Audience publique tenue le mercredi 10 septembre 2008, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président, en l'affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (R

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132-20080910-ORA-01-00-BI
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2008/26
Date of the Document
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CR 2008/26

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LAAYE

YEAR 2008

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 10 September 2008, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Higgins presiding,

in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD

________________

ANNÉE 2008

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 10 septembre 2008, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,

en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh

Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal

Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith

Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Cot

Oxman

Registrar Couvreur

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vce-prh,ident

RanMjv.
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal

Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith

Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skoteiskov,
CotMM.

jOges an, ad hoc

Cgoefferr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

The Government of Romania is represented by:

Mr. Bogdan Aurescu, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Professor
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Buchar est, President of the Romanian Branch of the
International Law Association, member of th e Permanent Court of Arbitration, substitute
member of the Venice Commission,

as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Cosmin Dinescu, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania,

as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;

H.E Mr. Călin Fabian, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

As Co-Agent;

Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of Inte rnational Law, University of Oxford, member
of the English Bar, associate member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,

a s Senior Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

as Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Simon Olleson, member of the English Bar, 13 Old Square Chambers,

as Counsel;

Mr. Gicu Boroşi, Director General, National Agency for Mineral Resources,

Mr. Mihai German, Deputy Director General, Nati onal Agency for Mineral Resources, member of
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,

Mr. Eugen Laurian, Counter-Admiral (retired),

Mr. Octavian Buzatu, Lieutenant Commander (retired),

Mr. Ovidiu Neghiu, Captain, Ministry of Defence of Romania,

as Technical and Cartographic Experts;

Mr. Liviu Dumitru, Head of the Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania, - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de la Roumanie est représenté par :

M. Bogdan Aurescu, directeur général au ministère roumain des affaires étrangères, chargé de
cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Bucarest, président de la section roumaine de
l’Association de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, membre
suppléant de la Commission de Venise,

comme agent, conseil et avocat ;

M.CosminDinescu, directeur général des affair es juridiques du ministère roumain des affaires

étrangères,

comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;

S. Exc. M. Călin Fabian, ambassadeur de Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,

titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat, Matrix
Chambers,

M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., professeur de droit internati onal à l’Université d’Oxford, titulaire de la

chaire Chichele, membre du barreau d’Anglet erre, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien

président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,

comme conseils principaux et avocats ;

M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

comme conseil et avocat ;

M. Simon Olleson, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 13 Old Square Chambers,

comme conseil ;

M. Gicu Boroşi, directeur général de l’agence nationale des ressources minières,

M. Mihai German, directeur général adjoint de l’agence nationale des ressources minières, membre

de la Commission des limites du plateau continental de l’ONU,

M. Eugen Laurian, contre-amiral (en retraite),

M. Octavian Buzatu, capitaine de corvette (en retraite),

M. Ovidiu Neghiu, capitaine, ministère roumain de la défense,

comme experts techniques et cartographes ;

M. Liviu Dumitru, chef de l’unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère roumain des
affaires étrangères, - 6 -

Ms Irina Ni ţă, Second Secretary, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Romania in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Ms Catrinel Brumar, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,

Ms Mirela Pascaru, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,

Ms Ioana Preda, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Romania,

Ms Olivia Horvath, Desk Officer, Public Diplom acy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Romania,

as Advisers.

The Government of Ukraine is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, Adviser to th e Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Professor of International Law,
National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy,

as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,

Mr. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, Director of the Lega l and Treaty Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,

as Co-Agents;

Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,

Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor emeritus of International Law at the University of ParisI

(Panthéon-Sorbonne),

Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., Member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,

Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the Rome Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,

as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Mr. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine,

Ms Cheryl Dunn, Member of the State Bar of California, Eversheds LLP, Paris,

Mr. Nick Minogue, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales,

Mr. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, Acting Head of International Law Division, Legal and Treaty

Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, - 7 -

Mme Irina Niţă, deuxième secrétaire, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade de Roumanie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,

Mme Catrinel Brumar, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,

Mme Mirela Pascaru, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,

Mme Ioana Preda, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère

roumain des affaires étrangères,

Mme Olivia Horvath, responsable du départem ent des relations diplomatiques du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,

commceonseillers.

Le Gouvernement de l’Ukraine est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine, professeur de droit international à
l’Académie Mohyla (Université nationale de Kiev),

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,

M. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, directeur du départem ent des affaires juridiques et des traités du
ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,

comme coagents ;

M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,

M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de dr oit international à l’Université de ParisI

(Panthéon-Sorbonne),

sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,

Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,

comme conseils et avocats ;

S. Exc. M. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine,

Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de Californie, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,

M. Nick Minogue, Solicitor à la Cour suprême d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,

M. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, directeur par intérim de la division du droit international, département

des affaires juridiques et des traités du ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine, - 8 -

Mr. Maxime O. Kononenko, First Secretary of the Embassy of Ukraine in the French Republic,

Ms Mariana O. Betsa, Second Secretary of th e Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

as Legal Advisers;

Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil, C. Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,

Major General Borys D. Tregubov, Assistant to the Head of the State Border Protection Service of

Ukraine,

as Technical Advisers. - 9 -

M. Maxime O. Kononenko, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine en France,

Mme Mariana O. Betsa, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme conseillers juridiques ;

M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil., C. Geol., F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty

Consultancy Services,

M. Borys D. Tregubov, général de division, assistant du chef du service de protection des frontières
d’Etat de l’Ukraine,

comme conseillers techniques. - 10 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. We meet this morning, with the sitting now open, to

continue the first round of pleadings of Ukraine and I call Professor Quéneudec.

M. QUÉNEUDEC : Thank you, Madam président.

IV. L E DROIT APPLICABLE À LAL DÉLIMITATION MARITIME

ENTRE L ’U KRAINE ET LA R OUMANIE

SUITE )

40. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, à la fin de l’audience d’hier matin, j’ai abordé

la deuxième partie de mon exposé sur le droit app licable en l’espèce. Cette partie comporte les

trois points suivants :

1) le processus de délimitation prescrit par le droit international ;

2) l’établissement d’une ligne provisoire d’équidistance ;

3) l’examen des circonstances pertinentes.

1) Le processus de délimitation prescrit par le droit international

La règle applicable en matière de délimita tion prescrit aujourd’hui le recours soit à la

méthode associant équidistance et circonstances spéc iales, soit à la méthode combinant principes

équitables et circonstances pertinentes. Bien qu’elles soient en principe applicables à la

délimitation de zones maritimes différentes, ces deux méthodes sont cependant intimement et

étroitement liées entre elles.

41. Ce que la Cour elle-mêm e a d’ailleurs expressément s ouligné en2001 dans l’affaire

Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales en tre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c.Bahreïn) (fond,

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 111, par. 231).

42. Lorsqu’il s’agit, comme en la présente esp èce, de déterminer une ligne unique délimitant

des zones maritimes situées au-delà de la limite extérieure de la mer territoriale des deux Etats, «les

critères, principes et règles applicables» en pa reil cas «trouvent leur expression dans la méthode

dite des principes équitables/circonstances per tinentes», pour reprendre les termes employés par

votre arrêt dans l’affaire de laFrontière terrestre et maritime ent re le Cameroun et le Nigéria - 11 -

(Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)) (C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.441, par.288).

Et, dans cet arrêt du 10 octobre 2002, vous en avez donné la définition suivante :

«Cette méthode, très proche de celle de l’équidistance/circonstances spéciales

applicable en matière de délimitation de la mer territoriale, consiste à tracer d’abord
une ligne d’équidistance puis à examiner s’il existe des facteurs appelant un
ajustement ou un déplacement de cette ligne afin de parvenir à un «résultat

équitable».» (Ibid.)

43. Ces deux méthodes sont d’ailleurs si proches l’une de l’autre qu’elles finissent par se

confondre. Derrière l’incontestable différence des formules, on trouve en définitive un seul et

même processus.

44. Se référant précisément à vos deux arrêts de 2001 et 2002, le tribunal arbitral chargé de

la délimitation maritime entre la Barbade et la République de Trinité-et-Tobago a donné une

description détaillée du processus de délimitation dans sa sentence du 11 avril 2006 :

«The determination of the line of de limitation … normally follows a two-step
approach. First, a provisional line of equidistance is posited as a hypothesis and a
practical starting point. While a convenient starting point, equidistance alone will in

many circumstances not ensure an equitable result in the light of the peculiarities of
each specific case. The second step accordi ngly requires the examination of this
provisional line in the light of relevant circumstances, which are case specific, so as to

determine whether it is necessa1y to adjust the provisional equidistance line in order to
achieve an equitable result.»

45. La raison essentielle de ce recours à un processus en deux étapes est à rechercher avant

tout dans l’exigence d’objectivité et de certit ude qui imprègne aujour d’hui le droit de la

délimitation maritime. «[T]he need to avoid s ubjective determinations requires that the method

used start with a measure of certainty that equidistance positively ensures, subject to its subsequent

2
correction if justified» , a encore fait valoir la sentence précitée Barbade/Trinité-et-Tobago.

46. Votre jurisprudence reconnaît certes que cette démarche en deux temps peut être tenue en

échec dans des cas tout à fait exceptionnels. Il en est ainsi notamment lorsqu’un ou plusieurs

éléments de la situation géographique rendent impossible ou extrêmement malaisé le tracé d’une

ligne d’équidistance provisoire.

47. Dans la dernière affaire de délimitation maritime que vous avez été appelés à trancher,

entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras, vous avez été confrontés en particulier au phénomène de

1
International Legal Materials (ILM), vol. 45 (2006), p. 798, par. 242.
2
Op. cit., par. 306. - 12 -

l’instabilité de la ligne côtière des deux Etats dans la région du cap Gracias a Dios. Vous avez été

amenés à constater que des difficultés d’ordre gé ographique et géologique rendaient impossible la

détermination de points de base stables et fiables dans cette région. Et en conséquence, avez-vous

dit, «la Cour se trouve dans l’impossibilité de défi nir des points de base et de construire une ligne

d’équidistance provisoire pour établir la frontière maritime unique délimitant les espaces maritimes

au large des côtes continentales des Parties» (Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et

le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes, arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 280).

48. Mais, ce faisant, la Cour a cependant reconnu que commencer par la construction d’une

ligne provisoire d’équidistance était bien la manièr e normale de procéder. Et que, après avoir noté

qu’elle se trouvait «face à des circonstances spéciales qui ne lui permett[aient] pas d’appliquer le

principe de l’équidistance», la Cour a tenu à préci ser: «Ce dernier [c’est-à-dire le principe de

l’équidistance] n’en demeure pas moins la règle générale.» (Ibid., par. 281.)

49. La règle générale consiste donc bien à établir en premier lieu une ligne d’équidistance

provisoire.

2) L’établissement d’une ligne provisoire d’équidistance

50. Dans cette première étape du processus, la seule difficulté qui peut se présenter tient à

l’identification et au choix des points de réfé rence à partir desquels sera établie la ligne

d’équidistance et, points de référence que l’on dési gne traditionnellement sous le nom de points de

base.

51. Eu égard à l’importance que ce problème revê t pour la solution à retenir dans la présente

affaire, la Cour me permettr a sans doute de consacrer à prés ent quelques développements aux

données générales qui président à la détermination des points de base.

a) Détermination des points de base

52. Pour déterminer l’emplacement des points qui serviront d’ancrage terrestre à la ligne

maritime d’équidistance, il convient naturellement de ne pas perdre de vue que le processus de

délimitation par voie judiciaire est entièrement gouve rné par le droit. Dès lors, il est à la fois

nécessaire et suffisant de se fonder sur la notion première qui préside à la définition des différentes

zones maritimes sur lesquelles un Etat côtier exerce sa souveraineté ou sa juridiction. De ce point - 13 -

de vue, la notion de côte est bien entendu la notion essentielle; car c’est la côte qui est

déterminante pour créer le titre juridique de l’Etat.

53. Or, chacun sait que, pour définir l’étendue des zones maritimes d’un Etat côtier, la côte

est représentée par les lignes de base définies par l’Etat côtier lui-même. Lorsque ces lignes de

base sont constituées par la laisse de basse mer, ell es sont le reflet du trait de côte, dont elles

suivent plus ou moins les contours. Lorsqu’il s’ag it de lignes de base droites, elles apparaissent

comme des figures plus ou moins stylisées de la cô te qui ne peuvent pas normalement s’écarter de

la direction générale de celle-ci. Cependant, dans l’un et l’autre cas, les lignes de base sont la

représentation du rivage physique par l’intermédiaire duquel s’engendrent les droits de l’Etat côtier

sur la mer adjacente. Ce sont, en effet, les lignes de base que l’on utilise, non seulement pour

mesurer la largeur de la mer territoriale, mais aussi pour déterminer l’étendue de la zone

économique exclusive et du plateau continental.

54. C’est pourquoi, lorsqu’il s’agit d’identifier les points de base qui serviront à tracer une

ligne d’équidistance provisoire, ces points de base seront choisis sur les lignes de base à partir

desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale. C’est ce que prévoit d’ailleurs

expressément l’article15 de la c onvention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, relatif à la

délimitation de la mer territoriale, pour la mise en Œuvre de la méthode associant équidistance et

circonstances spéciales. Cet article parle de «la ligne médiane dont tous les points sont équidistants

des points les plus proches des lignes de base à par tir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer

territoriale de chacun des deux Etats».

55. Toutefois, en dehors de cette indication assez générale, il n’existe dans le droit de la mer

contemporain aucune disposition écrite ni aucune règle coutumière précisant de quelle manière doit

ou peut être choisi tel ou tel point sur une ligne de base. Cela tient au fait que la sélection des

points qui vont servir à déterminer le tracé d’une ligne d’équidistance n’est pas en soi une question

appelant une réponse juridique. La détermina tion de ces points de base soulève une question

essentiellement technique.

56. Ce sont, en effet, des experts hydrogra phes et cartographes qui sont en mesure de

procéder à l’identification des points susceptibles d’ être retenus à cette fin sur une laisse de basse

mer ou sur des lignes de base droites. Ce s ont ces experts qui définissent par des coordonnées - 14 -

géographiques les points de base qu’ils considèrent comme techniquement pertinents pour tracer la

ligne provisoire d’équidistance.

57. La pertinence de ces points est alors appréciée du seul point de vue de leur distance

respective par rapport à la ligne dont il revient aux experts de calculer le tracé. En effet, comme

l’avait noté la Cour à l’occasion de l’affaire Libye/Malte, «une ligne d’équidistance repose sur un

principe de proximité» ( Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 44, par. 56).

58. Le droit international n’ordonne rien d’autr e en cette matière. Celle-ci relève avant tout

de la géométrie et de la mathématique, comme le montre clairement le recours systématique que

l’on fait aujourd’hui aux ordinateurs pour calculer de façon précise le tracé d’une ligne provisoire

d’équidistance.

59. Ce n’est qu’à un stade ultérieur, lors de la deuxième étape du processus de la

délimitation, que des considérations d’équité peuvent conduire à corriger éventuellement l’effet

produit par certains points de base, parce que la règle de droit app licable oblige à tenir compte de

circonstances spéciales ou de circonstances jugées pe rtinentes au regard de la norme fondamentale

du résultat équitable. Mais, au stade initial de l’établissement de la ligne provisoire d’équidistance,

ce sont des considérations d’ordre purement t echnique qui dominent l’opération de sélection des

points de base servant à déterminer le tracé de cette ligne.

60. Si le droit international ne comporte pas de règles précisant de quelle manière sont

définis ou choisis les points de base, il ne fixe pas non plus d’exigence quant au nombre de points

de base appropriés qu’il convient de retenir sur les côtes pertinentes. On peut seulement affirmer

que, pour des raisons évidentes, il en faut au mo ins deux, un sur chacune des côtes en présence.

C’est ainsi que, dans l’affaire Cameroun c. Nigéria, la Cour n’a retenu que deux «points d’ancrage

terrestre pour la construction de la ligne d’équidistance» ( Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le

Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.443, par.292), selon ses propres termes. Tout dépend de la configuration

côtière et de l’étendue de la zone maritime dans laquelle doit intervenir la délimitation.

61. De même, le droit international n’exige pas que soit fixé un nombre égal de points de

base sur chacune des côtes pertinentes. Le nomb re de points de base retenus sur chaque côte - 15 -

dépend ici aussi de la situation géographique, c’est-à-d ire de la configuration réelle des côtes et de

l’étendue plus ou moins grande de la zone mar itime en cause. Les sen tences arbitrales rendues

récemment entre la Barbade et Trinité-et-Tobago, d’une part, et le Guyana et Suriname, d’autre

part, en fournissent une bonne illustration.

62. De l’ensemble de ces constatations portant sur la manière dont sont déterminés les points

de base découle une conséquence importante quant au rôle que ces points de base sont appelés à

jouer dans le processus de délimitation.

b) Rôle des points de base

63. Les points de base jouent un rôle purement technique et ne servent qu’à calculer le tracé

de la ligne provisoire d’équidistance. On ne saura it leur conférer une vale ur juridique intrinsèque

d’où il résulterait, par exemple, qu’ils pourraient influer sur la définition des côtes pertinentes.

64. C’est notamment ce qu’a tenu à souligner le tribunal d’arbitrage

Barbade/Trinité-et-Tobago en récusant la thèse d’une des parties, qui avait prétendu que la ligne de

côte à prendre en considération pour la compar aison des longueurs côtières était seulement la

portion de littoral sur laquelle se trouvaient les point s de base pertinents. Le tribunal a considéré,

en effet, que les points de base ne pouvaient pas jouer un rôle déterminant pour l’identification des

façades côtières. Selon lui :

«basepoints have a role in effecting the delimitation and in the drawing of the

provisional equidistance line. But relevant coastal frontages are not strictly a function
of the location of basepoints, because the influence of coastlines upon delimitation
results not…from their contribution of basepoints to the drawing of an equidistance
3
line, but from their significance in attaining an equitable and reasonable outcome.»

65. Cette jurisprudence arbitrale n’a toutefoi s fait que développer sur ce point ce qui était en

germe dans votre propre jurisprudence. Les arbitr es se sont en quelque sorte bornés à expliciter ce

que votre Cour avait déjà la issé entendre dans l’affaire Qatar c.Bahreïn, lorsqu’elle avait décidé

qu’il convenait de déterminer «en premier lieu les côtes pertinentes des Parties, à partir desquelles

sera fixé l’emplacement des lignes de base ainsi que des points de base appropriés permettant de

construire la ligne d’équidistance» ( Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et

Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 94, par. 178).

3
Sentence du 11 avril 2006, par. 329, ILM, vol. 45 (2006), p. 798. - 16 -

66. Il est donc clair que la définition des côt es pertinentes aux fins de la délimitation doit

intervenir avant et précéder la détermination des points de base.

67. Et une fois que la ligne provisoire d’équi distance a été établie, il faut encore procéder à

son évaluation et évaluer et apprécier son caractère équitable à la lumière des circonstances

pertinentes. C’est la deuxième étape du processus et le troisième point de mon exposé de ce matin.

3) L’examen des circonstances pertinentes

68. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, la deuxième étape du processus, c’est-à-dire

l’examen de l’ensemble des circonstances pertinentes de la région maritime concernée par la

délimitation, cette deuxième étape est aussi la plus délicate. C’est celle à l’occasion de laquelle se

manifeste le plus fréquemment ce que trois émin ents juges particulièrement inspirés avaient

naguère appelé le «subjectiv isme prétorien» (affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe

libyenne/Malte), opinion conjointe de MMR . uda, Be djaoui et Jiménez de Aréchaga,

C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 90, par. 37).

69. La raison en est qu’il n’existe pas et qu’ il ne peut sans doute pas exister de définition

générale de la notion de circonstances pertinentes. Celles-ci sont, en effet, éminemment variables

d’une affaire à l’autre. Elles apparaissent comme spécifiques à chaque affaire de délimitation,

parce que le cadre dans lequel doit intervenir la délimitation n’est pas le même d’une affaire à

l’autre. La situation de chaque cas présente des caractéristiques qui lui sont propres. Et ce sont ces

éléments de variabilité et de spécificité des circ onstances qui font dire souvent que chaque cas est

un «unicum».

70. Pourtant, on observe quelques constantes dans l’examen que fait le juge ou l’arbitre des

circonstances propres à chaque affaire de délimitati on qui lui est soumise. Ainsi est-il désormais

bien établi que seules peuvent être retenues des circonstances qui apparaissent comme

juridiquement pertinentes, c’est-à-dire des circonstances qui ont un rapport avec la juridiction

maritime qui est en cause dans la délimitation.

71. En d’autres termes, seront donc regard és comme présentant un certain degré de

pertinence des éléments, des fact eurs ou des considérations qui sont liés au titre juridique dont

peuvent se prévaloir les Etats Parties à l’instance. Cela résulte de la mise en garde faite par votre - 17 -

Cour dans l’affaire Libye/Malte lorsqu’elle bannissait le recours à des considérations étrangères à la

notion de plateau continental: «bien qu’il n’y ait certes pas de liste limitative des considérations

auxquelles le juge peut faire appel, de toute év idence seules pourront intervenir celles qui se

rapportent à l’institution du plateau continen tal telle qu’elle s’est constituée en droit…» ( Plateau

continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 40, par. 48).

72. Ici aussi, la côte, en tant qu’elle est à la base du titre, constitue donc la référence

essentielle. C’est pourquoi les circonstances qui pe uvent apparaître pertinentes doivent avant tout

être recherchées dans les caractéristiques des cô tes des Etats en cause, c’est-à-dire dans les

particularités de la géographie côtière. Ainsi, se penchant sur l’identification de ces circonstances

et se fondant sur la jurisprudence de votre Cour en ce domaine, le tribunal arbitral

Barbade/Trinité-et-Tobago ⎯ encore lui ⎯ a-t-il pu souligner: «That determination has

increasingly been attached to geographical consider ations, with particular reference to the length

and the configuration of the respective coastlin es and their characterization as being opposite,

adjacent or in some other relationship.» 4

73. Rares sont en effet les décisions judiciaires ou arbitrales dans lesquelles le juge ou

l’arbitre a constaté l’absence de toute particularité dans la géographie côtière qui serait de nature à

entraîner une quelconque modification de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire, à l’instar de votre arrêt

dans l’affaire Cameroun c. Nigéria, par exemple ou de la sentence Guyana/Suriname.

74. Dans presque toutes les affaires de déli mitation maritime qui ont été jusqu’à ce jour

soumises à la Cour ou à une instance arbitrale, la comparaison des longueurs des côtes pertinentes a

tenu une place non négligeable et a même joué un rô le décisif dans plusieurs des décisions qui ont

été prises.

75. Le fait que les côtes en présence soient d’égales longueurs ou de longueurs comparables

a pu, par exemple, être retenu comme un facteur conduisant à écarter ou rectifier le tracé d’une

ligne d’équidistance qui ne reflétait pas cette égalité géographique de départ. C’est notamment ce

qui s’est produit dans l’ Arbitrage franco-britannique de 1977 s’agissant de la délimitation du

plateau continental dans le secteur Atlantique (dans les «Western approaches»).

4
Sentence du 11 avril 2006, par. 233. - 18 -

76. Et l’on rappellera, dans le même ordre d’ idées, le constat que la Cour avait dressé à ce

sujet, dans les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord où étaient en présence

«trois Etats dont les côtes sur la mer du Nord sont justement d’une longueur
comparable et qui par conséquent ont été traités à peu près également par la

[géographie], sauf que l’une de ces côtes par sa configuration priverait l’un des Etats
d’un traitement égal ou comparable à celui que recevraient les deux autres si l’on
utilisait la méthode de l’équidistance» ( Plateau continental de la mer
du Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale

d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 50, par. 91).

77. Inversement, une inégalité flagrante ou même une simple disparité des longueurs côtières

a été regardée à plusieurs reprises comme une ci rconstance appelant une modification plus ou

moins importante de la ligne d’équidistance. Il suffit de mentionner les exemples des décisions

prises par votre Cour dans les affaires Golfe du Maine, Libye/Malte ou Jan Mayen.

78. Et précisément dans cette dernière affaire, vous aviez notamment re levé dans votre arrêt

de 1993 que «les différences de longueurs des côtes … sont si importantes que cette caractéristique

est un élément à prendre en considération lors de l’opération de délimitation» ( Délimitation

maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c.Norvège), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p.68, par.68); et vous en aviez tiré une conséquence immédiate: «à la

lumière de la disparité des longueurs des côtes, la ligne médiane devrait être ajustée ou déplacée»

(ibid., p. 69, par. 69).

79. Quant au rôle susceptible d’être joué par la configuration côtière, présentée quelquefois

comme une catégorie particulière de circonstance pertinente, on se bornera à noter que, sous cette

expression, peuvent se dissimuler différentes approches.

80. Tantôt, on y verra avant tout le caractèr e concave ou convexe de la côte, comme c’était

principalement le cas dans les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord . Tantôt, on y fera

entrer le changement radical de la direction gé nérale du littoral d’une des parties, comme dans les

affaires Tunisie/Libye et Nicaragua c.Honduras . Tantôt, encore, on englobera dans cette

expression à la fois la relation d’opposition des cô tes et leur situation respective dans un cadre

géographique particulier, comme dans l’affaire Libye/Malte. Tantôt, enfin, on élargira cette notion

à la configuration géographique gé nérale de la zone maritime où doit intervenir la délimitation, - 19 -

comme cela fut fait dans l’affaire Cameroun c.Nigeria et, dans une certaine mesure, dans

l’arbitrage Guyana/Suriname.

81. Il y a là incontestablement une marge d’appréciation assez grande à l’intérieur de

laquelle peut et sans doute doit s’exercer la «discr étion judiciaire» (the «judicial discretion») à

laquelle faisait allusion la sentence rendue il y a deux ans par un tribunal présidé par un ancien

président de la Cour 5.

82. Cette même possibilité d’appréciation discrétionnaire se retrouve également face à

l’existence dans la région d’une ou de plusieurs formations insulaires.

83. Un examen attentif de la jurisprudence en matière de délimitati on maritime révèle que

des traitements différents peuvent être appliqués aux îles, surtout lorsqu’il est possible de distinguer

différentes sortes d’îles, comme l’avait fait le tribunal arbitral pour la Délimitation de la frontière

maritime Guinée/Guinée Bissau (sentence du 14février 1985, par.95). Cette différence de

traitement entre les îles se fait, semble-t-il, moin s en fonction de la taille des îles en cause qu’en

raison de leur localisation géographique et de le ur rapport avec la côte continentale, comme on a

encore pu le constater dans l’affaire Qatar c. Bahreïn.

84. Il apparaît aussi que c’est surtout la situ ation d’une île dans le contexte géographique

général et par rapport à l’ensemble des autres circonstances pertinentes qui peut conduire le juge ou

l’arbitre à en faire ou non soit une circonstance sp éciale, soit une circonstance particulièrement

pertinente. Et c’est cet élément qui est, en défin itive, pris en considération pour décider quel effet

attacher à l’île.

85. On retrouvera naturellement encore cette grande marge d’appréciation du juge lorsqu’il

s’agira de mettre en balance l’ensemble des circonstances qui auront été considérées comme

pertinentes. Dans cette opération, ce qui importe, c’est de parvenir à «déterminer l’équilibre entre

diverses considérations», selon la formule de l’arrêt Jan Mayen (Délimitation maritime dans la

région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993 ,

p.63, par.58). La prise en compte de l’ensem ble des circonstances a en effet pour fin ultime le

tracé d’une ligne qui soit équitable au regard de toutes les particularités factuelles du cas d’espèce,

5
Arbitrage Barbade/Trinité-et-Tobago, par. 244. - 20 -

et pas seulement au regard d’un facteur particulier. En effet, comme vous l’avez souligné dans

l’affaire Qatar c.Bahreïn , le but est de parvenir à «une so lution équitable qui tienne compte de

tous les autres facteurs pertinents» ( Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et

Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 115, par. 248).

86. L’un des moyens mis au point par votre jurisprudence afin d’apprécier la conformité

d’une ligne de délimitation à la norme fondamental e de la solution équitable réside bien entendu

dans le test de proportionnalité. Il en a déjà été question dans l’exposé introductif présenté par

M eBundy; il y reviendra à la fin de la présentation des thèses de l’Ukraine. Aussi n’est-il pas

besoin d’en dire davantage ici. Je me permettrai de renvoyer respectueusement la Cour à cette

autre plaidoirie.

87. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, parvenu au terme de mon exposé, je voudrais

remercier la Cour pour l’attention qu’elle a bien voulu me prêter et pour la patience dont elle a fait

preuve à l’égard de cet exposé un peu théorique.

e
88. Madame le président, M Bundy doit poursuivre les arguments de l’Ukraine en

présentant le contexte géographique de l’affaire.

Could you please give the floor now to Mr. Bundy. Thank you, Madam.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Quéneudec. We now call Mr. Bundy.

Mr. BUNDY: Thank you, Madam President.

V. THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT : THE RELEVANT COASTS AND THE RELEVANT AREA

Introduction

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, as ProfessorQuéneudec has explained, the

application of the principles and rules of inte rnational law relating to maritime delimitation

depends primarily on the geographical characteristics of the area to be delimited, particularly the

coasts of the Parties. Now this is true with respect to a coastal State’s entitlement to maritime areas

lying off its coasts, and it is equally true withrespect to questions of delimitation in situations

where the legal entitlements generated by the coasts of two States meet and overlap. - 21 -

2. In the light of these considerations, my task this morning is to examine the coastal

geography of the Parties in somewhat greater detail than I did in my opening presentation

yesterday. The geographic area of concern is well defined in this case as lying in the north-west

corner of the Black Sea. This area is bounded sole ly by the two States that are Parties to this

case ⎯ Ukraine and Romania.

3. It is within this area that my discussion of the geographic facts will be focused. I will start

by taking up the issues that divide the Parties in re lation to the relevant coasts, in the first part of

my presentation, and then subsequently I will deal with the identification of the relevant area.

4. With that introduction, let me turn directly to the relevant coasts of the Parties, starting

with Ukraine’s coast. I will first describe the char acteristics of Ukraine’s mainland coast, and then

afterwards I’ll turn to Serpents’ Island.

1. The relevant coasts of the Parties

A. Ukraine’s relevant coast

[Slide]

(i) Ukraine’s mainland coast

5. The map that now appears on the screen ⎯ which is in tab20, which is where my tabs

begin today ⎯ depicts the north-west corner of the Black Sea. As I pointed out in my earlier

intervention, Ukraine’s mainland co ast borders three sides of this area. On the west, Ukraine’s

coast stretches from the end of the land boundary with Romania up to roughly the city of Odessa,

and an important point ⎯ Illichivs’k [highlight in green on the map]. On the north, the coast then

extends eastwards towards the Kark inits’ka Gulf [highlight on map] . On the east, Ukraine’s coast

then extends to Cape Sarych on the south-west tip of Crimea [highlight on map]. Both Parties

agree that Ukraine’s coast east of Cape Sarych is not relevant to the present dispute.

6. In considering the question of the identification of the relevant coasts, it is useful to recall

the Court’s statement in the Tunisia/Libya case that: “The geographic correlation between coast

and submerged areas off the coast is the basis of the coastal State’s legal title.” ( Continental Shelf

(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982 , p. 61, para. 73.) And the Court

added: - 22 -

“The coast of each of the Parties, therefore, constitutes the starting line from
which one has to set out in order to ascertain how far the submarine areas appertaining

to each of them extend in a seaward direction, as well as in relation to neighbouring
States situated either in an adjacent or opposite position.” (Ibid., p. 61, para. 74.)

7. While the Court made these pronouncements in the context of a case involving continental

shelf delimitation, they are all the more app licable to the delimitation of a single maritime

boundary, where geographic factors play a predominant role. As ProfessorLowe rightly

emphasized last Friday: “It is the coastline th at generates the maritime zones.” (CR2008/21,

p. 56, para. 19.)

8. Each of the segments of Ukraine’s coast generates 200-nautical-mile entitlements which

extend over the entire area to be delimited with Romania. ProfessorLowe seems to think that a

State’s entitlements can only extend in a perpendicu lar direction to its coastal front. But this is

incorrect. The entitlement of a coastal State to continental shelf and exclusive economic zones is a

spatial concept, and those entitlements extend in all directions from the coast. Perpendicular

entitlements find no expression in the Law of the Sea Convention, and they find no expression

under customary international law.

9. It is striking that Ukraine’s south-facing coast ⎯ this is the part of the coast that Romania

seeks to suppress ⎯ generates a 200-nautical-mile entitlement throughout the area of concern in

this case. In fact, all three parts of Ukraine’s coast give rise to maritime entitlements and project

into the area to be delimited with Romania.

10. But contrary to the impression Romania seek s to convey, this underscores the relevance

of the entirety of Ukraine’s mainland coast bordering this part of the Black Sea for purposes of the

present delimitation.

11. Now the length of Ukraine’s mainland coast relevant to delimitation with Romania can

be measured in at least three ways. The first way is to take account of the actual coast including its

sinuosities. This has to be done reasonably, of c ourse, and measured in this way, Ukraine’s coasts

from the land boundary with Romania, along the north-west corner of the Black Sea down to

Cape Sarych, measures some 1,058 km in length, a figure that Romania has not challenged.

12. At the same time, Ukraine appreciates the f act that, for practical purposes, the Court has

also considered a party’s relevant coast in terms of the general direction that that coast assumes, or

in relation to what is commonly known as its “coastal front” or “coastal facade”. And it is possible - 23 -

to simplify Ukraine’s coast in this manner, as the graphic on the screen illustrates [slide: fig. 3-1 to

Ukraine’s Counter-Memorial]. Viewed in this way, the total length of Ukraine’s mainland coast

fronting the delimitation area, according with its general direction, is roughly 684 km.

13. The third way to assess Ukraine’s coast is by taking into account the system of straight

baselines that Ukraine enacted and notified to the United Nations in 1992. These baselines are now

being shown on the screen–– and you can find them at tab21 of your folders–– and Romania’s

system of straight baselines is also shown on the map [slide: fig.3-2 to Ukraine’s

Counter-Memorial]. As you can see, Ukraine has a mixed system of baselines. Along some

stretches of the coast, the baseline is the “normal” baseline ⎯ in other words, the low-water line

along the coast. In other areas, Ukraine has em ployed the method of straight baselines in

conformity with Article 7 of the Law of the Sea Convention. If Ukraine’s coast is measured taking

into account its straight baselines, the length of that coast is roughly 664 km.

14. Whichever method is employed, the fact re mains that Ukraine’s coast is substantial in

length and all of it projects into the area relevant to delimitation to Romania, not to delimitation

with third States.

(ii) Serpents’ Island

15. Having examined Ukraine’s mainland coast, I would like now to turn to Serpents’ Island.

It is necessary for me to spend a few minutes on Serpents’ Island, if only to respond to

ProfessorPellet’s argument last week that Se rpents’ Island has no baseline (CR2008/20, p.19,

para. 24), and to expand on this point from what I mentioned in my remarks yesterday morning.

16. The gist of my good friend’s argument went as follows:

⎯ First, Professor Pellet asserted that baselines established by the internal law of a State will only

be opposable to other States if they are traced and notified in conformity with international law

(CR 2008/20, p. 17, para. 19).

⎯ Second, he pointed out that, while in 1992, Ukraine did notify the United Nations of the

co-ordinates of its baselines used to measure the outer limit of its territorial sea, that

notification made no reference to Serpents’ Island (CR 2008/20, p. 18, para. 21). - 24 -

⎯ Third, and even more gravely according to ProfessorPellet, Ukraine did not even think to

include Serpents’ Island in its system of base lines until it filed its Counter-Memorial in this

case (CR 2008/20, p. 17, para. 20).

⎯ Fourth, Professor Pellet considers that Ukraine h as therefore admitted that Serpents’ Island has

no baseline, and that it is “abusive”–– those we re his words–– for the island to provide any

base points for the construction of the provisional equidistance line (CR2008/20, p.19,

para.24), and “artificial and illicit” –– two more terms ProfessorPellet used–– to include it

amongst Ukraine’s baselines (CR 2008/20, p. 30, para. 90).

17. Every step in that line of argument is fraught with errors that I shall now seek to explain.

Let me start with the most basic proposition ⎯ one that I mentioned yesterday.

18. Because Serpents’ Island has a coast , it follows that it has a baseline. All islands have

baselines. Indeed, even low-tide elevations, situated within the terr itorial sea of the mainland or of

an island, have baselines under Article 13 of the Law of the Sea Co nvention. Romania accepts that

Serpents’ Island has at least a territorial sea a nd this presupposes, necessarily, the existence of a

baseline for measuring the breadth of that territorial sea.

19. Ukraine’s 1991 Law on the State Frontier s tipulates that Ukraine has a 12-mile territorial

sea –– and I will quote from the law –– “measured from the line of minimum low tide both on the

mainland and on islands belonging to Ukraine, or from straight baselines joining the corresponding

points” (Ukraine Counter-Memorial, Vol. 4, Ann. 46). As a matter of law, that provision is entirely

proper and valid. Given that Serpents’ Island has a baseline, it is obvious that there are base points

on that baseline that can be used for plotting the provisional equidistance line.

20. Notwithstanding this, Professor Pellet contends that baselines established on the basis of

a State’s internal legislation are not opposable to other States unless they are traced and notified in

accordance with international law. But that proposition is wrong when the baseline in question is

the “normal” baseline ⎯ the low-water mark around the coast. Normal baselines do not have to be

so notified.

21. As authority for his proposition, ProfessorPellet cites the 1951 Norwegian Fisheries

case. But that case concerned Norway’s system of straight baselines, not “normal” baselines, and

is thus totally inapposite to the situation involving Serpents’ Island. - 25 -

22. On Serpents’ Island, there are no straight baselines. Thus, the figure that Professor Pellet

displayed last week to show why it would be contrary to Article7 of the United Nations

Convention for Ukraine to have straight baselines connecting the island to the mainland is

irrelevant (CR2008/20, p.20, para.25). It is only in various locations along Ukraine’s mainland

coast that Ukraine has adopted a system of stra ight baselines, and simply because Serpents’ Island

is not part of a straight baseline system does not mean that the island has no baseline.

23. Counsel for Romania appears to have mis understood this elementary point. He purports

to find significance in the fact that, when Ukra ine notified its straight baselines to the United

Nations in 1992, those baselines did not include any reference to Serpents’ Island. But as I just

explained, there was no reason to refer to Serpents’ Island in the notification because there were no

straight baselines on the island or connecting the is land to the mainland and, thus, no obligation to

notify what was otherwise Ukraine’s “normal baseline” around the island.

24. Article 16 of the Law of the Sea Conventio n provides that only baselines determined in

accordance with Articles 7, 9 and 10 of the Convention need to be depicted on large-scale charts, or

specified by a list of co-ordinates, deposited w ith the United Nations. With the exception of

Article7 dealing with straight baselines, which Ukraine did duly notify to the United Nations,

neither of the other two Articles is relevant here. Article 9 deals with the mouths of rivers and is

not at issue in this case. And Article10 deals w ith bays, including historic bays, and is also not

relevant.

25. Ukraine did notify its straight baselines in 1992. That notification identified the starting

and end points of each straight baseline segment on Ukraine’s mainland coast, which you can see at

tab 21 of your folders and on the screen [place on scr een fig. 5-2 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder], and that

was entirely proper.

26. Counsel argues that Ukraine’s notification must have included all of its baselines because

that notification indicates that, between various starting and end points of each straight baseline

segment, the baseline follows the low-water mark (C R 2008/20, p. 18, para. 23). But that was also

appropriate in order to highlight the location of each straight baseline segment. The fact that the

low-water mark on Serpents’ Island was not included in the notification is simply a function of the

fact that there were no baselines on the island whic h represented either the starting or the end point - 26 -

of a straight baseline segment. Once again, I need to stress the fact that there was no obligation

under the 1982 Convention to notify baselines on Serpents’ Island that were not part of a straight

baseline system.

27. My learned friend then points out that Uk raine’s notification did expressly mention five

other islands but made no reference to Serpents ’ Island (CR2008/20, p.19, para.24). And once

again, this argument misses the mark. The re ason why these five islands, which ProfessorPellet

identified, were mentioned in Ukraine’s notification was because base points on each of them

constituted either the starting or the end point of a straight baseline segment. But given that

Serpents’ Island was not in the same position ⎯ it was not situated at the beginning or the end of

any straight baseline segment ⎯ it was not mentioned in the notification and it did not have to be.

28. The last point raised by Professor Pellet concerns the Sulina dyke. Counsel purports to

find significance in the fact that Romania did speci fy a base point situated on Sulina dyke when it

notified its own straight baselines to the United Nations in 1997, while Ukraine did not identify any

base points on Serpents’ Island (CR2008/20, p.21, para.28). But the comparison is a false one.

Sulina dyke forms part of Romania’s straight baseline system, and therefore Romania was

obligated to identify it as a base point when it notified those straight baselines. Serpents’ Island

does not form part of a straight baseline sy stem, and there was accordingly no notification

obligation on Ukraine to do the same.

29. Now I regret, Madam President, that this exposé has taken some time. But the point is an

important one, and I trust that Ukraine has put to rest Romania’s assertion that Serpents’ Island has

no baseline. The island most certainly does have a baseline, and having a baseline, it is entirely

appropriate to use base points situated on that baseline for purposes of constructing the provisional

equidistance line.

B. Romania’s coast

30. Now, let me now move to the coasts of Romania.

[Place fig. 3-7 to Ukraine’s Counter-Memorial on the screen]

31. The length and configuration of Romania’s coast can be seen on the map that appears on

the screen, and Romania divides its coast into tw o segments; first of all, from the land boundary - 27 -

with Ukraine down to the Sacalin peninsula, and secondly, from that peninsula southwards to the

boundary with Bulgaria. The total length of Roma nia’s coast is approximately 258 km taking into

account the sinuosities along that coast.

32. Despite the fact that significant porti ons of Romania’s coast actually face south or

south-east, and thus do not, if they were to be extended in a perpendicular direction as seen on the

graphic that is at tab 22 in your folders and now on the screen, by projecting into a perpendicular

direction under Romania’s theory, they do not r eally project into the delimitation area. But

nonetheless, Ukraine accepts that it is appropriate to treat all of Romania’s coast as a “relevant

coast” for purposes of the present delimitation, just as Ukraine considers that all of its coast

fronting this part of the Black Sea also constitutes a relevant coast. This is because the projections

from each Party’s coast generate overlapping maritime entitlements and EEZ entitlements in this

part of the Black Sea. But notwithstanding this, to the extent that Romania tries to exclude portions

of Ukraine’s south-facing coast because they are said to “face” in the wrong direction or to lie too

far away, then the same criteria should be applied to Romania’s southern coast below the Sacalin

peninsula, most of which would also thereby be excluded under Romania’s thesis.

33. Now there are three particular characteristi cs, or three particular features characterizing

Romania’s coastal front which deserve to be highl ighted. The first concerns the presence of the

Sulina dyke just south of the terminal point on the State boundary between Ukraine and Romania

[arrow pointing to the Sulina dyke on the map]. The second concerns the Sacalin peninsula which

lies about 45 km south of the Sulina dyke [arrow poi nting]. And the third concerns the orientation

of Romania’s much longer stretch of coast south of the Sacalin Peninsula.

34. The Sulina dyke extends some 7.5km out to sea. And it is a feature which, although

forming part of what Romania says are permanent harbour works, is an artificial structure which

departs radically from what is otherwise the general configuration of the Romanian coast. Now a

photo of the end of the dyke now appears on the scr een and at tab23 [photo]. It shows that the

dyke consists of two, thin and very low, pa rallel stone embankments about 150m apart. Not

surprisingly, the use of a base point located at the very end of the dyke has a material effect ⎯

indeed, a materially distorting effect ⎯ on the course of an equidistance line. - 28 -

35. What is striking is the fact that Ro mania uses the Sulina dyke as a key base point

controlling, as I said yesterday, 160 km of its pr ovisional equidistance line while, at the same time,

Romania fails to give any effect to Serpents’ Is land (beyond a 12-mile territorial sea) despite the

fact that Serpents’ Island is a natural feature. This is just one example, we would suggest, of

Romania’s reliance on double standards in this case.

36. The Sacalin peninsula also has a signi ficant effect on Romania’s claim line to the

south-east of Serpents’ Island. Yet the peninsula itself is no more than a narrow uninhabited sand

spit, as the photo on the screen illustrates [photo], and it is at tab 24.

37. As for the southern stretch of Romania’ s coast, it is displaced by a distance of over

70km to the west of Romania’s coastal front between the land boundary with Ukraine and the

Sacalin peninsula. Most of this part of Romani a’s coast does not project on to the relevant area

under ProfessorLowe’s “perpendicular projection” theory, and none of that coast provides any

base points for Romania’s equidistance line.

38. Of course, ProfessorLowe stresses that it is not base points which generate maritime

entitlements, but rather: “It is the coastline th at generates the maritime zones.” (CR2008/21,

p.56, para.19.) He thus maintains that “the coastline south of Sacalin certainly generates the

maritime zones” (CR 2008/21, p. 55, para. 15).

39. The Court will probably recall ProfessorLowe’s “wave map” that he used to illustrate

the natural prolongation or projection of Romania’s coast. That map is now being placed on the

screen [Romania’s tab XIII-2 map].

40. In presenting this map, Professor Lowe is making exactly the same point that Ukraine has

made throughout these proceedings. It is the coast of a State ⎯ the whole coast ⎯ which

generates continental shelf and exclusive economic zone entitlements.

41. The problem with my distinguished opponent ’s presentation is that it only presents one

side of the equation. Ukraine’s coast ⎯ including all of its south-facing coast ⎯ also generates

similar maritime entitlements. Ukraine’s coast, if I could put it this way, can make waves of its

own.

42. The map on the screen illustrates the point [Ukraine’s south-facing coast “waves”]

(tab25). The Court will see the entitlements gene rated by Ukraine’s south-facing coast extend - 29 -

throughout the relevant area. Of course, it is not simply Ukraine’s south-facing coast but Ukraine’s

other coastal fronts generate similar entitlements ⎯ or waves, if you prefer. This only shows the

south-facing coast up to a distance of 200 nautical miles.

43. A further point worth noting with respect to Romania’s southern coast is that the last part

of that coast near Bulgaria lies about 136km from Romania’s final base point used for its

equidistance line on the Sacalin peninsula. That can be seen on the map on the screen, which is at

tab 26 in your folders. If we turn to Ukraine’s coast, it will be seen that all of that coast lies less

than 136km from the northernmost base points on Ukraine’s coast that Romania uses for its

version of the equidistance line ⎯ Cape Burnas and Cape Tarkha nkut. Notwithstanding this,

Romania urges the Court to treat its entire south coast as a relevant coast, but to exclude Ukraine’s

south-facing coast for the same purpose. And on ce again, we would suggest that double standards

stand in stark relief.

44. As I mentioned a few moments ago, Romania’s coast measures approximately 258km

taking into account the actual coastline with its sinuosities. If the coast is measured more generally

according to its coastal front, then the length is 185 km. And as with Ukraine’s coast, it is also

possible to measure Romania’s coast by reference to Romania’s system of straight baselines, which

I referred to a few minutes ago. Those baselines now appear on the map highlighted in blue

[fig.3-2 to Ukraine’s Counter-Memorial], and taking them into account, Romania’s baselines,

including the low-water mark and the straight baseline segments, measure roughly 204km in

length.

45. Based on these measurements, the coastal relationship of the Parties can be summarized

by the table which now appears on the screen and is also at tab 27 of your folders. It is a table that

compares “like with like” ⎯ in other words, which compares all of the coasts of the Parties which

generate maritime entitlements extending into the area to be delimited. I am not going to read out

the figures as you have them before you [place on screen] (tab 27):

Coastal lengths in kilometres

Ukraine Romania Ratio

Overall coastal length: 1,058 258 4.1 to 1

Coastal fronts or facades: 684 185 3.7 to 1 - 30 -

Using the Parties’ straight baselines: 664 204 3.3 to 1

46. I would point out that whichever of these methodologies is used, the result is a relevant

Ukrainian coast bordering the area to be delim ited which is on average 3.7times longer than the

relevant coast of Romania.

C. Romania’s attempt to refashion geography by amputating Ukraine’s relevant coast but
not its own coast

47. Having described the coastal geography of the Parties, I would like now to focus for a

few minutes on Romania’s attempt to “refashion” that geography by eliminating from

consideration over half of Ukraine’s relevant co ast while, at the same time, preserving Romania’s

entire coast. The stretch of Ukraine’s coast th at Romania tries to suppress extends from what

Romania quite arbitrarily labels “point S” to Ca pe Tarkhankut: that is shown on the map on the

screen [fig. 4-2 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder] (tab 28). It is a stretch of coast about 600 km long.

(i) Romania’s attempt to limit the relevant coasts to “opposite” or “adjacent” coasts

48. Romania’s first tactic is to argue that, in order to be relevant, the coasts of the Parties

have to be either opposite or adjacent to each other. This argument was advanced by

ProfessorCrawford last week who maintained that there is no third category of coasts

(CR2008/19, pp.11-12, para.7). ProfessorCraw ford then pointed to certain “segments” of

Ukraine’s south-facing coast which, in his view, were neither opposite nor adjacent to Romania’s

coast and, by implication, must therefore be excluded.

49. That thesis is misconceived and it does not comport with the Court’s own jurisprudence,

which I will speak to in a few moments. While it is true that Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the Law of

the Sea Convention refer to adjacent and opposite coast s, the fact is that nature is what it is,

including the coasts of States that border the sea. In practice, coasts cannot always be slotted into

convenient boxes labelled “adjacent” or “opposite” co asts. The maritime entitlements of a coastal

State are not determined by the precise directi on that a coast faces, but rather by the distance

principle pursuant to which a particular stretch of coast generates continental shelf and exclusive

economic zone rights out to a distance of 200 miles from the low-water line of that coast, or from

an appropriate system of straight baselines, regardless of its orientation. - 31 -

50. A question of delimitation arises when the maritime entitlements extending from one

party’s coast meet and overlap with those of a neighbouring State. It makes no difference if those

coasts are labelled “opposite” or “adjacent”, or, indeed ⎯ as is the case with Ukraine’s

south-facing coast ⎯ have an intermediate relationship evidencing characteristics of both

“oppositeness” and “adjacency”. What matters is that the coasts have to be capable of generating

maritime entitlements, in which case they will be “relevant coasts” for delimitation purposes

provided that they do not face, or are not more relevant to, delimitations with third States. That is

the situation that exists with respect to all of Ukraine’s coast facing the north-west corner of the

Black Sea.

(ii) Romania’s ill-founded effort to dissect Ukraine’s coast

51. In an effort to overcome this fact, Ro mania has deployed a second tactic pursuant to

which it attempts to dissect Ukraine’s coast into a number of segments ⎯ eight segments ⎯ and to

argue that some of those segments do not project into the relevant area. [Place Romania’s

tab XIII-6 on screen] I am putting on the screen a graphic that Professor Lowe illustrated last week

to show Romania’s approach. By arbitrarily carvi ng up Ukraine’s coast in this fashion, and then

drawing projections at 90° angles from each of the segments, Romania tries to create the

impression that part of Ukraine’s coast is not relevant ⎯ ostensibly because it “projects” in the

wrong direction ⎯ and that there is no Ukrainian coast th at generates maritime entitlements south

of Serpents’ Island.

52. The fundamental fallacy underlying th is methodology is ProfessorLowe’s assumption

that a coast can only project in a perpendicular direction from its general facade. As you can see

from Romania’s map, all of Romania’s arrows ⎯ whether large or small ⎯ project at a 90° angle

to Romania’s segmented view of Ukraine’s coastal fronts.

53. But that artifice bears no relation to th e manner in which the law treats a State’s

entitlement to maritime areas generated by its coast. Moreover, as I have noted, Romania again

engages in double standards. If it wishes to carve up Ukraine’s coast into small segments, it should

be prepared to accept the same approach for its own coast. And had it done so, it would be

apparent that much of Romania’s coast south of the Sacalin peninsula faces south or south-east and - 32 -

would, under Romania’s own theory, not constitute a relevant coast either. This can be seen from

the map that now is being projected on the screen (tab29) [slide based on Ukraine’s Rejoinder

fig.4-9]. A 60-km stretch of coast lying immediately below the Sacalin peninsula actually faces

south ⎯ not towards the area of concern [display projection]. A second stretch of Romania’s coast

faces south-east. also away from the delimitation area [arrow]. And a third segment ⎯ the very

southernmost segment ⎯ projects east into an area that, at most, only faces the very southernmost

part of the area to be delimited in this case.

54. Two can play this game of projecting 90° angles, but more importantly, under the Law of

the Sea Convention, as well as under customary international law, the maritime entitlements

generated by a coast are not limited to areas lying perpendicular to that coast. Maritime

entitlements are a spatial concept extending from a St ate’s baselines; they are not restricted to

preconceived angles or projections. That is wh y Romania’s piecemeal approach to the coastal

geography has no role to play in this case, and does not succeed in somehow rendering half of

Ukraine’s coast superfluous.

Madam President, I am about to now embark on a discussion of some of the case

precedents — the next section before I get to the relevant area at the end will probably take about

15 minutes. Perhaps it would be a convenient point to break now, but I am at the Court’s disposal.

I could go for another 15 minutes if the Court prefers?

The PRESIDENT: I think it will be better for you to continue, Mr. Bundy.

Mr. BUNDY: Very well, thank you, Madam President.

(iii) The Court’s jurisprudence

55. So, turning to the jurisprudence: counsel for Romania has sought support for its position

in the jurisprudence of this Court and of arbitral tribunals. Let me start with the Anglo-French

arbitration which Professor Crawford referred to in support of his proposition that a coast has to be

either opposite or adjacent to be relevant.

56. According to counsel, the Court of Arbitration held in Anglo-French that “there is no

third category, no geographical situation where th e delimitation is to be effected between coasts - 33 -

that are neither adjacent nor opposite” (CR 2008/19, p. 12, para. 7). But with the greatest respect,

that does not give a full or balanced account of what the Court of Arbitration actually said in

Anglo-French.

57. While it is true that the Court of Arbitration referred to the distinction that existed

between cases of “opposite” or “adjacent” coasts wi thout apparently envisaging a third category of

geographical situation, it did go on to state in two separate places of its Award — and I am going to

quote from the first part of the Award where it raises the point:

[Place quote on screen]

“On the other hand, while stressing the distinction between ‘situations’ where
the coasts are ‘opposite’ and where they are ‘adjacent’, the Court observed that this

distinction 6ay not always be uniform a nd clear-cut along the whole length of the
boundary.”

58. The geographic configuration of a coast does not need to be “uniform” or “clear-cut” in

order for that coast to be considered a releva nt coast. ProfessorQuéneudec a few minutes ago

referred to the Barbados/Trinidad arbitration where exactly the same point was made in the citation

that he quoted. And it was also made clear in the Court’s Judgments in both the Tunisia/Libya and

in the Gulf of Maine cases, two further precedents that counsel for Romania has referred to.

[Fig. 4-5 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder: Tunisia/Libya]

59. Let me start with Tunisia/Libya : a map of the relevant area in Tunisia/Libya taken from

the Court’s Judgment is on the screen and in tab 30 of your folders. The relevant coasts as defined

or as identified by the Court are highlighted in red. As can be seen, they stretch from Ras

Kaboudia in the north to Ras Tajoura in the east; and they also include the entire Gulf of Gabes

despite the fact that, under Professor Crawford’s “comparative proximity” theory, Tunisia’s Gulf of

Gabes coast should have been “eclipsed” by other pa rts of the Tunisian coast lying closer to the

delimitation area. It was not eclipsed.

60. Notwithstanding the fact that the coast along the back of the Gulf of Gabes was, strictly

speaking, neither “opposite” nor “adjacent” to Libya’s coast, and did not project into the

delimitation area under ProfessorLowe’s perpendi cular projection theory, the Court had no

6Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French

Republic, Decision of 30 June 1977, RIAA, Vol. XVIII, p. 55, para. 94 and p. 97, para. 206. - 34 -

hesitation in treating the entire coast up to Ras Ka boudia as a “relevant coast”. And if I can cite

from paragraph 126 of the Court’s Judgment, it stated:

“The major change in direction undergon e by the coast of Tunisia seems to the
Court to go some way, though not the whole way, towards transforming the

relationship of Libya and Tunisia from that of adjacent States to that of opposite
States.” (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 88, para. 126.)

A transformation— no precise point where you are either opposite or adjacent, but a

transformation.

61. Now, I may be accused of refashioning geography here, but if we turn the Tunisia/Libya

situation on its side, as is now being done on the screen [rotate slide], to appreciate the position as

far as the present case is concerned. In this way, it can be seen that the configuration of the

Tunisian coast around the Gulf of Gabes and up to Ras Kaboudia begins to resemble the

configuration of Ukraine’s south-facing coast between Odessa, heading towards Cape Tarkhankut.

What now appears as Tunisia’s south-facing coast was treated by the Court in Tunisia/Libya as a

relevant coast in that case; and so, too, is Ukraine’s south-facing coast a relevant coast in this case.

[Place map back on proper orientation]

I62. Tunisia/Libya, it is apparent that the only coasts that the Court did not consider

relevant were those outlined in blue on the map, which were more relevant to delimitations with

third States because of the direction in which they faced. At several places in its Judgment, the

Court emphasized that it was sensitive to the po tential rights of third States and the Court

circumscribed the relevant area in that case with this in mind. A glance at the map shows that north

of Ras Kaboudia, Tunisia’s coast clearly faced Italy, in fact an area that Tunisia had already

delimited with Italy; east of Ras Tajoura, Libya’s coast faced Malta, which had applied to

intervene in the proceedings and whose position was well known at that point. In contrast, none of

Ukraine’s coast ⎯ including its south-facing coast ⎯ faces a third State whose interests could be

impacted. Turkey, for example, has already delimited its boundaries far to the south. Thus there is

no justification for Romania to exclude Ukraine’s south-facing coast.

Gulf of Maine

63. Let me move to the Gulf of Maine case. As I shall show, that case also supports

Ukraine’s position as to the coasts of the Parties that should be considered to be relevant. - 35 -

[Figure 4-6 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder on the screen)

64. You have this at tab 31, the map that now appears on the screen. That map depicts the

coasts of the Parties that were considered to be relevant coasts by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine

case and the resulting delimitation line. There are several aspects of the Chamber’s treatment of

these coasts which are relevant to the present delimitation.

65. First, the Chamber treated all of the par ties’ coasts which abut the Gulf of Maine as

relevant coasts for delimitation purposes. These included a substantial portion of Canada’s coast

fronting the Bay of Fundy in the north-east corner , which the Chamber recognized as forming part

of the coastal geography of the Gulf of Maine proper.

66. The relevant coasts also included the en tire coast of the United States, from its land

boundary with Canada down to the island of Nantucket below Cape Cod. This was done ⎯

treating all of this as a relevant coast ⎯ despite the fact that the United States coast started out as

an “adjacent coast” to Canada near the land boundary, and ended up in an opposite relationship

between Cape Cod and Nova Scotia. The Chamber felt no need to identify the precise point where

the coastal relationship between the parties change d. It simply treated the entire United States

coast as a relevant coast.

67. Second, the lengths of the coasts of the parties in Gulf of Maine stood in a relationship of

1.38 to1 in favour of the United States. This magnitude of difference in overall coastal lengths

was considered to be a key relevant circumstan ce justifying an important adjustment to the

equidistance line in favour of the State with the longer coast ⎯ the United States.

68. Significantly, the Chamber identified the opposite coasts of the United States and Canada

in the case with some precision ⎯ and those coasts are highlighted in red on the map [highlight

Cap Ann to Nantucket and the southwest-facing coast of Nova Scotia]. Those coastal fronts were

approximately the same length and, if we tr anspose the analogy to the present case, under

Romania’s theory, these red coasts could be equate d with Romania’s coast on the one side, and

Ukraine’s coast between Cape Tarkhankut and Cape Sarych, on the other side.

69. In our case, Romania contends that its “opposite coasts” sector, between its coast and the

Cape Tarkhankut and Cape Sarych coast, should be delimited by an unadjusted median line without

taking into account the marked disparity that exis ts between the overall lengths of the Parties’ - 36 -

coasts fronting the delimitation area. In Gulf of Maine , however, the Chamber rejected such an

approach. It adjusted the median line so as to fa ll significantly closer to the Canadian coast all the

way out to the endpoint on the boundary line in order to take into account the difference in the

lengths of the parties’ coast throughout the Gulf of Maine.

70. It is quite clear that the long United States coast at the back of the Gulf of Maine was not

deemed to be irrelevant, or only relevant to the adjacent coasts sector. It had an influence on the

entire seaward portion of the delimitation line, despit e the fact that it was arguably far away. In

other words, the Chamber did not adopt Professor Crawford’s “principle of comparative proximity”

to exclude that coast at the back of the Gulf for overall delimitation purposes. Nor did it adopt

ProfessorLowe’s argument that coasts that are further away are somehow “eclipsed” by closer

coasts. Clearly, there existed in Gulf of Maine parts of the United States coast, such as Cape Cod,

that lay much closer to the seaward portion of the delimitation line than the United States coast

situated at the back of the Gulf of Maine or of Canada’s coast in the Bay of Fundy. Yet it was the

sum total of these coasts, and the differences in their total respective lengths, that dictated the

shifting of the equidistance line all the way to seawar d to its furthest point. All of the coasts of the

parties, the coasts at the back of the Gulf of Maine, the coasts in the Bay of Fundy, had an

influence on where the delimitation line was oriented throughout its most seaward course.

71. If we return to our case, all of Ukraine’ s coast fronting the area to be delimited with

Romania is similarly relevant, and that coast, be ing some four times longer than the relevant

Romanian coast, also merits an important adjustme nt being made to the equidistance line in order

to achieve an equitable result.

Libya/Malta

72. I turn briefly now to the Libya/Malta case. The relevant map is in tab 32 and is now on

the screen [map of Libya/Malta taken from p.27 of Judgment]. The point stressed by

Professor Crawford last week was that the Court id entified the relevant coast of Libya in that case

as lying between RasAjdir ⎯ the land boundary with Tunisia ⎯ and Ras Zarruq, excluding any

segment of Libya’s coast east of Ras Zarruq (CR2008/18, p.67, para.18). Although my

colleague’s argument was not entirely clear, it appears that what he was trying to do was to equate

Libya’s coast east of Ras Zarruq with Ukraine’s south-facing coast in this case. - 37 -

73. The reason why the Court limited Libya’s relevant coast at Ras Zarruq was made very

clear in its Judgment, and had nothing to do with Romania’s argument that the coast in question

was considered to be too remote to be relevant. As the Court stated at paragraph 22 of its Judgment

in Libya/Malta:

“The limits within which the Court, in order to preserve the rights of third
States, will confine its decision in the present case, may thus be defined in terms of the
claims of Italy, which are precisely located on the map by means of geographical

co-ordinates.” (I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 26, para. 22.)

74. Obviously everyone will recall that Ital y had applied to intervene in the case and its

claims were known. Italy’s claims on the east, as can be seen on the map, extended up to the

15°10'E meridian. When it came to identifying the relevant coast of Libya, therefore, the Court

noted that the 15° 10' E meridian, which defined th e limits of the area in which its Judgment could

operate, “crosses the coast of Libya not far from Ras Zarruq” ( I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 50, para. 68).

That was why Libya’s relevant coast was limited to Ras Zarruq in the case, because of the claims

of the third State, a situation we do not have here.

Nicaragua v. Honduras

75. Lastly, I need to say a brief word about Nicaragua v. Honduras, to which counsel also

referred in connection with his discussion of releva nt coasts. The map from the Court’s Judgment

is on the screen [map from p. 82 of Judgment].

76. My first point is that the geographic context within which the Nicaragua v. Honduras

case was decided obviously bears no relationship wi th the coastal geography in the present case.

Here, one of the Parties ⎯ Ukraine ⎯ has a coast which fronts three sides of the area subject to

delimitation ⎯ a situation which clearly did not exist in Nicaragua v. Honduras.

77. There is a further observation I would make regarding this case in response to Romania’s

position, illustrated so capably by Professor Lowe last week, that coasts should only be deemed to

project at a 90°angle, or perpendicular, to their general direction. I would simply note that if

Honduras and Nicaragua had been limited to 90° projections from their coastal fronts, there would

have been no delimitation, as you can see on the ma p. The Court’s bisector line would have fallen

right in the middle of a kind of “no man’s zone ” (tab33). Clearly coasts are not limited to - 38 -

90° projections. Here the projection, if you take the bisector, was 124°. It could have been further,

depending on the geography.

Madam President, it is at that point at whic h it might be appropriate to pause because I will

now move to a briefer part of my presentation on the relevant area. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: Very good. The Court will now rise.

The Court adjourned from11.30 a.m. to 11.50 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Yes, Mr. Bundy.

Mr. BUNDY: Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court.

D. The relevant area

78. Having dealt with the relevant coasts of the Parties, I now turn to a related concept ⎯ the

“relevant area”. And here, I can be quite brief, since there are a number of principles on which the

Parties agree and the remaining differences between the Parties on this issue are readily identified.

(i) The relevant area as defined by Ukraine

[Fig. 4-10 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder on screen]

79. Last Friday, Professor Lowe offered three st atements of principle with which Ukraine is

in accord.

⎯ First, ProfessorLowe stated: “The relevant area is an area of overlapping entitlements of the

Parties.” (CR 2008/21, p. 61, para. 45.) Ukraine agrees.

⎯ Second, my learned friend emphasized: “The correct approach ⎯ and the only rational

approach ⎯ is evident when one recalls the fundamental principle ⎯ that each segment of the

relevant coastline must be permitted to generate its own maritime zones.” (CR 2008/21, p. 62,

para. 52.) Once again, Ukraine agrees.

⎯ Third, ProfessorLowe concluded: “So, one looks at the whole of the zones generated by the

coasts.” (CR 2008/21, p. 62, para. 54.) Once more, Ukraine agrees.

80. The map now on the screen illustrates the pos ition–– it is also at tab34. The relevant

area extends off both Parties’ relevant coasts abutting this corner of the Black Sea. All of the areas - 39 -

shaded in green lie within the entitlements gene rated by the Parties’ coasts. And to recall

Professor Lowe’s principles, each segment of the relevant coasts generates its own maritime spaces

and one has to look at the whole of the zones generated by these coasts to identify the relevant area.

Just as the relevant area in the Tunisia/Libya case encompassed the entire area, including the Gulf

of Gabes, lying off the coasts of the parties to that case that were not relevant to delimitations with

third States, so, also, does the relevant area in th is case cover the entire north-west corner of the

Black Sea, including all of Ukraine’s south-facing coast.

81. On Friday, Professor Lowe presented an ex tended argument as to why the relevant area

should not be defined by the claims of the Parties (CR2008/21, pp.61-62, paras. 45-51). While

this presentation was most interesting, I was so mewhat puzzled because it has nothing to do with

our case, since neither Party in this case maintains that the relevant area should be so defined by the

claims of the Parties. The only genuine issue is how this area should be circumscribed in the south,

bearing in mind the presence of third States such as Bulgaria and Turkey.

82. The Court will observe that Ukraine has de fined the southern limits of the relevant area

by two straight lines. On the west [arrow poin ting], Ukraine has adopted a straight line extending

from the point where the Romania-Bulgaria land boundary meets the sea, out to a hypothetical

meeting point in the middle of the sea, where th e potential rights of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria

and Turkey converge. This represents a line dr awn seawards from the general direction of the

coast, in much the same way as the Court established the seaward limits of the relevant area in the

Tunisia/Libya case.

83. The eastern straight line [arrow] is drawn from Cape Sarych on Ukraine’s Crimean coast

to the same point where the interests of third States come into play.

84. These interests can be seen more cl early if the existing Turkey-Bulgaria and

Turkey-Ukraine delimitations are added to the map, as is now being done [add the red and black

lines as on fig. 8-1 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder]. The black segments of both delimitations correspond

to maritime boundaries that have actually been agreed, while the red extensions to both lines have

been agreed on a provisional basis subject to future third State delimitations. As can be seen, the

southern limit of the relevant area, as identif ied by Ukraine, respects both of these agreements,

including their potential prolongation. - 40 -

(ii) Romania’s attempt to refashion the relevant area

85. If I now turn to Romania’s version of the re levant area, it will be seen that Romania’s

position differs from that of Ukraine in three respects. Two of these differences are significant; the

third is relatively minor. For convenience, these areas of difference are now being highlighted on

the map on the screen –– which you can also find at tab 35 of your folders.

[Fig. 4-11 to Ukraine’s Rejoinder]

86. The first significant difference concerns the area hatched in green on the map in the

north, lying off Ukraine’s south-facing coast. And just as Romania seeks to suppress all of this

stretch of Ukraine’s coast for delimitation purposes, so also does it eliminate the area lying off that

coast from the relevant area. I have already explained earlier this morning why Romania’s attempt

to disregard this part of Ukraine’s coast is misguided. And Romania’s argument that the areas

lying off this coast do not form part of the relevant area is, in Ukraine’s submission, equally

ill-founded. That part of Ukraine’s coast generates its own maritime zones, according to

Professor Lowe’s principle, and the whole of such zones must be taken into account.

87. The second important difference between the Parties concerns a large triangle lying

between Ukraine and Turkey, which is hatched in red on the map. While Romania argues that this

triangle ⎯ or at least most of it, they excluded a small part last week for the first time ⎯ should be

included as part of the relevant area, a glance at the map, we would suggest, reveals why the

argument is unsound.

88. The area in question has already been subj ect to a prior delimitation between the former

Soviet Union and Turkey to which Ukraine has succeeded. The Court will note that the southern

limits of the triangle coincide with the Ukraine-Turkey maritime boundary ⎯ a delimitation

agreement as to which Romania has neither protested nor reserved its position. I will come back to

this on Friday when we discuss the application of the proportionality test, but the short answer is

that this red-hatched area in question has nothing at all to do with Romania. It involves an area

delimited with a third State and, thus, does not form part of the relevant area in this case.

89. The last difference between the Parties, as you can see, concerns a small sliver of area

situated off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria –– in solid light green on the map. Here, the - 41 -

difference has arisen because Ukraine has limite d the relevant area by a straight line, while

Romania has posited an equidistance line boundary between itself and Bulgaria.

90. Now, Romania and Bulgaria have not delimited their maritime boundary in this area, and

it follows that the respective limits to the relevant area drawn by each of the Parties in this sector

are, to some extent, hypothetical. As the Court can see, however, the difference between the

Parties’ positions is small in terms of area and, given the fact that application of the proportionality

test does not depend on what the Court has termed “nice calculations of proportionality”, this

difference is immaterial and has no real bearing on the case.

91. For these reasons, Ukraine stands by its identification of the relevant area, which is based

on a rational and reasonable approach consistent with the law. And, as I said, we shall come back

to this issue in our final presentation on Friday when we discuss the application of the test of

proportionality.

E. Conclusions

92. Madam President, Members of the Court, this morning I have addressed the relevant

coasts of the Parties for the present delimitation and th e relevant area. I believe that the facts speak

for themselves and that these facts have legal c onsequences for the delimitation of an equitable

boundary. These have been noted by my collea gue Professor Quéneudec earlier this morning,

particularly the relevance that a marked disparity in coastal lengths have, and they will be discussed

further by my colleagues in subsequent presentations.

93. For present purposes, what is of crucia l importance is, as the Court held in the

Cameroon v. Nigeria case, that “[t]he geographical configuration of the maritime areas that the

Court is called upon to delimit is a given” ( I.C.J. Reports2002 , p.443, para.295). And as I also

recalled in my opening presentation, the appli cation of equitable principles militates against

treating a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline.

94. Ukraine has followed this approach and has formulated its delimitation based on the

geographic facts. Unlike our colleagues on the othe r side of the Bar, Ukraine has not tried to

refashion geography by eliminating long stretche s of relevant coast or by ignoring a natural

feature ⎯ Serpents’ Island ⎯ while attributing significance to an artificial feature ⎯ the Sulina - 42 -

dyke ⎯ and elevating that artificial structure to a st atus which is more important than an island.

Nor has Ukraine attempted to form or posit a hi erarchy between the Parties’ coasts whereby the

entire coast of one Party is taken into considera tion while only half of the other Party’s relevant

coast is afforded similar treatment.

95. Madam President and Members of the C ourt, that concludes my presentation on the

relevant geographical facts, and I would be grateful if you could now call on Sir Michael Wood to

continue with Ukraine’s presentation. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Bundy. We now call Sir Michael Wood.

Sir Michael WOOD:

VI. ABSENCE OF A PRE -EXISTING ALL -PURPOSE MARITIME BOUNDARY
AROUND SERPENTS ’ SLAND

A. Introduction

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, yesterday I took you through the principal

instruments referred to by the Parties. I pointed to the two separate strands of negotiations and

agreements: those relating to the State border, and those concerning delimitation of the continental

shelf and EEZs. For convenience, we have once ag ain included the same list of instruments, the

one you saw yesterday, in the folders for today and it is at tab 36.

2. The Court’s task in this case is to delimit the Partiesrespective continental shelf and

exclusive economic zones. This morning, I sha ll address the question of the starting-point. In

particular, I shall show that there is no basis fr Romania’s thesis that the Parties have already

agreed a partial delimitation of maritime zones beyond point F. Point F, the final point on the State

border agreed by the two Parties, was fixed by co-ordinates, for the first time, in the 2003 Treaty.

It is common ground that pointF is the starting-poi nt for the delimitation to be effected by the

Court.

3. But Romania now claims, for the first time in these proceedings, that there is a

pre-existing agreement, in force between the Pa rties, providing for a maritime boundary running

along the outer limit of Ukraine’s 12-mile territori al sea around Serpents’ Island. This, they say, - 43 -

ends in what they call “point X”, or ⎯ as Professor Crawford put it last Friday ⎯ perhaps at some

7
point “located thereabouts” . This line, according to Roma nia, is an all-purpose maritime

boundary between the outer limit of Ukraine’s 12- mile territorial sea and Romania’s continental

shelf and exclusive economic zone.

4. Madam President, this is a new claim, which seems to have been developed with these

proceedings in mind. Indeed, Romania itself insist ed in the past that bilateral agreements from

1948 and 1949, which anyway, for a time, it claimed were invalid, did not incorporate provisions

referring to the delimitation of the continental sh elf, and Romania took the position that there was

no agreement on the delimitation of the shelf between Romania and the former Soviet Union. We

saw yesterday, by way of example, a Note Verbale of July 1995, in which the Foreign Ministry of

Romania said “there is no agreement between Romania and Ukraine on the delimitation of

8
maritime spaces in the Black Sea” .

5. As I recalled yesterday, in your Judgment in Nicaragua v. Honduras, you stated that

“[t]he establishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance and

agreement is not easily to be presumed”(para. 253) . Romania, the Party asserting the existence of

an agreement, has the burden of establishing it. Romania has not done so. That is clear, if one

looks at the two strands of negotiations that I described yesterday: the State border, and the shelf

and the EEZs. It is also clear from the complete ab sence of any language in the text of any of the

agreements relied upon by Romania that even hints at such an agreement. And it is clear from the

insistence by Romania, in the past, that there was no such agreement. That is surely an “admission

against interest”, if we can borrow a term from our opponents.

6. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is tempting to stop here. There really is no

case to answer. Romania has not discharged th e burden upon it. The establishment of a

pre-existing maritime boundary would be “a matter of grave importance... not easily to be

presumed”.

7
CR 2008/21, p. 40, para. 13.
8CMU, Ann. 25. - 44 -

7. Nevertheless, out of respect for our oppone nts’ submissions, I shall try to tackle their

arguments. But I would ask the Court to bear in mind that our principal submission is that

Romania has not discharged the heavy burden needed to establish an agreed maritime boundary.

8. Romania seems to appreciate the weakness of its new argument, for it makes alternative

arguments. The alternative argument that “t he maritime boundary around Serpents’ Island would

be the same independent of a ny agreement between the Parties” 9. Mr. Bundy will be dealing with

that. And it even makes the bold claim that Serpents’ Island is an Article 121, paragraph 3, “rock”.

MsMalintoppi will deal with that. My task to day is simply to refute Romania’s thesis of a

pre-existing agreement on an all-purpose maritime boundary running along the outer limit of the

12-mile territorial sea around Serpents’ Island–– a boundary which, they say, goes around to the

mythical and appropriately named “point X”.

B. Reasons why Romania’s argument fails

9. There are, in summary, at least ten reasons why Romania’s thesis does not begin to get off

the ground, why they have not begun to discharge the heavy burden upon them:

(i) There is nothing in the 1997 Exchange of Letters, concerning the future delimitation of the

continental shelf and EEZs, that even hints at a partial agreement already in place between

the Parties. If there had been such an agreem ent, it would surely have been mentioned in

what was, after all, quite a detailed text.

(ii) There is nothing in the text of the 1949 procès-verbaux, or associated maps, that indicat
es

an intention to do anything other than to delimit the “State border”, including the

territorial sea (and Romania’s prospective territorial sea).

(iii) There is nothing in the subsequent inst ruments to which Romania refers (those of 1954,

1963 and 1974) that “confirms” its interpretation of the 1949 procès-verbaux.

(iv) The relevant rules of the international la w of the sea applicable between the Parties in

1949 make it improbable in the extreme that th ey would, at that date, have agreed on the

delimitation of maritime zones beyond the territorial sea, that is the continental shelf and

9
Ibid., paras. 11.45-11.50. - 45 -

exclusive economic zones. Such zones were not accepted as part of international law at

that time, and certainly were not then recognized by either the Soviet Union or Romania.

(v) The only maritime area that the Parties had in mind in 1949 were their respective internal

waters and territorial seas. This is confirme d by their subsequent statements and actions,

most recently by the terms of the 1997Exchange of Letters and the fixing of the precise

co-ordinates of the last point of the territorial sea border ⎯ point F ⎯ in the 2003 Treaty.

(vi)Romania has referred the Court to a certain number of carefully selected charts, of

miscellaneous origin. But the earliest ones on which they rely date from 1957, some eight

years after the supposed agreement. Roma nia’s interpretation of the charts is

unconvincing. The charts are not referred to in any agreements or diplomatic

correspondence. Romania’s attempt to seek confirmation of an agreement dating from

1949 from these charts simply does not convince.

(vii) Romania has given no serious explanation for the construction of “point X”. It originally

relied upon various marks on various charts. La ter it relied on an artificially constructed

line, a construct that could not possibly have been agreed by the two Parties without much

discussion and joint technical work, of which there was none.

(viii)Romania’s own legislation makes it clear that the 1949 Agreements did no more than

delimit the territorial sea. You will find at tab37 the 1956 Romanian Decree on the

régime of the territorial waters. As you will see, Article1 provides that “[t]he territorial

waters of the People’s Republic of Romania.. . are delimited... in the north by a line

determined by agreement between the People’ s Republic of Romania and the Union of
10
Soviet Socialist Republics” . This clearly refers to the territorial sea determined by

agreement in 1949. Could I now invite you to look at tab 38, which contains Romania’s

EEZ Decree of 1986? This Decree, unlike the Territorial Waters Decree, makes no

reference to any EEZ delimitation having been agreed. On the contrary, Article2

provides that the extent of the EEZ

“shall be determined by delimiting it within the framework of

negotiations with the neighbouring States with coasts opposite or adjacent

10
MR, Ann. 81. - 46 -

to the Romanian Black Sea coast. [And it continues] The delimitation

shall be carried out..., by means of agreements with those States,
through the application, according to the specific circumstances of each
area to be delimited, of the delimitation principles and criteria recognized

in international law a11 in the practic e of States, in order to arrive at
equitable solutions.”

That clearly reflects the fact that there were no such agreements yet. The contrast between

the Territorial Waters Decree and the EEZ D ecree could not be clearer, and correctly

reflects the actual position.

(ix) The activities of the Parties in the relevant area ⎯ essentially petroleum and coastguard

activities ⎯ including Romania’s failure to react to Ukraine’s activities, are hardly

consistent with Romania’s thesis. My colleague, MsMalintoppi, will discuss these

activities later.

(x) And, finally, as I have said already, Romania appears to have devised its argument based

on the 1949Agreements, to the effect that there is a pre-existing agreement for the

purposes of these proceedings. The first appear ance of such a claim seems to have been

12
made in the Memorial, lodged in August 2005 . There is no mention of it in the

Application. Indeed, as we have already point ed out, Romania is on record as saying that

the bilateral agreements from 1948 and 1949 di d not incorporate provisions referring to

the delimitation of the continental shelf, and that there was no agreement on the

delimitation of the continental shelf between Romania and the former USSR. Romania’s

protracted efforts at the Conference on the Law of the Sea to secure a special position for

categories of islands that would have included Serpents’ Island would have been pointless

had there been a prior agreement.

C. Point F and “point X”

[Slide: sketch of points F and “point X”]

10. Madam President, Members of the Court, you are already familiar with pointF and the

so-called “pointX”. They are now shown on the sketch appearing on the screen and it is also at

tab 39.

11
RR, Ann. 4.
1MR, paras. 11.5-11.25. - 47 -

11. Just to recall, point F is a point agreed by the Parties. It is the point at which the State

border between the 12-mile territorial seas of the two Parties terminates. Its co-ordinates were

agreed in 2003. As we noted yesterday, point F is very close indeed to the final point on the line

depicted on map 134, the only relevant and authorita tive map annexed to the general procès-verbal

of 1949. A copy of map 134 is again in your folders at tab 40. It is common ground that point F is

the starting-point for the delimitation before the Court.

12. And then there is the aptly named “point X”. “Point X” is apparently located somewhere

on the outer limit of Ukraine’s 12-mile territorial sea, to the east of Serpents’ Island. “Point X” is

pure invention, it is a mythical point. It does not feature in any agreement. Romania itself admits

that it was not identified in the 1949 procès-verbaux 13. The only justification given in Romania’s

Memorial for “point X” seems to be the depiction of what I will later refer to as a “hook” in some

later charts, the earliest of which, as I have said, dates from 1957, eight years after the

procès-verbaux.

13. In its Reply, on the other hand, Romani a has come up with a new and highly artificial

construct to justify “pointX”. Mr.Bundy will be referring to this and I do not need to go into

details.

14. Then on Friday, we heard yet another “explanation” of “pointX” or rather of points

“located thereabouts”. We were told by Professor Crawford that

“[a]s soon as you accept that the Parties agreed a 12-mile marine boundary around
Serpents’ Island; as soon as you accept that th at zone did not stop after a short space
around point F ⎯ then as a matter of logic, there must be a point from which the

boundary running along the exterior margin of the marine boundary zone would depart
from this ‘exterior margin’ and join th e mainline coasts provisional equidistance
line . . . there must be a point X. Whether or not point X is located precisely where we
propose, it must be located thereabouts.”

But the premise is not accepted, and there is no “logic” or “must” in this matter.

ProfessorCrawford’s explanation, I would suggest, de monstrates just how mythical “pointX” is.

Based on a false premise, it does not even have a fixed location.

D. Outline of remainder of speech

15. Madam President, the remainder of my speech will be in two parts.

13
MR, para. 11.51. - 48 -

16. First, I shall say just a few words about the jurisdiction of the Court, as set out in

paragraph 4 (h) of the 1997 Exchange of Letters.

17. Second, and this will be the main part of my speech, I shall deal with Romania’s

interpretation of the 1949 procès-verbaux and of map 134 annexed thereto. I will show that it is

clear from the texts that in 1949, and subsequently, the Soviet Union and Romania intended only to

delimit their “State border”. As I set out yester day, they were concerned to delimit areas under

their sovereignty: the land border, and the maritime border out to the furthest point where their

territorial seas would meet once Romania extended its territorial sea to 12nautical miles. There

was no intention to delimit anything beyond the State border; no intention to delimit the

continental shelf; no intention to delimit any other maritime zone.

18. I shall also show that neither the subse quent agreements between the Parties, nor the

various non-contemporaneous maps produced by Romania, lend any credence to Romania’s thesis.

19. And, much more briefly, I shall describe the inconsistency of Romania’s thesis with the

Parties own actions and recent agreements.

E. Jurisdiction of the Court

20. If I may turn then, Madam President, first to the jurisdiction of the Court. The case was

submitted to the Court pursuant to a special agreement (a compromis). The Court’s jurisdiction is

governed by the terms of the compromis. The provision in question is paragraph4 (h) of the

1997Exchange of Letters. The Exchange of Letters ⎯ or Additional Agreement as it is also

called ⎯ is at tab 41 in your folders. You are already very familiar with it. Romania’s Application

to the Court relies only on this sub-paragraph 14. What has been referred to the Court is, in the

words of the sub-paragraph, “the case on delim itation of continental shelf and exclusive economic

zones” 15. The translation supplied by Romania says “the problem of delimitation of the continental

shelf and the exclusive economic zones”. The pa ragraph itself implements Article2 of the 1997

Treaty, which likewise refers to “the problem of the delimitation of their continental shelf and of

economic exclusive zones”.

14
Application, paras 4-6.
1MR, Ann. 2. - 49 -

21. In other words, in our submission, the Court has jurisdiction to delimit the continental

shelf and the EEZs between the two States. It do es not have jurisdiction to delimit other maritime

areas pertaining to either of the Parties, and in particular to delimit the territorial sea of either Party.

Notwithstanding the forceful arguments presented by ProfessorPellet last Tuesday 16, Ukraine’s

position remains, as it was put in the Counter-Memorial, that “[t]he Court is... excluded from

drawing a boundary line in any maritime area wher e the continental shelf and exclusive economic

17
zone of one of the Parties would be adjacent to the territorial sea of the other Party” . This

position is based on the wording of the compromis. We stand accused by ProfessorPellet of

deliberately not citing the words of paragraph4 (h), and of reading into them the words

“exclusively” and “between the parties”. But what we have done is to interpret the treaty in good

faith. As it was put in the Rejoinder, “[n]o mention is made of boundaries involving the territorial

18
sea of either State, and such boundaries are therefore excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction” .

This is not, as ProfessorPellet rather unfairly characterized it, “une pure pétition de principe” or

19
“self-serving” , but a perfectly reasonable interpretation of paragraph 4 (h). We accept of course,

that the terms of the compromis in the Anglo-French case were not identical, and we have not

suggested otherwise. But they were not so different, and that case is a useful example of a court, in

a matter of delimitation, taking care to stay w ithin the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred upon it

by the agreement of the Parties.

22. But Madam President, at the very least, we would say, the terms of the compromis in the

present case suggest that the Parties did not an ticipate that the Court would be called upon to

delimit an all-purpose maritime boundary along the outer limit of Ukraine’s territorial sea. Had

they done so, they would surely have drafted the compromis so as to cover this eventuality.

23. However, in our submission, this jurisd ictional question does not need to be decided

because, from pointF, the line proceeds in a so uth-easterly direction as a line delimiting areas of

continental shelf and the EEZs appertaining to each of the Parties.

16CR 2008/18, pp. 33-42, paras. 3-25.
17
CMU, paras. 2.18 et seq.
18RU, paras. 2.2 et seq.

19CR 2008/18, p. 35, para. 7. - 50 -

F. Interpretation of the 1949 procès-verbaux and map 134

24. Madam President, I will now turn to Roma nia’s arguments for a pre-existing all-purpose

maritime boundary, which is based essentially on its interpretation of the 1949 procès-verbaux. As

stated by Professor Crawford at the end of his speech last Wednesday, the thesis goes as follows:

“the text of the 1949 procès-verbal, as c onfirmed by the annexed and accompanying
maps, resulted in the delimitation of an all-purpose maritime boundary along the
12-mile arc around Serpents’ Island. That there was such a boundary around

Serpents’ Island was confirmed by subsequent agreements and in the mapping practice
of the parties, as well as of third States.” 20

25. With all due respect, this seems to me to be a carefully crafted example of what I

sometimes call the “accumulation of bad arguments” approach to international law. It is difficult to

disentangle the line of thought, but it seems to be that the text of “the 1949 procès-verbal” provided

for an all-purpose maritime boundary, when the text patently did no such thing. That it did so was

confirmed, so it is said “by the annexed and accompanying maps”, when in fact they show no such

boundary. That this boundary was confirmed by “subsequent agreements”, when these agreements

by Romania’s own admission changed nothing. Which leaves us with “the mapping practices of

the parties, as well as third States”, that in our s ubmission is a most uncertain basis on which to

construct a pre-existing boundary agreement.

26. Before turning to look in a little more de tail at the terms of the 1949 procès-verbaux, I

should briefly like to refer once again to your Judgment in Nicaragua v. Honduras, a Judgment that

was of course delivered after the submission of Ukra ine’s Rejoinder. There are some extracts at

tab43. As you will recall, the Court considered the Honduran claim to a “traditional” maritime

boundary along the 15th parallel. After dismissing the claim based on the principle of

uti possidetis, the Court went on to consider a separate argument that there was “a de facto

boundary based on the tacit agreement of the Parties” 21. After examining the practice of the two

States, you concluded “there was no tacit agreement in effect between the Parties . . . of a nature to

22
establish a legally binding maritime boundary” .

20
CR 2008/19, p. 52, para. 118.
21
Paras. 237-258.
22Para. 258. - 51 -

27. At paragraph253, which is on page 69, you said: “The Court must now determine

whether there was a tacit agreement sufficient to establish a boundary. Evidence of a tacit legal

agreement must be compelling.” And then co mes the sentence I have already quoted: “The

establishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance and agreement is

not easily to be presumed.” This well illustra tes the Court’s position that a tacit maritime

delimitation agreement will not be found absent the most compelling evidence.

In28. Nicaragua v. Honduras you were concerned with the Honduran claim that there was a

“tacit agreement” based on the practice of the Parties over a period. In the present case, Romania

appears to argue that there is a written agreemen t establishing the maritime boundary in question.

There is of course no such written agreement. The words of caution in your Judgment last year are

equally applicable to the present case, if not more so. What Romania seeks to do is to read into the

1949instruments what could at the most have been an implicit agreement on the delimitation of

future maritime zones. That indeed is “a matter of grave importance... not easily to be

presumed”.

29. Romania’s thesis, based on their interp retation of the relevant instruments, is

unconvincing. It depends, first, upon misreading the plain text of the 1949procès-verbaux and

ignoring the map— map134— expressly annexed thereto. Second, it depends upon misleading

speculation about the intentions of the negotiators, which ignores the state of the international law

of the sea in 1949. Third, it depends upon “map evidence”, said to derive from maps that are not

contemporaneous and which do not form part of any agreement or official contact between the

Parties. And fourth, it is wholly inconsistent with recent ag reements entered into by the Parties, in

particular those of 1997, and with their activities, or absence of activities. I shall deal with each of

these four points in turn.

(i) Romania’s assertion is based upon a misreading of the 1949 procès-verbaux and ignores the
annexed map 134

30. The Parties seem to agree that, for th e purpose of assessing Romania’s thesis, the key

documents are the two 1949procès-verbaux: the “general procès-verbal”, and the individual

procès-verbal of border sign1439 (beacon). Both Parties concur that subsequent agreements or

instruments, in particular those of 1954, 1961, 1963 and 1974, did not alter the effect of the - 52 -

1949procès-verbaux, but simply confirmed whatev er it was that was agreed in 1949. I shall

therefore concentrate on the two 1949 procès-verbaux.

31. The general procès-verbal 23, which as I mentioned yesterday is in three volumes, was

drawn up by the Mixed Soviet-Romanian Commission on the Demarcation of the State Bor
der. I

referred you to the relevant passages yesterday. You will recall that the task of the Commission

was to demarcate the State border.

32. In its ordinary meaning, in 1949 as today, the term “State border” refers to the border

between areas under the sovereignty of the States concerned, their land territory, internal waters

and territorial sea. And that is precisely what was covered by the 1949 general procès-verbal.

33. The most relevant passage from the general procès-verbal comes at the end of

VolumeIII, and you will find the key passage at tab45 of your folders. I should explain that for

convenience, we have reproduced in one place the original, and authentic, Russian and Romanian

texts, with the rather different— but not I think substantively different— English translations

submitted by Ukraine and Romania, as well as the Fr ench translations prepared by the Registry, all

of these texts as they appear in the written pleadings . Of course it is the original texts in Russian

and Romanian which are the ones that have to be interpreted.

34. The two sentences, relied upon by Romania, read as follows— and I am using the

English translation annexed to Ukraine’s Rejoinder, which you will find on the first page of the tab:

“The state border mark No. 1439 (pole) is placed on water in a turning point of

state border line which passes in the Black Sea, at the intersection of a direct line,
which goes from state border mark No.1438 (b uoy) in azimuth 102°30'0", with the
external edge of 12-mile maritime bord er strip of the USSR around of Zmiinyi
Island.”24

After giving the co-ordinates of mark 1439, a nd the length of the line between marks 1438 and

1439, the procès-verbal concludes with the following sentence: “ The state border [in French

translation la frontière d’état] from state border mark No. 1439 (pole) passes along external line of

a 12-mile maritime border strip, leaving Zmiinyi Island on the side of the USSR.” (Emphasis

added.)

23
RU, Ann. 1.
2The English translation submitted by Romania is somewhat different, and ends with the words “with the
exterior margin of the Soviet marine boundary zone, of 12 miles, surrounding Serpents’ Island”: see RU, para 3.23. - 53 -

35. The first of these two sentences which I quot ed simply describes the location of border

mark 1439. The second, on the other hand, indicat es what will happen to the State border beyond

border mark 1439.

36. I would next invite you to glance at the individual procès-verbal of border mark1439,

which you will also find in the same tab after the divider. Once again we have prepared a similar

multilingual version.

37. I will not take you to the sentences concerned, but the individual procès-verbal also

contains two separate sentences which mirror those in the general process-verbal. The first

paragraph of the extract we have provided describ es the location of border mark1439. The last

paragraph describes the line, including its c ontinuation along the outer limit of the 12-mile

territorial sea, beyond border mark 1439.

38. I would now like to return, Madam Presi dent, to the two sentences in the general

procès-verbal relied upon by Romania. Romania suggested that the first of these sentences means

that the border line goes all the way round th e outer limit of Ukraine’s territorial sea around

Serpents’ Island, or at least to “pointX”. This is wholly unconvincing. It ignores the general

economy of the procès-verbal, and the purpose and pl ain meaning of the sentence, which is simply

to locate border mark 1439 on the outer limit. We dealt with that argument fully at paragraph 3.24

of our Rejoinder.

39. The second sentence, on the other hand, does appear to address the continuation of the

State border around the territorial sea outer limit, in that it says that it goes on or along the limit.

But it says nothing about how far the State border c ontinues. For that we need to consider the

object and purpose of the procès-verbal ⎯ demarcation of the State border ⎯ and the map referred

to therein, map 134. So far as concerns the maritime area, “State border”, as I have said, refers to

the Parties’ common border between internal waters and territorial seas, and no more. This is

confirmed by map134, which was referred to in , and annexed to, the procès-verbal. Map 134

clearly indicates an endpoint approximately where ⎯ it was anticipated ⎯ the State border would

terminate.

40. Romania places considerable weight on the terminology used in the 1949

procès-verbaux, and subsequent documents, to describe the 12-mile territorial sea area around - 54 -

Serpents’ Island. In Ukraine’s English transl ation of the two sentences I just quoted from the

general procès-verbal, the area within the 12-mile limit is described as “12 mile maritime border

strip”; somewhat confusingly, in the indivi dual procès-verbal exactly the same Russian and

Romanian terms are translated ⎯ badly translated, I think ⎯ as “maritime borderland”. In the case

of each procès-verbal, Romania’s translation has “marine boundary zone, of 12miles”. The

Registry’s French translation seems to be “zone frontière maritime de 12 miles”.

41. Romania argues, largely on the basis of this terminology, that the intention in 1949 was

to refer to the totality of the Soviet Union’s entitlement to maritime areas, whatever that entitlement

might be in the future, with the consequence that any maritime rights or jurisdiction that might

exist south of the 12-mile limit would belong to Romania, not to the Soviet Union. Romania

asserts that “the maritime zone around Serpents ’ Island was established in 1949, in terms not

25
limited to a territorial sea” . There was, Romania boldly asserts, “an all-purpose maritime

boundary” 26.

42. There is, I respectfully submit, nothing in this terminological point. There is nothing in

the terminology used in the procès-verbaux that dictates the conclusion that, in 1949, the Parties

intended such an extraordinary result (and in our submission, very clear language indeed would

have been required).

43. In fact, of course, in 1949 the terminology used in the Soviet Union ⎯ and indeed

elsewhere ⎯ to refer to what we would now call the territorial sea was nothing like as uniform as it

is today. Now we have the work of the In ternational Law Commission from the 1950s, and the

1958 and 1982Law of the Sea Conventions, to guid e us on terminology. In earlier days, terms

were used much more fluidly to describe the territorial sea.

44. Professor William Butler described the uncertain Soviet terminology in his 1971 book on

The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea . You will find the relevant extract at tab 46 ⎯ i.e.,

pages 19 to 22 of the book. The whole passage is interesting, but I would draw attention to the first

full paragraph on page 21, and I quote:

25
MR, para 4.50.
2MR, para 11.20; emphasis in original. - 55 -

“Soviet legislators have employed several terms for waters washing Soviet
shores. These include ‘coastal waters’ [pribrezhnye vody]; ‘territorial belt of waters’;

‘sea border belt’ [morskaia pogranichnaia polosa] ; ‘sea belt’; ‘coastal waters’
[beregovye vody]. ‘Territorial waters’ has been used most often by Soviet legislators,
although not in the majority of instances. . . . it was not used in the 1927 statute on the

state boundary, which after 1948 was cited by the Soviet government as having
codified the 12-mile breadth of Soviet territorial waters.”

The term morskaia pogranichnaia polosa is the term used in the 1949 procès-verbaux, translated as

“maritime border strip”, “zone frontière maritime”, etc. It seems clear that morskaia

pogranichnaia polosa was one of a number of terms used in Soviet practice to refer to the

territorial sea.

45. The fact that in some later documents agr eed by the Parties we find the terms “territorial

sea” and “maritime boundary zone” used interchangeably merely confirms that the intention

throughout, since 1949, had been to refer to what today, using modern terminology, we would call

the territorial sea. So, in our submission, there is nothing in Romania’s terminological point.

(ii) Assertion that the 1949 negotiators had in mind the continental shelf and the EEZ

46. I turn next, Madam President, to the asserti on that in 1949, the negotiators had in mind

the continental shelf and the EEZ. Romania appear s to assert that the negotiators had in mind the

then inchoate concept of the continental shelf. It would be even more extraordinary if, as Romania

implies, they were thinking of some future notion of entitlement to an exclusive economic zone, a

concept whose birth lay decades in the future. Not only that, but according to the Romanian thesis,

the Parties must be deemed to have been ready to agree, back in 1949, how entitlement to these

future zones of sovereign rights would be shar ed, if and when they became established in

international law. And further they must be deemed to have agreed that all such rights would go to

Romania, and none to the Soviet Union. Merely to state this line of speculation is to show how

far-fetched it is.

47. You will find at tab 47 in the bundles an extract from the Award in the Guinea-Bissau v

27
Senegal maritime boundary arbitration . We have included both the original French as well as an

English translation. This case well illustrates the need to interpret maritime boundary agreements

in the light of the law applicable at the time of their conclusion. The parties in the

27
XX RSA 119 (French original); 83 International Law Reports 1 (English translation). - 56 -

Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal case first asked the Tribunal whether a delimitation Agreement of 1960

had the force of law in the relations between th em. The Tribunal ruled that the Agreement was

valid and binding on the parties so far as concer ned the maritime zones known in 1960, i.e., the

territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the continental shelf. But it did not establish a boundary in

relation to zones which in 1960 were not known to exist, that is, the EEZ and the exclusive

fisheries zone.

48. Having concluded that the 1960 Agreemen t was valid, the Tribunal considered four

arguments put forward by Senegal to the effect that the Agreement must be interpreted as applying

to the delimitation of the EEZs even though in te rms it only referred to the territorial sea, the

contiguous zone, and the continental shelf. These three domains constituted ⎯ according to the

Tribunal ⎯ “the law of the sea in 1960”, date of the Agreement. The fourth Senegalese argument

was that “the 1960 Agreement must be interpreted taking into account the evolution of the law of

the sea” 28. The Tribunal disagreed. At paragraph 85 it said:

“The Tribunal considers that the 1960 Agreement must be interpreted in the
light of the law in force at the date of it s conclusion. It is a well established general
principle that a legal event must be assessed in the light of the law in force at the time

of its occurrence and the application of that aspect of intertemporal law to cases such
as the present one is confirmed by case-law in the realm of the law of the sea...
[Here the Tribunal makes reference to the Abu Dhabi case].

In the light of the text [the Tribunal continued], and of the applicable principles
of the intertemporal law, the Tribunal considers that the 1960 Agreement does not

delimit those maritime spaces which did not exis t at that date, whether they be termed
‘exclusive economic zone’, ‘fishery zone’ or whatever . . .”

49. These words, we submit, Madam President, are equally applicable to our case. In our

case, far from being established in 1949, the doctrine of the continental shelf was still in its infancy.

As Lord Asquith put it in his celebrated Award of 1951 in the Abu Dhabi case, “in no form can the

doctrine [of the continental shelf] claim as yet to have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or the

definitive status of an established rule of International Law” 29. It was not yet accepted in State

practice. It did not become so until the mid- to late-1950s, at the earliest, and not fully until the

work of the 1958 Conference was completed with the adoption of the Convention on the

Continental Shelf. This is clear, for example, from a reading of O’Connell’s description of the

28
Para. 84.
2Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi case, 18 ILR 144, at 155. - 57 -

evolution of the doctrine of the continental shelf in his great work on The International Law of the

Sea. For example, referring to the Australian Proclamation of 1953, he writes: “In the uncertainty

surrounding the continental shelf doctrine at that time, which was still strongly challenged, the

Australian proclamation exercised a stabilizing influence by endowing the doctrine of the

International law Commission with the valuable benefit of State practice.” 30 He continues, “[a]fter

the Geneva Conference had adopted the Cont inental Shelf Convention, controversy was

immediately allayed as to the status of the continental shelf . . .” 31

50. The Soviet Union, for its part, seems to have been sceptical of the Truman Proclamation

and the new concept of the continental shelf, un til the 1958 Conference. If I could invite you to

look at another extract from the book by ProfessorButler, at tab46. This is at pages139 to 144,

where he describes Soviet attitudes to the continen tal shelf. In the sec ond paragraph on page 140,

we read that in 1950, Professor Koretsky, later, of course, judge and Vice-President of this Court,

published the first Article in the Soviet Union on th e continental shelf. As explained by Butler ⎯

you will find this half way down the second paragraph on page 140,

“Koretskii surveyed postwar claims to the shelf in considerable detail. The

claims of Saudi Arabia, Argentina, and Pe ru, he noted, were examples in which ‘sea
spaces are usurped and are transformed into “national waters”’. In making its 1945
proclamation, the United States [so said Koretskii] ‘simply dictated its will to

international law, proclaiming its “policy” with respect to the continental shelf . . .’ in
response to pressures from oil monopoli es and to its aspirations for world
domination.”

By the time of the 1958 Conference, as we see at the bottom of page 141 and the top of page 142,

the representative of the Soviet Union found the ILC text “largely satisfactory” because it

“guaranteed the exclusive right of the coastal stat e to utilize the wealth of the continental shelf

while limiting that right to a definite purpose, thus making any claim of the coastal state to

superjacent waters or air space juridically untenabl e”. I pause here to note that those concluding

words make it clear that the Soviet Union woul d not have accepted any EEZ-type jurisdiction even

in 1958, let alone in 1949.

51. The fact that, by 1949, and in reaction to the Truman Proclamation, a small number of

countries were beginning to assert jurisdiction ove r sea-bed and even the water column out to

30
D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, 2 Vols., 1984, 474.
3Ibid., 475. - 58 -

200 nauticalmiles in no way means that the Sovi et Union would have been ready to foreshadow

such claims in its own 1949 delimitation agreement. The fact, referred to by ProfessorCrawford

last week 3, that in 1945, just before the Truman Proclamation was issu ed, the United States

informed the Soviet Union and others of what was proposed, tells us nothing about the Soviet

Union’s attitude to the concept of the continental shelf, and is neither here nor there.

52. In conclusion on this point, Madam President, it seems unlikely in the extreme that the

Soviet Union and Romania would in 1949 have be en willing to delimit areas with a view to the

possible emergence of new zones in the law of the sea.

Madam President, the next section of my speech is a rather long one about sketches and

maps and I would be happy to break here if that would be convenient for the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Yes, I do see there is a significant amount more you wish to tell the

Court and we will therefore hold that until the morning. The Court will resume at 10 o’clock for

the continuation.

The Court now rises. Thank you.

The Court rose at 12.55 p.m.

___________

32
CR 2008/19, p. 51, para. 115.

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le mercredi 10 septembre 2008, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président, en l'affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine)

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