., JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 259; JCRM 9 (Suppl.), 2007, p. 63; JCRM JO(Suppl.), 2008, p. 60.
mReport of the Scientilic Committcc 2013, p. 80 <http://iY.c.int/cachc/download:
llwj9m9sehus40kswskggk8cw/2013%201WC%20SC%20report.pdl ; acccssed 12July 2013.
msc Report 2013, Anncx P: Special Permils, p.5 <http://iwc.int/indcx.php?ciD-=
3313&cTypc=documcnt&download=l> acccssed 13July 2013; tab 9.
1JCRM Il (Suppl.), 2009, p. 64.
140
SC Report 2013, Ann. P: Special Permits, p. 5; tab-9.
141
CR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19 (Sands); CR 2013/9, p. 37, para. 78 (Sands); CR 2013/19, pp. -24.2, par4
(Sands). -54-
o9-A" ..\ d\ &:~~• " \-4. ;.c.~d<Acc
")( refuted by other members 14• The resemblancehwith the review and comment procedure of
>c JARPA Il in 2005 and the way in which Australia treats these opposing viewsfH'ttstriking. lt is this
i~
aspect of the case to which 1willnow turn.
12. The absence of 63 scientists from the review and comment procedure in 2005 is the
second point that Australia continues to rely on in arder to assert that the process was "t•awed"
Setting aside the contradiction that this argument presupposes a submission of the JARPA Il
proposai, this incident is situated in the very context of a divergence of scientific opinions. The
Scientific Committee was not precluded from completing its "review and comment" procedure.
Upon further examination, the composition of the 122 scientists who did participate in the review is
rather interesting1 invite you to look at the list of scientists at tab 10 of your foldThey
include four former and the then Chairs of the Scientific Committee from Australia, the United
Kingdom and the United States (and tluee future Chairs). lt is a mark of special distinction to be
elected as the Chairf the Scientific Committee and the presence of these members in particular
during the review process carries a certain weight. ln total, the scientists from 19 out of
31 Contracting Governments were represented 14, including Brazil, Republic of Korea, New
Zealand, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, to name sorne of them. ln
addition, there was also a former Chair from Australia who participated as an invited participant,
Dr. John Bannister. The declaration of objection by the 63 scientiswas rebutted by a working
146
document ,which Professor Sands omitted to mention. There is no way to suggest that the views
of the minority of scientists who left the room should weigh more than those in the majority who
remained.
14CR 2013/20, pp. 39-40, para.23 (GleeSC Report 2013, Ann. PSpecial Pennits, p. 10, Ann. P3,
"Commentsby sorne members on the Special Permit Whaling Programmes: General comments", pp. 10-11, Ann. P4,
"Response by other members to Annex P3"; tab -9.
143
CR 2013/18, p. 19, para. 17 (Dreyfus); CR 2013/19, p. 27, para. 10, pp. 32-36, paras.25-32, p. 37, para.34,
p. 38, para. 37, pp. 43-44, para. 50, pp. 50-51, para. 68 (Sands); CR 2013/20, pp. 32-33 (Sands).
144
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia (a lormer Chair), Brazil, Denmark, Dominica, Grenada, lceland, Japan,
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, St. Kilts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and Grenadines, Spain, the United Kingdom (a lormer Chair), and the United States (a former Chair and the
thcn Chair).
145
J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 260, Ann. 01, App. 2; JCM (Ann. 108, tab Il).
14
bJCetacean Res. Manage. 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 262, Ann. 01 , App. 3; JCM (Ann. 152, tab Il). -55-
13. After the completion of the JARPA Final Review in 2006, 50 among the 63 scientists
were present at the Scientific Committee in 2007 147 but there was no production of a "detailed
critique" that they refrained from formulating at the time of the review of the JARPA Il proposai.
There was no rebuttal from Australia on this point.
14. The Court recognized in its Advisory Opinion case concerning Legal Consequencesfor
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia that compliance with established
practice of an international organization is sufficient 14•
15. Finally, a few words are called for on New Zealand's interpretation of paragraph 30.
New Zealand exaggerated the proper scope of paragraph 30 when it stated last week that "[i]t
requires that the legitimate interests of the parties can be seen to have been objectively taken into
149
account. To say otherwise would be to deny paragraph 30 of any meaning." Japan disagrees.
Paragraph 30 establishes a mechanism of co-operation between the Contracting Government and
the Scientific Committee and Japan demonstrated that it was fully engaged in continuous scientific
dialogue. Of course, New Zealand, as an intervening State under Article 63 of the Statute, was
conveniently precluded from commenting on Japan's engagement.
16. New Zealand still attempts to reverse the burden of proof, by maintaining that the views
of other parties "should be seen to have been taken into account" 150~.New Zealand stated last >c
week that "[i]t is not a question of bending to the views of [other parties]" 15• However its
interpretation of paragraph 30 ••asthe mechanism through which ... the interests of the parties in
153
the Special Permit process can be protected" , and its use of contentious IWC Resolutions as
evidence ofthese interests 15, strongly suggest otherwise.
14"Comments on the Government of Japan's Proposai for a Second l'hase of Special Permit Whaling in the
Antarctica (JARl'A Il)", App. 2, Ann. 01 to the Report of the Scientitic Committee, J. Cetacean Res. Manage.
8 (Supp/.),2006, p. 260; "List of Participants", Ann. A to the Report of the Scientitic Committee, J. Cetacean Res.
Manage. /0 (Suppl.), 2008. p. 75.
148Legal Consequences for States of the C'ontinuedPresence of South A/rica in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resoluti 276 (1970), Advis01yOpinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 22, para. 22.
14QWON,para. 95; CR 2013117, p. 46, para. 33 (Ridings).
15°CR 2013/17, p. 46, para. 33 (RidingJ)j )C
~R 2013117, p. 47, para. 37 (RidingsQ
152
CR2013117, p. 46, para. 33 (Ridings).
13
~WON, para. 86.
154
CR 2013117, p. 31, para. 54 (Finlayson). -56-
Il. Non-binding IWC Resolutions and Guidelines
A.IWC Resolutions
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court. So far, 1 have had the honour to explain Japan 's
compliance with the only binding provision of the Schedule governing special permit whaling. 1
willnow turn to soft law, namely the IWC Resolutions and Guidelines on which Australia puts
much emphasis.
18. lt is weil established under international law that resolutions are recommendations. The
Court statedn the South West A.frica ca:e
"The persuasive force of Assembly resolutions can indeed be very
considerable,- but this is a different thing. lt operates on the political not the legal
level: it does not make these resolutions binding in law."
19. The Resolutions by the deeply divided IWC cannot constitute subsequent agreement or
156
subsequent practice among the Contracting Governments ,as Professor Pellet explained in the
first round.
20. lt would be strange to argue that Contracting Governments are bound by non-binding
resolutionsf the treaty body, where there is an opt-out mechanism in the binding Schedule
amendment. Australia's case has retreated considerably on this point. Whilets Memorial it
argued that the Resolutionsof the IWC constituted subsequent agreement, or interchangeably
157
subsequent practice , Australia now agrees that decisions of the IWC other than the Schedule
amendments are mere recommendations. Australia is alson agreement that the issuance of special
permits does not"have to be consented to or authorized by the Commission or the Scientific
Committee, or that any other Governmentor authority than the issuing State can revoke or cancel
15
those permits" R.
21. This is where the close interplay between Australia and New Zealand begins. Australia
is quick to add that the question is "whether Japan's actions are or are not consistent with ... the
159
decisions taken under that Treaty" • Then, it systematically relies on New Zealand's
1~Sout West Africa (Ethiov.South Aji-ica;Liberiv.South Ajrica), Second Phase, Judgment,
/.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 51, para. 98.
1bCR2013/14, pp. 63-70, paras. 47-66 (Pellet).
157
y. MA,paras.4.65-4.6~c .J':IO C«.l.o\lJ&fr· .U-'\"~"~ : ~u ~-·~c:::rf.arc:J).
15CR 2013118,p. 39, para. 1(Crawford).
159/b.d -57-
160
interpretation of the legal signiticance of IWC Resolutions • Namely, that such resolutions
provide "legitimate interpretative aids" and that meaningful co-operation requires a Contracting
161
Government to give due account to the conditions described in the resolutions • Based on this
interpretation offered by New Zealand, Australia concludes that "Japan is required to take into
account the interests of the other members of the Treaty as weil retlected in those resolutipns" 162•
22. Then New Zealand picks up the baton and goes further: "Where a proposed special
permit programme has not met those conditions, the members of the Commission are entitled to
163
expect it will not proceed without amendment ... "
23. Australia, for its part, attempted to unilaterally re-write the tindings of the Scientitic
164
Committee, as if there were consensus views critical of Japanese special permit whaling , where
there were none. Or, it speaks as if the Scientitic Committee dismissed the JARPA Il data and its
analysis as useless 16, which is not true either. Then it invokes the Resolutions criticizing the
program adopted by the divided IWC and claims that Japan has not taken them into account 166•
24. Here, Japan is facing two cases advanced by two States. Setting that aspect aside, there
167
is a duty to take into account the Resolutions of the IWC • But this does not go as far as to
require the Contracting Governments to change their positions.
25. Australia and New Zealand's interpretation runs counter to the interpretation expressed
even at the beginning of a series of resolutions critical of special permit whaling in the aftermath of
the adoption of the moratorium under paragraph 10 (e). Thus, the United States delegate stated
regarding to the resolution on scientitic research programmes in 1987:
"The United States admits freely and in fact insists upon the fact that a nation
would remain free to disregard the advice of the Commission and to issue permits.
1°CR 2013119, p. 63, para. 16 (Crawford); CR 2013/20, p. 37. para. 12 (Giccson); CR 2013/19, p. 63, para. 16
(Crawford); CR 2013/20, p. 42, para. 32 (Giceson).
16CR 2013117,pp. 30-31, paras. 51-54 (Finlayson); cmphasis addcd.
16CR 2013/20, p. 42, para. 32 (Giceson).
1JCR 2013117,p. 31 para. 52 (Finlayson) ; cmphao;isaddcd.
b4CR2013/8, p. 25, para. 44 (Burmcstcr); CR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19 (Sands); CR 2013/19, p. 32, para. 24,
p. 36, para. 32 (Sands).
1~CR 2013/19, p. 17, para. II(Giccson).
16CR 2013/11, pp. 35-36, para. 36 (Giccson).
16Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West
Africa, Advisory Opinion,l.C.J.Reports 1955,scparatc opinion of'Judgc Lautcrpacht, p. 120. -58-
There can be no question about that. The nation has that right. lt would be within its
168
right under this Convention to disregard the recommendation."
lt seems that Australia's view ofthe effect ofiWC Resolutions is not shared by ali the parties to the
Convention.
B. Guidelines
26. 1would now like to tum next to guidelines. A series of guidelines were adopted by the
IWC in the form of resolutions, starting from 1986. The resolutions being mere recommendations,
they are not binding. The Guidelines are then annexed to the Scientific Committee Reports of the
year of incorporation and are referred to as "Annexes" .
27. The applicable guidelines according to which the Scientific Committee reviewed and
commented on the JARPA Il proposai are contained in Annex Y (2000) . As Professor Boyle
explained in the first round, Annex Y is "a compendium of non-binding Whaling Commission
169
resolutions on special permits" compiled by the Head of Science of the IWC Secretariat,
including Resolution 1999-2 that Japan voted against 170• lt was not the Scientific Committee itself
that elaborated the Guidelines according to which the scientific review was to be conducted.
171
Annex Y is attached to the Scientific Committee report of 2000 • The most recent set of
Guidelines are included in Annex P and it has a unique status from other Annexes in that, as the
Parties agree, Annex P was elaborated and adopted by the Scientific Committee in 2008 to be
172
subsequently endorsed by the IWC •
28. Mr. President, it is wrong to assert that Japan is tuming its back on the IWC
Resolutions m. Despite the fact that Japan was opposed to the adoption of sorne of the Resolutions
in which the IWC- and not the Scientific Committee- set out the criteria for the scientific
review, Japan submitted the JARPA Il proposai in 2005 to a "review and comment" procedure
under Annex Y. The procedure was conducted following the exact structure of the Annex Y
16Verbatim Record, 1987, p. 40 (United States of America).
16CR 2013115, p. 53, para. 33 (Bo)1c).
17Verbatim Record 1999, p. 157.
171
J.Cetacean Res. Manage. 3 (Suppl.), 2001, pp. 371-372.
172
Chair's Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, p.26 http://iwc.int/ indcx.php?
clrF 2555&cTypc- documcnt&down1oad=l, accessed 13 Ju1y2013.
173
CR 2013111, pp. 35-36, para. 36 (Glecson). -59-
format 174• Under each item, the Scientific Committee reproduced detailed criteria in Annex Y.
There was no finding of the Scientific Committee that the JARPA Il proposai did not satisfy the
criteria as set outin Annex Y.
C. On "meaningful co-operation"
29. Mr. President, Members of the Court, finally, 1 would like to tum to the question of
co-operation on the part of Japan from two angles: first, Japan's taking into consideration of the
views of other Contracting Governments at the IWC and, second, continuous scientific dialogue in
which Japan has been engaged with the Scientific Committee.
30. On the first point, in light of the foregoing, it is untenable to argue that Japan is not
engaged in meaningful co-operation 17just because Japan has had some serious disagreement with
some of the views expressed in the form of IWC Resolutions (which are not based on the findings
176
of the Scientific Committee) • This is far from saying that Japan thinks "it can do what it likes
under Article Vlll" 17,as Australia insists.
31. On the contrary, it was in response to the voice of other States that Japan abstained from
catching humpback whales that was planned to start in the 2007/2008 season. Resolutions 2005-1
and 2007-1 reflected the opposition of certain Contracting Governments to the proposed catch of
humpback and fin whales in JARPA Il Program. At the 2007 IWC Annual Meeting, under the
agenda item "Special Permits", Australia made a statement opposing Japan's proposed catch of
humpback whales under JARPA Il as follows:
"[Australia] noted that the JARPA Il programme is of particular importance to
Australia in view of proposed inclusion in the 2007/08 season of takes of humpback
whales. ft believed Japan should show goodwill and at /east withdraw the proposed
takes of hwnpback whales even if it would not drop ali lethal aspects of the
programme. lt also believed that the taking of humpback whales would further
inflame an already heated debate and would cause an adverse reaction of the
178
Australian public against Japan which it considered would be regrettable."
174
J. Cetacean Res. Manaf:e. 8 (Suppl.), 2006, pp. 48-53. CCCR 2013/19, pp. 38-39, paras. 36-37 (Sands).
17WON, paras. 81-107; CR 2013/17, pp. 43-47, pr2a7-36 (Ridings).
17CR 2013/19, p. 36, para. 33 (Sands).
17CR 2013/18, p. 20, para. 20 (Dre)li.Js).
178
Chair's Report of the 59th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2007,
p. 40; emphasis added. -60-
32. ln December 2007, Japan decided to suspend the proposed taking of humpback whales.
No humpback whale has ever been taken under JARPA Il. This was in response to a request from
the then IWC Chair, Dr. William Hogarth of the US 179• Australia requested that Japan show
goodwill, inter a/ia, not to intlame the adverse reaction of the Australian public. lt now refuses to
acknowledge the decision of Japan in a proper light and instead mocks the JARPA Il program
because it is not proceeding in the manner in which it was originally designed.
33. Second, on the question of continuous scientific dialogue, Japan 's responsiveness to the
comments and recommendations by the Scientific Committee has been demonstrated in detail in
the first round and has not been rebutted 180•
34. Australia ignores the scientific merits of JARPA Il in order to claim that the programme
181
is not for purposes of scientific research within the terms of Article Vlll • But Australia could not
rebut the very point that Japan had been engaged in a continuous and serious scientific dialogue.
35. ln relation to Statistical Catch-at-Age Analysis (SCAA), Australia sought in vain to
182
demolish the significance of Japan's contribution • Australia's description of the views of the
Scientific Committee on the utility of the age data obtained by lethal methods is again a complete
misrepresentation . Japan's full commitment to scientific dialogue is unshaken. This can be
demonstrated both from the context and substance. Professor Boyle will address the substance of
the matter, and 1will now focus on the context.
36. For the last decade, the Scientific Committee has allocated funds for development of the
Statistical Catch at Age (SCAA) method to make yet better use of the JARPA and JARPA Il age
183
data • The Committee unanimously agreed- with no dissent from Australia's own scientists-
to recommended funding of the IWC to the SCAA, Statistical Catch at Age, for further
1qCMJ, para. 5.80, fn. 740, Press Conference by Minister lor Foreign AITairs Masahiko Komura.. Friday,
21 December 2007, 6:35 p.m.; http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm press/2007!12/1221-2.html, accessed 14July 2013
[tab-12].
18
°CR 2013/19, p. 36, para.32 (Sands).
181
CR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19 (Sands); CR 2013/9, p. 37, para. 78 (Sands); CR 2013119, pp. ara.2~-24,
pp. 47-50 and paras.-65 (Sands).
182
CR 2013119, p. 48, para. 62 (Sands).
18E.g., Report of the Scientilic Committee , JCRM 7 (Supp/.)(2005), p. 55, Table 5; Report of the Scicntilic
Committce (2013), Table 10,p. 89 -61 -
184
investigation at its 2013 meeting • This would hardly be logical action for the Committee, if it
considered this data to be valueless, and its analysis to "produce nothing reliable" as
Professor Sands asserted.
37. Here is what the Sub-Committee on ln-depth Assessment in Annex G of the Scientific
Committee Report of this year states in the body of the text, at tab 13 of your folders: "Estimates
of age-at-length, obtained from reading of annual rings in earplugs, constitute an important input to
185
SCAA."
38. lnstead, Professor Sands gave a distorted interpretation of a few keywords from the
summary table at the bottom of a page in the same report, without looking at the report as a whole.
Australia's mere reliance on matching a few words- "MSYR" and "not robust" or "natural
mortality" and "further investigation recommended"- in the summary table without showing
Australia's understanding of what it ali means points to a Jack of genuine engagement with the
scientists participating in that sub-committee.
39. Discussions within the Scientific Committee are polarized when it comes to the debate
over lethal and non-lethal sampling methods. But it is irrefutable that the data obtained from lethal
sampling of JARPA and JARPA Il is being used by the Scientific Committee. Australia asserts
186
that nothing has been achieved in the eight years since the JARPA Il proposal • On the contrary
valuable results have been obtained 187• Australia could not destroy the case of Japan's full
engagement in the process of scientific dialogue 188•
Conclusion
40. By way of conclusion, 1would like to make a few remarks. First, in light of the above,
Australia failed to establish that Japan acted in violation of any procedural requirement. Japan
184
SC Report 2013, p. 39, pp. 88-91; http://Ï\\c.int/cache/downloadslllwj9m9sehu s40kswskggk8cw/
2013%201WC%20SC%20report.pdt: accessed 13 July 2013.
185
Report ofthe Sub-Committee on In-depth Assessments, Ann. G, Report ofthe Scientilic Committee 2013, p. 1;
http:/liwc.int/cache/downloads/dlk3x3g3hyOckww8k4ogw0kgo/Ann exG.pdl: accessed 13 July 2013 [tab 14].
18CR 2013119, p. 36, para. 32 (Sands).
187
CR 2013/15, pp. 40-41, paras. 33-36, footnotes 93-105 (Takashiba).
188
CR 2013/18, p. 41, para5 (Crawford). -62-
accepted the review and comment procedure under Annex Y and the JARPA Il proposai passed
that scrutiny.
41. Second, meaningful co-operation for the management of whales is achieved through
engaged scientific dialogue. The scientific data analysis provided by JARPA Il has tangibly
contributed to the work of the Scientific Committee and several Sub-Committees in particular.
43. Finally.)meaningful co-operation cannot mean unilateral acceptance of the interests of
other parties as retlected in Resolutions adopted with a slight majority and which, in any case, are
not binding.
\4+1G:.d Professor Akhavan already addressed Japan's commitment to the IWC.
Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it has been a great honour to appear before you
on behalf of Japan. Thank you very much for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Takashiba. 1 understand this completes this morning's
presentation by Japan. The Court will meet again this afternoon from 3 o'clock for the
continuation of arguments by Japan. This sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 12.45 p.m.
Audience publique tenue le lundi 15 juillet 2013, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire relative à la Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Zélande (intervenant))