NO&corrigé
Uncorrected 1
InternationalCourt Cour internationale
of Justice deJustice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR 2000
Publicsitting
held on Thurs8June 2000, at10am., atthePeacePalace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding
in thecaseconcerningMaritimeDelimitationand Questionsaleen
QatarandBahrain (Qatarv.Bahrain)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE 2000
Audiencepublique
tenuelejeudiuin 200àIOheures,auPalaisdelaPaiu,
souslaprésidedeM. Guillaume,président
enI'aflairedelaDélimitation martesquestionsterritorialeseneBahreïnr
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Pana-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesadhoc TorresBernhdez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésent: M. Guillaume, résident
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBernairdez
Fortierj,ugadhoc
M. Couvreurg,reffierTheState of Qatarisrepresentedby:
H.E.Dr. AbdullahbinAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-General of the Cabinet,
asAgentandCounsel;
Mr.AdelSherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr. SamiAbushaikha,LegalExpert,
as Counsel:
Mr.Eric David,Professorof InternationalLaw, niversitélibrdeBruxelles,
Dr.AlibinFetais Al-Meri,DirectorofLegalDepartment, Diwan Amiri,
Mr. Jean-PierreQuéneudec, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr.Jean Salmon,Professoremeritus ofInternationalLaw, Université libree Bruxelles,Member
of the Institut dedroitinternational,
Mr. R.K. P.Shankardass,Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India, Former President of the
InternationalBarAssociation,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G., Q.C., arristerat Law, Member otfheInstituteof International
SirFrancis Vallat,G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.CP.,rofessoremeritus of International , niversity of
London,MemberemeritusoftheInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr. RodmanR.Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appelde Paris,Memberof the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MsNanette E.Pilkington,Avocatà la Courd'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
as CounselandAdvocates;
Ms Cheryl Dunn,Member ofthe StateBar ofCalifornia,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
Ms InesSabineWilk, Lawyer before theGerman Court of Appeal,Memberof the Chamber of
Lawyersof Germany,
asCounsel;
Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.comC , olumbia, Maryland
(UnitedStatesofAmerica),
Mr.RobertC. Rizzutti,Project Manager,MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland (United Statesof
America),
Ms StephanieK.Clark, Senior Cartographer,MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland (United States
ofAmerica),
as Experts;
H.E.Sheikh Hamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,MinisterforForeignAffairs,
H.E. Mr. Ahmed bin AbdullahAl-Mahrnoud,Ministerof StateforForeignAffairs,
as Observers.
TheState of Bahrain isrepresentedby:
H.E.Mr. JawadSalimAl-Arayed, Ministeo rf Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
asAgent,L 'Etatde Qatarestrepreséntéepa:r
S.Exc.M.AbdullahbinAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,secrétairegénérad lu gouvernement,
commeagentet conseil;
M. AdelSherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M.Sarni Abushaikha,expertjuridique,
commeconseils;
M. EricDavid,professeurde droit internatiol l'universitélibre deBruxelles,
M. Ali binFetaisAl-Men, directeurdesaffairesjuridiquesduconseilde l'émir,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec,professeur de droit international à l'Université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M. Jean Salmon,professeur éméritede droitternationall'UniversitlibredeBruxelles,membre
de 1'Institutde droitinternational,
M. R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principalà la Cour suprême del'Inde,ancien présidentde
l'Associationinternationaledu Barreau,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,avocat,membrede l'Institutde droitinternational,
Sir FrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,professeuréméritdee droit internatioàl'Université
deLondres,membreémérite de l'Institutdedroitinternational,
M. Rodman R Bundy,avocatàlaCourd'appel deParis,membre du barreaudeNew York, cabinet
FrereCholrneley/Eversheds, aris,
Mlle NanettePilkington, avocatà la Cour d'appelde Paris, cabinetFrere Cholmeley/Eversheds,
Paris,
commeconseilset avocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de i'Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mme Inès Sabine Wilk,avocatprès d'unecourd'appeld'Allemagne,membrede la chambredes
avocatsd'Allemagne,
commeconseils;
M. Scott B.Edmonds, directeurdu service des levéscartographiques, société MapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
M. Robert C. Rizmtti, administrateur de projet, sociétéMapQuest.com,Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme StephanieK. Clark, cartographe hors classe,sociMapQuest.com,Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
commeexperts;
S. Exc.le cheikhHarnadbinJassirnbin Jabor Al-Thani, minisdes affairesétrangères,
S. Exc.M. Ahrnedbin AbdullahAl-Mahrnoud,ministre d'Etatauxaffairesétrangères,
commeobservateurs.
L'EtatdeBahreïnestrepresentépar :
S. Exc.M.Jawad SalimAl-Arayed, ministredYEtate 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
commeagent;Dr.FathiKemicha,MemberoftheBarof Paris,Kemicha& Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSirElihuLauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E.,noraryProfessor ofthe Universityof Cambridge,
Member of theInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr. JanPaulsson,Freshfields,Paris,Memberofthe Barsof Paris andtheDisûictof Columbia,
Professor MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougalProfessor of International Lawof Yale Law
School,Memberof the Bar ofConnecticut,Associateofthe Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr. RobertVoltena,Freshfields,London,Memberofthe Bar ofUpper Canada,
Professor ProsperWeil, EmeritusProfessoratthe Universityof Parisanthéon-Assas), Member .
of the Académiedes sciencesmorales etpolitiques (Institutde France), Memberof the Institut
de droitinternational,
as Counsel anAdvocates:
SheikhKhalidbin AhmedAl-Khalifa,First Secretary,Ministryof ForeignAffairsof the State of
Bahrain,
CommanderChristopherCarleton,M.B.E.,Head ofthe Law of theSea Divisionof the United
KingdomHydrographicOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,FresMelds, Paris, Memberofthe Barsof Parisand Beijing,
Mr. Graham Coop,Freshfields,Paris,Barristerand SolicitorofHigh Court of NewZealand and
Solicitorofthe SupremeCourtofEnglandand Wales,
Mr. AndrewNewcombe,Freshfields,Paris,Memberof theBarof British Columbia,
Dr.BethOlsen, Advisor,Ministryof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson,Former Reader at the University of Oxford,EmeritusFellow, St.Hugh's
College, Oxford,
as Advisors;
H.E.SheikhMohammed bin MubaraA k lKhalifa, Minister for Foreign Affairstf Bahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Azizbin MubarakAl Khalifa, Ambassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E.Dr.MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,Advisorto HisHighness,the Amirof Bahrain,
Mr. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs,StateofBahrain,
Her ExcellencySheikha Haya Al Khalifa,Arnbassador ofthe State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr. YousefMahrnood,Directorof the Office ofthe ForeignMinister,State of Bahrain,
as Observers;
Mr.JonAddison,Ministryof State ofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms Maisoon Al-ArayedM , inistryofStateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Mr. Nabeel Al-Rumaihi,MinistryofStateofthe State ofBahrain,
Mr. Hafedh Al-Qassab,Ministryof Stateofthe State ofBahrain,
Ms AneesaHanna,Embassy ofBahrain inLondon,
Ms JeanetteHarding,Ministryof Stateof theStateofBahrain,
MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
Ms IvaKratchanova,Ministryof StateoftheState ofBahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Mr. KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.Yasser Shaheen,SecondSecretary,Ministryof ForeignAffairsoftheStateof Bahrain,
asAdministrativStafM. Fathi Kemicha,membre du barreaude Paris,cabinetKemicha& Associés,Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E, rofesseurhonoraire'universitéde Cambridge,membrede
l'Institutdedroitinternational,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membrees barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. MichaelReisman,professeurde droit internationall'universitéde Yale,titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut,associé del'Institut de droit
international,
M. Robert Volterra,cabinetFreshfields, Londres,membrdubarreaudu Haut Canada,
M. Prosper Weil,professeur émérite à Yuniversitéde ParisII (Panthéon-Assas),membre de
l'Académie des sciencesmoralesetpolitiques(InstitutdeFrance),membre del'Institutde droit
international,
commeconseilset avocats;
Le cheikhKhalidbin Ahrned Al-Khalifa, premiersecrétaire,ministère des affaires étrangères de
1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Le capitainedefrégateChristopherCarleton,M.B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droit maritime du
bureau hydrographiquedu Royaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinet Freshfields, Paris, embredesbarreauxde Paris etde Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocatet conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeetconseillerde laCoursuprêmed'Angleterreet du Paysde Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinetFreshfields,Paris, membre du barreaude la Colombiebritannique,
Mme BethOlsen,conseiller,ministèred'Etatde 1'EtatdeBahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson,ancien maître de conférence à l'université d'Oxfordm, embre éméritedu
CollègeSaintHugh,Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S.Exc.lecheikh MohammedbinMubarakAlKhalifa,ministredesaffaires étrangèresdB eahreiïn,
S.Exc.le cheikh Abdul-Azizbin MubarakAl Khalifa, ambassadeurde 1'Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc. M. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,conseillerde Son Altessel'émir de Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi, sous-secrétaireYEtatuxaffairesétrangèresd1e'Etatde Bahreïn,
S.Exc. lacheikhaHaya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 1'Etatde Bahreïn auprèsde la République
fiançaise,
M. YousefMahmood,directeurdubureauduministredes affairesétrangère dseBahreïn,
commeobservateurs;
M. JonAddison, ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed,ministère d'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. Nabeel Al-Rumaihim, inistère'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. HafedhAl-Qassab,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeAneesaHanna,ambassadedeBahreïn,Londres,
Mme JeanetteHarding,ministèred'Etatde1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Mme VanessaHarris,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministère d'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme Sonja Knijnsberg,cabinetFresMelds,
M. KevinMottrarn,cabinetFreshfields,
M. Yasser Shaheen,second secrétair, inistèredes affairesétrangèrse 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
commepersonneladministratif. Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séance estouverte et nous commençons
aujourd'huila présentatiode 1'EtadeBahreïn. Je vouspried'abordd'excuser leretard aveclequel
la Courouvre cette séance, qua étédû àdes consultationsquej'aieuesavecles Parties. Jevais
maintenantdonnerlaparole à S. Exc. M.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,agentde1'Etad te Bahreïn. 1
Mr.AL-ARAYED:ThankyouMr.President.
1.Mr.Presidentand honourable Members of theCourt:
2.1 am honouredand pleasedto standbeforeyou andexpressthe State ofBahrain'srespect
for the International Courtof Justice, andto makemy voicean echoof our people'sdeepesthope
that yourdecisionwillenableus to look to thefuturewithserenityandwithconfidence.
3.Themembers of our legalteamareinthe list beforeyou,andintheinterestof tirne1shall
notmakeindividualintroductions.
4. Mr. President,ours is a very small country. With 914 peopleper square kilometre-
914people - Bahrainis the fifthmost densely populated countyn theworld. Although there are
more than twice as many Bahrainisas there are Qataris,Qatar'slandmassis 16times greaterthan
ours.
5. You will understandour depth of feeling when a neighbour,so richly blessed in land
tenitory,seeks to takeaway fromus onethirdof the precious spacein whichwehave to live,and
wherewemust nurturefuturegenerations.
6. Indeed,if Qatarwere to take theHawar Islandsffomus, and if its viewson the maritime
boundariesprevailed,our air forcewouldneedpermissiontouse Qatar's airspace simplyto land in
Bahrain. The sarnewouldbe trueofthelarger,commercialairplanesthatserveour smallland.
7. In other words, not only wouldour country be amputated-but even the sovereignty
remainingto us wouldbe intolerablydiminished.
8.Qatarhasrelentlesslypursuedits expansionisminto ourtemtory. In 1937it expelledour
people fiom the Zubarahregion by force. To this day, the area remainsunder Qatar'sdefacto
control. If we had not erected defensive fortifications on the Hawar Islands,Qatar would
undoubtedlyhaveinvadedthemalso. 9. In 1986,Qatar mountedan axmedattackonFashtad Dibal,one of ourprincipalmaritime
features. FortunatelyArab and internationalpressuredrovethem out. Onceagain, if we had not
shown our determinationto defendthe HawarIslands, we believe thatQatar wouldhave attacked
them too.
10.Untiltoday, our stateof readinesson the HawarIslandsremainshigh. Qatar'sdefacto
occupationof the Zubarah regionis unacceptableas a matterof principle. Force does not create
title. Mightisnotright.
11.No lessregrettably,Qatariexpansionism has also involved an abus oef the legalprocess.
As you have seeninour Memorials,Qatarfirstsoughtto raisea claimovertheHawar Islandsmore
than 60yearsago. In 1939,Great Bntainrejectedthis claimbecauseQatarhadfailedto showany
evidencethat ithadever had a presenceon theislands. Itsonlyargumentthen,as now,was based
on proxirnity.
12. In morerecent years,recognizingthat proximityby itself creates no sovereignrights,
Qatar somehowcollected a thick file of 82 supposedly historical documentsw , hich no historian
had ever seenbefore. These documentspurportedto show a history of Qataricontrol over the
Hawar Islands. Then Qatar made a unilateral application to thisCourt, and based the principal
contentionsinsupportofits claimon thosedocuments.AsBahrain wasabletoprove, everyone of
thosedocumentsis a forgery. Imaginethe darnagethat would havebeendonetothe administration
of internationaljustice indeedto the very positionof this Court- if Bahrainhad not exposed
those forgeries.
13.As forthe HawarIslands,how many tirnesmust Bahrainlitigatethis issue? Thereis a
long-establishedlegal principlethat uninterruptedpossession and administration createsa title
which cannotbedissolvedbythe greedof a neighbour, whohasnothingmoreto rely onthanmere
proximity. Thereis no rule in national lawthat says"it'sclose" - "1want it"- "thereforeit is
mine"? Andcertainlythereis nosuchruleininternationallaw.
14. How canthe finalityof the 1939decision, which confirmed Bahrain'seffectivecontrol
over the HawarIslands, now be overruled?
15.But beyondthoseprinciples,1donot wishto leaveyouunderany misapprehensionas to
the intensity of the feelings of the people of Bahrain. The Hawar Islandsare part of theirhomeland. Anythoughtof separatingthoseislands fi-omBahrainwould beintolerableto them.
Many thousandsof Bahrainisare membersof families, whohave had homeson those islands for
generations. Theirancestorsandrelativesareburiedthere. Thoseislands are anintegralpartofthe
fabnc ofour littlecountry.
16.Youwillthereforeunderstand,Mr.President,that this casetouchesthe heartof Bahrain's
existence. ForQatar, onthe other hand,thiscase isan adventurewithout risk. Thisexplainswhy
Qatarhas actedasthough ithas nothingto loseinmakingits unilateralApplication.
17.Recently, there hasbeen animprovementin the atrnospherebetweenOurtwo countries.
Qatar has said that it will not rely on t82 forged documents by letter to the Court dated in
December1998. ItsdistinguishedAgent-very properly- expressedregrets. TheAmirof Qatar
has takenthe initiativeof seekingbilateral negotiationswith Bahrain over a wide raof issues.
Thisresultedinhisvery welcomevisitstoourcountry.
18. The people of Bahrainwelcome these signs of a willingness toaccommodate and
CO-operate. Wedo not wishour relations tobe poisonedby the ghosts,and the rancour,of past
misunderstandings.
19.The future is wherewe and Ourchildrenwill live,and thatis whywe hope thatwe can
pursueourbilateralrelationsina constructiveand£iiendly,forward-lookingmanner.
20. Withyour permission, Mr. President,as we go forward in thecomingsessions, counsel
will not read out citationsuring the oral proceedings. The citationswill be provided to the
Registryand1wouldrequestthat theybe included inthewrittenrecords.
21. Andso, Mr. Presidentand distinguishedMembersof the Court, 1 thankyou for listening
with such care to my presentation to you, of the concernsand anxietiesof my small nation.
BahrainconsidersthatQatar'sforcibleandillegalannexationof Zubarahcannotbe upheld. As for
the HawarIslands,they are avital part of our land. They havebeen ours forgenerations and we
,
askyouto confirmourtitle.
22. Mr. President, 1 would ask you directly to cal1on SirElihuLauterpachtto give an
overviewofoursubstantivetemtorial contentions. 23. And so, the Bahrain peoplewill await yourjudgrnentwith confidence that justice will
prevail. My peopleare rootedin their land and the HawarIslandsare part of the soi1of Bahrain.
Thankyou, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Minister. May 1 now give the floor to
SirElihuLauterpacht.
Sir ElihuLAUTERPACHT:
1.INTRODUCTION
1.Mr. Presidentand Membersofthe Court,
2.Once again,1havethe privilegeand pleasure ofappearingbeforeyou. The patty that 1
have the honournowtorepresent istheStateof Bahrain.
3. Despite the 16 changesof scenethat the Court hashad during the presentationof the
Claimant'sopening,this wasnever,and is not now, a complex case.But it is not the same case
nowasit waswhenit wasfmt setoutinthe Claimant'sMemorial inSeptember1996.
4. It is tnie thatthemainquestionsin the caseremain thesame. The questionsof titleto the
Hawar Islandsand Zubaraharestillthe principal temtorialissues. And on the resolution ofthose
questionsdependsmuchof the otherprincipal part otfhe case-themaritime delimitation.
5. But themannerin whichthe Qatari claimto the Hawarshas been developed before the
Court haschangedfûndamentallysincethe QatarMemorialandCounter-Memorial. In considering
the implicationsofthatfact,Bahrainboundto pointto thereasonsfor it.
6. The reasonis the withdrawalby Qatar of relianceuponwhat have euphemisticallybeen
called "the82 documents"or the"non-authentic" documents.But no words can concealthe fact
thatthose documentsare forgeries.Dead men write no letters! Officia1conespondence is not
signed by 10-year-oldboys! It is not importantwho producedthe documents and Bahrainfully
acceptsQatar'sdisclaimerandapologies. But despitethe assertionby Qatar'sdistinguishedAgent
that thatmatteris close(CR 200015,p.16) closed itcannotbe. What has happened hasa direct
bearing on the substance ofvariousimportantaspectsof the case, especiallythe questionof the
Hawars. 7. If the Courtwere tohaveanopportunityof lookingagainat the highlightedversion of the
Qatar Memorial that was delivered by Bahrain to the President at the meeting held in
November 1997and which containsyellow marked passagesrepresenting theuse of the forged
documents,the Court would observethat the removalfiom ChapterV of that pleading, entitled
"The Temtorial Integrity of Qatarand Qatar'sSovereignty overthe HawarIslands", wouldnot
simply decimate that chapter; it would effectively destroy it. Gone entirely would be al1the
subsection of "Specific Instances Demonstrating Recognition" in the main section entitled
"Recognitionof Temtory". Gonewouldbe the so-calledOttomanSurveyMapof 1873so liberally
splatteredwith sealswhich investigatiohas subsequently shownwerebought acrossthe counterin
a novelty shop herein The Hague - a map whichso helpfullyto Qatarnamesthe Hawarsas the
"Hawarof Qatar"and drewa boundaryinthe sea well tothe westof thoseislands. Gonewouldbe
the references set outin footnote58 to the additional exerciseof Qatari sovereignty overthe
HawarIslands - al1totally false. Parenthetically, however,ne may observe that many ofthese
referencesdo serveto indicateveryclearly Qatar'sbeliefastothe sort of actions that aresufficient
for aclaimantStateto demonstratein relationto tenitory overwhich it assertstitleby possession
and control. As perusalof the forgeddocumentswillshow,theyappear tosuggest thatQatarwas
content witha very low standardof requirementas to the degreeof specificconduct requiredof a
Stateto establish its title toory. Veryfew acts ofpossessionwere assertedby Qatar. Rather,
it preferredto invokewhat is,really,no morethanhearsayevidenceon a largescale,principallyin
the formof statementsattributedto theOttomansand tothe Sheikhsof AbuDhabiandDubai. It is
hardlyopento those who paradesuchundemandingstandards ofproof of conduct andefîectivités
as a basis foa claimto titlenowto tuniroundand cal1uponBahrainto satisfya higherstandard.
Nevertheless, Bahrainhas met a higherstandard - as is evidencedfrom itswrittenpleadingsand
from their defence by Bahrain's counselin these hearings. The sort of actionsthat havein fact
marked Bahrain'spresence in these islands now stand totally unopposed by any contradictory
Qatari conduct. Gone, too, are the items which pretendedto evidence Bahrainirecognitionof
Qatar'ssovereigntyovertheHawarIslands.
8. The Qatari Counter-Memorialwas no less infectedby these noxious documents. In
paragraphs2.39 and2.40 of that pleading, 22 documents were cited in sumrnarizingQatar'sallegationsthatit had exercisedauthorityoverthe HawarIslands. Eachof these 22 documentswas
among the 82 which are now to beyas Qatar says, "disregarded". WhenQatar presentedthese
documentsit announced,notwithoutdramaticflourish, thattheywereproof of the unreliabilityof
the officialdocumentson whichBahrain relies. As Qatarsaid: "theappearance isreflectedin the
officialdocumentsin the British Archives"while "theunpleasantreality" - Qatar'swords - "is
reflected" inQatar'sowndocuments. Whatdocuments,one may ask,and how ever did they get
into the case?
9. The introductionto Qatar'sCounter-Memonalcontained asurnmaryof what itcalled the
central elementsof the case,andassertedthatQatar'sevidencehadachievedthe following:
- one, it had "demonstrated" theterritorialintegrity ofQataras comprisingthe wholepeninsula
andtheHawarIslands;
- two, it "showed" that this alleged temtonal integrity was recognized "at least" since the
mid-nineteenth centuryby Britain,the OttomanEmpire, localmlers,and indeedBahrain;
- three, it had "shown"the worthlessnessof Bahrain'sevidence in support of its successful
defenceof the HawarIslandsinthe arbitrationthatresultedinthe BritishAward of1939; and
- four,ithad "provided evidence" oQf atar'sown "actsof sovereignty"onthe HawarIslands.
10.As shownby Qatar'sowncitation, al1these "central elements"of Qatar's casedepended
on the use of the 82 documents. They are now al1gone. There is nothing left of the "central
elements"of Qatar'scase.
11.So whatwasBahrainentitledto expect once Qatarindicatedthat it would nolonger rely
upon these 82 documents? It would have beenreasonable to have foreseen that Qatar would
correspondinglyabandontheclaim,the proofof whichrested uponthesedocuments. Bahrain was
entitled to expect thatQatar, intheame spirit of regretthat markedits abandonment of thefalse
documents,would adhere tothe logic of the position ithad adopted andwould abandon pursuitof
itsclairnto theHawars. Afterdl, if you start acase entirelyinrelianceupon certainmaterials,one
would expect that when the materials areproved false, the affected partsof the case would be
withdrawn.Nor wouldithave beenany answerto Saythat theargumentof proxirnitycouldremain
a viable alternative tothat partof Qatar'scasebasedonthe forged documents.As willpresentlybeseen,the argument ofproximityas a support forQatar'sclaim of title to the Hawarsin its turn
collapsesentirelywhen confiontedbyproofof Bahrain'spossession ofthoseislands.
12. So Bahraincameto assume thatQatar would insteadfocusonlyon Zubarahand on the
maritime delirnitation. But,quite surpnsingly, Qatar hasinventeda replacement argument to
supportthe maintenanceof itsclairntothe Hawars. Thisnow purportsto dismissthe relevance of
conductand of al1eflectivi Itépspearsto go somethinglike this. Qatarwas an aclaiowledged
andeffective Statefiom 1868andincomplete controlof, andwithfulltitle to, thewholepeninsula.
That title extended, byreason of proximity,to the HawarIslands. Therefore, any subsequent
Bahrainiconduct therewas illegaland unopposableto Qatar. In any event,the criticaldate in
respectof the Hawars fallsin 1936,thusdeprivingal1of Bahrain'sefectivi -téhich in Qatar's
selective view al1occurredafter 1936- of their legal value. Thereforethe Hawar Islandsare
legallyemptyoruninhabited.Inconsequence, they belong to theclosestState. Thishappensto be
Qatar.
13.Bahrain asks the Courtto considerwhythis new argument,if it has thement that Qatar
now claims for it, was not developedin Qatar's originalMemorial. It could quite properly have
been presented thereas an alternativeline of approach. However,presumably forgoodreasons,
Qatardid not dothat. AndasBahrainrespondsto each ofthesenewargumentsin tur ntwillinvite
the Courtto shareits doubtsabouttherolethatthey nowcanplayinthis case.
14. This said,Mr. President andMembers ofthe Court, not out of rancournor outof any
desiregratuitouslyto reopenold wounds,but onlybecauseit is importantto restore tothe case its
proper focus. 1can now leavethe subjectof the forgeriesand their effect, subject only to one
additional point:althoughQatarhas undertakennot to rely on the forged documents, thefact is
that oncesuch materialhas pollutedthe case it continues toexercise aninsidiousinfluence from
which it is not easy to escape. Even now, for example, such matenal has ensnared
ProfessorSalmon. On5 Junehe referredto the recognitionof theauthority of theAl-Thaniover
thewholeof the Qatarpeninsulafromthe middle ofthe nineteenthcentury. His footnotereference
wasto paragraph 2.25of the QatarCounter-Memorial.In its turn this paragraphis dependenton
three supportive footnotes. One is, in this respect, innocent,namely a reference to Palgraves's
narrativeof hisjoumey of 1862-1863.The othertwoaretainted,beingreferencesto Annexes11.17andII.18of the QatarMemonal. Both of these are arnongthe forgeddocumentsbroughtto the
notice of the Courtand ofQatar. No suggestionis made that thisreference inProfessor Salmon's
pleadingsis otherthanentirelyaccidental.But it doesgoto showhowcarefûltheCourt mustbe in
its considerationof Qatar'sversionof the facts, especiallyon so important a contentionas one
pretendingto greaterauthorityinthe Al-Thanifamilythan it actuallypossessed. Withthis behind
me,1cannowturnto dealinamorepositivemannerwithsubstantivematters.
15.The Courtwill, ofcourse,understand thatin thisreply Bahrainwill not followeitherthe
order or the exact contentof Qatar'scurrent submissions.Instead, Bahrain's arguments- at any
rate onthe principalquestionsof sovereigntyover theHawarsandZubarah - will seekgenerally
to match andelaboratethe seriesof 14rather condensedpropositionsthat 1will presentlyofferthe
Court,in the hope thattheywill enablethe Court morerapidlyandeasilyto appreciatethe overall
thrustof Bahrain'scase. Suchcondensationnecessarilyleadsto a generalityof expressionthatmay
well attractcriticismin some quarters.1hope that thiswill notbethecase,butshould itbey1askto
be forgiven.
16.Somemeasureof generalizationis called forat the presentstage of a casethathas seen
the introductionof so muchdocumentarymaterial. Qatar, in particular,has producedfour times
morepages ofannexes than hasBahrain(even though Qatarhasonlyused about50percentof the
documentssubmitted). For despitethe seemingprofusion offactspresentedto the Court,notably
regardingeventsin the nineteenthcentury,this remains, as 1suggestedat the beginning,a simple
case. Itis one in whichBahrainseekstwo things: one,the restorationof its positionin its ancient
possession, Zubarah; and, two,the rejection ofQatar'sclaimto sovereignty overareasthat have
long been in Bahrain'spossessionand under its authority,namely,the Hawar Islands,including
Jananand HaddJanan, aswell as overal1the insular and otherfeatures,includingFashtad Dibal
andQit'at Jaradah thatconstitutetheBahrain archipelago.
17. In pursuit of these objectives, 1 shall now present the propositions reflecting the
essentialsofBahrain's territorilase. Thecaserelating to themaritimeboundarywill bepresented
separately.
18.The 14propositions are as follows: 19.The first three relate principallyto Zubarah,thoughthe secondis also relevant tothe
Hawars.
(1) Firstproposition: In the mid- to late eighteenthcenturythe Al-Khalifafamily (that is the
family of Bahrain) ruled in Zubarah. Their authority wasmaintainedthere throughoutthe
nineteenth century both directlyand bytheir adherents,the people of the Naimtribe. Even
Qatar concedes,in paragraph5 of its ownApplicationinthis case filedin July 1991 - and1
read-"Until 1868, theQatarpeninsulawas consideredby the Britishas a dependency of
Bahrain"-the Qatarpeninsulaa dependencyof Bahrain. Thisis anadmissionof thehighest
significance. Qatardoesnotdisputethecorrectnessof theBritishviewthatuntil 1868atleast,
the Qatar peninsulawas a dependencyof Bahrain. Qatartakes the viewthat the peninsula
includesthe nearby islands,notablythe Hawars,and Qataris boundby that view. We may
conclude, therefore,that Qataris heredmittingthat Bahrainhad titlenotonly toZubarah but
alsoto the Hawars.
Even after 1868,for the rest of the nineteenthcenturyand until 1916,
(2) Secondproposition:
there was no State of Qatar possessing attributes of sovereignty overthe whole of the
geographical areaof the peninsulaof Qatar. The townof Dohaon theeast coast cameunder
the sway of the Al-Thanifarnily(thatis the Qatarifarnily) inthe mid-nineteenthcentury,but
their authoritydid not extendto thenorth or north-westof the peninsulaas far as Zubarah.
The suggestionnow madeby Qatar that it is a Stateof the same age as Bahrain is entirely
unsupportedby thewordsor effectof the texton whichitrelies,namely,the 1868Agreement.
The earliestglimmerof recognitionof a Stateof Qatar thatone maybe able to identiQis in
the unratified 1913 Treaty. Even then the tenitonal extent of that entity remains quite
imprecise. Startingfiom Qatar's admissionwhich 1have recalled in Proposition One, that
until 1868the Qatarpeninsula wasconsideredbythe Britishas a dependencyof Bahrain, one
of the central questionsin this case with which Qatar mustgrapple-and whichhitherto
seemsto have escapedits attention - is this: how will Qatar dischargethe burden of proof ,
thatundoubtedly restsuponitbyreason ofthat admission, of showing how,when andin what
degree Bahrain lost its title to the peninsula including,more particularly,Zubarah and the
Hawars?(3) Thirdproposition:In 1937the Al-Thaniandtheir adherentsforciblyevicted fromZubarahthe
Naim tribesmenloyalto Bahrainwhorepresentedthe continuing authority in Zubarahof the
Rulers of Bahrain. This attack upon Zubarahwas an unlawfuluse of force fiom which no
legal rights couldarise. The Courtoughtnotto treat as valid an illegalact of this kind. The
continuing sovereign rightsof Bahrain and the other rights of the Al-Khalifa family in
Zubarah shouldberecognizedbytheCourt.
The remaining ten propositions relateprincipally to the Hawars-perhaps the most
importanttemtorial issueinthecase.
(4) Fourthproposition: Therequirements of international lawfor theacquisitionand retentionof
title over the Hawar Islands, including Janan,re the continuouspeacefulpossessionof the
temtory and the publicdisplayof governmentalauthoritytherein. As has been shown, and
will be shown again in plentiful detail, Bahrain has metand continues to meet these
requirements.
(5) Fifthproposition: The non-penetrationof the interiorof the Qatarpeninsulaby the Al-Thani
familybasedin Dohaandits adherentsinthe nineteenthcentury,and eveninto the twentieth,
meant not only that the Al-Thani influencedid not reach Zubarah. It also meant a total
absence of anyactual Al-Thani authority on or in relation to, the HawarIslands, including
Janan, or indeed on the peninsula coast opposite them. Even in 1934-1 emphasize
"1934"-the British Political Residetad occasion toobservethat the "Shaikhof Qatar is
more a large merchantthan a Rulerand has practicallyno authorityover the interior of his
State where oil operationswill presumablybe camed on and, where the strongestBedouin
elements are migratory tribes from Saudi Arabia" (SupplementalDocuments of Bahrain,
1March2000, Ann.5, Telegram; 10January1934). Moreover,the area between the West
coast and east coastof the peninsulawas and is desert, and couldthenbe crossed onlywith
difficultyThi ss in totalcontrat with theease of maritimecommunicationin the shallow
waters between themain island of Bahrainand the Hawars. In this sense, natural unity is
between the Hawarsand Manama,not betweenthe Hawars andDoha, as illusîrated onthe
map nowbehindme. Indeed, evenwhenthe oil Companybeganoperationson the westcoast
of Qatar,at Dukhan,notquiteoppositeto,but a littlebit southof,the Hawars,its base was in Bahrain and al1its supplieswere broughtby boat fiom Bahrain. Incidentally, there is no
reason to believethat the geologicalnitysuggestedby Qatar betweenthe peninsulaandthe
Hawars doesnot also extendto the Bahrain mainisland as well as to SaudiArabiaand even
Iran. Howfar,onemay ask, shouldthepolitical effectsof geological unitystretch?
(6) Sixthproposition: In about1800theQadi ofZubarah, thehighest-rankingreligiousandlegal
officia1of theAl-Khalifafamily,gavepermissionto a branch of theDowasirtribe to settlein
the Hawar Islands. In 1845the Rulerof Bahraininvitedthemalsoto settleonthe mainisland
of Bahrain. Thenceforththis branch of the Dowasirceased to benomadic. Thereafter,there
wasmovement by theseDowasir betweenBahrainand the Hawars and theiralternativehomes
in BudaiyaandZallaqon the Bahrain main island.The seasonalmovementfiom one settled
home in the Hawarsin the winterto another settledhome in the townsofZallaq andBudaiya
on the main island of Bahrain in thesurnrnerwas regular and continuousin the nineteenth
century,right through into themid-twentiethcentury. The BahrainDowasirin the Hawars
acceptedthe authorityof the Rulers of Bahrainalmost without interruptionthroughoutthe
nineteenthandtwentiethcenturies. Thepresenceof the BahrainiDowasir inthe Hawarshas
also been accompaniedby that of many non-Dowasir Bahrainis. Regularhabitationin the
Hawarsbyanestablishedpopulationis evidencedbythe fundamental indications or fesidence:
houses,mosques,cemeteries,water cisterns,fishtraps and so on, dating backto the earliest
days.
(7) Seventhproposition: The Bahrain .Governmenthas for many years exercised sovereign
authorityintheHawars. Suchauthorityhasbeenevidenced,interalia, bycontinuingBahraini
govemental legislative,judicial and executiveconduct in, or in relation to,the Hawars,
includingthe grantof licenses forfishing,pearlingand gypsurnextraction,as well as by the
building ofinhstnicture and theprovisionof public services.Theseactionsare whatwecal1
"effectivités. uchofBahrain's evidence inthisrespectpre-datesthe 1930s.
(8) Eighth proposition: At no the, and this must be emphasized,at no time has Qatar ever
exercisedanyauthorityoverthe Hawar Islandsortakenpossessionof themin wholeor inpart
in any way. 1have alreadyreferred to the abandonmentby Qatar ofsuch evidenceto the
contrary- al1forged- as was produced inits Mernorial and Counter-Memorial. It is a prominentandinescapablefeatureof the speecheson behalfof Qatar in the openingphase of
these oral proceedingsthat not once was anysuggestionmade of the existence of any Qatari
eflectivitor thepresence ofanyQatari residentsonthe Hawar Islands.
(9) Proposition nine: Bahrainipresence,and thecorrespondingabsence of anyQatariactivity, in
or in relation to the islands was reviewed and brought into prominence in the period
1936-1939when Britain,under whose protection bothBahrain and Qatar wereat the tirne,
carefullyexarnined the situationin the Hawarsfor thatpurpose. Britain invited Qatarmore
than once toprovideevidence ofthe extentof anyauthorityclaimed byit inthe islands. Qatar
producednoevidenceat al1of possessionor occupation ofthe islands- not evenof the map
attachedto the oil concession issuedby its Ruler on17May 1935 andsaid to extendto the
islands, as Mr.Paulssonwill presently mention. On the bais of the evidence available to
them about Bahrainipresencein the islands,and correspondingly about Qatariabsence,the
Britishaccordinglydeterminedthatthe HawarIslandsbelongedtoBahrain.
(10) Tenthproposition: The principalremaining argumentadvanced by Qatar in support of its
claim to theHawars hasbeenthat oftheir geographicalproximity to thecoastof Qatar andof
the fact thatpart of the islandslieidethe Qatar 3-miletemtorial sea. An attempt hasalso
beenmade byQatarto bolster thiswithreferencestomapsand evidenceof so-called"repute".
(11)Eleventhproposition: Internationallaw does not acceptthe use of proximityalone asa basis
of title, though it might do so as an elementin support of measures of possessionor the
exerciseof authority. Thisis equallytruewhether theislandsin questionlieoutsideor within
the temtorial watersof the adjacent State. In the EritrewYemencase the Tribunal observed
that
"thereissome presumption that any islandsoff thecoastsmay be thought to belongby
appurtenanceto that coast unless the state on the opposite coast has been able to
demonstratea clearlybettertitle" (Award,para. 458).
Following the abandonment by Qatar of its alleged evidence of possession of the
HawarIslandsand oftheexerciseof any governrnentalauthoritythere, its claimsto the islands
have been left to rest on proxirnityalone. By itself, this cannot serve to confer title on
Qatar- especially not so in the face of undisputed Bahraini possession. Recourse to proximity should,therefore, also have been abandoned whenthe false documentswere
dropped.
(12) Twelfthproposition:The mapsinvoked byQatar andthe evidence of so-called"repute"donot
help it. Indeed,counselfor Qatarhas acceptedthatmaps alonecannot establishtitle.
(13) Thirteentproposition:Whatis true of theHawar Islandsthemselvesis equallytrueof Janan
whichis nomorethananappendageof theHawars.
(14)Fourteenthand lastproposition: In addition to serving asa record of the facts relatingto
Bahrain'spresence in,and Qatar'sabsence from, the HawarIslands, the British decisionof
1939 detenninedthe questionof title to the islandsbetweenBahrainand Qatar. Itcan be
viewed - that is the decisi-n primarilyas an arbitration.As such, it rendersthe issue of
title resjudicata, a decidedmatter that cannotnowbe reopenedin this Court. Altematively,
the British decision can be viewed as a politicaldecisionmade within the scope of the
authorityof Britainasthe power protectingboth States.Eitherway, the duty ofthis Court,it
is subrnitted,isto upholdthe validity and effectofthe Britishdecision-tmoresobecause
onthe Grisbadamadoctrine a"settledstateof affairs"should notbe disturbed.
20. These,then,Mr. Presidentand Members of theCourt,arethe 14propositionsrelativeto
the temtonal issues relating to Zubarah and the Hawars. The maritime delimitation andthe
associated questionsof the statusof the maritimefeatures,Dibaland Jaradah,are distinctmatters
whicharebestleftto separatetreatrnentby mycolleaguesskilled inthesematters.
21. Thepropositionsjust formulated and the caseon thedelimitation andmaritimefeatures
willbe developedby counselinthe following manner:
(i) 1shallproceed presentlyto developa number oflegalsubmissionsmainlyrelatingto the
acquisition oftemtory and to thevery limitedoperationof the doctrineof proximityin
internationallaw. 1shall alsomakecertain legal observatiospon the legalinvalidityof
theforcibleseinire of Zubarahby Qatarin 1937andthe irrelevanceof the criticaldate
concept.
(ii) 1shall thenbe followedby my colleague, Mr. JanPaulsson,who willpresentthe Court
withthe factualelementsrelatingto Bahrain'spositionin both Zubarahand the Hawars.
Hewill alsorecallin some detailthecircumstancesandvalidity of the 1939decision. (iii) He will be followed by ProfessorReisman who will analyse the legal nature and
consequencesoftheBritishdecisionof 1939.
(iv) In view of the importanceof Bahrain'sdisplay of sovereignauthority in theHawarsto
the total exclusion of any comparable activity by Qatar, this matter will then be
developed in furtherdetailbyMr.RobertVolterra.
(v) After hi, MaitreFathiKemicha, recalling the emergenceof the parties into full
independencein 1971,will examinethe relevanceand effect in the present case ofthe
doctrineof utipossidetis.
(vi) Therewill thenremaintwo matters ofdetail in relation tothe HawarIslandswhichwill
require attention. The first is considerationof the role of maps as being supportive of
Bahrain's position in relation to the Hawars and as being unsupportiveof Qatar's
position. Thattaskwill fa1tome.
(vii) Finally, in relationto the secondemaining but significantpoint of detail relative to
Bahrain's authorityin the Hawars,Mr.Paulsson will return to speak of the mannerin
whichthe negotiationsfor and gant ofoil concessionsinthe area inthe 1930sconfmed
the authonty andtitle of Bahrainin the Hawarsandthe correspondingdenial of Qatar's
title.
(viii)Withthe variousaspectsofthetwomaincontestedareasof sovereigntybehindus, itwill
thenbe possibleto tum to thequestionofmaritime delimitation. It willbe inthiscontext
thatthe questionof the legalstatus ofibal and Jaradahwillbe considered. 1shallnot
attemptto summarizehere Bahrain'smain contentionsin thiscomection. It makesmore
sense to leave that aspect of the case in the greatly experienced hands of my
distinguishedcolleagues, ProfessorWeialnd ProfessorReisman, who will alsorevertin
moredetailto Bahrain'srightsinJanan.
22. Theprogrammeof Bahrain's casehaving thus been presented,1shall, withthe Court's
permission,now tum to the severallegal pointsthat are my concem. Mr. President,perhapsyou
may findthis aconvenientpointin whichtobreak. LePRESIDENT :LaCoursuspendpour dixminutes.
L'audienceestsuspenduede II h25àII h40.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir.La séanceest reprise. SirElihu, vous avez la
parole.
Sir Elihu LAUTERPACHT: Mr. President,Membersof the Court,just before the break 1
had indicated th1twould nowturn to the severallegal pointsthatare my concem. They are the
following:
23. The establishmentand maintenanceof title to temtory under three sub-headings: the
basiclaw; the responseto Professor Salmonsrgumentabouteflectivités;andthe questionof title
to the islands. In addition,1shallreferbriefly, tothe questionof the effectof the forcibleseinire
ofZubarahby Qatarin 1937and, lastly,tothequestionofthecriticaldate.
II.ESTABLISHME ANNTMAINTENANCE OF TITLE
A. Thebasiclaw
24. 1 come first to the law relatingto the establishmentand maintenance oftitle to the
Hawars.
25. Itwould appear thatso far asconcernsthe law applicabletothe determination oftitle to
theislandsthedifferencesbetween the Partiescanbe precisely defined.
26. For this purpose one must distinguishbetween, first, the basic law relating to the
acquisitionof title to the islandsand, second,the scope of applicationin this connection ofthe
conceptof proximityand itslimitations.
27. As regards the first, the basic 1had originally thoughtthat the Partieswere not
significantly divided, and thattheir main differences related to the second element,proximiq.
Thingslook a bit differentnowas a resultof ProfessorSalmon'sargument. Inorder,therefore, that
there shouldbe no doubt aboutahrain'spositionregardingthepositive legal elemesupporting
its title to the Hawars, 1 shall restate them briefly knowing, as 1 well do, that the basicconsiderations are alreadyfamiliarto the Court. In so doing1shall, of course,respond to what
Professor Salmon has said.
28.For presentpurposesitisnotnecessaryfor metoreferto a widerangeof authorities.
29. The Courtwill, 1am sure,see no disrespectto it if1pass immediatelyto the most recent
arbitral consideration ofquestions oftitle in theritreaflemen case. As the questionof title to
islands was specificallyinvolvedin that case, thedecisionis particularlyrelevantto the present
case. A fewquotationsfromthatAwardwillserve topresent therelevantlaw:
"The modem internationallaw of the acquisition(or attribution) of temtory
generally requires thattherebe:an intentionaldisplayofpower andauthorityoverthe
temtory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and
peaceful basis. Thelatter twocriteriaare temperedto suit the nature ofthe temtory
and the size of itspopulation,if any." (Eritreaflemen,First Award,9 October 1998,
para. 239.)
"Evidence ofintention toclaim the islands à titre de souverain isan essential
element of the processof consolidation oftitle. Thatintentioncan be evidenced by
showing a public claimof rightor assertion ofsovereigntyto the islandsas well as
legislative acts openlyseekingtoregulateactivityontheislands." (Ibid., para.24.)
In refemng to the evidenceof the apparentlong attachmentof the populationof each coast to
fisheriesinand aroundtheislands,theTribunal said:
"However, itdoes not constituteevidenceof eflectivités for the simple reason
that noneof these functionsareactsà titre desouverain. For Stateactivitycapable of
establishinga claimfor sovereignty,the Tribunalmustlookto the State licensingand
enforcementactivitiesconcemingfishingdescribed above." (Ibid., para. 15.)
In extrapolating,as 1do, fiom the lirnitedscope of this observation, myunderstandingis that the
Tribunal was saying that themere presenceof individualsonan islandis notby itselfsuEcient to
confertitle on theclaimantState to whichthey adhere. Somethingin the nature of relatedState
activiiyor authorityis required.
30. In thiscomection both ProfessorSalmon (CR200015,translation,p. 36, para. 26) and
Mr. Shankardass (CR200018,p. 34,para.49) referredto thedecisionof the Courtlast year in the
Kasikili/SeduduIsland case (1C.J.Reports 1999)as if supportiveof their position. So it may be
useM to identiQ bnefly the mannerin which the pertinentfacts of that caseare to be clearly
distinguishedfromthe facts inthepresentcase. Mr. Shankardasspresents theCourt'sdecision as
holding "that the Masubia did not occupy the island à titre de souverain when using it
intennittently, accordingto the seasonsand their needs, for exclusivelyagricultural purposes".However,counsei for Qatarmust havefailedto recall that the Court has identifiedtwo factors
which ledto its conclusion thatthe Masubiahad not occupied Kasikiliàtitrede souverain. Those
wereenunciateda fewlinesder the passage1havejust quotedand weretwoin number. The first
was that the Masubia use of the island began prior to the establishmentof any colonial
administrationin the CapriviStrip. Therewas thus no souverainin supportof whose titre they
could havebeen acting. Secondly, theMasubia use of the island seemedto have continued
subsequentto the establishmentof the colonial administrationwithoutbeing linked to temtorial
claimson the part of the authority administerinthe Caprivi.That was thesituation as identified
bythe Court.
31. The situation is totally differenthere and 1 need do no more than summarilyrecall,
becausethematterwillbereferredto in theargumentsofMr.Paulssonand Mr. Volterra,herethere
was a souverain that existed prior to the arriva1 of the Dowasir in the Hawars, namelythe
Al-KhalifaRulers of Bahrain. It wasthatsouverainfiomwhomthe Dowasirobtainedbygant the
right to reside in the Hawars. This was recognized by CaptainPrideaux,the British Political
Residentin 1909. Moreover, the presence of the Dowasir inthe Hawars isclosely linkedto the
territoriallairnsof the Rulersof Bahrain- as is shownby the variousefectivitéscarriedout by
Bahrain inthe Hawars during the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies. None is more striking
perhapsthanwhen someof the Dowasirlefi the Hawarsfor a periodof years in 1923and then
soughtthe permission of Bahrainto return to the Hawars inabout 1928. If, on the factsjust
mentioned,the relationshipbetweenthe Dowasirand Bahrainis not heldtobeà titre de souverain.
it isdifficultto seewhat relationship comeetthat requirement.
32.1 retum now tothequotationsfromthe AwardintheEritred'emen case. Itis alsoto be
noted thatin the Tribunal's examinationof life on theislands,which on the facts of that case it
foundto be seasonalandtemporary,in contrastwith thefactualpositionthatwill be demonstrated
in respectof the Hawars, the Tribunalnonetheless foundthat even that limitedactivity- in the
words of this Court- in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951 - represents a
"considerationnot to be overlooked, thescope of which extends beyond purely geographical
factors: that of certaineconomicinterestspeculiarto a region,the realityandimportanceof which
are clearlyevidencedbylongusage" (1C.J.Reports 1951,p. 133). 33. Now,to these observations may be added two more short ones: the first is fiom
JudgeHuberintheIsleofPalmascase - and1maymentionto youthatthe relevantextractsfiom
the Isle of Palmas Award appear as tab 1 in your folders that have been placed before you.
JudgeHuber saidin that case: "It isquitenaturalthat the establishment ofsovereigntymay bethe
outcomeof a slow evolution, ofa progressiveintensificationof State control."(2 R.I.A.A.829 at
867.) Thiswascitedwithapprovalin the Eritreflemen case(EritreaflemenAward,para. 104).
34. The second quotationis again fiom theEritrea/Yemencase where, it must be recalled,
thereweregovernmentalactsonboth sides,notsimplyon onesideas inthis case. Itis as follows:
35.
"Itmaybe saidat once thatoneresultof the analysisof the constantlychanging
situation ofal1thesedifferentaspectsof govemmental activitiesis that, as indeedwas
so in the Minquiers and Ecrehoc sase wherethere had also been argumentsabout
claimsto very ancienttitles, it is the [andthis is a passageto stress],relatively
recenthistoryof useandpossessionthatultimatelyproves to be a mainbasis of the
Tribunal'dsecisions" (FirstAward,1998,para.450. Emphasisadded.)
B. Responseto ProfessorSalmon's argument abouteffedvités
36.If 1maySayso,thequotationsthat1havejust readthe Courtare reallynot controversial.
As the Court willalreadyhave seen in Bahrain'swrittenpleadings and of whichthe Court willbe
remindedyetagaininthecourse ofourargumentsto come,thesequotationslaydownrequirements
that have been arnply satisfied by Bahrain'sconduct-not since 1936,as Qatar maintains,but
sincethe earliestdaysofBahrain's presenceinthe Hawars.
37. But when one cornes, as 1 do now, to the observationsof my fiiend and confière,
ProfessorSalmon,it cannotfor a momentbe suggestedthat he wasnot controversial. 1leaveaside
for later considerationby my colleaguesProfessorSalmon's openingpoints onquietanonmovere,
on utipossidetis,on the statehoodof Bahrain andon the emergence of Qatar. The matter with
which 1 must concern myself now is his fifth question "the effectivityof acts of occupation"
(CR2000/5,p. 31,translation). Herethe Courthasbeenpresented with anargument, 1 Sayitwith
respect,ascircularasit isunexpected.
38. ProfessorSalmon startswith thepassagein whichthe Charnberin theBurkina Fasocase
classifies the actsof administrativeauthorities intofour categones(CR2000/5,translation,p. 31,para. 17). Our fust suchcategory is"wherethe actcorrespondsexactlyto law". For somereason
the quotation - otherwise presentedin full- thenomitsthe followingeightwordswhichappear
in the original: "whereeffectiveadministrationis additional to utipossidetis". Here,in this first
category, theroleoftheeflectivité istoconfm the exerciseoftherightderivedfioma legaltitle.
39. The secondcategory is "where the actdoes not correspond to law", i.e., "where the
temtory whichisthe subjectof thedisputeis effectivelyadministeredby a Stateotherthanthe one
possessing thelegaltitle".In this casethe "preference shouldbe giventothe holderofthetitle".
40. Thethird categoryis where"theefectivitédoesnotCO-exisw t ithany legaltitle". In that
case "itmust invariablybe takeninto consideration".
41. And the fourth case is "where the legal title is not capable of showingexactly the
temtorial expanseto whichit relates".
42. Why ProfessorSalmoninvokesthis classificationis quite bafflingbecauseit does not
help to solve the problem now before the Court. Everythingtums on the category within the
analysis in which one placesthe present problem. Bahrain wouldSaythat the situation,if it falls
into any of these categories which areal1"colonial"related,would probably fa11into the fust
category,narnely: "Whenthe act correspondsexactly to the law"(and 1complete the quotation
with the wordsornittedby ProfessorSalmon)"whereeffectiveadministrationis additionalto uti
possedetis", i.e., additionalto existinglegal title. In other words Bahrainhas legal title and its
effectivitéare in support ofthat. In this case,as the quotationys "theonlyrole of egectivités is
to confvm the exercise ofthe right derivedfiom the legal title". In Bahrain'sview,Bahrainhas
alwayshadtitletotheHawarsbecausetheyfellwithinthe areaof Al-Khalifaruleat thetirneof the
original grant to the Dowasir. Nothing has happened todeprive Bahrain of that title; and its
effectivitésonfirm itspossessionofthat title.
43. Professor Salmon,on the otherhand, would appearto place the case in a different
category. Whichone, is not quite clear,but probablyit is the second: "where the act does not
correspond to law ... preference should be given to the holder of the title". Presurnablyhe
considers thatQataris theholder of the title and therefore its title shoulgiven preference over
the eflectivitésf Bahrain. 44. But this approachdoes nothing to prove Qatar's title. Nordoes ProfessorSalmon's
elaborationof the matterdo so. The very first sentenceof his paragraph19revealsthedeficiency
ofhis argument:
"These elementaryprinciples show thereason why an occupation of temtory
belongingto anotherStatedoesnot involvea conflict betweentwo eflectivitéswhose
respectivemeritswillhaveto be evaluated,a conflictwhichwould haveto be resolved
by grantingthetemtorytothepartywith thebestefectivité".(Emphasisadded.)
ProfessorSalmon assumes precisely whah te has to prove. Hestarts fiom the assumptionthat the
Hawars "belong"to Qatar. Yet that "belonging"is the verypoint in issue. In consequence, his
conclusionis entirelywithoutvalue. He says: "Inthis regardthe whole ofBahrain'sargumentas
to the predominanceof the efectivitéof its occupationof the Hawar Islandsis irrelevant. Only
acquiescence by Qatar, the territorial sovereign, could have created a title." Perhaps
ProfessorSalmon wouldhave beenright in his conclusionif Qatar were theterritorialsovereign.
But as this is what he must prove, his whole attempt to exclude the relevance of Bahrain's
efectivitésfails. lndeedto bringto an end thispart ofmyargument,ProfessorSalmon couldhave
provided no clearer indicationof Qatar'sconcem over the reality and significanceof Bahrain's
eflectivitésinthe Hawarsthanthis attemptto denytheirrelevance.
RTLE TO ISLANDSASSUCH
45. So nowwe must turn to considerthe basis,otherthan mere assertion, onwhichQatar
claims title to the Hawars. On 30May SirIan SinclairsummarizedQatar's positive case for
sovereigntyoverthe Hawarsinthe followingterms:
"Qatarclaimsanoriginaltitle to theHawar Islandsonthe ground thatthegreat
majority of them lie within a three-mile limit drawn from the low-water mark on
Qatar'smainlandcoast,andthe remainder on the basis of the principle froxirnityas
properlyunderstood." (CR200016,p. 53para. 39.)
46. SirIan alsoreferredto two fier grounds "whichsupport and sustain",as he put it,
Qatar's claim, namely, the historicalevidence and themap evidence. These will be considered
later. For the moment1willconfinemyself to SirIan'sprincipalargument developedby him and
in Qatar'swrittenpleadings.
47. ButbeforeinvestigatingSirIan'scontention, itisnecessaryto alludeto onematterof fact
onwhich his argumentrests. As statedin Qatar'sReply(atpara.4.6): "Qatarreliesnot only upon thefact that the majorityof the islandsand islets
constituting theHawarIslandslie whollyor partiallywithina three-miletemtonal sea
limit fiom themainlandcoast of Qatar(that limitbeingthe one recognizedby Qatar
and GreatBritaininthe 1930~)~but also thatall-ofthemnow lie withina twelve-mile
temtonal sea limitfromthemainlandcoast(thatlimitbeingthe onecurrently applied
by Qatar)."
And that fact wasagainrecalledby SirIan(CR200016, p.47,para.27).
48. The positionas regardsthe effect ofthe 3-miletenitonal sea limitindicatedin Map
No. 9 of the Memonal of Qatar(oppositep. 145),whichhasbeen put up on thescreen. Bahrain
has no reason toquestionthegeneralrepresentationonthis Qatarimap ofthe 3-milelimit,though
Bahrainmustreserveits positionas regardssomeof the detailsof the mapandthe location ofthe
baselinesinrespectswhich donot significantlyaffect thepresentpoint. 1shouldalsopoint out that
the permanently dry land area of the islands is the lighteryellow and that the outer penumbra
represents onlythe areasexposedat lowtides.
49. As canbe seen,the3-mile limitdoesnot embracethe HawarIslandsto the degree thatis
implied in Qatar'sreferenceto the islandslying "whollyor partially"within the 3-mile limit. In
truth, the islands lieonlyver=partiallywithinthe 3-milelimit. To be precise,movingfiom south
to north, only half of Janan,about one-thirdof Hawar itselftogether with SawadJanubiyah and
SawadShamaliyahlie withinthe 3-mile limit. Outside the 3-mile limit lies half of Janan, the
northem and greater part ofHawar as well as, in their entirety,the islandUmmf Hazwarah,
Umm Jini,JuzurAlajiyat,JaziratAjirah,RabadSharqiyahandRabadGharbiyah.
50. So, evenif Qatar'srelianceupon therole ofthe 3-mileterritorial seawereid (which,
as willbe seen, it is not), itstill could only applyto a limitedextent. It wouldbe a matter for
debate, into whichQatarhasnot entered,as to whethertheareasinsidethe 3-milelimitbroughtal1
the islands intothe régimeof the temtorial sea or whetherthelarger areaoutsidethe 3-milelimit
had the reverse effectof removingthe whole ofthe islandsfromthe influenceof the 3-milerégime.
Bahrain,itneedhardlybesaid,contendsthat the factthatthelarger partofthe HawarIsland,being
the principal island,liesoutsidethe 3-mile limit wouldmakeQatar'sargument based on that limit
ineffective even if,quodnon,it werevalidinprinciple.
51. As regardsthe effectof the extensionof Qatar'sterritorialsea lirnitfiom 3 to 12miles,
Bahrain submits that that can make no difference to thelegalposition. Qatar onlyextendedits
claim to 12miles on 16April1992, someninemonthsafterit filed its application ithi sase on8July 1991. Suchan actionmust, therefore,be excludedfiomconsideration. Inany event, evenif
the extensionhad taken place earlier, it wouldmakeno differenceto the role of the territorial sea
which, if it operatedat all,must haveneso manydecadespreviously. It may alsobe mentioned
in passingthat the extension byQatar ofthe width of itsterritorialsea from 3 to 12mileswas a
clear breach ofthe status quoprinciple laidown in 1983as part of the mediationprocessto be
conducted by HisHighnessthe King of SaudiArabiato whom Bahrainremains evergratefulfor
his efforts. It was obviouslydone with a view to improvingQatar'slegal position in this case.
Qatarcannotreallyturn roundnowandaccuse Bahrain of breaches ofthe status quo. Inanyevent,
it wasforthe Mediator tohave intervenedin relation toany allegedbreachesof the statusquo. He
did not do so inthis or in anyotherepisode of allegedbreach. Bahrainconsiders that thequestion
of the statusquorequires nofùrtherdiscussioninthis case.
52.To retun to the operationof SirIan's argument basedonthetemtorial sea. If it is valid
at all, which Bahrain submitsthat it is not, it is of significantlylimitedgeographical scopeand,
arguably,becauseofits limited effect,is ofnorelevance atall.
53.1 nowtum nowto the substanceof SirIan'sargumentderivedfrom aState'ssovereignty
over the temtorialsea. Now,thereareat leastthreepossible responsesto it.
54. The first is that those who have specificallydiscussed the questionof title to islands
within the temtorialseahave alwaysqualifiedtheirobservationsaboutthe coastalStates'rightsby
acknowledgingthe possibilitythat anotherStatemayhave acquired titleto the island by ordinary
means. Thereis no absoluterule that islandswithi tne territorial seabelongto the coastal State.
Thus in the Eritreaflemen case,the Tribunalobserved, inrelation tothe Mohabbakahs,whichlie
withi 12miles of the EritreanCoast: "Whatever thehistory, in the absenceof any clear titleto
them being shownby Yemen, the Mohabbakahs mustfor that reason today be regarded as
Eritrean". (Award, 1998,p. 125,para.472). 1emphasizethewords: "in the absenceof anyclear
title to thembeing shown byYemen ...".It is, of course,Bahrain'scontentio- and it willbe
supportedlater- that it possessesa clear title to theHawarsby virtue of its ancient authority
coupledwithcontinuousoccupationand demonstrationog fovernrnentaluthonty.
55, The Eritreaemen Tribunal cited ProfessorBowetts'sbook on the Legal Régimeof
Islands in InternationaLaw (p.48 (1978)),wherehe has the followingto say about islandslyingwithin thetemtorial sea of a State: "Herethe presumptionis that the island is under the sarne
sovereigntyasthemainlandnearby." Andhe continues:
"Thiscanbe nomorethan a presumption,for not infrequentlyislandsunderthe
sovereigntyofoneStateliewithina distancefiom the shoreof anotherStatewhichis
less thanthe limit of territorialwaters. Hence the presumptionis displacedwhere
proofof sovereigntyinanother Stateis adduced." (Ibid.)
56. In developinghis argument, SirIan quoted a passage fromJudgeHuber's awardin the
Isle ofPalmas case - a passagewhich SirIan described as "thekey passage" in the Award.
(CR 2000/6,p. 46). However, heput aninterpretationon thatpassagewhich1respectfullycannot
share; andbecausethe disagreementisrather basic,1 am sorry tohave to impose on the Courtyet
a furtherreading of thesamepassage: The Court will find the Awardin the judges'folders,at
tab 1. and1amreadingfiomp. 854andthequotationis as follows:
57.
"Although States have in certain circumstances maintained that islands
relatively close to their shores belongedto them in virtue of their geographical
situation, itis impossible toshowthe existenceof a rule of positiveinternationallaw
to the effect thatislands situatedoutside territorial waters shouldbelong to a State
fiom the merefact thatits temtory formsthe terrafirma (nearest continentor island
of considerablesize)."
58.From this passage,SirIan soughtto spellout whathe calleda negativeproposition. As
he putit- and1quotehimagain:
"Now, the Court wouldsurely note that his [that is Judge Huber's]negative
propositionappliesonlytoislandssituated outsidetemtorial waters; it doesnot apply
toislands situatedwithin territorialwaters." (CR200016, p.46, para.24.)
60.With respectto SirIan, 1donotreada negativepropositionintothosewords. 1readonly
a positivepropositionin the sentencetakenas a whole, narnely,that it is impossible to showthe
existence ofa mle of positiveinternationallaw to the effectthat islandssituate in the high seas
shouldbelongto thenearest State.
61.Sowhatdid JudgeHuberintendto conveywhen heincluded thewords "islandssituated
outsidetemtorial waters"in his statementthat it is impossible to showthe existenceof a positive
ruleof internationallawto the effect thatislandsoutsidetemtorial watersshouldbelongto a Statefrom the mere fact that its temtory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of
considerablesize)"?
62. The first thingto recallis thatthe islandof Palmas is,as statedin the compromisof that
case, some50miles southofCapSanAugustin,a capeinthe southempart ofthe Philippineisland
of Mindanao - which is the morenortherly ofthe two arrowsnow showingon the map before
you. Palmas lies about halfwaybetweenthat cape andthe nearest islandof the Nanusagroup of
what was then the NetherlandsEast Indies and is now Indonesia- that is the most southerly
arrow on the map before you. The island was therefore in the high seas, nowhere near the
temtorial seaof eitherParty.
63. Judge Huberwas clearlyconscious of thisfact because he alludedto the locationsof
islandsearlierinhis Award. Speakingofthe delimitationoftemtory, he said:
"If,however,noconventionalline ofsufficienttopographical precision existosr
if thereare gaps in the frontierserwiseestablished,or if a conventionalline leaves
room for doubt, orif, as e.g. in the case of an island situated in the high seas, the
questionarises whethera titleis valid erga omnes,the actualcontinuousandpeaceful
display of State functionsis in case of disputethe sound and natural criterion of
temtonal sovereignty."(UNRIAAV , ol. II,p. 840. Emphasis added.)
64. Again, a little later in the Award, he said that "it must be remembered thatit is a
somewhatisolated islandandtherefore a temtory clearlydelimitedand individualized" (WRIAA,
65. Certainly JudgeHuberwas not responding to any argumentadvancedby either party
suggestinga specialposition for islandsin territorialwater1.have examinedthe pleadingsin the
Palmas case and cannotfindany passagein which eithersidesuggestedthata distinctionshould be
drawnbetweenislands in temtorialwatersand islandsinthe highseas.
66.1 wouldrespectfüllysuggestto the Court thatwhenJudgeHuberinsertedin his remarks
about islands the phrase "islandsoutside territorial waters" he was doing nothing more than
exercisingproperjudicial cautionandrestraintin a mannerwithwhich1ventureto suggestthat this
Courtis familiar. The casebeforehimrelated toan islandin the high seas. It was not necessary
for him to lay down a rule for islandsin temtorial waters and thereby create the possibility of
subsequentlybeingexposed to criticism for sayingsomethingthat wouldbe purelyobiter. Though
he spoke onlyof "islandssituatedoutside temtorial waters", nothing that he said excluded theapplicabilityof his reasoning to islandswithinthe territorialsea. He didnot, forexample,suggest
that such islands weresubject to differentrules fiom thoseapplicableto islandsin the high seas.
The important pointis thatthe logicof hisapproach, andthe generalityof his language,was such
thathisapproachis asmuchapplicableto islands within the temtorial sea asitisto islandsoutside.
67. Thus, when he said that it is impossible to show the existenceof a rule of positive
internationallaw to the effectthat islandsbelong to a Statefiom the mere factthat its temtory
foms the nearestterrafinna, that statementwas as applicableto temtorial sea islandsas to high
seasislands. Just as he saidthat thereare no precedentssufficientlyfiequentand precisein their
bearingto establisha mle ofproximityin internationallaw inrelationtohighseasislands,sothere
are none that establishsuch a rule for islandswithin the temtonal sea. Just as he said that the
applicationof the conceptof contiguityto islandsin the high seas would be in conflictwith what
has been said as to the acquisition oftemtorial sovereignty,so the same would be true of the
applicationof the concepttoislandswithinthetemtorial sea.
68.Doctrineand practice subsequenttothe Palmascase support theanalysisthat1havejust
presented. There is a statementby Sir HumphreyWaldockthat is highly pertinenthere. In an
article in 1948 when he was speakingof the Judgment of the Permanent Courtin the Eastern
Greenlandcase,hesaid:
"[it,that is, the Judgment]does not, it is subrnitted,conflict atal1with the views of
Judge Huber as to the non-legalcharacterof theproximitydoctrines. .. Arbitral
decisions of the present century have established beyond al1 doubt that 'effective
occupation'does not meanphysicalsettlementof the temtory but effectivedisplayof
state activity. Ifhis vitalpointis remembered,theEasternGreenlandcasepresents
no difficultyandnoconflict with theprinciplesofeffective occupation.TheCourtdid
not hold Denmarkto have sovereignty over Eastern Greenland merely by reasonof it
being acontinuationof othertenitorypossessedby Denmark; nordidit doso merely
becauseGreenland,beingan island,isa geographicalunity. TheCourt heldDenmark
to have actuallydisplayedstate authontyin regard tothe whole of Greenland,slight
though the impact of that authoritymight have been in the contestedpart of the
island ... ThegeographicalunityofGreenlandwasanimportantfactin assessingthe
limits ofDenmark'sstate activity,butit is plain fiom thejudgrnentthat geographical
continuitywould not have availedDenmark in the least if she had notestablished
somestateactiviîydisplayedinregardto thewholeisland".
SirHumphrey continued:
"In short, anysignificancethathas been atûibutedby internationaltribunalsto
proxirnityhas beennot as a legalpnncipleindependentof effectiveoccupationbut as
a fact indicating thextentof an effective occupation." ("Disputed Sovereignitnythe Falkland Island Dependencies",BY XXV (1948), pp.343-344. Emphasis in the
original.)
69.And SirHwnphreyhadmoretosay:
"Internationallawthereforeappearsto take accountof continuityor contiguity
of temtory only withinthe principleof effective occupation. Withinthat principle
proximity may,in certain circumstances,operateto raisea presumptionof fact that a
particularstateis exercisingor displayingsovereignty overoutlyingtemtory in which
there isno noticeableimpactof its stateactivity ."(Ibid.)
But,if1may ventureto add afewwords ofmyown,that isal1thattheconceptofproximitydoes.
70. The fact that SirHumphrey madetheseremarks in relationto a questionof sovereignty
overa single continuous pieceof temtory, namely,Greenland,indicatesthat hisrepetition without
qualificationa few pages earlier(at p. 341)of Judge Huber'sexclusionof islandswithina State's
temtorial waters wasprobably not a considered one. It cannotstandtogetherwith Sir Humphrey's
acknowledgement thatthe presurnption following from proximityis limitedeven in relationto a
continuousportion of landtemtory. Afortiori, it would not apply toan island withintemtorial
waters.
71. And that, in al1 likelihood, is why Sir GeraldFitanaurice deliberately omitted the
questionable words"situated outsidetemtonal waters" (as indicatedby dots withinhis quotation)
from his owncitation ofJudgeHuber's propositioni,n one ofhisleamedarticles in theBritishYear
Bookon the Law andProcedureof this Court. (See BYhUl (1955-56),p. 74; "TheLaw and
Procedure ofthe InternationalCourt ofJustice(1986)",Vol. 1,p. 312, No.2). Qatar suggeststhat
"Sir Gerald may havebeen in error" (Reply ofQatar, para.4.21). 1would prefer to think that
SirGerald - a most distinguishedjudge ofthisCourt,not givento makingmistakes - wasnot in
error,but was applyingto the question thestrict legal logicthatwasthe hallmarkof his important
contributionto thelaw.
72. The second reason why islands within the temtonal sea should not be seen as an
exception to the exclusionof the conceptof proximityas a basis oftitle is this: thejustification
advanced for treating islandswithin the territorialsea in this wayhas been expressedin terms of
security. Sir Iansaid:
"the Courtwill undoubtedlyrecall that the raisond'êtreof thenotion ofthe temtorial
sea wasthe perceivedneedto protectthe fundamentalsecurityinterestsof the coastal
State; and that is a consideration which still applies today" (CR200016, p.46,
para. 25). 73.Well, if that consideration still apsoday, thesecurityof the coastalState is unlikely
to be protectedonly bythe automatic extension,s SirIan wouldsuggest,of a State'ssovereignty
over itstemtorial watersto al1islandssituatedwithin thosewaters,regardlessof the fact thatthe
islandsmightbe in the possessionof anotherState. Theideathatthe securityof the coastal State
mightbe so protectedis reallythe applicationof the canon-shotle in reverse. Becausein olden
timesa canonhad a range of3 miles, theStatemightintheoryhave beenprotectedif islandswithin
3miles ofits shoresweresubjectto its sovereignty.Butthat is manifestlyuntruetoday when the
range of missilesis so enormouslyincreasedthat a Statecanbe imperilledfiom a launchingpad
scoresor even thousandsof miles away. Thesecurityapproach,if valid,wouldjustiQ claimsto
islandsmanymiles distant fromthe coast; andobviouslythatcannotbe the case. By reference to
security considerations,therefore,there is noreason for treatingislandswithinthe temtorial sea
differentlyfrommoredistantislands.
74. The third reasonfor rejectingtheproxirnity concept,and in particular,its applicationto
islands within the temtorial sea of a State,is that, as aer of practice,Stateshave foundit
possible to accept the presenceof foreignislands close to theircoasts, and even within their
temtorial seas. TheHawarsareno exception.
75.Inconsideringtheextentto whichthe presenceof anislandclairnedbyStateA in whole
or in part within the temtorial waters of StateB and thus, as Qatar would contend, almost
automatically part othetemtory of StateBonthe basisofproxirnity,it isappropriateto recallthat
there areat least1 instancesin whichislandsof StateA lie wholeor partlywithinthe temtorial
waters of State, or very closeto themandyetare acceptedasbelongingto StateA. Evidentlyin
thesesituationsargumentsaboutproximity,the need for thedefenceof StateB and so on havenot
prevailed.1will now givethe Courtthese 11 examples:
- First,theKamaranIsland
Untilthe union in1990 of the DemocraticRepublic ofYemenand theYemenArab Republic,
the Democratic Republic ofYemenclaimedthe island of Kamarann , otwithstandingthe fact
that it lies within thetemtonal watersof what wasthenthe YemenArabRepublic (ascanbe
seenfromthe mapon the screen)andwasclairnedby theYemenArabRepublicon thebasisof proximity. In this connection the British Govemment in 1956 expressedthe view that
propinquityin itselfesnot givetitletotemtory.
- Weturtn o the GreekislandsofLesvos,Khios, SamosK , os,Simi,RhodesandMegisti,al1these
liewithin adistanceoftheTurkishcoastlessthanthe width ofthe latter's territlea and we
haveputupjust a coupleof examplesfor you.
- Third,the Malawi islandsof Chisamule andLikomalin Lake Nyasa whichis a boundarylake
betweenthe two States,respectivelylie within10 and 3 miles off the coastof Mozambique,
whichis the eastemsideofthe map foryou.
- Next,the Frenchisland ofStPierreandMiquelonlie 10to 12nauticalmilesoffthe southem
coast of Newfoundland.
- TheShortlandIslandsGroupwhichbelongstothe SolomonIslandslie3to 5nauticalmiles off
the coastof PapuaNew Guinea.
- Untilrecently cededto Namibia, the 13PenguinIslands,lyingwithin6 miles offthe coast of
Namibia, belonged to South Afiica. We have put up two examples,but the rest are not
dissimilar.
- The Coriscoand EIobey Islanh of EquatorialGuinea lie approximately16 nauticalmiles off
the coastof Gabon.
- The AustralianislandsofDauan,BoiguandSaibailiebetween5 and 1.7nauticalmiles offthe
coastof PapuaNew Guinea.
- TheSpanishislands,IslasChaferinasl,ie2 nauticalmilesoff the coastofMorocco.
- Atitsclosest,the Greek islandof Co@ isabout 1.1nauticalmilesfromtheAlbaniancoast.
- Andthe Bangladeshiislandof St,Martinsliesabout4.7miles due west of the nearest pointon
Myanrnar,or Buma's coast.
Al1thesemaps areprintedagainin thejudges'folders,sothatyoumay lookatthem.
76. As the Courtcanthus see, the closenessof the Hawarsto the Qatarpeninsuladoes not
posean unusualproblem.
77. Thereis anotherway - andanimportantway - oflookingat thequestionof proximity.
78.Let itbe assumed,contrarytofact,thatas Qatarcontends,it wasalreadyinexistenceasa
Stateinthe latterhalfofthenineteenthcenturyandinanareacoextensivewiththe limitsof whatiscalled theQatar peninsula. It woulfollowthat,atthe commencementof thatState'slife 140years
or so ago,if the doctrineof proximitywere operative atall, it wouldhave operatedfiom theutset
to extendQatar's title theHawars.
79. Forthat, of course,is howthe doctrineof proximityoperates. Being a legalconcept,it
must be operativeat the momentthat the State invokingit acquired title to the generativeor
dominant area. If, therefore, Qataracquired sovereignty overthe adjacent peninsula inthe
nineteenthcentury,itmusthavebeenatthat timethatit acquiredtitle to the Hawarsby operationof
the doctrineofproximityor contiguity. As the Rulerof Qatarclaimedin 1939,"theHawarislands
belongedto the Qatar Statefiom the very daywhen God createdthem" (Memonal of Bahrain,
Ann.289,Vol.5, p. 1184).
80. Thequestion must thenbe asked how, ifat all, has Qatar supportedor maintainedthat
title overtheinterveningyearsin the total absence of any activon its part in theislands,and in
the faceofevidentopposingactivityby Bahrain?
81. The questionis irnplicitin one sentence ofthe award ofJudge Huberin theIslandof
Palmas case. There,inhis discussion of intertemporallaw,he observes that"a distinctionmustbe
made betweenthecreationof rightsand theexistenceofrights".
"The sarneprinciplewhichsubjectstheact creativeof arightto the lawinforce
at thethe the rightaises, demands thatthe existenceof the right, in otherwordsits
continued manifestation, shalflollow theconditions requiredby the evolutionof law".
(UNRIAAV , ol.II, atp. 845).
In other words,the merelytheoretical extensionof Qatarisovereigntyfrom the peninsulaitselfto
the adjacentislandsthatmight have been sufficientwithoutmorein the mid-nineteenthcenturyto
accordtitleto Qatarcannotsurvive the fact thatin the ensuing150 years Qatarhas failedin any
respectto demonstrate its claimedsovereigntyoverthe Hawarsor, indeed,even over theadjacent
peninsula coast, but that does not matter. With the exception of the relatively recent oil
developmentat ZikritandDukhanon thecoastof thepeninsula, notquitefacingtheHawars-and
the map you see is the famousconcessionmap - this regionof the Qatar peninsula isan empty
quarter- empty of inhabitantsand emptyof meansof communication. As the Courtwill see,
there isa broadyeilowbanddrawnfromthe coastoppositethe HawarstowardsDoha,andthat is
an empty area; empty of inhabitantse,mptyof communication.Whilethere is no needto questionQatar'spresent title tothe peninsulaitself (with the exception of Zubarah), itcertainlyshouldbe
pointed out thatin termsof compliancewith the histoncal developmentof the lawrelating tothe
acquisition and,more to the point, the retention of title to temtory, Qatar hasdone absolutely
nothing in relationto theHawars.
82.Onecomesthusto anotherhighlyrelevantconsiderationtwiceexpressedbyJudge Huber
in thePalmascase. Thefirstisthis:
"if the contestationis based onthe fact that theother Party has actually displayed
sovereignty, it cannot be sufficient to establish the title by which territorial
sovereigntywasvalidlyacquiredat a certainmoment; it must alsobe shownthat the
temtorial sovereigntyhas continuedto existand didexistat the momentwhich forthe
decisionof the disputemustbe considered ascritical. This demonstration consistsin
the actualdisplayof State activities,such as belongsonlyto the territorial sovereign."
(UNRIAAV , ol.II,p. 839.)
83.The secondrelevant observation comeslaterin theAward:
"The admission of the existence of temtonal sovereignty early in the
18thcentuy and the displayof such sovereigntyin the nineteenthcentury ... would
not lead.. . to the conclusion that, unless the contrary is proved, there is a
presumptionforthe existenceof sovereigntyin the meantime ... No presumptions
of this kind are to be appliedin international arbitrations,except under express
stipulation. It remainsfor theTribunalto decidewhetheror not itis satisfiedof the
continuousexistenceof sovereignty,on the ground of evidence as to its display at
more orless long intervals."(UNRIAAV , ol.II, atp. 864.)
84. In short,if the presumptionof title by proximityoperatesat all, it must have operated
from the inception of Qatar'sstatehood. Qatar asserts that that statehood cameabout in the
nineteenthcentury. Butin al1the intervening yearsQatar has done nothing at al1to displayor
assertitssovereigntyoverthe Hawars,evenat the time,soQataralleges,beforeBahrainlaidclaim
to the Hawars. And since then - said by Qatar to be fiom 1936 onwards - Qatar hasdone
nothingto assertitstitleexcept for a shortwhileto makea fewandlirnitedprotests.
85. To conclude,if there ever wasa presumptiveQatarititle to the Hawarsit has lapsedby
reason of the passageof time andof governmentalinactivity. Inmakingthis submission1do no
more than echo the views expressed by JudgeHuber as restated and approved by
Sir HumphreyWaldockin thefollowingpassage,and1quotefromSirHumphrey:
"Judge Huber insisted thatthe presumptiononly operates in the initial stages
and that,whentitle is clairned bya continuousandprolongeddisplayof sovereignty,
there mustbe somemanifestation ofsovereigntythroughoutthe temtory clairned. In
other words, proximityonly constitutespresumptiveevidence of an assumptionof
sovereignty which is rebutted by a failure to provide any positive evidencethat sovereignty isassertedduringa periodof tirnein which somedisplayof sovereignty
wouldobviouslybecalledfor." (Waldeck, op. cit.,p. 345.)
86. This virtuallyequates thebasis of Bahrain'stitle to the Hawars with thenotion of an
historictitle ininternationallawspokenof intheEritreaflemencaseinthe followingterms:
"Butanhistorictitlehas alsoanotherand different meaningin internationallaw
as a title that has been created,or consolidated,by a process of possession, or
acquiescence, orby possessionso long continuasto havebecomeacceptedby law
as a title.hesetitles too arehistonc inthe sensethat continuityand the lapseof a
period of times oftheessence." (FirstAward,1998,para. 106.)
87.Thus,the longer that Qatarmaintainsthatit has beena State,the longeris the periodin
whichthe total absenceof Qatariefectiviinsthe Hawar Islandsevidences thedisappearance of
suchclaimed titleasitmayeverhavehadthere.
88.So,Mr. President,that bnngs me to theend of thesectionon legaltitle. 1nowtm quite
brieflyto thequestionoftheuse offorceby Qatarin seizingZubarahin 1937.
ZUBARAH T: E USE OF FORCEBY QATAR INSEIZING ZUBARA IN 1937WASINEFFECTIVETO
DEPFUVE BAHRAI N FITSTITLE
89. Professor David gave this subject remarkably short shrift in his argument on
5 June(CR200019,p. 15,para. 26): «Jene m'attarderai as nonplus sur les méritesd'unetelle
qualificationqui, en dépit dece quesuggèreBahreïn,n'a mêmjaemais retenu l'attentde la
SociétédesNations.
90. 1venture to sugge-t and you will forgiveme for my Fren-h 1venture to suggest
thatwhetheror not theeinire of Zubarahengaged theattention ofthe League ofNationsis of no
relevance. Theconsiderations denyilegal effecttoorcibleseinires of tenitory are substantive
onesthat operateeventhough League procedures manot have beeninvolved.
91. If theeinire of Zubarahin 1937by an act of forcewereto occurtoday therewouldbe
no doubt that itwould beunlawfuland ineffective to depnveBahrain of its title. In 1937 the
position was not so clear because the law was then in the processof evolution~om, first, the
situationin which war andthe use of force had been acceptedas lawful to, second, theposition
nowprevailing, andfullyaccepted,thatthe use of forceis unlawfuland by itself is ineffectiveto
bringabout a changeoftitle. But althoughthe thirtieswere a periodof transitionBahrain submits
thatthe Courtshould notaccordvaliditytothe forcibleseinire of ZubarahbytheAl-Thaniin 1937. 92. At that timethe majorinstrumentsaffecting the forcible seizure of temtory were the
Covenantof the Leagueof Nationsand the Kellog-Briand Pactof 1928. By the latterespecially,
Statesundertook torefrainfiomtheuseof force asaninstrumentof nationalpolicy.
93. 1 should also recall, but need not repeat in detail here, the references made in the
Memorial of Bahrain to such significant developmentsas the Declaration made in 1932 by
19AmericanRepublicsto theeffectthat they would not recognize the validity of any temtorial
acquisitionswhich mightbe obtained through force of arms; the note addressedto Japan in that
same 1932,by theMembersofthe Councilof the Leagueof Nationsdrawingattention to the
factthatitappeared tofollowfromArticle10of theCovenantthat noinfringementofthe temtorial
integrityof any Member of the Leaguebrought about by disregard of that Article ought to be
recognizedas valid;the similardeclarationmadesoonafterwardsby the LeagueAssembly; andthe
MontevideoConventionof 1933onthe Rightsand Duties ofStatesin which thePartiesagreednot
to recognizetemtorial acquisitionsobtainedby force(Memorial of Bahrain,pp. 227-228).
94. Those instrumentswere notwithout effectin shaping thelaw. It is appropriateto note
the mannerin which theproblem wasapproachedinthe fiflhedition ofOppenheim'sInternational
Lawwhichappearedintheveryyearof theseizureofZubarah,1937. Thelearnededitorthensaid:
"The recognitionof titleby conquestwas,priorto the Covenantof the League
and the General Treatyfor the Renunciationof War, the necessary result of the
admissibility of theright of wars an instrument bothfor enforcing thelaw and for
changing existingrights. Theright to teminate the existence of another member of
thecommunityis a legalanomalywhichcan be understoodonlyby referenceto other
anomalies of thelegalsystemin question. UndergeneralInternationalLawconquest
is not the result ofillegal act; on the contrary,it is the consequenceof use of force
permittedby InternationalLaw. The positionhas, itis submitted, undergone change
as the resultoftheCovenantof the Leagueand,in particular,ofthe General Treaty for
the Renunciationof War[Le.,the Kellog-Briand Pact]. In so far as these instruments
prohibitwar, theyprobablyrenderinvalidconqueston thepart ofthe State which has
resortedto war contrary toits obligations. An unlawfblact cannotnormallyproduce
results beneficial to thelaw-breaker. As has been pointed out above, the so-called
doctrine of non-recognitiondoes not render such conquest illegal; it is an
announcementoftheintentionor the assumptionof an obligationnotto validateby an
actof recognitionclaimsto temtonal title whichoriginate in an illegal act and which
is, accordingly,itself invalid." (Oppenheim'sInternationalLaw, 5th ed. (1937), by
H. Lauterpacht,at pp.453-454.) 96. Despite the cautionon this subject of the editorof 1937edition of Oppenheim,it is
instructiveto observehow it has been dealt with in the latesteditionof Oppenheirn preparedby
SirRobert JenningsandSirArthurWatts. Theysaid:
"Thereis,however, afurtherdimensionofthisproblemto beconsidered. There
is irnpressiveauthorityfortheviewthat theprohibitionofforce expressedin Article2,
paragraph4, of the Charterof the UnitedNations isnotonlya principleof customary
internationallawbut also afundamentalor cardinalprincipleof suchlaw; and indeed
that it has the characterofius cogens. If the rule againstthe use of forceis of this
geremptory character,the question then must arisewhetherit is now still permissible
to plead evenan ancientandhistonc title bysubjugation;andthis notwithstandingthe
principleofthe inter-temporallawwhich,thoughina senseaxiomatic,is nevertheless
not one whichhas attractedthe notionof a ius cogens."(Oppenheim's International
Law, 9thed. 1992,Vol.1,p. 704.)
Even though, as onewould expectfrom authorities of the eminenceof SirRobertJenningsand
SirArthur Watts,the implications ofthisveryperceptivequestionareimmediatelyqualifiedby the
statement of possiblecompeting considerations, 1have feltit rightto drawto the attentionof the
Court their suggestion that itshould not be assumed that forcible takings of territory in the
pre-charterdaysarenecessarilyprotestednow.
98. The situation in Zubarah is, Bahrain submits, preciselythe kind of situationthat the
editorsof Oppenheirn couldhave had in mindin questioning"whetheritis now stillpennissibleto
pleadeven an ancient andhistorictitleby subjugation". As the editorspointedout, "recognition,
acquiescence and general historicalconsolidation" may lend legitimacy to a continuous and
peacefuldisplay of temtorial sovereignty,even if the originalclaim nowappearsvitiatedin the
lightof this peremptorynom prohibitingits acquisitionby forceorthreatof force"(id.). Butthese
conditions are not satisfied inthe case of Zubarah. Bahrainhas neverrecognized,acquiescedor
participatedin a general historical consolidationwhich couldlend legitimacy tothe seizure by
Qatar of Zubarah. To the contrary,Bahrainhas consistently expressedoppositionto the seizure
and maintainedits claim to the area. Between 1937 and 1961Bahrainprotested againstQatar's
action in Zubarah no less than 24 times (see Memorial of Bahrain, Sect. 2.14, and
Counter-Mernorialof Bahrain, para.4.15). Bahrain has maintainedits position throughoutthe
mediation process. And,of course, themaintenanceof this positionunderlayBahrain'sinsistencethat the question of Zubarahhad to be included in thecasethat Qatarbroughtbefore theCourtin
the present proceedings. (ReplofBahrain,Sect.4.5, pp.140-143.)
99. Itis noteworthy thatQatar itselfaccepts the view of the stateof the law in 1938just
described as denying validity to seinire of temtory consequent upon an aggressive act.
Adrnittedly,the context was somewhatdifferent in that Qatar was allegingthat Bahrain had
unlawfullyseizedthe Hawarsin 1938. But as the facts do not support theQatari allegation,in
contrast with what undoubtedly happenedin Zubarah in the previous year,Bahrain has no
hesitation in remindingQatarof theposition thatthe latterhasenon the law and from which it
cannotnow resile. (SeeMemonalofQatar,paras.5.58-5.59.)
CRITICA DLATE
100.1comelast, Mr. President, andhappilybnefly, to the subject ofthe criticaldate. 1do so
only becausebothProfessorSalmon andSirIan Sinclairhavebrought it up.
101. In introducing thesubject,Professor Salmonsaid: "It wouldbe surprising if the old
chestnut of the 'cnticaldate'were not raised or did not put in an appearance." (CR200015,
translation,p. 37, para.28.) Actually,it isrprising that the subject has been raised in these
words, for the fact is that in its Counter-MemonalQatar "deliberatelyrefiained fiom positing the
notionof a specific'criticaldate"'(Counter-Memorial of Qatar,para. 3.98).
102.Nowthe concept retums,at this last stage ofthe case, evidentlybecause Qatar remains
aware that it possessesno evidence ofconducton its ownpart in the Hawarsand is desperately
anxiousto excludethe ample evidence ofBahrainiactivity inthose islandsthat has accumulated,
especiallyin the periodince1936. Itreturnswith escalatingdegrees ofemphasis.
103.In itsCounter-Memorial, Qatadrid
"not ask the Courtto rejectanyevidenceput forwardbyBahrainasbeinginadmissible
in limineonly by reason ofthe fact that it relates to activitiescanied out by or on
behalfofBahrain afierApril1936".
It did, however,ask the Court to rejecastotally inadmissibleany evidencewhich the Court is
satisfiedis "manufacturedby Bahrainto strengthenits case" or relates to "activitiesundertaken
with a view to improvingBahrain'slegal position" (Conter-Memonal of Qatar, para.3.99).
Professor Salmonis now saying that "none of Bahrain'sacts subsequentto... 28 Apnl 1936isopposableto Qatar",apparentlywithoutreferenceto whetheror not theactswere"manufacturedto
strengthen Bahrain'scase or were undertakenwith a view to improvingits legal position" (see
CR200015,translation,p.37, para.29). In his argument, SirIan Sinclairtook the matter a step
further. He said that post-1936 evidenceis wholly inadmissible.Only,he said, if this absolute
positionis rejecteddoesitbecome inopposable (CR2000/8,pp.41-42, paras. 16-18).
104. However, in the end the difference between the various ways in which Qatar has
expresseditself in itspleadings maynotatter. Qataritselfcitesthe TabaAwardfor thefollowing
proposition: "Eventssubsequentto thecriticalperiodcaninprinciple alsobe relevant, notinterms
of a change of the situation, but only to the extent that they may reveal or illustrate the
understandingof the situationas it was during the criticalperiod" (Counter-Mernorialof Qatar,
para.3.100).
105.In Bahrain'ssubmissionthe Court may,and should,in this caseweighal1the evidence
subsequentto 1936just asit shouldal1theevidencerelatingtoeventsbefore 1936.
106.For whateverearlier criticaldateor criticalperiod,if any, thatmight be chosenwould
not serve to exclude the attachrnentby the Court of weight to acts performed in the steady
continuationof pnor governmentaladministration.Thishasbeenthe situationinthe present case.
Bahrain'sconduct throughout-and thatmeansfkomthenineteenthcentury - has been consistent
withthe developmentofanaturallyandnormallyevolvingcornmunityinthe Hawars - something
which beganmany yearsbefore 1936andcontinuesunbrokento the presentday. If the Paceand
scale of developmenthas increased, this cannot be ascnbed to impropermotivation. It is a
reflectionofthe greaternterestandneedsofthe population and ofmoreamplemeansto meettheir
wishes. Also, as pointedout elsewhere,the suddenQatariattackonFashtDibalin 1986has made
the Governrnentof Bahrainmoresensitiveto the need fordefensivemeasuresinthe Hawars.
107.One may introduce heresomewords fiom the argumentof Sir GeraldFitniaurice in
the case ofMinquiersandEcrehos, asquotedby SirRobertJenningsin his masterlystudy, The
Acquisitionof TerritoryinInternational Law.Sir Geraldsaid:
"Toputthecriticaldatetooearlywouldbetoplace apremiumon themakingof
paper claims whichthe country concernedneed not then followup or insist upon,
becauseit would besecureintheknowledgethat themeremakingof the claimwould
operate to freezethe legal positionand to shut out or nulli@the value of al1the
subsequentactsofthe other party." (Op.cit,p. 38.)"Paperclaims"is an exactdescriptionof the unsubstantiated clairnsmadeby the Rulerof Qatar in
1938-1939. They cannot serve to deny legal significanceto the continuationof Bahrain's real
presence and activityinthe Hawarsoverthe ensuing60 years.
108.Mr.Presidentand Members ofthe Court,thatbringsme to the end ofmy argument for
the day. Forthe patienceand attention withwhichyouhaveheardme, 1am mostgratefbl. May 1
askyoutherefore,Mr. President,nowtocal1uponMr.Paulsson.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, SirElihu. Et j'appelle maintenantà la barre
M. Jan Paulsson.
Mr.PAULSSON:
THE EVENTS OF THE 1930s INTHEIRCONTEXT
Introduction
1.Thank you, Mr.President. It is a privilege forme to addressthe distinguishedjudges of
this Court.
2.Bahrainhasentrustedme withthe task of dealingwithmattersof history. But,apart fiom
some necessaryoverview,my primaryfocus will be on a very short period: the decade of the
1930s.
3.1 wouldliketoproposefiveseriesof simple questions:
- fust, as the 1930sbegan: what was Bahrain, and what was Qatar? Qatar now says that it
enjoyed sovereigntyoveral1of thepeninsula. WasthattruOr is Babrainrightin sayingthat
theAl-Thanirulewasconsolidated, ifat all,onlyinparts ofthepenin-ulmostly onthe east
coast?
- secondly,asthe 1930sbegan:whatwereBahrain'sconnections with Zubara- andwhat were
Qatar's connections?1sthere anyevidence thatZubarahwas everunder Al-Thanidomination
before the invasionof37?
- thirdly,Qatar's armedattack on Zubarah. What actuallyhappened?Did Qatarsubjugate or
liberatethe inhabitantsof the ZubarahRegion? And did Bahrainever, fiom 1937until today,
abandonitspositionthat Qatar's conqut asillegal andthereforenot entitledtorecognition?- fourthly:the Hawar Islands. As the 1930sbegan, what wereBahrain and Qatar'srespective
connections with theislands?
- and thefifthand final setof questions: the Britishdecisionin 1939to the effectthatBahrain
ownsthe HawarIslands. Howdid this British determinationcome about? Andwhatwas the
afterrnathofthis decision,from 1939untiltoday?
4. Five simpleseriesof questions maynot soundlike verymuchMr. President,but 1fea. 1
will not evenreach the secondseries of questions untiltomonow moming for the simplereason
thatthe firisthe longest. 1havefond the moment,1think,about 18minutesfromnowwhere it
wouldbeconvenientforme tostop,but if 1amwrongin myestimations,1 am atyourdisposal.
Le PRESIDENT: Vous pouvezallerjusqu'à13h 10.
Mr. PAULSSON: Je vousremercie.
I.THE TWO STATES
Whatwas Bahrain attheoutsetof the 1930s?
5.Themainislandof Bahrainhas had a permanent populationfor manythousandsof years.
It wasthe centreof the DilmunEmpire. Accordingto the Sumenanepic Gilgamesh,thisis where
the solesurvivorof the GreatFlood,Ziusudra,had found refuge,and where the heroGilgamesh
cameto fmdthe secretofperpetualyouth.
6. Givenits simtegiclocationon the routefiom the MiddEast to the Indiansubcontinent,
Bahrainhasalwaysbeenand remains acentrefortradeintheregion.
7. By comparison,the coastallands near the archipelagooBahrainare aridand sparsely
populated. Thereis no mysteryhere. Bahrainis blessed with a gift of nature: this is wherethe
immense freshwater aquifersunder the Arabian peninsula rise toward the surface asartesian
springs. Hencethe name Bahrain,or "two seas"in Arabic- the salt sea around,the sweet sea
below. Some fieshwater springs actually emerge on the seabed itself, creating the unique
phenomenon ofplaces in theGulf ofBahrainwherethe water, at a fewmetres'depth,is actually
drinkable. Thesecretsof iïndingtheseplacesarestilllcnownto the fishermenof Bahrain. 8. Fishingfor pearls was Bahrain'sgreat traditional industBut this industrydeclined
rapidlyin the 1920s. The pearlbankswere depleted.Andperhapsmoreimportantly,the Japanese
house of Mikimotodeveloped thecultured pearl, which quiclciyoverwhelmedthe international
markets.
9. Politically,Bahrain had been ruled without interruptionby the Al-Khalifa since the
eighteenthcentury. Britain had dealt with Bahrainas a Stateat lasslong ago asthe General
Treaty of 1820. As the 1930s began,the Rulerwas SheikhIsabin Ali, who diedin 1932after a
reignof 63years.
10. 1932also happenedto be the year when oil was discovered on the main island of
Bahrain. Thiswasthe first discovery ofoil on the Arab side of the Gubefore SaudiArabia,
beforeKuwait,before AbuDhabi,andbefore Qatar.
11. The oil business was theocus of feverish speculation,aam1 sure you know, in the
1920s. Asa waytoquickwealth,itwasthe Intemetoftheday.
12.Onemanwho was obsessedwith thequest foroil on the Arab side of the Gulfwas the
legendaryMajorFrankHolmes,aNewZealanderwhohadfought inWorldWar 1andnowthought
he knewsomethingaboutgeology. Thisis howhehasbeendescribedby one historian:
"He was convinced that the Arabian Coast'would be a fabulous source of
petroleurn,and he pursued his drearn with unswe~ng starnina. A promoter par
excellence,withagift formakingpeople believe inhim,he travelledup and downthe
Arabiansideof the Gulf, from oneimpoverishedrulerto the next,spinninghisvision,
promisingthem wealth wherethey saw only poverty,seeking alwaysto put another
concessionintohis kit." (DanielYergin,e Prize,pp. 280-281(1991).)
13. In 1925,the Amir of Bahraingranted an oil concession to Holmes's company,the
EasternandGeneral Syndicate. Butthe company ranout of money,andwas unabletoraiseany in
London. "Holmes wasthe worstnuisanceinLondon," it wassaid. "Peopleran whentheysawhim
coming." (Idem,p. 282.)
14.SoHoimeswent to America. And eventually- by 1930 - StandardOil of California
had acquiredan option to take over Holmes'srights,and established a subsidiary,called the
BahrainPetroleumCompany - BAPCO - asholder oftheconcession inBahrain.
15.TheBritish Govenunentimmediatelydisapproved. Britain had made agreementswith
various Sheikhsinitsprotectoratesensuringthatoil couldbe developedonly by "Britishinterests".Very tough, high-level negotiationswith the United States Governrnentwere required before
Britain relented,and allowedthe AmericanBAPCOits concession.
16. BAPCObegan drilling in October 1931. Six months later, Holmes's obsessionhad
becomeareality.
17.The greatdiscovenesin SaudiArabiaand Kuwaitdid not comeuntil 1938, and Qatar's
fmt discoveryin 1939.ThisexplainsBahrain'sheadstart,andhow Bahraincameto have - for a
tirne-the world'sfourthlargest oilrefinery.
18.It is an ironyof history thatlittle Bahrain, whichturnedoutto have far less oil reserves
than the otheroil-producing nationsin the Gulf,thusenjoyeda briefperiodof singularprospenty.
Sir CharlesBelgrave, whoafteraniving in 1926served 31yearsasAdvisortothe Amirin Bahrain,
wrote asfollowsinhismemoirs:
"Whenoil wasdiscoveredBahrainacquiredthereputationinthe gulf ofbeing a
place 'whereal1the streetsarepavedwithgold',andArabsfromotherpartsof the Gulf
entered the country seeking work, expectingto make their fortunes in a few
months ...many of them entered Bahrain illegally, paying largsums of moneyto
boat owners who landed them at nighton deserted stretchesof the coast, or on
sandbanksat low tide, telling themthat they were onthe Bahrainicoast. Whenthe
tide rose and thesea coveredthe sandbankmany ofthese unfortunate peoplewere
drowned ..."(CharlesBelgrave,Persona1Column,pp. 103-104,(1959).)
19. Human nature being what itis, it is safe to say that toward the end of the 1930s,
prosperousBahrainwas lookedat byits poorerneighboursnot onlywithadmiration,but alsowith
envy.
What wasQatar attheoutsetof the1930s?
20. Qatarwas,and is, a flat,gravellydesertcountry. It has virtuallyno naturalvegetation.
With 16timesasmuchlandasBahrain,Qataris yet bypopulationthe smallestcountryin theArab
world. The histoncal record suggests that there was hardly any human habitation in this
inhospitableland inthe mid-nineteenthcentury,whenfishermen andpearldivers graduallybegan
to transformtheirternporarycampsintoa villageonthe eastcoastof the peninsula, where Dohais
today.
21.Qatar's Memorials speculateaboutimportantcommunitieswhichmayhave existedinthe
north of Qatarevenbefore theanival of the Al-Khalifa. In his oral presentation, Profesr avidspoke of a town which ((auraitpu exister)) ["mighthave existed"](CR200018,p. 53, para.7).
These speculationsmaybe true,but it cannot seriouslybeproposedthatthe modem Stateof Qatar
somehow succeededto a ghostlyancientpnncipalitywhoseexistenceis uncertain,whose tirneis
entirely speculative,whosebordersareunknown,and whoserulers cannotbe identified.
22. Yet in these oral proceedings, Qatarhas sought to convince the Court of two
propositions:first, thatby the 1930sQatar had for a long time beena State, andsecondlythat the
inherent tenitory belonging to that State of Qatar had for a very long time been the entire
peninsula,and indeedthe HawarIslandsas well. Eachsuccessive speaker seemedto push further
back into the past the datewhen Qatar allegedlybecarnea coast-to-coastpolitical entity, fiom
ProfessorSalmon - "beginningsof the twentiethcentury", (CR200015,p. 28, para. 15(a)) - to
Mr. Bundy- "roughly 1870n,(CR2000/7, p. 9, para.7) - to ProfessorDavid "as ofthe middle
of thenineteenthcentury"(CR2000/8,p. 55,para. 12).
23. Butthis wasnotQatar'spositionwhen it madeitsApplication inthis case, nor indeedin
itswrittenpleadings beforeits abandonmentof the 82 documents. At the time when Qatar was
hoping to use those documentsto try to convince the Court thatit had evidenceof acts of
administrationin Zubarahand on the HawarIslands,it had no reluctance inadmittingthat it had
not becomea State in control ofthe entire peninsulauntil sometime after 1945. Throughoutthe
nineteenthcentury, Qatar wrote,"there were only tribal chiefs who endeavouredto consolidate
their positionby developing their relations with other tribesand controllingthe trade networks"
(Counter-Memorialof Qatar,para.2.14)
24. Qatar statedthat itthen became a State in themodem sense of the word "after World
WarII" (Counter-Memonalof Qatar,2.13) - i.e., sometimeafter 1945. So in 1930,Qatar, as a
political entity,was still,att,strugglingto defineitsel- sociallyaswellasgeographically.
25.Qataralso statedthat Bahrain too was sucha traditional societ- inits caseuntil 1923.
This is certainlyinaccurate. Babraincould spenda lot of tirneon thisdebate,but willspend none
at al1- itjust does not matterfor this case. SinceQatar hasadmittedthat it was, prior to 1945,
merely the domain of a "tribalchief' trying to "consolidate[his]position",surely aclairnthat any
particularterritoryhadbelongedto sucha tribalchiefmustbeproven. Qatarhas ineffect conceded
that the extentof Al-Thaniauthoritydependedon whichtribeswishedto accept Al-Thanirule atany particular time. Surelythe Al-Thani clan did not have some kind of manifest destiny,or
mandate fiom heaven,to mleover apredeterminedtemtory; it had no inherentgeopoliticalunity.
NewStatesdo not haveanapriori existence.
26.Let us considerthefactthat GreatBntain had coloniesin NorthAmericawhichachieved
collective sovereigntyin 1776. They established a federal capital in Washington. Looking
westward, if onewere tofollowQatar'scurrenttheory aspresentedfor thefirsttime lastweek,the
temtory of Californiawouldbe a part ofthat new AmencanState, if onlyone could finda few
convenient maps. After all, the natural lirnitwas the shoreof the PacificOcean. Accordingto
Qatar'sthesis, any Spaniardsor native Arnericanswho rnightbe found in California shouldbe
dismissedas "occupiers".
27. There are of course many islands and peninsulas with divided sovereignty: the
Dominican Republicand Haiti - two former colonieswhichhave to sharethe same island; or
idem: Indonesia and East Timor; oryet again Indonesiaand Papua New Guinea. Howabout
Bomeo, where threesovereignStatesarepresent: IndonesiaM, alaysiaandBrunei? Thecapitalsof
two of those three countriesarenot evenon the islandof Borneo- 1amthinkingof Jakartaand
Kuala Lumpar - this changesnothing;and so similarlythe fact that the Al-Khalifamovedtheir
capitalfiom Qatar is hardly decisive. Or Sweden and Norway - perhapsa particularlygood
example - becausetheywereboth onceunder the dominionof the samecountry,Denmark,and
yet sharea peninsulawithout,1believe,the slightestinclinationto accept ProfessorSalmon'sthesis
of natural units whichwouldcondemnone of the Scandinaviankingdomsto be absorbedintothe
other.
28. It is just not possibleto clairnon behalf ofthe Al-Thanithat as soas they became
masters ofDohatheyinstantlybecamelordsof apreordainedterritorialunit,includingZubara-
let alone the HawarIslands. Noris it acceptable,as variouscounsel forQatarhave put it, toSay
that this political entity "graduallycame into existence" (CR200015, p.28, para. 15 (a)),
"graduallyemerged"(CR200016,p. 2,para. l), cameto be "recognized"over aperiod of 70years
(CR2000/7,p. 9,para. 1,seealsoCR200018,p. 55,para. 12),asthoughthemereeflluxionoftime
meansthat one is dispensedfiomhavingto pointto anyactualevents constitutiveof title. Politicalauthorityovertemtory is notacquiredby stealth,or by the accumulationof convenient indications,
or mis-indicationson favouritemaps.
29. ProfessorSalmonarguedthat eflectivitésin westem Saharaor in the Arnazonjungle do
not create title unless the sovereignconsents or acquiesces. The analogy is inapposite for the
simplest of reasons: fmt there must be a sovereign. In the case of westem Sahara, as
ProfessorSalmonmustadmit, al1concemed - Spain,Morocco,andMauretania - agreedthatthe
bledsiba in the relevantnorthemsector wasalready a part of the State of Morocco(CR2000/5,
p. 41, para.25 (a)). As for Brazil,who can doubt, even in the Arnazon,that it has long since
established its sovereignty there? But that was not thecase with the State of Qatar and the
peninsulaonwhichit cameintobeing.
30. This is not a legaltheorywhichfailsbecause its lastlink ismissing;the missinglinkis
the very fust one.
31. Qatar's theoryof statehoodand territoryseemsto be a matter of mysticismor emotion.
As Sir Elihujust remindedthe Court,SheikhAbdullahAl-Thaniof Qatarwrotethis: "TheHawar
Islandsbelongedto the QatarState (sic)fromthe verydaywhenGodcreatedthem. ..theydo not
belong to Bahrain accordingto theirnatural and geographical position." (Memorial of Bahrain,
Vol.5, Ann.289, p. 1184.) SurelyQatarmust concedethatthe organizationof human societyon
our planet occuned some time subsequentto the creation of the Hawar Islands. As forthe
particularpart of humansocietywhich has become the contemporarynation ofQatar, it was not
bom full grown: Qatar is theproductof expansionand consolidation.The expansionto Zubarah
wasillegal; the expansionto theHawarIslandssimplyneverhappened.
32. In fact,the admissionby Qatar inits Counter-Memorial thatit did not become a State
until after 1945wasas inevitableas it is fatal to the Qatarithesistoday. The situationin the Qatar
peninsula well intothetwentiethcenturyis inconsistentwith any notionof statehood - or even
indigenoustribalsovereignty- extendingoverthe entireQatarpeninsula. Oneneed onlyconsider
a fewelementsof the historicalrecord(see,inaddition,Counter-Mernoriaol f Bahrain,Sect.2.2):
- In 1871,that is to sayaftertheyear 1868whichnow loomsso largein Qatar'snew conception
of its emergence as a political unit, an intemal Ottoman Empire report referred to Mohammed bin Thani as residing inDoha and having "no rule over the other villages"
(Memorialof Bahrain, paras.133and 158).
- In 1881,Mohammed'ssonJasimwroteto the BritishPolitical Residentthat:
"1have no powerover [theKatarcoast]. You are aware of thetreaty madein
the time of my father [1868]betweenus and the BritishGovt.namelythat we were
onlyto be responsiblefor[DohaTown]and Al Wakra[a villagejust southof Doha]."
(Mernorialof Bahrain,para. 133.)
- In 1893,in a meetingwiththe BritishPoliticalResident: "ShaikhJasimat once acknowledged
the nghts of Bahrain andexpressedhis willingnessto pay tribute as before." (Memorial of
Bahrain,paras.66and 164.)
- Andfinally,throughouttheirpresenceon thepeninsula, 1871to 1915,the Ottomansreferredto
the "Qatar province" asbeing the region of Doha, as opposed to theZubarah and Odaid
temtorieselsewhereonthepeninsula(seeMernorial of Bahrain, Sect2..7).
Andhere,Mr.President,1wouldliketo askyourpermissionto stop.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremerciebeaucoup. La séance estlevée.Nous nous réunirons à
nouveaudemainà 10heures.
L 'audiénceest levéeà 13h10.
Audience publique tenue le jeudi 8 juin 2000, at 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président