Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/16
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 31 mai 2011, à 17 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962
en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 31 May 2011, at 5 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962
in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vicepra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
GuMilMu.me
jugesCot, ad hoc
Cgefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Cot
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères et de la
coopération internationale,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre d’Etat,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrétaire d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération
internationale,
S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume du Cambodge
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Sarun Rithea, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
comme conseillers ;
M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international à l’Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sirFranklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage, professeur invité de droi t international à l’Université d’Oxford et à
l’Université de Cape Town,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP (Paris),
comme conseils ;
M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur à l’Université de Rennes 1,
Mme Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de New York,
Mme Ivrea Degeaive. - 5 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E.Mr.LongVisalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Sarun Rithea, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
as Advisers;
MrJ.ean-Marcorel, Professor of Internatio nal Law at the University of PariIs
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, member of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of Internationa l Law at Oxford University and the University
of Cape Town,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris , member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel;
Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes 1,
Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars,
Ms Ivrea Degeaive. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume de
Thaïlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
M. Ittiporn Boonpracong, directeur général du départ ement des traités et d es affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Kasit Piromya, ministre des affaires étrangères ;
M.Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, secrétaire auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
S.Exc.M.Asda Jayanama, conseiller auprès du mi nistère des affaires étrangères, président de la
commission mixte thaïlando-cambodgienne sur la dé marcation de la frontière terrestre (partie
thaïlandaise), envoyé spécial de la Thaïlande chargé des questions relatives au Temple de
Phra Viharn,
M. Theerakun Niyom, secrétaire permanent du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Thani Thongphakdi, directeur général du département de l’information du ministère des affaires
étrangères,
le général Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur général du service géographique royal thaïlandais,
quartier général des forces armées du Royaume de Thaïlande,
M.ChukiertRatanachaichan, secrétaire général adjoint du bureau du conseil d’Etat, cabinet du
premier ministre,
M. Chatri Archjananan, directeur de la division des affaires juridiques au département des traités et
des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeWasanaHonboonheum, directrice de la division des frontières au départ ement des traités et
des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.Donald McRae, professeur à l’Université d’O ttawa, titulaire de la chaire Hyman Soloway,
membre de la Commission du droit international, membre du barreau de l’Ontario, - 7 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand is represented by:
H.E.Mr.VirachaiPlasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of
Thailand to the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. Ittiporn Boonpracong, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E. Mr. Kasit Piromya, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr.Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, Secretary to th e Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
H.EM. r. sdaJayanama, Adviser to the Mini stry of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the
Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarca tion for Land Boundary (Thai side), Special
Envoy of Thailand on Matters concerning the Temple of Phra Viharn,
Mr. Theerakun Niyom, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Thani Thongphakdi, Director-General, Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Lieutenant-General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director-G eneral, Royal Thai Survey Department, Royal
Thai Armed Force Headquarters,
Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy-Secretary-General, Office of the Council of State, Office of
the Prime Minister,
Mr.ChatriArchjananan, Director, Legal Affairs Division, Department of Treaties and Legal
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsWasanaHonboonheum, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties and Legal
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Member of the International
Law Commission, Member of the Ontario Bar, - 8 -
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ou est, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
MmeAlina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M.Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de NewYork , maître de recherche au Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law de l’Université de Cambridge,
comme conseils. - 9 -
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Thomas Grant, Member of the New York Bar, Senior Research Associate, Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law, University of Cambridge,
as Counsel. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT : Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets this afternoon to
hear the second round of oral observations of th e Kingdom of Thailand. I believe that the first
speaker on the list is Professor Alain Pellet. You have the floor.
M. PELLET : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président.
L A REQUÊTE DU CAMBODGE EN INTERPRÉTATION EST UN TROMPE L ’ŒIL
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieu rs les juges, le calendrier des audiences que
vous avez fixé ne permet guère à l’Etat défendeur de ré
pondre réellement aux arguments du
demandeur et encourage les répétitions plus qu’il ne permet de les éviter. Nous ferons cependant
de notre mieux pour respecter les directives de l’ article 60, paragraphe 1, du Règlement et des
instructions de procédure VI et XI mais … ad impossibilem nemo tenetur !
2. Pour ma part, je reviendrai sur les problèmes de compétence insurmontables auxquels se
heurte la requête en interpré tation du Cambodge tandis que mon compère James Crawford traitera
des questions plus spécifiquement liées à la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires.
3. Dans un premier temps, je répondrai à quel ques points particuliers abordés ce matin par
nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre, et auxque ls nous n’avons pas, ou pas complètement, répondu
par avance dans nos présentations d’hier après-mi di. Puis, dans un second temps, je récapitulerai
nos positions sur l’incompétence manifeste de la Cour pour se prononcer sur la requête en
interprétation que le Cambodge lui a soumise ⎯sans me réfugier derrière le fait que «cela va de
soi» comme l’a fait hier avec quelque insouciance mon éminent contradicteur, même si,
1
assurément, «the matter speaks for itself» ⎯ mais ce qui va sans dire va encore mieux en le
disant !
A. Sur quelques points particuliers
4. D’abord donc, quelques remarques cursives sur trois points particuliers abordés plus
spécialement ce matin par les avocats du Cambodge ⎯ principalement sir Franklin Berman, tandis
que le professeur Sorel sera l’interlocuteur privilégié du professeur Crawford.
1
CR 2011/13, p. 35, par. 19 (Berman), à deux reprises. - 11 -
5. Première remarque: elle est spécifique, ma is elle porte sur l’appr oche générale de mon
éminent contradicteur. Il proclame, je cite, «The re is no room left for argument as to whether the
rights [established by a Judgment in favour of the successful Party] exist, only as to whether there
is a real dispute over their interpretation.» 2 Les choses sont moins simples : il ne suffit pas qu’une
partie affirme que l’arrêt lui confère des droits; il faut encore convaincre la Cour ⎯qui a le
dernier mot en la matière 3 ⎯ qu’effectivement l’arrêt lui confère les droits qu’elle prétend en tirer
et que ces droits appellent une interprétation.
6. Deuxième remarque spécifique ⎯mais du même ordre: je note l’extraordinaire
propension de siF r ranklin à vouloir renvo yer à la phase sur le fond (the merits
stage) ⎯ c’est-à-dire en l’espèce, celle de l’interprétation ⎯ quantité de problèmes que nous avons
soulevés 4. C’est une façon élégante mais un peu cavalière de mettre la charrue avant les bŒufs :
⎯ la Cour ne peut indiquer de mesures conservatoires que si elle a, prima facie, compétence pour
examiner l’affaire au principal ⎯ en l’espèce, pour interpréter l’arrêt de 1962 ;
⎯ c’est à la Cour elle-même qu’il appartient de le déterminer, c’est-à-dire de vérifier que les
5
conditions de l’article 60 sont remplies prima facie ;
⎯ ce qui oblige à se demander s’il existe un différend réel entre les Parties sur le sens à donner à
l’arrêt ⎯ ou plutôt sur les éléments de celui-ci figurant dans le dispositif ;
⎯ la réponse est fermement négative pour les raisons que j’ai exposées hier et sur lesquelles je
vais revenir dans un instant.
[Projection n o1 : points 1 et 2 du dispositif (F et E).]
7. Troisième et dernière observation particulière ⎯mais la plus importante peut-être: la
Partie cambodgienne fait grand cas des liens existant entre les différents points du dispositif (en
tout cas du point 1 et du point 2 ⎯ puisque en ce qui concerne le point 3, il n’est pas concerné par
la demande cambodgienne. Nos cont radicteurs font tellement de cas de ce point, que sir Franklin
va jusqu’à m’accuser (très poliment) d’avoir truqué la présentation du dispositif de l’arrêt en
2
CR 2011/15, p. 17, par. 2 (Berman)
3 CR 2011/14, p. 22, par. 3 (Pellet).
4 Voir notamment CR 2013/11, p. 30-31, par. 13 (Berman) ; p. 35, par. 35 ; CR 2011/15, p. 17-18, par. 4.
5 Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31mars2004 en l’affaire Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains
(Mexique c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique) (Mexique c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
16 juillet 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 323, par. 45. - 12 -
omettant l’expression «en conséquence» da ns la projection que j’en avais faite 6 ⎯j’avoue que je
ne m’en étais pas aperçu et, que consultée, not re technicienne m’a dit que c’était à cause du
manque de place sur l’écran! Toutes mes excuses sirFranklin! Bien sûr qu’il y a «en
conséquence» entre les points1 et2 du dispositif. Mais il est difficile d’en tirer tout ce que nos
contradicteurs y mettent (et ils y mettent beaucoup ! C’est même dans cet «en conséquence» qu’ils
7
semblent placer tous leurs espoirs !) :
⎯ donc, la Cour dit, dans un premier temps que «le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire
relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge» (mais elle ne dit pas où passe la frontière dans la
zone sur laquelle le temple est situé), elle dit juste le temple est au Cambodge, et ;
⎯ dans un second temps, elle tire de cette première constatation la conséquence (oui, oui, bien
sûr, le mot y est, la conséquence) que la Thaïlande est tenue de retirer tous les éléments de ses
forces «qu’elle a installés dans le temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien».
8. Il ne fait assurément aucun doute que cette seconde décision est bien la conséquence de la
première: si le temple avait relevé de la souveraineté de la Thaïlande, on ne voit pas pourquoi
celle-ci eût dû retirer ses forces (sous réserve des exigences du droit des conflits armés ⎯ mais ce
n’était pas le problème). Par ailleurs, la formul e utilisée par la Cour établit qu’il y a des environs
du temple situés en territoire thaïlandais comme il y a des environs du temple en territoire
cambodgien, ce qui implique que la frontière passe non loin du temple mais, que ce soit isolément
ou en combinaison avec le point précédant du dispos itif, la Cour ne dit toujours pas où serait située
la frontière même dans cette z one. Oui, Monsieurleprésident, les deux points du dispositif sont
liés : le second est la conséquence du premier et le premier la base nécessaire du second mais sans
que ni l’un ni l’autre puisse s’analyser en, ni reposer sur, la fixation de la frontière : ils impliquent
tous deux qu’il y a une frontière, ils ne fixent celle-ci ni l’un ni l’autre. Et la formule utilisée dans
le paragraphe 45 de la requête doit être prise pour ce qu’elle est, une astuce d’avocat, «trouvaille»
qui égare le lecteur pendant quelques secondes ma is qui ne justifie en aucune manière la
compétence de la Cour en l’espèce : certes, le retrait des forces thaïlandaises est «une conséquence
particulière» de la souveraineté cambodgienne sur le temple mais ceci est sans rapport avec le tracé
6
CR 2011/15, p. 23, par. 10 (Berman).
7Requête, par. 10 et 36. - 13 -
de la frontière et il y a un non sequitur évident entre cette constatation et la fin de la conclusion
cambodgienne selon laquelle le retrait serait «une conséquence particulière de l’obligation générale
et continue de respecter l’intégrité … du Cambodge [dont il n’est question nulle part dans l’arrêt],
territoire délimité dans la région du temple et ses envi rons par la ligne de la carte de l’annexe 1 sur
laquelle l’arrêt de la Cour est basé», et son di spositif parfaitement muet: il est reproduit derrière
moi dans son intégralité cette fois ⎯ du moins pour ses points 1 et 2, et cela est facile à vérifier...
[Fin de la projection 1.]
B. L’incompétence manifeste de la Cour pour se prononcer sur la requête cambodgienne
9. Monsieur le président, après ces rema rques ponctuelles, j’en arrive à quelques
considérations plus générales en vue de résumer le raisonnement qui donne inévitablement à penser
que la Cour est manifestement incompétente pour se prononcer sur la requête, prétendument en
interprétation, du Royaume du Cambodge. Ce raisonnement peut s’articuler en
dix propositions ⎯ chacune très brève rassurez-vous.
10. 1) En1959, le Cambodge a introduit «devant la Cour une instance contre le
Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande relative à la souveraineté territoriale sur le temple de
Préah Vihéar» (Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1961, p.19); par son arrêt du 26mai1961, la Cour a reconnu qu’elle avait
compétence pour se prononcer sur cette demande 8 (pas sur autre chose...) et, dans son arrêt au fond
9
du 15juin1962, elle a rappelé que tel était l’unique objet du différend ; et elle a dit ⎯ c’est le
premier point du dispositif que je viens de lire ⎯ «que le temple de PréahVihéar est situé en
territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge» ( Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge
c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 36).
11. 2) En revanche, et c’est ma deuxi ème proposition, bien que le Cambodge eût
tardivement formulé des conclusions à ces fins 10, la Cour a expressément refusé de se prononcer,
dans le dispositif de l’arrêt, «sur le statut juridique de la carte de l’annexe I et sur la ligne frontière
8
Voir Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1961,
p. 22 et 35.
9
Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 14.
10Ibid., p. 11. - 14 -
11
dans la région contestée» . En conséquence, il est clair que la Cour n’a rien décidé quant à
l’emplacement de la frontière que ce soit en général ou dans les environs du temple ⎯ tout ce que
l’on sait à cet égard, du fait de la rédaction du point 2 du dispositif, est qu’elle considérait qu’il y
avait des «environs situés en territoire cambodgien» 12 et, a contrario mais, à mon avis, très
évidemment, qu’il y avait donc aussi des «environs» situés en territoire thaïlandais. Mais l’arrêt ne
dit rien quant à leur limite respective.
12. 3) Bien sûr, dans les motifs, la Cour se fonde, entre autres arguments, sur l’acceptation
par la Thaïlande, de la «carte de l’a nnexeI», mais cela reste un motif; or ⎯ j’ai largement
développé ce point hier 13 ⎯ on ne peut recourir aux motifs, même ceux qui sont le support
indispensable du dispositif, que pour interpréter un dispositif obscur ; celui de l’arrêt de1962 est
parfaitement clair et se suffit à lui-même. En outre, en aucune manière, on ne peut remonter du
dispositif aux motifs ⎯qui n’ont pas l’autorité de la chose jugée et ne peuvent, de ce fait, ê
tre
l’objet d’une requête en interprétation. Le Cam bodge en est bien conscien t comme en témoignent
les formules alambiquées qu’il utilise pour tenter de vous convaincre, Mesdames et Messieurs de la
Cour, de vous prêter à sa subtile mais vaine manŒuvre.
13. 4) Bien qu’elle ne se fût pas réjouie de la décision de la Cour, la Thaïlande a très
rapidement reconnu que le temple était situé en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du
Cambodge 14 (et elle n’est jamais revenue sur cette reconnaissance); en conséquence, elle a retiré
ses troupes du temple et de ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien, s’acquittant ainsi des
obligations lui incombant en vertu de l’arrêt.
154. Mutatis mutandis, on peut d’ailleurs transposer aux faits qui ont suivi le prononcé
de l’arrêt le raisonnement même qu’a suivi la Cour pour décider que le temple de PhraViharn
relevait de la souveraineté cambodgienne :
⎯ pendant plus d’un demi-siècle, chacune des Pa rties a contrôlé effec tivement une partie des
«environs» du temple ;
11
Ibid., p. 36.
12Ibid., p. 37.
13CR 2011/14, p. 28-30, par. 19-22.
14Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, Note to the UN Secretary-General after the Judgment (6 July 1962) ;
voir aussi UN document circulating the letter of 6 July 1962 (12 July 1962) (Thaïlande, dossier des juges, document
n 3). En ce sens : CR 2011/13, p. 29, par. 11 (Berman). - 15 -
⎯ on ne saurait contester que le retrait des forces thaïes en application du point 2 du dispositif de
l’arrêt et la construction d’une barrière et d’un point de passage «ont constitué ⎯ et je reprends
des petits passages de l’arrêt de 1962 ⎯ un événement d’une certaine importance» ( Temple de
Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c.Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1962 , p. 23); or, en dépit
d’incidents sporadiques dans les années1960, les autorités cambodgiennes n’ont pas
protesté ⎯encore une citation de1962 ⎯ «pendant de nombreuses années et l’on doit, de ce
fait, conclure à leur acquiescement. Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac
potuisset» (ibid.) (mes dons pour les langues, fussent-elles mortes, sont presqu’aussi éclatants
que ceux du professeur Crawford !) ;
[Projection n 2: photo de la visite du prince Si hanouk au temple de Phrah Viharn
(5 janvier 1963).]
⎯ et il n’est pas jusqu’à une visite princière qui n’appelle le même genre de comparaison; la
Thaïlande peut en effet se prévaloir de la visite effectuée par le princeSihanouk le
5janvier1963, au même titre que le Cam bodge l’avait pu de celle du princeDamrong
en 1930 15: à son arrivée au temple, le prince Sihanouk n’a pu ignorer la clôture érigée près du
16
temple, et derrière laquelle étaient massés des journalistes et des gardes thaïs ;
⎯ j’ajoute qu’il est certainement vrai qu’à partir de l’inscription du temple par l’Unesco sur la
liste du patrimoine mondial, le Cambodge a réalisé que l’arrangement dont il s’était
accommodé durant tant d’années posait des problèmes car il ne lui permettait pas de présenter
un plan de gestion complet, comportant une car te finalisée, comme le lui demande le Comité
17
du patrimoine mondial ; mais «[o]n ne saurait en droit réclamer des rectifications de frontière
pour le motif qu’une région frontière se révélerait présenter une importance inconnue et
insoupçonnée au moment de l’établissement de la frontière» (ibid., p. 25) ;
en d’autres termes, tous les arguments qui ont bénéficié au Cambodge en 1962 peuvent, on le voit,
être invoqués à l’encontre de la thèse qu’il soutient aujourd’hui devant vous.
15Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 30.
16Voir «Sihanouk Leaves Guard at Temple» (Bangkok Post, 7 January 1963) ou «Peaceful Overture Held in
Cambodia at Disputed Shrine» (New York Times, 8 January 1963).
17 o o
Voir le paragraphe 16 du document n 20 reproduit dans le dossier des juges de la Thaïlande, document n 20
(Décisions adoptées à la 32 session du comité du patrimoine mondial (Québec 2-10 juillet 2008) (doc. 32 COM 8B.102,
doc. revisé, 31 mars 2009). - 16 -
o
[Fin de la projection n 2.]
15. 6) Sixième proposition: il est résulté de tout cela une situation sur le terrain que
chacun pouvait constater et qui, de l’aveu du Cambodge, a été acceptée, de facto en tout cas, par les
deux Parties puisque, écrit-il, «rien ne laissait présager, jusqu’à une période récente [il précise qu’il
s’agit de l’année2008 18], que la Thaïlande interpréterait cet arrêt d’une manière qui diverge de
19
l’interprétation que le Cambodge en a toujours faite» . SirFranklin en était également
20 21
convaincu hier même si, ce matin, il semble ne plus l’être .
16. 7) Au demeurant, il ne s’agit là, pour la Thaïlande, que d’un argument supplémentaire,
mais superfétatoire : quand bien même cet arrangeme nt sur le terrain ne refléterait pas la «bonne»
frontière dans la zone du temple , ceci n’aurait strictement aucune incidence sur la compétence, ou
plutôt l’incompétence, de la Cour pour se pronon cer sur la requête du Cambodge en interprétation
de l’arrêt de 1962 : cela montrerait qu’il existe un différend persistant sur la frontière mais, comme
la Cour, dans l’arrêt de1962, ne s’est pas prononcée sur le tracé de la frontière, il est impossible
d’interpréter l’arrêt sur ce point (le seul qui fasse pr oblème...) et l’on ne peut même pas vraiment
22
parler de requête en exécution de l’arrêt ⎯ comme je l’ai dit hier , il s’agit plutôt d’une tentative
de faire appel devant la Cour d’ aujourd’hui contre le refus délibéré de la Cour d’hier (ou plutôt
d’avant-hier) de se prononcer sur le tracé de la frontière.
[Projection n o3 : article premier du MoU du 14 juin 2000.]
17. 8) Au reste, qu’il existe un différend entr e les Parties sur le tracé de leur frontière
commune ⎯ de toute leur frontière commune, y compris dans la zone du temple, cela ne fait aucun
doute. Et c’est la raison pour laquelle les Parties ont conclu, le 14 juin 2000, le «Memorandum of
Understanding» sur le relevé et la démarcation de la frontière qui reprend les choses à la base et, de
façon fort significative, ne mentionne pas l’arrêt de 1962 parmi les documents que la commission
mixte est appelée à prendre en considér ation pour s’acquitter de son travail ⎯ l’article 1 erde cet
accord est projeté à l’écran. C’est dire à nouveau , et de manière éclatante, que les deux Parties
18
Requête, par. 12, 17, 25 et 30 et CR 2011/13, p. 15-16 (Hor), p. 31, par. 14 (Berman), p. 39, par. 6 (Sorel).
19
Requête, par. 27.
20CR 2011/13, p. 31, par. 14 (Berman).
21CR 2011/15, p. 18, par. 6 (Berman).
22CR 2011/14, p. 32, par. 29. - 17 -
étaient et sont conscientes que l’arrêt n’est pas un instrument de délimitation de la frontière ⎯ y
compris dans la zone du temple.
18. Les deux intervenants de ce matin ont uni leurs efforts pour conjurer cette conclusion.
Sir Franklin a attiré l’attention sur l’objet de l’accord : la démarcation (et non la délimitation) de la
frontière23. Certes! Mais pour pouvoir être démarquée, il faut qu’elle ait été délimitée au
préalable; la liste (limitative) du matériau documentaire et cartographique que les Parties
s’accordent à considérer comme ayant effectué cette délimitation n’inclut pas l’arrêt de 1961. Et ce
n’est pas une réponse d’affirmer ⎯comme le fait Jean-Marc Sorel ⎯ qu’«il n’est nul besoin de
citer dans ce cadre [«ce cadre, c’est le MoU»] l’ arrêt puisque les instruments juridiques cités dans
cet accord sont identiques à ceux utilisés par la C our et ne peuvent donc faire parvenir les Etats
qu’à la même conclusion» 2. C’est là une position bien absolue de ce qu’est la «vérité juridique» ;
mais surtout il faut se demander ce que signifie l’ex pression «la même conclusion» ? Si elle veut
dire que la frontière à tracer doit laisser le temple au Cambodge, c’est certainement le cas ne fût-ce
que parce qu’il y a là une vérité judiciaire qui ne peut être remise en cause aujourd’hui. En
revanche, dès lors que ce résultat est atteint et que le temple est au Cambodge, rien n’interdit à la
commission mixte d’analyser le matériau ca rtographique et documentaire à sa disposition
différemment de la Cour dans les motifs de l’arrêt.
19. 9) En somme, les Parties sont en désaccord sur l’emplacement de leur frontière
commune à la fois dans cette zone et très loin du temple ; mais ce désaccord n’est pas lié à ce qui a
été décidé dans l’arrêt de 1962 ⎯ il ne décide rien sur le tracé de la frontière ; il porte, au contraire
⎯ le désaccord entre les deux Etats ⎯ sur ce qui n’y a pas été décidé dans l’arrêt de 1962.
20. 10) Dixième et dernier point de ce décalogue : l’article 60 du Statut étant la seule base
de compétence invoquée par le Cambodge, votre in compétence, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges,
pour vous prononcer sur sa prétendue requête en inte rprétation, est manifeste et, par ricochet, cela
exclut aussi, prima facie, que vous indiquiez les mesures conservatoires demandées par le
23
CR 2011/15, p. 12, par. 6 (Sorel) et p. 19, par. 7 (Berman).
24CR 2011/15, p. 12, par. 6 (Sorel). - 18 -
Cambodge et cela conduit inéluctablement à la conc lusion que l’affaire doit être rayée de votre
25
rôle .
21. Il y a d’autres raisons à ceci. Mon excellent collègue et ami, le professeur Crawford va
les aborder brièvement avec votre permission, M onsieur le président. Je vous remercie très
vivement de votre écoute.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorAlainPellet for his pleadings. Now, I invite
Professor James Crawford to take the floor.
CMRr. WFORD:
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in this brief presentation I will deal with
Cambodia’s case for provisional measures as developed in these hearings. Specifically, I will do
three things: first, I will show again the disabling disparity between the Application for
interpretation and the Request for provisional measur es. Secondly, I will summarily show that the
six requirements for provisional measures are not sa tisfied here. Finally, I will show the clear
contradiction at the heart of the Cambodian Request.
The disparity between the Application and the Request
2. Mr.President, Members of the Court, counsel for Cambodia this morning completely
failed to understand the point I was making yester day about the relationship between Articles41
and 60 or the relevance of the fact that 50 years nearly have passed since your Judgment of 1962.
Mr. President, I do not know about you, but I would like that 50 years back ⎯ I would like to start
over. But I cannot have them back, and neither can Cambodia, even under Article 60. It is not that
there is any time-limit, expressed or implied, in Artic le 60; that is obvious, even to me. It is that
an interpretation goes back to the text of the Judgment; whereas a request for provisional measures
relates to the future conduct of normally both par ties. There is a tension between the two, which
becomes ever more acute as time passes. In what he said today, about provisional measures,
25Voir Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavic.Espagne), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 773, par. 35 ; Licéité de l’emploi rce (Yougoslavie c.Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnan ce du 2juin1999, C.I.J.Recueil1999(, p.925, par.29)Demande
d’examen de la situation au titre du paragraphe 63 de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour le 20 décembre 1974 dans l’affaire des
Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle -Zélande c.France(Nouvelle-Zélande c.France) , ordonnance du 22septembre1995,
C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 306, par. 66. - 19 -
Professor Sorel completely failed to address this problem. Sir Franklin Berman did address it, but
only in the context of jurisdiction to interpret; not provisional measures. It is the latter which need
discussing here.
3. I invite the Court to read carefully the provisional measures Request sought by Cambodia;
and to ask yourselves whether and how those measur es relate to the interpretation sought. In the
ordinary case ⎯ where a Court has apparent jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute ⎯ the
provisional measures sought will fall within the scope of that jurisdiction, with a view to protecting
rights pending the merits decision. It is true that ancillary measures may be ordered, e.g.,
non-aggravation of the dispute, but you have made it clear that these will only be ordered as an
adjunct to provisional measures and not as free- standing items. Here, Cambodia’s provisional
measures Request either (A) anticipates a favourable decision on the question of interpretation; or
(B) does not relate to the question of interpretation as such at all. The point can be emphasized by
reference to the Avena case, the only case where the Court, on a request for interpretation, ordered
provisional measures. SirFranklinBerman said yesterday, that he would “be guided by the
approach that the Court has recently taken in the Avena case” 26, which he said was “similar to the
2728
present case” . In truth it was a very special case, quite unlike the present. I can count at least
five differences.
4. The first thing, it was a death penalty case, by definition involving irreparable harm.
Secondly, there was little delay: interpretation was sought soon after Avena I; Mexico did not wait
for 50 years, by which stage, even the United States procedures for death penalty cases would have
been finished. Thirdly, it concerned the fate of prisoners specifically named in the dispositif in
Avena I. In Avena I, you decided on the merits both on th e United States general obligation under
the Consular Convention and also on the specific obligations with regards those named prisoners 29.
You did the latter in paragraph 9 of the dispositif in Avena I. It was that element and that element
26CR 2011/13, p. 24, para. 2 (Berman).
27
Ibid.
28CR 2001/13, p. 30, para. 12.
29Case concerning Avena and Other Mexi can Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 72, para. 153 (9); (“Avena I”). - 20 -
30
alone of the dispositif which Mexico, in Avena II, said required interpretation . There was an
obvious link. Unlike the present case, it was not a request for interpretation of reasoning, of motifs.
There was the closest possible link between the pris oners, consistently protected by the Court, and
the dispositif in Avena I. That is the third, and we say crucial, difference.
Fo5u.rnly, Avena there was agreement between the parties as to the facts, and no
disagreement as to jurisdiction 31. To have denied provisional measures in respect of convicted
death row inmates specifically covered by the dispositif in Avena I could not have been justified.
6. Fifthly, the Parties in Avena II never joined issue over the relation between Articles41
and 60. The matter was hardly argued at all.
7. And, then, in the end, in Avena II, look what you did! You found that there was no
32
difference of interpretation which you could resolve under Article60 . It follows that there was
no disputed right to protect.
8. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is a mark of desperation to rely on Avena as
similar to the present case. It holds that provi sional measures can be granted in cases commenced
under Article60, but we do not deny that. What we do say is that the character of your
interpretation jurisdiction is such that provisiona l measures will only be available in special cases,
especially when a lengthy period has elapsed since the first judgment, especially when ⎯ as also
here ⎯ the interpretation on which Thailand has based its application of the Judgment has long
been known.
Cambodia’s case for provisional measures
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the six requirements that must be met,
for you to grant provisional measures.
10. First, there must be a dispute concerning interpretation. That m eans that in the present
case, the dispute must concern the 1962 Judgment. Your jurisdiction is not jurisdiction over the
merits forever, including the merits of any new le gal situation which that judgment creates. It is
30
Application instituting proceedings, 5 June 2008.
31See, e.g., CR 2008/15, p. 59, para. 3 (Bellinger).
32Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2009,
p. 21, para. 61 (1); (“Avena II”). - 21 -
significant that the Agent for Cambodia spoke at great length about a dispute which emerged in
2008 33. That makes all the more clear that Cambodia, is in truth, seeking the adjudication of a new
dispute, which makes Cambodia’s Application one concerning enforcement.
11. But, second, it is not enough to say there is a dispute. It must be a dispute which, prima
facie, falls within your jurisdiction.
12. Professor Pellet has already dealt with that question as it relates to the underlying request
for interpretation 34. It follows from what he said that there is no prima facie jurisdiction here.
13. Third, the party seeking measures must show there is a sufficient link between the
measures requested and the rights to be protected.
14. Not much was said on the requirement of a link today. I responded yesterday on that
35
point, and will not repeat what I said then . The only point is that Cambodia again avoids the
problem presented by its request on a request. When it tries to show that its requested measures
would have a link, it said nothing to show that these measures would have the only link that could
be sufficient: i.e., a link to the matter which you might properly be asked to adjudicate under
Article 60 — a dispute over interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.
15. In this context, I want to say a word about new facts. Sir Franklin accepts that new facts
are irrelevant to the substantive claim for interpretation 36. I accept ⎯ and did so expressly
yesterday ⎯ that whether there is a question in dispute over interpretation can only be determined
by reference to facts subsequent to the Judgment 37. That brings us to his third category ⎯ facts
relevant to provisional measures. Obviously, one needs to establish urgency in order to get
provisional measures at all, but one also needs to establish a link to the basis of claim, and here lies
the difficulty. The longer the time which has elapsed, the more attenuated that link must be.
16. Fourth, Cambodia must establish the plausibility of the putative right it seeks to protect.
17. Sir Franklin yesterday seemed to argue that, in a request for provisional measures based
on Article 60, the plausibility requirement does not exist. In the normal or typical case provisional
33CR 2011/13, pp. 20-23 (Hor).
34
CR/2011/16, p. 11, para. 6 (Pellet).
35
CR 2011/14, p. 37, para. 12 (Crawford).
36CR 2011/15, p. 25, para. 15 (Berman).
37CR 2011/14, p. 39, para. 19 (Crawford). - 22 -
measures, he said, are requested before the Court has reached a judgment on the merits. The
present case, he said, is not like that. The merits have been established 38. They have been “settled
39 40
with binding effect” . He said much the same thing this morning .
18. Mr.President, Members of the Court, if nothing else, this is an open acknowledgement
of what Cambodia in truth seeks by making its request for provisional measures. To say that all the
rights relevant in the present case have already been settled by the Judgment, is to say that the
present case is an action for enforcement.
19. This morning SirFranklin accepted the distinction between interpretation and
enforcement, but he simply assured the Court, by reference to the terms of the Application, that
only interpretation is sought. Whether or not that is true for the Application for interpretation, it is
most certainly not true of the Request for provisional measures.
20. Fifth, the situation in which the measures have been requested must be urgent.
Professor Sorel suggested yesterday morning that the urgency is connected to the risk of irreparable
harm 41. But urgency is, of course, a separate re quirement, connected though it may be. I would
only say that Thailand’s interpretation of the 1962 Judgment has been known to Cambodia for a
considerable period ⎯ indeed, from the point, a month after the Judgment, when Thailand
indicated its intention to accept the result and made known, through the United Nations, the manner
in which it would implement it. The Cabi net Decision may have been confidential ⎯ not unusual
for cabinet decisions ⎯, but the content of the Decision was immediately published in the Thai
42
Foreign Ministry newsletter and communicate d to the United Nations Secretary-General .
Subsequently, the fact that the decision had been made and its essential parameters were published
in a variety of forms including in the Thai map, annexed to the Request for interpretation as
Annex 3. It is simply not the case that the position was kept as a surprise until recently.
38
CR2011/13, p. 30, para. 13 (Berman).
39
Ibid.
40CR 2011/15, p. 25, para. 16 (Berman).
41CR 2011/13, p. 42, para. 10 (Sorel).
42
Judges’ folder, tab2: Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Vol.1, No.6 (June-July 1962); Le tter of Foreign Minister of
the Kingdom of Thailand to the Secretary-General of the Un ited Nations, 12 July 1962. Cf.CR 2011/14, p.10, para.2
(Plasai). - 23 -
21. Sixth, there is the risk of irreparable harm . I dealt with this yesterday, and given that it
was scarcely mentioned this morning, I have nothing to add.
Concluding observations
22. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the indispensable requirement for a request for
interpretation is that there be a difference of interpretation in respect of something the Court
actually decided. A request cannot be granted if ther e is no such difference. It is striking in this
regard, that Sir Franklin said yesterday that “T hailand did after all, however reluctantly, accept the
43
Court’s Judgment and did, after all, acknowledge its binding force” . Now, nowhere in your
Statute does it say that a party mu st accept a judgment of the Court with enthusiasm. If Thailand
was “reluctant” in 1962 the reason, perhaps, coul d be found in some of the positions the Court
took. The Court never faced up to the fact that the Temple lies manifestly on the Thai side of the
44
watershed . Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, to be fair, did so . The Court held, on flimsy evidence, that a
treaty line had been displaced by conduct 45. The Court held that a Prince behaving as an
46
ever-polite tourist had consented to the sovereignty of a foreign power . But, whatever its
misgivings, Thailand accepted the Judgment. As Sir Franklin observed, Thailand “acknowledge[d]
its binding force” 47. If Thailand accepted the result and accepted the result as binding, then where
is the question of interpretation.
23. In his pleading this morning, ProfessorSorel contended that it was not the intention of
Cambodia to obtain a provisional judgment on the merits 48. But what Professor Sorel contends the
intention is behind Cambodia’s argument is not what matters; what matters is what Cambodia has
actually requested by way of provisional measur es. In the present case, Cambodia has presented
the Court with a request, in which the Court would have to decide what constitutes the “area of the
Temple”; the Court could not grant the requested measures without deciding that question, and to
43
CR 2011/13, p. 29, para. 11 (Berman).
44See dissenting opinion of J udge Sir Percy Spender, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp.122-124; dissenting opinion of
Judge Wellington Koo, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p.98, paras.50-51; separate opin ion of Judge SirGe rald Fitzmaurice,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 55.
45
See dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 122-124.
46Ibid., pp. 30-31.
47CR 2011/13, p. 29, para. 11 (Berman).
48
CR 2011/15, pp. 15-16, para. 10 (Sorel). - 24 -
do so would have the precise effect of prejudging the case that the Court determined that the
boundary was settled on the basis of the Annex I map line. Thailand’s objection that an award of
provisional measures in this case would involve prejudging the merits still stands.
24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as we have shown, Cambodia now advances a case
theory that would overstep the bounds of interpretation and which is unsupported by your
jurisprudence on Article60 49. Cambodia supposes that its rather unspecific allusions suggesting
that the recent disputes along the boundary are di rectly related to the Temple will cover up the
deficiencies in that claim. It apparently hopes to obtain at the provisional measures stage ⎯ before
the case has been properly pleaded ⎯ a result which it suspects it will not reach at the merits stage.
It asks you to exceed the proper bounds of Article 41. This, with the respect, you should decline to
do
25. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I referred at the outset of my presentation
yesterday to the contradiction at the heart of Cambodia’s request. Actually, there were two
contradictions. One I referred to yesterday, is as follows. If this Request concerns interpretation of
50
what was said in 1962 then it is not new, and if it is new then it is not interpretation . Cambodia
completely failed to address that problem this morning. But there is a second contradiction,
revealed by the contradiction between counsel yesterday as to whether Thailand accepts your
decision of 1962 or not. Sir Franklin said we do 51, Professor Sorel said we do not 52. They cannot
have it both ways, you might think! But what if we did not accept it? That would reinforce the
point that this is in truth a misguided attempt at an action for enforcement. Are we to be penalized
in terms of Article 60 because we did accept the J udgment? Surely not. Yet counsel needs us to
accept the Judgment for the purposes of avoiding the characterization of this case as an
enforcement case, and thereby sustaining your jurisdiction in that respect ⎯ while at the same time
they need us to reject the Judgment in order to sustain there is a dispute over an element of the
dispositif in another respect.
49CR 2011/14, pp. 28-29, para. 19 (Pellet).
50
CR 2011/14, p. 44, para. 26 (Crawford).
51CR 2011/13, p. 29, para. 10 (Berman).
52CR 2011/13, pp. 39-40, paras. 6-7 (Sorel). - 25 -
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in this way too, Cambodia’s case is confused and
contradictory. In respect of provisional measures it does not satisfy the criteria for such measures,
notably in light of the fact that the only basis claim is a request for interpretation of an ancient
text.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention. Mr.President, I would
ask you to call upon the Agent of Thailand to close Thailand’s case.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorJamesCr awford for his presentation. Now I am
inviting to the floor, HisExcellency,AmbassadorVi rachaiPlasai, Agent of Thailand, to make his
concluding statement.
PMLr.SAI:
Introduction
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, allow me to conclude by highlighting
two key words that encapsulate Thailand’s position towards the subject before us here and the overall
relations with Cambodia which flow from Tha iland’s fundamental commitment to justice and
peace that I elaborated yesterday. They are: (1 )consistency and (2)sincerity. I will elaborate
them in turn.
Consistency
2. First, Thailand has been consistent in he r position. That position is simply that Thailand
did accept the Court’s Judgment in 1962 and fully complied with it and Cambodia herself did
accept that Thailand has given full compliance with the decision. You heard ProfessorPellet’s
reference to Prince Sihanouk.
3.Thailand has also been consistent in her position that the Court in 1962 did not rule on the
boundary line. That question was left to be mutually determined in accordance with international
law. And as things stand, that question is to be determined, and is be ing determined, under the
existing bilateral mechanism sub sequently and mutually establis hed by both countries under the
2000 Memorandum of Understanding. Pending demarcation of the boundary, we have been - 26 -
consistently adhering to the Thai Cabinet line of 1962. We did not change our position about the
boundary in 2007 ⎯ nor any other time for that matter ⎯ as alleged by Cambodia.
4. Thailand has also been consistent in her position regarding inscription of the Temple of
Phra Viharn on the World Heritage List. The Te mple requires a buffer zone as a World Heritage
site, and that can only be found in Thai territory. We understand that, and have always been ready
and willing to undertake a joint nomination with Cam bodia. It is Cambodia’s constant refusal of
such joint undertaking that is the root cause of the problems that have arisen over the inscription.
As the timeline approaches and the prospect is still uncertain, a “conflict by design” triggering the
indication of an artificial provisional measures by the Court as a backdoor to clear the area for the
much-desired buffer zone to be included in the management plan at the World Heritage Committee
meeting at the end of next month, is a strategy that Thailand understandably resists.
Sincerity
5. Mr. President, I now turn to the second fundamental position that Thailand has held dear in
all her dealings with Cambodia, that is sincerity. To portray the relationship between Thailand and
Cambodia in terms of unequal power relationship is wrong and disingenuous. The picture is that of
two neighbouring countries sharing a common bor der approximately 800km long where people
engage in peaceful activities every day throughout th e year. This is the fact between peoples of
Thailand and Cambodia ⎯ the fact that has not and will not change.
6. Therefore, it was regrettable to hear a re peated Cambodian narrative of the weak against
the strong.
7.In this connection, I will deal with some of the Cambodian allegations made yesterday and
this morning that simply have no basis.
8. First, there is no such thing as a “secret ” map as dramatically claimed by Cambodia’s
counsel. Thailand has neither secret designs nor territorial ambitions against Cambodia. We only
want to keep what is strictly ours under interna tional law, and are ready to resume with good faith
and sincerity our bilateral boundary negotiation with Cambodia as soon as possible. It is important
to stress once more that the issue of the boundary is not the subject-matter of the 1962 Judgment,
nor does it concern our current proceedings today. - 27 -
9. Second, the so-called Pagoda was not built in 1996 or 1998 as claimed by Cambodia’s
counsel. It was built years later. And this has been subject to constant protests from Thailand at
both local and diplomatic levels.
10. Third, Cambodia counsel’s attempt to portray Thailand as trigger-happy bent on
damaging the Temple was untruthful and obscured th e fact that Cambodia stationed her troops in
the Temple, using it as a military base to attack Thailand in contravention of the 1954Hague
Convention. Thailand merely acted in self-defence in accordance with the principles of
proportionality and directed only at locations fro m where Cambodia launched attacks. And here
lies an interesting inconsistency in Cambodi a’s position. On one hand, the Cambodian
Prime Minister confirmed at the ASEAN Summit meeting in Jakarta on 8 May 2011 that there were
no Cambodian troops at the Temple, despite photos pointing to the contrary. On the other hand,
Cambodia’s counsel yesterday did not dispute the ex istence of Cambodian so ldiers at the Temple
when he argued in favour of Cambodia’s refusal to calls for demilitarization of the Temple. Let me
be clear, this is not about the Judgment. This is not about reclaiming the Temple. It is about the
respect for the 1954 Hague Convention to which Cambodi a is a party. Above all, it is a matter of
common sense. The Temple must not be a military base.
11. Fourth, consistent with Thailand’s commitment to peace, Thailand has been actively
participating in disarmament negotiations, including on the Convention relating to Cluster Munitions,
although Thailand is not yet party to it. From this basis, Thailand did not use cluster munitions
according to her understand ing of the term. In this regard, it is interesting to note in parallel
Cambodia’s past record in disarma ment. In 2008, it was reported to the IXth Meeting of States
Parties of the landmine prohibition Convention, to which both Cambodia and Thailand are parties,
that newly planted anti-personnel landmines have been used against Thai soldiers in Thai territory
near the Temple of Phra Viharn in October 2008.
12. Fifth, Cambodia’s counsel claimed that the Thai Parliament completed its internal
process concerning the JBC Agreed Minutes on 1 May 2011, and that it was completed only
because Cambodia had filed its request for interpretati on on 28 April. The fact is that the internal
legal process of Thailand was completed on 19 April 201 1. This was widely reported by the press.
On the same day Cambodian senior officials including the Deputy Agent of Cambodia, who is - 28 -
present here, gave a press interview acknowledging this fact. This was well before Cambodia filed
the Request.
13. Sixth, Thailand’s domestic politics has nothing to do with the issue before us today as
claimed by Cambodia’s counsel. Thailand is a functioning democracy with a parliamentary
system. Matters relating to sovereignty are strictly regulated by the Parliament as in many other
countries. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Raising the issue of Thailand’s political
situation by Cambodia cannot be seen other than as a desperate attempt to put together different,
unconnected things. Worse, it is irrelevant to the case and to the reality on the ground.
14. Seventh, the Cambodian civilians living in the immediate surrounding area of the Temple
53
have not been living there for a long time, as Cambodia would have the Court believe . They
were put there on purpose only recently to serve political motives that are entirely outside the scope
of these proceedings.
15. Eighth, there is no risk of aggravation of the dispute due to Thailand’s behaviour, as
Cambodia’s counsel attempted yesterday to have the Court believe 54. The reality is that, as all the
armed incidents that took place were initiated ⎯ or sometimes even predicted ⎯ by Cambodia
itself, any aggression could only happen if Cambodia decided to do so.
16. Ninth, Cambodia’s counsel accused Thailand of moving the conflict away from the
PhraViharn Temple to the TaKwai and TaMuen Temples, situated about 150km away, because
of the 28April ceasefire, a ceasefire that Tha iland only accepted because the present proceedings
was initiated at the Court by Cambodia the same day 55. The fact is that, first, the 28April local
ceasefire concerns the sector of the TaKwai and TaMuen Temples, not the PhraViharn Temple.
How could Thailand, presumably to circumvent a ceasefire, start conflict in a location for which
that very ceasefire has been agreed? Moreover, the ceasefire was concluded locally at 08.05 hours
local time, that is, 03.05 hours in the morning in The Hague, whereas the Cambodian Request was
filed at the Court around 17.00hours local time on the same day, that is some 14hours after the
ceasefire. Cambodia simply contradicts itself in its attempt to mislead the Court. Let me stress that
5CR 2011/13, p. 44, para. 14 (Sorel).
54
Ibid., pp. 45-48, paras. 15-19.
5Ibid., p. 45, para. 17. - 29 -
Thailand agreed to the 28 April ceasefire in good faith, regardless of any legal proceedings, only to
see it violated some 11hours after Cambodia filed their Application, as if an urgency by design
was somehow required to justify the latter’s provisional measure request. In any case, as
Professor McRae showed the Court yesterday, events at the Ta Kwai and Ta Muen Temples are of
no relevance to the present proceedings.
17. In fact, it was Cambodia, not Thailand, who moved the conflict away from the Temple of
Phra Viharn to this new location.
[Beginning of slide 3] 56
This is because the situation at Phra Viharn seems to have returned to normality after the
February clashes. As shown in these pictures taken as recently as 25 May this year – some six days
ago, Mr.President, officers and soldiers of both sides have maintained close working and social
contacts. Thailand is committed to maintaining this positive atmosphere.
[End of Slide 3]
At the same time, contrary to Cambodi a’s assertion, the ASEAN process of ceasefire
negotiations was progressing well, and the bilate ral boundary negotiations under the JBC could
resume by the last week of April when the Thai internal process for the three previous agreed
minutes was completed. In this context, Cambodia needed to find something else to portray
urgency justifying its provisional measure request.
18. Tenth, Cambodia’s counsel this morning referred to the incident of 26 April 2011 which
had been mentioned by ProfessorMcRae yesterday. Indeed, ProfessorSorel seemed grateful for
Thailand mentioning this incident because finally, Cambodia was able to link the Temple area with
a recent incident that might justify the ordering of provisional measures. But, this simply shows
the bankruptcy in Cambodia’s position. Up un til this morning Cambodia had just made vague
allusions about incidents in the Temple area, impl ying that all of the incidents of April-May 2011
occurred there. When it was explained to the Court that this was not so, Professor Sorel, clutching
at straws, tried to give the impression that what Cambodia had apparently overlooked was in fact
56
See the judges’ folder, tab 26. - 30 -
central to its case. But, none of this gets away from the essential point that Cambodia has simply
not made a case for any urgency in respect of its request for provisional measures.
19. The best that Cambodia has been able to do, as we heard again from Professor Sorel this
morning, is to paint a vague picture of the past incidents near the Temple of Pra Viharn being a
precipitator of incidents elsewhere in the country. Then, the fact of incidents elsewhere in the
country means that it is likely that there will be future incidents at the Temple ⎯ some kind of
perverse reverse loop that justifies the Court in awarding provisional measures in respect of the
area of the Temple. But all of this is conjecture, not based on facts. A real analysis of the facts
would ask questions about why Cambodian troops were moved from the Temple of Pra Viharn area
to Ta Muen and Ta Kwai just before the attacks by Cambodian troops against Thai forces occurred.
20. But, of course, Mr.President, none of this sort of conjecture about the relationship of
incidents in one part of the country with the possibility of incidents in another part of the country is
of assistance to you in deciding this case. The Court cannot order provisional measures in respect
of the Temple area on the basis of some kind of supposition that conflict elsewhere in respect of
different temples and a different boundary creates a likelihood of irreparable harm in the area of the
Temple.
21. Eleventh, Cambodia’s counsel asked this morning what appears to him to be a simple
question: why a peace-loving country like Th ailand did not resort to the United Nations
mechanism if she sees herself as the victim of Cambodia’s alleged armed aggression? I would then
reply in what appears to be a simple explanation. First, the right of self defence is an inherent right,
exercised in the face of instant and overwhelming necessity. In any case, when deemed necessary,
Thailand immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. The Court is fully
informed by my letter dated 26May2011 of the two letters of our Prime Minister and Foreign
Ministers to the United Nations Security Council reporting the situation in early February.
22. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, at the end of these observations on
Cambodia’s request for provisional measures, you are left with two simple things to decide:
Are the events relied on sufficient to establish an urgent need to protect rights in dispute
from irreparable harm pending the outcome of the interpretation requested? - 31 -
Is there prima facie jurisdiction in this case for the Court to entertain a request for
provisional measures?
In respect of the former, Thailand has de monstrated that there is no basis on which
provisional measures could be ordered in this case.
In respect of the latter, Thailand has demons trated that there is no dispute between the
Parties over the meaning or scope of the Judgment of 1962. The request for interpretation is an
attempt to get the Court to determine something that was not decided in 1962. On that basis, not
only is there no prima facie jurisdiction, there is simply no justification for moving on to any
question of interpretation.
23. Mr. President, I will now place on record Thailand’s submissions:
Final submission
24. In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court and having regard to the Request for
the indication of provisional measures of the Kingdom of Cambodia and its oral pleadings, the
Kingdom of Thailand respectfully requests the Court to remove the case introduced by the
Kingdom of Cambodia on 28 April 2011 from the General List.
25. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, to conclude our participation in this
stage of oral proceedings, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Roya l Thai Government, our
appreciation to you, Mr.President, and each of the distinguished Members of the Court, for your
kind attention to our presentations. May I also offe r our thanks to the Court’s Registrar, his staff
and to the interpreters and translators.
26. Finally, I would also like to thank publicly the skilful counsel and all the members of our
delegation. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, Ambassador Virachai Plasai, Agent of Thailand
for his concluding statement, including the final submission. This brings the present series of
sittings to an end. But before closing, one Member of the Court wishes to put a question to both of
the Parties. I shall now give the floor to JudgeCançado Trindade. I call upon
Judge Cançado Trindade. - 32 -
M. le juge CANÇADO TRINDADE : Merci, Monsieur le président.
Dans la demande en indication de mesures con servatoires objet de la présente procédure, il
est notamment indiqué que les incidents qui se s ont produits depuis le 22 avril 2011 dans «la zone
du temple de PréahVihéar» ainsi qu’en d’autres lie ux situés le long de la frontière entre les deux
Etats parties au différend ont provoqué des «morts, blessés et évacuations de populations».
Les Parties peuvent-elles donner à la Cour de plus amples informations concernant le
déplacement de ces populations? Combien d’ha bitants ont été déplacés? Ceux-ci ont-ils pu
retourner en toute sécurité et volontairement dans leurs foyers? Où dans la région sont-ils
installés ? Y sont-ils installés depuis longtemps ? Quel est leur mode de vie ? Quelle est la densité
de population dans la région ?
Pour préserver l’équilibre linguistique de la C our, je me permets de poser la même question
aux Parties en anglais.
In the present request for the indication of pr ovisional measures by the Court, it is stated,
inter alia, that, as a result of the incidents occurred si nce 22 April 2011 in “the area of the Temple
of Preah Vihear”, as well as at other places al ong the boundary between the two contending States,
“fatalities, injuries and the displacement of local inhabitants” were caused.
What further information can be provided by the Parties to the Court about such displaced
local inhabitants? How many inhabitants were displaced? Have they safely and voluntarily
returned to their homes? Whereabouts do they live in the region? Have they been settled there for
a long time? What is their modus vivendi? What is the population density of the region?
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Cançado Trindade.
The text of the questions will be sent to the Parties as soon as possible. The Parties are
invited to provide their written replies to the questions by Tuesday 7 June at 6 p.m. at the latest.
In addition, Article 72 of the Rules of the Court provides that any written reply by a party to
a question put under Article 61, or supplied by a party under Article 62 of these Rules, received by
the Court after the closure of the oral proceedings shall be communicated to the other party which
shall be given the opportunity of commenting upon it . Now, in accordance with this rule, the other - 33 -
party is given this opportunity to offer comments, and that deadline is set for Tuesday 14 June 2011
at 6 p.m. at the latest.
It remains for me to thank the representatives of the two Parties for the assistance they have
given the Court by their oral observations in the course of these four hearings. I ask the Agents to
remain at the Court’s disposal.
The Court will render its Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures as
soon as possible. The date on which this Order w ill be delivered at a public sitting will be duly
communicated to the Agents of the Parties.
As the Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 6.15 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le lundi 30 mai 2011, à 17 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à la Demande en interprétation de l'arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l'affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)