Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2008/27
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2008
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 10 September 2008, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2008
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 10 septembre 2008, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale
sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judge ad hoc Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident
RanMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skjoteiskov,
jugeGaja,. ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Georgia is represented by:
Ms Tina Burjaliani, First Deputy-Minister of Justice,
H.E. Ms Maia Panjikidze, Ambassador of Georgia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agents;
Mr. Payam Akhavan, Professor of International Law, McGill University,
as Co-Agent and Advocate;
Mr. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
as Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Nika Gvaramia, Minister of Justice,
Mr. Ekaterine Zguladze, First Deputy-Minister of the Interior,
Mr. Archil Giorgadze, Head of Human Rights Unit, Office of the Prosecutor-General,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Professor of Law, University College London, Member, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Zachary Douglas, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Cambridge,
Ms Stephanie Ierino, Barrister & Solicitor, Supreme Court of Tasmania, Research Associate,
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme
Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Mr. Andrew B. Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
as Advisers.
The Government of the Russian Federation is represented by:
Mr. Roman Kolodkin, Director, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
H.E. Mr. Kirill Gevorgian, Ambassador of th e Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agents; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de Géorgie est représenté par :
Mme Tina Burjaliani, premier vice-ministre de la justice,
S. Exc. Mme Maia Panjikidze, ambassadeur de Géorgie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents;
M. Payam Akhavan, professeur de droit international à l’Université McGill,
comme coagent et avocat;
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., prof esseur de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, avocat, Matrix Chambers,
M. Paul S. Reichler, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, W ashington D.C., membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
comme avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Nika Gvaramia, ministre de la justice,
Mme Ekaterine Zguladze, premier vice-ministre de l’intérieur,
M. Archil Giorgadze, chef du département des drotis de l’homme au bureau du procureur général,
M. Philippe Sands, professeur dedroit au University College de Londres, avocat, Matrix Chambers,
M. Zachary Douglas, avocat, Matrix Chambers, chargé de cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université
de Cambridge,
Mme Stephanie Ierino, avocat et Solicitor à la Cour suprême de Tasmanie, Research Associate au
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law de l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
M. Andrew B. Loewenstein, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement de la fédération de Russie est représenté par :
M. Roman Kolodkin, directeur du département des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
S. Exc. M. Kirill Gevorgian, ambassadeur de la Fédération de Russie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agents ; - 6 -
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Directo
r
of the Walther-Schückling Institute, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Dmitry Ognev, Solicitor, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners, Moscow,
Mr. Khristofor Ivanyan, Managing Partner, Ivanyan and Partners law firm, Moscow,
as Advocates;
Mr. Nikolay Uvarov, Lieutenant General, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation,
Mr. Ilya Tiatkin, Major General, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation,
Mr. Elbrus Kargiev, Principal Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Mr. Grigory Lukyantsev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations, New York,
Mr. Maksim Musikhin, First Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Ivan Volodin, Acting Head of Division, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
Ms Maria Zabolotskaya, Second Secretary, Perm anent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations in New York,
Mr. Pavel Kornatskiy, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Svetlana Shatalova, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
Ms Diana Taratukhina, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
Ms Anastasia Tezikova, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Cambridge), Walher-Schückling Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Alina Miron, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University Paris Ouest-La Défense,
Researcher, Center for International Law of Nanterre (CEDIN), - 7 -
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Dmitry Ognev, Solicitor, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Moscou,
M. Khristofor Ivanyan, associé gérant, cabinet Ivanyan & Partners, Moscou,
comme avocats ;
M. Nikolay Uvarov, général de division au ministère de la défense de la Fédération de Russie,
M. Ilya Tiatkin, général de brigade au ministère de la défense de la Fédération de Russie,
M. Elbrus Kargiev, conseiller principal au mini stère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de
Russie,
M. Grigory Lukyantsev, conseiller à la mission pe rmanente de la Fédération de Russie auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M. Maksim Musikhin, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas,
M. Ivan Volodin, chef de division par intérim du département des affaires juridiques du ministère
des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
Mme Maria Zabolotskaya, deuxième secrétaire à la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M. Pavel Kornatskiy, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Svetlana Shatalova, attaché au département des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
Mme Diana Taratukhina, attaché au département de s affaires juridiques du mi nistère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
Mme Anastasia Tezikova, attaché au département d es affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
MC. hristian . ams, LL.M., docteur en dr oit de l’Université de Cambridge, Institut
Walther-Schücking de l’Université de Kiel,
Mme Alina Miron, attaché temporaire d’enseignement et de recherche à l’Université de
ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, chercheur au centre de droit international de Nanterre
(CEDIN), - 8 -
Mr. Sergey Usoskin, Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners,
Ms Elena Krotova, Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Ms Tatiana Tolstaya, Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners,
Ms Anna Shumilova, Junior Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners,
Ms Oxana Gogunskaya, Junior Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners,
as Advisers. - 9 -
M. Sergey Usoskin, juriste, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mme Elena Krotova, juriste, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mme Tatiana Tolstaya, juriste, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mme Anna Shumilova, juriste junior, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mme Oxana Gogunskaya, juriste junior, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
commc eonseillers. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open and the Court meets to hear the
second round of oral observations of the Russian Federation on the Request for the indication of
provisional measures filed by George and I believe it is Professor Zimmermann who is to open for
the Russian Federation. You have the floor.
Mr. ZIMMERMANN: Thank you, Madam President.
I. APPLICATION OF A RTICLES 2 AND 5 OF CERD AND ISSUES OF ATTRIBUTION
1. Application of Articles 2 and 5 of CERD in the present case
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, allow me to begin by addressing the territorial
scope of CERD. To this, ProfessorCrawford de voted very little time, merely referring to the
Ilascu case1. After some argument on the scope of application in the first round, Georgia thus
returns to its initial approach b ased on mere assumptions. But we believe the matter does deserve
significant more consideration.
2. Madam President, when considering wh ether Article22 of CERD may serve as a
jurisdictional basis in situations of armed conflict occurring on the territory of a foreign State, it is
particularly relevant to take into account the prac tice of States which have appeared as Applicants
before this Court in cases involving allegations of inter-ethnic violence.
3. Thus, neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor Croatia invoked Article22 CERD in their
respective cases brought against the FRY (see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) and
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia). The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case concerning Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi)) despite strong
underlying allegations of “ethnic cleansing” on their respective territory.
4. Similarly, in the Wall case, when you spelled out the legal rules applicable to the occupied
territories, you referred to the ICCPR and the Rights of the Child Convention, but did not mention
1CR 2008/25, p. 20, para. 40 (Crawford). - 11 -
CERD ⎯ and this despite the fact that written obser vations submitted by States had discussed the
prohibition and elimination of racial discrim ination under international law (see e.g., Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , Written
Observations of Syria, p. 5).
5. What I believe is even more im portant is your 2005 Judgment in the Congo v. Uganda
case. Uganda had inter alia ⎯ I now quote from your Judgment–– “incited ethnic conflicts and
took no action to prevent such conflicts” ( Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005 , p. 240, para. 209)
in Ituri. You then moved on to explicitly determin ing that a number of instruments in the field of
human rights were both applicable and relevant to these Ugandan acts ( ibid., p.243, para. 217).
The list of treaties which, in your opinion, fulf illed these two criteria included the ICCPR. Yet,
you in your Judgment did not list CERD, despite the fact that both the DRC as well as Uganda had
been contracting parties of CERD at all relevant moments in time.
6. This survey indicates that both parties to disputes which Georgia would probably qualify
as clear-cut CERD cases as well as this Court have apparently never considered CERD to apply
with regard to inter-ethnic conflicts occurring abroad.
7. Madam President, I will not repeat here what I have said about the wording of Articles 2
and 5 of CERD 2 which supports a territorial scope of app lication. I may add, however, that the
wording is supported by a comparison with Article 3 ⎯ the qualified prohibition of apartheid,
which does refer to “territories under their jurisdiction”.
8. Madam President, if there is one general obligation, Article 2, and one qualified
prohibition specially condemned, Article 3, then why should the qualified prohibition have a more
restrictive scope of application? The natural reading suggests that States would lay down more
extensive obligations with respect to the qualifie d prohibition, that is Article3. Georgia’s
argument cannot explain this.
9. That brings me to my next point, namely the issue of effective control.
2
See CR 2008/23, pp. 40-42, paras. 6 et seq. - 12 -
10. Madam President, Honourable Members of the Court, we submit that the Respondent
does not exercise effective control over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and/or adjacent regions of
Georgia. This appears from the jurisprudence of this Court, to which I referred on Monday, as well
as that of other courts and tribunals, such as th e Strasbourg court, that have had to interpret
“effective control tests” and to apply it to specific patterns of fact.
11. Let me stress again that this jurisprude nce almost exclusively concerns cases based on
treaties that ⎯ unlike CERD ⎯ contained a general provision envisaging at least some degree of
extraterritorial application.
12. Madam President, Members of the Court, the one case the Applicant refers to is Ilascu 3.
This did not come as a surprise, because even by Strasbourg standards, Ilascu is a rather unusual
4
case, difficult to square with subsequent cases such as Issa or rulings by the Grand Chamber such
as Bankovic 5.
13. But be that as it may. Ilascu is not, as Professor Crawford put it, an “instructive
precedent” 6for the Applicant. And, indeed, four observations are called for in that regard.
14. First, the case was not about “effective control”. The Strasbourg court made it clear that
it would apply a different test. It observed that the Convention would apply to cases where a
foreign State exercised, not necessarily effective control, but ⎯ I quote the court––“at the very
7
least . . . decisive influence” over a separatist entity.
15. Second, the case was not abou t the effective control over a stretch of territory as such.
Rather, it concerned a special case of extrate rritorial jurisdiction, long recognized in the
jurisprudence of courts and tribunals ⎯ that of the intensive control exercised by a State over
individuals captured abroad. The Ilascu judgment makes this clear when stating that “the
3
European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 48787/99 ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia),
judgment [GC] of 8 July 2004.
4European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 31821/96 ( Issa and Others v. Turkey), judgment of
16 Nov. 2004.
5European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 52207/99 (Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others),
judgment [GC] of 12 Dec. 2001.
6CR 2008/25, p. 20, para. 40 (Crawford).
7European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 48787/99 ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia),
judgment [GC] of 8 July 2004, para. 392. - 13 -
8
applicants were arrested in June 1992 with the participation of soldiers of the 14th Army” and this
was indeed a critical factor the court took into consideration.
T1hir.d, Ilascu underlines the importance of the very two factors I referred to on Monday:
time and intensity of control. It concerned an area which had been under the “decisive influence”
of the Russian army for more than a decade ⎯ a fact which the Court underlined at various times
in its judgment 9.
17. Fourth and finally, as regards intensity, the court “attache[d] particular importance” to
the fact that Russia had a formalized military co-o peration with the separatist forces in the region,
e.g., through an agreement on “joint work with a view to using armaments, military technology and
10
ammunition” ⎯ and there is no equivalent to such an agreement in our case.
18. Madam President, we submit that if ever there is an “instructive ECHR precedent” on
11
effective control at all, then it is likely to be Loizidou . That case ⎯ equally a Strasbourg
decision ⎯ has been accepted and followed frequently.
19. Comparing the situation on the ground, one cannot however fail to see the major
differences between an area of accepted effective control ⎯ namely Turkish control over northern
Cyprus ⎯ and our case. For your convenience, some of the more striking features are set out in a
table that you can find at tab 1 of the judges’ folder.
20. These differences cannot be overestimated ⎯ in fact, the ratio of Turkish troops per
square kilometre in northern Cyprus is approxima tely 20 times as high as that of Russian troops in
Abkhazia. Not surprisingly, this difference has consequences on the places where troops are
stationed. Turkish troops are stationed throughout the whole of northern Cyprus and constantly
patrol all lines of communications.
21. Finally, Turkish troops have been in northern Cyprus since 1974, while Russian forces
have been in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for a few weeks only, in a much more volatile
8
European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 48787/99 ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia),
judgment [GC] of 8 July 2004, para. 383.
European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 48787/99 ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia),
judgment [GC] of 8 July 2004, paras. 387, 392, 393.
1European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 48787/99 ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia),
judgment [GC] of 8 July 2004, para. 390.
1European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 15318/89 ( Loizidou v. Turkey), judgment on preliminary
objections of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310. - 14 -
environment. And while the number of Russian troops is decreasing, the number of Turkish troops
in Cyprus, which are, incidentally, not peacekeepers, has, by and large, been stable ever since 1974.
22. These figures show that our case does not even begin to compare with Loizidou.
23. Madam President, let me now turn to one of the areas on which Georgia placed particular
emphasis, the area to the south of South Ossetia, including the Gori district.
24. In their pleadings yesterday, the Applicant’s Agent, as well as counsel, referred to human
12 13
rights abuses in what they called “Russia’s self-proclaimed ‘buffer zone’” . To form a picture of
the real situation in that zone, may I draw your attention to the map projected on the screen, which
you can also find in tab 2 of your folder.
25. The Agent of the Russian Federation has aut horized me to make a number of statements
of fact about the situation–– statements based on information by the Ministry of Defence of the
Russian Federation.
26. First, Russian troops are situated in six observation posts on the southern border of the
zone. You can identify those posts easily on the map. They are dispersed over a border zone of
approximately 80km, that is, there is a post ever y 10 to15km only. Each observation post is
manned by forces in platoon size. The total number of troops stationed amounting, as of today,
to 195.
27. Second, over the last days, forces have been reduced considerably. On Monday, the
14
Russian Agent gave their figure as 272 . Since then, there has been a major reduction and the
number was decreased to the above-mentioned 195. I may add that Russia denies as untrue the
allegation, made yesterday by the Agent for Georgi a, that “while we were appearing before the
Court, Russian military forces [had] opened a new checkpoint in the western Georgian village of
Nazadi bringing yet another Georgian community under its control” 15. This checkpoint had been
set up on 16August and will, in any event, be ab olished in the next days under the agreement
12See, e.g., CR 2008/25, p. 40, para. 4 (Burjaliani) and pp. 26-27, para. 15 (Akhavan).
13
See, e.g., CR 2008/25, p. 38, para. 21 (Reichler).
14CR 2008/23, p. 24, para. 43 (Gevorgian).
15See, e.g., CR 2008/25, p. 40, para. 7 (Burjaliani). - 15 -
recently reached between the Parties. The develo pment occurring over the last days is therefore
one of considerable reduction of troops, not of establishing new posts.
28. Third, while there are 195 Russian troops controlling the 80km border, no forces are
stationed within the zone. I repeat, there are no troops with in the zone. It is therefore misleading,
to say the least, to describe this as a zone of control.
29. Fourth, Russian forces are under instructio n not to hinder the entry into the zone of
Georgian police forces. As a matter of fact, acco rding to the most recent information available to
the Respondent from forces on the ground, Georgian police have entered the zone, carrying arms
16
and have established their own checkpoints within the zone .
30. MadamPresident, this information is indica tive of the real extent of Russian control in
the so-called “buffer zone”. It is misleading to characterize this zone as a control zone. One
hundred and ninety-five Russian soldiers are patro lling its outer border. But these are 195 soldiers
stretched along a line of 80 km. By their very number, they simply are unable to exercise effective
control over the border, let alone the zone as such.
31. Madam President, much the same can be sai d for the Akhalgori region in South Ossetia,
which received much attention yesterday. Info rmation available to Russia is the following ⎯ and
again, you can follow this on the map:
⎯ there are two observation posts on the Akhalgori part of the southern border of the zone;
⎯ the total number of Russian troops stationed there is approximately 100;
⎯ no Russian troops are stationed in Akhalgori district outside the two posts;
⎯ there are several Georgian police checkpoints on the border between Akhalgori district and the
adjacent Georgian territory.
32. Let me conclude this point by also re ferring to the fact that five observation posts
between Poti and Senaki, close to the Georgian-Abkhazian border are being withdrawn right now.
33. I will now turn to issues of attribution.
16Georgian checkpoints ha ve been established, inter alia, at the following locations: CitaAlakhubany
(near Didi-Giromi);Kvenakotsa; Zadiantcarkari. - 16 -
Attribution
34. MadamPresident, Practice Direction XI st ates that during proceedings on provisional
measures parties should not enter into the merits of the case beyond what is strictly necessary for
the purpose of dealing with the criteria for the indication of provisional measures . Counsel for
Georgia claimed that this line had been crossed, gi ven that, as he then put it, “the only question at
17
this stage is whether facts are credibly asserted” and that, therefore, any consideration of issues of
attribution or breach is misplaced.
35. Let me make two briefs points in that regard.
36. First, Georgia itself has, time and again, referred to facts that clearly raise issues of
attribution and indeed has, to mention just two examples, claimed that Russia is responsible for acts
of militias operating in the territories under consider ation or that it can be held responsible for acts
18
of persons who have previously been employed by the Respondent . On the other hand, it claims
that issues of attribution are be yond the reach of these proceedings 19. Yet, Georgia cannot have it
both ways.
37. Second, and more important, may I remind you of your Order on provisional measures in
the Great Belt case ( I.C.J. Reports 1991 , p.17, para.22), where you indeed considered the very
same question, and where you confirmed that the “purpose of provisional measures [is] to preserve
‘rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings’” ( United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1979 , p.19, para.36; see also Frontier Dispute, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, p. 8, para. 13). This implies, as Judge Shahabudeen put it, that the Court is –– as is
indeed also confirmed by parties appearing before it –– (See, e.g., I.C.J. Pleadings, Nuclear Tests,
Vol. 1, p.1 89 (statement by Solicitor-General Ellicott, Q.C.); I.C.J.Pleadings, Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf, pp. 89, 97 and 115 (statement by D.P. O’Connell), not bound by a mere assertion
of rights (Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of
29July1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991 ; separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p.28). And
Judge Shahabudeen then rightly continued that even for purposes of provisional measures,
17CR 2008/25, p. 11, para. 6 (Crawford).
18
CR 2008/22, pp. 43-44, para. 20 (Akhavan).
19CR 2008/25, p. 11, paras. 4 et seq. (Crawford). - 17 -
“the Court must be concerned with satisfying itself affirmatively of the possible
existence of the rights claimed, the requir ed degree of proof being dependent on the
character and circumstances of the particular case” ( Passage through the Great Belt
(Finland v. Denmark), Provisional 20asures Order of 29 July 1991; separate opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 28) .
38. It is, therefore, not sufficient that Georgia merely asserts that certain breaches have
occurred or that they are attributable to the Respondent, even more so since you have recently
confirmed your own strict view on attribution ( Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro ),
Judgment of 26 February 2007, paras. 396 et seq.).
39. As to substance, let me now first turn to one instance where Georgia claimed that certain
acts had been committed by organs of the Russian Federation, namely by some of its officers 21. A
witness claims that his “interrogation was mostly carried out by Russian officers” since, while he
could not recall the stars on the uniform of the interrogators “Russia was written on their badges”.
40. Yet, it must be noted that the Russian ar my, including the formations deployed in South
Ossetia, ever since 2003, no longer uses badges which would either carry “Russia” or “Russian
Federation”.
41. That brings me to my next point rela ting to the allegation that, “senior military and
intelligence officials in the de facto separatist governments are in f act officials of the Russian
22
Federation” .
42. Let us start by having a look at tab22 of Georgia’s judges’ folder, where the very first
person, the Prime Minister of South Ossetia, is described as having been ⎯ prior to coming to
South Ossetia–– a director of a Russian energy company. One truly wonders how such an
employment, which, in any case, has ended prior to becoming a member of the South Ossetian
Government, can be of any relevance when it comes to attribution.
43. Besides, I can confirm that, according to information received from the Russian Ministry
of Defence, Mr.Anatoly Zaitsev, the Chief-of-S taff of Abkhazia was dismissed from the Russian
armed forces quite some time ago.
20
On the same point see Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005 , Vol.III, at
p. 1410).
21
CR 2008/25, p. 28, para. 20 (Akhavan).
22CR 2008/25, p. 22, para. 1 (Akhavan). - 18 -
44. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Mr.Anatoly Barankevich, who, again, is no
longer a member of the Russian armed forces.
45. Finally, as to Mr. Atoev, Georgia itself only claims that he has been in the past a Russian
official.
46. These persons were, therefore, to apply the standard you used in the BosGenocide
case, “according to the internal law of the Respodent no longer, officers of the army of the
Respondent” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro ), Judgment of 26 February 2007,
para.388) and can therefore not be considered itsde jure organs. But even if they still were
employed by Russia ⎯ they are not ⎯ this would still not enable the Court, for that reason alone,
to treat them as organs of the Respondent or as bein g under its direct control. This is even more
true, to again apply the standard you used in the Bosnia Genocide case, since those persons formed
part of the South Ossetian authorities and exercised authority on its behalf, but not on behalf of the
Respondent (cf. Application of the Convention on the P revention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro ), Judgment of 26 February 2007,
para. 388).
47. Madam President, Members of the Court. Thank you very much for your kind attention
and may I ask you now to give the floor to my colleague, Sam Wordsworth.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Zimmermann. We now call Mr. Wordsworth.
WMOr.RDSWORTH:
II. HE CRITERIA FOR THE GRANT OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES ARE NOT MET
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, the case that Georgia put before you in opening,
and again put yesterday by Mr.Reichler, is that there is a “risk of irreparable harm to the ethnic
Georgians who still remain in the Akhlagori district of South Ossetia, the Gali district of Agkhazia,
and the portion of the Gori district that Russian military forces still occupy as their so-called buffer
zone”. - 19 -
2. It was said that there were no issues between the Parties as to the criteria to be applied.
Briefly, that is not correct, as we say: (i) that th e risk must be a serious risk, which is the test
applied, for example, in Cameroon v. Nigeria (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Provisional Measures, Order of 15March1996, I.C.J.
Reports 1996(I), pp.21-23, paras.35-42) or the Congo v. Uganda case ( Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures,
Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, para. 43.) and; (ii) that the irreparable prejudice must of
course be to the rights claimed and opposable to Russia under Articles 2 and 5 of the CERD. On
the so-called Russian occupation, you have already just heard Professor Zimmermann.
3. Before turning to the facts as they can reliably be ascertained in respect of ethnic
Georgians in the three identified areas, I want to look at the underlying picture that Georgia put to
you yesterday, which had three central elements:
⎯ first, that this case is concerned with acts of ethnic cleansing that post-date the period of armed
conflict and are in essence separable from that conflict;
⎯ second, that those acts are ongoing, and the situation is becoming more precarious by the
day— although that contention was notably made by reference to a document dated
23
13 August ;
⎯ third, that Russia is actively participating or complicit in those acts.
4. On the first point, much has been made of the maps at tab 21 of Georgia’s judges’ folder.
Russia’s Agent, Mr. Kolodkin, will return later to what was really happening in the conflict zones.
I want to take the Court to just one piece of ev idence, at paragraph 57 of the 8 September report of
Mr. Hammarberg, which is at tab 28 of Georgia’s judges’ folder. He says:
“A great number of the displaced with whom the Commissioner met originated
from the Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali. Some of them told the Commissioner
that locals had organized evacuation already on 4 and 5 August 2008. [The conflict,
of course, started on 7August.] Some elderly persons had opted to stay on, as they
did not want to leave their homes. The ev acuation buses or cars had gone either to
Gori or Tbilisi. Those who stayed on had been forced to hide until 11-13August
2008, before they could attempt to flee.” (Emphasis added.)
23
Mr. Reichler, referring to the Human Rights Watch bulletin of 13 August, Ann. 5 to Georgia’s Observations. - 20 -
5. So, some evacuations clearly even predat ed the conflict as there was evidently knowledge
that the Georgian intervention was about to take place. As soon as the conflict commenced, vast
numbers left, as could only be expected.
6. The second issue, the ongoing situation. What does the evidence show?
7. Georgia has now, as it were, sought to bring you up to date. And we heard a lot about that
yesterday. But in fact, in terms of up-to-date docum entation, it has added to its judges’ folder just
one UNHCR bulletin of 2September and the Hammarberg report; both are clearly valuable
additions, but that is it — apart from a short statement and a Fox news report going to the denial of
access to the buffer zone to the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania and the
Ambassadors of Sweden, Latvia and Estonia.
8. At tabs 4 to 9 of our judges’ folder we have included a series of the six USAID bulletins
from 25August to 5September, so that the Cour t can track through for itself how matters have
been developing in the past few weeks, including in terms of the re turn of refugees. The Agent for
Georgia, Deputy-Minister Burjaliani, said yesterday that only approximately 30,000 IDPs from the
town of Gori, not the Gori district, have started to return to areas that have returned to Georgian
Government control. Well, the USAID figur es, which are taken from OCHA and the UNHCR,
show the following.
(a) As of 25August, a total of 128,703 newly displaced persons in Georgia. In fact, the figure
24
according to Mr.Hammarberg is 121,000 , that is considerably less than the 158,000 that
Georgia was claiming in opening 25.
(b) As of 26 and 27August, 10,000returnees are shown from parts of Georgia to Gori. These
bulletins show increased total new IDP figures but with an asterisk that says that estimates have
since declined.
(c) As of 3September, the figure for returnees from parts of Georgia has increased markedly to
53,557.
24
At para. 53 of his report.
2CR 2008/22, p. 39, para. 2. - 21 -
(d) As of 5 September — and again the figure is sourced from a United Nations agency, although
here it is the UNHCR— the returnees to parts of Georgia is shown at 90,500. That is three
times the figure that you were told yesterday.
9. I also note, since so much of this was made yesterday, that there is a passage in the
5 September USAID bulletin dealing with access to the South Ossetia security zone. This says:
“Since the beginning of the crisis, in ternational humanitarian agencies and
donors have been supporting relief operations in South Ossetia through the ICRC;
however access for other organizations continues to be limited, particularly for groups
attempting to access the region from Georgia rather than Russia. According to relief
agencies and USAID team members, access to villages in the buffer zones remains
inconsistent.”
But Mr. Hammarberg, of course, was also able to access the areas he wished to visit.
10. Sticking with that point, we have incl uded two bulletins from ReliefWeb at tabs 10 and
11, dated 3and 4September. The second of these explains how Mercy Corps does have access
into the buffer zone, and how they have “develope d a rapport with Russian control posts that allow
us to access and to move around in these areas”.
11. At tabs12 to 17 of our judges’ folder, we have also included the UNHCR bulletins of
28 and 29 August and through to 9 September. You will recall that on Monday you were told that
there had been approximately 10,000new IDPs in the ten-day period up to 5September 26. Well,
we could find no trace of that in the USAID figures, and the same goes for these UNHCR
bulletins:
(a) On 28 August there is a reference to the ear lier registration as IDPs as “a small number of
persons who have fled from villages in the so-ca lled buffer zone north of Gori within the past
three days due to security conditions on the ground”. But later the bulletin says: “Today,
unlike the previous two days, no new arrivals from villages from the ‘buffer zone’ in Gori were
registered.” The report concludes: “The security situation in the field remains calm.”
(b) On 29 August, it is recorded that tented camp of Gori received ten, not 10,000, ten new IDPs
from the village of Beloti, close to the South Ossetian border. There is also a passage on
Akhalgori — and Akhalgori is one of the three key areas identified by Georgia, of course. And
this states as follows:
26
CR 2008/22, p. 18, para. 10. - 22 -
“The UNHCR assessment team met with the local commandant responsible for
the security in the region, according to whom 40per cent of the population, both
ethnic Georgian and Ossetians, have fled the area. Other interlocutors among the local
population estimated the displacement rate to be up to 80per cent. He noted that
some humanitarian assistance had been provided by EMERCOM” and that is the
Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations “but shared UNHCR’s concern over the
fact that most medical staff of the local clinic had also left.
According to the commander, some people are returning to the area and he
invited all displaced former inhabitants to retu rn. Civilian traffic, including buses,
was allowed to pass checkpoints during the observations. Some return movement was
observed by the team.” (Emphasis added.)
(c) In the 9 September bulletin, there is a passage on the South Ossetian buffer zone, stating that:
“Initial rapid assessments at village level with in the eastern and north-eastern sectors of the
buffer zone have revealed that most of the IDPs from that area have already returned.”
(d) I also note that there is a reference to significant numbers of new arrivals to the refugee camp at
Gori, but that is movement from Tbilisi, not elsewhe re. So this is a more complete picture of
the current situation and it is not supporting Georgia’s contentions.
12. To complete the round-up, so far as we are aware there are no further Amnesty
International bulletins since 22August, which is an interesting fact in itself, but there are three
further Human Rights Watch bulletins ⎯ and these are at tabs 19 to 21 of your judges’ folder.
(a) First, there is “South Ossetia: Tskhinvali’ s Apocalypse” of 29August, summarized on the
Human Rights Watch website as follows:
“With the fighting over, Tanya Lokshina hitches lifts between
checkpoints around South Ossetia’s wrecked capital Tskhinvali
chronicling the grieving and burying, looting and burning, the
unexploded bombs, disenchanted m ilitias and Russian troops struggling
to protect what remains of abandoned Georgian villages.”
Tanya Lokshina is a source relied on by Georgia in the Human Rights watch report at tab 5 of
its Observations. The text describes the following encounter:
“We get into a jeep with two Ossetian militiamen, who promise to
take us to our destination. But after five minutes, at the nearest
checkpoint, federal soldiers [and th ese are Russian federal soldiers]
refuse to let us through. Well, not us, but our escorts. The purpose of
this checkpoint is specifically to stop the Ossetian militias from entering
Georgian villages on the Tskhinvali road. Its commanding officer, a
Russian lieutenant colonel, shrugs phle gmatically: ‘We’re trying to stop
the looters.’.”
(b) The two further Human Rights Watch bulletins ⎯ these are of 1 and 2September ⎯ concern
the use of cluster munitions. The bulletin of 1September deals with Georgia’s - 23 -
acknowledgment that it did use cluster munitions during the armed conflict. The bulletin of
2 September corrects the Human Rights Watch bu lletin at Annex 3 of Georgia’s Observations,
saying that it cannot in fact be determined that Russia used cluster bombs at Shindisi and
Pkhvenisi.
13. None of this, none of this was brought to the Court’s attention yesterday.
14. I turn to another recent development of such obvious importance so far as concerns the
developing facts on the ground, and the question of urgency, that we cannot but remark on the
failure of Georgia to mention it yesterda y. This is of course the fact that ⎯ as was very widely
reported ⎯ highlights of an updated ceasefire plan were announced on Monday following talks
with Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy in Moscow. These are as follows ⎯ and to save time I am
going to quote from the Associated Press release which is at tab 18 of the judges’ folder, along with
the full text of the plan:
“European Union Monitors: 200 European Union monitors to deploy to regions
surrounding South Ossetia and Abkhazia by October 1.
Russian Withdrawal: Russian peacekeeping forces to withdraw from posts
outside the Black Sea port Poti and the area near the town of Senaki within seven
days, on condition Georgia signs a pledge not to use force against the breakaway
province of Abkhazia. Full withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from regions
surrounding South Ossetia and Abkhazia will take place within ten days of
deployment of EU monitors.
Georgian pullout: Georgian troops must return to their barracks by October 1.
International talks: International ta lks to begin on October15 in Geneva;
agenda to include security and stability in South Caucusus and the question of return
of refugees.”
15. Madam President, there are four points to make in relation to this document.
First, Georgia may not see the displacement a nd refugee tragedy as one aspect of the armed
conflict, but that is evidently not how others see it.
Second, the issue of monitoring, and security , in the South Ossetian buffer zone is being
addressed. It is not just that IDPs are in fact re turning, despite the picture painted yesterday; but
Russia’s positive démarches before the OSCE, as I described on Monday, and now with the
European Union and President Sarkozy, are addressing precisely the problem that is being put
before you as the basis for urgent provisional measures. I also ask the Court to note that it is not - 24 -
just the South Ossetian security zone that under this plan is to be monitored by EU monitors, but
the Abkhazian buffer zone also, right next to Gali. And the plan provides that the United Nations
and OSCE observers will also continue to carry out their mandates.
Third, further security and stability issues are to be addressed in international talks, which
are imminent and are obviously to be at a very high level.
Finally, the return of refugees is also to be addressed in international talks, and I quote from
the text of the plan, “settling the issues of refugees and displaced persons on the basis of
internationally recognized principles and post-conflict resolution practice”.
All of these documents, statements and facts contradict Georgia’s assertion of an ongoing
worsening crisis. There has been a humanitarian crisis to be sure, but it is part of the recent armed
conflict and is being addressed in that context at the highest levels.
16. I move onto the third general topic I wish to cover, which is the allegation of Russian
participation or complicity in the acts of alleged ethnic cleansing. We were criticized yesterday by
ProfessorAkhavan for “not having produced any evidence rebutting Georgia’s voluminous
evidence demonstrating that Russian forces are participating in such acts of ethnic cleansing” and it
was said that the article in the Guardian “Russia’s cruel intention” is “corroborated by numerous
other sources in Georgia’s Observations”. Wher e? By the Amnesty International bulletin of
22 August? No. By the Human Rights Watch bulletins? No, to the contrary as is clear from the
report of 29 August I just took you to. By the Hammarberg report? No. It is also not corroborated
by the USAID or UNHCR or ReliefWe b bulletins that we have put in the folder today. This is a
wholly unsustainable allegation, and it is such a ser ious allegation it is quite remarkable that it has
been made with no support other than a few press articles and some witness statements that are
internally inconsistent if the trouble is taken to read them carefully.
17. I just want to add a word or two about the two newspaper articles recording the views of
BernardKouchner on 27August, at tabs 16 and 17 of Georgia’s Observations. He says: “I just
want to say, here’s the map of South Ossetia, and here’s a town called Akhalgori, and I’ve been
told that tonight Russian troops are sweeping through it pushing Georgians out and over the border.
It’s ethnic cleansing...” Well, what can one make of this? BernardKouchner was told
something. That something evidently did not ha ppen, or else if it did it was missed by Human - 25 -
Rights Watch, UNHCR, USAID, Amnesty, the rest of the world’s media, etc. The Court is asked
to accept that Georgia’s newspaper articles have value applying the test in the Nicaragua case. I
think not.
18. Madam President, you will recall from the Human Rights Watch bulletin at Annex 5 of
Georgia’s “Observations” that it is Russia’s position that there should be decisive and tough action
against looters. We have obtained some figures overnight from Russia’s Chief Military
Prosecution Office. These are record ed in the letter which is now at tab22 of the judges’ folder.
The figures: Russian military patrols have appr ehended 140looters and handed them over to the
South Ossetian authorities. The South Osse tian authorities have themselves apprehended
245 looters.
19. This letter also notes that, in the villages of Karaleti and Variani that are directly visible
from Russian observation posts, up to 70percent ⎯ up to 70percent ⎯ of the population has
returned.
20. Madam President, before I turn specifically to the serious risk in respect of rights alleged
so far as concerns the three identified areas ⎯ that is the South Osse tian buffer zone, Gali and
Akhalgori ⎯ can I just pick up on a couple of points in rebuttal.
21. First, an awful lot was made by Professor Crawford of Mr. Kokoity’s statements on right
of return, and it was suggested that the all-c ontrolling hand of Russia was behind a change in
position. The focus was in particular on what Mr.Kokoity said to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees on 22August. I do want to be sure that the Court recalls what the
High Commissioner stated, which is why I took y ou to the document, and which was passed over
by Professor Crawford yesterday. This is, that he was “reassured by [Mr. Kokoity’s] commitment
to prevent further displacement th rough the guarantee of safety for all members of the population,
27
independently of their ethnic background” .
The PRESIDENT: Could you please go a little more slowly, Mr. Wordsworth.
Mr. WORDSWORTH: I do apologize, Madam President.
27
Http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS&id=48b0665c4. - 26 -
Georgia no doubt thinks that the High Commissioner was duped, because approximately
10,000 further refugees later fled South Ossetia. But we cannot find any basis for that
10,000-refugee figure, as I said earlier.
22. Second, the 89 detainees. It was said th at I told the Court on Monday, quoting a South
Ossetian source, “that the authorities in Tskhinvali were holding 89Georgian civilians who were
taken into custody to save them from being lynched”. It is said that I would have the Court believe
that the Georgian civilians were being protected from harm. Now, what I in fact did was to refer to
Annex19 of Georgia’s Observations, a BBC report, and I set out verbatim the words of a Red
Cross spokesman there, not a representative of th e South Ossetian authorities. The relevant
passage reads as follows:
“Meanwhile, a Red Cross spokesman in the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali
said the authorities there were holding 89 Ge orgian civilians who were taken into
custody to save them from being lynched af ter the initial Georgian attack on the town
earlier this month.”
23. As to how these 89 detainees were treated, there is the implausible account of their being
interrogated by Russian officers, there is a photo which shows nothing whatsoever about conditions
of detention other than that certain detainees ar e at a particular time outdoors, and there is the
actual fact that the 89 detainees received visits from the ICRC (Annex11 to Georgia’s
Observations) and were subsequently released.
24. I move onto the case to be met ⎯ serious risk to the claimed rights under Articles 2 and
5 of the CERD opposable to Russia, and urgency ⎯ in relation the portion of the Gori district in
the South Ossetian buffer zone, the Akhalgori distri ct of South Ossetia, and the Gali district of
Abkhazia. Those three identified areas.
25. The South Ossetian buffer zone. Two key points:
(a) The case is being put to you on an incorrect basis. It is said that IDPs are not returning to the
buffer zone, when in fact they are. The Court knows this from the UNHCR bulletin of
9September, as well as the chief military prosecu tion office letter that I have just referred to.
Georgia should know this because these are the IDPs on its territory in respect of which it is
claiming rights. It is wrong on its overall IDP returns figure of 30,000 ⎯ the real figure on
UNHCR estimates is 90,000 ⎯ and it is wrong on returns to the buffer zone also. - 27 -
(b) Georgia has elected not to grapple with the f act that time has moved on so far as concerns
security in the buffer zone. It has not dealt with Russia’s offers through the OSCE Permanent
Council to have military monitoring officers of the OSCE and an OSCE European Union civil
police operation in the buffer zone. It has simply ignored the further principles announced on
Monday for 200 European Union monitors to be deployed into the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
buffer zones, and for Russian peacekeeping troops to make a full withdrawal tendays later.
We heard time and again yesterday that Russia was the problem in the buffer zone, and as soon
as it moved out, the IDPs would return. Well, we think that is a complete misrepresentation of
the true position, but the plan announced on Mo nday gives Georgia what it wants in this
respect.
26. Second, the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia.
(a) Here, the difficulty for Georgia is that it has no evidence that ethnic Ge orgians are threatened.
It has the Guardian article which, unexpectedly at least to me, has taken central stage in the
supposed mass of evidence that the Court has been presented with. This is not a document that
found its way into the Georgian judges’ folder unlike the Bernard Kouchner article. And
maybe that is because the claims made in that article actually undermine Georgia’s case on
Akhalgori. Georgia’s case is that there ar e 9,000 Georgians in Akhalgori, and these need
protection. The author of the Guardian article says that almost all of the ethnic Georgians have
already fled from Akhalgori (Georgian Observations, Ann. 13).
(b)Of course, there is reliable evidence on Akhalgori in the form of UNHCR bulletin of
29August. It is strongly in consistent with Georgia’s case because it shows some return
movement being observed by the UNHCR. It is also strongly inconsistent in that the local
commander is recorded as saying that both ethnic Georgians and Ossetians fled, and that the
Russian EMERCOM is supplying aid.
27. Third, the residents of Gali, Abkhazia. Yesterday, Georgia strived to make a virtue out
of silence. But this will not do. If there was a palpable risk of a humanitarian catastrophe
unfolding in Abkhazia, the Court can be sure that it would have read about this in the bulletins of
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, USAI D, etc., maybe even in an article in the
Guardian. We have heard nothing, despite the resources that were no doubt deployed by Georgia. - 28 -
And this is not because there is nobody there in Ab khazia. The Court should know that the ICRC
has an office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, and I quote (this is from the ReliefWeb bulletin of
28
3 September), “it continues to keep a close eye on the situation of people in the area” . And there
is, of course, in addition in Abkhazia the presence of the UNIMOG observers.
28. There was reference yesterday to the d eclaration of Mr.Mishvelia, who is a local
Georgian official. This is at Annex 36 to Georgia’s Observations, and I can only invite the Court to
read it in full to gauge the quality of the evidence. So far as the content, the Court will recall that
he says that he is “not aware of any acts of murd er or injury to civilians” and “they haven’t burnt
the houses”. He also says ⎯ and I have to add that he has no direct knowledge of this whatsoever:
“But the fact is that the population is not able to enter their houses and take care
of their property, which naturally causes loss fo r them. It is the harvest time for nuts,
which represents the main source of income for the population, but they are not able to
start gathering the harvest, causing significant losses.”
Now if that is true, and there is very little to go on, so far as concerns Georgia’s positive case, it is
serious. But it comes nowhere near serious risk of irreparable loss.
29. And I would add three further factors on Abkhazia:
First, it is not right that Gali is physically cut off. I am advised by the Russian Ministry of
Defence that the bridge is open to the local popula tion, who simply have to give 24 hours notice of
wishing to cross. In addition, I have similarl y been advised that there are six Georgian-manned
checkpoints along the Inguri river, with 170 police stationed there.
Second, under the plan announced on Monday, there are to be European Union monitors in
the buffer zone next to Gali. This is in a ddition to existing United Nations monitoring which
covers the Gali zone.
Third, the Russian withdrawal of troops has already begun. I read from an AFP report of
yesterday which I understand is now at the last tab of the judges’ folder as follows:
“Russian troops withdrew Tuesday from a Georgian village near the breakaway
region of Abkhazia in the ‘first sign’ of a promised pull-out from the country, the
Georgian [the Georgian] interior ministry sai d. Russian troops have left the village of
Ganmukhuri [Ganmukhuri is where Mr.Mishvelia is from] in the Zugdidi district,
near the administrative border with Abkhazia,’ Ministry spokesman Shota Utiashvili
told AFP. ‘It is the first sign of the Russian pull-out from the so-called buffer zones as
a result of the September 8 agreement, he said. A defence ministry official in Moscow
28
ReliefWeb, 3 Sept, judges’ folder, tab 11. - 29 -
confirmed the move, Russia’s State’s news agency RIA Novosti reported. ‘In
accordance with agreements reached and signed by the President of the Russian
Federation, the defence ministry has begun the dismantling of checkpoints and zones
near South Ossetia and Abkhazia’.”
30. Madam President, the case on Abkhazia is smoke and mirrors, and it is anyway bypassed
by events.
31. Madam President, I conclude on one further factor on urgency. This is the European
Court of Human Rights interim measures order th at I noted on Monday. ProfessorCrawford
elected to deal with this, telling the Court that I appeared to suggest that the proceedings before this
Court had been rendered moot by virtue of the or der, and that the question was whether the order
rendered Georgia’s Request inadmissible.
Three brief points: first, Professor Crawford helpfully confirmed that there is indeed
“overlap” between the rights being covered by that order and those claimed here; second, he did
not challenge anything else I said, including in respect of what Russia has said about its
compliance; third, he chose to address an argument I did not make. I put the order before you as a
matter going to urgency, and so it remains.
32. Madam President, Members of the Court, I thank you again for your attention and ask
you to call on Professor Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Wordsworth. We now call Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET : Merci, Madame la présidente.
III.L’ABSENCE MANIFESTE DE COMPÉTENCE DE LA C OUR
1. Madame la présidente, Messieurs les juges, dans sa plaidoirie d’hier, le
professeurCrawford s’est montré contrarié que je n’ aie pas discuté les faits autant qu’il l’aurait
souhaité ; il a qualifié mon interven tion de lundi après-midi de «zone franche factuelle» («fact-free
zone» 29). Mais mon contradicteur et ami n’est pas tr ès constant dans sa critique: juste avant il
nous avait reproché de trop aborde r les faits, et je lui rappelle que ⎯ la présentation qu’une partie
fait à la Cour de son affaire est un tout⎯ et doctement ⎯mais à juste titre ⎯ il a rappelé que:
29
CR 2008/25, p. 16, par. 23 (Crawford). - 30 -
«The merits of the dispute are only relevant inso far as they relate to the factual basis for the
30
provisional measures requested.»
2. Au demeurant, Madame la présidente, loin de moi l’idée que le droit soit un jeu abstrait de
l’esprit, surtout dans un contexte humain et politique si tragique. Mais pour dramatique qu’il soit,
ce cadre ne peut faire oublier à la Cour de céan s qu’elle est une instance juridictionnelle, qui ne
peut qu’appliquer le droit tel qu’il est ⎯quitte à manifester, comme il lui arrive de le faire, sa
préoccupation au sujet des aspects humanitaires d’un différend d
ont elle ne peut connaître. Ceci
étant, au stade de l’examen d’une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, les
considérations de fond sont, et doivent être, st rictement limitées, et je trouve paradoxal que les
conseils géorgiens nous mettent systématiquement au défi de prouver que la Fédération de Russie
31
n’a pas causé les maux dont la Partie requérante l’accuse , alors qu’eux-mêmes conviennent que
ce n’est pas le lieu de le faire et se retranchent souvent derrière cette position juridique (fondée je le
32
répète) pour ne pas plaider le fa it quand ceci ne les arrange pas ; ou alors, ils confondent preuve
du fait et fortes affirmations ou indignations.
3. La plaidoirie d’hier de James Crawford en donne un exemple topique. J’ai montré lundi,
en me fondant sur la requête, sur les de mandes successives en i ndication de mesures
conservatoires, sur l’attitude passée constante de la Géorgie et sur les relations entre les deux pays
durant les dix-huit ans qu’aurait duré le présent «d ifférend», que celui-ci ne portait nullement, en
réalité, sur l’interprétation et l’application de la convention sur la non-discrimination, mais sur
toute autre chose : l’intervention que la Géorgie re proche à la Fédération de Russie en réponse à sa
propre action à l’égard de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud et les violations alléguées des règles
du droit humanitaire à cette occasion. En réponse, mon habile contradicteur s’indigne (je
paraphrase) : «comment est-il possible d’affirmer cela ? Notre requête indique bien que ce qui est
en cause, ce sont des violations de la conventio n de 1965» ; d’ailleurs, et cette fois je cite:
«I ⎯ professor Crawford is speaking ⎯ I opened my own presentation yesterday with the words :
«This is a case about the ethnic cleansing of Georgi ans…»». Précisément, Madame la présidente,
30Ibid., p. 10, par. 3 (Crawford).
31
Ibid., p. 13-14, par. 12-14 (Crawford) ; p. 22, par. 3 (Akhavan).
32Ibid., p. 11, par. 6 (Crawford). - 31 -
il ne suffit pas que le professeur Crawford soi-même, ou le professeur Akhavan, ou M. Reichler, ou
même Mmel’agent de la Géorgie affirme qu’il exis te un différend concernant l’application de la
convention de 1965 entre les Parties pour que ce différend existe…
4. Il ne suffit pas non plus que le demandeur établisse que des actes de discrimination raciale
sont commis, en Ossétie du Sud ou en Abkhazie. Même s’il s’agit de l’hideuse épuration ethnique,
il faut encore qu’il montre avec un degré raisonnable de certitude que ces actes sont imputables à la
Russie ⎯ notre agent reviendra à son tour sur ce point dans un instant, qu’il en résulte un différend
interétatique entre les deux Etats et que ce di fférend a fait l’objet de l’une des procédures
envisagées à l’article 22 de la convention de 1965.
5. Or, en écoutant nos collègues de l’autre côté de la barre, avant-hier comme hier, je n’ai pu
m’empêcher de penser à la définition des lignes pa rallèles, qui «ne se rencontrent jamais aussi loin
qu’on les prolonge». C’est aussi le cas de l’argumentation géorgie nne ; elle se déroule selon deux
lignes de démonstration que, malgré leur indéniable talent, nos collègues de l’autre côté de la barre,
n’arrivent pas à rassembler :
⎯ d’un côté, ils nous expliquent longuement que l’ Ossétie du Sud et l’Abkhazie sont le théâtre
d’actes de discrimination raciale, et même d’épuration ethnique ;
⎯ de l’autre, ils affirment que la Géorgie a été victime d’interventions armées illicites de la part
de la Russie et que l’Ossétie du Sud est le théâtre de violations du droit humanitaire.
C’est, ce me semble, à une simple addition de ces deux propositions que se borne toute la
démonstration de la Partie géor gienne; mais leur juxtaposition ne suffit certainement pas à
prouver, même prima facie, qu’existe un différend entre la Géorgie et la Russie sur l’interprétation
et l’application de la convention de 1965 sur la non-discrimination raciale.
6. Pour qu’il existe un différend «sur ce point» et pour que la Cour puisse en connaître, il
faut que deux conditions, cumulatives, pas alternatives, soient remplies :
⎯ d’une part, que la Cour ⎯car c’est à elle qu’il appartient de définir l’objet véritable du
différend à partir de l’argumentation des Parties 33 ⎯ soit convaincue que la requête entre dans
34
les prévisions de la convention ;
33
CR 2008/23, p. 28, par. 8 (Pellet).
34Ibid., p. 28-30, par. 9-12 (Pellet). - 32 -
⎯ d’autre part, que les procédures préalables auxquelles son article 22 subordonne la saisine de la
Cour aient été suivies.
7. Ni l’une, ni l’autre de ces conditions ne sont remplies. Je l’ai montré lundi dernier
⎯mais peut-être sans insister suffisamment sur le fait qu’elles sont très étroitement imbriquées
l’une avec l’autre: c’est parce qu’ il n’y a pas de différend entre la Géorgie et la Russie sur
l’application de la convention que les deux pays n’ont pas négocié à ce sujet et que l’Etat
demandeur n’a pas actionné les procédures expressémen t prévues par l’article 22. Et l’absence de
telles négociations au sujet d’un différend dont la Pa rtie géorgienne prétend qu’il remonte à plus
de dix-huit ans est un élément ⎯ parmi d’autres d’ailleurs ⎯ qui établit l’absence de ce différend.
8. Au bénéfice de ces remarques, j’aborderai successivement trois points.
1. L’échec de négociations sur le différend supposé entre les Parties au sujet de l’application
de la convention est une condition indispensable à l’exercice
par la Cour de sa compétence
9. Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, contrair ement à ce qu’a tenté de faire croire lundi le
professeur Crawford 35, l’échec de négociations ou des mod es conventionnels de règlement du
différend supposé exister entre les Parties au sujet de l’application de la convention est, en vertu de
l’article 22, une condition indispensable à l’exercice par la Cour de sa compétence.
10. Lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpréter la conventio n, et plus particulièrement les articles16
36
et 22 , je pense qu’il faut s’en tenir aux méthodes d’in terprétation éprouvées, le texte, le contexte
et, le cas échéant (car il n’y a pas de pratique subséquente), les travaux préparatoires. En style
télégraphique, si vous le permettez, Madame la présidente ⎯ car je suis pris par le temps :
⎯ article 16 : le texte est clair ; il signifie que si il existe un différend entre les parties en matière
de discrimination, d’autres moyens convenus permettant de le régler, persistent ⎯ la Géorgie
n’invoque aucun de ces autres moyens ; quant au contexte, il est essentiellement constitué par
l’article 22 précisément ;
35CR 2008/22, p. 32-35, par. 49-56 (Crawford).
36Voir N. Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A
Commentary, Leiden, Sithoff, 1970, p. 99 et 104 (édition citée par M. Crawford ; la second édition (de1980) ne comporte
pas de changements sur ces points ⎯ p. 92 et 97). - 33 -
⎯ article 22 : le texte est clair : la Cour peut c onnaître des différends entre les parties au sujet de
l’interprétation et de l’application de la convention s’ils n’ont pas été réglés autrement
(notamment par voie de négociations) ⎯encore faut-il qu’il y ait eu négociations ou que
celles-ci se soient révélées impossibles ; le contexte: ce sont les article11 à13
⎯ peut-être 14 ⎯ les procédures de règlement prévues par la convention elle-même; les
travaux préparatoires : ils confirment qu’il s’agit là d’une condition préalable et, faute toujours
de temps, je me permets, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, de vous renvoyer à la note de bas
de page n o 25 de ma plaidoirie de lundi dernier . 37
11. Le professeur Crawford a, adroitement, tenté de «noyer le poisson» en se référant à une
liste d’affaires38, en apparence impressionnante ⎯ tout est relatif, il en a cité six ⎯ dans lesquelles
la Cour a rejeté l’argumentati on de défendeurs fondée sur ce que j’ai suggéré d’appeler le
non-épuisement de «l’exercice effectif de moyens de règlement préalables» 39. Mon contradicteur
concède, à regret, qu’il y en a au moins une septième qui va dans le sens contraire. La chose mérite
que l’on y regarde d’un peu plus près : certes, da ns six des sept affaires qu’il mentionne la Cour a
rejeté l’exception ⎯mais jamais «par principe». Bien au contraire, elle s’est, dans chaque cas,
fondée sur les circonstances particulières de l’espèce, c'est-à-dire moins sur le libellé de la clause
compromissoire en question que sur le comportement des parties. Et il se déduit déjà de ceci,
a contrario, que si une clause de juridiction doit être interprétée comme excluant la compétence de
la Cour en l’absence du recours à d’autres modes de règlement, et surtout s’il apparaît que les
parties n’ont pas recouru à ces modes de règlement, la Cour ne peut que se déclarer incompétente.
12. Mais, malgré le temps, je ne veux pas esquiver la question, et je vais être plus spécifique.
o
Le tableau qui figure sous le n 3 de votre dossier, Madame et Messieurs les juges, présente sous
une forme compacte, et j’espère, commode, les sep t affaires mentionnées par mon contradicteur en
suivant l’ordre chronologique. Son analyse conduit aux constatations suivantes :
37
CR 2008/23, p. 35 (Pellet).
38
CR 2008/22, p. 32-33, par. 49 (Crawford).
39CR 2008/23, p. 36, par. 29 (Pellet). - 34 -
1) les clauses pertinentes connaissent des variations (assez mineures) non seulement les unes par
rapport aux autres, mais aussi selon la manière dont elles ont été traduites en français ou en
anglais ;
2) la formule de l’article22 de la convention de1965 ne se retr ouve nulle part dans sa version
française («n’aura pas été réglée»); en revanche, la version anglaise («is not settled») est
identique à la rédaction des dispositions correspondantes dans les affaires de l’ Obligation
d’arbitrage et des Activités armées ;
3)les deux formulations sont un peu différentes dans l’affaire du Nicaragua ⎯ plus
particulièrement chère à M. Crawford 40, mais, je le reconnais volontiers, voisine dans son esprit
pour ce qui est de l’anglais («not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy»), moins s’agissant du
français (mais ce n’est pas un texte original) («qui ne pourrait être réglé de manière
satisfaisante») ;
4) mais lorsque l’on passe de la deuxième colonne de mon tableau (qui reproduit les clauses
compromissoires) aux deux suivantes, qui reflètent la position de la Cour, on s’aperçoit qu’en
réalité, celle-ci ne s’est pas arrêtée à ces nuances dans la rédaction des dispositions pertinentes ;
elle s’est exclusivement intéressée à la question de savoir si des négociations poussées sur la
convention en question avaient eu lieu que l qu’en soit le cadre (comme dans les
affaires Mavrommatis, Sud-Ouest africain ou Activités armées) ou étaient encore envisageables
(comme dans celles de l’Obligation d’arbitrage, des Otages, du Nicaragua, ou de Lockerbie).
13. Le professeur Crawford n’a pas manifesté une grande sympathie pour la solution retenue
par votre arrêt de 2006 dans l’affaire République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda, sur laquelle il
a ironisé ⎯ peut-être un peu facilement 41. C’est pourtant celle qui est la plus proche de la nôtre :
⎯ le point pertinent de la clause compromissoire est rédigé, en anglais, de la même manière («is
not settled») ⎯alors que la formulation française de l’ article22 de la «CERD» («n’aura pas
été réglé») insiste plus nettement sur l’idée d’une obligation préalable ;
⎯ dans les deux cas, il s’agit de conventions multila térales relatives à la protection de droits
humains fondamentaux ;
40
Voir ibid., p. 33-34, par. 50-51 ; et CR 2008/25, p. 17, par. 28 ; p. 18, par. 34 (Crawford).
41Voir CR 2008/22, p. 35-36, par. 55-56 (Crawford) ; voir aussi CR 2008/25, p. 18, par. 35 (Crawford). - 35 -
⎯ et c’est précisément dans cette affaire que vous avez refusé de considérer, dès le stade des
mesures conservatoires, que votre compétence ét ait établie faute de négociations préalables
entre les parties (Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête : 2002)
(République démocratique du Congo c.Rwanda) , mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.247, par.79). Il en va de même dans notre espèce qui
concerne ⎯ nous y insistons ⎯ non pas des pratiques discriminatoires mais une crise
humanitaire résultant d’un conflit armé.
2. Il n’y a pas eu de négociations entre la Géorgie et la Russi
e sur un différend touchant
l’application de la convention de 1965
14. Madame la présidente, s’il faut en croire la Géorgie ⎯ c’est mon deuxième point ⎯, les
négociations seraient allées bon train entre les Parties ! Et c’est vrai : la République de Géorgie et
la Fédération de Russi e ont beaucoup négocié ⎯au plan bilatéral et dans des enceintes
multilatérales (aux Nations Unies et à l’OSCE nota mment), seule à seule ou en présence de tiers ;
et elles continuent à le faire. Et la Russie ne s’est jamais dérobée à une demande de négociations
qu’aurait pu formuler la Géorgie. Mais jamais au grand jamais les deux Etats n’ont négocié sur un
différend qui les opposerait en tant que parties à la convention de1965, et la Géorgie n’a jamais
suggéré d’entamer de telles négociations ⎯pas davantage d’ailleurs que, jusqu’au dépôt de la
requête, elle n’a accusé la Russie d’une forme quelconque de discrimination raciale.
15. Certes, Madame la présidente, «parce qu’un Etat ne s’est pas expressément référé, dans
des négociations avec un autre Etat, à un traité part iculier qui aurait été violé par la conduite de
celui-ci, il n’en découle pas nécessairement que le premier ne serait pas admis à invoquer la clause
compromissoire dudit traité» comme vous l’avez dit dans Nicaragua (Activités militaires et
paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicar agua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), compétence
et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p.428-429, par.83). Mais il faut tout de même que
l’objet de la négociation soit bien un différend au sujet de l’interprétation ou de l’application de la
convention et que les parties en soient conscientes. Ainsi que vous l’avez dit, dans l’affaire
Ambatielos, «[i]l ne suffit pas que le gouvernement qui présente la réclamation établisse u
n rapport
lointain entre les faits de la récl amation et le traité» qu’il invoque ( Ambatielos (Grèce c.
Royaume-Uni), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1953, p.18. Voir aussi affaire du Sud-Ouest africain - 36 -
(Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt , opinion
dissidente conjointe de sir PercySpender et sir GeraldFitzmaurice, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p.562.)
Or, je l’ai montré lundi 42, ni la Russie ni, à l’évidence, la Géorgie n’ont, à un moment quelconque,
eu la moindre conscience qu’elles négociaient au sujet d’un différend touchant l’interprétation ou
l’application de cette convention.
16. Il est d’ailleurs fort révélateur à cet égar d que le professeur Crawford se garde de parler
de négociations. Lorsqu’il essaie de faire naître cette idée, il utilise de prudentes périphrases:
43
«there have also been extensive b ilateral contacts between the parties» or «Russia and Georgia
had conducted bilateral meetings…» 44. And he concludes: «For these reasons, even if Article 22
of the1965Convention were considered to la y down a condition precedent for seising the Court,
that condition is satisfied here.» 45 Voici qui est bien catégorique et qui mériterait aussi que l’on y
regarde d’un peu plus près…
17. Je l’ai fait, Madame la présidente, et je n’ai pas été convaincu ; je ne pense pas que vous
puissiez l’être non plus. Je dois malheureusement passer rapidement. Mais, qu’il s’agisse
⎯ du protocole de pourparlers du 9 avril 1993 ;
⎯ de l’accord quadripartite sur le rapatriement lib rement consenti des réf ugiés et des personnes
déplacées du 4 avril 1994 46;
⎯ du rapport du Secrétaire général des NationsUnies au Conseil de sécurité en date du
47
9 avril 2003 ;
⎯ de la résolution 1494 du 30 juille t 2003 du Conseil de sécurité ⎯ autant de documents que j’ai
épluchés avec soin ⎯ ; ou
er
⎯ de l’échange de lettres des 23juin et 1 juillet2008 que la Partie géorgienne a cru bon de
produire hier,
42
CR 2008/23, p. 34-38, par. 22-33 (Pellet).
43
CR 2008/22, p. 35, par. 57 (Crawford).
44
Ibid., p. 35, par. 58 (Crawford).
45 Ibid., p. 36, par. 60 (Crawford).
46 S/1994/397, annexe II.
47
S/2003/412, par. 5. - 37 -
aucun de ces documents, qui sont principalement relatifs au rôle facilitateur de la Russie, ne
concerne, ni de près ni de loin, des mesures discriminatoires que la Géorgie imputerait à la Russie.
Et si quelques-uns concernent le retour des pe rsonnes déplacées, aucun d’eux ne montre que la
Géorgie impute la responsabilité de cette situation dramatique à la Russie. Au contraire, ils
montrent que les deux pays coopèrent pour tenter de faire face à cette situation humanitaire
préoccupante.
18. Dans le même esprit, je note que, bien que la Géorgie semble reconnaître qu’elle n’a
jamais saisi le CERD du «différend» qui l’opposerait à la Russie, elle ne s’en emploie pas moins,
par la voix de ses conseils, à essayer de faire naître l’impression que le Comité se serait prononcé
sur ce point. Ainsi, le professeur Crawford a e xpliqué que «CERD has expressly recongnized that
48
ethnic discrimination is a key aspect of conflicts in South Ossetia and Abhkazia» . Mais, Madame
la présidente, il ne suffit pas que le Comité ait constaté l’existen ce d’un conflit ethnique se
traduisant par des actes discriminatoires en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie pour que l’on puisse en
déduire que le CERD reconnaît l’existence d’un différend à cet égard entre la Russie et la Géorgie !
Au surplus, il va de soi qu’une telle constatati on dans un rapport du Comité ne remplirait pas la
condition de procédure imposée par l’article 22.
19. Madame la présidente, Messieurs les juges, la vérité toute simple, évidente, c’est qu’il
n’y a pas eu le moindre début de négociations (ni de recherche d’un autre mode de règlement) entre
les Parties sur un différend :
1)qui ne les opposait pas entre elles mais qui pouvait opposer la Géorgie à ses entités
sécessionnistes ;
2) qui ne portait pas sur l’application de la convention sur la non-discrimination mais bien sur
les suites d’un conflit armé et l’application du droit humanitaire ; et
3) à la suite duquel la Russie a été impliquée comme facilitateur mais pas comme partie. Il va
sans dire que ce n’est pas parce qu’elle a pris part à des négociations sur le retour des personnes
qui se sont réfugiées sur son territoire (et qu’elle est prête à continuer d’en discuter) que la
Fédération de Russie est responsable de cette situation.
48
CR 2008/22, p. 29-30, par. 41 (Crawford). - 38 -
3. Les conditions de l’article 22 n’étant pas remplies, la Cour
ne peut que
constater son incompétence manifeste et rayer l’affaire de son rôle
20. Madame la présidente, Messieurs les juges, la compétence de la Cour est basée sur le
principe du consensualisme; vous le ra ppelez vous-même inlassablement aux plaideurs
téméraires : «sa compétence repose sur le consentement des parties, dans la seule mesure reconnue
par celles-ci» (Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête : 2002) (République
démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), arrêt du 3 février 2006, p.39, par.88. Voir aussi Certaines
questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale , arrêt du 4 juin 2008, par.48).
Comme l’a précisé M. Kolodkin lundi dernier, la Russie étend, progressivement, son acceptation de
la compétence de la Cour 4. Elle l’a acceptée s’agissant de la convention sur la non-discrimination
raciale, dans les limites fixées par l’article 22 de celle-ci.
21. Or, le différend au sujet de la convention de1965 dont la Géorgie vous a saisi n’existe
pas (ce qui ne veut pas dire qu’il n’existe pas d’autres différends entre les Parties, bien sûr !). Mais
dès lors, votre incompétence est manifeste. Et elle le serait tout autant si l’on admettait, pour les
seuls besoins de la discussion, qu’un tel différend ex istât: il n’a, en tout état de cause, pas fait
l’objet de la moindre tentative de règlement en tre les Parties: avant que la Géorgie dépose sa
requête à la Cour, le 12août dernier, la Fédération de Russie n’en soupçonnait pas même
l’existence. Pour cette raison également, l’incompétence de la Cour est manifeste du fait que les
conditions préalables mises à votre saisine par l’article 22 ne sont pas remplies.
22. Face à cette double incompétence manifeste, la Cour, qui, «comme organe juridictionnel,
a pour tâche de résoudre des différends existant entre Etats» ( Essais nucléaires (Australie c.
France), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1974 , p.270-271, par.55, et Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c.
France), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1974 , p.476, par.58), a non seulement le pouvoir, mais aussi le
devoir de rayer l’affaire de son rôle. Il ne lui a ppartient pas de se substituer au Conseil de sécurité
ni d’obliger la Russie à revenir s’expliquer devant vous sur la compétence et la recevabilité dans le
but, comme le professeurCrawford l’a suggéré, de convaincre un dirigeant ossète de respecter la
convention de 1965… 50 «[D]ans un système de juridiction consensuelle, maintenir au rôle général
une affaire sur laquelle il apparaît certain que la Cour ne pourra se prononcer au fond ne
49
CR 2008/23, p. 14, par. 20 (Kolodkin).
50CR 2008/24, p. 12, par. 10 (Vassylenko). - 39 -
participerait assurément pas d’une bonne administration de la justice» ( Licéité de l’emploi de la
force (Yougoslavie cE.spagne), mesures c onservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 773, par. 35 et Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II) , p.925,
par. 29). C’est en ce sens que la Fédération deRussie vous présentera ses conclusions maintenant
par la voix de M.RomanKolodkin auquel je vous prie, Madame la présidente, de bien vouloir
donner la parole.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorPellet. I now call Mr.Kolodkin, Agent of the
Russian Federation.
Mr. KOLODKIN:
IV.C ONCLUDING REMARKS
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, my colleagues have already mentioned the
evidently wrongful statements of facts such as th e quotation of Mr. Bernar d Kouchner, references
to old uniforms or the so-called “new checkpoint”. Let me mention a couple of other examples.
2. According to ProfessorAkhavan yesterda y, the Abkhaz leader said: “The Russian
peacekeeping contingent will remain in the Republic and [they] will also be our border guards in
Gali District.” “They” in this context means Russians. And now allow me to provide you with the
correct quotation that you may find in tab24 of your folder: “The [Russian] peacekeeping
contingent will remain in the republic and there will also be our border guards in Gali District.”
It is Abkhaz border guards not Russian. By ch anging “there” into “they” Professor Akhavan
simply misrepresents the facts.
3. Let me now turn to another important piece of evidence relied on by the Applicant.
4. Both yesterday and the day before, Pr ofessorAkhavan showed you a map depicting
Georgian villages that have been allegedly dest royed –– “the white circles map”. The Agent said
this map showed that the Georgian villages surrounding Tskhinvali had been “ethnically cleansed”
51
“Abkhazia will be able to host brigade of RF troops ⎯ Bagapsh”, 08.09.08, 11:57, www.itar-tass.com. - 40 -
and that the Georgian villages in Gori district have been systematically destroyed . But the Agent
did not mention at least two things.
5. First, he forgot to say that this was th e area of the most intensive combat during the
conflict. I will use the same map, but this time showing military activities as they were registered
in the logbooks of the two Russian battalions. One formed the basis of the Russian peacekeeping
forces deployed in South Ossetia. The second battalion was sent for reinforcement. The logbook is
an official document of an armed unit that reflects day-to-day events in chronological order.
6. In fact, the “white-circles” villages are s ituated in the area where intensive hostilities took
place. Our map depicts two areas. The green one represents the zone of hostilities, which took
place between 8and 10August 2008; the re d one–– that of the hostilities between 10and
12 August.
7. The logbook attests that as early as 1 August, sporadic shelling took place from the
following villages: Prisi, Sarabuk, Dmenis, Er edvi, Vanati, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Nikozi,
Avnevi. Similar incidents continued on the following days.
8. As MrW. ordsworth has already cited today from the 8September report of
Mr.Hammarberg, on 4 and 5August civilians fro m Georgian villages to the north of Tskhinval
were evacuated by Georgian authorities.
9. On 7August, heavy fire was located as originating from Prisi, Tamarasheni, Ergneti,
Nikozi, Kere, Avnevi and other villages. At 23.36, massive shelling of the city of Tskhinval began
first from Ditsi.
10. On 8August at 06.25 Georgian troops attacked the Russian peacekeepers battalion and
its southern base in Tskhinval. The peacekeepers were raked from the tanks, artillery, mortars and
automatic guns, air bombing. In two days, while they were encircled, 15 peacekeepers were killed
and dozens wounded.
11. The Georgian army attacked the town along three routes: the 4th infantry brigade ⎯
from the villages Dmenis, Tamarasheni, the 1st infantry brigade ⎯ from Karaleti and the 3rd
infantry brigade ⎯ from Avnevi and Khetagurovo.
52
Tab 20 of Georgia’s folder. - 41 -
12. The attack on Tskhinval from the south was supported by special units of the Georgian
Ministry of the Interior. These units had been in advance deployed in the Northern Georgian
enclaves situated along the main road connecting Tskhinval to North Ossetia, namely Kekhvi,
Kurta, Achabeti and Tamarasheni villages. The i ssue of the deployment of these Georgian armed
units in civilian villages had been repeatedly raised by Russia at the meetings of the Joint Control
Commission (negotiation mechanism for the settlement of the Georgian Ossetian conflict).
13. The Russian armed forces moved along this very road to unblock the Russian
peacekeepers surrounded by the Georgian army. After the Russian reinfo rcement passed the town
of Java, it was exposed to massive fire attack from the Georgian enclaves. It continued to fight its
way through in order to get to Tskhinval and render assistance to our blocked peacekeeping
battalion.
14. The above-mentioned areas, as you unders tand, were the theatre of war with a high
intensity of fire from all sides. So, the real reason for the massive exodus of Georgian civilians and
destruction of villages were the hostilities in this zone.
15. The second thing is that Georgia produced several maps from UNOSAT. But
representatives of Georgia produced only some of the maps from this site. For example, they did
not produce the map called “Village damage summa ry: Kekhvi to Tskhinvali”. This map shows
about 50per cent of the houses of the Georgian village, standing on the road along which the
Georgian military was moving, were destroyed. At the same time, the same map demonstrates
undamaged Georgian villages located farther from the road. This map is dated 20 August 2008. It
clearly supports the statement on the other map, called “Active fire locations for Tskhinvali, South
Ossetia, Georgia”. This is the map from the same site, saying “it is hi ghly probable that such
detected fires are directly or indirectly linked to the armed conflict”. The said maps you can find in
tab 27 of your folder.
16. Madam President, one may think these are just minor mistakes. To us, however, it is
clear that we deal with something else. In fact , just like the pieces of evidence I have quoted, the
whole case has been put on a premise of racial discrimination. It is not a case of racial
discrimination, but a case of the use of force, international humanitarian law, or also a case of
ethnic relations between Georgians, on one hand, and the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, on the other. - 42 -
We could hear a lot about the matter if representatives of those nations were present in this room.
But they are not!
17. Professor Akhavan in both of his speeches referred to testimonies of witnesses who had
to flee their villages after their homes were bur nt. There is no doubt that losing one’s house,
having to leave the place where you have lived all your life is a great grief. However, we must also
remember that hundreds of South Ossetian civilia ns and Russian peacekeepers are simply not
capable of giving testimonies any more.
18. Minister Burjaliani submitted yesterday th at “Georgia has no conflict with Ossetians”.
We submitted a lot of witness testimonies in our wr itten contribution. We could have spoken at
length about suffering to which Ossetian and other civilians as well as Ru ssian peacekeepers were
subjected from 7 to 9 August, and indeed before that . We have not done this out of respect to the
specific nature of this stage of proceedings, and act ually due to the fact that so far we have been
brought to this Court as Respondent.
19. Madam President, Mr.Reichler was keen to stress that it is not for the Court to discuss
who fired the first shot. He suggests that such an unimportant detail could be left for the merits.
Knowing the real story, his position is not surpri sing. Yet Georgia requests provisional measures
directly related to the hostilities that took place in August. Could I dare to recall ⎯ it is common
knowledge anyway ⎯ that the said hostilities were started by Georgia? It is our firm conviction
that the history of those hostilities is absolutely indispensable for this Court to take an informed
decision and it would remain a key factor going to discretion.
20. Yesterday the Respondent was accused of play ing with figures. It is claimed that 2,000
killed civilians somehow shrank to 133. On that may I ask our Georgian colleagues: are
133perished civilians too few? Yet the figure represented the number of bodies identified as of
20August. As of now, 311 victims have been identified by South Ossetian law enforcement
bodies 53, and that bearing in mind that quite a nu mber of people had been buried before the
investigation could begin, or their bodies have been rendered unidentifiable. According to today’s
statement of the Prosecutor-General of South Ossetia the number of identified victims rose to
53
Available at www.ossetians.com. - 43 -
700 dead 54⎯ identified victims. This is to be compared to the said figure of civilian deaths in
Georgia itself: 109civilians. Ethnic Georgians ar e, of course, not responsible for the acts of
Georgia.
21. Let me stress again: the Russian State a nd the Russian people deeply regret the loss of
lives, health and property of all those who beca me affected by the violence. Indeed, our
sympathies are with ethnic Georgian victims as much as with Russian or Ossetian ones.
22. In this context, it is notable that in four-and-a-half hours of pleadings, the Applicant has
not expressed anything similar to that. Even more so, it was hardly ever mentioned that there had
been victims on the other side. We firmly believe th at this is not a proper reflection of the feelings
of the Georgian people.
23. What the Applicant is saying, however, is that Russia should now leave Abkhazia and
South Ossetia altogether ⎯ apparently so to allow new attempts by the Georgian authorities to
“restore the constitutional order”.
24. On that, Mr. Wordsworth has today inform ed the Court of the arrangements reached on
Monday between the Presidents of Russia and Fr ance. Those arrangements include a speedy
withdrawal of all Russian forces from the zones ad joining South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But it will
certainly take time for the confidence to be restored, and Russia will spare no effort to contribute to
this aim.
25. Madam President, Professor Crawford in his pleading on Monday alluded to a parallel
between Russia’s alleged policy in the region and the practice of apartheid. I have just one remark
to make with respect to this. Can anyone imagine that thousands of people would come to live in a
country that discriminates against their ethnic gro up either in an apartheid-style or in any other
way? Yet, according, for example, to the figu res indicated five years ago, in 2003, by the
Chairman of Russia’s Governmental Commission on Migration, the number of Georgians residing
in Russia increased from 130,000 in 1989, to 200,000 in 2002. It is common knowledge that these
figures have significantly increased during the last years. What story do these figures tell? Racial
discrimination of Georgians by Russia? Most definitely not.
54
Available at www.itar-tass.com. - 44 -
26. The Russian Federation has always honour ed and will honour its obligations under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, be it in respect
of Georgians or of any other people. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
is an authoritative body of 18 independent experts with recognized knowledge and competence in
the field. The Committee has continuously welcomed the open and frank dialogue with my
country. As any other State party to the Conventio n, Russia has its issues. But the Committee has
never found, inter alia, during the period outlined in the Application submitted by Georgia, any
significant violation by Russia of its relevant obligations, no evidence of anything which would
even remotely resemble an institutionalized or Stat e-sponsored policy of racism as the Applicant is
attempting to prove. You may find all the concl uding observations of the Committee through this
period in your folders at tab 26.
27. What is of particular relevance in our par ticular circumstances is that the latest periodic
reports of Russia were discussed as recently as in August this year. The Committee was
deliberating –– I apologize, Madam President, that I was not able to complete my statement before
6 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please do not worry about that, and continue at your own speed,
Mr. Kolodkin.
Mr. KOLODKIN: Thank you very much.
The Committee was deliberating on the concluding observations on Russia’s latest reports at
the time of the armed conflict in August 2008 55. The observations were adopted on 15August.
According to the rules of the Committee, Russia di d not participate in those deliberations. The
members of the Committee, while considering the matter, were reading the same newspapers and
the same NGO reports to which th e Applicant refers in its written documents and oral pleadings.
The members of the Committee were watching the ne ws on TV. And yet they did not change their
minds, and you find nothing in the concluding ob servations on a possible connection between the
current or previous events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Russia’s obligations under the
55
CERD/CRUS/CO/19, 20 Aug. 2008. - 45 -
Convention. Not a single word about possible breaches of Russia’s obligations in the context of
the situation in these territories.
28. What story does this tell? Is it that ther e is prima facie evidence that Russia is in breach
of its obligations under the Convention with respect to Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
Or, is it about the prima facie absence of any breach of Russia’s obligations? We believe the
answer is absolutely clear, but of course it is up to this Honourable Court to decide.
29. Madam President, Members of the Court, you have now heard our first and second round
pleadings. Let me briefly summarize them.
30. First: The dispute that the Applicant has tr ied to plead before this Court is evidently not
a dispute under the 1965 Convention. If there were a dispute, it would relate to the use of force,
humanitarian law, territorial integrity, but in any case not to racial discrimination.
31. Second: Even if this dispute were unde r the 1965 Convention, the alleged breaches of
the Convention are not capable of falling under the provisions of the said Convention, not the least
because Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention are not applicable extraterritorially.
32. Third: Even if such breaches occurred, th ey could not, even prima facie, be attributable
to Russia that never did and does not now exercise , in the territories concerned, the extent of
control required to overcome the set threshold.
33. Fourth: Even if the 1965 Convention could be applicable, which, I repeat, is not the
case, the procedural requirements of Article22 of the 1965 Convention have not been met. No
evidence that the Applicant proposed to negotiate or employ the mechanisms of the Committee on
Racial Discrimination prior to reference to this Court, has been nor could have been produced.
34. Fifth: With these arguments in mind, the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the case.
35. Sixth: Should the Court, against all odds, find itself prima facie competent over the
dispute, we submit that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate the criteria essential for provisional
measures to be indicated. No cred ible evidence has been produced to attest to the existence of an
imminent risk of irreparable harm, and urgency. The circumstances of the case definitely do not
require measures, in particular, in the light of the ongoing process of post-conflict settlement. And - 46 -
the measures sought failed to take account of the key factor going to discretion: the fact that the
events of August 2008 were born out of Georgia’s use of force.
36. Finally: Provisional measures as they were formulated by the Applicant in the Requests
cannot be granted since they would impose on Russia obligations that it is not able to fulfil. The
Russian Federation is not exercising effective cont rol vis-à-vis South Ossetia and Abkhazia or any
adjacent parts of Georgia. Acts of organs of South Ossetia and Abkhazia or private groups and
individuals are not attributable to the Russian Federation. These measures if granted would
prejudge the outcome of the case.
37. Madam President, Members of the Court, I now have the honour to read out to you the
final submission of the Russian Federation which, for the reasons set out in our oral pleadings, and
in accordance with the conclusions set out by our counsel, are as follows:
38. The Russian Federation requests the Court to remove the case introduced by the Republic
of Georgia on 12 September 2008 from the General List.
Madam President, Members of the Court, this concludes the pleadings of the Russian
Federation. I would like to take this opportunity to express our thanks to the Registrar and his
colleagues and the interpreters. And, of course, I thank you, Madam President, Honourable
Members of the Court, very much for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.Kolodkin. This brings to the end the present series of
sittings. It remains for me to thank the representa tives of both Parties for the assistance they have
given to the Court by their oral observations in the course of these four hearings. In accordance
with practice, I ask the Agents to remain at the Court’s disposal.
The Court will render its order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures as
soon as possible. The date on which this order w ill be delivered at a public sitting will be duly
communicated to the Agents of the Parties.
Having no other business before it today, the Court now rises.
The Court rose at 6.10 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 10 septembre 2008, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de la convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie)