Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/7
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 22 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 22 mars 2011, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,
Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel;
Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,
Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Assistants; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,
M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme conseils ;
M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,
Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,
MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des
affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme assistants ; - 6 -
Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;
Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -
MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;
M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,
MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,
Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,
Csounsel;
Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Asdvisers;
H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,
MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents ;
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,
M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseillers ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -
Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,
as Diplomatic Advisers;
Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,
Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,
as Administrative Staff. - 11 -
M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,
comme conseillers diplomatiques ;
M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,
M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,
comme personnel administratif. - 12 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. This afternoon the Court continues
the first round presentation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Professor
Phillipe Sands will continue his presentation, so, le t me invite Professor Phillipe Sands to take the
floor and continue his presentation.
SMANr.DS:
II. The Respondent’s breach of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord
cannot be justified on the basis of exceptio
32. Thank you very much, Mr.President. I now turn to address the Respondent’s second
excuse, the purported role of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. Now, this too appeared, out of
the blue, in January 2010, in th e Respondent’s first written pleading. It might be called the mouse
that roared 1. The Respondent describes it as an “excepti on of non-performance” which is derived
2
from a so-called “general principle of reciprocity” . It suffers from, it might be said, a number of
problems: there is the minor difficulty that it has never before been invoked by this Court for the
purposes sought by the Respondent; there is the little matter of the fact that the International Law
Commission declined to follow th e approach for which the Respondent argues; there is the not
inconsequential consideration that the use of the exceptio for which the Respondent argues would
entirely rewrite the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility; and ⎯ last but not least ⎯
there is the observable fact that where it does feature in the writings of leading commentators ⎯
including some in this room ⎯ it does so exclusively on the basis that it is reflected and applicable
3
exclusively in the law of treaties, in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .
To the extent the principle does exist, it can do so only in the detailed and conditional rules that
have developed within the law of treaties and perhaps also the law of State responsibility, as
reflected in the view put by the former Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission, to
which I made reference yesterday 4. Yet it is clear to all in this room that the Respondent failed to
1
RCM, paras. 8.1-8.62; AR, paras. 5.46-5.83; RR, paras. 8.6-8.23.
2
CM, para. 8.3.
3See, e.g., P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, Droit International Public, 8 éd., 2009, at pp. 339-341.
4CR 2011/5 (Sands), especially para. 26. See also judges’ folder, tab 2, plate 6. - 13 -
adhere to the law of treaties or to the law of St ate responsibilities in its conduct: and that is what
has forced it to rely heavily on a broad principle that is novel, unsupported in practice, lacking the
support of the International Law Commission, and deeply damaging to well-established rules of
international law.
33. As with the Article 22 argument, the Respondent raised the “exception of
non-performance” for the first time almost two y ears after it objected to the Applicant’s NATO
membership. So, this too is an ex post facto justification of a breach of Article11, concocted by
the lawyers, or maybe just some of them, since it s eems to us pretty clear that they do not all agree
with it.
T3he. exceptio is invoked by the Respondent in the following way: it claims that “as long
as [the Applicant] does not comply with its obligations under the 1995 Accord, [the Respondent] is
5
entitled not to comply with its own obligations under the same instrument” . Now, this principle, it
has to be said, offers the Respondent a numb er of convenient advantages. First, “the exceptio
defence can be invoked at any time” 6, as the Respondent says; second, “no procedural
7
requirements” need be complied with in order to invoke it, the Respondent says; third, it requires
no prior notice ⎯ and indeed the Respondent gave no prior notice ⎯ and; fourth, it is capable of
being applied unilaterally with no objective criteria having to be satisfied. One might say what a
terrific new rule of international law ⎯ one wonders why it took so long ⎯ until 2010 ⎯ for it to
be discovered? It has marvellous consequences. A State does not like the way a treaty partner is
acting, and all it has to do is allege some sort of non-performance and ⎯ hey presto! ⎯ all the
safeguards carefully put in place by States in the law of treaties and in the law of State
responsibility just melt away.
35. The Respondent cannot rely on the law of treaties, as it knows, and we say it cannot rely
on the law of State responsibility. It never raised this particular version of the exceptio with the
Applicant, and obviously none of the Respondent’s legal advisers thought to alert the Foreign
Minister, or the Prime Minister, or the Ambassador to the United Nations of its existence and of its
5RCM, para. 8.3.
6
Ibid., para. 8.3.
7Ibid., para. 8.26. - 14 -
role. It has been invoked at a late stage for the purpose of enabling the Respondent to defend itself
against a claim that it violated Article11. To be able to succeed, even on its own case, the
Respondent has got to show two things: first, that the “exception of non-performance” is a
recognized principle of general international law; and second, that the Applicant has failed to
perform an obligation that is relevant under the Accord. The Respondent manifestly fails on both
counts on its own case.
36. Mr.President, the exceptio is not a principle of international law applicable to treaty
relations between States in the way it has been argued for. It does not appear in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ⎯ at least not in the form the Respondent would like ⎯ and it
8
is nowhere to be found in the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility . It
exists, according to the pleading of the Respondent, as a “[g]eneral principle[] of law recognized by
9
civilized nations” which falls to be applied by the Court under Article 38 (1) (c) of its Statute .
37. This claim is entirely without merit. The Respondent seeks to rely on a principle that has
never been recognized by any international court or tribunal in modern times. What case law does
it rely on? Well, it has managed to find the dissenting opinions of two judges in a single Permanent
Court of International Justice case that dated back to 1937 10, long before the adoption of the
superseding Vienna Convention. Beyond that, the Respondent has also found a couple of academic
articles ⎯ but if you read them carefully, you will see that they do not support the proposition upon
which they seek reliance, and it has also found a single, 1983 arbitral award under the rules of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ⎯ but they seem not to have read it
very carefully because that award applied the exceptio as a principle of national law, of French law,
11
and in any event ⎯ as we all know ⎯ that award was later annulled . The Respondent simply has
no support for its version of the exceptio as a principle of general international law.
8
Responsibility of States for In ternationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
2001, Vol. II, Part Two.
9
RCM, para. 8.9.
10Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, 1937, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 70; ibid.; RR para. 8.7.
11Klöckner v. Cameroon, Award of 21 October 1983, ILR, Vol. 114, p. 211. - 15 -
38. The Respondent has sought recourse to a legal fiction, and it has done so because it
cannot meet the requirements of the Vienna Conve ntion on the Law of Treaties. The Respondent
has not even tried to justify its actions under the 1969 Convention, and in particular its Article 60 12.
39. Article60 is obviously relevant, in circumstances in which the Respondent now,
belatedly, claims that the Applicant h as “materially breached” the Interim Accord 13; yet another
claim, as we know, that only saw the light of day after April 2008. Article 60 sets out a complete
set of rules regulating the permissible responses to a material breach by one party to a treaty; it
provides that “[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in
part”. However, as the Court will know, for very good reasons this rule is subject to strict
procedural requirements. They are set out in Articles 65 to 68 of the Convention. At no point
before April 2008, after it had breached its Article11 obligations, did the Respondent even
formally assert in writing the Applicant was in ma terial breach of the Interim Accord as the
Convention requires. And it has not formally inv oked Article60 to suspend the operation of the
obligation not to object in Article 11 as it is re quired to do under Articles 65 and 67 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
40. So, the Respondent is left with what one might call the Athenian version of the exceptio
because it did not follow the requirements of Arti cle60. So it claims that the exception of
14
non-performance is “rooted in the law of State responsibility and not in the law of treaties” .
Now, this argument may perhaps best be described as a lonely one, it is utterly bereft of any
obvious support. Indeed, I would say with great respect to them, there are a number of colleagues
on the other side of the room, and before me, who know a thing or two about the law of State
responsibility. Yet there is nothing in the efforts, in the 1990s in particular, of the International
Law Commission to provide any support whatsoever for the proposition that the Athenian version
of the exceptio is a general principle of international law, applicable in the manner identified by the
Respondent. The International Law Commission’ s Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility
12
See, for example, RCM, para 8.12: “Greece does not argue the suspension of the Accord”.
13
See RCM, paras. 4.44; 4.73; 4.82; 8. 27(f); 8.29; 8.32; 8.41; 8.43; 8. 51; 8.59; 8.61; 9.3; 9.6 and RR,
paras. 1.22; 6.32; 7.4; 7.16; 7.81; 8.3; 9.1; and 9.6.
14RCM, para. 8.13. - 16 -
returned to this concept in 2001, in an acad emic article. What did the Special Rapporteur
conclude? Well, he expressed the view that “uncer tainty remains as to the status of the exception
of non-performance in international law”. That seems to open a possible door. But then he adds,
perhaps for good measure: “it has not established an independent place as a rule or principle of
15
international law” . And finally, lest we had not quite got the message, he put in a warm
Australian boot and said that the exceptio could not be categorized as a principle of international
16
law “in the sense of Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice” .
41. Now, it is true that in preparing the ILC Draft Articles, some Members of that
distinguished body did indeed give some attention to a more narrowly-defined version of the
exception of non-performance. There was debate, fo r example, as to whether this narrow version
could preclude wrongfulness resulting from the failure to perform a conventional obligation “if the
State has been prevented from acting in conformity with the obligation as a direct result of a prior
breach of the same or a related international obligation” 17. It is abundantly clear that this disputed
version does not assist the Respondent. Why? Because it was not prevented from performing the
obligation of non-objection by a prior breach of th e Accord by the Applicant; the reality, as the
evidence makes very clear, is that the Respondent chose not to perform its obligation. The
Respondent’s Foreign Minister, MsBakoyannis, made this very clear in the interview of
October 2007. But in any event, even this vers ion will not assist the Respondent. Why? Because
it was rejected by the International Law Commission and it does not figure in the final text. This is
not an exceptio or principle that is resting or sleeping, or stunned, or even comatose. It is dead.
T4he. exceptio on which the Respondent now purports to rely to justify its breach of
Article11 is broader and more fa r-reaching than the limited version rejected by the Commission.
The Respondent invokes the concept of reciprocity 18. It claims that it is only because the Applicant
undertook to “reform its antagonistic and irredentist behaviour, to be referred to as the FYROM in
15
J. Crawford and S. Olleson, “The Exception of Non-Pe rformance: Links between the Law of Treaties and the
Law of State Responsibility”, 21 Australian Yearbook of International Law, 2001, pp. 56 and 73.
16
Ibid., p. 73.
17International Law Commission, Second Report on State Responsibility, Mr. James Crawford, Special
Rapporteur, A/CN.4/498/Add.2, Article 30bis, pp. 57-58; emphasis added.
18RCM, para. 8.19. - 17 -
international organisations, and to negotiate in good faith, that Greece accepted ‘not to object’” . 19
Professor Murphy dealt with the facts earlier this day.
43. But this argument is self-serving and unsustainable as a matter of law and fact. First, the
Respondent has mischaracterized Article11 of th e Interim Accord. Article11 does not create a
self-standing obligation on the Applicant to be referred to as “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia” in international organizations; rather, it creates a condition that, if not fulfilled, allows
an objection to be made. Second, the other two ob ligations to which the Respondent refers, in this
respect, are enumerated in Article5 of the Accord, that is to say the obligation to continue
negotiations on the dispute over the Applicant’s na me in good faith, and Article 7, to refrain from
hostile activities. These obligations, unlike Article11, apply to both Parties and cannot by their
nature be given by the Applicant in exchange for an obligation undertaken solely by the
Respondent.
44. The Respondent now claims that the A pplicant has somehow breached Articles 5 and 7
of the Interim Accord ⎯ although it has not brought a claim; it has not brought a counter-claim to
that effect ⎯ and also Article 6 (2) of the Interim Accord. Now, you are obviously going to hear a
huge amount on Thursday and Friday about our appalling behaviour ⎯ far more, I suspect, in a day
and a half, than we heard in 13 years betwee n 1995 and 2008, when th e notion did not seem to
figure much in the consciousness of the Respondent. But in our written pleadings we have
explained why the factual allegations are simply w ithout foundation. And, they were not raised in
any way to justify the act of objection: we do not see how they can now support the Respondent’s
reliance on the exception of non-performance.
45. For the Respondent’s exceptio defence is premised on the assertion of a principle that
where one party to a treaty has breached one or more obligations, then the injured party will be able
to withhold the execution of its own obligations, “which are synallagmatic to the ones not
20
performed by the other Party” . Now, I emphasize the word synallagmatic, for that is at the heart
of the Respondent’s claim.
19
RCM, para. 8.20.
2Ibid., para. 8.15. - 18 -
46. And I do so because the obligations set forth in Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Interim Accord
are not, as claimed by the Respondent, synallagmatica lly connected to Article 11: the Respondent
has provided no argument or evidence to support the claim that the obligation set forth in Article 11
falls to be performed on a quid pro quo basis as the Respondent is claiming. These obligations
enumerated in the Interim Accord are not causally linked in this way. Even if the Applicant had
breached any of the obligations to which the Respondent refers ⎯ which it has not done and is not
the case ⎯ it would not be relevant to these proceedings because the breach of one or more
provisions of the Interim Accord by the Applicant cannot justify the breach of Article11 by the
Respondent. That is why States negotiated and ad opted Article60 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties: that is the process to be followed in circumstances in which a material breach
of a treaty is alleged to have occurred.
47. This case is not about material breaches of Articles 5, 6 and 7. If it were about material
breaches of Articles5, 6 and 7, the Respondent would have brought a case to this Court alleging
such violations, but it has not done so. And it might be the case if the Respondent had brought a
counter-claim, but it has not done so. Indeed, in its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent confirmed
that it did not seek to argue that any portion of the Interim Accord had been suspended or
21
terminated due to a material breach . At no point did the Respondent pursue the procedures set
forth in Article 60 and it would be wholly improper now to seek to raise such a defence. Instead,
the Respondent is proceeding off the back of a novel, unprecedented and invented principle for
which no authority has been found, and which wa s rejected by our distinguished friends and
colleagues on the other side of the room when they were wearing their International Law
Commission hats.
48. In any event, and for the avoidance of doubt, there is no credible evidence of material
breaches by the Applicant. We have dealt with this very fully in the written pleadings and we do
not intend to repeat the points here. I will refer you simply to paragraphs5.12-5.20 of the
Memorial and 5.84-5.99 of the Reply 22. Specifically, the claim that the Applicant has somehow
violated its obligation to continue good faith ne gotiations on the dispute over the name, as required
21
RCM, para. 8.2.
2AM, paras. 5.12-5.20; AR, paras. 5.84-5.99. - 19 -
by Article 5, is patently unarguable ⎯ it does not get off the ground ⎯ in circumstances in which
the United Nations Special Envoy, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, has commended both Parties for their
efforts. His latest statement was given on 9 Febr uary 2011, just a month ago. Did he criticize the
Respondent? No. Did he criticize the Applican t? No. He commended both Parties for their
23
“positive attitude towards moving forward on [the name] issue” .
49. Mr. President, if this Court is a court of law, as it surely is, if it is to promote the law of
treaties, this defence should be given very short shrift. It seeks to replace a system designed to
ensure the stability of treaty relations with arra ngements that allow a State party to a treaty to
circumvent its obligations on a whim, without giving notice, without being required to meet any
procedural requirement or without being based on any standards capable of objective application.
We made all these arguments in our Reply, respon ding to this new line of argument made in the
Respondent’s Counter-Memorial. The Respondent’s Rejoinder does not respond to any of these
points, a clear sign, we say, that its authors recognize the hopelessness of the argument. We trust
that you will reject this claim, and do so very firmly.
III. The Respondent’s breach of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord cannot
be justified on the basis of countermeasures
50. Let me turn then, finally, to the Responde nt’s third excuse, a “defence” it is described,
although, with respect, it is rather generous to give it that nomenclature: the claim is that it was
entitled to act by way of lawful countermeasures 24. Now this is very curious. In its
25
Counter-Memorial, the Respondent says that it “does not rely” on countermeasures . But then in
its Rejoinder ⎯ presumably confronted with the appalling reality of the limited prospects of its
arguments on Article 22 and the exceptio ⎯ the argument on countermeasures comes roaring back
into life ⎯ well, roaring is probably a bit generous, whimpering back into life. On the other hand,
it has to be said, walking into Court this morn ing with my colleague ProfessorSeanMurphy, he
said to me as I was thinking and preparing, at least it is a legal argument.
23
“Nimetz ⎯ No New Proposal”, VOA News, 9 February 2011.
24
AM, paras. 5.41-5.54; RCM, para. 8.29; AR, para. 5.3; RR, paras. 8.24-8.40.
25RCM, para. 8.3; see also para. 8.1. - 20 -
51. We pre-empted this argument in our Memorial 26. The legal régime governing
countermeasures under the Law of State Responsibil ity is well established. The Commission’s
Draft Articles establish a comprehensive régime regulating the use of countermeasures in
27
international law, as set out in its Articles 49-54. These rules reflect general international law .
52. Three conditions have to be met for a State to be able to exercise lawful
countermeasures. First, the measures can only be taken in response to a previously committed
wrong. Second, countermeasures can only be taken after the injured State has given notice to the
State committing the allegedly wrongful act and calls upon it to discontinue the wrongful conduct
in question. And third, countermeasures must be proportionate. The Respondent has failed to
establish that any of these three conditions has been met.
53. In relation to the first condition, there was no previous breach of the Interim Accord by
the Applicant. The Respondent’s new claims of material breach are part of its overall strategy to
divert attention from its violation of Article 11, yet another ex post facto attempt to justify unlawful
conduct. This is patently obvious from the steady stream of diplomatic Notes Verbales sent to
Applicant after the Bucharest Summit. Count the numbe r of Notes Verbales sent between 1995
and April 2008 in the Respondent’s pleadings and then count the number that have been sent,
landed on our desks, it has to be said very sadly, after that date of April 2008. If you look at the
dates of the Notes Verbales set forth in the annexes of these pleadings, it is readily apparent that
there is a correlation between the filing of this case in November 2008 and the catalytic effect this
seems to have had on the need to create a proper paper trail that would justify the allegations of
material breach. The fact is that the Respondent has got a real evidentiary problem: we know that
some international lawyers do not like dealing with evidence, but the evidence is there. The Court
has to look at the facts. The Respondent has not been able to identify a single occasion, not one,
prior to its acts of objection in April 2008 when it confronted the Applicant with a claim that it had
acted in material breach, a substantial violation of the Interim Accord.
2AM, paras. 5.41-5.54.
2Bodansky and Crook, “Symposium: the ILC’s State Responsibility Articles”, AJIL, Vol. 96, p. 786: “Articles
49–54 attempt to steer a middle course: they accept the lwfulness of countermeasures but make them subject to
significant substantive and procedural qualifications that seem largely to reflect existing customary law.” - 21 -
54. The first Note Verbale that does this is dated 15 May 2008, more than a month after the
Respondent objected at the Bucharest Summit to th e Applicant’s membership of NATO. But, and
it is a big but, this was only sent in response to a Note Verbale that we sent in which we raised the
Respondent’s conduct as being a violation of the In terim Accord; a violation by objecting to
NATO membership on a ground not permitted by Ar ticle11(1). In its Note Verbale, the
Respondent accuses the Applicant of “materially breaching the Interim Accord since its
28
conclusion” ⎯ the Respondent alleges viola tions of various provisions of the Accord. Where is
the evidence of allegations of material breach be fore April 2008 brought to the attention of the
Applicant? There is none. These allegations of the Respondent, like all of those which were to
follow after 15May2008, are factually baseless and they are incapable ⎯ incapable ⎯ of
amounting to a “internationally wrongful act” wi thin the meaning of Article49 of the Law
Commission’s Articles. More to the point, the a llegations post-date the Bucharest Summit for the
most part, so it is really difficult to see how they could be invoked by the Respondent to justify its
own earlier act of objection. None of the R espondent’s allegations amount to breaches of the
Interim Accord, and the Respondent is in no way an “injured State” entitled to exercise lawful
countermeasures.
55. In addition, as is the case in relation to Article60 of the Vienna Convention, the
Respondent has not met any of the procedural requirements necessary to justify countermeasures.
Article 52 (1) of the Law Commission’s Articles s tipulates that “before taking countermeasures, an
injured State shall... call upon the responsible Stat e... to fulfil its obligations under Part Two”
and “notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate
with that State”. There is no evidence, none, before this Court that at any time before the
Respondent’s conduct amounting to breach of Article11 that it notified the Applicant of its
decision to take countermeasures. Nor is there any evidence to show that the Respondent offered
to negotiate with the Applicant with regard to its decision to object to the Applicant’s membership
to NATO. The Applicant raised all of these points in the Memorial, but once again the Respondent
has failed to address them in its replies.
28
RCM, para. 8.32; emphasis added. - 22 -
29
56. The Respondent claims then that it “f ulfills the requirement s for countermeasures” .
But it is only able to do so because it believes that the requirements do not actually apply in this
30
case . The Respondent quotes this passage from the ILC’s Commentary to Article 52 (1):
“In practice, however, there are usually quite extensive and detailed
negotiations over a dispute before the point is reached where some countermeasures
are contemplated. In such cases the injured State will already have notified the
responsible State of its claim in accordance w ith Article 43, and it will not have to do
it again in order to comply with [Article 52] paragraph 1 (a).” 31
From this passage the Respondent concludes: “[i]n the present case, the Parties have been engaged
in a negotiation process since the signature of th e Interim Accord. No formalistic condition of
32
sommation applies in this case.”
57. That conclusion is plainly wrong. First, the Commentary says that notice does not have
to be given again if previously given in the course of negotiations. The Respondent did not give
any notice to the Applicant as to its intention to in voke countermeasures. And then there is the
passage in the Commentary immediately preceding the one quoted by the Respondent ⎯ what does
that say ⎯ this is what it says: “[t]he principle und erlying the notification requirement is that,
considering the exceptional nature and potentia lly serious consequences of countermeasures, they
should not be taken before the other State is given notice of a claim and some opportunity to
33
present a response” . The second point is that although ne gotiations between the Respondent and
the Applicant on the name issue were ongoing since the signing of the Interim Accord, the process
of negotiation required by Article 52 has to be in relation to the countermeasures. The Respondent
has never made an offer to negotiate with the Applicant with regard to its application to NATO or
in respect of countermeasures.
58. The Respondent has also failed ⎯ it has to be said ⎯ to meet the third condition of
lawful countermeasures, mainly, proportionality. Article51 of the Article requires that a
countermeasure has to be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity
29
RR, para. 8.29.
30
Ibid., para. 8.38.
31Ibid. (citing ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of St ates for Internationall y Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 136, para. 4 of the Commentaries to Article 52).
32Ibid.
33Report of the Commission to the General Assemb ly on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session,Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 2001, p. 136; emphasis added. - 23 -
of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question”. Now this principle was of course
addressed by the Court in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, when it emphasized that “the effects of
a countermeasure must be commensurate with the in jury suffered, taking account of the rights in
question” ( Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovak ia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 ,
p. 56, paras. 85 and 87, citing Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River
Oder, Judgment No. 16, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23 , p. 27; see CR 2011/6, footnote 130). In
that case, it will be recalled, the Court concluded that Czechoslovakia’s unilateral assumption of
control of a shared resource that deprived Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share
of the natural resources of the Danube failed to respect the proportionality which is required by
international law. Against that background, can the Respondent’s act of objecting to the
Applicant’s membership of NATO reasonably be sai d to be proportionate to the alleged act of
wrongdoing attributed by the Respondent to the Applicant? We do not possibly see how that could
be said, even assuming these acts to have been established and in any way contrary to the
requirements of the Interim Accord, which they are not, and which we strongly deny. The Court
can simply make up its own mind; we invite you to look at the record in the pleadings as set out in
the Notes Verbales and other communications that are set out in the Respondent’s own written
pleadings. You will note again, first, that on no occasion before April2008 did the Respondent
make an allegation to the Applicant of material breach. And then, you are bound to note the
extraordinary triviality of the allegations: th e renaming of Skopje’s international airport of
Alexander the Great, for example, or the renaming of a highway ⎯ Pan-European Corridor
highway ⎯ also named after Alexander the Great. How on earth can it seriously be argued that
these acts are incompatible with the Interim Accord , or with any rule of international law? How
can it plausibly be argued that such acts caused the Respondent an injury, in any reasonable sense
of the word? How can the publication on a gove rnment website of a photograph that shows a
crowd of spectators at a basketball match in which one dimly observable spectator is seen to be
waving a prohibited flag: how can that possibly contribute to a justification to object to
34
membership of NATO ? Let us get real here. How can it ser iously be argued that an incident in
3See Note Verbale dated 15 April 2009 from the Respondent’sLiaison Office in S kopje to the Applicant’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. F. 141.1/49/AS 489: AM, Ann. 60. - 24 -
which a group of schoolchildren who throw eight pebbles at the residence of the Respondent’s
Ambassador in Skopje is of a nature to justify the NATO objection ⎯ eight pebbles that caused no
physical damage, no harm and one that was prompt ly investigated by the Applicant’s local police
35
force ? These are the acts that the Respondent invokes to support an argument justifying
countermeasures. Objecting to the Applicant’s NATO membership on the b asis of these kinds of
allegations ⎯ even if well-founded, which they are not ⎯ cannot reasonably be said to be
proportionate.
59. Mr.President, the Respondent knows th at it does not meet the requirement of
proportionality or any of the requirements for lawful countermeasures. In its Counter-Memorial it
36
said it was not going to rely on the argument . It is readily apparent why it initially adopted that
wise position. One might now ask oneself, why later in the proceedings they have sought to bring
it back to life. The only possible explanation for the abandonment of the earlier position, is a
recognition of the paramount weaknesses of the othe r two arguments on which it relies. This is an
act of sheer desperation.
IV. Conclusion
60. To conclude, none of the Respondent’s th ree arguments to justify its wrongdoing comes
close to crossing a line of plausibility. Article 22 does not trump the obligation not to object that is
set forth in Article 11. The violation cannot be justified on the basis of an Athenean exceptio. The
objection cannot be excused as a lawful counterme asure to the throwing of pebbles. We look
forward to hearing what the Respondent will conjur e up on Thursday and Friday; which of these
arguments it might still maintain, or whether, yet again, new arguments or new variations of old
arguments will somehow emerge. But we look forward with particular interest to seeing which of
its distinguished counsel will feel able to be associated with any of these three arguments.
3Note Verbale of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No.F.010.GS/23/ AS 720, dated 1June2009
and Note Verbale No.93-1741/4 of the Ministry of Forign Affairs of the FYROM dated 10July2009 in reply, AR,
Ann. 73.
3RCM, para. 8.3; see also para. 8.1. - 25 -
61. Mr.President, with your permission, my colleague ProfessorBastidBurdeau will now
address the remedies sought by the Applicant and bring our first round submissions to a close. I
thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, for your very kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorPhilippeSands for his presentation. I now invite
Professor Geneviève Bastid Burdeau to make her presentation. I understand that the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will conclude its first round of oral argument with this statement.
You have the floor, Madam.
Mme BASTID-BURDEAU :
LES CONCLUSIONS PRÉSENTÉES PAR L ’ETAT REQUÉRANT SONT FONDÉES ET RENTRENT
DANS LA FONCTION JUDICIAIRE DE LA C OUR
Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames, Messi eurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur
d’apparaître pour la première fois devant la Cour et d’intervenir pour l’Etat requérant dans la
présente affaire.
2. L’objet de ma plaidoirie sera d’exposer et de préciser les conclusions présentées par l’Etat
requérant. Pour mesurer leur enjeu, il n’est pas inutile de rappeler que l’objectif essentiel de
l’accord intérimaire du 13septembre1995 était de mettre un terme à des relations de méfiance et
d’hostilité entre des Etats voisins en normalisant leurs relations. Il s’agissait également de
permettre au requérant de s’insérer pleinement dans les relations internationales, comme tout Etat
souverain est en droit d’y prétendre, notamment par sa participation aux organisations et
institutions internationales.
3. La résolution 817 du Conseil de sécurité a constitué à cet égard une première ouverture en
rendant possible l’admission du requérant dans les organisations du système des Nations Unies, et
en ouvrant la voie à une vague de reconnais sances qui jusqu’alors n’avaient été que
parcimonieusement accordées. Dans ce mouvement rendant enfin possible une véritable insertion
de l’Etat demandeur dans la communauté internati onale, l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire devait
ouvrir définitivement la voie en rendant désormais possible, sous la seule réserve énoncée dans ce - 26 -
même article, l’admission et la pleine partic ipation de celui-ci dans toute organisation
internationale de son choix dans le respect des règles de cette organisation.
4. C’est dans ce contexte juridique qu’il co nvient de situer les conclusions de l’Etat
requérant. Par sa première conclu sion, le requérant prie la Cour: «de dire et juger que le
défendeur, par ses organes et agents de l’Etat, a violé ses obligations résultant de l’article11,
37
paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire» . Par ailleurs, la seconde conclusion vise à obtenir de l’Etat
défendeur qu’il revienne au respect de l’article 11, paragraphe 1, en s’abstenant désormais de toute
objection aux demandes d’admission du requérant dans les organisations internationales dès lors
que la condition énoncée par ce tte disposition serait respectée 38. Enfin, le requérant se réservait le
droit de modifier et d’étendre les termes de sa requête. Aucune demande nouvelle n’ayant été
présentée à ce titre, la question est à ce jour sans objet. Le défendeur n’a plus insisté sur ce point
dans sa duplique. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de s’y attarder.
5. L’Etat défendeur a contesté l’objet, la pertinence et l’utilité des deux demandes
principales. La présente plaidoirie s’attachera à démontrer que ces conclusions sont appropriées à
la solution du litige qui oppose les Parties et qu’elles rentrent dans la fonction judiciaire de la Cour.
6. Les arguments relatifs à la recevabilité de la requête et à sa pleine compatibilité avec la
fonction judiciaire de la Cour ont été exposés ce ma tin par le professeur Klein. Il vous a démontré
que la Cour est bien compétente pour connaître de la requête, et que les demandes sont recevables.
Je ne reviendrai donc plus sur ces questions. Qu ant aux contestations par la Partie adverse des
deux demandes formulées par l’Etat requérant su r le fond, je vous propose de les examiner
maintenant au regard de chacune de ces conclusions.
37AM, p. 123.
38AM, p. 123 : le requérant prie la Cour :
«d’ordonner au défendeur de prendre immédiatement t outes les mesures nécessaires pour se conformer à
ses obligations résultant de l’article11, paragraphe1, de l’accord intérimaire et de mettre fin et de
renoncer à son objection quelle qu’en soit la forme, directe ou indi recte, aux demandes d’admission
comme membre de l’Organisation du Trai té de l’Atlantique Nord et/ou de toutes autres organisations et
institutions internationales, multilatérales et régionales dont l’Etat défendeur est membre, dès lors que la
désignation de la demanderesse au se in de ces organisations et institu tions est conforme à la désignation
fournie par le paragraphe 2 de la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité». - 27 -
A. La première conclusion au fond
7. Par sa première conclusion, l’Etat demandeur sollicite la Cour de dire et juger que l’Etat
39
défendeur a violé son obligation résultant de l’article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire .
8. Comme cela vous a été amplement dém ontré, la portée de cette disposition a été
considérable pour le requérant depuis 1995 : elle a mis fin à une situation de blocage et d’isolement
sur la scène internationale et a rétabli une situ ation normale pour un Etat souverain: celle dans
laquelle celui-ci peut légitimemen t espérer devenir membre d’orga nisations et d’institutions
internationales dès lors qu’il en remplit les conditions d’admission. De plus , la pratique constante
suivie par les deux Etats dans l’ application de cette disposition depuis 1995 jusqu’au 3 avril 2008,
soit pendant près de treizeans, a permis l’instaura tion, dans les relations entre les Parties, d’une
sécurité juridique qui avait fait défaut jusque-là. Outre la violation flagrante de ses droits, c’est
aussi l’atteinte portée à cette situation de prévis ibilité et le retour à l’incertitude qui ont porté
préjudice au requérant.
9. En demandant à la Cour de constater la violation par l’Etat défendeur de son obligation
résultant de l’article11, paragra phe1, le requérant entend obtenir confirmation de l’interprétation
qu’il défend de cette disposition et faire établir la contrariété du comportement du défendeur avec
les termes de celle-ci. Par le biais d’une telle déclaration de responsabilité, il vise également à
obtenir réparation sous la forme d’une mesure de satisfaction. Il n’y a là rien de bien extravagant.
La satisfaction est un mode habituel de réparation. Comme l’énonce l’article 37 des articles de la
Commission du droit international sur la respon sabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement
illicite: «L’Etat responsable d’un fait internati onalement illicite est tenu de donner satisfaction
pour le préjudice causé par ce fait dans la mesure où il ne peut pas être réparé par la restitution ou
l’indemnisation.» Ce texte prévoit également que «[l]a satisfaction peut consister en une
reconnaissance de la violation». C’est ce que sollicite l’Etat requérant en l’espèce, et l’on voit bien
mal pourquoi la Cour ne serait pas en position de faire droit à une telle demande.
10. L’Etat défendeur avance par ailleurs un autre type d’argument pour s’opposer à cette
demande. Il affirme que si la Cour était amenée à statuer sur la seule de mande de constatation de
violation présentée par le requérant, sans prendre en compte en même temps le comportement de ce
39
AM, p. 116, par. 6.12 et suiv. - 28 -
dernier, sa décision serait, si l’on comprend bien, incomplète et «injuste » . L’argument est
surprenant. Si l’Etat défendeur entendait que la Cour se prononce sur la responsabilité du requérant
pour d’éventuelles violations de l’accord intérimaire, il lui revenait de mettre cette responsabilité en
cause de façon formelle devant la Cour. Il pouva it le faire de deux manières : en introduisant une
requête sur la base de l’article21 de l’accord intérimaire, ou en formulant une ou plusieurs
demandes reconventionnelles. Il n’en a rien fait, sachant fort bien que de telles actions étaient
vouées à l’échec. L’Etat défendeur a, certes, tenté d’excuser la violation de l’article11,
paragraphe 1, de l’accord dont il s’est rendu respon sable, en invoquant de prétendues violations de
l’accord par le requérant. Il s’est fondé à cette fi n, comme on vient de le voir, à la fois sur le
principe de l’exceptio non adimpleti contractus et sur la théorie des contre-mesures. Mon collègue
le professeur Philippe Sands vous a toutefois amplem ent démontré il y a quelques instants que les
conditions d’invocation de ces deux institutions ne sont nullement remplies en l’espèce. Dès lors,
on ne voit pas en quoi la fonction juridictionnelle de la Cour serait affectée par une déclaration de
sa part sur l’objet principal de la requête, à savoir l’existence d’une violation par le défendeur de
son obligation résultant de l’article 11, paragraphe 1.
11. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieu rs les juges, la déclaration de responsabilité
que sollicite l’Etat requérant est loin d’être purement symbolique. Elle est au contraire
extrêmement importante pour rétablir la situation d’équilibre qu’avait instaurée l’accord de1995.
En constatant la violation de l’ article 11, paragraphe 1, vous préciserez l’interprétation de cette
dernière disposition qu’il convient de retenir et vous mettrez par là même un terme à la période
d’incertitude et d’insécurité juridique ouverte par la décision du défendeur d’empêcher l’admission
du requérant au sein de l’OTAN. Par là même, la Cour remplira sa fonction judiciaire qui est, aux
termes de l’article36 de son Statut, d’exercer sa juridiction «sur tous les différends d’ordre
juridique ayant pour objet: a) l’interprétation d’un traité…, b)la réalité d’un fait qui, s’il était
établi, constituerait la violation d’un engagement international».
12. Quant à la mesure de satisfaction que re quiert l’Etat demandeur, elle constituera une
forme de réparation pour le préjudice que celui-ci a s ubi du fait de l’atteinte à sa dignité en tant
40
RCM, p. 197, par. 9.6 et AR, p. 185, par. 9.6. - 29 -
qu’Etat souverain et de la discr imination publique dont il a été l’objet par rapport aux autres Etats
candidats à l’admission dans l’OTAN en même temps que lui. Ainsi, la constatation demandée à la
Cour dans la première conclusi on aura trois effets juridiques im portants: l’interprétation d’une
disposition clé de l’accord intérimaire; l’établisse ment de la responsabilité de l’Etat défendeur
pour violation de cette disposition ; et le prononcé de la mesure de réparation qui en découle. J’en
viens, Monsieur le président, à la deuxième conclusion au fond.
B. La seconde conclusion au fond
41
13. Dès son mémoire , l’Etat requérant a demandé à la Cour non seulement de se prononcer
sur le passé, mais également de prendre des mesures concernant l’avenir. En effet, dans la seconde
conclusion, il est demandé à la Cour de juger que l’Etat défendeur doit revenir au respect de
l’article11, paragraphe 1, en s’abstenant déso rmais de toute objection aux demandes d’admission
du requérant dans les organisations internationales dont le défendeur est membre dès lors que les
termes de cette disposition sont respectés.
14. La décision demandée à la Cour est donc double et répond à la dualité de nature du
comportement de l’Etat défendeur. D’un premier poi nt de vue, en effet, on peut considérer que la
décision de l’Etat défendeur d’objecter à l’admission du demandeur à l’OTAN lors du sommet
d’avril 2008 est une décision qui constitue une viola tion ponctuelle d’une obligation internationale.
En conséquence, il est demandé à la Cour d’or donner au défendeur la non-répétition de son acte,
que ce soit à l’occasion d’un futur sommet de l’OTAN où l’admission de l’Etat requérant serait à
nouveau débattue, ou à l’occasion de toute autre procédure d’admission dans n’importe quelle
organisation ou institution internationale dont le dé fendeur est membre. Il est donc demandé à la
Cour qu’elle ordonne à l’Etat défendeur de pr endre immédiatement toutes les mesures nécessaires
pour se conformer à ses obligations découlant de l’article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire.
15. Mais le comportement de l’Etat défendeur peut être aussi être analysé comme une
violation continue de l’obligation résultant de cette disposition. En effet, le requérant demeure
candidat à l’admission comme membre de l’OTAN et il a été établi qu’aux yeux de l’ensemble des
Etats membres, il remplit toutes les conditions de participation prévues par la charte constitutive de
41
AM, par. 6.18 et suiv. - 30 -
cette organisation. Seul le maintien d’une objection persistante de la part de l’Etat défendeur, dont
42
ce dernier ne fait pas mystère, y compris dans les déclarations récentes de ses autorités officielles ,
dissuade le requérant de réitérer sa demande d’admission. En persistant de manière constante dans
son attitude de blocage, le défendeur se rend responsable d’une violation continue de son obligation
résultant de l’article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire.
16. Face à cette dualité de violations, ponctuelle et continue, l’Etat requérant demande
respectueusement à la Cour à la fois d’ordonner la non-répétition de la violation et sa cessation. La
demande portant sur la non-répétition du fait illicite concerne le comportement qui devrait être
observé par le défendeur à l’occasion de décisions sur des candidatures présentées par le requérant
dans certaines organisations internationales, y compris l’Union européenne, ou lors d’un nouvel
examen de sa candidature organisé dans le cadre d’un sommet de l’OTAN. A cet égard,
43
l’argument développé par l’Etat défe ndeur dans son mémoire en duplique , selon lequel
l’injonction de non-répétition pr ononcée par la Cour interférera it avec l’examen des conditions
d’admission prévues par les chartes constitutives d es organisations internationales est sans aucun
fondement. Il s’agit là de deux questions entière ment distinctes. Il est clair qu’en posant sa
candidature à l’admission comme membre d’une organisation ou d’une institution internationale, le
requérant est bien conscient qu’il doit, comme n’importe quel Etat candidat, satisfaire aux
conditions posées par l’acte constitutif de l’organisa tion concernée. Il n’a jamais prétendu que
l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire pouvait, à cet égard, faire office de passe-droit. En demandant à
la Cour d’ordonner la non-répétition, l’Etat requér ant entend simplement obtenir le retour à la
situation qui prévalait en ce domaine dans les relations entre les Parties avant 2008.
17. S’agissant maintenant de la demande de cessation de la violation continue, il est clair que
des circonstances spéciales existent en l’espèce, qui justifient cette mention expresse. Certes, le
défendeur indique dans sa duplique que «[l]’obligation d’observer l’accord intérimaire est évidente,
et la Grèce ne la conteste pas». Cette affirmation ne permet toutefois en aucune façon de garantir
que l’Etat défendeur se conformera à l’avenir au prescrit de l’article 11, paragraphe 1, compte tenu
42
AR, vol. II, annexe 164.
43RR, par. 9.12. - 31 -
de son comportement depuis avril 2008 . La Cour a souligné, dans l’affaire du Différend relatif à
45
des droits de navigation en 2009 , que «du seul fait que la Cour constate l’existence d’une
violation qui présente un caractère continu, il découle de plein droit l’obligation de la faire cesser, à
la charge de l’Etat concerné». Néanmoins la Cour a admis également que, dans des circonstances
spéciales, il pourrait être opportun que l’arrêt me ntionne expressément l’obligation de faire cesser
la violation.
18. Si de telles circonstances ne paraissaient pas réunies dans l’affaire précitée, s’agissant de
droits de navigation et de pêche qui n’avaient pas dans le passé donné lieu à un différend entre les
parties, la situation est tout à fait différente dans la présente affaire. Ici, par contre, l’historique des
relations entre les Parties, depuis l’accession du requ érant à la qualité d’Etat en1991, montre les
obstacles multiples qui ont été élevés par le défendeur à l’exercice normal par l’Etat requérant d’un
certain nombre de ses droits fondamentaux en tant qu’Etat souverain. Il fait apparaître également
les efforts considérables qui ont été accomplis pour permettre l’exercice normal de ces droits.
Telles sont les circonstances spéciales qui appellent de la part de la Cour une mention expresse
dans son arrêt à intervenir de l’obligation pour le défendeur de faire cesser la violation de
l’article 11, paragraphe 1. Compte tenu de toutes les difficultés rencontrées avant l’accord de 1995
par l’Etat requérant et qui ont ressurgi en force depuis trois ans du fait de la violation par l’Etat
défendeur de son obligation énoncée dans l’article11, paragraphe1, le rappel par la Cour de
l’obligation découlant pour ce dernier de cette dis position, non seulement n’est pas superflu, mais
indispensable pour clore ce différend.
19. Il est inexact de prétendre, comme le fait l’Etat défendeur, qu’il soit demandé pour autant
à la Cour d’ordonner «une mesure dépendant entièrement de l’OTAN» 46. La mise en Œuvre de
cette obligation de cessation appartient natu rellement au défendeur qui peut informer
l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord et ses membres de la levée de son objection. Il ne
s’agit en aucune façon de préjuger de la décision qui pourrait être prise par cette organisation.
44Voir par. 9.15, dernière phrase.
45Affaire du Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c.
Nicaragua), arrêt du 13 juillet 2009, par. 148.
46RR, par. 9.15. - 32 -
L’obligation contenue dans l’article 11, paragraphe1, de l’accord intérimaire est certes tout à fait
inhabituelle en droit international. Il n’est pa s courant et peut-être même sans précédent, qu’un
Etat accepte de limiter son pouvoir discrétionnair e de se prononcer sur l’admission d’un nouvel
Etat dans une organisation internationale à laquelle il appartient . Mais, comme cela vous a été
démontré ce matin par le professeur SeanMurp hy, il s’agit là d’un engagement conventionnel
entièrement distinct et détachable des règles propres de l’organisation internationale en question, et
il doit, comme tout engagement international, être respecté par son titulaire.
20. Dans le même ordre d’idée, on observera qu’il est déjà arrivé dans le contentieux
international qu’une autorité chargée de régler un différend ordonne à un Etat de ne pas s’opposer à
une certaine prise de position dans une organisation internationale dont il est membre. C’est ainsi
que dans la médiati on dans l’affaire du Rainbow Warrior en1986, le Secrétaire général des
NationsUnies a décidé, à la demande de la Nouvelle-Zélande, que la France ne devait pas
s’opposer à une décision de la Communauté europ éenne concernant les im portations de beurre
47
néo-zélandais au Royaume-Uni . Aucune interférence avec les règles de l’organisation
internationale n’a été avancée à ce sujet.
21. L’Etat demandeur prie donc respectue usement la Cour de lui adjuger les deux
conclusions qu’il a présentées. Ces demandes sont l’une et l’autre parfaitement justifiées, compte
tenu, d’une part, de l’objection formée par l’ Etat défendeur à l’occasion du sommet de l’OTAN
d’avril2008, en violation de son obligation résultant de l’article11, paragraphe1, de l’accord
intérimaire. Elles sont pareillement fondées, d’ autre part, au regard de l’intention manifestée
publiquement par les autorités de l’Etat défendeur de ne pas modifier sa position de blocage tant
que la divergence sur le nom de l’Etat requérant n’aura pas été résolue. Ces demandes n’ont rien
que de très classique et elles rentrent parfaitement dans la fonction judiciaire telle qu’elle a été
définie et exercée à de nombreuses reprises par la Cour.
47Affaire concernant les problèmes nés entre la Fr ance et la Nouvelle-Zélande de l’incident du
Rainbow Warrior, règlement du 6juillet1986 opéré par le Secrétaire général de l’ONU, RSA, vol.XIX,
p. 199-221, spéc. p. 203 et 214. - 33 -
22. Cette présentation concluait le premier tour de plaidoiries au nom de l’Etat requérant. Je
vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, pour votre aimable
attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Genevièv e Bastid-Burdeau for her statement of
conclusions presented by the Applicant State. Now, this concludes the first round of oral argument
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Gr eece will begin its first round of oral argument
on Thursday 24 March from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. The sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 4.05 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mardi 22 mars 2011, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de l'accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995 (ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)