Audience publique tenue le lundi 23 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Shi, président

Document Number
131-20040223-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2004/1
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

CR 2004/1

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LHAAYE

YEAR 2004

Public sitting

held on Monday 23 February 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Shi presiding,

on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2004

Audience publique

tenue le lundi 23 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,

sur les Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur
dans le Territoire palestinien occupé
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU

____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presidenit
Vice-Presidejetva

Guillauueges
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins

Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma

Tomka

Couvgisurar

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Shi,président
Ricejpra,ident

GuiMllu. e
Koroma
Vereshchetin
HigMgmse

Parra-A.anguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma

juges ka,

Cgoefferr,

 - 4 -

Palestine is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador, Perman ent Observer of Palestine to the United
Nations;

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Professor of Internationa l Law, Graduate Institute of International

Studies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge;

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford, Counsel
and Advocate;

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus of Interna tional Law, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Peter Bekker, Member of the Bar of New York, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Anis Kassim, Member of the Bar of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at law, Ramallah, Palestine, Senior Counsel;

Ms Stephanie Koury, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

Mr. Jarat Chopra, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Professor of International Law,
Brown University, Counsel;

Mr. Rami Shehadeh, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

H.E. Mr.Yousef Habbab, Ambassador, General Delegate of Palestine to the Netherlands,
Adviser;

Mr. Muin Shreim, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United
Nations, Adviser;

Ms Feda Abdelhady Nasser, Counsellor, Perm anent Observer Mission of Palestine to the

United Nations, Adviser;

Mr. Michael Tarazi, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Adviser/Media Co-ordinator;

MsKylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, University of
Cambridge;

Mr. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

Mr. Markus W. Gehring, Yale University;

Mr. Jafer Shadid, delegation of Palestine in the Netherlands. - 5 -

The Republic of South Africa is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Delegation;

H.E. MsP. Jana, Ambassador of the Repub lic of South Africa to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and diplomatic representative to the International Court of Justice;

H.E. Mr. D. S. Kumalo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the
United Nations;

Mr. M. R. W. Madlanga, S.C.;

MsJ.G.S. de Wet, Acting Chief State La w Adviser (International Law), Department of
Foreign Affairs;

Mr. A. Stemmet, Senior State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign
Affairs;

Ms T. Lujiza, State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. I. Mogotsi, Director, Middle East Department of Foreign Affairs.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Noureddine Djoudi, Ambassador of Algeria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Professor of International Law;

Mr. Mohamed Habchi, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Abdelkader Cherbal, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Merzak Bedjaoui, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Hazim Karakotly, Minister plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Sameer Aggad, First Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Saud Alshawaf, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Ziyad Alsudairi, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Legal
Counsellor;

Mr. Khaled Althubaiti, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. David Colson, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Brian Vohrer, Assistant Legal Counsellor. - 6 -

The People's Republic of Bangladesh is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Netherlands;

Ms Naureen Ahsan, First Secretary at the Embassy of Bangladesh in The Hague.

Belize is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Bassam Freiha, Permanent Representative of Belize to Unesco;

Ms Mireille Cailbault.

The Republic of Cuba is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the

Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Enrique Prieto López, Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Cuba in the Netherlands;

Mrs. Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, Official of the Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

The Republic of Indonesia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Ambassador the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Ms Nuni Turnijati Djoko, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, member;

Mr. Mulya Wirana, Counsellor (Political Affairs), member;

Col. A Subandi, Defence Attaché, member;

Mrs. Kusuma N. Lubis, Counsellor (Information Affairs), member;

Mr. Sulaiman Syarif, First Secretary (Political Affairs), member;

Mr. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), member.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is represented by:

H.R.H. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussi en, Head of the Delegation and Permanent
Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, New York;

H.E. Mr. Mazen Armouti, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Kingdom

of the Netherlands;

Sir Arthur Watts, Senior Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan;

Mr. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan; - 7 -

Mr. Nigel Ashton, Historical Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan;

Mr. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Bisher Al Khasawneh, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Samer Naber, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Ashraf Zeitoon, Political Adviser;

Ms Diana Madbak, Support Staff.

The Republic of Madagascar is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Alfred Rambeloson, Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the Office of the
United Nations at Geneva and to the Specialized Agencies, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, Inspector, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Malaysia is represented by:

H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Head of Delegation;

Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, wife of the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Secretar y-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia;

H.E. Dato’ Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations;

H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassa dor of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;

Mr. John Louis O’hara, Head, International Affairs Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers;

Professor Nico Schrijver, Professor of Interna tional Law, Free University, Amsterdam and
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;

Professor Dr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of In ternational Law, The Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva;

Mr. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Undersecretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Hasnudin Hamzah, Special Officer to the Foreign Minister;

Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands;

Mr. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, Firs t Secretary, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United

Nations;

Mr. Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federa l Counsel, International Affairs Division,
Attorney-General’s Chambers. - 8 -

The Republic of Senegal is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Saliou Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Cheikh Niang, Minister-Counsellor, Pe rmanent Mission of Senegal to the United

Nations;

Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Director of Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

The Republic of the Sudan is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abuelgasim A. Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the Netherlands;

Mr. Ali Al Sadig, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Sudan in the Netherlands.

The League of Arab States is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States;

Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Law, Head of the Legal Team;

Ms Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Professor of Law;

Mr. Yehia El Gamal, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Salah Amer, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, Legal Adviser of the Secretary General, Head of the
Legal Department, League of Arab States.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary Ge neral of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference;

Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Professor of Public Law, University of
Paris VII-Denis Diderot, as Counsel;

Mr. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours , University of ParisVII-DenisDiderot, as Assistant to
Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Babacar Ba, Ambassador, Permanent Ob server of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva. - 9 -

La Palestine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Nasser Al-Kidwa, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit in ternational à l’Institut de hautes études

internationales, Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M.James Crawford, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Université de Cambridge (chaire
Whewell), conseil et avocat;

M.Vaughan Lowe, professeur de droit internat ional à l’Université d’Oxford (chaire
Chichele), conseil et avocat ;

M.Jean Salmon, professeur émérite de droit inte rnational à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M. Peter Bekker, membre du barreau de New York, conseil principal;

M. Anis Kassim, membre du barreau du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, conseil principal;

M. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at Law à Ramallah, Palestine, conseil principal;

Mme Stephanie Koury, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

M.Jarat Chopra, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, professeur de droit
international à la Brown University, conseil;

M. Rami Shehadeh, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

S.Exc. M. Yousef Habbab, ambassadeur, dé légué général de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas,
conseiller;

M. Muin Shreim, conseiller à la mission perm anente d’observation de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conseiller;

Mme Feda Abdelhady Nasser, conseillère à la mission permanente d’observation de la
Palestine auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Michael Tarazi, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, coordonnateur pour les

médias;

Mme Kylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, Université de
Cambridge;

M. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

M. Markus W. Gehring, Université de Yale;

M. Jafer Shadid, délégation de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas. - 10 -

La République sud-africaine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Aziz Pahad, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, chef de la délégation;

S. Exc. Mme P. Jana, ambassadeur de la République sud-africaine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

S. Exc. M.D. S. Kumalo, représentant perman ent de la République sud-africaine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M. M.R.W. Madlanga, juge;

Mme J. G.S. de Wet, conseiller juridique en chef a.i. (droit international), ministère des
affaires étrangères;

M.A. Stemmet, conseiller juridique principa l (droit international), ministère des affaires
étrangères;

Mme T. Lujiza, conseiller juridique (droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. I. Mogotsi, directeur, direction du Moyen-Orient, ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République algérienne démocratique et populaire est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Noureddine Djoudi, ambassadeur d’Algérie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Ahmed Laraba, professeur de droit international;

M. Mohamed Habchi, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Abdelkader Cherbal, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Merzak Bedjaoui, directeur des affaires juridiques au ministère des affaires étrangères.

Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :

S.Exc. M. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, ambassad eur et représentant permanent du Royaume
d’Arabie saoudite auprès de l’Organisation d es NationsUnies à NewYork, chef de la
délégation;

M. Hazim Karakotly, ministre plénipotentiaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Sameer Aggad, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Saud Alshawaf, conseiller juridique;

M. Ziyad Alsudairi, conseiller juridique;

M. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, professeur émér ite de droit international, conseiller
juridique;

M. Khaled Althubaiti, conseiller juridique; - 11 -

M. David Colson, conseiller juridique;

M. Brian Vohrer, conseiller juridique adjoint.

La République populaire du Bangladesh est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, ambassadeur du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

Mme Naureen Ahsan, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume

des Pays-Bas.

Le Belize est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Bassam Freiha, ambassadeur délégué permanent du Belize auprès de l’Unesco;

Mme Mireille Cailbault.

La République de Cuba est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères;

S.Exc. M. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, ambassad eur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès
du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Enrique Prieto López, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de Cuba aux Pays-Bas;

Mme Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, fonctionnaire à la direction des affaires multilatérales du
ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République d’Indonésie est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Mohammad Jusuf, ambassadeu r de la République d’Indonésie auprès du

Royaume des Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation;

Mme Nuni Turnijati Djoko, ministre, chef de mission adjoint, délégué;

M. Mulya Wirana, conseiller (affaires politiques), délégué;

Le colonel A. Subandi, attaché de défense, délégué;

Mme Kusuma N. Lubis, conseiller (affaires de presse), délégué;

M. Sulaiman Syarif, premier secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué;

M. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, troisième secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué.

Le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie est représenté par :

S. A. R. Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussien, ambassadeur, chef de la délégation, représentant
permanent du Royaume hachémite de Jo rdanie auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies;

S. Exc. M. Mazen Armouti, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie aux du
Royaume des Pays-Bas; - 12 -

Sir Arthur Watts, conseiller juridique principal du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M.Guy Goodwin-Gill, conseiller juridique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M.Nigel Ashton, conseiller historique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, conseiller juridique;

M. Bisher Al Khasawneh, conseiller juridique;

M. Samer Naber, conseiller juridique;

M. Ashraf Zeitoon, conseiller politique;

Mme Diana Madbak, personnel administratif.

La République de Madagascar est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Alfred Rambeloson, représentant permanent de Madagascar auprès de l’Office
des Nations Unies et des institutions spécialisées à Genève, chef de délégation;

M. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, inspecteur au ministère des affaires étrangères.

La Malaisie est représentée par :

S. Exc. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, chef

de la délégation;

Mme Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, épouse du ministre des affaires
étrangères;

S. Exc. Tan sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, se crétaire général du ministère des affaires
étrangères;

S. Exc. Dato’ Rastam Mohd. Isa, représentant permanent de la Malaisie auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

S. Exc.Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

M. John Louis O’hara, directeur de la divi sion des affaires internationales, bureau de

l’Attorney-General;

M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre d’Amsterdam et à
l’Institut d’études sociales de La Haye, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage;

M. Marcelo G.Kohen, professeur de droit inte rnational à l’Institut universitaire de hautes
études internationales, Genève;

M. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, sous-secrétaire à la division de l’Organisation de la Conférence
islamique, ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. Hasnudin Hamzah, conseiller spécial auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères; - 13 -

M. Zulkifli Adnan, conseiller de l’ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas;

M. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, premier secrétaire de la mission permanente de la Malaisie auprès
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conseil (Federal Counsel) , division des affaires

internationales, bureau de l’Attorney-General.

La République du Sénégal est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Saliou Cissé, ambassadeur du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation ;

M.Cheikh Niang, ministre-conseiller à la mission permanente du Sénégal auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, directeur des affaires juridiques et consulaires au ministère des
affaires étrangères.

La République du Soudan est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abuelgasim A. Idris, ambassadeur du Soudan aux Pays-Bas ;

M. Ali Al Sadig, chef de mission adjoint à l’ambassade du Soudan aux Pays-Bas.

La Ligue des Etats arabes est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Amre Moussa, Secrétaire général de la Ligue des Etats arabes;

M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit, chef de l’équipe juridique;

Mme Vera Gowlland-Debbas, professeur de droit;

M. Yehia El Gamal, conseiller juridique;

M. Salah Amer, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohammed Gomaa, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, conseiller juridique du Secrétaire général, chef du
département des affaires juridiques de la Ligue des Etats arabes.

L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de la Conférence

islamique;

Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur de droit public à l’Université
Paris VII - Denis Diderot, conseil;

M. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours à l’Univer sité Paris VII – Denis Diderot, assistant du
conseil;

S. Exc. M. Babacar Ba, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de l’Organisation de la
Conférence islamique auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève.- 14 - - 15 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The session is open.

The Court meets today to hear oral statements and comments in accordance with the terms of

its Order of 19December2003, w ith regard to the request for advisory opinion submitted to the

Court by the GeneralAssembly of the UnitedNations on the question of the Legal Consequences

of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

*

On 8December2003, by resolutionA/RES/ES-10/14, the GeneralAssembly of the United

Nations decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court. On the same date, the text of the

resolution was transmitted by a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Court

and received in the Registry by facsimile on 10December2003. I shall ask the Registrar to read

from the operative paragraph of that resolution the question on which the Court is asked to

“urgently render an advisory opinion”.

GRLEeFFIER:

«Quelles sont en droit les conséquences de l’édification du mur qu’Israël,

puissance occupante, est en train de construire dans le Territoire palestinien occupé, y
compris à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour de Jérusalem-Est, selon ce qui est exposé dans
le rapport du Secrétaire général, compte tenu des règles et des principes de droit

international, notamment la quatrième convention de Genève de 1949, et les
résolutions consacrées à la question par le Conseil de sécurité et l’Assemblée
générale ?»

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article66, paragraph1, of the Statute, all States

entitled to appear before the Court were given notice forthwith of the request for advisory opinion.

The United Nations and its Member States were also notified, under Article 66, paragraph 2, of the

Statute that, by an Order dated 19 December 2003, th e Court had determined that they were likely

to be able to furnish information on all aspects ra ised by the question submitted to it and that, by

the terms of that Order, it had fixed 30Ja nuary2004 as the time-limit within which written

statements might be submitted to the Court. Palestine was also notified that, by its Order, the Court

had decided - 16 -

“that, in light of General Assembly resolutionA/RES/ES-10/14 and the report of the
Secretary-General transmitted to the Court with the request, and taking into account

the fact that the General Assembly has gran ted Palestine a special status of observer
and that the latter is co-sponsor of the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion,
Palestine may also submit to the Court a written statement on the question within the
above time-limit”.

By the same Order, the Court decided, “in accordance with Article66, paragraph4, of the

Statute and Article105 of the Rules of Court, to hold hearings during which oral statements and

comments may be presented to the Court by the United Nations and its Member States, regardless

of whether or not they have submitted written stat ements” and fixed 23 February 2004 as the date

for the opening of those hearings. The Court fu rther decided that, for the reasons I mentioned

earlier, “Palestine may also take part in the hearings due to open on 23 February 2004”.

It also invited the United Nations and its Member States, as well as Palestine, to inform the

Court’s Registry, by 13February2004 at the late st, if they intended to take part in the oral

proceedings.

The Court subsequently decided, pursuant to Article66 of its Statute, upon requests

submitted by the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

respectively, that those two international organizations were likely to be able to furnish information

on the question; and that accordingly they mi ght submit written statements within the same

time-limit, fixed by the Court in its Order of 19December 2003, and participate in the oral

proceedings opening on 23 February 2004.

*

Moreover, on 30January2004, the Court issu ed an Order regarding its composition in the

case.

*

Within the time-limit fixed by the Court for th at purpose, written statements were filed, in

the order of receipt, by:

Guinea, Saudi Arabia, the League of Arab St ates, Egypt, Cameroon, the Russian Federation,

Australia, Palestine, the United Nations, Jordan , Kuwait, Lebanon, Canada, Syria, Switzerland,

Israel, Yemen, United States of America, Morocco, Indonesia, th e Organization of the Islamic - 17 -

Conference, France, Italy, the Sudan, South Africa, Germany, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom,

Pakistan, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland on its own behalf, Ireland on behalf of the European

Union, Cyprus, Brazil, Namibia, Malta, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Cuba, Sweden, Spain, Belgium,

Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marsha ll Islands, Senegal and th e Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea.

*

As I indicated a moment ago, the Court is meeting today to hear oral statements and

comments relating to the request for advisory opinion in a single series of hearings. In this regard,

the Court has been informed that the following participants, set out in speaking order, wish to take

the floor during the current oral proceedings:

Palestine, South Africa, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Belize, Cuba, Indonesia, Jordan,

Madagascar, Malaysia, Senegal, the Sudan, the L eague of Arab States and the Organization of the

Islamic Conference.

The specific arrangements for the hearings ha ve been made known by the Registry to the

participants I have just mentioned, by means of various communications. The schedule of the

hearings has also been made public by Press Re lease No.2004/9 dated 18Fe bruary 2004. This

morning, the Court will hear Palestine; and this afternoon, South Africa, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and

Bangladesh will take the floor. Palestine will sp eak for a maximum duration of three hours and all

the other participants in the oral proceedings will speak for a maximum of 45 minutes each.

Before inviting the delegati on of Palestine to address the Court, I would add that, in

accordance with Article106 of the Rules of Co urt, the Court has decided that the written

statements submitted in the current advisory proceed ings are to be made accessible to the public

with effect from the opening of the present hear ings. Further, these written statements will from

today be posted on the Court’s website, to allo w for consultation of both the original language

version and the unofficial translation, as submitted to or prepared by the Registry.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr.Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador and Permanent

Observer of Palestine to the United Nations. - 18 -

AML-.KIDWA:

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is my honour to address you on behalf of

Palestine. I wish to thank the International C ourt of Justice for granting Palestine the opportunity

to participate in these advisory proceedings on the “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a

Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”.

2. I stand before you as a representative of th e Palestinian people, the indigenous people of

the land, who for too long have been denied th e right to self-determination and sovereignty over

their land and half of whom remain refugees. The Palestinian people have been subject to a

military occupation for almost 37 years. They have been dehumanized and demonized, humiliated

and demeaned, dispossessed and dispersed, and brutally punished by their occupier. The

occupation has systematically denied them th eir basic rights and freedoms and has controlled

almost every single aspect of their lives.

3. This case, however, is not about the whole of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  it is about

the Wall. This Wall is being constructed almost entirely in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

This Wall is not about security: it is about entrenching the occupation and the de facto annexation

of large areas of Palestinian land. This Wall, if completed, will leave the Palestinian people with

only half of the West Bank within isolated, non-co ntiguous, walled enclaves. It will render the

two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict practically impossible.

4. The Wall is not just a physical structur e; it is a whole régime. It encircles entire

communities in walled enclaves and, if completed, w ill wall-in most of the Palestinian population.

It is already causing the displacement of Pales tinian civilians and has imprisoned thousands of

Palestinians between it and the Armistice Line of 1949, the Green Line. There is, moreover,

without a doubt, a correlation between the route of the Wall and the illegal Israeli settlements in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory and the water resources in the area.

5. There is also, of course, a correlation between the route of the Wall and Israel’s

long-standing illegal policies and practices with regard to Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is occupied

territory. The international community has neve r recognized Israel’s illegal annexation of East

Jerusalem. The route of the Wall will clearly entrench this annexation. It will compound the - 19 -

humanitarian hardships being faced by the Palestin ian inhabitants of the city. Moreover, it will

isolate the city from the rest of the Palestinian population, obstructing their access to the city and its

Holy Places.

6. We are here because the United Nations has a permanent responsibility  legally,

politically and morally  for the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its

aspects. The General Assembly has reaffirmed this in at least 25resolutions. It is, after all, the

General Assembly that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, dealt with mandated

Palestine, deciding on 29November 1947, in r esolution181(II), to partition Palestine into two

States, one Jewish and one Arab. The Arab State has, of course, not yet been realized; and thus the

Palestinian people have been unable to exercise thei r right to self-determination. Indeed, Palestine

is still not a Member State of the United Nations , but remains an observer. Since 1947, however,

the General Assembly has never ceased dealing with the question of Palestine or its aspects.

7. The Security Council has also continuously dealt with the question of Palestine. It first

placed the “Situation in Palestine” on its agenda in 1948. The Council’s attention to the matter

increased after the Israeli occupation in 1967. Since then, the Council h as adopted 38 resolutions

addressing the situation in the Occupied Pales tinian Territory, 26 of which recall the Fourth

Geneva Convention, including its applicability to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967,

including Jerusalem.

8. These resolutions, of course, remain valid. Israel has complied with almost none of them.

The Council has, historically, failed in its respons ibility for the maintenance of international peace

and security in the case of Palestine. It has fa iled to follow up the implementation of its own

resolutions and take the necessary measures to en sure compliance, and has failed to prevent the

continuous and, at times, massive violations of international law and of the Charter itself. The

basic reason has been the use, or the threat of use, of veto by one of the Council’s Permanent

Members. In the 30years between 1973 and 2003, 27vetoes have been cast on the Palestinian

issue. The most recent was cast on 14 October 2003, when the issue of the construction of the Wall

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was brought before the Council and it failed to act.

9. Over the years, in light of the Council’ s inaction, the General Assembly has tried to

discharge its own responsibilities in line with Genera l Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 1950. Four - 20 -

of its ten emergency special sessions have been on Palestine and the Middle East situation. In

reaction to the last veto, the tenth emergency special session was resumed to consider the situation.

Like the Security Council, the Assembly conduc ted a serious debate on the issue and two draft

resolutions were submitted. One requested the Inte rnational Court of Justice to issue an advisory

opinion on the Wall. After intensive consultati on and negotiations, however, the Members of the

European Union introduced a draft resolution, with the understanding that the co-sponsors of the

original two drafts would not insist on a vote on those drafts. The European Union co-sponsored

draft resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority, on 21 October 2003, as

resolution ES-10/13.

10. Three specific elements of that resolution should be highlighted: First, it demanded

“that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is

in contradiction to relevant pr ovisions of international law” . Second, it requested the

Secretary-General to report on compliance. And, th ird, it expressly stated that upon receipt of the

first report “further actions should be considered, if n ecessary, within the United Nations system”.

The wording of that third element reflected a compromise on the means of following up the issue,

including the possibility of a request for an advisory opinion from this Court on the legal

consequences in case of non-compliance. The phr ase could not have meant anything other than a

1
reference to the Court, and, regardless of the claim made in one Written Statement of a different

understanding, it is indisputable that the idea fo r requesting an advisory opinion was widely

discussed and debated.

11. Following the resolution’s adoption, Israel not only continued but accelerated its

construction of the Wall on Palestinian territory. The Secretary-General, pursuant to the resolution,

presented a report containing a clear factual presen tation about the Wall. It concluded that “Israel

is not in compliance with the Assembly’s demand that it stop and reverse the construction of the

wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” 2. Accordingly, the emergency special session resumed

again on 8December 2003, and adopted by a larg e majority resolution ES-10/14 requesting this

1
Written Statement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
2A/ES-10/248. - 21 -

Court to urgently render an advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s

construction of the Wall.

12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Israel’s Written Statement to the Court claims that

it does not deal with the merits of the case. We be g to differ. The Israeli statement is rife with

attempts to justify the construction of the Wall through the presentation of a detailed case on terror

attacks and through political arguments, including on th e Road Map. Israel repeatedly refers to the

Road Map and to Security Council resolution 1515 (2003). This is ironic. The Government of

Israel has never wanted this Road Map, it has never wanted the Security Council’s endorsement of

it and has repeatedly caused the delay of both. After the Road Map was formally presented in

April 2003, the Israeli Government would not say that it accepted the Road Map itself but only

what it called “the steps set out in the Roadmap” . Even then, in accordance with the Israeli

Cabinet Statement of 25 May 2003, 14 reservations were attached to it.

13. Israel later vehemently objected to th e Russian Federation initiative to bring the Road

Map to the Security Council for endorsement. When Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) was

finally adopted on 19November 2003, the Council he ld no debate. This was due to Israel’s

opposition. Then, on 17 December 2003, Israel unde rmined the traditional consensus on a General

Assembly resolution on “Assistance to the Pales tinian People” specifically because the European

Union, co-sponsoring the resolution, added a paragraph welcoming the endorsement by the Council

of the Road Map in resolution1515. Israel ma de its adherence to con sensus on that resolution

conditional upon the removal of the reference to resolution 1515, which did not occur.

14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, th ere has been no shortage of peace initiatives on

the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, since the adoption of Security Council

resolution242 (1967), and throughout every one of the subsequent initiatives, Israel has

simultaneously been engaged in the intensive col onization of our land. It has transferred 400,000

illegal settlers to the Occupied Palestinian Territory , including East Jerusalem. It is continuously

attempting to change the status, physical charact er, nature and demographic composition of that

territory, most recently through its construction of the Wall. Actually, since the signing in 1993 of

the Declaration of Principles between the Govern ment of Israel and the Palestine Liberation

Organization, Israel not only continued its illega l settlement activities and expansion but actually - 22 -

doubled the number of its settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

Doubled. How can it be expected that the Pales tinian people would continue to believe that peace

was imminent under such circumstances?

15. The Road Map could be different; and we hope that it will be. It is rooted in the

principles of resolution242 (1967) and in the vision affirmed by the Security Council in

resolution 1397 (2002) of “a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within

secure and recognized borders” . This initiative deserves a chance  we want it to succeed. But

Israel cannot once again be permitted to continue its ceaseless taking of Palestinian property and

rights, under the cover of the peace process or th e semblance of a peace initiative. The legal rights

of the Palestinian people cannot simply be ignored or suspended whenever there is a peace process

under way. That plays into the hands of extremists on both sides. One of our chief hopes is that the

Court will make it clear that the Palestinian peopl e have rights and that international law is not

irrelevant to the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

16. There is near unanimity among the States in the world that building this Wall is

unacceptable. The overwhelming majority of Member States believe that it is in contradiction to

international law. The same overwhelming major ity believes, as one group, the European Union,

has officially declared, that the Wall renders “the two-State solution physically impossible” .

Saving the Road Map thus and the prospects for peace requires a cessation of the construction of

this Wall, its removal and non-recognition by States of any of its consequences.

17. With regard to the Quartet, it has expr essed its concerns about the Wall. Moreover,

3
despite the implication in one Statement to the Court that the members of the Quartet are in

agreement that an advisory opinion would likely hinder the peace process, it should be clarified that

there is no agreement among the Quartet with regard to asking the Court not to render the requested

advisory opinion. The Statement of the Russian Federation does not ask the Court to refuse to give

an opinion. The Statement of the United Nations does not do so. Nor does the European Union

Statement. Ireland’s Minister for Foreign A ffairs affirmed this in the Irish Senate on

4 February 2004, stating that “Contrary to some press reports, the EU has not asked the ICJ to

refrain from issuing an Advisory Opinion. Th ere would have been no con sensus to adopt such a

3Written Statement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. - 23 -

position.” Indeed, we even doubt whether the Statement of the United States could be

characterized as such.

18. Some States have said that an advisory op inion could harm the final status issues that

should be left to the parties for negotiation. It is clearly Israeli actions in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, and not any Court opinion, that will c onstitute illegal facts on the ground in relation to

final status issues. Nevertheless, we do agree that the Court is not being asked to advise on

solutions for the final status, although it will undoubt edly be necessary to make some reference to

final status issues due to the intricate relati onship between the Wall and the settlements and the

character and route of the Wall in and around East Jerusalem.

19. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I wish now to address the issue of the suicide

bombings, the security situation and Israel’s polic ies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory. Israel claims that the construction of the Wall is a temporary defensive measure to

prevent suicide bombings and provide security for Israel. This is not true, and the proof is simple.

If this were in fact the case, then Israel would have constructed the Wall on its territory along the

Armistice Line of 1949 and not in departure of the Armistice Line and almost entirely in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory. If Israel wanted a Wall for security, it could construct it on its

territory and raise it to 80m rather than 8m if it wished. This would not bode well for mutual

coexistence of course, but no one would challenge its legality in principle.

20. The suicide bombings have led to the death of 438 Israelis in Israel. Four hundred and

ninetyIsraelis, mostly soldiers and settlers, have also been killed by other kinds of violence. In

contrast, since September2000 and as of 18Fe bruary2004, the Israeli occupying forces have

directly killed, including many by extrajudicial execution, a total of 2,770Palestinian civilians,

including children, women and men. Of those ki lled, more than 1,200Palestinians have been

killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Gaza Strip, even though Israel has already built another

kind of wall surrounding the Gaza Strip. The question that must be asked is: how then will this

Wall being built by Israel solve the security pr oblem? If anything, its route and the illegal

measures entailed in its construction ensure that it will actually exacerbate the security situation. It

is more than obvious that when you deprive an entire people of their rights, expropriate their land

4Statement to Senate of Ireland, 4 February 2004; European Union Presidency (January–June 2004). - 24 -

and property and wall them into enclaves and ghettos, you are not solving the security problem but

creating an untenable situation that will combust.

21. At this time, I wish to make our position vis-à-vis the suicide bombings very clear. We

have consistently, repeatedly and unequivocally condemned these bombings. We condemn any

violence directed at civilians in this conflict, wh ether Israeli or Palestin ian. We consider the

suicide bombings to be unlawful. They are also harmful to the just and honourable cause of the

Palestinian people.

22. That said, I draw attention to the fact that the first suicide bombing occurred nearly

27years after the onset of this oppressive military occupation of the Palestinian people. This

phenomenon is the result of Israeli policies and me asures, including the relentless colonization of

our land. It is not the cause of those policies and me asures. It is also imperative that a distinction

be made between such unlawful acts of violence against Israeli civilians in Israel and acts of

Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation and to military attacks by the occupying forces,

consistent with international law. Nevertheless, Palestine reaffirms its commitment to a peaceful,

negotiated solution to end this occupation and end this conflict.

23. There is a humanitarian crisis in the Occ upied Palestinian Territory. Serious violations

and grave breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law are being committed. The

Wall, part and parcel of these violations and breach es, is severely exacerbating this situation. How

can the Road Map truly succeed under such circumst ances? It cannot. How can Israel expect the

Palestinian side to be able to act effectively when it has destroyed Pal estinian security capabilities

and has confined the leader of the Palestinian people and elected President of the Palestinian

Authority, Yasser Arafat, for more than two year s, undermining the leadership’s ability to properly

function? It cannot. How can Israel’s constructi on of this Wall and its continued confiscation and

colonization of the Palestinian land lead to peace and security for both peoples? It cannot.

24. The colonization by Israel of the Palestinian land under its occupation and the attempts to

change its legal status are not new phenomena. Wh at is new, however, is the magnitude of Israel’s

attempt to change the legal status and to effect the de facto annexation of large parts of the

Occupied Territory by means of the Wall. The Wa ll will be the culmination of all previous illegal

measures and practices carried out by Israel since 1967 towards that end. It will destroy the hopes - 25 -

of the Palestinian people for the realization of their inalienable rights, including the right to

self-determination, and destroy their faith in the rule of international law and the international

community’s ability to uphold it in the face of such grievous violations. It will destroy the hopes of

the international community for implementation of the Road Map and the “two-State” solution of

Israel and Palestine, both living side by side within secure and recognized boundaries. Such a

lamentable outcome must be avoided at all costs.

25. Mr.President, Members of the Court, on be half of Palestine, the Palestinian people and

their leadership, I respectfully request the Court to give full consideration to the gravity of this

situation and to the importance of an advisory opinion at this critical moment. In your most recent

address before the General Assembly, Mr.President , you underlined the role of the Court as the

“guardian of international law” and you assured the Assembly “that the Court will pursue its

efforts to respond to the hopes placed in it” . The Palestinian people have great hopes for this

proceeding and have full confidence that the Court will help the General Assembly to carry out its

functions by rendering the advisory opinion. Th is would allow the Assembly to make its own

substantial contribution in response to Israel’s continued construction of the Wall and the ensuing

threats to the prospects for peace between the two peoples. It is our firm belief that such an

advisory opinion can lead to positive developments and perhaps even a chain of events similar to

that resulting from the Court’s Advisory Opinion on Namibia.

26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, our delegation now wishes to make a brief factual

presentation of what we believe to be the minimum necessary to help clarify the legal submissions

that will follow. It will be made by Ms Stephanie Koury. She will be followed by

ProfessorJamesCrawford, who will address the questi on of admissibility of the request. He will

be followed by Professor Georges Abi-Saab, ad dressing the question of the application of

international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, and then by Professor Vaughan Lowe, who will speak on the violations of those laws.

Our submissions will be closed by Professor Jean Salmon, who will speak on the relation between

the Road Map and the right of self-determination and on the legal consequences of the Wall.

Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Members of the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Al-Kidwa. I now give the floor to Ms Stephanie Koury. - 26 -

KMOUs RY:

F ACTUAL PRESENTATION

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this factual presentation is in two parts. I will

describe the nature and route of the Wall. Then, I will outline its effects at the local, regional and

national levels. This presentation is based on repor ts included in the United Nations dossier before

you. I am joined by Professor Jarat Chopra of Brown University.

I. The nature and route of the wall

5
[Slide 1: Cross section of the Wall complex ]

2. Now, let me turn to the nature and rout e of the Wall. The Wall complex varies in width

between 30 m and 100 m, with closed military zones on either side. As the slide indicates, the Wall

complex includes a number of components: stacks of coils of barbed and razor wire, trenches, an

electrified fence with automatic sensors, a paved road for Israeli patrols, a sand trace path to detect

footprints, a dirt area, and surveillance cameras.

[Slide 2: Section of the Wall complex 6]

3. This photograph shows these components of the Wall complex.

[Slide 3: Concrete sections of the Wall 7]

4. In some places, the Wall is made of conc rete and is 8 m high, including around Occupied

East Jerusalem. In Qalqilya, the concrete Wall is lined with watch towers approximately 300m

apart.

[Slide 4: Gate installed along the Wall ]

5. Gates are also one of the features of the Wall. According to the United Nations, there are

37 gates built into the Wall. Approximately half of these gates are not operating. Some gates open

for short 15-minute intervals only two or three times a day. However, the opening times change

unpredictably and Palestinians have to wait for soldiers to open the locks. A number of gates have

never been opened, like the one shown on this slide.

5
Cross section of the Wall complex, document 1, Palestine’s Written Statement, Volume 1, maps and graphics.
6
Photograph 1, Palestine’s Written Statement.
7Photographs 15 and 4, Palestine’s Written Statement.

8Photograph 14, Palestine’s Written Statement. - 27 -

[Slide 5: Phases of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory]

6. The United Nations Secretary-General’s repor ts divide construction of the Wall into four

phases. A fifth phase of construction is proj ected, as noted by the United Nations Special

Rapporteur and the Commission on Human Rights. On this map, the blue represents Israeli

settlements. Phase A of the Wall is completed and is illustrated by the solid red line. This phase

extends from Salem to the Israeli settlement of “Elkana”. Phase A also includes two sections of the

Wall north and south of Jerusalem . PhaseB extends from the Jordan River and south to Tayasir.

This latter portion is the beginning of an Eastern Wall. A majority of Phase B has been completed,

and the broken red lines indicate areas either appr oved or under construction. Phase C of the Wall

extends from the settlement of “Elkana” to Jerus alem. Much of the current construction is

occurring in this phase. Phase D has been approved and will extend from the Israeli settlement of

“Gilo” to the south-east of Hebron. A fifth phase in the east is projected to extend along the entire

Jordan Valley.

7. If completed, the total length of the Wa ll will be between 700 km and 800 km, and it will

enclose some 56.5 per cent of the West Bank inside the Wall.

[Slide 6: The Wall in Occupied East Jerusalem]

8. This slide illustrates how the Wall signifi cantly deviates from the Green Line in Occupied

East Jerusalem. It weaves in and around the Pal estinian population, residing in areas indicated in

grey, separating Palestinian from Palestinian. It also creates enclaves of Palestinian populated

areas and isolates East Jerusalem from the remainder of the West Bank. The Wall denies

worshippers access to holy sites in Jerusalem’s Ol d City. You can also see how the Wall extends

around Israeli settlements, which are shown in blue on the map.

[Slide 7: The Wall and settlement expansion around Qalqilya]

9. The relationship between the route of the Wall and settlement expansion is clearly

illustrated in the Qalqilya area. The Wall has been routed around the planned expansion areas of

the “Zufin” and “Alfe Menashe” settlements, as shown by the light blue. The Wall is also routed

around the roads that link the settleme nts with each other and to Isr ael, as shown by the light blue

lines. The result of this pattern is the enclosure of Qalqilya.

[Slide 8: The Wall and Israeli settlements expansion] - 28 -

10. Not only in Qalqilya, but throughout the West Bank, the route of the Wall corresponds to

Israeli settlements. The dark blue represents existing settlements. The light blue represents

planned settlement expansion areas. The grey re presents the jurisdictional areas of settlements,

which are reserved for future settlement expansion and other settlement activities. The route of the

Wall, in red, corresponds to these Israeli settlement areas.

II. The effects of the Wall

11. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I would now like to draw your attention to the

effects of the Wall at the local, regional, and national levels.

[Slide 9: Local impacts of the Wall: Focus Jayyus]

12. At the local level, Palestinians are bei ng separated from their land and deprived of their

water resources. On this map, the Green Line is indicated. The yellow line represents Palestinian

village boundaries. The brown areas are agricultura l areas. The blue circles are water wells. And

the red line is the Wall weaving its way throu gh the West Bank. The blue areas are Israeli

settlements and the dotted blue lines again represent planned settlement expansion.

13. Jayyus is a village of approximately 3, 000 people, the majority of whom depend on

farming. Approximately two thirds of the village land is now situated to the west of the Wall,

separating villagers from their land and water wells . Consequently, these farmers of Jayyus are no

longer investing in their land. The picture on the right is a view from Jayyus of its land on the

other side of the Wall.

[Slide 10: Regional impacts of the Wall: Focus Qalqilya area]

14. At the regional level, the Wall has also ha d a serious impact. For instance, due to the

complete enclosure of Qalqilya by the Wall and a gate, some one third of the shops have closed and

unemployment rates have increased. The impact on the villages dependent upon Qalqilya has also

been severe. People’s access to b asic services has declined drama tically. For example, a United

Nations hospital in Qalqilya has experienced a 40percent decrease in caseloads since the

enclosure of Qalqilya and the surrounding areas. Both Qalqilya and the neighbouring villages are

separated from almost all of their agricultural land in what is considered to be part of the “Bread

basket” of the West Bank. Because of these conditions, Palestinians are leaving the area. - 29 -

[Slide 11: The Wall and gate closures ] 9

15. The Wall is also disrupting access to education. These photographs illustrate students at

gates waiting for Israeli soldiers to open the locks and allow them through.

[Slide 12: National impacts of the Wall]

16. At the national level, a significant portion of the water fields will be situated outside of

the Wall, as shown by the shaded areas on the left map. Consequently, Palestinian capacity to

develop the national economy and agricultural base will be significantly curtailed.

17. As shown by the map on the right, main urban centres throughout the West Bank are

being isolated by the construction of the Wall. As in the case of Qalqilya, the capacity of these

main centres to provide regional services and to dr ive economic development is being extensively

eroded by the Wall. The Wall is also reroutei ng the movement of goods and people, significantly

increasing travel times.

[Slide 13: The closed zone and permit system]

18. Exacerbating the existing effects caused by the Wall, Israel has issued military orders

declaring the area between the Wall and the Green Line a “Closed Zone”. According to these

military orders, Palestinian residents over the age of 12 within the Closed Zone must apply for a

permit to live in their own homes and remain on thei r land. In addition, Pa lestinians living inside

the Wall wishing to access their land, to work or visit relatives in the Closed Zone must obtain

access permits. Israeli citizens are exempt from this permit system. Significantly, obtaining a

permit to enter the Closed Zone does not guarantee access because of gate closures. Altogether

these procedures are causing Palestinians to leave their homes.

Thank you, Mr.President, Members of the Court. I would now like you to call on

Professor Crawford.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Koury. I now give the floor to Professor Crawford.

9Photographs 21 and 22, Palestine’s Written Statement. - 30 -

CMRA. WFORD:

C ONSIDERATIONS OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is both an honour and a grave responsibility to

appear before you today to address the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility of the request. The

responsibility is the more grave in that a number of States have objected to the request, even though

they, along with the vast majority of the international community, consider the Wall to be unlawful.

2. However it is possible to respond to these obj ections just by using the language the Court

has used repeatedly in its earlier opinions. Rep eatedly it has been objected that requests raised

political issues, were politically motivated, wereinopportune, affected United Nations Member

States who are parties to the dispute, involved c ontroversial questions of fact or would prejudice

negotiations. Repeatedly the Court has reject ed these arguments. While you maintain your

jurisprudence constante you cannot, I respectfully suggest, decline to answer the question now put

to you.

3. This presentation will be classically in two pa rts. In the first part I will briefly remind the

Court of the words you have used in earlier cases wh en deciding to respond to advisory opinions.

Your own words answer all the general objections that have been made against the admissibility of

the request.

4. Then, in a second part I propose to deal w ith three particular arguments made against

admissibility, arguments having particular relevance to the Occupied Territory as such. I will

show that each of these arguments, properly understood, is a reason for you to respond to the

request. Far from being objections, they are arguments in favour.

A. General objections against jurisdiction and admissibility

5. I turn to the general objections in my first part.

(1) Israel’s ultra vires objection

6. First, Israel objects that: “the request is ultra vires the competence of the 10th Emergency

Special Session and/or the General Assembly . . . [a s] there was no failure by the Security Council

to act”. - 31 -

7. There is an initial and simple answer to this. The General Assembly’s request for this

opinion was made in a validly adopted resolution. In the Namibia case, you said: “A resolution of

a properly constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ’s

rules of procedure, and is declared by its Preside nt to have been so passed, must be presumed to

have been validly adopted.” 10 I stress that this is not a matter of fundamental competence but of

11
internal procedure, to use the distinction you drew in the Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory

Opinion.

8. But if it is necessary to go beyond this, the answer is still quite clear.

AmbassadorAl-Kidwa has outlined the circ umstances surrounding the General Assembly’s

request. In the light of what he has said, nothing in the Uniting For Peace Resolution prevented the

Assembly’s adoption of this request. The request does not of course require the Court to take

“action” within the meaning of Article 11, paragr aph 2, of the Charter, nor did it involve such

“action” by the General Assembly. No question involving the Charter distribution of authority

between the General Assembly and the Security Council is raised. Again, I quote your words:

“The Court considers that the kind of action referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, is coercive or

enforcement action . . . The word ‘action’ must mean such action as is so lely within the province

of the Security Council.” 12 Requesting this advisory opinion is not solely within the province of

13
the Security Council . It is as simple as that.

9. I turn to the other general objections. The starting point here is that the Court “should not,

in principle, refuse to give an advisory opini on”, as you have many times said. As you recalled in

Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons : “In accordance with the . . . jurisprudence of the Court, only

‘compelling reasons’ could lead it to such a refusa l... There has been no refusal, based on the

discretionary power of the Court, to act upon a request for an advisory opinion in the history of the

present Court . . .” 14

10I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 22 , para. 20.
11
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 82, para. 29. See also Expenses Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168.
12I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 164.

13See also Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 233, para. 12.

14I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 235, para. 14. - 32 -

10. This position applies even more powerfully to the General Assembly, which the Charter

15
expressly authorizes to request “an advisory opinion upon any legal question” . And there can be

no doubt that the question asked of the Court is a legal question, as you have consistently defined

16
that term .

(2) The politicization objection

11. Then it is objected that the request “po liticizes the Court” and that the Court should

therefore refuse to give the opinion . But as you said in Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:

“Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal

character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task,
namely, an assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of States with regard to
the obligations imposed upon them by international law.” 18

12. Indeed, as you noted in the WHO Regional Headquarters Advisory Opinion: “in

situations in which political considerations are prominent it may be particularly necessary for an

international organization to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to the legal principles

19
applicable to the matter under debate . . .”  particularly.

(3) The objection that the Court would be repeating the General Assembly’s views

13. Then it is objected that the General Assembly has already made up its mind and so you

should remain silent. According to one statemen t: “An opinion by the Court would provide no

20
guidance to the General Assembly, as that body has already pronounced itself on the issue.” But

the General Assembly had already pronounced itself on the underlying issue in earlier cases  in

Namibia, both the General Assembly and the Secur ity Council had done so. Here, as in Namibia,

you are asked to look at the legal consequences of a given situation in the light of certain

resolutions; here, as there, you need to look at the legal position underlying those resolutions.

15
Charter, Article 96, paragraph 1 (emphasis added).
16
E.g., Western Sahara , I.C.J. Reports 1975 , p.18, para.15, cited in Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 233-234, para. 13.
17Italian Written Statement, p. 4.

18I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13.

19I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 87, para. 33.
20
Germany, Written Statement, p. 8. - 33 -

14. Even more fundamentally what this objecti on ignores is that you do not give just another

political opinion. You give a reasoned judicial opinion as the principal judicial organ of the United

Nations. In giving the opinion the Court remain s “faithful to the requirements of its judicial

21
character” . The result is a judicial decision: it is not just a repetition of something the Assembly

has already done. And if ever a situation needed a recent judicial opinion, it is this one.

(4) Usefulness of the advisory opinion

15. Then it is said that the opinion is not useful. According to one statement: “there is a

striking degree of consensus amongst those most closely involved in promoting the peace process

in the Middle East that an advisory opinion would be of no assistance and would be likely to be

22
unhelpful” .

16. The first point to note is that this conclu sory statement is untrue. Ambassador Al-Kidwa

has shown that there was no consensus within th e European Union or among the Quartet that the

Court should decline to give an advisory opinion.

17. Furthermore the Court gives an advisory op inion to the organ which requests it, not to a

23
self-appointed group of States. You made this point in the Peace Treaties Opinion , and you have

24
repeated it frequently since . And as you said in Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: “it is not for

the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly

for the performance of its functions. The General As sembly has the right to decide for itself on the

usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.” 25

B. Specific arguments related to the OPT: the case for admissibility

18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I move now to consider three more specific issues

in my second part. Each of these, although they have been cited against your answering the

request, properly understood support your doing so.

21
Western Sahara, p. 21, para. 23.
22
United Kingdom, para. 3.23.
23I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71.

24See the cases referred to in Threat or Force of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 235, para. 14.

25Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, p. 237, para. 16. - 34 -

(5) This is a dispute between two States: the principle of consent

19. The first of these issues is that of consent. Australia objects that: “The effect of the

request is to bring key elements of the Isra eli-Palestinian conflict before the Court for

determination without the consent of Israel.”

20. But South Africa did not consent to the Namibia request, Spain did not consent to the

Western Sahara request, Romania did not consent to the Mazilu request, Malaysia did not consent

to the Cumaraswamy request. All those requests involved the responsibility of a particular State.

Yet you gave the Opinions.

21. As you said in Western Sahara: “In the present case, Spain is a Member of the United

Nations and has accepted the provisions of the Charter and Statute; it has thereby in general given

26
its consent to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction.” Moreover Israel cannot

object, any more than could Spain, to the exerci se by the General Assembly of its competence in

the field of self-determination. It cannot object to the General Assembly dealing with the situation

of Palestine. These competences of the General Asse mbly were exercised even before Israel came

into existence, notably in the passage of the Partition Resolution, General Assembly

resolution181(II) which signalled the wish of the in ternational community that Israel come into

existence.

22. The General Assembly has always had a v itally important role in relation to Palestine 

as it had in relation to the other former mandated territory left over after 1945, South West Africa.

This is a key aspect of the role it has consiste ntly exercised with respect to dependent and

colonized peoples ever since 1945. Israel and Palestine are not two States Members of the United

Nations and the dispute over the Wall is not a pre-ex isting bilateral dispute on a matter falling in

principle within Israel’s domestic jurisd iction. That was the situation in the Eastern Carelia case.

It is not the situation here. There is no pre-ex isting bilateral dispute arising between Israel and

Palestine, no dispute which (to use your words in Western Sahara ) arose “independently in

bilateral relations”27. There is no trace in the record of such a prior, independent bilateral dispute.

23. Rather the Wall is an attempt by Israel to impose a unilateral settlement in relation to a

multilateral conflict and to do so in violati on of fundamental obligations, obligations erga omnes.

26
I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 24, para. 30.
2I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 34. - 35 -

These relate to humanitarian law and human rights, including self-determination. The people of

Palestine have an unfulfilled right to self-determination. Israel cannot veto or negate the interest of

the General Assembly in having a legal answer to th e question asked. Indeed that interest, and the

General Assembly’s long-standing and legitimate institutional role, is a compelling reason for

answering the question  as it was in Western Sahara, on a much more abstract question.

(6) The issue of fact-finding

24. Then secondly, it is objected that the re quest is inadmissible because there is insufficient

evidence before the Court to enable it to make the findings of fact required. According to Israel:

“the Court has received no evidence from Israel b earing on the substantive question, and evidence

received from others, including the United Nations Secretariat, cannot be regarded as authoritative

28
or reliable” .

25. But in all the Opinions you have given, you have used the information publicly available,

where organizations could help you, you have asked them to help. You have used the information

before you as best you could. It is true that in Eastern Carelia the Permanent Court gave as a

subsidiary reason for not answering the question an issue of fact  the intention of Russia in

making a declaration during the negotiation of a bilateral treaty 29that had nothing whatever to do

with the League of Nations. The position is quite different here. This is not a matter within

Israel’s domestic jurisdiction and not a matter on which it has a sovereign privilege to act.

26. Much more relevant is the a pproach of the Permanent Court in European Commission of

the Danube. That was a dispute under a regional mu ltilateral treaty between Romania and four

other States. The Court referred to the findings of a Special Committee whose report had been

adopted by an Advisory and Technical Committee of the League of Nations. It said:

“The Court is fully aware that the Romanian Government has refused to accept

the facts established by the Committee... but the Court is of opinion that, for the
purposes of the present procedure, it must accept the findings of the Committee on
issues of fact unless in the records submitted to the Court there is evidence to refute
30
them.”

28
Israel, Written Statement, para. 6.15.
29
1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 28.
301927, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 14, p. 46. - 36 -

27. In the present case there is not one report but many, the reports of competent bodies

including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Human Rights Committee, the Special

Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights and so on. They are in the Secretary-General’s

dossier and have been supplemented by others. They tell a concordant story. The Court is

perfectly well informed.

28. If Israel wished to challenge the circumst ances and facts set out in these reports it could

have done so, as Romania did in European Commission of the Danube. Israel cannot plead lack of

facts as a ground to have the Court refuse to deci de, when any deficiency in the facts could have

been corrected by Israel itself. Israel does not have a veto, any more than Spain did in Western

Sahara  and if a veto in principle does not exist then it cannot be created by the back door of

refusing to present substantive arguments.

29. Anyway the basic facts are perfectly clear. The dominant fact is the US$2billion fact of

the Wall, growing daily and dividing Palestinian communities from each other and from their lands

and water. That is the essential fact, this US$2b illion so-called “temporary” edifice. So much is

now known about the Wall, and what is not known can be deduced from its route, its size, its cost,

its régime, its effects and the avowed intentions of those who are building it to impose a unilateral

settlement.

(7) Prejudicing the Road Map and future status negotiations

30. This brings me to my final point, which is the impact of the request on the Road Map and

on future status negotiations. The United States expresses the point in the following way:

“The United States... and the other members of the Quartet are deeply
involved in efforts to advance those negotia tions, with the support and encouragement
of the Security Council and the General Assembly. It would be extremely damaging

to future negotiating efforts if the Court were to set forth, even on a non-bi31ing
advisory basis, legal conclusions with respect to permanent status issues.”

31. Now formulated in these terms this is not an objection to your giving the request at all. It

is a cautionary note as to the permanent status issues. In this moderate formulation (certain Written

Statements were more extreme), it goes to the cont ent of the Opinion, not to the question whether

3United States, Written Statement, para. 4.4. - 37 -

you should give it at all. And this recalls an answer you gave to an analogous objection in Threat

or Use of Nuclear Weapons. You said:

“It has also been submitted that a re ply from the Court in this case might

adversely affect disarmament negotiations ... The Court is aware that, no matter
what might be its conclusions . . . they . . . would present an additional element in the
negotiations on the matter. Beyond that, th e effect of the opinion is a matter of
appreciation . . . The Court cannot regard this factor as a compelling reason to decline
32
to exercise its jurisdiction.”

32. In the present case the relationship between the Road Map and the Wall can be put in a

couple of sentences. The Road Map is a project for the final settlement to be reached by agreement

of interested parties, including Palestine. Substantively it has its origins in United Nations

resolutions going back to Security Council resolu tion242. The Wall is not in the Road Map.

Indeed it is the Wall itself which is inconsistent w ith the Road Map, and the Wall, if allowed to be

completed, will destroy the Road Map. The requ est, and the Court’s opinion, can only support the

multilateral process presently embodied in the Road Map.

33. There is a further point, equally fundamen tal. The question you are asked relates to the

present situation, not the future. You are not asked what the content of the final settlement should

be. You are not asked to determine the boundaries of a future Palestinian State. It is sufficient for

the purposes of this opinion that the Wall is being constructed for the most part, and indisputably,

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

34. That is not a negative point, it is a positive point. In determining the present legality of

the Wall in relation to the powers of Israel ove r the Occupied Palestinian Territory, you will be

helping to elucidate and thereby to preserve the legal status quo pending the final status

negotiations. You are asked to give an authorita tive legal opinion on the legal consequences of the

construction of the Wall now. Your answer will be relevant to existing questions of legal status and

its consequences. This will help to secure the foundations for a future agreement  unlike the

Wall, which undermines those foundations.

Conclusion

35. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the principle of self-determination, one of the

constitutive, one might say constitutional, principl es of the United Nations Charter, has not done

3I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 237, para. 17. - 38 -

33
well out of bilateral contentious cases. Recall South West Africa in 1966 . Recall, if I may say so,

East Timor 34. Self-determination is above all a multilateral norm, and disputes about

self-determination are multilateral disputes. More over they are disputes as to which the General

Assembly has always played a significant role. Contrast with the three contentious cases I have

mentioned, the five advisory opinions you have given on such issues  four on Namibia, one on

Western Sahara. They became key parts of th e legal perspective for the resolution of those

disputes; in Western Sahara this is still true. Recall above all Namibia  the Status Opinion of

35 36
1950 , the Legal Consequences Opinion of 1971 . Would that we had had their equivalents for

Palestine. The successful outcome of that long-st anding dispute owes much to the Court’s judicial

role. With respect, it is submitted that you should continue to perform that role today.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your careful attention. Mr. President, it

is up to you, the next speaker is Professor Abi-Saab, before or after the break.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford. I now give the floor to

Professor Abi-Saab.

Mr. ABI-SAAB:

A PPLICABLE LAW

Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is my privilege and pleasure to stand before you

again today, on behalf of Pales tine, to address the issue of the applicable law to the Occupied

Palestinian Territory.

This issue is treated at some length in Pal estine’s Written Statement, so I shall limit myself

to highlighting and elaborating further only on some salient points.

The question put to the Court by the Genera l Assembly focuses mainly on international

humanitarian law via the reference to the Fourth Geneva Convention and by characterizing the

Territory as “occupied” by reference to that law. But the rules and principles of international laws

that have a bearing on the situation have a much wide r scope than that. In the first place, closest to

33
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
34
I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90.
3I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 128.

3I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16. - 39 -

the rules and principles of international humanitari an law, and increasingly intertwined with them

are those of the international law of human rights.

But there are also the general rules of international law, particularly two of its cardinal,

constitutive, principles ProfessorCr awford has just been referring to. One of them, namely, the

prohibition of the individual use of force and its corollary, the prohibition of conquest or the taking

of territory by force, and the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to

self-determination. But as my colleagues Professors Vaughan Lowe and Jean Salmon will be

dealing with aspects of the latter two categorie s and given the limitations of time, I shall

concentrate my remarks on international humanitarian law, or the jus in bello.

Up to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the instruments codifying these rules did not

explicitly define the circumstances triggering their application.

By contrast, the Geneva Conventions  instructed by the experiences of the Second World

War  in Article2 common to the four Conventi ons, state in paragraph 1: “the present

Convention shall apply to all cases of declared wa r or of any other armed conflict which may arise

between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by

one of them”.

The Hague Regulations, for their part, define, in Article42, the circumstances under which

“a territory is considered occupied” and these ci rcumstances are, again according to that Article,

“when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army”.

That is exactly what happened in 1967. In the course of an armed conflict between several

States, Israel invaded and occupied militarily, inter alia, the West Bank and Gaza, formerly part of

the British mandated territory of Palestine, which had never been before under Israeli jurisdiction

or administration. In other words, an armed conf lict as provided for in Article2, paragraph 1, of

the Geneva Convention, brought about a situ ation falling under Article42 of the Hague

Regulations. A typical case of belligerent occupation.

These are clear texts that dispose clearly of the matter. But Israel contests this conclusion on

the basis of the second paragraph of Article2 of the Fourth Convention, which provides: “The

Convention shall also apply”  so this is a second case  “to all cases of partial or total - 40 -

occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no

armed resistance.”

This provision was added ex abundante cautela in 1949 to cover the case of occupatio

pacifica, that meets with no armed resistance, like the occupation of the Suddet en in 1938. Even

that is considered an occupation, and triggers the application of the Convention. But in such cases,

as there is no visible armed conflict, there is a need for another criterion which explains the

reference to the legal status or title to the terr itory thus occupied, a title which does not belong to

the occupant.

But in cases of belligerent occupation, covered by the first paragraph of Article2, what

matters is the taking of control ove r the territory in the course of an international armed conflict,

and maintaining it by military force; not the title of the entity that was peacefully administering the

territory before the occupation, or any other entity that may have a claim on this.

This particularly applies to claims laid by th e belligerent occupant on the occupied territory.

It would make a mockery of the law if an invader could evade the application of the jus in bello by

merely formulating a claim on the territory it occupies by force. It would be tantamount to an

invitation to annex the territory.

This rule also applies, regardless of the char acterization of the use of force by the belligerent

occupant, that is whether it is an alleged aggresso r or allegedly exercising self-defence. For it is a

cardinal principle of jus in bello that its rules apply equally to all parties, irrespective of their rights

and wrongs under the jus ad bellum.

I shall not go into the specific arguments of Israel relating to the non-incorporation of the

Hague Rules and the Fourth Geneva Convention into its municipal law, nor on the alleged

application de facto of only the humanitarian components of the Fourth Geneva Convention. After

all, are there any non-humanitarian components in the Geneva Conventions? Even the procedural

aspects provide guarantees for the observance of th e substantive protective rules. And can one

apply only de facto instruments and rules by which one is legally bound? Indeed, this august Court

itself has found that both the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions have passed into

general international law (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , I.C.J. Reports 1996,

para. 79) and even characterize them as being intransgressable not to use jus cogens. As such they - 41 -

are universally binding, regardless of the conventiona l limitations that may be attached to them as

treaties.

The same can be said of most of the provisions of Additional ProtocolI to the Geneva

Conventions, in any case those provisions that ma y be relevant here, such as Article75 on

Fundamental Guarantees.

Mr.President, Members of the Court, I have been addressing the legal rationale of the

applicability of the law of belligerent occupation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. But this

rationale, moreover, has been endorsed by almost the unanimity of the international community

apart from Israel.

I need not recapitulate here all the resoluti ons of the General Assembly and the Security

Council, or of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention or the

declarations of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the latest being on the 18th of this

month  and the ICRC is the institutional guardian of the Conventions  or of the different States

or groups of States. All these declarations assert the applicability de jure of the Fourth Convention

to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Palestine Written Statement, paras. 387-392).

I would like simply in this respect to make a short remark on the status and role of the

General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which are specifically referred to in the request

for the advisory opinion.

The Israeli statement in these proceedings, in an attempt to undermine the basic role of the

General Assembly, which has just been d escribed by ProfessoC r rawford, declares:

“Resolution ES-10/13, which purports to determin e illegality, cannot properly be relied upon as an

authoritative determination of legality. It is not binding.” (P. 116, para. 9.9.)

The Statement contrasts that resolution with Security Council Resolution276 (1970) ( ibid.,

para. 9.10), which was referred to in the request for an advisory opinion in the Namibia case (I.C.J.

Reports 1971). However, in that very Advisory Opinion on Namibia the Court has said:

“it would not be correct to assume that, b ecause the General Assembly is in principle
vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases

within the framework of its competence, re solutions which make determinations or
have operative designs” (ibid., p. 50, para. 105). - 42 -

Making determinations is part and parcel of the functions of the General Assembly and the

Security Council. It is only on the basis of su ch determinations that they can envisage further

action, on items they deal with, within the limits of their powers under the Charter. This is the

quasi-judicial role of these two organs, as h as been already described by the regretted

Professor Oskar Scharffer already in 1964.

The Court has, on numerous occasions, particularly in advisory proceedings, recognized and

acted upon such determinations by the General Asse mbly and the Security Council, and has never,

to my knowledge at least, ignored or set aside such a determination.

Of particular significance to the question put to the Court are the resolutions of the General

Assembly and the Security Council relating to settlements and the annexation of East Jerusalem

and its surroundings. These resolutions, particularly several resolutions of the Security Council,

adopted unanimously with the positive vote of the United States, determine  I am quoting from

the dispositif of such resolutions  the illegality of the settlements (see Palestine Statement,

paras.165-167), and of the annexation of Jerusal em, characterizing this annexation as a flagrant

violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that does not affect the continued applicability of that

Convention to Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Territory ( ibid., paras.168, 361-364).

Resolution478 goes even further and determines th at “all legislative and administrative measures

taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the status and character

of the Holy City of Jerusalem... are null and vo id . . . and must be rescinded forthwith . . .”

(Security Council res. 478(1980)).

Mr.President, I turn now very briefly to the content of international humanitarian law

inasmuch as it regulates belligerent occupation.

Article42 of the Hague Regulations defines belligerent occupation as a de facto status

arising from the effective control of the territory by a hostile army, and extending only as far as this

effective control (or “authority” as it calls it) “has been established and can be exercised”.

International humanitarian law takes cognizance of this de facto status, to which it attaches

legal consequences or a régime. This legal régime is guided by two major principles:

(1) The first is that occupation is a temporary (or transient) state of affairs. It is an abnormal or

emergency situation, and the law of occupation tr ies to strike a balance between, on the one - 43 -

hand, accommodating the military needs of the Occupying Power in prosecuting the war and its

war aims and, on the other hand, protecting th e rights, freedoms and welfare of the population

of the occupied territory, as well as their normal way and train of life from being excessively

disturbed and affected by the occupation.

In this respect, internationa l humanitarian law, while rec ognizing to the Occupying Power

the prerogatives of government over the occupied territory, imposes on it the positive obligations of

government in terms of restoring and ensuring “public order and saf ety” (Article 43 of the Hague

Regulations), as well as ensuring food and medi cal supplies and services for the population to the

fullest extent possible (Articles 55 and 56 of th e Fourth Geneva Convention) as well as respecting

their human rights and dignity and so forth.

(2) The second governing principle of the law of occ upation is that occupation, being a temporary,

transient régime, cannot affect nor transfer s overeignty to the Occupying Power. In this

respect, the régime of occupation operates to a large extent as an interim measure (une mesure

conservatoire), by freezing the status juris of the occupied territory for as long and as far as

occupation remains effective; so that it cannot be changed by any unilateral act or action on the

part of the Occupying Power.

The legal effects of this principle are reflect ed in Article 47 of the Fourth Convention which

provides:

“Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any

case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or
government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the
authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any

annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.”

But the law of occupation goes even further. It enjoins the Occupying Power to leave things

as they were before the occupation to the fullest ex tent possible; for example, “not [to] alter the

status of public officials and judges” in Article 54 of the Geneva Convention. In the same vein,

Article 43, which I have just referred to, of the Hague Regulations directs the Occupying Power to

“take all measures in his power to restore and to ensure, as far as possible, public order and

safety”  and here is a clause I want to underline  “while respecting, unless absolutely  not - 44 -

necessarily  absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country” (and the same about criminal

laws in Article 64 of the same Convention).

Referring to Article43, the ICRC Commenta ry on the Fourth Geneva Convention says the

following: “This provision of the Hague Regulations is not applicable only to the inhabitants of the

occupied territory, it also protects the separate existe nce of the State, its institutions and its laws.”

(Pp. 273-274.)

Indeed, the protection of the separate status a nd corporate existence of the occupied territory

is reflected in the Hague Regulations by the pr otection they provide not only to private property

(Arts. 46 and 47), but also to the commons and to public property in the form of “public buildings,

real estate, forests and agricultural estates” of wh ich “the occupying power shall be regarded only

as administrator and usufructuary” and “must safeguard the capital of these properties and

administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct” (Art. 55).

The prohibition of effecting durable changes by the unilateral act or action of the Occupying

Power is not limited to the formal legal status of the territory (through a purported change of

sovereignty). It extends also to such chang es in the human and material components of the

occupied territorial entity  whence the prohibition, in Article49 of the Fourth Convention, of

demographic changes through “individual or mass forcible transfer as well as deportation” of

civilians outside the occupied territory; as well as the deportation or transfer by the Occupying

Power of “parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies”.

These prohibited acts constitute, under the Gene va Conventions and Article 147 particularly

of the Fourth Convention, as well as Article85 of ProtocolI and Article8 of the recent Rome

Statute, grave breaches of international law which entail individual criminal responsibility.

Mr. President, it is by the standards of this legal régime that the legality of the Wall has to be

assessed, and the justifications provided by Israel for its construction have to be weighted.

One of these justifications, self-defence, does not belong to international humanitarian law or

the jus in bello, but to the jus ad bellum. Israel makes here an impermissible confusion between the

two branches of the law of war that have to be kept radically apart. Once an armed conflict is

brought into being, the jus in bello (or international humanitarian law) comes into play, as the lex

specialis governing the ensuing situation regardless of the rules of the jus ad bellum. - 45 -

Moreover, logically, how can one say that a St ate exercises self-defence against a territory

under its own military occupation, that is under its effective control, and in which it has the

authority and even the obligation to “ensure public order and safety” according to Article 43 of the

Hague Regulations?

Can the Wall be then be justified as a military necessity?

One of the great advances of international hum anitarian law is that it has moved away from

Clausewitz’s concept of military necessity as Kriegsraison, i.e. the idea that the aims of war justify

using any means considered necessary to achieve them.

That concept of military necessity is ultimately negatory of international humanitarian law.

Fortunately, at least since the Hague Regulations of 1899, it has been replaced by the modern and

much narrower concept of military necessity, strictly limited to the contexts in which it is expressly

recognized and under the conditions set by the provision in the relevant instruments that recognizes

it.

Those conditions include, in particular, specificity and proportionality.

It is in this sense that the Declaration of the Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva

Convention states in paragraph5 that “the Fourth Geneva Convention, which takes fully into

account imperative military necessity , has to be respected in all circumstances” (United Nations

Secretary-General dossier No. 67).

Then we have to look in the Geneva Conven tion or the Hague Regulations. Where can we

find in them a recognition of a military necessity (or even of a legitimate military need) that can be

invoked to justify the Wall?

In my submission, the only possible justification for the Wall is as a safety measure taken by

Israel in the exercise of its authority as an Occupying Power under Article43 of the Hague

Regulations and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

As my colleague Professor Vaughan Lowe will explain, neither provision justify the building

of a Wall to protect civilian citizens of the Occupying Power implanted in the occupied territory.

The argument that a similar barrier around Gaza has proved effective in reducing the

attacks  while debatable, as Ambassador Al-Kidwa has mentioned in his introductory speech 

still this argument, even if it were true, inten tionally ignores the fact that the wall around Gaza had - 46 -

for purpose  had for avowed purpose  to seal it off hermetically; and that is what Israel is

emphatically denying being the purpose and effect of the Wall in the West Bank. Why? Because

if it admits that the purpose is for it to hermetica lly seal what is within the Wall, that will confirm

all its flagrant features violative of international humanitarian law.

The Wall also starkly fails the test of necess ity and proportionality as a security measure,

because of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who remain unchecked on the other side of

the Wall, on the western side for example. Unless of course they are made, directly or indirectly, to

leave that area; which would constitute another fl agrant grave breach of Article 49 of the Geneva

Convention. Not much for possible justification.

Finally, Mr.President, may I say in conclusion, that arguing on the basis of the law of

occupation does not mean recognition or acceptance of the legality of this occupation, particularly

when it turns into prolonged occupation that borders on annexation. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Abi-Saab. It is now time for a break of

15 minutes. The Court will resume its hearings at five minutes to noon.

The Court adjourned from 11.45 a.m. to 11.55 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to Professor Lowe.

Mr. LOWE: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court. It is an honour for me to appear before you, and to

have been entrusted with this part of Palestine’s presentation.

2. My task is to present Palestine’s obser vations on the manner in which the rules of

international law apply to the factual situation in the Territory.

3. The Court is not, of course, asked to rule upon particular breaches of international law. It

is asked, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to respond to requests for advice

from the United Nations General Assembly. - 47 -

4. The Assembly has determined in resolution ES 10/13 that the Wall is “in departure of the

Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law”. That

resolution does not, however, answer all questi ons; it leaves open important questions. For

example, in what respects, and under which rules of international law, is the Wall illegal? What

must be done to restore the situation to legalit y? And what are the duties of States in the

meantime?

The tasks

5. I have three main points to put before the Court:

(a) first, that Israel has, in the Occupied Pal estinian Territory, only the rights of an Occupying

Power, which are conferred by and limited by in ternational law, and that the construction and

operation of the Wall does not fall within those rights;

(b) second, that Israel, as the Occupying Power, is legally bound to ensure the rights prescribed by

international law for those persons lawfully resi dent in Palestine, and that the Wall violates

those rights; and

(c) third, that the effect of the Wall is to change the status of the Territory in a manner tantamount

to annexation, in violation of international law.

The basic illegality of the Wall

6. [Screen: photograph4] Let me begin with the underlying question of the legality of the

Wall. The issue here is not whether Israel has the right to build a wall: it is whether it has the right

to build the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri tory. Palestine’s main point is that whatever

security effects the Wall might have could be secu red by building the Wall along the Green Line,

on Israeli territory, so that there is no legal justif ication for building it in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory.

7. As you have already seen, the constructi on of the Wall has involved both the taking of

land and the destruction of Palestinian property in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Under

international law the requisitioning of land and th e destruction of property are permissible only

within narrow and closely defined limits. - 48 -

8. Requisitioning of land is governed by Ar ticle52 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which

stipulates that “[r]equisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or

inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation”.

9. [Screen schematic map showing the green line and the route of the Wall and the

settlements] Israel admits that the route of the Wall is designed to protect Israeli civilian

settlements which have been built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

It has explicitly said so, for example in th e confiscation notice which is quoted beneath

photograph 9 in Volume 1 of the Annex to our Written Statement. In any event, the map speaks for

itself. The Wall departs from the Green Line in order to fix the settlements on what is no doubt

thought of as the “Israeli” side of the line. Pe rhaps the most striking examples are in the areas

around Qalqilya and the Israeli settlement “Ariel”, and in and around East Jerusalem.

10. Those settlements were th emselves created in violation of international law.

Article49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention pr ohibits the transfer by an Occupying Power of

parts of its own civilian population into the occupi ed territory. As a Legal Adviser to the United

States State Department said, in relation to Is raeli settlement policy, that prohibition “extends

clearly to reach such involvements of the o ccupying power as determ ining the location of

settlements, making land available and financing of settlements, as well as other kinds of assistance

and participation in their creation” (paras.464 and465 of Palestine’s Written Statement). He

concluded that Israel was in breach of that pr ohibition. Numerous Security Council and General

Assembly resolutions have determined that the settlement activities breach international law.

11. Now the breach is a serious matter. It is d eclared to be a “grave breach” of international

law by Article 85 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

12. The logic is inescapable. The civilian se ttlements are unlawful. Therefore there is no

right to divert the Wall from the Green Line in order to protect those unlawful settlements.

Therefore the confiscations of Palestinian land fo r that purpose violate international humanitarian

law. The Wall, away from the Green Line, has been constructed, and Palestinian property has been

taken, for a legally impermissible purpose. Ther e is no need to examine security concerns and

arguments in depth in order to appraise the legality of those diversions. - 49 -

13. [Screen: photograph 9] Similarly, the dest ruction of Palestinian property for the purpose

of constructing the Wall is far removed from anythi ng that is, in the words of Article53 of the

Fourth Geneva Convention, “re ndered absolutely necessary by military operations”. There are no

such military operations, in the sense in which Artic le 53 of the Convention uses the term. Indeed

the route of the Wall sometimes seems to have been devised with a view to the infliction of wanton

damage. The photograph is of the former mark et of Nazlat Issa, on which the livelihood of

hundreds of Palestinian families depended. It was d estroyed by the Israeli army “out of necessity

to protect Israeli settlements in the area”. The nearest Israeli settlement is 4 km away.

14. On this point, Palestine accordingly respectfully suggests that the Court should advise the

General Assembly that the building and operation of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, violates international law.

The Wall violates Palestinian human rights

15. The impact of the Wall on the basic human rights of the men, women and children in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory is graphically illust rated in the United Nations reports, and by the

reports of B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights organization.

16. There are two broad categories of violations. First, there are the direct seizures of land

and destruction of property that the construction of the Wall enta ils. And those I have addressed

already. Second, there are the rights that are violated as a result of the restrictions on the

movement and residence of the Palestinian populat ion that are imposed under the régime of the

Wall. These violations affect the entire popula tion of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, not

simply those whose property is taken or those who have been walled in by the Israeli Government.

17. The scale of those violations must be unde rstood. This is not a technical squabble over

Israeli trespass on Palestinian land. Three of the United Nations reports within the last year (the

Bertini 3, Dugard 38 and Ziegler 39 reports) concluded that there is a humanitarian crisis  their

words, not mine  in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and one that is man-made.

37
Annex 14 to Palestine’s Written Statement, para. 3.
38
Annex 6 to Palestine’s Written Statement, para. 41.
3Dossier No. 56 accompanying the United Nations Secretary-General’s submission, paras. 8, 58. - 50 -

18. We had intended to take the Court to passages in those reports that epitomise conduct in

clear violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We

understand, however, the Court’s desi re to focus at this stage on law rather than facts; and last

Wednesday the International Committee of the Re d Cross issued a statement which captures the

essence of what we, and the various United Nations and other reports, are trying to communicate

and fixes it precisely in its legal context. It states the following:

“The ICRC is increasingly concerned about the humanitarian impact of the
West Bank Barrier on many Palestinians living in occupied territory.

Where it deviates from the ‘Green Line’ into occupied territory, the Barrier

deprives thousands of Palestinian residents of adequate access to basic services such
as water, health care and education, as we ll as sources of income such as agriculture
and other forms of employment. The Pal estinian communities situated between the
‘Green Line’ and the Barrier are effectivel y cut off from the Palestinian society to

which they belong. The construction of the West Bank Barrier continues to give rise
to widespread appropriation of Palestinia n property and extensive damage to or
destruction of buildings and farmland.

The ICRC has repeatedly condemned delib erate attacks against Israeli civilians
and stressed that all acts intended to spread terror among the civilian population are in
clear violation of international humanitarian law (IHL). It recognizes Israel’s right to
take measures to ensure the security of it s population. However, these measures must

respect the relevant rules of IHL.

The ICRC’s opinion is that the West Bank Barrier, in as far as its route deviates
from the ‘Green Line’ into occupied territo ry, is contrary to IHL. The problems

affecting the Palestinian population in their daily lives clearly demonstrate that it runs
counter to Israel’s obligation under IH L to ensure the humane treatment and
well-being of the civilian population living u nder its occupation. The measures taken
by the Israeli authorities linked to the constr uction of the Barrier in occupied territory

go far beyond what is permissible for an occupying power under IHL. These findings
are based on the ICRC’s monitoring of th e living conditions of the Palestinian
population and on its analysis of the applicable IHL provisions. The Israeli authorities

have been regularly informed about the ICRC’s humanitarian and legal concerns.

The ICRC therefore calls upon Israel not to plan, construct or maintain this
Barrier within occupied territory.”

19. I would respectfully direct the Court’s attention to the Written Statement submitted in

this case by the Swiss Government, which has a pa rticular position as the official depository of the

Geneva Conventions. It is helpful to read the words of the ICRC alongside that statement.

20. Palestine’s Written Statement identifi es the main provisions of international

humanitarian law and international human rights law that are applicable in this context. It

identifies breaches of several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, - 51 -

which Israel has ratified. They include Articl es 12, on freedom of movement, and 17 on the right

to family life. There are breaches of the Interna tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights, also ratified by Israel, including Articles11 and12, on the right to food and to medical

care, and Article13 on the right to education. There are also breaches of the Convention on the

Rights of the Child, again, ratified by Israel. Pa lestine attaches particul ar importance to this.

Children constitute over half of the Palestinia n population. The Written Statement identifies

breaches of Articles24 and27, on the right to food and medical care, Article28 on the right to

education, and Article 16 on the right to family life.

21. The response of many Israeli officials has been: the Wall is the price that supporters of

terrorism must pay; the solution lies in the hand s of the Palestinian Authority. That is an

unacceptable response, and not only because of Israel ’s repeated incursions into the territory, its

destruction of the Palestinian security apparatu s and institutions, its imposition of curfews and

roadblocks, and its construction of the Wall  all of which steps have undermined the Palestinian

Authority.

22. The response is unacceptable first, becau se Israel, as Occupying Power, carries the legal

responsibility to ensure basic human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It cannot claim

the rights of a military occupant without accepting the corresponding responsibilities.

23. Second, that response is tantamount to the imposition of a collective punishment. The

Palestinian Authority has consistent ly condemned terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians; and it is as

absurd as it is offensive to imply that all Pales tinians are engaged in a murderous conspiracy to

attack Israel. To impose the Wall, and all the c onsequent restrictions on movement and access to

property, jobs, welfare, education and familie s, as a punishment on the whole Palestinian

population is unfair, unprincipled, and illegal. It ap pears to be, as was noted in one of the United

40
Nations reports, a form of collective punishment in retribution for attacks on Israel . Collective

punishments are specifically prohibited by the La ws of War, under Article147 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I.

24. Third, it is evident that the Wall, in so far as it departs from the Green Line and is built in

Occupied Palestinian Territory, cannot be justified by appeals to Israel’s security interests. Israel’s

4Ziegler report, dossier No. 56 accompanying the United Nations Secretary-General’s submission, para. 38. - 52 -

legitimate interests can, as we have explained in our Written Statement, be protected by building

the Wall on Israel’s soil; Israel has no legal right to take Palestinian land and destroy Palestinian

property in order to protect unlawful settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Palestine

accepts the right of every State to take protective measures. But those measures must be lawful.

States cannot cast off all legal and moral constrai nts by merely calling on the name of “security

interests”.

25. The question before the Court is whether the Wall, as described in the

Secretary-General’s report, violates international humanitarian law and international human rights

law. Our Written Statement sets out detailed submissi ons on this issue; but the point is a simple

one. Having read the Secretary-General’s report a nd the reports that are appended to it, can the

Court realistically say that it doubts whether Israel is violating international law in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory? Having read through the su pporting documents put before it in response to

its request to States to provide relevant informa tion, can it say that there is no reason to believe

that, as the ICRC put it, “the measures taken by th e Israeli authorities linked to the construction of

the Barrier in occupied territory go far beyond what is permissible for an occupying power”?

26. Palestine respectfully suggests that the C ourt should advise the General Assembly that

Israel is obliged to ensure for the residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territory the rights to which

they are entitled under international humanitarian law and international human rights law; that

those rights include the rights listed in paragra phsC and D of Chapter12 of Palestine’s Written

Statement; and that those rights have been violated by the construction and operation of the Wall.

The Wall alters the status of the territory

27. The hardships that are borne all day, a nd every day, by the Palestinian people in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory are naturally the main focus of concern. But as a matter of law, and

in the long term, there is another matter of cardi nal importance. It is that the Wall is, entirely

foreseeably and probably deliberately, changing the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

28. It is a fundamental principle of international law that an Occupying Power is not entitled

to change the status of occupied territory. It is allowed to remain in territory that is not its own, and

to exercise limited powers there, because internati onal law recognizes that in situations of armed

conflict such action may be necessary in order effec tively to protect the State. Those rights are - 53 -

essentially defensive, and they are temporary: occupying armies are expected to withdraw once the

conflict that led to the occupation has ended. Occupying Powers have no right to treat the occupied

territory as their own, or to decide its future.

29. International law does not prohibit only the annexation of occupied territory. It prohibits

all changes in the status of that territory: plainly, the territory could not lawfully be made into a

protectorate, or a colony, or otherwise have its status changed.

30. That prohibition has been affirmed by the Security Council, for example in

resolution 446, which required Israel

“to desist from taking any actions which woul d result in changing the legal status and

geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab
territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer
parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories”.

31. No State can evade the prohibition by refraining from making a formal and explicit

annexation or other change in status while tying up the territory and its residents in a mass of

restrictive legislation and physical constraints. In ternational law looks to th e reality of situations,

not to the artifice of forms. In the Starrett case , for example, it was held that property could be

expropriated without a formal transfer of title, if the owner’s rights of enjoyment were seriously

interfered with. And in the Nottebohm case 42, this Court looked behind the formality of

naturalization to determine the reality of a man’s link with the territory of his putative State.

32. The Wall is changing the status of the O ccupied Palestinian Territory. It is, entirely

foreseeably, causing demographic and other changes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that will

eliminate the possibility of the Palestinian people effectively exercising their right to

self-determination, and this is tantamount to a de facto annexation of territory.

33. Israel maintains that the Wall, on whic h it is said to be spending around US$2 billion 

US$2,000 million  is temporary. That is difficult to believe. One might take a different view if

the Israeli Government were to announce publicly , now, that it recognizes that the Palestinian

territory is occupied territory; that it recognizes that all of the settlements  including settlements

such as Ariel, Ma’ale Adumin, and the settlements in East Jerusalem  are in Occupied

Palestinian Territory, and as such within the territory that is in principle the Palestinian State under

41
Starrett Housing Corp v. Iran 4 Iran-USCTR 122 (1983).
4I.C.J. Reports1955, p. 4. - 54 -

the two-State vision of the Road Map. But far from saying that, it appears from recent reports that

the Israeli Government is planning to relocate se ttlers withdrawn from Gaza into the West Bank,

thus consolidating its hold on the West Bank.

34. Israeli regulations are dividing the Occupied Palestinian Territory into the area “inside”

the Wall, and the area outside and adjoining Israel . Prior to the Wall, people were free to move

across that part of the Occupied Palestinian Te rritory, to their farms, workshops, schools, and

hospitals. They were free to live in the area now covered by the Wall and the Closed Zone. Now,

under these regulations, people need permits to move w ithin that same Palestinian territory if that

involves crossing the Wall; and they need permits to stay in their homes. And in a substantial

proportion of cases permits are awarded la te, capriciously, or not at all. All of this is explained, in

detail, in our Written Statement.

35. Many Palestinians are now moving out of the worst affected areas, such as Qalqilya,

displaced deeper into the Occupied Palestinia n Territory. This creates facts on the ground.

Palestinians are, in fact, being driven out of areas adjacent to the Wall, and adjacent to Israel.

36. Some think that Israel is content to ru le the Occupied Palestinian Territory without

formally annexing it, because annexation would make it difficult to deny citizenship, voting rights

and equality before the law to those born in that territory. But whatever its reason, its status is

plainly changed. And a recent United Nations report hit the point exactly. It said: “the wall is

manifestly intended to create facts on the ground. It may lack an act of annexation, as occurred in

43
the case of East Jerusalem and of the Golan Heights. But its effect is the same: annexation.”

37. That puts this case in context. It ar ises from two concerns: one, that the lives of

Palestinians have, already, been made nearly unb earable by the calculated imposition of a series of

constraints and hardships, of which the Wall is the cu lmination; and the other, that the Wall is not

simply a present hardship, but marks the boundary of the miserable patch of land into which Israel

intends to force the Palestinian people, in a grotes que caricature of the two-State vision that is as

far from justice as it is from legality.

4Dugard, 2003 (United Nations doc. E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 Sept ember 2003, reproduced as Annex 6 to Palestine’s
Written Statement), para. 14. - 55 -

38. Palestine respectfully suggests that the C ourt should advise the General Assembly that

the construction and operation of the Wall is cha nging the status of the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, in violation of international la w and Security Council resolutions, including

resolution 446.

39. The effect of the Wall upon the right of th e Palestinian people to self-determination, and

upon the Road Map, will be addressed by my colleague, M.JeanSalmon, who will conclude

Palestine’s presentation.

40. Mr. President, Members of the Court; unless I can help you further, that concludes my

part of this presentation. And I w ould ask you to call now on my colleague,

Professor Jean Salmon.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Lowe. I now give the floor to

Professor Jean Salmon.

M. SALMON :

M ANŒUVRES POUR QUE LA C OUR NE REPONDE PAS A LA DEMANDE D AVIS ET EXPECTATIVES

LEGITIMES DE L ’ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE RECEVOIR CET AVIS

1. Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs de la Cour, c’est toujours un grand honneur de

se retrouver à cette barre. Pour un juriste donles premiers pas professionnels furent accomplis

comme conseiller juridique à l’UNRWA, il est émou vant de devoir aujourd’hui cet honneur à la

confiance de la Palestine.

Il m’appartient de développe r devant vous deux aspects de la question portée devant la

Cour : il s’agit de traiter, d’une part, de ce rtaines manŒuvres utilisées pour que la Cour ne réponde

pas à la demande d’avis et, d’autre part, des expectatives de l’Assemblée générale à recevoir un

avis sur les aspects juridiques de la question.

I. Les manŒuvres utilisées pour que la Cour ne réponde pas
à la demande d’avis de l’Assemblée générale

Mon collègue, le professeur James Crawford, a déjà entretenu la Cour de l’ensemble de ces

manŒuvres. On reviendra cependant ici sur deux aspects particuliers. - 56 -

2. Il est notoire que quelques Etats souhaiteraient que la Cour ne se prononce pas sur la

question posée par l’Assemblée générale. On avance, à l’appui de cette aspiration, le fait que l’avis

demandé serait inutile. L’Assemblée générale ayan t déjà déclaré que le mur est illégal, son siège

est fait. C’est oublier que certains Etats, en particulier Israël, ont dénié à l’Assemblée toute

compétence pour prononcer une opinion juridique fa isant autorité sur la validité internationale du

mur.

A lui seul cet Etat de choses justifie que la Cour se prononce sur la légalité de cette

construction litigieuse avant de déterminer les c onséquences qui s’y attachen t. Les Etats qui ont

abordé le fond de la question da ns leurs exposés écrits n’ont-ils pas consacré l’essentiel de leur

démonstration au problème de l’illégalité? Il convient que le principal organe judiciaire des

NationsUnies exprime, avec l’autorité qui est la sienne, les fondements juridiques de l’illégalité

afin que cela ne puisse plus à l’avenir être contestée.

Il est temps, en effet, que l’Assemblée qui a conduit à l’indépendance les deux tiers de

l’humanité reçoive de la Cour l’appui qu’elle demande pour aider un territoire, auquel le droit à

l’autodétermination fut promis en 1920, à pouvoir réaliser le droit sans que son assise territoriale

soit amputée par un mur.

Il ne faut pas être grand clerc pour compre ndre que les arguments relatifs à l’inutilité de

l’avis ont, en réalité, pour but d’empê cher la Cour de dire le droit afin de laisser Israël continuer

tranquillement le dépeçage de la Palestine en préte ndant ne pas être tenu en la matière par quelque

règle de droit.

3. Il en va de même de l’autre argument utilisé pour bâillonner la Cour, celui qui prétend que

son intervention serait de nature à mettre en péril la «feuille de route».

Cet argument, sous couleur de préoccupations liées à la sauvegarde du processus de paix et

du règlement négocié de la question, met, en réalité, doublement en péril le droit à

l’autodétermination du peuple palestinien, sur le territoire duquel Israël construit un nouveau mur

de la honte.

1) Il occulte le fait que l’exercice du droit à l’autodétermination du peuple palestinien sur

l’intégrité des territoires occupés est, en réalité, un des fondements mêmes du processus de paix

et de la feuille de route. - 57 -

2) Il occulte le fait que c’est le mur qui enfre int gravement les obligations contenues dans la

feuille de route.

En un mot, c’est un épouvantail pour empêcher la Cour de procéder à ces deux constatations.

*

* *

Envisageons les, tour à tour.

1.L’argument de la feuille de route occulte le fait que l’exercice du droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple palestinien sur l’ intégrité des territoires occupés est, en
réalité, un des fondements mêmes du processus de paix et de la feuille de route

4. Le Conseil de sécurité, par sa résolu tion1515 du 19novembre 2003, «Demande aux

parties de s’acquitter des obligations qui leur in combent en vertu de la feuille de route, en

coopération avec le Quatuor, et de concrétiser la vision de deux Etats vivant côte à côte dans la

paix et la sécurité.»

La vision de «deux Etats vivant côte à côte» repose sur un socle juridique dont la première

pierre est la résolution181(II) de l’Assemblée générale de 1947, prévoyant la création de deux

Etats sur le territoire de l’ancien mandat britannique sur la Palestine. Elle s’appuie, en outre, sur

une série de résolutions obligatoires du Conseil de sécurité auxquelles elle se réfère expressément :

en particulier, la résolution 242 (1967) qui prévoit la non-acquisition de territoire par la force et le

retrait des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit, résolution qui fut confirmée par les

résolutions 338 (1973) et 1397 (2002) du même organe.

Ainsi est fixée l’assise territoriale sur laquelle le peuple palestinien a le droit de disposer de

lui-même. Il s’agit des territo ires occupés par Israël depuis 1967, délimités par la ligne de

démarcation qui résulte de la convention générale d’armistice entre le Royaume hachémite de

Jordanie et Israël, signée à Rhodes le 3 avril 1949, et de son application.

C’est ce que l’on appelle communément la «Ligne verte».

5. Le processus de paix repose donc sur deux droits fondamentaux du peuple palestinien : - 58 -

 le droit à disposer de lui-même sur les territo ires palestiniens occupés depuis 1967, y compris

Jérusalem-Est;

 le droit de mettre en Œuvre ce droit par une négociation où son consentement ne serait pas vicié

par l’accumulation de faits accomplis illégaux de l’ autre partie tendant à limiter l’exercice de

ce droit.

Le document visé sous le nom de «feuille de route» prévoit comme stade ultime de la

négociation «deux Etats, Israël et une Palestine s ouveraine, indépendante, démocratique et viable,

coexistant dans la paix et la sécurité». La pr océdure envisagée est celle de négociations directes

pour mettre fin au conflit et définir au stade final un «statut permanent». Ce dernier a été défini,

dans des accords avec Israël conclus à Washingt on en1993 et à Taba en1995, de la manière

suivante: «Jérusalem, les réfugiés, les implanta tions, les arrangements en matière de sécurité, les

frontières, les relations et la coopération avec d’autres voisins, et d’autres questions d’intérêt

44
commun» .

Pour que l’on puisse prétendre que la présente demande d’avis serait, de la part de

l’Assemblée générale, une initiative mettant en danger le processu s de paix, encore faudrait-il

prouver qu’un prononcé de la Cour sur l’illégalité du mur serait de nature à porte atteinte à ce

45
«statut permanent». C’est ce dont convie nnent les exposés écrits du Royaume-Uni et des

Etats-Unis 4.

Or, tel n’est pas le cas.

Les cent quarante-quatre Etats qui ont estimé que le mur constitue une violation du droit

international se sont fondés sur des éléments de droit qui sont au cŒur même de la feuille de route :

 le respect du droit du peuple palestinien à l’autodétermination;

 le respect du statut en droit international du territoire occupé et de son assise territoriale;

 le respect des obligations internationales déc oulant de ce statut quant aux droits de la

population civile (droit humanitaire et droits de l’homme).

44
Déclaration de principes sur les arrangements intérimaires d’autonomie , signés à Washington le
13 septembre 1993, article V, RGDIP, 1994, p.264; accord intérimaire sur la Cisjordanie et Gaza, signé à Taba le
28 septembre 1995A/51/889, S/1997/357.
45
Royaume-Uni., exposé écrit, par. 3.21.
46Etats-Unis d’Amérique, exposé écrit, par. 4.2. - 59 -

6. En constatant que le mur viole ces droits, la Cour n’interférera ni avec la mise en Œuvre de

la feuille de route ni avec des questions qui font partie du «statut permanen t». La Cour n’est pas

appelée à trancher un problème de frontières, mais à faire assurer le respect du statut d’un territoire

colonisé (sous la forme mandataire) qui s’est en suite trouvé occupé par une puissance étrangère.

Le peuple de ce territoire a le droit de voir respecter ses droits face à la construction d’un mur

au-delà de la ligne de démarcation qui le sépare de la puissance occupante.

A supposer que la Cour soit conduite, en raison de la manière dont le mur est construit, à

faire allusion à certaines questions qui relèvent du statut permanent (relatives à Jérusalem, ou aux

colonies de peuplement, par exemple), ce sera pour rappeler les obligations préexistantes découlant

des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité qui ont un caractère obligatoire et auxquelles il n’est pas

permis de déroger par des accords particuliers. S ous la réserve du respect d’obligations ayant ce

caractère, les deux parties sont libres, au cours de la négociation, et pourvu que leur consentement

ne soit pas vicié, d’opérer les négociations qu’elles jugeront opportunes pour aboutir à un statut de

paix définitif.

7. En conclusion de ce premier point, on peut dire que la demande d’avis adressée à la Cour

n’empêche en rien la négociation de se poursuivre et que, loin de perturber le processus de paix, la

Cour, par ses prononcés, l’encadrera en rappelant que ls sont les droits du peuple palestinien qui ne

peuvent être enfreints par la construction du mur.

Appeler de ses vŒux la négociation entre le loup et l’agneau doit s’accompagner d’un

minimum de protection pour l’agneau.

Je passe maintenant au second aspect de l’argument relatif à la feuille de route.

2. Il occulte le fait que c’est le mur qui enf reint gravement les obligations contenues dans la

feuille de route

8. La très grande majorité des Etats Membres de l’ONU a souligné que ce qui mettait en

péril le processus de paix, c’était non la demande d’avis, mais bien le mur construit par Israël.

Le processus de paix comporte, il ne fa ut pas l’oublier, l’accord intérimaire

israélo-palestinien sur la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza signé à Taba le 28 septembre 1995 47, qui

dispose en son article XI, que

47A/51/889, S/1997/357. - 60 -

«1. Les deux parties considèrent la Cisj ordanie et la bande de Gaza comme une
seule unité territoriale, dont l’intégrité et le statut seront préservés au cours de la

période intérimaire»

et, en son article XXXI, qu’

«7. Aucune des deux parties n’entreprend, ni ne prend de mesure à même de
modifier le statut de la Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza avant que les négociations
sur le statut permanent n’aboutissent.»

Ces dispositions sont au cŒur même du processus de paix.

La feuille de route contient, au surplus, une série de dispositions que l’exposé écrit de la

République française a mises, à juste titre, en lu mière. Je prends ici un certain nombre de

passages :

««Israël prend toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour aider à normaliser la vie des

Palestiniens» et «gèle toutes les activités d’implantation de colonies»;

«[l]e Gouvernement israélien ne prend aucune [mesure] susceptibl e de [saper]…la
confiance, notamment les expulsions,…,la saisie ou la destruction [d’habitations et]

de biens palestiniens …, [en tant que mesu re] … destinée à faciliter … la construction
de [bâtiments israéliens], la destruction d’institutions et d[e l]’infrastructures
palestiniennes…»».

9. Au lieu d’observer ces obligations, Israël, par la construction du mu r, tourne le dos au

droit du peuple palestinien à disposer de lui-même et, en même temps, sabote la feuille de route.

Comme l’exposé écrit de la Palestine l’a démontré 48

«a)dans la mesure où le mur se situe au-delà de la Ligne verte et est construit en
Territoire palestinien occupé, y compris Jérusalem-Est et ses alentours, il ampute

l’assiette territoriale sur laquelle le peuple palestinien est fondé à exercer son droit
à l’autodétermination. Dans la même mesure, le mur contrevient également au
principe juridique qui interdit l’acquisition de territoire par le recours à la force;

b) le tracé du mur est conçu pour modi fier la composition démographique du
Territoire palestinien occupé, y compris Jérusalem-Est, par le renforcement des
colonies de peuplement israéliennes situées en Territoire palestinien occupé et par

l’emploi de moyens destinés à faciliter leur expansion  au mépris du fait que ces
colonies sont elles-mêmes contraires au droit international;

c) par la création d’enclaves palestinienn es, le mur a pour effet manifeste et

prévisible le déplacement forcé de la population palestinienne, il vise à réduire et à
morceler l’assiette territoriale de la Pa lestine occupée et d’établir des secteurs
palestiniens non contigus assimilables a ux bantoustans, ce qu’interdit le droit
international;

d) le mur porte atteinte au droit du peuple palestinien à la souveraineté permanente
sur ses ressources naturelles et détruit le tissu économique de la vie du peuple
palestinien».

48Par. 548 et suiv. - 61 -

En un mot,

e) le mur compromet la praticabilité d’un Etat viable pour le peuple palestinien et
porte ainsi atteinte aux futures négoc iations basées sur le principe des
«deux Etats».»

En conclusion l’épouvantail de la feuille de route est une manŒuvre dont le but est

d’empêcher la Cour de dire le droit, au plus grand profit d’Israël qui en tirera argument pour

continuer impunément ses voies de fait en Territoire palestinien occupé.

J’en viens maintenant à la seconde partie de mon exposé consacrée aux expectatives

légitimes de l’Assemblée générale à recevoir un avis sur les aspects juridiques de la question.

II. Les expectatives légitimes de l’Assemblée générale à recevoir un avis
sur les aspects juridiques de la question

10. Les expectatives légitimes ont bien ét é décrites par la Cour dans l’affaire du Sahara

occidental, «Cet avis est requis pour aider l’Assemb lée générale à définir la politique de

décolonisation qu’elle adoptera à l’avenir.» 49

La Cour est appelée à aider l’Assemblée généra le dans la manière dont elle doit exercer sa

responsabilité à propos d’un territoire dont elle se préoccupe depuis 1947.

Dans ces conditions, que peut espérer l’Assemblée générale d’un avis de la Cour ?

11. En premier lieu que celle-c i la conforte dans l’invoca tion qu’elle a faite, dans ses

résolutions du 21octobre2003 et du 8décembre2003, de divers principes de droit international

pour condamner la construction du mur.

L’exposé écrit de la Palestine a, pour sa part, détaillé, en son chapitre12, les violations

spécifiques du droit international résultant de la construction de ce mur. On ne voudrait pas abuser

de la patience de la Cour en les reprenant ici in extenso.

12. En second lieu l’Assemblée espère que l’avis de la Cour dégagera les conséquences

juridiques découlant des graves violations du droit international imputables à Israël.

Il s’agit d’appliquer les prin cipes coutumiers en matière de responsabilité internationale.

C’est une matière qui est familière à la Cour. Sa jurisprudence a largement informé les articles de

la Commission du droit international consacrés a ux conséquences de la responsabilité. Il convient

de les envisager dans le chef de l’Etat d’Israël, et dans le chef des autres Etats.

49Affaire du Sahara occidental, avis consultatif du 16 octobre 1975, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 68, par. 161. - 62 -

Conséquences juridiques pour l’Etat Israël

13. En ce qui concerne Israël tout d’abor d, la première conséquence est l’obligation de

cessation.

Israël est tenu de cesser immédiatement de poser tous les actes internationaux illicites

découlant de l’édification, de la planification et de la gestion du mur dans le Territoire palestinien

occupé, y compris Jérusalem-Est.

Israël est également tenu de s’y abstenir de prendre toute autre mesure modifiant, ou visant à

modifier, le statut juridique, la structure institu tionnelle, le caractère géographique et historique

ainsi que la composition géographique de la zone fermée ou d’un secteur de cette zone, ou de toute

mesure qui porterait atteinte aux droits des Palestin iens ou du peuple palestin ien. En particulier,

Israël a l’obligation de s’abstenir de transférer da ns ce secteur une partie de sa population civile et

d’entraîner le déplacement de la population palestin ienne hors de la zone visée. Il doit y appliquer

les obligations que lui imposent les résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité.

14. La seconde conséquence est l’obligation de restitution c’est-à-dire de rétablissement du

statu quo ante.

A cet effet, Israël doit démanteler immédiatement toutes les portions du mur, situées en

Territoire palestinien occupé, qui franchissent la Li gne verte, et supprimer le régime qui y est

associé. Israël est notamment tenu de rapporter to utes les mesures et pratiques administratives et

législatives adoptées en rapport avec la construction, la gestion et la planification du mur, ceci

inclus l’expropriation des terres et des biens situés dans le secteur considéré. Il doit rendre à leurs

propriétaires tous les biens saisis ou réquisitionnés. Il doit leur rendre leurs oliviers si c’est

possible.

Il est tenu d’annuler toutes les mesures de restrictions imposées à la circulation des

personnes et des biens et aux activités des organismes humanitaires.

En outre, Israël a l’obligation de procéder immédiatement au rapatriement de sa population

civile qui s’est installée dans les zones adjacen tes au mur à l’intérieur du Territoire palestinien

occupé depuis le début de la c onstruction du mur et de démanteler les colonies établies dans le

secteur considéré. Il doit assurer et faciliter le re tour immédiat, en toute circonstance, des civils

palestiniens ayant dû quitter le secteur considéré et libérer les personnes détenues en raison de la

construction et de l’entretien par Israël du régime d’administration associé au mur. - 63 -

15. En conformité avec son obligation de répa rer les dommages causés, Israël à l’obligation

d’indemniser intégralement les préjudices subis par les personnes lésées pour tous les préjudices

matériels et personnels subis à la suite de la violation par Israël de ses obligations internationales.

16. Enfin, en conformité avec ses obligations en vertu du droit international humanitaire, de

respecter et de faire respecter la quatrième conven tion de Genève, Israël a aussi des obligations en

matière pénale. Il doit rechercher et traduire devant ses tribunaux les personnes suspectées d’avoir

commis ou d’avoir ordonné que soient commis de graves manquements au droit international

humanitaire; il doit prendre les mesures nécessai res pour empêcher tous autres manquements au

droit international humanitaire qui découlent de la c onstruction, de la gestion et de la planification

du mur.

Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats autres qu’Israël

17. Cette matière est classique depuis l’avis de la Cour rendu dans l’affaire de la Namibie.

En conséquence des graves manquements au droit in ternational par l’Etat d’Israël, les autres Etats

ont :

 l’obligation de coopérer, les uns avec les autres, ainsi qu’avec les NationsUnies et les autres

organismes internationaux compétents, en vue de mettre fin à ces violations;

 l’obligation de ne pas reconnaître les situations illicites qui découlent de ces violations;

 l’obligation de ne pas prêter aide et assistance au maintien de ces situations.

18. Si Israël persiste dans son refus d’appliquer les règles de droit international susdites et ne

se plie pas aux conséquences de sa responsabilité, l’Assemblée générale est en droit d’attendre que

le Conseil de sécurité prenne les mesures coercitiv es qui s’imposent et qui, s’agissant de violations

de règles de droit impératif, ne devraient pas pouvoir faire l’objet de l’usage de veto par un membre

quelconque du Conseil.

Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, le présent exposé clôture les

plaidoiries orales de la Palestine; il m’appartient au nom de tous ceux qui vi ennent de s’exprimer à

cette barre de remercier la Cour de sa bienveillante attention. - 64 -

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Salmon. This concludes the oral statement and

comments of Palestine. The oral proceedings will resume this afternoon at 3o’clock in order for

South Africa, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh to be heard on the question submitted to the

Court. The sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 1.00 p.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le lundi 23 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Shi, président

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