Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2008/33
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2008
Public sitting
held on Friday 19 September 2008, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2008
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 19 septembre 2008, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Cot
Oxman
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vce-prh,ident
RanMjv.
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skoteiskov,
CotMM.
jOges an, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Romania is represented by:
Mr. Bogdan Aurescu, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Professor
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Buchar est, President of the Romanian Branch of the
International Law Association, member of th e Permanent Court of Arbitration, substitute
member of the Venice Commission,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Cosmin Dinescu, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E Mr. Călin Fabian, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
As Co-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of Inte rnational Law, University of Oxford, member
of the English Bar, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
a s Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Simon Olleson, member of the English Bar, 13 Old Square Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Gicu Boroşi, Director General, National Agency for Mineral Resources,
Mr. Mihai German, Deputy Director General, Nati onal Agency for Mineral Resources, member of
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Mr. Eugen Laurian, Counter-Admiral (retired),
Mr. Octavian Buzatu, Lieutenant Commander (retired),
Mr. Ovidiu Neghiu, Captain, Ministry of Defence of Romania,
as Technical and Cartographic Experts;
Mr. Liviu Dumitru, Head of the Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Roumanie est représenté par :
M. Bogdan Aurescu, directeur général au ministère roumain des affaires étrangères, chargé de
cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Bucarest, président de la section roumaine de
l’Association de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, membre
suppléant de la Commission de Venise,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
M.CosminDinescu, directeur général des affair es juridiques du ministère roumain des affaires
étrangères,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Călin Fabian, ambassadeur de Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat, Matrix
Chambers,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., professeur de droit internati onal à l’Université d’Oxford, titulaire de la
chaire Chichele, membre du barreau d’Anglet erre, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Simon Olleson, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 13 Old Square Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Gicu Boroşi, directeur général de l’agence nationale des ressources minières,
M. Mihai German, directeur général adjoint de l’agence nationale des ressources minières, membre
de la Commission des limites du plateau continental de l’ONU,
M. Eugen Laurian, contre-amiral (en retraite),
M. Octavian Buzatu, capitaine de corvette (en retraite),
M. Ovidiu Neghiu, capitaine, ministère roumain de la défense,
comme experts techniques et cartographes ;
M. Liviu Dumitru, chef de l’unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère roumain des
affaires étrangères, - 6 -
Ms Irina Ni ţă, Second Secretary, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Romania in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Catrinel Brumar, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Mirela Pascaru, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Ioana Preda, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Olivia Horvath, Desk Officer, Public Diplom acy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Romania,
as Advisers.
The Government of Ukraine is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, Adviser to th e Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Professor of International Law,
National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,
Mr. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, Director of the Lega l and Treaty Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor emeritus of International Law at the University of ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., Member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the Rome Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine,
Ms Cheryl Dunn, Member of the State Bar of California, Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Nick Minogue, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales,
Mr. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, Acting Head of International Law Division, Legal and Treaty
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, - 7 -
Mme Irina Niţă, deuxième secrétaire, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade de Roumanie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Catrinel Brumar, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Mirela Pascaru, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Ioana Preda, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Olivia Horvath, responsable du départem ent des relations diplomatiques du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
commceonseillers.
Le Gouvernement de l’Ukraine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine, professeur de droit international à
l’Académie Mohyla (Université nationale de Kiev),
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
M. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, directeur du départem ent des affaires juridiques et des traités du
ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de dr oit international à l’Université de ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine,
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de Californie, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Nick Minogue, Solicitor à la Cour suprême d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, directeur par intérim de la division du droit international, département
des affaires juridiques et des traités du ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine, - 8 -
Mr. Maxime O. Kononenko, First Secretary of the Embassy of Ukraine in the French Republic,
Ms Mariana O. Betsa, Second Secretary of th e Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil, C. Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Major General Borys D. Tregubov, Assistant to the Head of the State Border Protection Service of
Ukraine,
as Technical Advisers. - 9 -
M. Maxime O. Kononenko, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine en France,
Mme Mariana O. Betsa, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil., C. Geol., F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. Borys D. Tregubov, général de division, assistant du chef du service de protection des frontières
d’Etat de l’Ukraine,
comme conseillers techniques. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. We now meet for the second day of submissions of
Ukraine. Professor Quéneudec, you have the floor
M. QUENEUDEC : Thank you, Madam President.
V. L IGNE D ÉQUIDISTANCE PROVISOIRE ET CIRCONSTANCES PERTINENTES
Introduction
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, durant le premier tour des plaidoiries,
l’Ukraine, paraît-il, a fait preuve d’une remar quable réticence à exposer la ligne de délimitation
1
qu’elle propose . A les en croire, nos adversaires auraient même piaffé d’impatience dans l’attente
d’une présentation détaillée de cette ligne, qu’ils n’auraient vu apparaître qu’une seule fois sur
l’écran, lors de l’audience du 9 septembre 2 .
2. Lorsque nous nous résolûmes enfin à justifier cette ligne, ce fut, nous a-t-on dit, entre
3
12h12 et 12h15 le vendredi 12septembre . Trois minutes seulement pour indiquer comment
ajuster la ligne provisoire d’équidistance, se lon une méthode que le professeurCrawford a
4
aimablement appelée «the method of the dance floor, slipping and sliding» . C’était vraiment trop
5
bref, a-t-on laissé entendre de l’autre côte de la barre .
3. La brièveté du propos sur ce point s’explique aisément par deux raisons, l’une de forme ou
de procédure, l’autre plus fondamentale.
4. D’un point de vue formel, on rappellera d’abord que la ligne de délimitation proposée par
l’Ukraine avait fait l’objet de développements subs tantiels dans les pièces écrites. Dix pages du
6
contre-mémoire et quatre pages de la duplique y étaient consacrées . Il était donc non seulement
inutile mais encore peu souhaitable de répéter, lors de la phase orale, les arguments qui étaient déjà
invoqués dans ces pièces de procédure. D’autant plus que l’instruction de procédure VI de la Cour,
1
CR 2008/30, p. 20, par. 1 (Crawford).
2
CR 2008/24, p. 34, par. 67 (Bundy).
3
CR 2008/30, p. 21, par. 5 (Crawford).
4 CR 2008/30, p. 22, par. 12 (Crawford).
5 CR 2008/30, p. 17, par. 20 (Aurescu).
6
Contre-mémoire de l’Ukraine (CMU), par. 9.1-9.29 ; duplique de l’Ukraine (DU), par. 7.19-7.28. - 11 -
après avoir rappelé les termes de l’article 60 du Rè glement, insiste sur «le plein respect ... du degré
de brièveté requis». On ne saurait blâmer une partie de suivre cette instruction à la lettre.
5. Si l’on se place ensuite à un point de vue s ubstantiel, la ligne proposée par l’Ukraine a,
selon nous, le mérite de la simplicité, tant en ce qui concerne la description de son tracé qu’en ce
qui concerne les motifs qui sont à la base dudit tracé. Elle se différencie fondamentalement en cela
de la ligne revendiquée par la Roumanie. Celle-ci est une ligne si compliquée, notamment autour
et au-delà de l’île des Serpents, que la Partie adverse a dû consacrer de longs discours pour en
7
expliquer et tenter d’en justifier le tracé . On comprend mieux, dès lors, l’insatisfaction qu’ont pu
éprouver nos contradicteurs.
6. Madame le président, avant d’aller plus loin, je voudrais encore rassurer le
professeurCrawford. Lundi dernier, estimant sans doute que l’équipe ukrainienne allait vaciller
sous les assauts roumains, il a fait part de sa crainte de voir l’Ukraine saisir l’occasion du dernier
mot qui lui revient dans le second tour de plaidoiries orales pour présenter, suggérer, ébaucher ou
8
esquisser une autre ligne de délimitation . Au risque de le décevoir, je dois dire que telle n’est pas
notre intention. Comme l’a indiqué hier l’agent de l’Ukraine, rien de ce qui a été avancé au début
de cette semaine de l’autre côté de la barre n’est de nature à amener un quelconque changement de
la ligne de délimitation que nous avons proposée. [Projection : délimitation finale selon l’Ukraine.]
C’est la ligne en bleu que l’on voit à l’écran et qui figure sous l’onglet 18 dans le dossier des juges.
7. Madame le président, dans le présent expo sé, nous allons nous attacher essentiellement à
réfuter ce qui nous paraît contestable dans ce que nous avons entendu en début de semaine
concernant, d’une part, la constr uction de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire et, d’autre part, à
propos des circonstances pertinentes. Seuls ser ont abordés quelques-uns des aspects les plus
importants. Le fait de ne pas répondre à tout ce qui a été avancé par la Partie adverse n’implique
évidemment aucun abandon des positions que nous avons défendues et des points de vue que nous
avons soutenus tant dans les pièces de procédure écrite qu’au premier tour de plaidoiries orales.
7
CR 2008/21, p. 20, p. 35-52 (Crawford).
8CR 2008/30, p. 22, par. 10 (Crawford). - 12 -
A. La construction de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire
8. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, j’aborde le premier point qui concerne donc la
construction de la ligne d’équidistance provisoir e. Mardi dernier, le professeurLowe a fort
justement remarqué que les deux Parties étaient d’accord sur la démarche à suivre. Il a noté en
particulier que la ligne d’équidistance provisoire de vait être une ligne de «stricte» équidistance, en
ce sens que son tracé reposait nécessairement sur les points les plus proches des côtes de chacun
9
des deux Etats, quels que puissent être ces points de base . [Projection : établissement de la ligne
d’équidistance provisoire.] La ligne de stri cte équidistance établie par l’Ukraine apparaît
maintenant à l’écran et est reproduite également da ns l’onglet19 du dossier des juges. On y voit
les quatrepoints de base ⎯deux sur chacune des deux côtes pertinentes ⎯ qui ont servi à son
établissement.
9. Nous sommes également d’accord avec la Partie roumaine pour reconnaître que notre
divergence porte sur l’identification des points de base et, plus particulièrement, sur la prise en
compte de l’île des Serpents dans l’établissement de ces points de base.
10. Je ne reviendrai pas sur le problème posé pa r la digue de Sulina. En effet, mon collègue
M e Bundy a dit hier ce qu’il y avait à dire de l’e ffet inéquitable produit par ce point de base sur la
ligne d’équidistance présentée par la Roumanie. Je suivrai donc le précepte qu’énonçait
l’abbéSiéyès: «A quoi bon, quand l’erreur est une fois démontrée, entasser objections sur
10
objections, comme si l’on voulait finir par écraser ses adversaires.»
11. Le professeurLowe a voulu démontrer que l’île des Serpents ne pouvait pas servir de
point de base parce qu’elle entrait dans la catégorie des rochers du paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de
la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Or, nous a-t-il dit, ne pouvant engendrer ni
zone économique exclusive ni plateau continental, une telle formation insulaire ne peut servir de
point de base dans une opération de délimitation concernant précisément ces deux types d’espaces
maritimes 11.
12. Nous ferons ici quatre remarques qui nous paraissent de la plus grande importance.
9
CR 2008/31, p. 10, par. 3.
10
Siéyès, «Lettres aux économistes sur leur système de politique et de morale».
11CR 2008/31, p. 15, par. 25. - 13 -
13. Premièrement: l’artic le121 de la convention de 1982, consacré au régime des îles, est
une disposition relative au titre juridique que l es îles engendrent à l’égar d des espaces maritimes
qui les entourent. C’est pourquoi, après la définition générale de l’île donnée au premier
paragraphe, les paragraphes 2 et 3 précisent la manière dont sont déterminés les espaces maritimes
d’une île. Cet article ne dit rien quant au rôle susceptible d’être joué par une île dans une opération
de délimitation et il n’a pas été conçu comme une disposition consacrée à la délimitation maritime
entre Etats.
14. Deuxièmement: il y a évidemment un lie n entre le titre juridique sur les espaces
maritimes et la délimitation de ces mêmes es paces. Et l’on pourrait sans doute invoquer
l’article 121, paragraphe 3, dans une opération de délimitation qui mettrait directement en cause
deux côtes dont l’une serait uniquement celle d’un e île entrant dans la catégorie prévue par ce
paragraphe. Dès lors, on voit mal le rôle que peut jouer cette disposition dans une délimitation
mettant en cause des côtes continentales dans une s ituation comme celle concernant l’Ukraine et la
Roumanie.
15. Troisièmement: dans toute opération de délimitation maritime, le tracé d’une ligne
d’équidistance doit se faire en se fondant sur les lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la
largeur de la mer territoriale de chacun des deux Et ats. Telle est la règle énoncée à l’article 15 de
la convention de1982 pour la mer territoriale. Telle était la règle de l’article6 de la convention
de 1958 sur le plateau continental. Telle est aussi la règle appliquée par la Cour lorsqu’elle a à se
prononcer sur le tracé d’une ligne unique de délimitation maritime.
16. Quatrièmement: il importe peu, en défin itive, que l’île des Serpents puisse être rangée
dans l’une ou l’autre des catégories prévues aux paragraphes2 et3 de l’article121. La ligne de
base à partir de laquelle est mesurée la largeur des eaux territoriales entourant cette île est
parfaitement apte à fournir un (ou des) point(s) de base pour le tracé de la ligne provisoire
d’équidistance. Car, contrairement à ce qu’a a ffirmé le professeurLowe, il n’y a pas de «base
points that are relevant to the generation of an EEZ», pas plus qu’il n’y a de «base points that are
relevant to the generation of a continental shelf» 12. Ce ne sont certainement pas les points de base
12
CR 2008/31, p. 15, par. 27 (Lowe). - 14 -
qui génèrent ces zones, ce sont les côtes. Les points de base ne sont que des éléments de la
technique de calcul du tracé d’une ligne.
17. En fin de compte, l’insistance qu’a mise la Roumanie à invoquer constamment
l’article 121, paragraphe 3, de la convention ressemble fort à une incantation rituelle. Elle fait
même songer au refrain de cette chanson qui fit na guère la gloire et la fortune d’un groupe de
jeunes Anglais chevelus, chanson où revenait sans cesse un «Yellow Submarine».
18. Madame le président, lors du premier t our de plaidoiries, nous avions indiqué qu’il
résultait des termes de l’article premier du traité du 17 juin 2003 que la Roumanie avait accepté que
l’île des Serpents serve de point de base pour le tr acé de la frontière entre les mers territoriales des
13
deux Etats . Le professeurLowe a contesté ce point de vue et nous a dit que cette disposition
déterminait simplement («simply») «le point de jonction» des limites extérieures des mers
14
territoriales respectives des parties contractantes . C’est pourquoi je rappellerai que
l’articlepremier du traité de2003 fait expressément mention des «mers territoriales des parties
contractantes mesurées à partir des lignes de base ». Comme il s’agit du point de jonction entre la
limite extérieure de la mer territoriale de la Rouman ie et «la limite extérieure de la mer territoriale
de l’Ukraine autour de l’île aux Serpents», c’ est donc qu’il y a bien eu reconnaissance par la
Roumanie de la ligne de base et, à travers celle-ci, de l’existence de points de base sur la côte de
l’île des Serpents.
19. En conséquence, avions-nous dit, la Roum anie peut être réputée avoir accepté que l’île
des Serpents serve de point de base dans l’opérati on de délimitation, de la même manière que la
France s’était vu opposer son acceptation de la fi xation d’un point de base sur Eddystone Rock
lorsqu’il s’était agi de la délimitation du plat eau continental avec le Royaume-Uni. Le
professeurLowe a également contesté la pertinen ce de ce précédent au motif que l’article121
n’existait pas encore en tant que disposition conven tionnelle et qu’il n’aurait pu, en tout état de
15
cause, être applicable dans l’arbitrage franco-britannique . Tout cela est sans doute
rigoureusement exact mais n’enlève rien au fa it qu’il y a une incontestable analogie entre la
13CR 2008/29, p. 34, par. 46.
14
CR 2008/31, p. 17, par. 30 (Lowe).
15CR 2008/31, p. 12, par. 13-14 (Lowe). - 15 -
situation de la France à l’égard d’Eddystone Rock et la situation de la Roumanie à l’égard de l’île
des Serpents, parce que dans l’un et l’autre cas il y a eu reconnaissance de l’existence de points de
base, même si cela s’est fait par des moyens et dans des cadres différents.
20. Finalement, le professeurLowe a soute nu que, même si l’île des Serpents pouvait être
retenue comme point de base, on ne devrait cependant pas lui faire produire un effet sur la ligne de
16
délimitation . Je dois avouer que la logique de ce ra isonnement m’échappe. Si l’on admet que
l’île puisse être utilisée comme point de base, on doit admettre qu’elle a nécessairement un effet sur
le tracé de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire. Ce n’est que dans la deuxième étape du processus de
délimitation, lorsque l’on examine les circonstances de nature à corriger ce tracé provisoire, qu’on
peut éventuellement se poser la question de sa voir si l’île doit produire un plein effet ou n’avoir
qu’un effet réduit sur le tracé de la ligne défin itive de délimitation. La même question se pose
d’ailleurs pour la digue de Sulina.
21. Madame le président, Messieurs les jug es, cette remarque nous conduit au deuxième
point de notre exposé, qui concerne la question des circonstances pertinentes.
B. Les circonstances pertinentes
22. La Cour voudra bien me permettre d’attirer son attention sur le fait que la Partie adverse
semble avoir des circonstances pertinentes une vision quelque peu déformée, comme on en a eu
l’illustration mardi dernier.
23. Dans un exposé où j’avoue ne pas avoir re trouvé la clarté et la rigueur qui caractérisent
habituellement ses plaidoiries, le professeurPellet a envisagé successivement la configuration
générale des côtes, l’île des Serpen ts en tant que circonstance pertin ente ou spéciale et la disparité
des longueurs côtières.
24. En ce qui concerne la configuration généra le des côtes, il s’est déclaré «prêt à admettre»,
«pour les besoins de la discussion», a-t-il précisé, qu’elle «peut constituer une circonstance pouvant
peut-être être prise en considération», mais à condition que l’on envisage «le cadre géographique
17
global» . Il n’a toutefois pas expliqué en quoi ce cadre géographique gl obal constituait une
16
CR 2008/31, p. 16, par. 30 (Lowe).
17CR 2008/31, p. 27, par. 12 (Pellet). - 16 -
considération qui conduirait à modifier (ou à ne pa s modifier) une ligne provisoire d’équidistance.
Envisageant à cette occasion la question du non-em piètement, il a par ailleurs estimé que la ligne
proposée par l’Ukraine compliquerait l’accès au port de Sulina, sans toutefois là encore expliquer
18
pourquoi . De surcroît, on ne voit pas bien le lien existant entre la configuration côtière et ce
dernier élément.
25. Quant à l’île des Serpents, le professeur Pellet a contesté son caractère d’île côtière et
critiqué le critère que nous avions cru pouvoir trou ver dans le chevauchement des eaux territoriales
19
continentales et insulaires afin de mieux cerner cette notion . Reprenant l’exemple de la sentence
arbitrale de 1985 entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Biss au, il n’a voulu y voir que la première catégorie
d’îles côtières qui y étaient mentionnées et qui ét aient celles «considérées comme partie intégrante
du continent». Or, dans cet arbitrage, les trois juges de la Cour qui composaient le tribunal avaient
pris soin de préciser qu’ils tenaient aussi pour côtières les îles Bijagos dont les eaux territoriales
20
étaient liées entre elles et à celles du continent . Ce qui est aussi la situation de l’île des Serpents.
26. S’agissant, enfin, de la disparité entre les longueurs des côtes des Parties, notre valeureux
contradicteur a estimé que c’était de façon très exceptio
nnelle 21 que cette disparité conduisait à
ajuster la ligne provisoire et que, dans deux des qua tre cas recensés, cette disparité «a joué un rôle
correcteur non pas au stade des circonstances pertinentes, mais à celui du test final» 22. On reste
confondu devant ces contrevérités.
27. Cela nous donne l’occasion de revenir sur l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime dans la
région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen , affaire dans laquelle la Norvège estimait qu’une
comparaison des longueurs des côtes était dépourvue de pertinence. On sait que la Cour en a fait
une circonstance déterminante qui a conduit à déplacer la ligne médiane. La Cour a toutefois pris
soin d’indiquer que «la prise en compte de la disparité des longueurs des côtes ne signifie pas une
application directe et mathématique du rappor t entre les longueurs des façades côtières»
(Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland
et Jan Mayen (Danemark
18CR 2008/31, p. 28, par. 16 (Pellet).
19
CR 2008/31, p. 34, par. 25 (Pellet).
20
RSA, vol. XIX, p. 149, paragraphe 95 de la sentence (p. 183-184).
21CR 2008/31, p. 38, par. 32 (Pellet).
22CR 2008/31, p. 38, par. 33 (Pellet). - 17 -
c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p.69, par.69), mais qu’il s’agit uniquement «de tirer les
conclusions appropriées, dans l’application des principes équitables, du fait que les longueurs des
côtes présentent une disparité marquée» ( ibid., p. 79 et 81, par. 92). Ce que précisément l’Ukraine
a proposé de faire dans la présente espèce.
28. On notera d’ailleurs que, dans cette affaire Jan Mayen [projection : croquis n 1 de l’arrêt
de la Cour, p.45], la petite île de Bontekoe, [flèche indiquant cette île sur le croquis] située à un
peu plus de 22 kilomètres de la côte principale du Groenland, a été utilisée comme point de base et
paraît même avoir exercé une influence non négligeable sur le tracé de la ligne médiane et, par voie
o
de conséquence, sur la ligne de délimitation qui a finalement été retenue. [Projection : croquis n 2,
arrêt Jan Mayen, p. 80.] Ce que l’on peut voir sur les deux croquis projetés et qui sont reproduits
sous l’onglet 20 du dossier des juges.
Conclusion
29. Madame le président, dans la présente affaire, nous persistons à penser que le tracé de la
ligne provisoire d’équidistance stricte doit être ét ablie de façon objective, c’est-à-dire en prenant
appui sur les points de base dont la pertinence est déterminée automatiquement par le principe de
proximité. L’île des Serpents doit donc être prise en compte à ce titre. Nous estimons, d’autre part,
que l’examen et la mise en balance des circonstan ces pertinentes, telles qu’elles ont été identifiées
et évaluées dans les plaidoiries précédentes de l’Uk raine, conduisent à ajuster la ligne provisoire
dans le sens que nous a vons indiqué de manière à satisfaire à l’exigence du résultat équitable.
[Projection: délimitation finale selon l’Ukraine. ] Le «glissement» suggéré ne vise nullement à
introduire, à côté de ce qu’on nomme la «translati on», une nouvelle catégorie d’ajustement dans la
modification d’une ligne d’équidistance provisoire. C’est tout simplement un terme commode pour
désigner le type d’ajustement proposé.
30. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, parvenu au terme des quelques remarques que
je souhaitais présenter dans ce qui sera ma derniè re plaidoirie devant votre Cour, je tiens à vous
remercier pour votre attention et votre écoute durant ces trois longues semaines de plaidoiries.
31. Madame le président, il convi endrait d’appeler à la barre M eBundy qui va poursuivre la
présentation de l’argumentation de l’Ukraine. Thank you, Madam. - 18 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Quéneudec. We do now call Mr. Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court.
VI. THE EQUITABLE NATURE OF U KRAINE ’S LINE :THE RELEVANT AREA ,
PROPORTIONALITY TEST , AND NON -ENCROACHMENT
1. In this presentation, which will slightly prolong these three weeks but I hope not too long,
I shall show that the Ukraine’s delimitation line achieves an equitable result in the light of the facts
of the case.
2. In responding to Romania’s arguments on this matter, I shall take up three related issues
on which the Parties remain divided: first, th e question of the relevant area; second, the
application of the proportionality test; and third, the issue of non-encroachment. I shall also
provide Ukraine’s answer to Judge Oxman’s question that was posed to both Parties.
A. The relevant area
[Map of different relevant areas: tab 35 of Ukraine’s folder]
3. With respect to the relevant area, it is he lpful once again to refer to the map on the screen,
which illustrates the differences between the Parties. And as can be readily seen, the two main
differences concern an area in the north, which Romania seeks to exclude, and the triangle in the
east, which Romania seeks to include.
4. The inclusion of the northern area is a f unction of whether Ukraine’s coast fronting this
area is considered to be a relevant coast. That is an issue that I discussed fully yesterday.
5. I would only note at this stage that there is no more reason to exclude the northern area in
this case than there was to excl ude the Gulf of Gabes in the Tunisia/Libya case. In Tunisia/Libya,
the Gulf of Gabes was considered to form part of the relevant area notwithstanding the fact that
Tunisia had enacted a straight, bay-closing line ac ross the Gulf closing off its waters as internal
waters. So, also, does the northern area in this case ⎯ which has not been similarly closed off
except for a short portion of the Karkanits’ka Gulf ⎯ form part of the relevant area.
6. That brings me to the eastern triangle. Romania claims that this triangle ⎯ or virtually all
of it ⎯ should be included in the relevant area. Ukraine says it should not because it constitutes an - 19 -
area that is subject to delimitation with a third State, Turkey ⎯ indeed, that has already been
delimited ⎯ and an area over which Romania has never expressed any interest previously.
7. On Monday, Professor Crawford argued that the eastern triangle is relevant because it lies
within a 200-nautical-mile arc extending from Roma nia’s coast. He displayed two graphics on the
screen to illustrate the point (CR2008/30, pp.12-1 3, paras.45-46), and I will put one of them up
on the screen ⎯ in a sense, Romania’s “best” one, the one that illustrates Romania’s more
extensive 200-mile potential entitlement referred to by Professor Crawford ⎯ in order to show why
Romania’s arguments are misplaced.
[Tab II-12 of Romania’s 15 September presentation]
8. ProfessorCrawford’s contention was that, because the projection of Romania’s coast out
to 200 miles covers most of the triangle, it must necessarily form part of the relevant area.
9. But that line of reasoning runs counter to th e approach that the Court adopted in the only
other case where it identified the relevant area with the same degree of specificity for purposes of
applying the proportionality test as can be done here ⎯ and that was the Tunisia/Libya case.
[Map of Tunisia/Libya with relevant area]
10. Now appearing on the screen is a map depicting the relevant area identified by the Court
in Tunisia/Libya. (See, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p.91, para.130, for the identification of the relevant
area.) If we adopt Professor Crawford’s 200-mile projection theory to Tunisia’s east-facing coasts,
it will be seen that 200-nautical-mile projections from Tunisia’s coast along the island of Djerba,
and from Tunisia’s coast between the Gulf of Gabes and Ras Kaboudia, both extend much further
eastwards than the limit of the relevant area identified by the Court.
In11. Tunisia/Libya, the Court was clearly sensitive to the rights and interests of third States
in the region. It did not consider the Tunisian coast north of Ras Kaboudia ⎯ a coast that faced an
area that had already delimited between Tunisia and Italy ⎯ to be relevant. Nor did it consider the
Libyan coast east of RasTajura, which faced Malta, to be relevant either. The relevant area was
therefore limited by a parallel of latitude ex tending east from RasKaboudia and a meridian of
longitude extending north from Ras Tajura.
12. In other words, the Court implicitly reject ed the proposition that the relevant area should
encompass areas extending all the way out to a distance of 200nautical miles from the coast of a - 20 -
party, in this case Tunisia, when such an extension would cross over into areas that are relevant to
delimitations with third States: rejected the approach that Professor Crawford is suggesting.
13. The same considerations apply here. ProfessorLowe maintained that the projection
eastward from Romania’s coast does not “fizzle out” somewhere to the west of CapeSarych
(CR 2008/31, p. 51, para.44). But this misses th e point. The eastward projection from Tunisia’s
coast did not “fizzle out” west of Ras Tajoura either. Nonetheless, the relevant area, in that case,
was limited by a line drawn north from Ras Tajura b ecause of the presence of third-State interests
beyond that limit.
[Map of Black Sea delimitations: tab5 of Ukrain e’s first round folders without the relevant area
shaded green]
14. In this case, there is a pre-existing delimitation agreement concluded between Turkey
and the former Soviet Union, and subsequently, be tween Turkey and Ukraine, and it is depicted on
the screen.
15. Romania has indicated that this boundary is based on equidistance (Romanian Memorial,
paras. 6.10-6.11). The points on the coasts of Uk raine and Turkey, which control the western end
of the delimitation line, are now being added to the map [add to map]. Ms Malintoppi showed you
this in a different context yesterday. These would be the control poi nts for the equidistance
boundary.
16. On the Ukrainian side, it is clear that CapeSarych provided the last base point for
constructing the delimitation line. The relevant Turkish base point can also be seen. The area
lying between those control points thus circumsc ribed the area that was being delimited between
Turkey and Ukraine, and between Turkey and the Soviet Union earlier.
17. That area so delimited between Ukraine and Turkey includes the entire triangle that
Romania now urges the Court to accept as part of the relevant area in this case. But such an area
should not be included. It is an area that was relevant only to the delimitation between Ukraine and
Turkey as to which Romania never expressed the s lightest interest prior to these proceedings.
Permit me to recall the fact that Romania never protested this agreement ⎯ indeed it accepts the
agreement ⎯ and Romania never once intimated that Ukrain e, or the Soviet Union, together with - 21 -
Turkey, were delimiting an area that Romania cons idered was relevant to its delimitation with
Ukraine.
18. And it is for these reasons that Ukraine maintains its position that the eastern triangle
cannot properly be deemed to form part of the relevant area in this case.
B. Answer to Judge Oxman’s question
19. Having addressed the question of the relevant area, it is appropriate for me to respond to
JudgeOxman’s question put to the Parties on Friday . The question also relates, in a way, to a
situation that exists within the relevant area in this case.
20. Judge Oxman’s question was:
“Does paragraph 3 of Article 121 of th e United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea apply to marine areas that are in any event within the limits of the EEZ and
continental shelf of the same State, such as marine areas within 200 nautical miles of
the mainland of that State?” (CR 2008/29, p. 51.)
21. Before giving Ukraine’s response to that question, I need to say a few words about
Romania’s answer provided by Professor Lowe on Tuesday.
22. What was surprising about Professor Lowe’s answer is that it did not actually address the
question that was asked. ProfessorLowe prefa ced his remarks by saying that Judge Oxman
“asked, in essence, if Article121 applies to mari ne areas within 200nauticalmiles of the
mainland” (CR 2008/31, p. 11, para. 6). And he then offered an extended analysis of Article 121 as
a whole without actually focusing on paragraph 3, to which the question was specifically related.
23. Professor Lowe’s answer was “yes. Article 121 is entitled ‘Regime of islands’.” He went
on to argue that Article 121 purports to define the legal régime of islands, that “there is nothing in
the Article which says it applies only to islands on the high seas”, that “Article 121 is a treaty text”
as to which, under the law of treaties, there is no proper approach to its interpretation that “could
lead one to suppose that it is limited in its a pplication to areas more than 200 miles from mainland
coasts”, and that the “plain words of Article 121 mean what they say” (CR2008/31, p.11,
paras. 7-9).
24. But all of this is beside the point. The scope of Article121 as a whole was not ⎯ at
least, as far as Ukraine understood it ⎯ what the question asked. The question related to
paragraph 3 of Article 121. - 22 -
25. In Ukraine’s submission, paragraph3 of Article121 has no practical application to
situations, such as we have in this case, wher e all of the marine areas at issue lie within
200 nautical miles of the mainland coasts of both Parties.
26. Article121(3) is an “entitlement” provision . It is not concerned with questions of
delimitation. It deals with the maritime entitlements of rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own. Such rocks have no EEZ or continental shelf.
27. But, when such features al ready lie within a maritime area that is, in any event, within
the 200-nautical-mile limits of the EEZ and cont inental shelf of a mainland coast, Article121(3)
has no relevance to that area. It is only in situations where an Article 121 (3) rock is being used to
extend the outer limit of a coastal State’s EEZ or continental sh elf beyond the 200-mile limit
generated by other coasts of a State, as was the case with Rockall, that Article 121 (3) might have a
role to play.
28. Obviously, that is not the situation we have in this case. As we have shown, Serpents’
Island is not an Article 121 (3) rock in any event. But even if it were, quod non, the entire marine
area at issue in this case ⎯ in other words, all of the relevant area ⎯ lies within 200 nautical miles
of Ukraine’s mainland coast. Arti cle121(3) does not change that fact. That is why we say that
Article 121 (3) has no practical application, and no real relevance at all in such situations.
C. Application of the test of proportionality
29. I now turn to the application of the proportionality test as an ex post facto test at the third,
and final, stage of the delimitation process.
30. Professor Lowe prefaced his remarks on this issue by emphasizing that it was important
already, before the proportionality test is applied, to get the first stage of the exercise right ⎯ the
choice of the provisional equidistance line (CR 2008/31, p. 44, para. 14, and p. 45, para. 19).
31. Ukraine agrees that establishing the provisiona l equidistance line is an important step in
the process. And we have heard Professor Quéneud ec on that. But I must say that my colleagues
and I were baffled by the graphic that Professor Lowe placed on the screen to illustrate his point.
[Tab IX-3 to Lowe’s 16 September presentation] - 23 -
32. Now, perhaps it is due to my own shortcom ings, or maybe it is due to the fact that the
slide was produced very late at night ⎯ I suspect it is more my own shortcomings ⎯ but I cannot
see how this graphic lends the slightest support to Professor Lowe’s argument about the importance
of getting the provisional equidistance line right.
33. According to my colleague, the slide shows “two adjusted provisional equidistance lines”
hypothetically adopted by a tribunal ⎯ that is two lines which are not the provisional equidistance
line itself, but rather adjusted lines that have already taken into account differences in coastal
lengths and other special circumstances. These are th e red line on the left, and the blue line on the
right. In one case this hypothetical tribunal has fixed the adjusted equidistance line 40 miles off the
coast of State A ⎯ i.e., the red line ⎯ and in the other hypothetical case, the tribunal has adjusted
the line 70 miles off the coast ⎯ the blue line.
34. In between, Professor Lowe drew a white line which, under his hypothetical, represented
a division of the area ⎯ presumably the maritime area ⎯ in strict proportion to the lengths of the
two States’ coasts. ProfessorLowe then speculated that, in either case ⎯ the red or the blue
case ⎯ a tribunal might view the adjusted line as pr oducing a result within the bounds of equitable
proportionality (CR 2008/31, p. 45, paras. 16-18).
35. That may or may not be so. Presumably, the tribunals would have had good reasons for
drawing the adjusted equidistance line where they did in each of the two examples to reflect the
particular facts of the case.
36. But why these scenarios have anything to do with counsel’s argument that it is important
to get the first step in the process right ⎯ the plotting of the provisional equidistance line ⎯ is
anything but clear. No provisional equidistance lines even appear on the graphic.
37. As ProfessorQuéneudec has explained, th e Court clearly has a margin of appreciation
when it comes to weighting the effect that a mark ed difference in coastal lengths has for adjusting
the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. Both Parties agree that
delimitation does not entail a division of the relevant area in a strict mathematical ratio
corresponding exactly to the ratio between the lengt hs of their coasts. It is the role of the
proportionality test to check whether the result of the line produced by the first two steps in the
exercise ⎯ the plotting of the provisional line and its adjustment to take into account relevant - 24 -
circumstances ⎯ produces a result that is not overly dispro portionate. I showed last week that
Ukraine’s line meets that test while Romania’s line does not.
38. ProfessorLowe then took aim at what he termed Ukraine’s “three-sided argument” ⎯
the fact that Ukraine has a much longer coast fr onting on three sides of the delimitation area while
Romania has a shorter coast fronting just one side of the area (CR 2008/31, p. 46, para. 25).
39. My colleague’s reaction to this was “so what?” And he produced another graphic to
illustrate the point.
[Tab IX-6 to Lowe on screen]
40. Even using this schematic, as ProfessorLowe pointed out, the coastal ratios stand in a
ratio of 5:1 while the maritime areas are in a ratio of 3:1. He then asked on what other grounds
than coastal length might one object? (CR 2008/31, p. 47, para. 26.)
41. The answer is that it is precisely in such situations ⎯ as demonstrated by the Gulf of
Maine, by the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case, by other cases where coastal lengths have been
relevant, that an adjustment would be made to the provisional equidistance line to reflect the
relevant geographic circumstances.
42. But there is a danger in relying on these kinds of overly simplified schematics ⎯ what
ProfessorLowe termed a “table-top exercise in delimitation” (CR2008/31, p. 50, para.39). For
instance, if ProfessorLowe’s graphic had been drawn to reflect perhaps more faithfully the
situation we have in this case, it would have looked like this ⎯ as you see on the screen.
[Place revised sketch on screen]
43. Now the situation looks different and the dashed line begins to lose its appeal.
44. Madam President, Members of the Court, Ukraine believes that it is preferable to look at
the actual geographic situation that exists in the nort h-west basin of the Black Sea rather than
relying on table-top schematics.
[North-west corner with Parties’ relevant coasts]
45. Ukraine believes that it has shown that the actual geographic relationship between the
lengths of the Parties’ coasts stands in a ratio in the order of 3.7 to 1, and that the provisional
equidistance line should be adjusted to reflect that fact. - 25 -
46. ProfessorLowe complains that this is us ing proportionality as an independent principle
of delimitation ⎯ something it is not supposed to do (CR2008/31, p.46, para.21). Indeed, my
good friend introduced a scare tactic in his closing speech on Tuesday. In his words:
“If relative coastal lengths were to be regarded as a factor requiring the
adjustment of the provisional equidistance lin e in cases such as this now before the
Court, that would elevate the proportionality issue into the dominant principle for
maritime delimitation ...and it would contradict 50years of international
jurisprudence.” (CR 2008/31, p. 48, para. 30.)
47. With great respect, that alarmist reaction scarcely reflects either how the jurisprudence
has treated situations where there is a marked difference in coastal lengths or how Ukraine has
arrived at its delimitation line.
48. Because once again, our opponents mix up the role that differences in coastal lengths
have as a relevant circumstance justifying an adju stment or shifting of the provisional equidistance
line, with the role that the proportionality test plays after such an adjustment has, or has not, been
made. The Court had made it perfectly clear wh at the difference in these two steps involves at
paragraph 66 of its Judgment in the Libya/Malta case; Professor Quéneudec cited that last week ⎯
I will not read it again (CR 2008/29, p. 40, para. 89).
49. Professor Lowe’s contention that “[p]lainly, the disparity in coastal lengths in this case is
a matter, not for the stage two adjustment of the provisional equidistance line but for the stage three
proportionality test” is simply not correct (CR 2008/31, p. 48, para. 31). It runs counter to the way
the Court and arbitral tribunals have consistently treated the issue.
50. In the present case, the Parties reach the fo llowing position after the first two steps in the
delimitation process have been carried out, and before they apply the test of proportionality.
⎯ On Ukraine’s side, Ukraine has plotted the pr ovisional equidistance line from the nearest base
points on the baselines of the Parties from which the breadth of their territorial sea is measured,
and has then adjusted that line to reflect the relevant geographic circumstances.
⎯ Romania has plotted a different provisional equidistance line, and then makes no adjustment to
that line except for postulating a 12-mile arc around Serpents’Island and claiming an
additional area in the north to compensate it for areas that it alleges it “lost” when it entered
into agreements in 1949 with the Soviet Union. - 26 -
51. This takes us through the first two steps of how the Parties have got there, and the
purpose of the proportionality test at the third stage is to test the equitabl eness of the lines that the
Parties have arrived at as a result of these first two steps.
52. Last Friday, I showed that Ukraine’s delimitation fully satisfies the test of
proportionality. I do not intend to repeat the demonstration again other than to simply recall that
Ukraine’s line produced a division of the maritime ar eas in a ratio of 3.1 to 1, whereas the ratio
between the lengths of the relevant coasts of the Par ties is in the order of 3.7 to 1. That is not a
disproportionate result (CR 2008/29, p. 47, para. 21).
53. I also explained why Romania’s line failed the test because it produced a division of
maritime areas only in the order of 1.4 to 1, which Ukraine submits is grossly disproportionate
when compared to the Parties’ coasts that actually generate such areas (CR2008/29, p.48,
para. 24).
54. ProfessorLowe did not come back to these calculations. Instead, he presented yet
another graphic, which I will put on the screen [map – tab IX-11 to Lowe]. This one was designed
to show that Romania’s line meets the proportionality test if now you only exclude the
Karkanits’ka Gulf from the equation while still keeping the eastern triangle included.
55. There are two basic problems with this new effort by my colleague to squeeze Romania’s
claim into satisfactory proportionality calculations. The first is that there is no reason to exclude
the Karkanits’ka Gulf. I addressed that matter yesterday, citing both the Gulf of Gabes and the Bay
of Fundy examples which contradict ProfessorLo we’s approach. The second problem is that
Romania continues to include the eastern triangle, which has the effect of adding substantial
areas ⎯ over 13,000sq km of sea area ⎯ to Ukraine’s side of the equation while, conveniently,
adding no more Ukrainian coast. I have shown in my presentation earlier this afternoon why that
manoeuvre is misguided.
56. In contrast, ProfessorLowe had nothing to say about a further demonstration Ukraine
made last week, which had also appeared in our Re joinder, that confirmed the equitable nature of
Ukraine’s line. I refer to the fact that ⎯ as we showed on the screen last week ⎯ even if one were
to include, for sake of argument, both the eastern triangle and the northern area as part of the - 27 -
relevant area, Ukraine’s line would still readily satisfy the proportionality test (CR 2008/29, p. 48,
para. 23). There was no answer to that on Tuesday.
57. Nor has Romania responded to a third wa y in which Ukraine has shown that its line
respects and satisfies the proportionality test.
[Fig. 8-2 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder]
58. The map that now appears on the screen was figure 8-2 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder. It shows
the result that would be produced if one were to eliminate the northern area from the
proportionality calculation while treating Romania’ s closing line between “pointS” and Cape
Tarkhankut as a notional coastal front instead.
59. This is similar to a situation that the Court of Arbitration faced in the Canada-France
arbitration involving St. Pierre and Miquelon.
60. In that case, France argued that significant segments of the southern coast of
Newfoundland should be excluded, and that a closing line across what was called the Cabot Strait
in that area lying in front of that coast that Fr ance wanted to exclude, should not be considered as a
“coast”, the closing line should not be considered as a notional coast.
61. The Court of Arbitration disagreed. It stated, and I quote from its award:
“But the coastlines that France wants to exclude form the concavity of the Gulf
approaches and all of them face the area where the delimitation is required, generating
projections that meet and overlap, either laterally or in opposition. The closing line
across the Cabot Strait represents coastlines inside the Gulf which are in direct
opposition to Saint Pierre and Miquelon and are less than 400nauticalmiles away.”
(RIAA, Vol. XXI, pp. 280-281, para. 29.)
62. So, even taking Romania’s closing line as a notional coast, the figure on the screen still
shows that Ukraine’s delimitation fully satisfies the proportionality test. And as I said, we
addressed this in our Rejoinder: it is another matter which Romania has failed to grapple with.
D. Non-encroachment
63. The last issue I intend to address is the question of non-encroachment. Here, I can be
very brief since counsel for Romania had virtually nothing additional to say on the matter in his
second round presentation. - 28 -
64. In particular, we heard no response to th e demonstration that Ukraine made last week ⎯
and I refer back, for the record, to tab87 in our first round folders ⎯ that Romania’s claim line
cuts off the projection of Ukraine’s much longe r coast situated between the land boundary up to
“point S” ⎯ cuts it even excepting pointS, it cuts it off even more if you take the coast beyond
point S. There was also no response to the fact that Romania’s claim line cuts off and runs parallel
to Ukraine’s south-facing coast while, at the same time, according to Romania’s own east coast a
full projection eastwards. It was a clear imbalance. There is a cut-off effect, we showed it last
week and there has been nothing from the other side in response.
65. There was only one new argument presente d this week, not by ProfessorLowe, but by
Professor Pellet, on Tuesday.
66. He complained that Ukraine’s delimitation line, when coupled with the presence of
Bulgaria further south, places Romania in a concave situation (CR 2008/31, p. 28, para. 15).
67. Now that argument, ProfessorPellet’s argument, was really the same argument that
Cameroon unsuccessfully made in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case. There, Cameroon contended that
the concavity of the Gulf of Guinea and the c oncavity of its own coastline created a virtual
enclavement of Cameroon which constituted a speci al circumstance that should be taken into
account.
68. The Court disagreed. It noted that the particular sectors of Cameroon’s coastline relevant
to the delimitation with Nigeria ⎯ in other words, not taking into account parts of the coast that
faced third States in the region ⎯ exhibited no particular concavity ( I.C.J. Reports 2002 , p.445,
para. 297).
69. The same applies here.
70. And so I come back full circle to the point at which I began in my opening presentation
last week, when I cited the Court’s passage from Cameroon v. Nigeria in which the Court stated:
“The geographical configuration of the maritime areas that the Court is called
upon to delimit is a given. It is not an element open to modification by the Court but a
fact on the basis of which the Court must effect the delimitation.” ( I.C.J. Reports
2002, pp. 443-445, para. 295.)
We subscribe to that wholeheartedly. - 29 -
Conclusions
71. MadamPresident, Members of the Court, I am coming to the end. There have been
suggestions during these hearings from the other si de of the Bar that it is Romania alone which
respects international law and has presented a reaso nable approach. The distinguished Agent of
Romania intimated that if recognized norms had been accepted by Ukraine during negotiations, we
would not be here today (CR 2008/18, p. 22, para. 22). Need I recall that Romania was also unable
to reach agreement with the Soviet Union despite years of negotiations.
72. No one State has a monopoly on international law.
73. During these proceedings, the position of Romania has been put to you with vigour and
with skill. Ukraine has endeavoured to do the same.
74. Ukraine believes that it has met all of the arguments raised by our colleagues on the other
side. We have treated “like with like”, whether with respect to the relevant coasts of the Parties, or
with respect to the role of Serpents’ Island and th e Sulina dyke, or in connection with applying the
proportionality test. We believe that we have s hown that Ukraine’s delimitation line is based on a
proper and a legally sound application of the prin ciples and rules of maritime delimitation to the
facts of this case.
75. Madam President, Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation. I thank the
Court very much for its attention, and I would ask you, Madam President, if you would now call on
Ukraine’s Agent to present Ukraine’s final submissions. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.Bundy. We now call the Agent of Ukraine,
Mr. Vassylenko. Your Excellency.
VMAr.SYLENKO:
VII. FINAL SUBMISSIONS OF U KRAINE
Madam President, Members of the Court, Ukraine greatly appreciates the work of the
International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It is because of
this that we were happy to entrust this matter to the Court. This case, the first case before the Court
to which Ukraine is a Party, is of great impornce to my country. We are confident that your
judgment will be a significant contribution to good relations between Ukraine and Romania. - 30 -
I shall now read Ukraine’s final submissions:
“For the reasons given in Ukraine’s written and oral pleadings, Ukraine requests
the Court to adjudge and declare that th e line delimiting the c ontinental shelf and
exclusive economic zones between Ukraine and Romania is as follows:
(a) from the point (point 1) identified in Article 1 of the 2003 Treaty between Ukraine
and Romania on the Regime of the Ukrainian-Romanian State Border, having the
co-ordinates of 45° 05' 21" N; 30° 02' 27" E, the line runs along a straight line to
point 2, having the co-ordinates of 44° 54' 00" N; 30° 06' 00" E; then
(b)from point2, the line runs along an azimuth of 156° to point3, having the
co-ordinates of 43°20'37"N; 31°05'39"E; and then continues along the same
azimuth until it reaches a point where the in terests of third States potentially come
into play.
The co-ordinates are referenced to the Pulkovo datum i.e., using the Krasovsky
ellipsoid, and all lines are loxodromes.”
Madam President, Members of the Court, my colleagues and I would like to thank you for
your attention, patience and courtesy.
I would also like to express thanks, on behalf of the entire Ukrainian delegation, to the
Registrar and all his staff for ensuring the smooth running of these oral proceedings and the
efficient administration of the entire case.
I would especially like to thank the interpreters for their outstanding efforts.
And, finally, I wish to express our appreciation to the members of the Romanian delegation
for their co-operation throughout the proceedings.
I thank you, Madam President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. The Court takes note of the final
submissions which you have read on behalf of Ukraine, as it took note on Tuesday
16 September 2008 of the final submissions read on behalf of Romania.
This brings us to the end of these three week s of hearings devoted to the oral argument on
the case.
And we wish the very best to Professor Quéne udec, who has said that this is his swansong,
and who has assisted this Court over the years.
I should like to thank the Agents, counsel and advocates for their statements. - 31 -
In accordance with the usual practice, I shall request both Agents to remain at the Court’s
disposal to provide any additional information it may require. And with this proviso, I now declare
closed the oral proceedings in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine).
The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in due
course of the date on which the Court will deliver its judgment. Having no other business before it
today, the Court now rises.
The Court rose at 4.15 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le vendredi 19 septembre 2008, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président, en l'affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine)