Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
Courinternationale InternationalCourt
deJustice ofJustice
LAHAYE THE HAGUE
Audiencepublique
tenue le vendredi15mars2002,Oheures,au Palais delaPaix,
souslaprésidence M. Guillaume,président,
en l'affairedela Frontière teet maritime entrele Camerounet leNigéria
(Camerounc.Nigéria;Guinéeéquatoria(intervenant))
COMPTE RENDU
YEAR2002
Publicsitting
heldon Friday15March2002,at IOa.m, at thePeacePalace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding,
in thecaseconcerning theLand andMaritimendarybetweenCameroonand Nigeria
(Cameroon v.Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)
VERBATIMRECORDPrésents:M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Ranjeva
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby,juges
MM. Mbaye
Ajibola,juges adhoc
M. Couvreur,greffierPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Ranjeva
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Judgesad hoc Mbaye
Ajibola
Registrar CouvreurLe Gouvernementdela République duCamerounest représentp éar :
S.Exc. M. Amadou Ali,ministre d7Etatchargéde lajustice, garde dessceaux,
commeagent;
M. Maurice Kamto, doyen de la faculté dessciencesjuridiques et politiques de l'universitéde
Yaoundé II,membrede laCommissiondu droitinternational,avocataubarreau de Paris,
M. PeterY.Ntamark, professeur à la facultédes sciencesjuridiqueset politiques del'universitéde
YaoundéII,Barrister-at-Law, membrede 1'InnerTemple,ancien doyen,
comme coagents, conseilset avocats;
M.Alain Pellet, professeuràl'universitéde ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien présidentde la
Commissiondu droit international,
commeagent adjoint,conseil et avocat;
M.Joseph Marie Bipoun Woum, professeur à la facultédes sciences juridiques et politiques de
l'université deYaoundé II,ancienministre, ancien doyen,
commeconseiller spécialet avocat;
M. Michel Aurillac, ancienministre, conseillerdYEt onoraire,avocat enretraite,
M.Jean-Pierre Cot, professeur l'université dParis 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne)a,ncienministre,
M.Maurice Mendelson,Q.C.,professeurémérite de l'universitéde Londres,Barrister-at-Law,
M.Malcolm N. Shaw, professeurà la faculté dedroit de l'universitéde Leicester, titulaire de la
chaire sirRobertJennings,Barrister-at-Law,
M.Bruno Simma, professeur à l'université de Munich, membre dela Commission du droit
international,
M. ChristianTomuschat, professeur à l'universitéHumbold de Berlin, ancien membre et ancien
présidentde la Commissiondu droitinternational,
M. Olivier Corten, professeuàla Facultéde droitde l'université lideBruxelles,
M.Daniel Khan,chargédecours àl'Institutde droit internationalde l'universitéde Munich,
M.Jean-Marc Thouvenin, professeur à l'université deParis X-Nanterre, avocat au barreau de
Paris, sociétd'avocats Lysias,
commeconseils etavocats;TheGovernmentof the Republicof Cameroonis representedby:
H.E.Mr. AmadouAli, Ministerof State responsible forJustice, Keeperof the Seals,
as Agent;
Mr. Maurice Kamto, Dean,Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof YaoundéII,
memberof the InternationalLaw Commission,Avocatat the Paris Bar,LysiasLawAssociates,
Mr. Peter Y. Ntamark, Professor, Facultyof Law and Political Science, Universityof YaoundéII,
Barrister-at-Law, member ofthe InnerTemple,formerDean,
as Co-Agents,CounselandAdvocates;
Mr. Alain Pellet,Professor, University ofParis X-Nanterre,member and former Chairmanof the
InternationalLaw Commission,
as DeputyAgent, Counseland Advocate;
Mr. Joseph-MarieBipoun Woum, Professor, Facultyof Law and Political Science, Universityof
YaoundéII, formerMinister, former Dean,
as SpecialAdviserandAdvocate;
Mr.MichelAurillac, former Minister,HonoraryConseillerd'État,retiredAvocat,
Mr.Jean-PierreCot, Professor, Universityof Paris 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne)f,ormer Minister,
Mr.Maurice Mendelson,Q.C., EmeritusProfessorUniversityof London,Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Malcolm N. Shaw, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law, Facultyof Law,
UniversityofLeicester, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor, University of Munich, member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Professor, Humboldt University of Berlin, former member and
Chairman, International Law Commission,
Mr.Olivier Corten, Professor,Faculty ofLaw, Universitélibrede Bruxelles,
Mr.DanielKhan,Lecturer,InternationalLaw Institute,Universityof Munich,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Professor,University ofParis.X-Nanterre, Avocatat the Paris Bar,
Lysias Law Associates,
as Counseland Advocates;Sir IanSinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law, ancien membre de la Commission du droit
international,
M. EricDiarnantis,avocat aubarreaude Paris,Moquet,Bordes & Associés,
M. Jean-Pierre Mignard,avocataubarreaudeParis, sociétéd'avocats Lysias,
M. JosephTjop, consultantà la sociétd'avocats Lysias,chercheurau Centre de droit international
deNanterre (CEDIN), UniversitéParis X-Nanterre,
commeconseils;
M. PierreSemengue, générad l'armée, contrôleur général des armé aec,ien chef d'état-major des
armées,
M. JamesTataw, générad le division, conseillerlogistique,ancien chefd'état-majorde l'arméede
terre,
S. Exc.MmeIsabelle Bassong, ambassadeur du Cameroun auprès des pays du Benelux et de
l'Unioneuropéenne,
S. Exc.M.Biloa Tang,ambassadeurduCamerounen France,
S. Exc.M.Martin Belinga Eboutou, ambassadeur, représentan ptermanent du Camerounauprès de
l'organisation desNations Unieà New York,
M. EtienneAteba, ministre-conseiller, chargé d'affaires a.i.à l'ambassade du Cameroun,
à LaHaye,
M. RobertAkamba, administrateur civilprincipal, chargéde mission au secrétariatgénéral e la
présidencede laRépublique,
M. Anicet Abanda Atangana, attachéau secrétariatgénéral de la présidence dela République,
chargéde cours àl'universitéde YaoundéII,
M. ErnestBodo Abanda,directeurdu cadastre,membredela commissionnationale des frontières,
M. OusmaneMey, anciengouvemeur deprovince,
Le chef Samuel Moka Liffafa Endeley, magistrat honoraire,Barrister-at-Law, membredu Middle
Temple(Londres), ancienprésidentde lachambreadministrativede la Coursuprême,
MeMarcSassen,avocatet conseiljuridique, sociétéPetten, Tideman& Sassen(LaHaye),
M. Francis Fai Yengo, ancien gouvemeur de province, directeur de l'organisationdu territoire,
ministère del'administration territoriale,
M. JeanMbenoun, directeurde l'administrationcentraleau secrétariat générdle la présidencede
laRépublique,Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,Barrister-at-Law, former member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. EricDiamantis, Avocatatthe Paris Bar,Moquet,Bordes & Associés,
Mr. Jean-PierreMignard,Avocat atthe Paris Bar,LysiasLaw Associates,
Mr. Joseph Tjop, Consultant to Lysias Law Associates, Researcher at the Centre de droit
internationaldeNanterre (CEDIN), Universityof ParisX-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
General Pierre Semengue, Controller-Generalof the Armed Forces, former Head of Staff of the
Armed Forces,
Major-GeneralJamesTataw, LogisticsAdviser,FormerHead of Staffof the Amy,
H.E. Ms IsabelleBassong,Ambassadorof Cameroonto the BeneluxCountriesand to the European
Union,
H.E. Mr. Biloa Tang,Ambassadorof Cameroonto France,
H.E. Mr. Martin Belinga Eboutou, Ambassador,Permanent Representativeof Cameroon to the
UnitedNationsinNew York,
Mr. Etienne Ateba, Minister-Counsellor, Chargéd'affaires a.i. at the Embassy of Cameroon,
The Hague,
Mr. Robert Akamba,Principal Civil Administrator,Chargé demission, GeneralSecretariatof the
PresidencyoftheRepublic,
Mr. AnicetAbandaAtangana, Attaché to the GeneralSecretariatofthe Presidencyof theRepublic,
Lecturer,Universityof Yaoundé II,
Mr. Ernest Bodo Abanda, Director of the Cadastral Survey, member, National Boundary
Commission,
Mr. OusmaneMey,formerProvincial Govemor,
Chief Samuel Moka Liffafa Endeley, Honorary Magistrate, Barrister-at-Law, memberof the
Middle Temple (London), former Presidentof the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme
Court,
Maître MarcSassen,AdvocateandLegalAdviser,Petten, Tideman & Sassen(The Hague),
Mr. FrancisFai Yengo,formerProvincialGovemor,Director, Organisation du Territoire,Ministry
of TerritorialAdministration,
Mr. Jean Mbenoun,Director, Central Administration,General Secretariatof the Presidency of the
Republic,M. EdouardEtoundi, directeurde l'administration centraleau secrétariat géndle la présidence
de laRépublique,
M. RobertTanda, diplomate,ministère desrelationsextérieures
commeconseillers;
M. SamuelBetah Sona,ingénieur-géologue e,xpert consultantde l'organisation desNationsUnies
pour le droitde lamer,
M.Thomson Fitt Takang, chef de service d'administrationcentrale au secrétariatgénéralde la
présidencede la République,
M. Jean-JacquesKoum,directeurde l'exploration, sociééationaledeshydrocarbures(SNH),
M. Jean-Pierre Meloupou, capitaine de frégate,chef de la division Afrique au ministèrede la
défense,
M. PaulMobyEtia, géographe,directeurdel'Institutnationalde cartographie,
M.AndréLoudet, ingénieurcartographe,
M. AndréRoubertou, ingénieurgénéral del'armement, hydrographe,
commeexperts;
MmeMarieFlorenceKollo-Efon,traducteurinterprèteprincipal,
commetraducteurinterprète;
Mlle CélineNegre, chercheurau Centre de droitinternationalde Nanterre (CEDIN), Universide
ParisX-Nanterre
Mlle SandrineBarbier, chercheurau Centrede droit internationaldeNanterre (CEDIN),Université
de ParisX-Nanterre,
M. Richard Penda Keba, professeur certifié d'histoire, cabinetdu ministre de lajustice, ancien
proviseurde lycées,
commeassistantsde recherche;
M. BoukarOumara,
M. Guy RogerEba'a,
M. AristideEsso,
M.NkendeForbinake,
M. NfanBile,Mr. Edouard Etoundi, Director, Central Administration, GenerS alecretariat of the Presidency of
the Republic,
Mr. RobertTanda,diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Samuel BetahSona,Geological Engineer, Consulting Expertto the UnitedNations forthe Law
ofthe Sea,
Mr. ThomsonFitt Takang, Department Head, CentralAdministration, General Secretariatof the
Presidency ofthe Republic,
Mr. Jean-JacquesKoum, Directorof Exploration, National HydrocarbonsCompany(SNH),
Commander Jean-PierreMeloupou,Headof AfiicaDivisionatthe Ministryof Defence,
Mr. PaulMoby Etia,Geographer,Director,Institutnational decartographie,
Mr. AndréLoudet,CartographicEngineer,
Mr. André Roubertou, Marine Engineer, Hydrographer,
asExperts;
Ms MarieFlorenceKollo-Efon, Principal Translator-Interpreter,
Ms Céline Negre, Researcher,Centre d'études dedroit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof ParisX-Nanterre,
Ms Sandrine Barbier, Researcher, Centred'étudesde droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
UniversityofParis X-Nanterre,
Mr. Richard Penda Keba, Certified Professor of History, cabinet of the Minister of State for
Justice, formerHead ofHigh School,
as ResearchAssistants;
Mr.Boukar Oumara,
Mr. GuyRogerEba7a,
Mr.Aristide Esso,
Mr. Nkende Forbinake,
Mr.Nfan Bile,M. EithelMbocka,
M. OlingaNyozo'o,
commeresponsablesdela communication;
Mme RenéeBakker,
Mme LawrencePolirsztok,
MmeMireilleJung,
Mme TeteBéatrice Epeti-Kame,
commesecrétairesde la délégation.
Le Gouvernementdela République fédérale duNigéria estreprésentépar :
S. Exc. l'honorableMusa E. Abdullahi, ministre d7Etat,ministre de la Justice du Gouvernement
fédéradlu Nigéria,
comme agent;
Le chefRichardAkinjide SAN,ancien Attorney-General de la Fédérationm , embre du barreau
d'Angleterreet dupays deGalles, ancienmembrede la Commissiondu droit international,
M. Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim SAN, CON,commissaire pour les frontières internationales,
commission nationaledesfrontièresduNigéria, ancienAttorney-Generalde la Fédération,
comme coagents;
MmeNella Andem-Ewa,Attorney-Generaletcommissaire à lajustice, Etat de CrossRiver,
M. IanBrownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre du
barreau d'Angleterre, membrede l'Institutde droit international,
SirArthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre,membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
M.JamesCrawford,S.C.,professeurde droitinternational àl'universitéde Cambridge,titulaire de
la chaire Whewell,membre des barreaux d'Angleterre et d'Australie,membre de l'Institutde
droit international,
M. GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire à l'Institut universitairede hautes études
internationalesde Genève,membre del'Institutde droit international,
M.AlastairMacdonald, géomètre a,nciendirecteurde I'OrdnanceSuwey,Grande-Bretagne,
comme conseilset avocats;
M. TimothyH.Daniel, associéc ,abinetD. J.Freeman, Solicitors,Cityde Londres,Mr. EithelMbocka
Mr. Olinga Nyozo'o,
as MediaOficers;
Ms RenéBakker,
Ms Lawrence Polirsztok,
Ms Mireille Jung,
Mr.NigelMcCollum,
Ms TeteBéatriceEpeti-Kame,
asSecretaries.
The Governmentof the FederalRepublicofNigeria is representedby:
H.E.the HonourableMusa E.Abdullahi, Minister ofStatefor Justiceof the Federal Government of
Nigeria,
asAgent;
Chief Richard Akinjide SAN, Former Attorney-Generao lf the Federation, Memberof the Bar of
Englandand Wales, former Memberofthe InternationalLaw Commission,
AlhajiAbdullahi Ibrahim SAN, CON, Commissioner, International Boundaries, National Boundary
CommissionofNigeria, Former Attorney-Generalofthe Federation,
as Co-Agents;
Mrs. Nella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-Generaa lnd Comrnissioner for Justice, Cross River State,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., Member of the International Law Commission, Memberof the
EnglishBar, Memberof theInstitute of International Law,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Member of the English Bar, Member of the Institute of
International Law,
Mr. James Crawford,S.C., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge,
Memberof theEnglish and Australian Bars, Memberofthe Instituteof InternationalLaw,
Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Honorary Professor,Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,
Memberof theInstitute of InternationalLaw,
Mr. Alastair Macdonald, Land Surveyor,Former Director, OrdnancS eurvey,GreatBntain,
as Counseland Advocates;
Mr. TimothyH.Daniel,Partner,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,M. AlanPerry, associé,cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
M. DavidLerer,solicitor, cabinetD.J.Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
M. Christopher Hackford,solicitor,cabinetD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
Mme CharlotteBreide,solicitor, cabinetD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
M. NedBeale, stagiaire, cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
M. GeoffreyMarston, directeur du départementdes étudesjuridiques au Sidney Sussex College,
Universitéde Cambridge,membredubarreaud'Angleterreet duPaysde Galles,
M. MaxwellGidado, assistant spécialprincipal du président pour les affaires juridiques et
constitutionnelles,ancienAttorney-Generalet commissairà laJustice, Etat d'Adamaoua,
M. A. O.Cukwurah,conseil adjoint, ancienconseiller en matière de frontières(ASOP) auprès du
Royaumedu Lesotho, ancien commissairepour les frontières inter-Etats, commissionnationale
desfrontières,
M. 1.Ayua,membrede l'équipe juridiqueduNigéria,
M. K.A.Adabale,directeurpourle droitinternationalet le droitcomparé,ministèrede lajustice,
M. JalalArabi, membrede l'équipe juridiqueduNigéria,
M. GbolaAkinola,membredel'équipejuridique duNigéra,
M. K.M.Tumsah, assistantspécialdu directeur générad le la commission nationale des frontières
et secrétairede l'équipe juridique,
commeconseils;
S. Exc.l'honorable DubemOnyia,ministred'Etat,ministredes affairesétrangères,
M. AlhajiDahiru Bobbo,directeurgénéralc,ommissionnationaledesfrontières,
M. F.A. Kassim, directeurgénérad lu servicecartographiquede la Fédération,
M. AlhajiS.M. Diggi,directeurdes frontièresinternationales,commissionnationaledes frontières,
M. A. B.Maitama,colonel,ministèrede ladéfense,
M. AliyiuNasir, assistantspécialdu ministred'Etat,ministrede la Justice,
commeconseillers;
M. ChrisCarleton,C.B.E.,bureauhydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. DickGent,bureauhydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. CliveSchofield,unitéde recherchesurlesfrontièresinternationales,Université de Durham,
M. ScottB. Edmonds,directeurdesopérationscartographiques,International MappingAssociates,Mr. AlanPerry, Partner,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,City ofLondon,
Mr. DavidLerer, Solicitor,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,
Mr. ChristopherHackford, Solicitor,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,City ofLondon,
Ms CharlotteBreide, Solicitor,D.J.Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
Mr.Ned Beale,Trainee, D. J. Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
Dr. Geofiey Marston, Fellowof Sidney Sussex College, University oCf ambridge; Memberofthe
Bar ofEngland and Wales,
Mr. MaxwellGidado, SeniorSpecial Assistantto the President(Legal andConstitutionalMatters),
Former Attorney-Generaland Commissioner for Justice,AdamawaState,
Mr. A. O. Cukwurah, Co-Counsel, Former UN (OPAS) Boundary Adviser to the Kingdom of
Lesotho,Former Commissioner, Inter-State Boundaries, National Boundary Commission,
Mr. 1.Ayua,Member, NigerianLegalTeam,
Mr. K.A.Adabale, Director(Internationaland Comparative Law) Ministryof Justice,
Mr. Jalal Arabi, Member,Nigerian LegalTeam,
Mr. GbolaAkinola, Member, NigerianLegal Team,
Mr. K. M. Tumsah, Special Assistantto Director-General,National Boundary Commission and
Secretaryto the LegalTeam,
H.E.theHonourableDubemOnyia, Ministerof Statefor Foreign Affairs,
AlhajiDahiruBobbo, Director-General, National Boundary Commission,
Mr. F. A.Kassim, Surveyor-General ofthe Federation,
Alhaji S.M.Diggi, Director(International Boundaries), National Boundary Commission,
ColonelA.B. Maitama,Ministry ofDefence,
Mr. AliyuNasir, SpecialAssistanttothe Ministerof StateforJustice,
asAdvisers;
Mr. ChrisCarleton, C.B.E.,UnitedKingdomHydrographic Office,
Mr. DickGent,United KingdomHydrographic Office,
Mr. Clive Schofield,International Boundaries Research Unit, Universyf Durham,
Mr. Scott B.Edmonds,Director ofCartographieOperations, InternationalMappingAssociates,M.Robert C.Rizzutti, cartographeprincipal,International MappingAssociates,
M.Bruce Daniel,International MappingAssociates,
MmeVictoriaJ.Taylor, internationalMappingAssociates,
MmeStephanieKim Clark,International MappingAssociates,
M.Robin Cleverly,ExplorationManager, NPAGroup,
MmeClaireAinsworth,NPAGroup,
commeconseillers scienti$queset techniques;
M. MohammedJibrilla, experten informatique, commissionnationale des frontières,
MmeCoralieAyad, secrétaire,cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
MmeClaire Goodacre, secrétaire,cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City deLondres,
MmeSarahBickell,secrétaire,cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
MmeMichelleBurgoine, spécialisteen technologie de l'information, cabinet D. J.Freeman,
Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
commepersonnel administratg
M.Geofiey Anika,
M.Mau Onowu,
M.Austeen Elewodalu,
M. UsmanMagawata,
commeresponsables dela communication.
Le Gouvernementde la République deGuinée équatoriale, que ist autoriséeà intervenirdans
L'instance,estreprésentépar:
S.Exc. M. RicardoMangue ObamaN'Fube, ministre d'Etat, ministre du travail et de la sécurité
sociale,
commeagent et conseil;
S.Exc.M. RubénMaye NsueMangue, ministre de la justice et des cultes, vice-présidentde la
commissionnationale desfrontières,
S.Exc. M. CristobalMafianaElaNcharna,ministredes mines et de l'énergie,vice-présidentde la
commissionnationale desfrontières,
M.DomingoMbaEsono, directeur national de la société nationale de pétrole de
Guinéeéquatoriale,membrede la commissionnationale desfrontières,Mr.Robert C.Rimtti, SeniorMapping Specialist, International appingAssociates,
Mr.Bruce Daniel, International Mapping Associates,
Ms VictoriaJ.Taylor, International Mapping Associates,
Ms StephanieKimClark,InternationalMappingAssociates,
Dr.Robin Cleverly, Exploration ManagerN, PA Group,
Ms ClaireAinsworth,NPA Group,
as Scientificand TechnicalAdvisers;
Mr.MohammedJibrilla,ComputerExpert, National BoundaryCommission,
Ms CoralieAyad,Secretary, D. J. Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
MsClaire Goodacre,Secretary, D. J.Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
Ms SarahBickell, Secretary,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors, CityofLondon,
MsMichelleBurgoine, ITSpecialist,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
asAdministrators,
Mr. GeoffreyAnika,
Mr.Mau Onowu,
Mr.Austeen Elewodalu,
Mr. UsmanMagawata,
as MediaOifficers.
TheGovernmentof the RepublicofEquatorialGuinea,whichhas beenpermitted to intervenein
the case,isrepresentedby:
H.E.Mr. Ricardo MangueObamaN7Fube,Ministerof State forLaborand SocialSecurity,
as Agent andCounsel;
H.E. Mr. RubénMaye Nsue Mangue, Ministerof Justice and Religion, Vice-Presidentof the
National BoundaryCommission,
H.E. Mr. Cristobal Maiiana Ela Nchama, Ministerof Mines and Energy, Vice-Presidentof the
National BoundaryCommission,
Mr. Domingo Mba Esono, National Director of the Equatorial Guinea National Petroleum
Company,Memberof theNational Boundary Commission,M. Antonio Nzambi Nlonga,Attorney-General,
commeconseillers;
M. Pierre-MarieDupuy, professeur de droit international publià l'université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) eàl'Institutuniversitaire eurode Florence,
M. DavidA. Colson, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau de 1'Etatde Californie et du barreau du district de
Columbia,
commeconseilset avocats;
Sir DerekBowett,
commeconseilprincipal,
M. DerekC. Smith, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreau de 17Etat
de Virginie,
commeconseil;
MmeJannette E.Hasan, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreaude 17Etatde
Floride,
M. Hervé Blatry, membredu cabinetLeBoeuf, Lamb,Greene & MacRae,L.L.P.,Paris, avocaà la
Cour,membre du barreau de Paris,
commeexpertsjuridiques,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop,Sovereign GeographInc.,Chape1Hill, CarolineduNord,
M. AlexanderM.Tait,EquatorGraphies,SilverSpring,Maryland,
commeexpertstechniques.Mr. AntonioNzambi Nlonga, Attorney-General,
asAdvisers;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law atthe University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas)andat the European University Institutein Florence,
Mr. DavidA. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,Washington,D.C., member of
the California StateBarand Districtof ColumbiaBar,
asCounsel andAdvocates;
Sir DerekBowett,
asSenior Counsel;
Mr. DerekC. Smith, LeBoeuf,Lamb,Greene & MacRae,L.L.P.,Washington,D.C.,memberof the
Districtof ColumbiaBar and Virginia StateBar,
asCounsel;
Ms JannetteE. Hasan, LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae,L.L.P., Washington,D.C., member of
theDistrictof Columbia BarandFloridaStateBar,
Mr. HervéBlatry, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene& MacRae, L.L.P.,Paris, Avocatàla Cour, memberof
the Paris Bar,
asLegal Experts;
Mr. CoalterG. Lathrop, Sovereign GeographicInc., Chape1Hill, North Carolina,
Mr. AlexanderM.Tait,Equator Graphics,Silver Spring, Maryland,
as TechnicalExperts. Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. L'audience est ouverteet je donnetout de suitela
parole au nomde la République fédérad luNigéria,M. leprofesseurGeorgesAbi-Saab.
M. ABI-SAAB :
LA RESPONSABILITÉ INTERNATIONALE
1.Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieursde la Cour,mes proposce matin ontpourbut
de revisiter rapidement la question du fardeaude la preuve dans le cadre de la demande en
responsabilité du Cameroun. Ce qui m'induit à le faire, ce sont les remarques du
professeurTomuschat quirévèlent quenos contradicteurs n'ont pas compris,ou n'ont pas voulu
comprendre, ce que j'ai dit, et qu'ils continuenà entretenir une certaine confusion entre les
considérations de droitet les considérationsde fait de sorte que je me trouve donc obligéde
reformuler brièvementmes propos à ce sujet, en termes très simples, enespérant dissiperla
confusionainsicréée.
2. Il n'y a pasde controversesur lefaitquec'est le Cameroun quiest la Partie demanderesse
dans la présenteaffaire, ayant introduit l'instancepar une requête unilatéraleconformément à
l'article 36, paragraphe2, du Statut. Cela recouvre toutes lesdemandes du Cameroun,y compris
les demandesenresponsabilité. Selon larèglelaplus fondamentaleenmatièredepreuve, lacharge
de la preuve incombe àla partie demanderesse.
3. Le professeur Tomuschatnous déclaredès l'ouverture desa plaidoirie du lundi Il mars
(CR 2002116, p. 51, par. 1) que «La responsabilitédu Nigeria résulteprincipalement de son
invasion de la péninsule de Balcassi...)) Ailleurs, il nous dit que «Bakassi a étéoccupé
militairement))(ibid., p. 54, par. Il interjettepar la suite uneproposition normati:«La seule
présence de troupes surun territoire étranger est en lui-mêmela preuve concluante de la
responsabilité))(ibid.,p. 62,par.),pour arriverà la fin desaplaidoiriàla conclusion suivante:
«des troupes ainsi que des forces de sécuriténigérianessont déployées tant dans la
péninsulede Bakassi que dans un largesecteur du lacTchad, chaquefois en territoire
camerounais où elles n'ont aucun droitde présence. Cette présence constitue à elle
seule un fait intemationalement illicite.)) (Ibid., p. 71, par. 53; les italiques sont de
nous.)
4. Ces affirmationsaudacieusessontbaséessur des présomptions postuléespar le Cameroun
quant aux auxfaits et quant audroit,et quisont i) qu'il y a eu effectivement«invasion» et «occupation» militaires, ou pour employer les
termes plus neutres du professeur Corten «un déploiementet stationnement de troupes
nigérianes));
ii) que ce déploiementet stationnementdetroupes se sont faitsdansun territoirequi était,au
moment du déploiement, effectivemenc tontrôlé et administrpar le Cameroun, et qu'ils
sesont dérouléc sontre songré,c'est-à-direpar la force.
Ce sont là deux présomptionsquant aux faits; la troisièmeprésomptioncamerounaiseest
quantau droit,à savoir :
iii) quece territoireappartientendroit au Camerounde manièreclaireet incontestable.
5. Or, comme il ne s'agit pas de présomptionsjuridiques, c'est-à-dire des présomptions
édictéespar le droit, et qui, par conséquent, renversentla charge de preuve, il incombe au
demandeur,le Cameroun,de prouverleur véracité, commte oute autre affirmationqu'il émetpour
soutenir sa demande en justice. Mais le Cameroun ne l'a pas fait jusqu'à cette heure tardive,
presque à lafin de laprocédureorale. Permettez-moide m'expliquer.
6. La troisième présomption duCameroun,cellequantau droit, à savoir queBakassi comme
les autres points en litige appartiennent en droit, sans conteste, au Cameroun, assume que la
présenteaffaire a déjàdébouché sur uneissue favorableau Cameroun,et que la situationjuridique
était aussiclaireau momentdu déroulement des faits. Maic s'estune issueloin d'êtreacquise. Les
deux Parties ont soumis à la Cour ce qu'elles considèrentcomme leurs titres juridiquesrespectifs,
et la Cour tranchera. C'est lepropre d'un différendterritorial ou frontalier que de mettre en
présence desprétentionscontradictoiresquant autitre au territoireou quantà une certainelignede
frontière. Etsi le jugement, pour des raisons juridiques évidentes, est censé avoir un effet
déclaratoire,on ne peut, par préséancep,révoirce qu'il révèlera ou déclarera, avantqu'il ne soit
prononcé.
7. Mais entre-temps,c'est là où c'est importantpour nous, ce qui compte dans ce type de
situation,(et je m'excusede répéteurn peu ce que j'avais dit déjàvendredipassé),ce qui compte
en présenced'un différend territorialou frontalier, cen'est pas tantle titre contestépar les deux
parties et dont le sortne sera révéde manière définitiveque plustard, par lejugement ou par unaccordentrelesparties. Cequi compte,c'est le contrôleet l'administration paisible du territ,tree
quidéterminele statuquoprotégé par le droit.
8. C'est une solution conforme auxbesoins de la sécurité juridique et qui s'accordeavec
l'interprétationla plus autoriséede l'article 2, paragraphe 4, de la Charte, figurant dans la
déclaration relative aux principes de droit international touchant aux relations amicales
(résolution2625 XXV de l'Assembléegénérale,1970)' ainsi que c'est en conformitéavec la
pratiqueduConseilde sécurité, quje'ai citéedansma premièreintervention.
9. Celam'amène àla secondeprésomptiondu Cameroun,postulant quele territoire,objet de
l'invasion et de l'occupation par les troupes et les forces de l'ordre nigérianes, était coétrôle
administrépar le Cameroun, aumomentoù cettesupposéeinvasion a eu lieu.
10.Et c'est là que le bât blesse l'autre Partie. Car, plutôt que de fournirdes preuvesde sa
présence effectiveà Bakassipar des signes visibles de son contrôle et de sonadministrationréelle
de ce territoiretitre de souverain,le Cameroun,Partie demanderesse,doncayant la chargede la
preuve, s'est contentéd'invoquer des titres contestables et contestéspar le Nigéria. Età où il
présente cequ'il considère comme des élémentd se preuve, c'est par exemple une pièce de
législationpour changer en bloc la toponymiedu territoire contesté, dontje vous laisse en tirer la
conclusion.
11. Le Nigéria,en revanche, bien que Partie défenderesse,s'est efforcéde démontreren
détail,par une abondance de preuves, qu'il a toujours étél,ui comme ses prédécesseurs,résentà
Bakassi,qu'ils ontadministré en tantquepuissance publique,à titre de souverain,sansinterruption
jusqu'àprésent,avec la fermeconvictionqu'il s'agitd'unepartiedu territoirenational.
12. Cela m'amène enfin à la première présomptiondu Cameroun, qu'il y a eu en fait
invasion et occupation du territoire. Or, la vérification decette présomptiondépendde la
vérificationde la seconde, concernant le contrôle et l'administration effectivedu territoire. Car,
envahirveut dire s'introduire parla forcechez autrui. On n'envahitpas un territoirequ'oncontrôle
et qu'on gouvernedéjà. Ainsi, la qualificationjuridique du déploiementet du stationnement des
troupes dépendde l'identité dugouvernementqui contrôleetadministreleterritoire. Silestroupes
appartiennent à ce mêmegouvernement, il s'agit simplement de l'exercice de la puissancepublique, et non pas d'une invasion. C'est seulement si ces troupes appartiennent à un autre
gouvernementetqu'elles se déploiens tansson consentement, qu'on peut parler d'invasion.
13. Ainsi, en l'espèce, bienque l'administration nigériane de Bakassi étaittout à fait
adéquateet adaptéeaux besoins de la région, cesbesoins étaient limités et nermes de présence
militaireet de forces de sécurité aprèlsa fin de la guerre civile. Cependant,vers la fin de 1993,
pour desraisons internesdéjàexpliquéesdans lesécrituresdu Nigéria (duplique, p. 118,par 3..131
et suiv.) quemonéminentcollègueetami leprofesseur Brownlie aexposéesen détail hier- et
qui onttraità un différendentredeuxEtatsde la Fédération nigériaq nuei menaçaitde dégénérer en
conflitouvert, leGouvernementfédéral d aû renforcersa présencemilitaire àBakassi; mais c'était
égalementpour protégerla populationdesincursionscroissanteset du harcèlementdes gendarmes
camerounais. Un renforcementd'une présence déje àxistante dans une région administrép ear le
Nigéria,relevant du maintien de l'ordre etde la défensedu territoire; fonctions normalesde tout
gouvernement.
14.En fait,les plaidoiriesorales camerounaisesreconnaissent,bien que de manièreoblique,
ces faits. Ainsi,le professeur Thouvenin, dans sa plaidoirie du mardi 26 février(CR2002/16,
p. 48, par. 11)'nous informe qu'à partir de décembre 1990, les autoritéscamerounaisesont reçu
des informations alarmantes selon lesquellelsa marine nigériane s'est positionnéeà Jabane. Les
autorités camerounaises n'y étaient do pas et ontdû attendre que les nouvelles leurparviennent.
Quelques paragraphesplus loin, le professeurThouvenin nous dit : «le poste d71dabatofut
pleinement opérationned lèsle 4 janvier 1994))(ibid.,p. 50, par. 19). La séquencechronologique
est intéressante,ellenous indiquequi étaitdéjàlàetqui s'est introduitpar la suite.
15. Cela m'amène à mon dernier point,qui est la qualificationjuridique de ce que le
Cameroun considèrecomme «le fait intemationalement illicite)) etl'interprétationde la règle
primaireque ce faitest censévioler.
16. Le Cameroun prétendque leNigéria a violé le principe du non-recours àla force, et le
professeur Tomuschatm'attribue «une nouvelle théoriesur la signification et la portée))de ce
principe :
((Selonlui [Abi-Saab], le Nigérian'a pas engagésa responsabilité,parce qu'il
n'a jamais remis en cause le statu quo territorial et que, sur le terrain, il n'a fait
qu'administrer paisiblemenu t n territoirequ'ilcroyait le sien. Le professeurAbi-Saab voit dans ces circonstancesune nouvelleexception à l'interdictionde franchir par la
forceune frontièreintemationalementreconnue.))(CR2002/16,p. 55,par. 9.)
17. Que mon collègue le professeur Tomuschat se rassure. Je ne prétends à aucune
innovation en la matière;j'adhère fermement à l'interprétationla plus exigeante de ce principe
fondamental, qui n'admet aucune exception, sauf celle expressément stipulée dans la Charte, la
légitime défenseface à une attaque armée préalable. Mais je ne peux manquer de relever la
contradiction dans son proprepropos, ou plutôtdans sa formulation de la théorie qu'il m'attribue.
Car comment peut-onne pas remettreen causele statu quo territorial et administrerpaisiblement
un territoire qu'on croit le sien, tout enanchissant par laforce en mêmetemps unefiontière
internationalementreconnue ?
18.A part la contradictiondans lestermes,on en revient ainsià deux desprésomptions non
vérifiéesdu Cameroun :
i) la première:c'est qu'ilexiste une frontière internationalementreconnue.Mais, comme
nous l'avons déjà vu, la frontièreréclamée par le Cameroue nst contestable et contestée
par le Nigéria,qui ne lareconnaîtpas;etc'est lemêmeobjetde l'instance actuelledontla
Cour estsaisie;
ii) deuxièmeprésomption :qu'il yaiteufranchissementde cette frontièrepar la force. Mais
cela nous ramène à l'étatinitial ducontrôleet de l'administration du territoire.Commeje
viens de le rappeler, c'estle Nigériaqui étaiten place Bakassi, donc il ne pouvaitpas
s'auto-envahir, utiliser la force contre lui-même. Alors que le Cameroun, Partie
demanderesse, n'a pas fourni la preuvede sa présence etde son contrôle du territoire,en
se bornant àinvoquersaqualitédepossesseurdetitre; titre quiest contestépar leNigéria,
de même que lafrontièrequ'il fonde.
19. Cependant, et jusqu'au jugement -votre jugement -, le droit protègele possesseur
paisible,qui administreleterritoire titre desouverain,car il considère,pour desraisonsjuridiques
crédibles,qu'il a titre sur ce temtoire. Et cela mêmesi son titre est contestépar un autre Etat.
Mais il n'y a aucun recours à la force dans ce scénario dela part du possesseur paisible qui était
déjà là.
20. Il s'agit làd'une règleprimaire quidéfinit lestatu quo temtorial protégpar la règlede
non-recours à la force,à la lumièrede l'interprétationfournie par la déclaration desprincipes(résolution2625 XXV de l'Assemblée général 1e,70),ainsi que de la pratique de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies etla doctrine. C'est le Nigériaqui est le bénéficiaireen l'espècede cette
protection,ayantfournila preuve qu'il remplissait les conditios'applicationde cetterègle.
21. Le professeur Tomuschat, s'accrochan t une analogiefaite dans les écrituresnigérianes
avec ladoctrine d'«honestbeliefand reasonable mistake))en commonlm, critiquela qualification
juridique de la position du Nigéria, ainsi quje viens de la présenter, disant qu'ils'agitd'une
qualification juridique changeante,llant de la «faute»aux «circonstancesexcluant17illicéité»,i
appartiennent toutesaux règles secondairesde la responsabilité, pofinirpar unerègleprimaire.
22.Mais là aussi, ily a confusion. Caril s'agit simplementd'arguments«in the alternative))
très courants dans les plaidoiries, présentatn argument juridique de substitution au cas où la
Cour n'accepterait pas l'argument principaql,ui reste pour le Nigériacelui de la règleprimaire, ou
plutôt de l'absencedetoute violationde la règle primaire.Quantà l'argument«in the alternative»,
tirédes règlessecondairesde laresponsabilité,c'est mon éminentcollègueet ami sir Arthur Watts
qui va ledévelopper.
Jevous remercie, Monsieurleprésident, Madame et Messieursde la Cour.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. 1 now give the floor to
Sir ArthurWatts.
SirArthurWATTS:Thankyou, Mr. President.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
1. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, when Cameroonresponded, earlier this week, to
Nigeria's case on State responsibility,unselfocused on onlytwo matters. He concentrated on,
first, the so-called invasion and occupation of Cameroon territory, and, second, on what he
regarded as Nigeria's violations of the Court's Order of 15March 1996- the
Provisional Measures Order. And indeed, Cameroon's steadily shrinking case on State
responsibilitydoesreduce itselfto those two alleged bases for responsibility. Weheard- quite
rightly- no more about violations of the pnnciple of utipossidetisjuris, and no more about
violationsofthe obligationto settle disputes by peacefulans. 2. And that is entirely correct, Mr.President. The alleged breaches of the Court's
Provisional Measures Order are a self-containedand somewhatseparate basis for responsibility,
and Nigeria will deal withthem in a moment. But for therest,although Cameroon startedoutwith
a whole catalogue of allegedbases of internationalresponsibilityon Nigeria's part, they were al1
simply different ways of looking at the onebasic complaint. The alleged violation of temtorial
sovereignty, the use of force, the intervention,and so on- they were al1just the one complaint
dressed up in different legal clothes, centring on the so-called invasion and occupation of
Cameroonianterritory.
3. As counsel expressed it', the cm of this case is at the north and south ends of the
Nigeria-Cameroonboundary. And he repeatedCameroon'scurrent presentation of its case, to the
effect that thevarious specific incidentswhich Cameroonhad cited were only part of that central
element of Cameroon's case andnot autonomous basesof international responsibility. Nigeria
commented last week on this changeof courseby Cameroon,and will not repeat those comments
now.
4. Nigeria will, however,just observe thatif the incidents are simply part of the so-called
invasion and occupation at the two ends of the Nigeria-Cameroonboundary,what was Cameroon
doing in citing a number of incidents "al1 along the land boundary", to use Cameroon's own
words? Those words were, in any event, a gross exaggeration of the relatively few, and
insubstantial,incidents whichCameroonin factput fonvard,but evenso they are now shownto be
irrelevant to Cameroon's case. For the Courthas alreadyheld that those land boundaryincidents
do not establishthat the boundary itselfwas in dispute2,sothey areirrelevantin that context; and
now by Cameroon'sown admissionthey areirrelevantto whatCarneroon itselfregards as the crux
of its State responsibility case. Theycan therefore be completelydisregarded- quite apart,that
is, from their inadequacy in any event as bases for any claim of Nigeria's international
responsibility.
'CR2002116,p.52,para.2 (Mr.Tomuschat).
2~andand Maritime BoundarybetweenCarneroonand Nigeria(Cameroonv. Nigeria),PreliminaryObjections,
Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1998,pa90. 5. To tum then to Cameroon's contentionthat Nigeria has violated its international
obligationsin "invading" and "occupying"Bakassi and various areas in Lake Chad, there is at the
outseta question of fact, or at least a mixed questionof fact and law. As ProfessorAbi-Saabhas
shown,the basic issues are, what was thestatus quo, and whichParty disturbedit by resorting to
armedforce?
6.As Mr.Brownliehasshown soconclusively,the statusquo was undoubtedly one inwhich
Nigeria wasthe Party in possession,not just for the past few years but since independence. That
Nigerian presence, that Nigerian civil administrationof Bakassi, was not only sufficient to
constitute a consolidation of Nigeria's titleto Bakassi, but was also the clearest demonstration
possibleof a statusquo which Cameroonsoughtto destabilize.
7. Nigeria did not need to mount an "invasion" ofBakassi in order to "seize" it, as counsel
put it. Nigeria was already there, andhad been for a long time. And being there in peaceful
possession - peaceful, that is, until Cameroon startedits campaign of systematic encroachment
intoNigerianterritory-Nigeria had littleneed foran extensivemilitaxypresence inthat area. Of
course, if need arose, Nigeria was perfectly entitled to strengthen its security forces to meet
whateverthe need was. And this Nigeriadid, indeed, do fromtime to time - for example,in late
1993. At that time, as Nigeriahas shown3,therewas a seriousrisk of civil disturbancein Bakassi
as well as a perceived threat also fiom Cameroon, and to avoid possible trouble security
reinforcementswere sent to the area. Cameroon has chosen to see this as an "invasion" of its
territory, but that is Cameroon's mischaracterizationof Nigeria's action,not their reality. The
NigerianGovemment has adutyto protectthe populationof Bakassi andto protect the territoryof
the State. There was no "invasion" of Cameroonian territory, only deployrnents to defend
Nigeria'ssovereigninterestsandterritorialintegrity.
8. Counsel tried to make something out of the suggestion by ProfessorBasseyAte that one
option opento Nigeria was that it"couldunilaterallyoccupyBakassi Peninsula". Letmejust make
four points. First, Professor Ate didnot mention the use of force. Second,the passage counsel
quotedshowed thatthe purpose of the contemplated occupationoption was to secure negotiations
'~ejoinder ofNigeria, App.to Chap. 16,p. 656,para.92 (2).with Cameroon. Third, it is clear that the occupationwasjust one option amongst others being
consideredby the Professor. Fourth,Cameroon shouldbe able to distinguishbetweenan academic
think tank and a govemment. The Professor's viewsare nothing to do with the Govemment of
Nigeria.
9. Counsel sought also to show that it was perfectly normal for questions of State
responsibility and territorial title tobe joined. But this is not so in practice, nor is it appropriate.
As the Court will know, there have been many cases in which territorial disputes have affected
populated areaswhich one side or the otherhas administered andcontrolled - several such cases
have indeed been considered by the Court. Yet Cameroon cited no case in which a territorial
dispute has been resolved in favour of one State, and in which the losing State was then held
intemationally responsible for its actsof civil administration ormaintenance of public order in
areas in which, as a result of the decisionon the territorialdispute, it was found to have had no
right.
10. That absence of any finding of State responsibility in such circumstances is, Nigeria
submits, appropriate. It reflects the generally acceptedpractice of litigating States to treat the
rightness or wrongness of the State's administrationof a disputed area as simply consequential
upon the territorialfindingby whichthe dispute isresolved, ratherthan in itselfa primary sourceof
State responsibility. Any other approach would tum every territorial dispute into a State
responsibilitycase, sometimesofenormousmagnitude.
11.Mr. Presidentand Membersof the Court, givenCameroon'schange of attitude towards
itsvarious allegedseparateincidents,Nigeriasees no needto add very muchto what it hasalready
said, especially in its ~ejoindeq, by way of showing the inadequacy of those incidents either as
separate and individualbases of responsibilityor, as Cameroonwould now have it, as supporting
evidence for itsmain allegationsof Stateresponsibility. In both respects thoseincidentsneedto be
properly establishedby credibleevidencemeetingtheappropriatestandards, andCameroonhasnot
come evencloseto dischargingthe necessaryburden uponit.
4~p.599-601,paras.16.1-16.10,App.to Chap.16,andparas.17.1-17.3,pp.619-717. 12.But although Nigeriawill refrainat this stagefrom any detailed rehearsalof this ground,
it is, in view of counselfor Cameroon'scomments,necessary for mejust to make a brief further
responseto Cameroon's continued presentationof the notorious incident of 16May 1981as one
which engaged Nigeria's internationalresponsibility- an incident which, 1 must note, was
introducedinto these proceedingsby Cameroon. The facts of that incident speak for themselves,
and Nigeria has set them out in full5. But reduced to its bare essentials what we have here is a
military incident resulting in loss of Nigerian life, followed by forma1expressions of regret in
writingby Cameroon'sHeadof Stateand orallyby Cameroon'sForeignMinister as an envoysent
speciallyto Nigeria for thepurpose, and the payment of compensationby Cameroon- with no
indication that it was paid ex gratia or otherwise without admission of liability. Those,
Mr. President and Membersof the Court,are not the actions of a Statewhich is guilt free. Nigeria
sees no need to try to embellishthose bare facts any more. Asa basis for some allegedNigerian
internationalresponsibility,as Cameroon alleges, thewhole affairiscompletely withoutsubstance.
13.1need alsoto Saya word ortwo aboutoneveryminor incident, and 1do so onlybecause
it was the subject of the four late documents which the Court admitted into the record by its
decisionof 7 February 2002. Carneroonappearsto be complaining about an alleged overflightof
Cameroonian - occupiedterritoryby aNigerian militarysurveytearn,flying a civilianaircraft.
14. This complaint, however,is not borne out by the documentary evidencesubmittedby
Cameroon. That evidenceconsistsofan apparentlyinterceptedintemalNigerian message. Letme
take the first document supplied by Cameroon: it is the first document in the judges' folder at
tab 28. 1should add that in the lefi-handmargin of that document,there are some missingletters,
but thatishow the document was providedtoNigeria: it is not a fault inNigeria'sphotocopying.1
think nevertheless the message itself is perfectly understandable. But, converting the message's
militaryabbreviationsinto a languagewithwhich theCourt may be more familiar,the intercepted
messagewhich wasbeingreportedwas asfollows: "Be informedthat military surveyteamwill be
using civilaircraft for surveyaround the general area ofoccupation. Don't panic andensureyour
troops do not fire at aircraft. Dates7 December 2001. Act and acknowledge." The rest of the
'~ejoinder ofNigeria, pp.611-615, paras. 16.35-16.46,and App.toChap. 16,pp.631-640, paras.29-45.evidencesubmittedby Cameroonconsists of Cameroon's reaction tothat interceptedmessage,and
reportsthata survey flighthad takenplace on5December.
15.The crucialfact about these documentsis that theyare whollyimpreciseas to wherethe
flight took place. The interceptedmessage simplyrefers to a planned flight "around the general
area of occupation",and 1 invitethe Court tonotethe words"around" and"generalarea". Eventhe
term "area of occupation"is unclearand unspecific. Cameroon'sownreports are nomore precise.
They simply Saythat theaircraftflew "from northto southand vice versa". "Northto south"over
what landarea, Mr. President? Given that Cameroon's evidencetells us nothing aboutthe kindof
survey which was taking place, there can be no basis for assuming that any flight had to be
vertically above the area being surveyed- for example, oblique, high-level photographic
surveyingis an acceptedtechniquefor a numberofpurposes.
16. But apart from that, there is anotherpoint to be made about Cameroon's documents.
Could 1now invite the Court, Mr.President,to look at the next documentwhich is at tab 29 in the
folder. It isnot clearwhat this documentis, butits substanceis plain- it sets outthe English text
of the messagewe havejust looked at, that'sthe one at tab 28, togetherwith a French translation.
But not quite,Mr. President. May1invite yourattentionto the very firstline of the Englishtext of
the documentat tab 29: it refersto a "CRS Survey Team". "CRS" refersto "Cross River State",
and that's clear from the French translation of that second message, which spellsout the words
Cross River State. But if you recall,Mr. President,in the firstmessagewe lookedat, at thatplace
in the message- itis in the fourth lin- thereference is to a "Mil [Le.military] survey tearn".
Mr. President,someonehas alteredthe terms ofthe messageto tum a civilian surveyinto a military
survey: it certainlywasn'tNigeriawhich madethat alteration.
17. In shor- and quite apart fiom the underlying question of title to the temtory being
overflown - Carneroonhas, quite simply, yet again, provided no useful evidence- and indeed
contradictory evidence- regarding this survey flight. Cameroon's complaint is shown to be
without foundation.
18. Mr. President and Members of the Court, 1 shouldnow like to tum to the questionof
defences to intemational responsibility. First, it is necessary for me to emphasize that this is
essentially a secondary, or consequential,issue. The primary question is whether Nigeria hascommittedanact whichis prima faciewrongful. Nigeria deniesthat Cameroonhasestablishedthat
that is so. For Nigeria, therefore, the questionof possible defencesdoes not arise, since there has
been no actof wrongfulnesswhich could be precluded by the application of one or other of the
possibledefenceswhichmight be invoked.
19.It is only ifsuch a potentially wrongfulact has been proved to have beencommittedby
Nigeriathatthe possibilityof defencesneeds to be considered. It is, asProfessor Abi-Saabhasjust
said, essentially an argument in the alternative. In the first place, Nigeria has committed no
potentially wrongfulact; alternatively,ifNigeriahas committeda potentially wrongfulact, then it
is not in fact wrongful because its wrongfulness is precluded by theoperation of one or more
defences. It is onlyonthat alternative hypothesisthat Nigeriahas raised thepossibleapplicationof
certain defences6.Andit is only onthat basisthatNigeria considersthe matter furtherhere.
20. Therearesome generalpointsto be madeat the outset. The law in this areais sometimes
statedin an oversimplified form. It is not the casethat defencescan al1be packaged andplaced, so
to speak,in a box marked"defences",so that whenevera Statewants to invoke, Sayself-defence, it
goes to the box to findthat particulardefence. In truth, the matter is more complicated. In some
caseswhatmay usuallybe seen as a defencemay in fact be one of the constituent elementsof the
substantiverule the breach of which is in question. Defencesare thus, on analysis,not absolute
concepts, butarerelativeto the primaryobligations in question.
21. This reflectionbears also onthe InternationalLawCommission'sdraft Articles onState
Responsibility. That impressive product of many years' work callsfor two comments in the
present context. First, while it is impressive, and has a lot of authority, it is not a treaty or
quasi-legislative act: it has not been adopted by States. It would be wrong to regard its
prescriptionsas necessarily a reflection of customary internationallaw. Second, it is in effect a
code of general application, and in the presentcontext a general formulation of the circumstances
precludingwrongfulnessapplicablein principle to al1or most international obligations. It setsout
to cover the whole field in terms of general application, but as a result it may not always fit
precisely the particularcircumstancesto which itis soughtto be applied.
6~ounter-~emorialofNigeria, pp.638-639,para.24.34. 22. In short,it is a good- but notnecessarily infallibl- guide. Andit is probably- one
might venturethe thoughtthatit is almostcertainly - the casethat as commentatorscometo grips
with it, manyof its apparentcertaintieswillacquirea coatingof caution.
23. It is in the lightof the foregoingremarksthat Nigeria's invocationof "honestbelief' and
"reasonable mistake" falls to be considered. Cameroon seeks to dismiss them as non-existent
defences in internationallaw. But they ment more carefùl considerationthan that. After all, any
primaryrulewhich containsas part ofthe rule a considerationofreasonablenessiswell on theway
to allowing either that the making of a reasonable mistake when committing an act will prevent
there havingbeen any breachof the rule in the first place, or that if a breachhas occurredthen the
existenceof thereasonablemistakewillbe a defencepreventingthe actbeing wrongfùl.
24. Cameroonsoughtto argue thatthere could not be a reasonablemistake, or honest belief,
where a boundaryhas beenestablishedby treaty7. Of course,so far as concemsBakassi,that is the
very question at issue: Carneroon believes that the 1913Treaty effectively establishes the
boundary, but Nigeria takesthe opposite view - on groundswhich Nigeriais satisfied aresound
in law and which certainlycannot be dismissedas without seriousmerit. Nigeria does genuinely
believe that its arguments are sound, and expects the Court to uphold them. But if, contrary to
Nigeria's expectations,the Court finds against Nigeria, then while it may follow that Nigeria's
presence will have been found to be unlawfùlit will also be the case that Nigeria's presencewill
have been based on a reasonablemistake asto the real situation,and on an honest belief that the
situation had been as Nigeria believed it to be. Nigeria submitsthat in such circumstancesit is
hardly imaginablethat Nigeria should be held intemationally responsiblefor behaviour which, at
thetime it tookplace,Nigeriahad everyreasonto believewas lawful.
25. Wereit othenvise, every case involving a territorial disputewouldnecessarily involvea
series- possiblyan extensiveseries- of State responsibilityissuesby virtue of the canying out
in the disputed tenitory, over a period of manyyears, of normal State activity by whichever State
eventually lostthe case. 1have referred earlierto the generalpractice- one could probablySay
universal practice, Mr. President, but fi-anklythere has not been time to do the research which
'CR2002117,p.43, par28 (Mr. Corten).wouldenable me to Sayso with confidence - so, the general practice of litigating States to treat
therightnessor wrongnessof the State's administrationof a disputedarea as simplyconsequential
uponthe territorialfindingby which thedisputeisresolved, ratherthan in itself aprimarysource of
Stateresponsibility. Thusthe relevantStatepractice,inprecisely the kindofcontextwith whichthe
Court is here dealing, implicitly acknowledgesthat in such circumstances any apparent
wrongfulness ofthe losing State'sconduct in administering the disputed area is in the eventnot to
be treated as wrongful since that administrationwas only determinedto have been wrongfulin
retrospect. It is not at al1inappropriateto characterizethat kind of situationas one involving the
losingState's honestbelief in its right to administerthe area, nor is it inappropriateto regard it as
involving a reasonable mistake to the likeeffect.
26. Counselwent on to suggestthat itwas notreasonableto make such a seriousmistake as
oneover title to territory8. But whethersuch a mistakewas madeis a questionof fact. Once that
becomesthe argument,thenthe principlehas beenacceptedthat reasonableness, if established, is a
defence. Nigeriahas shown, by its arguments,that its belief that Bakassi is Nigerian is entirely
reasonable- andthat is putting it at itslowest,forinNigeria'sviewits honestbelief in its right to
Bakassiis notjust reasonable butSound. Conductingitself as a reasonably competent Govemment,
to use the phraseology of another of Cameroon's counse19, theresult for Nigeria is the same.
Knowingwhat it knows about its relationshipto Bakassi,and the history of the whole matter,the
Government of Nigeria has every justification for honestly believing in its sovereignty over
Bakassi.
27. Counsel for Cameroon alsodrew attention to the fact the International Law
Commission's draft Articles on State Responsibilitydid not mention either honest beliefor
reasonable mistakeas defencesto the wrongfulness of cond~ct'~.And he asserted thatthe list of
defencesin those draft Articles was exhaustive. This, howeveri,s where the cautionary remarks
which 1made earlier needto be recalled. There is not only roomfor a moresubtle analysis of the
role of "defences" than is contained in the general code prepared by the InternationalLaw
'CR 2002117,p. 45, para.34(Mr. Corten).
9~~ 2002116, p.59,paras. 20-21 (Mr. Tomuschat).
lolbi d.58,para. 16.Commission,but there is alsoroom for argumentwhetherthe Commission's catalogueof defences
is indeedexhaustive.
28. One recent writer, commenting onthe equivalentprovisions of an earlier draft of the
Commission'sArticles, observedthat
"In any case, it is difficult to see the ILC's enumeration of defences as a
complete catalogue of the relevant law since many substantive rules clearly provide
for specific defences as part of the definition of the content of the relevant
obligation. .. The assumptionin the ILC's work that a uniform regimeof defences
applies to al1internationalobligationsthereforerequires somequalification. In most
cases,the applicationof anyone ofthe defences willalsobe influencedby the content
of the nom violated, as well [as by] other competing principles of international
ia~."~
29. And the same writer noted also that "the practice of internationaltribunals has been to
contextualizedefences and not to make general assumptionsuninfluencedby the specificnom in
questionand the issuesof principlewhichunderpin if"'*. The references,Mr.President,will be in
the transcript.
30. One other aspect of Nigeria's possibledefencesto allegations of wrongîulness levied
againstitmust be addressed,andthat concemsself-defence. Counselfor Cameroon soughtto deny
the applicability of any Nigerian argument based on self-defence, on the ground that Nigeria
nowhereclaimedthat Cameroonwas an "aggressor",but only spokeof "incidents"or "incursions";
nowhere, itwas said,had Nigeriaclaimedthat Nigeriahad beenthe subjectof an "armedattack"13.
31.Two shortpointscanbe made inresponseto thosearguments. First,Nigeriadidnot seek
to engagein the kind of extravagant languagewhichhas been such a feature of Cameroon'scase.
Whatmatters,Mr.President,arethe facts,not the labelsusedto referto them.
32. The secondpoint is tothe sameeffect. Whileit is true, of course,that Article51 of the
UnitedNations Charter acknowledgesthe inherent right ofself-defencewhere a Stateis the victim
of an armedattack,that doesnotmean that the use ofthoseprecisewords is a sine qua non for the
exerciseof the right of self-defence.hatmatters isthatthere is, onthe facts,an armedattack, not
whether thatattack is in termsdescribed lateras constitutingan "armed attack". WhenNigeria has
"~kowa, in TheReality oflnternatLm,aeds. Goodwin-Gilland Talmon, 1999,p. 391.
I2pp.390-391.
"CR 2002117,p. 39, paras. 17-20(Mr.Corten).shown that Cameroonianmilitary units have attacked Nigerianposts or towns, firing weapons at
Nigerian targets, and causing casualties among the Nigerian population orsecurity forces, those
facts are sufficient to give rise to the right to take action in self-defence without the need for
Nigeria formallyto characterizethem as constitutingan "anned attack". To hold othenvisewould
be to place formabove substanceto a quite astonishing degree.
33. Mr.President and Members of the Court, let me now respond to Cameroon's further
arguments by which Cameroon seeks to show that Nigeria is in breach of the Court's Order of
15March 1996 - the "interimmeasures" Order.
34. Nigeria has alreadyresponded to Cameroon'sallegationsthat there has been some kind
of breach by Nigeria of the Court's Order, and has shown them to be without fo~ndation'~.
Counsel forCameroonneverthelesscameback,on fourpoints'5. Let metake them oneby one.
35. He repeated, first, that Nigeria was responsible for the proposed UnitedNations
"fact-finding"mission endingup as only a "goodwill" mission,which he characterized as a much
more low-key affair. Mr.President, as 1 noted in the first roundI6,the decision on what kind of
mission shouldbe sentwasa political matter decidedby govemmentsinNew York. At the timeof
the Court's Order al1that the Parties had on the table in New York was a "proposal" from the
Secretary-Generalfor afact-findingmission to the BakassiPeninsula. The Court, therefore,could
only ask that the Parties should assist thatproposed mission- but in the event, for political
reasons which no doubt commendedthemselves to govemments, al1that was agreed was the
goodwill mission: it is too simple to treat the eventualoutcome in New York as the result of the
views of any one govemment- many factors come into play with many govemments when
decisions of this kind are being taken in New York. The fact is that the political decisionwhich
was eventually taken in NewYork was not tohavethe fact-findingmissionwhich wasproposedat
the time the Court made its Order, but to have a goodwill mission instead. That was the only
mission which in practice came to exist, it was the only mission with which Nigeria could
CO-operatea,ndNigeriadidCO-operate fullywithit.
I4~ejoindrfNigeria,p.577,para.15.5CR 2002114,pp. 6-38,paras.46-54(SirArthurWatts).
2002/16,pp.63-66,paras.31-36 (Mr.Tomuschat).
I6C~2002/14,p. 36,para.49 (SirArthurWatts). 36. Then,as his secondpoint, counsel for Cameroonrevertedto the incidentwhichoccurred
in late April and early May 1996. Henoted in particular that Cameroon protested immediately,
whereasNigeria,which assertedthat in truth it hadbeen the victimof the attack andhad only acted
in self-defence,had only protested toCarneroonin a letter sentin June 1996. Mr. President, thisis
really a far-fetchedargument.
37. As an "answer" to Nigeria's responseon this incident, Cameroon's argument - and it
wasthe only argument on this incident - is singularlyunconvincing. Infact,five or six weeksfor
a consideredletter is by no means unduly long, especiallyfor a government- like Nigeria's-
which wanted to make careful enquiriesabout the facts, and which in any event covered, in its
eventual letterof protest, not only the attackof April-May 1996but also a number of othermatters
whicharoseat around thattime.
38. As counse17sthirdpoint,he arguedthatNigeria, in concentratingonNigeria's continued
provision of local health, educational and social welfare services in the Nigerian populationof
Bakassi, had misunderstood Cameroon's allegation. Cameroon's allegation was not about such
beneficial services,so counsel said, but about the creation of a new municipal authority which,so
Cameroonargued, created a situation whichwouldprejudice Cameroon's position in the eventthat
the Court might decide in Cameroon's favour. Counsel purported to see in thisnew local
government arrangementan admissionby Nigeria that Bakassi had not previously formedpart of
the Nigerian administrative system: it was,he said, a new act, changing the situationto the
prejudice of Cameroon.
39. Counsel's argument is wrongin manyrespects. Letmeidentifi just someof them. First,
in the event thatthe Court shoulddecidethat Bakassiis part of Cameroon(a possibility, ofcourse,
which Nigeria denies), there is nothing irreversible in whatever municipal administrative
arrangements aremade for Bakassi, so therecan be no prejudiceto Cameroon. Second, it is local
govemment arrangementswhich provide the administrative umbrella under which the various
beneficial social services are provided tothe population: unlessthe local governmentsystem is
kept modernized,the provision of social services will suffer. Third, it isuntrue that the local
government arrangements madein 1996were the first of their kind: on the contrary,Nigeria has
by legislation established local govemment servicesin Bakassi since the 1960s. The factthatCameroonis not awareof that, Mr.President,just confirmsthat Cameroon'sassertionsthat it was
in occupationofBakassiare withoutfoundation.
40. Counsel'sfourth point was no better than the firstthree. He said that airtraffic control
arrangements for flightsover Bakassi were clearly an invasion of Cameroon's territorial rights.
Apart fromthe question-beggingnatureof that assertion,it is, even on the assumptionthat Bakassi
is Cameroonian territory (which of course Nigeriaoes not accept), incorrect. It is a cardinal
principle of internationalcivil aviationthat airic controlzones and similar arrangements are
established with safety considerationsprimarily in mind, and are not intended to reflect national
frontiersonthe ground,and arewithoutprejudiceto suchfiontiers.
41. It is apparentthat little of Cameroon'sclaims in the field of Stateresponsibilityremains
for considerationby the Court. They are not well founded in law, and they are not adequately
established in fact. The record before the Court has shown Cameroon's case to have been
supported- if that is not too strong a w-rdby allegationsmisleadinglymade and unreliably
attested. As the Applicant,Carneroonbears aheavy burden of proof, both as to the lawand even
more so as to the facts. Cameroonhas not satisfiedthat burdenofoof, and Nigeriasubmitsthat
Cameroon's StateresponsibilityclaimsagainstNigeriashouldaccordinglybe dismissed.
42. Mr. President andMembersof the Court,that concludesNigeria'ssecondroundpleading
on the issueof Stateresponsibility.m gratefulfor the Court's attention.Could 1nowinviteyou
please,Mr.President,tocal1upon Professor Crawfordto continueNigeria's pleading.Thankyou.
LePRESIDENT :Je vous remercie,sir Arthur. Je donne maintenantla paroleau professeur
James Crawford.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Mr.President.
NIGERIA' CSOUNTER-CLAIMSAND
CAMEROON F'SILURETORESPOND
1.Mr. President,Membersofthe Court,in the first round 1addressedyou at somelength on
Nigeria's counter-claims. tried not to go intotoo much detail. B1did emphasizea number of
points, asto the admissibilityoftheclaims, asto their contextand asto their content. 2. Cameroonin its secondround saidhardly a wordon theseissues. Theywere addressedby
my good friend and former colleague, Professor Christian Tomuschat,for a total of- by my
watch- 13minutesi7. He spent at least five of those minutes on one incident, the shooting
incident of 16May 198118.That was an important incidentin the historyof the dispute between
the two States, as Chief RichardAkinjidehas explained. But it is not a counter-claimbecausethe
tenderand acceptanceof an apologyand compensationby Cameroonto Nigeria resolvedit; it puts
an endto the claim. The incidentwas thereby closedinterms ofany issueof responsibility.
3. By my mathematics,13minus fiveis eight. Cameroonhas so far spent either minutes on
the counter-claims,which it nonetheless accepts are fully admissible.
4. In the remaining minutesthat he used afterhe had finished dealingwith the incidentof
May 1981, ProfessorTomuschatmade afewpoints, towhich 1shouldbrieflyrespond.
5. First, as 1 have noted, he formally acceptedthat al1the Nigerian counter-claims are
admissibleI9.Thatis progress,as compared with Cameroon'swritten observations.
6. Secondly,he sought tobolster Cameroon's caseas to the incidentsof 3 February 1996by
referenceto a numberof document^ O^n. concerned a statementby a Nigerian brigadier-general,
which is not shownto relate to any action at all. Oneconcemed the handover of the body of a
Nigerianofficeron22 December1995. Oneconcemed an ICRCcommunicationof 25 April 1997.
Noneof these events,as the dateswill show,have anybearing onactual issuesof responsibility for
whathappenedon 3 February 1996,a matteralready dealt withby Sir Arthur Watts.
7. Then Professor Tomuschatraised a quibble as to the precise time of the 18April 1998
attacks. He said: "the statementsdivergein a substantial wayconcerningthe time of the attack".
Actually,there are20 or so statements- they are inAnnexNR203 of the Rejoinderof Nigeria -
although only one suggests that the attacktook place at noon. Two Sayit was at dawn or in the
earlyhours; the others do not mention thetime. Thestatements are, taken together, consistentin
their reporting of a Cameroonattack whichkilled oneand injuredat least 20,nearly al1civilians.
"CR2002116,pp.66-71,paras.37-54.
I8lbid.,pp. 66-68, paras. 38-40.
I9lbid.,p.66,para.37.
201bid, p.68-69, paras.44-47.ProfessorTomuschatthinks itunlikely thatthis couldhave beencausedby "bombs",whichhe says
would have causedgreater darnage. The statements suggest that these were mortars, not carpet
bombing: on that basisthe casualty figuresare entirely credible.
8.Then Professor Tomuschat referredto the incidentsof 23 February and27 June 1993,and
claimedthat the relevant documents donot Saywhere the incidentstook place. That is true of the
secondincident,whichtook place at sea "on the border"; the localfishermen actuallydo not carry
GPS trackers with them. But the first one is specifically said to have taken place "at Abana"
(Counter-MemorialofNigeria,Ann.NC-M 356). Sothereis nothingin that quibbleeither.
9. Much more significantthan what ProfessorTomuschatsaidwas what he did not Say. In
particularthe Courtwill rememberthat 1gave an estimate,in the firstround, oftotal casualtiesand
damageincurred on the BakassiPeninsula in the decadefrom 1991on both sides. That includes
the period of the so-calledinvasion and occupationby Nigeria. The tally was carefully prepared
lookingat al1the annexes duly tenderedonboth sides ofthis case in the pleadings. It assumedthat
al1particularized allegationswere true, irrespective of whether there was much evidence in their
support; so it made the assumption that al1 particularized allegations are true. It excluded
generalizedallegationsinnewspaper clippings,and otheritems of a generalcharacter, thoughthese
would have significantly increased the casualty figures on the Nigerian side. Thus it is fairly
reliable,and nothingmorereliable can be forthcomingintheseproceedings.
10.May 1remindyou ofthe overallfigures:
(a) Attributedto Cameroonin the Nigeriandocuments: 30 killed (of whom 27 were civilians);
117wounded (of whom 106 were civilians); eight houses and four boats destroyed or
damaged, togetherwith a substantialamount of otherdamage.
(b) Attributed to Nigeriain theCameroondocuments:threekilled, 13wounded(al1military).
Thus therewere smallnumbersof militarycasualtiesonboth sides; fewer deadoneach sidein fact
than in the incident of May 1981. But there were substantialcivilian casualties on the Nigerian
side. Andthere isnoevidencewhateverofNigerian troopskilling orwoundingtheirown people.
11. In the part of his speech, in the eight minutes devoted to counter-claims this week,
ProfessorTomuschatdidnot commenton those figures. Al1he saidwasthat "ilpeuty avoir eudesvictimes civiles, ce que Cameroun regrette profondément'J2'.Faced with a balance of casualties
such as that 1have given, for counsel to Say "ilpeut y avoir eu des victims civiles" is not very
helpful. Tobe told belatedlythatCameroon "profoundlyregrets" doeslittle to mitigatethe damage
caused, and still being caused, by Cameroon. For itis not the case that there "may have been"
victims: "ilpeut y avoir eu des victimes civiles". There were such victims. Therecontinueto be
civilian victims. If therehad beennone, Cameroonwouldhavebeenthe first to tellyou.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Professor Tomuschatdid not hesitate to raise
quibbles about Ourcounter-claims,when he thought he could do so. 1have dealtwith them. He
said he had no time, andin factyou were patientin givinghim extratime. No doubtsilenceis not
consent, but in the context of an orderly forensicprocedure such as that of the Court, with more
than ampletime in ten days of oralargument,Carneroon's approachis significant. "Ilpeut y avoir
eu des victimes civiles .. "
13. 1 note again what the Court has said of the function of counter-claims: "to have an
overview of the respective claims of the Parties and to decide them more consistent~~"~~T . he
figures 1 have given as to the respective claimsof the Parties are substantiallyaccurateand areso
far unchallenged. They stand in stark contrastwith the inflatedrhetoric of Cameroon'spleadings,
with its language of aggression, conspiracy, coercion,extortion andoppression. When there are
military incidents,Cameroon's languagebecomeswhite hot; whenthere are significantnumbersof
civilian victims, the tone changes to that of marked understatement: "II peut y avoir eu des
victimes civiles."
14.ProfessorPellet seemsto think it is a sinto get a map wrong. Actuallyit is not, as 1will
show. It givesthe otherParty anopportunityforwhich theyshould beboth pleasedand grateful,as
we are. But there are forensic sins, and they relate to real ones. To inflate problems between
States, whose general relations are as precariousas those now between Cameroonand Nigeria, is
questionable. To make wholly unsupportedallegationsof extortion and coercion is questionable.
You have heard CameroonSaythewhole boundaryis ablazewith conflict andyou have seenwhat
the truth is. You have heard Carneroonallegea serious dispute at Tipsan, andyou have seenwhat
2 ' ~2002116,p.70,para.48.
221..JReports 1997,p.257,para.30.the truth is. You have heard Cameroon allege Nigerian coercionand extortion against its
neighboursin the Gulf; we will seenext week whether thatallegation is sustained,fterthe alleged
victim has had its chance to speak. Cameroon's pleading is al1 of a piece; sensationalist,
rhetorical,unbalancedand unsupported by seriousattemptsatproof.
15. Complaining of lack of time, Professor Tomuschat reserved the right to respond in
Cameroon's finalstatementto the counter-claims.No doubt he wantedto make up for his failure
to do so this week. It is a safe wayofakingup, secure from any possibilitythat we can reply to
it. But Camerooniswelcometo respondif it canto the overall civiliancasualty figures,andto the
consequent contrast between rhetoricand realityon the Cameroon side. In the absence of such a
response the Court will finally be in a position "to have an overview of the respective [State
responsibility]claimsofthe Partiesandto decidethem moreconsistently".
Mr.President,thatis al11haveto say aboutcounter-claimsin the circumstances. 1thinkthat
makes eight minutes. May 1 ask you to cal1on Professor Abi-Saab to begin our response on
Cameroon7smaritime boundary claim, but perhaps a brief coffee break would be appropriate
before that.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie beaucoup, Monsieurle professeur. Nousallons écouter
le professeur Abi-Saabmaintenant ;nousprendronsla pause-caféaprèsson intervention.
M. ABI-SAAB : Merci, Monsieurle président, pourvotre patience. J'essaieraide ne pas la
taxer trop.
LA DÉLIMITATIONMARITIME
1.Monsieur le président,Madameet Messieursde la Cour,j'entame maintenant le chapitre
de la délimitationmaritime. Nous approchonsduterme de ces longuesplaidoiries,etnous sommes
tous un peu fatigués,entout casmoi. Je n'ai pasenvie de polémiquer avecmonjeune collègue,le
professeurKamto, à proposde saplaidoiriede mardipassé,en lui répondantpointparpoint.
2. Pour faciliter la tâche de la Cour, j'essayerai d'identifier les pointsde divergence, en
expliquant les basesjuridiques denospositions. Cela dit,je maintiens toutes les critiquesqueai
formulées à l'égardde l'approchedu Camerounet de la ligne qu'elle a produite, etjeme permets
de vous référerà ma plaidoiriedejeudipassé. 3. Nos points de divergenceont pour point focal, la définition dela zone pertinente et des
côtespertinentes qui lui serventde base. De là découlentd'autres divergencessur la méthodede
constructiond'une ligne pour délimitercettezone, et l'équitde cette délimitationla lumièrede
lajurisprudence. Commençonsdoncpar la zoneet lescôtespertinentes.
Zoneset côtes pertinentes
Unezone ou trois?
4. Dans sa plaidoirie du mardi 12mars, le professeur Kamto a critiquéle point de vue du
Nigéria,selon lequel le golfe de Guinée enfermetrois zones pertinentes et non pas une seule.
Pourtant, cettenotion de trois zones pertinentesvient en premier lieu du mémoiredu Cameroun,
qui parle de trois zones différentes tout en les décrivant(mémoire du Cameroun, p. 503,
par.5.119-5.121), pour conclure ((Ayantprocédépar étapeen fonction des différenteszones
pertinentesdans lesquellesla délimitation doit être effectilec,onvientde construireune ligne...))
(Ibid.,par. 5.122.)
5. Cependant, s'il s'agit d'une mêmedélimitation,entre les mêmesdeux Parties, pourquoi
aurions nousalors trois zonespertinentes? Les côtes sont lesmêmes,et l'opérationest la même,
impliquantlesmêmesEtats. Il y a unitédepersonneset delieux.
6. Nous sommes en revanche d'accord qu'ily a bien trois véritableszonespertinentes,mais
qui sont différentes,car il n'y a ni unitéde personne -elleimpliquentdes ensembles différents
d'Etats côtiers-, ni unitéde lieux -s'agissant defaçades maritimes différentes. [Projection
no30.1
7. Or, c'est à ce moment-là (ut the Ilth hour, comme disent les Anglais), que le
professeurKamtonous dit qu'ilne s'agitque d'une seulezone pertinente,qui n'inclutque les deux
Parties, saufpour le petit détail de l'île deBioko, qu'onpeut envelopperà la Christo dans une
petite enclave, comme les îles Anglo-Normandes;ce qui ne laisse aucun obstacle entre la côte
nigérianeet la côte camerounaise, quis'étendrait ains, ar unecertaine astucemagique à laquelle
je reviendrai,usqu'à la fermeturedu golfede Guinée, à CapLopez au Gabon. Il neresterait entre
lesdeux qu'untout petit boutde la merterritorialedePrincipe,au fin fondde cettezone pertinente
homogèneetpresque bilatérale. 8. Il y a donc, selon le Cameroun,une seule zone pertinente et non trois, couvranttout le
golfe de Guinée, à laquelle le Camerouna un accès total non obstruépar un chapelet d'îles
imaginairesfaisant fonctiond'écran etbissectantle golfeen deux.
Examinonscette visioncamerounaiseidyllique de la zone pertinente.
Le chapeletd'îleset la bissectricedugolfe
9.Regardonsen premierlieu ce qu'afait lanature, sans se soucier de l'interventionhumaine.
[Projection31 .]
Cette carte topographiqueet bathymétriquedu golfe de Guinée indique bienqu'il y a un
chapelet continu d'îles et que ce chapelet a un effet de bissectrice et qui parle tout seul.
[Projection32.1
10.Le professeurKamtoest prêt à faire une petiteexceptionpour Bioko. Maisil considère
que Bioko n'a aucun lien avecl'archipel de Sao Tomé-et-Principe. Cependant,si on regarde la
carte de ces îles avec leurs eauxterritoriales,on remarquera immédiatement queles distances qui
les séparent au-delàde la merterritoriale est de8 milles marins, c'est-à-dire bienen deçà d'un
quart de l'étendue d'unezone économiqueexclusive pour chacune d'elles, on remarquera
égalementque cette distanceest plus procheque toute côte continentale au-dessousde la latitude
de Bioko. N'oublionspas égalementquela zone économiqueexclusive généré per Biokovers le
sud rencontre celle générép ear la côte continentalede la Guinéeéquatoriale, dansune direction
nord-ouest. Sitout cela neproduit pas uneffet d'écraninfranchissable,je ne vois pas qu'est-ce qui
pourrait le faire.
11.Venons-en donc à Bioko à laquellele professeur Kamto est prêtà accorder une petite
exception à la manièredesîles Anglo-Normandes. Biokoest une grande île; elle portela capitale
de la Républiquede la Guinéeéquatoriale,unepopulationimportante,constituantune grandepartie
de la populationtotale de 1'Etat. Elle a une surface maritime de 110 milles marins, alors que la
façademaritimedu Camerounn'est quede 155milles marins; c'est-à-dire que Biokà elleseule a
une façademaritimeéquivalantaux deuxtiers de celledu Cameroun. Cequi compte en droitde la
mer c'est la façade maritime, et non pas la masse terrestre qu'elle enferme. La Cour l'a trèsclairement dit dans l'affaire du Plateau continental Libye/Malte (C.I.J.Recueil1985, p. 40,
par. 49). [Projection33.1
12. De plus, le droit est trèsclair quant au traitementdes îles, comme la Cour l'a déclaré
dans son dernier arrêtdans l'affaire Qatar c. Bahreïn (par. 185), en se référantà l'article121,
paragraphe 2, de la convention de Montego Bay, qu'elle considère comme exprimant le droit
coutumieret qui stipuleque «lesîles, quellequesoit leur dimension,jouissen...du mêmestatut, et
par conséquentengendrent les mêmed sroitsenmer queles autresterritoirespossédant laqualitéde
terre ferme».
13. A part l'importance intrinsèque de Bioko, la référence dsao ns contexte au traitement
desîlesAnglo-Normandes dans l'affairede laMerd'Iroise, est tout àfait déplacée. Car, comm jee
l'ai ditdans ma première plaidoirie, il y a une différence radicale enltretraitement desîles qui
appartiennent à une partie à la délimitation etles îles qui appartiennentà un tiers Etat, et qui
introduisentpar celamêmeune nouvelle façade maritime indépendand teans la délimitation.l ne
s'agitdoncpas dansce cas d'un déplacemene txagéré de la façade maritimed'une des Partiesvers
la façade de l'autre, par l'incident de l'existence de l'île, maisde l'avènementd'une troisième
partie, quine peut êtrtraitéedemanière cavalièreé , galitsouveraineoblige.
14. Et même si,par hypothèse,on alloue à Bioko moins qu'uneffet total, ce que ni les
parties,et avec tout monrespect,ni la Cour,ne peuvent faire, au stade initd'unedélimitation,en
l'absence de la Guinéeéquatoriale, mêmd eans ce cas-là,arguendo, la ligne soi-disant équitable
que nous propose le Cameroun mord sur plus que la moitiéde l'effet de Bioko, comme le
démontreraplus tardmon collègueet ami leprofesseur Crawford.
15.Le professeurKamto nous dit «maisBioko est sur le plateau continentaldu Cameroun))
on pourraitrépondreet vice versa. Ils sont condamnésàvivre sur le mêmeplateau continental et
de lepartager mais pasdans le dosd'un autreEtatqui estleNigéria. Il est d'ailleursintéressantde
relever que la premièreligne transversale, tiréepar le Cameroun entre Bonyet Campo, traverse
Bioko. Le professeurKamto nousexpliquedanssa plaidoirie,que l'intérê dteBioko a étépréservé
dansle choix de laposition du point 1sur cette ligne, qui, selon lui,nereflète plus,commeon nous
l'avait dit précédemmenlte,s proportionsdes longueursdes côtesdes deux Partiesaux deux points
d'ancragede la ligne,mais qu'ilne s'agit que d'une ligne d'équidistance ajustée, en décd alaatmoyenne de la largeur de Bioko le point 1 vers l'ouestà partir du point d'équidistance. Cette
nouvelle justification du point qui ne figurenulle part jusqu'à la plaidoirie du deuxièmetour
démontreainsi que la base de la construction de la ligne a complètement changépar rapport à
l'explication initiale. Et que de toute manière,s'il y aajustementde l'équidistanceen faveur de
1'Etattiers,c'est exclusivementet complètementà la charged'unedesparties,qui est en l'espèce le
Nigéria.
16.Par ailleurs,àpropos de cettepremière lignej,e dois répéter, qumêmeselon la logique
du système,comme on nous l'a expliquéauparavantc ,etteligne rogneune partie substantiellede la
longueurde la côte nigérianepour ce secteur,en commençant à Bony, plutôt qu'à Akasso,tout en
ajoutant une partie substantiellenon pertinentede la côte camerounaise,à savoir toute la partie
obstruéedu cap Debundshajusqu'à la frontièresud.
17.S'il devait y avoirune ligne de ce genre, même si on accepte sa logique,elle aurait dû
êtretiréed7Akasso à cap Debundsha. Ce qui m'amène à la définitiondes côtes pertinentes des
Parties.
Les côtesperiinentes desParties
18. Le professeur Kamto critique notre description des côtes pertinentes des Parties
(CR 2002/17,p. 50,par. 20-22). Maisj'aimerais lerassurer;il s'agit là d'une certainemesured'un
malentendu. Il n'y a pas decontroversesur le fait que la côte pertinente nigérianeest celle qui
s'étenddu point terminal de la frontièreterrestre jusqu'à Akasso,d'où la côte nigérianevire
brusquement vers le nord, en tournant le dos au golfe de Guinée. Ence qui concernela côte
pertinente camerounaise -et c'est là que s'insère le malentendu - cette côte commence
évidemmentau point terminalde la frontièreterrestre, ets'étend plus loinjusqu'à cap Debundsha.
Ce qui changeaprèsla régionexiguë de l7adjacence,et quiaffectéepar levirementen arc (comme
je l'ai ditjeudi passé),vers le sud de la côte camerounaise,c'est le type de rapport entreles côtes,
passant d'un rapport d'adjacence dans la vicinitéimmédiate dupoint terminal de la frontière
terrestre,à un rapport de vis-à-vis avec le virement vers le sud de la côte camerounaise.
[Projection34.1 19. Ce rapportde côtes se faisant face,ou de vis-à-vis,s'arrête cap Debundsha,non pas
parce que la côte vire radicalementvers le sud, comme a pu le croire le professeur Kamto, car de
toute manièreelle continue às'orienter verslegolfe deGuinée. Ce quichange c'est quece rapport
de vis-à-viss'interromptpar l'effet d'écradeBioko, et la côte qui faitfaceàla côte camerounaise
dèsle cap Debundshaetjusqu'à la frontièreavecla Guinéeéquatoriale, à Campo,n'est plusla côte
nigériane,mais lafaçadeest de l'îlede Bioko.
20. Il y a, en plus, une autreraison, cettefois-cijuridique et non plus naturelle,qui inviteet
impose la même solution. Il s'agitdu fait quele cap Debundshaconstitue avecla pointe nord-est
de Bioko, un détroitqui ne dépassepas en largeur24 millesmarins, c'est-à-direun détroitdontles
eaux s'épuisenttotalement dans les eaux temtoriales des deux Etats côtiers. C'est la raison pour
laquelle une fermeture àce niveau là s'impose, comme l'a indiqué la Coud rans l'affaire du GoIfe
du Maine (C.I.J.Recueil1984, p. 336, par. 221). Il faut également releverici, dans le calcul des
côtes pertinentes,que dans des situationsoù il y a des échancruresprofondes,même quand elles
donnent sans obstructionsur la zone pertinente, les juridictions internationales les ont toujours
ferméespar une ligne droite dans la mesure des côtes pertinentes. C'estla solutionque la Coura
adoptéedans l'affairedu Golfe du Maine en fermant l'embouchurede la baie de Fundy (ibid.,
p. 268, par.31). [Projection35.1
21.Demêmeletribunal arbitraldans l'affairede SaintPierre-et-Miquelona adoptéla même
solution pour le détroitde Cabot dontl'embouchuremaintenantla fermetureest de 50 milles alors
que si l'oncalculaitla façade intérieurecelaauraitétde 500(décision,par. 29). [Projection 36.1
22. C'estpour ces raisons-làque la partie de la côte camerounaise,dèsle cap Debundshaet
jusqu'à la frontièreàCampo, ne peut plus êtrequalifiéede côte pertinente dans le contexte de la
présentedélimitation.
La définitionde lazonepertinente
23. J'aimerais revenirun instantsur lazone pertinente. Nousl'avons définiecommeétantla
zone bordée parles côtes pertinentes, en d'autrestermes, les côtes des Parties qui sont ou bien
«adjacentes»,ou bienqui «se fontface»,et quiconstitueainsila zonede délimitation. 24. Cettedéfinitionest conformeavec lajurisprudenceconstantede cette Cour,dont il suffit
de citerdeuxaffaires :l'affairedu Plateau continental(Tunisie/Libye),oùla Cour dit :
((C'estdonc en partant de la côte des Parties qu'il faut rechercher jusqu'oùles
espacessous-marinsrelevantde chacune d'elles s'étendenv ters le large, ainsi quepar
rapport aux Etats qui leur sont limitrophes ou leur font face. Les seules zones qui
puissent intervenir dans ladécision ...sontcellesqui peuvent être considéréescomme
étantau large [desParties]. .. Néanmoins,pour délimiterle plateau entre les Partiesil
n'y a pas à tenir compte de la totalitédes côtes de chacune d'elles ... Les cartes
mettent en évidence, sur lacôte de chacune des deux Parties, l'existenced'un point
au-delàduquel laditecôte ne peutplus avoirde lien avecles côtesde l'autrePartieaux
fins de la délimitation desfondsmarins.)) (C.I.J.Recueil1982, p. 61, par. 74-75; les
italiquessont de nous.)
25. Demême,dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine, la Cour nous dit :«en définitive, seulela
notiond'aire de délimitation [delimitationarea] estune notionjuridique ...Par contre,la notionde
((régiondu golfe du Maine)) ... apparaît comme une notion aux confins très élastiques))
(C.I.J. Recueil1984,p. 272,par. 41).
26. Dansl'affaire de la Mer d'Iroise, letribunalarbitral,nous dit également ((quela méthode
de ladélimitation à adopterpour la régionatlantiquedoit êtreen rapport avec les côtesdes Parties
qui bordent eflectivementleplateau continentaldecette région)( )RSA,vol.XVIII,par.248).
27. Le Cameroun, cependant, a construit sa ligne en s'appuyant sur, c'est-à-dire en
s'appropriant, lescôtes continentalesde la Guinéeéquatoriale et du Gabonjusqu'au Cap Lopez. Il
invoque commejustification, l'affaireGuinée/Guinée-BissauD . ans cetteaffaire, le tribunal,plutôt
que d'utiliser commeligne de base la laisse de basse mer, a tiréune ligne droite de direction
générale de la côte de 17Afiiqueoccidentale, joignantla pointe des Almadies (Sénégal) au Cap
Shilling(SierraLeone). Cette ligne englobedonc lescôtes des deux parties,mais les dépasse,car
elle trouve son ancrage dans deux autres Etats. Je sais que le professeur Kamto aime bien cette
affaire.En fait, il lui a consacréun articledans la revue égyptiennede droit internationalde 1985.
Untrèsbon article dejeunesse etje l'enfélicite.[Projection 37.1
28. Maistout de mêmec ,ette décision isoléfeaisantrecoursà la macro-géographie ne saurait
fairejurisprudence face à l'attitude claire de la Cour.En plus, il ne s'agissait pasde définirune
zone pertinentede délimitation,mais simplementde tirer une ligne droite de la direction générale
de la côte, produisantune façade maritime homogène nonobstruée versle large, commeles lignes
debase droitepour la merterritoriale.La méthodede constructionde laligne
29. De toute manière, rienne peutjustifier en droit l'appropriationpar le Cameroun de la
côte continentalede la Guinée équatorialet de la côte gabonaisejusqu'à Cap Lopez. Je n'ai pas
besoin de revenir icisur ma déconstructionde cetteligne dansma plaidoirie dejeudi passé. Et je
suis même flatté qulee Camerounait adoptécommesienne la carte quej'ai préparée à cet effet.
[Projection38.1
30. Il est clairque l'astucedes parties pointillées des ransversalesn'a pour but que de
faire passer la côte camerounaise, par une sorte de saute-mouton géographique,par-dessus le
chapelet d'îles pour aboutir dans la zone pertinente occidentale. Il s'agit donc d'une refonte
radicale de la nature,on a redessinélabaie qui se fermeavec la ligne rougeplutôt que commeelle
l'est dans lanature. Mais ce queje n'ai pas ditjeudi passé,c'est que le Cameroun,en ce faisant,
prolongede toutemanièresacôte de la longueurde lalignerouge. Donc, il continue à s'approprier
une longueurquine lui appartientpas.
L'équité de la ligneéquitable la lumièrede lajurisprudence
31. Enfin, et en guise de conclusion, Monsieurle président,Madame et Messieurs de la
Cour,j'aimerais commenterles proposduCameroun concernantles deux arrêts dans les affairesdu
Plateau continentaldela merdu Nord,et duPlateau continentalTunisie/Libye.
32. En ce qui concerne le Plateau continental de la mer du Nord, la Cour a fait un
ajustement relativementminimalpar rapport à une solution d'équidistancestricte. Tout ce que la
Cour a proposé était depousser le point triple vers le large, vers un point qui s'imposait
logiquement et qui ne se distançaitque modérémend tu tripoint d'équidistance stricte,moins que
50 % de la longueurde la ligne qui le reliait aucreuxde la côteallemande. De même, l'ouverture
des angles desdeuxcôtésdutrianglene dépassaiten aucunpoint uncoefficientde 0.2 de lacôte la
plusproche desparties. Et ona la solutionadoptéepar laCourdansla carte39. [Projection 39.1
33. En aucun cas, il ne s'agissait de l'élimination pureet simple du triple point en faveur
d'une percée dela ligne d'équidistanceavec l'Angleterreen face, avec un grand virage vers le
large en passant entre le Royaume-Uniet le Danemark. C'est, dans notre contexte, la ligne
équitabledu Cameroun.[Projection 39.1 34. En cequi concernel'affaireduPlateau continental Tunisie/Libye,le professeurKamto a
faitun grand effortpour la distinguerdelaprésenteaffaire. Maisil ne s'est pas adressauxpoints
de similitude quej'ai évoqués et qui sont que la Tunisie égalementa une côte concave, bordée
d'îlesétrangèrese,n fait deuxrangéesd'îles étrangèrese,t que par conséquent elle éttondamnée
à n'avoir qu'une ceintureétroitearallèleà ses côtes,sans avoirune échappéevers le large. Je ne
voudraispas entrerdans les détailspourrépondreauprofesseurKamtopoint par point, bien queje
soistentéde le faire, ayantété conseilanscette affaire. [Projection.1
35. Mais la Cour savait bien que la Tunisie avait déjàconclu un accord avec l'Italie, qui
empêchaittoute percéeau nord et au nord-est de ses côtes. Par conséquent,la seule échappée
qu'elle auraitpu avoir, étantdonnéla proximitéde la frontière terrestre avec la Libyedu creux de
labaiede Gabès,pouvaitse situer seulemententrelaLibye et Malte,au sud-estde ses côtes,vers la
Méditerranée orientale.
36. En adoptantla ligne qu'elle a adoptée,ui étaitmêmemoins de l'équidistance dans son
premiersecteur,etqui visaitun tripointéquidistantavecMalte dansle second secteur,laCour était
bien consciente qu'elle parachevaitla ceinture autour de la Tunisie. Sans doute, la Cour s'est
sentie obligéede le faire, car elle ne pouvait pas, au nom de l'équité, adopter une solution
extravaganteallant à l'encontre desdonnéesessentiellesde la nature et de la pratique bien établie
desparties.
Un dernier mot sur le terme «ligne d'exclusion» que mon collègue et ami le
professeurKamton'aime pas. Il dit que le Nigériaveut êtreprésentdans toutes les délimitations
car il a des ambitionsimpérialisteset veut êtrele maître du partage. Mais regardons en fait cette
ligneéquitableduCameroun. Que nousdit cette ligne ? 11dit auNigéria qu'elledoit abandonner
toute délimitationavec deux Etats, qui sont la Guinéeéquatoriale et SaoTomé-et-Principe,dans
des zones où leurscôtes sontbeaucoupplus prochesde ses zonesque toute côte camerounaise,et
qui sont plus intimementliées aveccettezone, car elle est dans la trajectoire de leurs côtes alors
qu'elleest toutàfait décalédees côtesduCameroun,en disant quele Nigéria aura sapart équitable
par cette ligne. Et pour lereste on va sedébrouilleravec les autres et aussi sans définirla zone, la
part qu'il voudrait en tirer et qui permettraitde juger l'équitéde la part du Nigériaen termes de
proportionnalité,quelleque soit la méthodepour mesurercette proportionnalité.Qui veut dans ceschémaêtrele maîtredu partage ? Celui que l'onfait sortirenpremierou celui quigarde toutes les
cartes danssa main sans même donner le critèrede mesure del'équide cette solution
Jevous remercie,Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieursde la Cour.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie Monsieur leprofesseur. La séanceest suspenduepour
une dizainede minutes.
L'audienceest suspenduede II h45 àII h55.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir.La séanceest reprise. 1 now give the floor to
ProfessorJames Crawford.
Mr. CRAWFORD:Thankyou very much,Sir.
THE MARITIMEBOUNDARY: CAMEROON APPROACH
CONTRASTEDWITH NIGERIA' SPPROACH
1.This speech will be in two parts. In the first part 1will respondto a nurnber of points
made by counsel for Cameroonin their secondround concemingthe Maroua Declaration. In the
second part 1 will tum to consider the issue of the maritime boundary, as adumbrated by
ProfessorsPelletandKamtoonTuesday.
A. TheMarouaDeclaration
2. Mr. President,Nigeria informed Cameroonat the latest by 1978that it did not accept the
Maroua Declaration. Cameroonnow agreesthat this was the case23.There was thus a dispute,by
this time,as to thevalidityoftheDeclaration.
3. Nigeria has already dealt extensively with the issues associated with the Maroua
Declarationin its writtenpleadingsand in the firstround24.1wouldonlymake three furtherpoints
about itatthis stage.
4. The first concernsthe Nigerian Note of27 March 1962, on which Professor Mendelson
placed suchemphasis2s.But thequestion iswhatprecise effectthisNote is saidto have. Thefocus
')CR200216p.6,para10.
2 4 200219pp.36-42paras97-120.
"CR 2002116p.38,para16.ofthe Note isonthe offshore; the author'sconcemwas oil licensing. Thelettergivessomeinsight
into the way in which, from an early stage of the independence of the two States, the oil practice
developed. Nigeria has made no secret whateverof that practice; indeed if there has been any
reticence on that score it hasbeen Cameroon's. But it is impossibleto believe thatin the modem
world the fate of inhabitedterritories and their peoples can be determined by correspondenceof
this character; that the fate of substantialhuman populations can be decided as a side-windor a
by-product of oil licensing. The letter is certainlynot a cessionof territory, nor is it a proleptic
abandonmentby Nigeria, that is, an abandonmentfor the future, of any claim to Bakassi based
upon such factorsas historicalconsiderationandactual administration. Thusthe lettermusttakeits
place among otheritemsofevidencein the record, inthe overallbalance thatthe Courtwill haveto
strike on thatscore. Indeed,as Mr. Brownliehas already recorded, counselfor Cameroon accepted
thatthat balancefavoursNigeria.
5. The second question concems the issue of constitutional invalidity,which Mr. Brownlie
discussed in the first round26. In the course of his speech on that ~ubject~~S , ir Ian Sinclair
presented his own analysisof Nigeria's constitutionalposition,which is in fact relatively easy to
follow, and not at al1"highly complex" ashe suggested. In his case it was not a question of art
being used to conceal difficultiesbut rather to exaggeratethem. His purpose was to demonstrate
that at the time the Maroua Declaration was signed (and indeed at the time of the YaoundéII
Declaration, to the extent that it may be relevant), the constitutionalposition was govemed by
Nigeria's 1963Constitution as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1966, and that this had been the
position ever since the passing of Decree No. 13 of 1967, restoring the 1963 Constitution as
amended.
6. SirIan concludedthat, in the sameway as under DecreeNo. 1of 1966,the 1967Decree
had vested bothexecutiveand legislativeauthorityin the FederalExecutiveCouncil,andhe citeda
compilationby Blausteinand Flanz in supportofthis concl~sion~~B . ut it is difficultto understand
how, having concludedthat such authority vestedin the Councilas at 1June 1975,he could then
2 6 ~200219pp. 36-42paras.98-120.
2 7 ~2002117pp. 34-36paras.10-14.
''~bi p.35,para.12.concludewith the statement that Cameroon'sinterpretationof the position was, nevertheless, that
the Head of Nigeria's FederalMilitary Govemment acting alone was entitled to make treaties
*
withouteven the advice, let alone the approval,of the FederalExecutive Council- that body, as
he indicated,was essentiallyan extendedsub-committeeof theSupremeMilitaryCouncil.
*
7. In thesecircumstancesthereisno need formeto repeatwhatNigeria said in itsRejoinder,
or indeed in its first oral round. Nothing inOuropponents' observationsaffectsthe demonstration
that President Ahidjo was clearly aware of the constitutional constraints under which
GeneralGowon was operating. Thepositionof the Nigerian Govemmentis clear and unchanged.
There can be no presumption that as an incidental result of a series of meetings concemingthe
maritimeboundary,Nigeria wassurrenderinga significanttractof tenitory in its lawfulpossession
andpopulatedbyNigerians - still less that itwasdoing soduringa discussioninwhichthere isno
recordthat the BakassiPeninsulawas mentionedeven once.
8. It is againstthis backgroundthat you needto considermy third point, which concemsthe
August 1993 Joint Meeting of Experts on Boundary ~atters*~. Remember this came just
sevenmonths before Cameroon'sinitial Applicationput in issuebefore the Courtboth Bakassi and
the maritime boundary. The minutesthus constitute a very helpful snapshot of the situationjust
priorto the commencementof the case. SincetheParties agreethat you shouldreadtheminutes,I
willnot take youthroughthem indetail.
9. But in contrast to Cameroon's reading of them,you will be able to see the following
elements:
(1) The meetingwas headedby seniorofficialsonboth sides.
(2) It was apparently amicable,though there had evidently been tension between the parties on
particular points.
(3) It was held not less than 15years afterNigeria informed Cameroonthat it did not accept the
Maroua Declaration. Both partieswere wellaware ofthatdisagreementand of thereasonsfor
it.
(4) Thenext step interms of the landboundarywasto be aworkshopconvenedby Carneroon.
29~ejoinderofNigeria, Ann. NR173.(5) Along the maritime boundary, both parties were awareof each other's oil activities; joint
ventures could be considered,but in the event both parties accepted "the fieedom of each
countryto develop itsresourcesalongthe border", and this despite the disagreementover the
Maroua Declaration,adisagreementpatentonthe faceofthe same document.
(6) There wasconcern"tomaintainarégimeofpeace inthe area".
(7) The tripoint with EquatorialGuineahad still to be determined, in order to enable each party
"to exploitits naturalresourcesinthe areain peace".
(8) Nigeria hadfailed to respondto Cameroon'sannouncementthat it wouldgo aheadwith work
onthe Betika Weststructure,just southofpoint G.
10. SirIan Sinclair,who is usually "the very pineapple of politeness"3- that comes fiom
his favouriteauthor, Sheridan- accusedme ofmakingup the facts; "indebtedto my imagination"
he calledit,perhaps he ismorea pineappleonsome occasionsthan on others3'.So it isworthwhile
to compareCameroon'sposition aboutthe facts as at the early 1990swithNigeria's. 1cannot of
course deal with al1of the facts in thetime availableand this day you would not want me to, but
here is abriefreview:
(1) Cameroonsays that the whole boundary alignment wasin dispute. There is no evidence of
thatin theminutes,whichcoverthe area fiomLake Chadto the sea.
(2) Atthe sametime, Cameroonsaysthat there wereno particularproblemsof delimitationalong
the boundary, only problemsof demarcation. But asthe minutes show,the two parties were
examining questions of delimitation and demarcation aswell as problems of transboundary
CO-operation.
(3) Cameroon says that the parties must have realized that their oil practice was fatally
inconsistent with Nigeria's positionon the Maroua Declaration and Nigeria's claim to
Bakassi. But both parties inthe sarneminutes agreed(a)that that disputewas unresolvedand
shouldbe referred to higher authority,and (b) in the meantirne, that theywere freeto develop
theirresourcesseparatelyalongtheborder. Hence thedisjunctionof land and maritimeissues
to which 1referred, withoutimagination,inthe firstround.
30~B. Sheridan, TheRivais(177Act 3scene 3.
"CR 2002117,p. 41, para. 23.(4) Cameroon saysit was ignorantofthe oil practicesouth of point G. But theminutesdealwith
precise issuesthat the parties werewell aware they faced there- the locationof the tripoint;
the proposedBetika West structure.
(5) Cameroonsays,throughProfessor Pellet, that Nigeria was coercingCameroon licenseesnot to
operate in the southern zone of overlapping claims. But when did this happen? Thereis no
suggestion ofit in the minutes. There isno trace of evidenceof it in therecord of this case,
unless ProfessorPellet was himself giving evidence- a strange thing for counsel to do,
especially inthe second round. Perhaps he should be called to make a declaration under
Rule 64 (a)?
(6) Cameroon saysit was deliberatelyrefrainingfiom licensinginthe areasto the southandWest
of the approximatetripoint, and alongwhat is now its claim line, inordernot to aggravatea
dispute. The minutestell a completely different story. The parties wantedto determinethe
tripoint to enable them to continue to exploit their own areas securely. They were not
planning to determinethe tripoint in order to have Cameroon immediatelyignore it with a
maritime claim out to 350nautical miles. If Cameroonhad for a moment entertainedsuch a
claim- or indeed a claim evento point H, at right angles to point G in the midst of known
Nigerian installations- don? youthink it mighthave said so during thismeeting? At least a
reservation ofrights would have been appropriate- certainlynot discussionof howto agree
on the precise location of the tripoint. Cameroon complains about the non-exchange of
information followingthe meeting - this seems anitem of information theparties wouldhave
consideredrelevant, notto Saynovel,had it beenin Cameroon'smind.
11. So the Court will see from this review just where lies the balance of truth and
imagination in this situation, just monthsbefore the present casewas commenced,just a short
while before the ultimatecriticaldate.
B. The maritimeboundary
12.Mr. President, Members of the Court, thab trings me tothe controversyover the maritime
boundary. Just as 1 have compared Cameroon's and Nigeria's positionin 1993 over the landboundary and especially Maroua and Bakassi,so 1 will compare Our two positions on the
delimitationof the maritime boundary.
13. An initial point is that Carneroon hasleft unchallenged or undiscussed largeareas of
Nigeria's maritimeboundary presentationlast week. 1 can illustratethis from tab 41, now on the
screen. We showedhow their line could not possibly go out to pointM. No response. Weshowed
how it could notpossiblygo beyond point L. No response. We argued that forthe Courtto award
a three-milestrip of maritime territory aroundpoinL would be effectivelyto deal with therights
of SaoTome and Principe. We showed how their line could not mysteriously emerge fiom
EquatorialGuinea'swaters in the south,at pointIl. No response on eitherpoint. We showed that
the line could not go around Equatorial Guinea by aforced exchangeof temtories. Silence. We
showed how Professor Pellet's white box, his maritime non liquw et,s untenable. The white box
has disappeared. We argued that the Agreementof 2000 did not involve a relinquishment by
Equatorial Guinea of any maritimeareas vis-à-vis Cameroon. That issue- crucial to your
jurisdiction- is apparently postponed. We arguetdhat the coastline of Rio Muni could not
possibly be relevant here.No response. Thiswas not adialogue ofthe deaP2. Carneroon was not
speakingat all; it was mute; it was a Nigerian soliloquy.
14.1must, however, acknowledge one thing. Ot nhis occasion,at least, Cameroon'sclaim
line has notchanged. This isthe firstphase ofthe writtenand oralpleadingsatwhich their linehas
remainedthe same, and for this stability wemust begrateful.1 congratulatethem. Cameroon still
claimsexactly the sameline, right outtopointM, even ifin its secondround ithas not attemptedto
defendthe extensionofthe line outto that point.
15. But, Mr. President, this unchanging lineis actually rather odd, because you heard
ProfessorKamto change the reasoning for the Now he justifies it as an adjusted
equidistance line, adjustedsidewaysby the average thicknessof Bioko. But is itnot odd howtwo
methodssototally different - lateralapportionmentofthe Gulf of Guineain slicesby referenceto
coastal ratios ignoringthe islands, on the one hand, andthe adjustmentby referenceto Bioko of a
median line drawn interpartes- on the otherhand, how two methods so totally differentcould
3 2 2002117,p.31,para.2.
"~bidpp.58-60,paras.41-48.still manage to produce the verysamepoint, pointI? Let alone the very same pointsJ, K, L and
M? A remarkable coincidence: 1 willretum to it.
16. And then you heard ProfessorPellet apologize for their mapping errors. Forgive me
Court, he said, for we have ~inned~~M . r. President,it is not a sin to makemappingerrors; weal1
do it occasionally,although 1cannotresist sayingthat they mighthave traded in oneor two oftheir
large team of foreign counsel for a good surveyorand cartographer,had they been serious about
their maritime claim- or forthatmattertheir landboundary.
17.The problem is not sin,which can be forgiven; it is ignorance,which in those blindto
the truth presents a greater problem. Cameroon's presentationof the maritime boundary ignores
the facts andthe law,as 1will nowshow.
1. The practice of the Parties
18.The first issue concerns thepractice of the Parties. This involvesquestionsboth of fact
and law. Letme takethe factsfirst.
19. ProfessorPellet complainedthat Cameroon's map of overlapping concessions, which
you can see on the screen, and in tab 42, was based on inaccurate Nigerian data fiom Our
Counter-Memorial; if they had sinned, he said,it was because they were led into err~r~~.In fact
Cameroon hadand has its own sourcesof information in itsSociétéNationale des Hydrocarbures,
in its oil companies and in the scouting services. Moreover,this Cameroon map is a relatively
accurate one; as 1 said in the first round, it does not differ in essentials fiom the map of
overlapping concessions shown in Nigeria's Rejoinder, and again last week. That map was
carefully based on informationobtained fi-omthe licensees and fiom the Nigerian Departmentof
Petroleum ~esources~~.
20. The inaccurate maps are those that ProfessorPellet showed you on Tuesday. The
Cameroon maps in your folder for 12March show erroneous licensing CO-ordinatesfor blocks
OPL 230 and OML 114. The correct CO-ordinateswere included in Our Counter-Memorial,
1
3 4 ~2002117,p. 19,par4.
351bid.,. 27, para.31.
36~ep1yof Cameroon,mapR 25,afterp. 438.AnnexNC-M341, signedby a surveyo?'; they are depictedaccuratelyin Our~ounter-~emorial~~
and Our ~ejoinder~'. We suspect ProfessorPellet's maps of Tuesday use data obtained
commercially fiom IHS. But these are essentially secondary sources. Nigeria went back to the
primary sources, the actual licenses, whichwe annexed and depicted accurately. The map now
shown on your screen (Reply of Cameroon, map R 24), which is also in tab42- another
Cameroonmap - againgets the situation approximately correct, unlike Cameroon'sgraphicsthis
week, whichmark a regression away fiom the comparative accuracy oftheir map of overlapping
concessions.
21. A second factual point. Professor Pellet agreed with us that there had been no
Cameroon oil activities in the southernzone of overlapping licences. And althoughhe was less
clear, he also seemedto agree withus that concordantoilpracticecouldbe a relevant circumstance
in maritimedelimitation, since he invoked it inrespect of areas north of point G. But he argued
that the practicesouthof point G was unilatera140.Mr. President,even if it had beenunilateral,it
was public, open and of long duration. In those circumstances even a unilateral practice,
unprotestedby otherStates in the region, wouldbe a basis for acquiescence andthe establishment
of vested rights. But of course the practice was not unilateral. Actually it was trilateral. It
involved al1three States. You can see it from the familiar graphic in tab 43. That is not an
indication of a merelyunilateral practice. 1refer you againto the Appendix in Chapter10 of Our
Rejoinderforthe historyof the practice.
22. While on the facts of practice,we had again the allegation- another allegation totally
unsupported by any evidence or proof- of force and threats by Nigeria against its neighbours.
Now we are told of "intimidation and threats"against Equatorial Guineaover Ekanga,as well as
against SaoTome and Principe over the JDZ ~~reements~'. 1 will not digni@ these allegations
with an answer. 1was at both negotiations,1helped to clraftboth agreements. But 1will not give
evidenceaboutthem. No doubtnextweek EquatorialGuineacan speakfor itself.
37~ounter-~emorialof Nigeria, Vol.X,pp. 2600-2601.
38~ounter-~emorialof Nigeria, fig.20.4.
39~ee,g.,Rejoinderof Nigeria, fig. 10.2.
4 0 2002/17, p.28,para. 36.
4'~bid, . 29, para.40. 23. 1turn from the factsto the law onthe subjectof oil practice and its relevance. It is true
that in a nurnber of cases the practice of the Parties has not been sufficient either to show
acquiescence,or to provideevidenceofthe Partiesthemselvesas to whatwould be equitable, orto
establish a set of legitimate expectations. But inOurcase, as we showed in Ourwritten pleadings,
J
that was because the practice inthose other caseswas ephemeral, disputed,equivocalor of short
duration prior to the dispute arising. For example,mere seismic work is ephemeral and will not
have much or any effect, as you impliedin the Aegean SeaOrder on Provisional Measures. Nor
will licensing of relatively short duration, especiallyif protested and not accompaniedby actual
drilling and exploitation,as in Gulfof Maineor the secondphaseof Eritrea/Yemen. But Statesare
well aware of the differencebetween mere licensingand general surveying,on the one hand, and
actual exploitation on the other, and they protect themselves bystandstill agreements. There was
such an agreement inthe St. Pierre et Miqueloncase: it was inforce from 1967 until 1992when
the decision ofthe CourtofArbitrationwasimplemented.
24. Professor Pellet did not disagree with thedecision in Tunisia/Libya,nor that the Court
treated the oil practice as relevant4*. Buthe said it was the "cas-limite"for such practice, the
limiting case. Here there are two pointsto make. First, even if it is the limiting case, andthere is
no statement to that effect in the jurisprudence, the present case is even stronger. The evidence
here is of longerpractice, it is practicef three Statesnot two, it involvesmuch denserpatternsof
activity, and there has at no stage been a large discrepancy between oilconcessions and oil
installations such as eventually developed betweenTunisia and Libya. The evidence here does
precisely showa tacit accord between theParties,no doubtstillsubject to some minorclarification
andto the needfor a final delimitation. It certainlyshowsacquiescenceonthe part ofCarneroon.
25. ProfessorPellet treated Tunisia/Libyaas based entirely on a defacto line establishedby
oil concession^ ^^d,it is true thatthe Court paid attentionto the pattern of concessions,as you
said in your~ud~ment~~B . ut it alsopaidparticularattentionto the actualpatternof exploitation, as
1 will show. The Courtwillsee onthe screen andin tab 44 thepattern of oilconcessions,including
4 2 2002/17,p.25,para.24.
431bipd.25,para.23.
44~.~.Reports1982,p.84,para.117.the stepped Tunisian concessions essentially along the line of 26'. The area of overlapping
licences offshore,which are shownin bluey-greyon this graphic, only appearedin 1974and only
some distanceoffshore. The SpecialAgreementwas signedin 1977. The concessionpracticewent
back to the late 1950s'as it doeshere. You can see fromthe black-arrowedline on the screenthe
Court's actualdelimitation,andit is evidentthat inshorethe generalconcordanceof licenceswas a
highly relevantcircumstance.
26.But it wasnotjust the licences. Nowyou cansee onthe screen (againtab 44) the actual
wells drilledby the two States,red forTunisia,black forLibya. Andyou can seethe linetheCourt
drew, neatly betweenthem - with only one exception, a late Tunisian well on the wrong side of
the line which was dry,non-productiveandhad been abandoned. It is clearthat the actualpattern
of exploitationwas highly significant.
27. 1need hardly remindthe Court of the extent of practice here. You see it on the screen
(tab 43). The practiceis muchdenserand is nowof considerablylonger durationthan was the case
with Tunisia and Libya in the late 1970s. If the Court values consistency and legitimate
expectations,thishasto be ahighlyrelevantcircurnstance.
28.Finally, Mr.President, a mixed question of law and fact. Cameroon argues again that
Nigeria's failure to informit of further oil practice rendersthe practice i~licit~. o this there are
any number of answers. First, although it is true that there may have been some problems of
communication at different times, Cameroon has not shown that Nigeria persistently failed to
communicate relevant information, at Ministry level, before or after the case began. It is
Cameroon,in fact,that has declinedto be openwith the Court overthe oil practice. Secondly,the
indications are that bothsides were well informedof the other's practice, asthey might wellhave
been. Thirdly, the information wasin the public domainanyway, at least in its general outlines.
Fourthly, to the extent that Cameroon relies onthe allegedcommitments made in 1991or 1993,
they couldnot possiblyhave madeunlawfulanexisting30-year-oldpractice, of whichbothParties
were wellaware. Fifthly,thereis no evidenceof protestat any generic failureto giveinformation.
The 1993minutes, for example, do not contain such a protest. They do contain one specific
4 5 2002117p, .26,para. 26.complaintby Cameroonconceming Nigeria's failure torespondto a recent request conceming the
proposed BetikaWestfield. Butthe specific excludesthegeneral: therewas no generalcomplaint
about lack of information and there is no indication that information was wanting. The Parties
knew whateach was doingand no one suggestedthat anytemporaryfailureto provideinformation, t
if such failurethere was,affectedtherightsofthepartiesoneach sideofthe commonborder.
2. Deficienciesin Cameroon's globalmodel
29. Mr.President, Members of the Court,1tum to the second major issue which separates
the Parties still. Thisis Cameroon'sglobal model for allocationof maritime spacesin the Gulf of
Guinea, shown again intab 45. Eversincethat claim wasfirst made in 1995,it has been based on
the now familiar set of transverse lines and of points alongthose lines determined in accordance
with the ratioof coastallengths betweenNigeriaand Cameroon,ignoringthe islands.
30.Upto and includingCarneroon's firstoral round,the ligne équitablewas alwaysjustified
on the same basis. According to Cameroon, the global situation excluded any version of an
equidistance line, which was fundamentallyinequitableto Cameroon. So it dividedthe Gulf of
Guinea laterally with these three lines. On the outermosttwo lines, it indicated a non-pertinent
section attributable respectivelyto RioMuni and Gabon. It divided the remainder of each lateral
line in the ratio of the coastal lengthsof Cameroonand Nigeriato createpoints 1,J and K. There
was no pretence of equidistance and no attempt to take into account the single most important
factor in the Gulf, the coastal frontagesof Biokoand Principe. That wasthe methodof the written
pleadingsandof Professor Mendelson.
31.Professor Mendelsonexplained itin the first round. You will recall him saying that the
firstlateralline had to be drawn to Bonnyrather than Akassoso that the three boxeswould have
approximatelythe sarne area46. Why they should havethe same area is not clear, and he did not
explainit - but forthemoment weareplayingthis gameto Cameroon'srules, and thatwas one of
them. Youwill also rememberthathe said he could not take Bioko into account becauseto do so
i
would shiftthe line evenfurther westand thatwould be unfairto ~i~eria~'.
4 6 2002/6, p.52,paras.17-18.
47~bi d.5,, paras.22. 32. In Our written pleadings and in our first round, we showed that this method was
untenable in principle,under the applicable law, that is to Say,the internationallaw of maritime
delimitationbetween two Statesas laid downby the Court. 1will not repeat that demonstration. 1
will only show,very briefly, that Cameroon cannot evenapply its ownmethod consistently. After
fourroundsof argumentit cannoteven getits ownmethodright.
- First, Cameroonconsistentlyconfusescoastallengths andcoastal ratios. Tomake any senseof
these straight lines you have got to measure ratios along them, not coastal lengths. That is
elementary.
- Secondly, Camerooncannot work out whichparts of the lateral lines are non-pertinent. They
have come up with two versions, as you can see on the screen and in tab 46, one in their
Mernorial, one in their Reply. Both are wrong. Neither of them represent actual coastal
lengthsas you can see fiom the arcs on the screen. Nor do they represent coastalratios. It is
stillunclear whattheyrepresent.
- Thirdly, Carneroon's change in non-pertinent sectionsshould have changed the location of
points J and K. Afterall, those points are determinedsupposedlyby applying coastalratiosto
the remaining pertinent section. Yet those points did not change. Cameroon is completely
confused about its own method. If counsel for Carneroon do not understand the method
themselves, howcanthey expectthe Courtto do so?
- Fourthly, if you applytheir method as ProfessorMendelson explainedit, you get completely
unacceptableresults. As you can see, wehave drawnthe non-pertinent sectorsas he saidthey
should be drawn. We have then divided the remainingline by the coastal ratios, the coastal
ratios accordingto Cameroon. The new points J1 and K1 you can see on the screen. Onthis
basis, point L is off the WestCoastof Nigeria and point M is on the Benin-Nigeriamaritime
boundary. Their methodachieves a complete cut-offof the whole coastal fiontage of Nigeria
fiom eastto West. As 1said earlier,thisis quitea line!
33. No doubt conscious of these difficuities, Mr. President, Members of the Court,
ProfessorKamto has courageouslytried a completelynew tack. Now he justifies the line as an
adjustedformof equidistance line! 34. Mr. President,in your absencelast week1took the liberty of quotingyour lectureto the
Sixth Committee last year showing the virtues of equidistance as a startingpoint for maritime
delimitation4'.ProfessorKamtowas evidentlydeeply impressed. 1wishlecturesof mine hadsuch
an effect! For nowhe produces a completely differentjustificationfor the line4'. First, he shows I
you an equidistance line - you see it on the screen,tab 47. Then he says it shouldbe adjusted.
How? Well what he says in effect- 1 will not quote it at length, it's paragraph 44 of the
compterendu- is that it shouldbe adjusted by the mean thickness of Bioko applied sideways.
Andwe've donethat now,a 30km line appliedsideways.
35. Thisattemptcalls forthe followingremarks.
- First, it is transparentlyan expost facto attemptto recasttheir lineas an adjusted equidistance
line under the influenceof a lecturefiom thePresident. ProfessorMendelsonin the firstround
expresslydeniedthat theyhadtaken Biokointoaccountat all.
- Secondly,theligne équitableis not an adjustedequidistanceline. It isthe transpositionupona
lateral line Campo/Bonny of the thickness of an island. As the Court will be aware,
equidistance linesare not drawnin this way,adjustedornot.
- Thirdly, the method, giving lateral effect to the average thickness of Bioko along the
CampoA3onnytransverseline,miraculouslyproducespoint1 !! A completelydifferentmethod
produces precisely the same point out of the universe of possible points along the
Campo/Bonnyline. Whata coincidence!
- Fourthly,the transpositiondoesnot start froma pure equidistancelineeither,as you can see. It
starts fiom a virtually straight line,at best a simplified equidistance line. The Courthas not
been told how it has been drawn. The real equidistance line, giving ni1effect to Bioko, is
shown now in green. Mr.President,if, forthe sake of argument,you attemptto transposethe
average thicknessof Bioko along the Campo/Bonnyline fiom a zero effect equidistanceline,
you would not get point 1, you would get point X. It's about 2.5 nautical miles further
eastwards. So Camerooniswrongon thattoo.
4 8 200243, pp.53-54,paras.6-8.
4 9 2002/17,p.59,para.44.- But, fifthly, the coincidence deepens. Not merely isthe adjusted equidistance line said to
produce point 1, it is also said to produce points J, Ky L and even M out to sea.
ProfessorKamto did notbother to tell us howS0.This is adjusted equidistance of a tmly novel
kind. As it proceeds, it gets further and further away froman equidistance line, and for no
discemible reason.
36. But most fundamentallyof all,ProfessorKamto's method bears no relationship whatever
to the lawof maritime delimitation, any morethan did ProfessorMendelson's differentjustification
for the very sarne line. Why take the southem coastal fiontage of Bioko, which does not face
Nigeria at all, and use it as a basis for an adjusted equidistanceline? Why not take the north-west
facing coast and use that? 1think because it would not produce point 1. Cameroon's new method,
like its old,ignores the basic axiom that maritime delimitationoccurs between facing coasts. The
Court of Arbitration inSt.Pierre et Miquelondid not take the south-facing coastal fiontage of the
French islandsand treat it as a basis for shiftinga ni1effect line to the west. It gave separateeffect
to the west-facingcoasts of the French islands, andto the south-facing coasts.
37. In the second place, the method operates on the entirely novel basis of State thickness.
How thick is a State? The Court delimits from coastal fiontages, not fiom hinterlands, as you
alreadysaid in~ib~a/~alta~'.
38.For the Court to adoptthis method wouldbe to abandonthe hard-won progressin the law
of maritime delimitation for an obviously arbitrary, result-oriented and partisan approach. 1 am
afiaid ProfessorKamto was in the position referredto by theplaywright Sheridan, of whom Sir Ian
should have wamed him. As to Cameroon's method ofdelimitation, he could "only spoil it by
trying to explain itVs2.If it were not already spoiled- which, forthe reasons we have given, it
already thoroughly is.
39. A final point, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court. Let us for the sake of argument
assume that you were to give less than full effect to Bioko as against the opposite coast. You
obviously couldnot give it less than half effect. It is a substantial islandwith a substantial coastal
''CR 2002/17,p.60,paras47-48.
Sheif (LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1985,40-41,para.49.
52~.B. Sheridan, TheRivals(1775),Ac4,SC3.fiontage. The halfeffect lineis shown onthe screennow. It is entirely withinthe watersattributed
to Equatorial Guinea under the Agreement of 2000. It is obvious that that line cannot be the
subjectof a judgment of the Court. You have nojurisdiction as to the area where the half effect
line runs. But, secondly, to give anything lessthan full effect to Bioko is to judge Equatorial r
Guinea,to exercisejurisdiction over it,and it is not a party to theseproceedings. SoCameroon's
talk of partial effect for Bioko- one way or another,sideways,backwards, however- can be
givenno applicationin this case.
3. "PointH"and Carneroon'c slaimto maritimeareasto thesouth
40. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 tum to my thirdpoint this moming, which is +
Cameroon'simplicitclaim to maritime areasto the south of the linebetween point G andpoint H.
Cameroon, throughProfessor Kamto sought to justify point H as the jumping off point for an
inadmissiblesystemof global distributionbut he also gave an independentreason for it based on
equidistance53.
41. Membersof the Court will see in tab 49 a close-up of the position around pointsG and
H. 1wishto makeanumber of points inrelationtothese.
42. First ofall,of course,Nigeria doesnot acceptthe validity ofpoint Gto startwith. That's
partof the issueaboutthe Maroua Declaration,which 1have alreadydiscussed.
43. Secondly,even if - quod non- point G wereto be considered asa valid startingpoint,
it would by no means be inequitable as a geographical matter alone. As we have already
established, Nigeria's relevant coastallengths significantly outweigh those of Cameroon, by a
factor of about 2:l. Secondly, even on Cameroon'sown assumptions asto the land boundary,
Nigeriancoastline dominatesthe Calabarestuaryby a factor of 3:1. A solutionsimilarto the Gulf
ofMaine case wouldproducea line deflectedto theCameroonside.
44. But the dominantconsiderationsconcern thepractice ofthe Parties. The claimto a sharp
right-hand tum was never articulated at any stage by Carneroon pnor to the deposit of its
Memorial. The claim was never made. It contrasts sharply with the practice of the Parties,for
- --
"CR 2002117,p. 59,paras44-45.examplein terms of the proposed Betika Westwell, which, as you can see, seems never to have
beendrilleds4.
45. Above all, for the Court to grant point H to Cameroon would involve the transfer to
Cameroonof three oil-bearing structures,that is to Say,three fields,of two operationalplatforms,
of two producing wells and of a complexof pipelines. These were constructed, under Nigerian
licences,unprotestedand became operationalin the mid-1980s. Forthe reasonsI've alreadygiven,
the allocationof these facilitiesto Cameroonis excludedin terms of an equitable outcome inthe
circumstances. No doubt the transfer ofthese facilitieswould marginallyimprove Cameroon'soil
reserves and monthly production; but even Professor Pelletsuggested that this was not really a
juridical consideration in terms of delimitation5',andwe strongly agree. For the Courtto transfer
these installationsto Cameroonwould strikeat the rootsof securityof tenure interms of offshore
oil operations, notlimited to the Gulf ofinea. It wouldopen the door to furtherambitclaims of
thiskindwhereveroilwas discoveredandexploitednearaboundary.
4. Nigeria's claim line
46. Finally, Mr. President, 1should say somethingfurther about Nigeria's claim line. As1
said last week, Cameroon disputes the relevance of oil practice. If the Court agrees with that
position,the result should in Oursubmissionbe an equidistanceline drawn from the point on the
coastwhere the landboundary ends,untilitmeets theequidistancelinewith EquatorialGuinea. In
the context of Nigeria's longer relevant coast, and in the absence of any other special
circumstances, that equidistance line will be the maritime delimitation line. In Nigeria's
submission,consequentupon the Court's upholdingitsclaimto the BakassiPeninsula,the line will
be locatedinthe Riodel Rey.
47. On the other hand, forthe purposesof maritimedelimitationthe practiceof theparties is
a relevant circumstance, as1have said. What is relevantfor Nigeria, weaccept, is relevant for
Cameroon, and the Court will necessarily have to take this factor into account, if it upholds
Nigeria'spositionagainst Cameroononthepoint ofprinciple.
54~fC.R 200217p.23,para.7.
"CR 200217,p.21,para.10. 48. As to the precise locationof the equidistanceline, the Court will see from the satellites
photographon your screenand intab 50 that thereis a substantial, 2 km, Sandislandoff the Riodel
Rey. It appeared on the satellitephotographs in the mid-1990s; it is still there. Nigeria was
willing to treat it as a basepoint forthe delimitationof maritime zones; Cameroonseems reluctant
to acceptthis, though it should benoted that theyhave not denied theexistenceofthe island. They
deny that it has yet appeared on nautical charts- if it exists it will appear on nautical charts.
Accretion, siltation and the formation of islands in this region is by no means an unusual
phenomenon. Lookatthe maps ofBakassi overthe period of the dispute andyou will see Bakassi
itself silting up. Thisis a form ofconsolidationof land, it is not thehistorical consolidationoftitle
of whichProfessorBrownliespoke; but it isa formof consolidation
C.Conclusion
49. Mr. President, Members of the Court, during his final speech last Thursday, the
distinguished Agent for Cameroonmade what was described as a new proposal. It has already
been analysed by SirArthur Watts. It applied equally to the land and maritime bounda~y~~.If 1
may Sayso, with respect,it containedthe followingcontradiction. The Agentsaid: we accept that
there maybe areasalongthe boundarywherethere is no adequatedelimitation. In relation to these
areas, the Court should decide. Or altematively it should establisha demarcationcommission5'!
But the premise of the argument is that there are unresolved pointsof delimitation. For these, a
demarcation commissionwill not help, even if the Court couldmandate one - which SirArthur
has shown you cannot. Nor can you delegate your judicial power,the power vested in you by
virtue of Cameroon's Application made in conformity with the Statute, as you have already
decided it was- therewas, 1think,a three-second discussionof the BarcelonaTractiondictumin
Cameroon7ssecondround, but my timing might have been wrong. The Courthas no altemative
but to delimit itself,in those areas where the existing delimitation is found to be inadequate or
defective.
5 6 2002117p,.64,para.2.
"~bidp..65,para.7. 50. As to the maritime boundary, the proposal is even more contradictory; one does not
demarcatea maritime boundaryout to sea. MoreoverdespiteCameroon'sreluctance to negotiate
withNigeria,that is preciselywhatthe 1982Conventionrequires.It is Nigeria'sviewthat oncethe
Courthas laiddown the general legalfiameworkforthe maritimedelimitation,the three States can
readily resolvethe precise location of the tripoint,thus producing the result contemplated by the
two Parties in 1993, as well as by the 2000 Agreementbetween Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea.
That wouldbe in full compliancewiththe applicablelaw.
51.Onthe other hand,the Courtnow has al1the informationit needsto delimit the maritime
boundary intepartes downto the approximatetripointwithEquatorialGuinea,in accordancewith
the methodology 1outlined last week.For the reasons given, youhave nojurisdiction togo beyond
the equidistanceline withEquatorialGuinea. Forthe reasonsgiven, you haveno need to do so in
any event.
52. Mr.President, Members of the Court, that completes Nigeria's presentation on the
maritime boundary in this round. 1would ask you to cal1on Nigeria's Agent,the Honourable
Musa Abdullahi,to concludeNigeria's reply. Thankyou verymuch.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. 1 now give the floor to
HisExcellencythe AgentofNigeria.
Mr. ABDULLAHI:
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court. First 1 should like to Say how
honoured 1am to have actedas Agent for Nigeria inthese proceedings. 1am extremelyproud of
the dignified and constructive way in which Nigeria has striven to respond to our opponents'
attacks, even when these have been deeply wounding and have questioned Ourcommitment to
peace and progress, Ourhonesty and integrity, and Ourgenerosity- the very elements of Our
self-respect.
2. Themoment is longoverdue,Mr. President,for our neighbours'attitude to change. They
have declared us an "enemy country". The Court has seen that intermittent Cameroonian
incursions intoNigerian villages and fishing Settlementsin disputed areas has been accompanied
by arrests, detentions,torture,rape andkillings. The record growsdaily andNigeria keepsit up todate. Yet despiteal1this - and 1say despiteal1this, Mr. President,because the Courtcan see that
Nigeria has had a very great deal to put up with- Nigeria continues to show forbearance and
openness, in circumstanceswhereother Statesmightnot have doneso. Wedothisbecauseit is our
traditionalway, because of Ourpacific foreign policy, andbecauseof Ourcommitmentto Ourrole
as a leader and CO-architectof initiativesto further peace, securityand economic developmentin
Africa.
3. In furtheranceof this attitudeof opennessand positiveengagement,between 1985and the
year 2002, four Nigerian Presidents visited Cameroon. They are, Mr. President,
GeneralIbrahim Babangida, General SaniAbacha, and General Abdulsalami Abubakarand the
present PresidentOlusegunObasanjo. It is striking evidence ofCameroon's attitudeto us that
there hasnever been a retumpresidentialvisit till today. Similarly,althoughNigeria has continued
throughoutto maintainthe highest level ofdiplomaticrelations withCameroon,by the presenceof
an Ambassador and Consuls-General, Cameroon maintains the lowest level of diplomaticand
consularrepresentationin Nigeria. Whenthey tell the Court theydo not want totalk to us,they are
at leastbeing consistent!
4. Cameroonnever speaks of the people, the livingcommunitiesthat it wants theCourt to
transferfrom Nigeriato Cameroon. Itsinterest in the disputedterritories is simplyin landand oil.
But, Mr.President, as is very evident from the copious evidencethat Nigeria has suppliedto the
Court,Bakassihasa largeindigenous Nigerian population.
5. At its heart, this caseis about the people, the communities, that wouldbe thrown into
chaos if Cameroon were to succeed in taking control of them. Cameroon accepts that they are
Nigerians. Will these tens of thousandsof people, in various parts of Nigeria, agree to a sudden
change totheir nationalityso asto becomeCameroonians? Everythingknownabouttheir attitude,
and Cameroon'sown deplorable record,makes this extremely unlikely. Would the populations
#
concemedhave in reality to vacate theirhomes, eitherbecause Cameroon forcibly displaced them
or becausethey were too frightenedand intimidated to stayon in them? It seemsvirtuallycertain.
Wherewill they move to? Mat will it lead to? In a world of power politics,will the Security
Council be able to do anything about this, despite the emphasis given by both the League of
Nationsand the UnitedNationsitselfto theinterestsand security of populations? 6. Mr. President,distinguishedMembersof the Court,Cameroon has triedto tell youthatthe
Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabardid not havethe necessaryinternationallegal personalityto enter
into a protection treaty with the British. Nigeria, most recently through Sir ArthurWatts, has
shown that Ouropponentsare wrong aboutthis. The Court will note that ProfessorShaw,one of
Cameroon'sowncounsel,haswritten
"Africa was not regarded as terra nullius, and occupation was not therefore
availableas a mode of acquiring legaltitle to territory. Territorywas acquired onthe
continentprimarilybymeans of agreementsof cessionwithlocal leader^."^^.
1sCameroonnowsayingthatnineteenthcenturyCalabarwas terranullius?
7. Cameroon has tried to play games with photocopies by presenting the Court with the
famousDr. Eliasletter. My Co-Agent ChiefAkinjideyesterday putfonvard Ourcomments on that
letter. As he said, a lawyeris only as goodas his brief. Butpermitme to add, Mr. President, that
what Cameroonpresented to the Court was not a letter but a newspaper publication containinga
purported extract of the late jurist's views. 1s it accurate? And what does it leave out?
UnfortunatelyDr. Elias, whom 1 respect andis a distinguishedNigerian of greatrepute, is no more
alive to claim or disclaim it as his work or to comment on the accuracy of the piece. Clearly in
thesecircumstancestheevidentialvalue of such anewspaperarticleis closeto nil.
8. Cameroonalso makesmuch of a documentpurportingto be a NigerianMinistry of Justice
legalopinion on this dispute. Ian Brownliehas alreadyput this in its proper perspectivender the
rules of internationallaw. Permitme to add, Mr.President,as a Minister of Justicein Nigeria, that
under our practiceal1officialcommunicationsaresignedby theAttorney-General,the Minister,or
the Solicitor-General. Directors, DeputyDirectors and AssistantDirectors do not sign letters on
behalf of the Ministry. Mr.Olukolu,unfortunatelynow deceased,was an AssistantDirectorin the
Departmentof International and ComparativeLaw, andso not authorized to sign letters on behalf
of the Ministry. The paper ~ameroon has presented to the Court was neither signed by anybody
nor on the Ministry'sletterheadnor stamped. It was not a letterto anybody. Cameroon couldnot
even inform the Court how it came into possession of this document, yet itwants the Court to
believe that it is Nigeria's legal opinion. Mr. President, distinguishedMembers of the Court, the
58~alcolmShaw: "Title toTerritories in Africa", Clarendon Press, 1986,p. 33.matters1am raising here are mattersof elementarylegalknowledge! My answerto this isthat this
is not a document emanating fiom my Ministry. The so-called opinion, like the late
Dr. TaslimElias's opinion, is simply nottoberelied upon.
9. But let me goback to the people,Mr.President,who are theheart of this case. Cameroon
claimed to be amazed when we said that Bakassi localgovemment area has a population of
156,000people. 1 want to state that this population is real. It is, as Chief Akinjide showed
yesterday, adapted to live densely according to the terrain,uch as mangrove in some areas, flat
and sandy terrain in others such as Abana, and higher, finner areas such as Archibong. It may
interest the Court to know that Lagos,which is a tiny city state in Nigeria, has a population of
13millionpeople. And, if you takethe populationof Lagos and Ibadan togetherthe populationis
more than 16 million people, which is theentire population of Cameroon. As a late Nigerian
musician,Fela Kuti, putit in a Song- letmequotehim in Ourpigeon Nigerian language: "Every
day my people dey inside bus, 44 Sitting,99standing." That tells youthe nature of the population
we have. The minimum population forthe creation of a local govemment creation in Nigeria
duringthe last localgovemmentcreating exercisewas 100,000 people. Bakassi qualified.And in
any event,we are talking of large numbersof people,whateverthe exact figure. They are people,
Nigerianpeople, legally in a Nigerian territory.
10.With al1respect to the Court, Mr. President and distinguished Members, Nigeridaid not
think it fit either or necessary that a difference betweentwo neighbours can be brought to court
without firstexhaustingbilateral or fiiendly options. However, 1believe thatthe positiveway in
which Nigeria has defended the case shows much more clearly than mere protestationscould do
that Nigeria has greatconfidencenotonlyinthejustice of the Court,but in the strengthof its case,
on Bakassi,on Lake Chad, onthe landboundary,on themaritimeboundary, onStateresponsibility
and on counter-claims.
11.Today, Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court,theNigerianGovemmentand
people, and particularly the communities whose futuresare placed at risk by these proceedings,
have their eyes fixedupon The Hague. They believethat they will be vindicated by the Court's
judgment. 12.In proper respectto Ouropponents,1now turn to the closing speechof the distinguished
Agent of Carneroon, H.E. Amadou Ali. 1 have four thingsto Sayto him through the Court, if1
may put it that way, Mr.President. 1hope he willfind al1four of these points as constructiveas
they areintendedto be.
13.First,1 am glad that he is sohappy about Ourposition on the instruments goveming the
land boundary, though 1 confess 1 am genuinely at a loss to understand why he is so suddenly
happy, sincenothinginNigeria's position haschanged.
14. Second, 1am sorry that he finds Ourattitude to the boundary instruments exaggerated.
We did not choose to embark onthis exercise. Cameroonforcedus to examine the meaning ofthe
instruments in detail, and we have therefore come up with our conclusions and presentedthem
fairly and squarelyto the Court. Absolutelynothing inurresponse isartificial or unreasonable.
15. Third, although SirArthur Watts has already dealt with the proposals made in the
distinguished CameroonianAgent's final speech, 1 am pleased to see that Our Cameroonian
colleaguesnow appearat lastto accept thatthere is a very genuineneed, inthe interests of stability
and good order, for clarification ofthe meaning of the boundary instruments,as Cameroonitself
requestedin itsnow famouswords "préciserdéfinitivement".
16.Finally, although Cameroon may feea lt the presenttime that itdoes not like Nigeriavery
much, we remain Afiican brothers and neighbours. We Nigerians believe thatone day they will
love us as brothers should. 1hope it will nottake too long. As a first step in the right direction
Nigeria invites Cameroonto releam the language of dialogueand friendship. Thisis good as an
instrument of international obligation, iits aer of commonsense andof goodneighbourliness.
17.Mr.President, 1should like to finallypay tributeto the literally hundredsof Nigerians,
both the distinguished andthe relatively humble,who haveplayed apart in enablingNigeria'scase
to be brought to this Court and presented openly and confidently. Giventhe sheer scale of Our
opponents'applications, andthe mannerinwhichthey havepursuedtheir claims,ithas beena very
considerableexercise. 1will Saynothing ofthe expense,but it is right for me to pay particular
tribute to the many Nigerians who have worked selflessly,often for long hours and in difficult
conditions,to provide the Court with theevidence thatthe nature of this case requires. A number
of them have been presentin Court during these proceedings. Our country will not forget them.Nor will it forgetthe services of the distinguishedteam of foreign lawyersand expertswho have
assistedus with the case.
18. Finally,1 should like on behalf of my Govemment to expressNigeria's thanksto you,
Mr.President, to your Vice-President, and to the other distinguishedMembers of the Court, for
your patience, goodwill and impartialityin studyingthe lengthy writtendocumentationand Sitting
patiently and attentively through al1these oral presentations. Mr.President, 1 do not Say this
merely out of conventionalcourtesy. Nigeriaknowsto its costhow wideranging and complicated
are the issues raised inhese proceedings. It is tmly grateful to you andyour colleaguesfor your
attention andyourpatience, and alsoto the Registrarand the Court staff,includingparticularly the
interpretersandtranslators,foral1theirhard work.
19.Mr. President, 1have thehonourto informyou thatthis completesNigeria's speechesfor
today. 1thankyouverymuch.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieur l'agent. Votre déclarationmet un terme au
second tour de plaidoiriesde la République fédérad lu Nigéria. Ainsiqu'il en a été convenul,a
Cour consacrera l'essentiel des séancesqu'elle tiendra la semaine prochaine à l'audition des
observations de la Guinée équatoriale,Etat autorisé à intervenir dans l'instance, ainsi qu'à
l'audition desPartiessur l'objet de l'interventionde la Guinéeéquatoriale.
J'ajouterai que, commeil a étédécidél,a Cour tiendra égalementla semaineprochaineune
brève audience aux fins de permettre au Cameroun de répondre, fût-ce brièvement, aux
observationsformuléespar le Nigéria lors desondernier tour de plaidoiriesau sujetdes demandes
reconventionnelles qu'il aprésentées. La date et la duréede cette audience seront précisées
ultérieurement.
La Cour se réunira à nouveau lundiprochain 18mars à 10heures pour entendrele premier
tour de plaidoiriesdelaRépubliquede Guinée équatorialeJ .evous remercie, laséanceest levée.
L'audienceestlevée à 13heures.
Audience publique tenue le vendredi 15 mars 2002, à 10 heures, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président