Non-Corrigé
IUncorrecteci
InternationalCourt Courinternationale
ofJustice deJustice
THEHAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR 2000
Publicsitting
held on Monday5June 2000,at 10am., atthePeacePalace,
President Guilpresiding
in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitation andTerritorialQuestionsbetween
Qatar andBahrain (QvBahrain)
VERBATIMRECORD
ANNEE 2000
Audiencepublique
tenuelelundi 5juin 2000,à10heures,au Palaisdela Paix,
souslaprésidencM.Guillaume,président
en l'affairedela Délmaritime etdesquestions territorialesentreQataret Bahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBernirdez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésent: M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi, vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBemkdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierTheState ofQatar isrepresentedby:
H.E.Dr. AbdullahbinAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-Generalofthe Cabinet,
asAgentandCounsel;
Mr.Adel Sherbini, LegalAdviser,
Mr.SamiAbushaikha,LegalExpert,
asCounsel;
Mr. Eric David, Professorof InternationalLaw,Universlibrede Bruxelles,
Dr. Alibin FetaisAl-Meri,DirectorofLegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr.Jean-PierreQuéneudec, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr. Jean Salmon, Professoremeritus of International Law, Universibre de Bruxelles,Member
of the Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr.R. K. P. Shankardass, SeniorAdvocate, Supreme Court ofIndia, Former Presidentof the
InternationalBarAssociation,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Barristerat Law,Member ofthe Instituteof InternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.CP.,rofessor emeritus of Internatilaw,University of
London,MemberemeritusoftheInstitutdedroitinternational,
Mr. RodrnanR. Bundy,Avocat à la Courd'appelde Paris, Memberof the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MsNanetteE. Pilkington,AvocatàlaCour d'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
as CounselandAdvocates,
Ms CherylDunn,Memberofthe StateBarofCalifornia, FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
Ms Ines SabineWilk, Lawyer before theGermanCourt of Appeal, Member of the Chamberof
Lawyersof Germany,
as Counsel;
Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographicOperations, MapQuest.com, Columbia M, aryland
(United StatesofAmenca),
Mr.Robert C.Rizzutti,Project Manager,MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland (United State of
Amenca),
Ms StephanieK.Clark, Senior Cartographer,MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland (United States
ofArnenca),
asExperts;
H.E.SheikhHamadbinJassimbinJaborAl-Thani,Minister for ForeignAffairs,
H.E.Mr. AhmedbinAbdullahAl-Mahrnoud,Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,
as Obsewers.
TheState ofBahrainis representedby:
H.E. Mr. JawadSalimAl-Arayed,Ministerof State ofthe Stateof Bahrain,
asAgent;L'Etatde Qatarest represéntép ear:
S.Exc.M. AbdullahbinAbdulatif Al-Muslemani,secrétaire général du gouvernement,
comme agentet conseil;
M.AdelSherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,
comme conseils;
M.EricDavid,professeur de droit international l'universitélibredeBmxelles,
M. Alibin FetaisAl-Meri, directeurdesaffairesjuridiquesdu conseilde l'émir,
M.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M.Jean Salmon,professeur émérit dee droit internationaluniversité libde Bruxelles,membre
de1'Institutdedroitinternational,
M.R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principal à la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'AssociationinternationaleduBarreau,
SirIanSinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., avocat,membrede l'Institut dedroit international,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,professeur éméritd ee droit internationalàl'université
deLondres,membreéméritd eel'Institutdedroit international,
M.Rodrnan R.Bundy,avocatàla Courd'appel deParis,membredubarreaudeNewYork,cabinet
FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington,avocat àla Cour d'appelde Paris,cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,
Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de 1'Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
MmeInès SabineWilk, avocatprèsd'une cour d'appeld'Allemagne, membrede la chambre des
avocatsd'Allemagne,
comme conseils;
M.Scott B. Edmonds, directeur du service des levéscartographiques, société MapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland (Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
M.Robert C. Rizzutti,administrateur de projet, société MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographe hors classe, société MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
comme experts;
S.Exc.le cheikhHamad binJassimbinJabor Al-Thani,ministre des affairesétrangères,
S.Exc.M. AhmedbinAbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministred'Etatauxaffairesétrangères,
comme observateurs.
L'Etatde Bahreïn estrepresentépar :
S.Exc.M. Jawad SalimAl-Arayed,ministre d'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
comme agent;Dr.FathiKemicha,Memberofthe Bar of Paris, Kemicha& Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E., HonoraryProfessorof the UniversityofCambridge,
Member ofthe Institut dedroitinternational,
Mr.JanPaulsson,Freshfields, Paris,MemberoftheBars of Parisand theDistrict of Columbia,
Professor Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of InternationalLaw of Yale Law
1
School, Memberof theBar of Connecticut,Associate of the Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr.RobertVolterra,Freshfields, London, Member otfheBarofUpperCanada,
ProfessorProsperWeil, Emeritus ProfessorattheUniversity ofParis II (Panthéon-Assas)M, ember
of the Académie dessciencesmoraleset politiques(Institut de France),Memberof the Institut
dedroit international,
as CounselandAdvocates;
SheikhKhalid bin AhmedAl-Khalifa, First Secretary, Ministry of ForeigA nffairs of the Stateof
Bahrain,
Commander Christopher Carleton,M.B.E., Headof the Law of the Sea Division of the United
KingdomHydrographieOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields,Paris,Memberof theBars of ParisandBeijing,
Mr. GrahamCoop,Freshfields, Paris,Barristerand Solicitorof theHighCourt ofNewZealandand
Solicitorof theSupremeCourtof Englandand Wales,
Mr.AndrewNewcombe,Freshfields,Paris, Member ofthe BarofBritishColumbia,
Dr.BethOlsen,Advisor,Ministryof Stateofthe State ofBahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson, Former Reader at the Universityof Oxford, Emeritus Fellow,St.Hugh's
College,Oxford,
asAdvisors,
H.E.SheikhMohammedbinMubarakAlKhalifa,MinisterforForeignAffairs,StateofBahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Azizbin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Arnbassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E.Dr.MohammedJaber Al-Ansari,Advisorto His Highness,the AmirofBahrain,
Mr. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs,-Stateof Bahrain,
Her Excellency Sheikha Haya Al Khalifa, Arnbassador ofthe State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr.Yousef Mahrnood,Directorof theOfficeof the ForeignMinister,State of Bahrain,
as Observers;
Mr. JonAddison,Ministry ofStateof theStateofBahrain,
MsMaisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry of Stateotfhe State ofBahrain,
Mr.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi, Ministry ofStateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Mr. HafedhAl-Qassab, Ministryof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
MsAneesaHanna,Embassyof BahraininLondon,
MsJeanetteHarding,Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
MsIvaKratchanova,Ministry ofStateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
MsSonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Mr. KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.Yasser Shaheen,SecondSecretary,MinistryofForeignAffairsof theStateof Bahrain,
asAdministrativeStaflM.FathiKemicha, membredubarreau deParis,cabinet Kemicha & Associés,Tunis,
Sir ElihuLauterpacht, Q.C., C.B.E., professeur honoàl'universitéde Cambridge, membrede
l'Institutde droitinternational,
M.Jan Paulsson, cabinetFre~~elds, Paris, membre des barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. Michael Reisman, professeude droitinternationall'universitéde Yale, titulairede la chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associé del'Institut de droit
international,
M. RobertVolterra,cabinet Freshfields,Londres,membre du barreaudu HautCanada,
M.Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'université deParisII (Panthéon-Assas), membrede
l'Académie des sciences oraleset politiques(Institutde France),membrede l'Institutde droit
international,
commeconseilset avocats;
Le cheikhKhalid bin AhmedAl-Khalifa, premier secrétairem, inistèredes affairesétrangèdes
1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Le capitainede frégateChristopher Carleton,M.B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droitmaritimedu
bureauhydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfields,Paris,membredesbarreauxde Pariset de Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseillerde laCoursuprêmed'Angleterre etdu PaysdeGalles,
M. AndrewNewcombe, cabinetFreshfields, Paris, membre du barreade la Colombiebritannique,
MmeBethOlsen,conseiller,ministère dYEtadte1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M.John Wilkinson, ancien maître de conférence à l'universitéd'Oxford, membre émérite du
CollègeSaintHugh,Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S.Exc.lecheikhMohammedbin MubarakAlKhalifa, ministredes affairesétrangèred se Bahreïn,
S.Exc.le cheikh Abdul-Azizbin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de lYEtatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc.M.Mohammed JaberAl-Ansari, conseiller de SoA nltesse l'émir dBahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi, sous-secrétaieYEtaatux affairesétrangèresdlYEtatde Bahreïn,
S. Exc.lacheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 1'Etatde Bahreïn auprèsde la République
française,
M.Yousef Mahmood,directeurdu bureauduministredes affairesétrangèredse Bahreïn,
commeobservateurs;
M.JonAddison,ministèredYEtad t e lYEtt eBahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed, ministère dYEtadt e1'EtatdeBahreïn,
M. NabeelAl-Rumaihi, ministèred'EtatdelYEtadte Bahreïn,
M. HafedhAl-Qassab, ministèredYEtadt e1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme AneesaHanna,ambassadede Bahreïn,Londres,
Mme JeanetteHarding,ministèred'EtatdelYEtadt eBahreïn,
MmeVanessaHarris, cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIvaKratchanova,ministère dYEtat e 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeSonjaKnijnsberg,cabinetFreshfïelds,
M.KevinMottram,cabinetFreshfields,
M. YasserShaheen,second secrétaire,ministère daffairesétrangèrese 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
commepersonnel administratif: Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vousasseoir. La séanceest ouverteetje donne immédiatement
la parole SirIan Sinclair.
SirJanSINCLAIR: Merci,MonsieurlePrésident.Mr.President,MembersoftheCourt:
DECISIO ONNSHAWAR
1.Inresurningmypresentationon the1936and 1939Britishdecisionsonthe HawarIslands,
1would wish very briefly toremind the Courtof the main threadsof the argument which1had
developedbefore 1hadto stoplast Wednesday.
2.1 had askedthe Courtto pay closeattentionto the "carefulconsideration"of the evidence
which the British Government claimed tohave given before announcing their decision of
11July 1939,in favourof the Bahrainclaim tosovereigntyover Hawar. 1had alsosubmitted,as a
preliminarypoint of law,that, in any event,theconsentofbothRulersto the determinationby the
British Governmentof their dispute over title to the Hawar Islands wouldhave been required
before that determination,howeverit mightbe characterized,wouldhave becomebindingon the
parties; and that no such consent had been given bythe Ruler of Qatar, whether at the time or
subsequently.1had alsocited apassagefroma reportby a BritishForeign Officeofficialin 1964
admittingthat neither of thetwo Rulerswasaskedbeforehandtopromisehis consentto the British
decisionof 1939,nor afterwardsto give it,and thatthe decisionwasin fact "imposedandthat
was theveryword he used - fiom abovebythe British.
3. 1then proceededto analyse the evidencerelied upon by the British authorities tojusti@
the "provisionaldecision"of 1936infavour of Bahrain. The reasonwhy British oficials in the
Gulf deliberatelyithheldfromthe Ruler ofQataranyinformationaboutthe forma1claimmade by
the Ruler ofBahrainto Hawarin April 1936,couldnot havebeenbecauseLoch andFowlewere
unawareinearly 1936thatthe Rulerof Qatarclaimedsovereigntyover Hawar. Afterall, Loch,the
.
Political Agent, had taken part in the RAFreconnaissanceof Qatar in 1934 which, with the
permission ofthe Rulerof Qatar alone,hadverflownHawar. 1pointedout that no realeffortwas
made at the time to test the veracity of the assertions made by Belgrave in his letter of
28 April 1936,in supportof the claim by the Rulerof Bahrain; and1reminded the Courtof thedocumentary evidencefiom the British Archives in 1933 and 1934 which confirmed British
recognitionthat theHawarIslandsappertainedto Qatar.
4. The Court's attentionwas also directedto the lack of any evidencein Bahrainiofficia1
records priorto thosefor 1937-1938orin thePoliticalDiariesof theBritishPoliticalAgentpnor to
those for 1938 of Bahraini acts of administrationin the Hawar Islands; and its attentionwas
equallydirected to thedevastatingconsequencesfor Qatar ofthe Bntish "provisionaldecision"of
9 July 1936,in favourof the Bahrainclaimto the Islands. 1was ableto concludelastWednesday
by speculating aboutsome of the reasons for the British "provisional decision"of 1936, and
suggestingthat one reasonmay have been the critical state of Bahrain'spublic financesin the
mid-1930s.
5.Mr. President,Membersof the Court,1can now resurneby describingthe genesisof the
1938-1939supposed "enquiry" intotheissueof sovereigntyovertheHawarIslands.
The genesisof the1938-1939"enquiry"intothe issue of sovereignty
overtheHawarIslands
6. Theprocessof enquiringinto therespectiveclaims ofthe Ruler of Bahrainand theRuler
of Qatar was initiatedas a result of a memorandumby Fowle, Political Residentin the Gulf,to
Symon, of the India Office, of 5 April 1938',in response to a requestfor his views on what
procedureshouldbe followedin determiningthe questionof sovereignty overthe HawarIslands.
Fowle'sproposalswere asfollows:
(a) that he, as Political Resident, should write to the Ruler of Qatarinforming him that in
connectionwith negotiationswhich certaincompanieswereaboutto commence, thequestion
of the ownership of Hawar and Fashtad Dibal must be decided; thaton the evidence at
presentavailableto His Majesty's Govemment, these islandsappearedto belongto the Ruler
of Bahrain; butthat His Majesty's Govemmenatlsohadreasonto believethat he,the Rulerof
Qatar,mightwishto advanceclairnstothese islands; if so, he shouldsubmittheseclaims to
His Majesty'sGovemmentwithin a certainperiod, Say,two months, after which no claims
wouldbe considered;
'~emorial of Qatar,Ann.111.146,Vol. 7,p. 233.(b) that, thereafter,a letter shouldbe sentto the RulerofBahrain, enclosing acopyofthe letterto
the Rulerof Qatarand explainingthat, whenthe latter's replyhadbeenreceived, a copy would
be communicatedto hirn, the Ruler of Bahrain. He would then have an opportunity of s
rebuttingtheclaimof the Ruler ofQatar,should the latteradvanceone;
(c) a secondlettershouldthen be senttothe Ruler ofBahrain,referringto the firstletter- which
1havejust described - andrequestingthe Ruler topostponenegotiations withthecompanies
concemeduntilthe ownershipof Hawarand FashtadDibalhad beendecided; and
(d) a furtherlettershouldthen be senttoPCLandBAPCOinformingthemof theactiontaken.
7. Althoughthe interests oftheRulerof Qatarhadbeenseriously,if not fatally,damagedby
the exparte "provisionaldecision"takenby the BritishGovernrnenton 9 July 1936,there seemed
to be some prospect of restoring the balance if al1 of Fowle'sproposals had been adopted.
However, at a meeting held in the India Office on 12April1938, between Fowle,India Office
officials and representativesofPCL,to discussPCL activitiesin the Gulf, it rapidly emergedthat
PCLwere stronglyopposedto anypostponementofthenegotiations. Theywereevenopposedto a
postponement for a period as short astwo orthreemonths,to enablea finaldecisionto be takenon
the sovereignty issue. Indeed, it was at this meeting that Longrigg for PCL statedthat "he
personallythought itwouldbe a pitytoputideasof ownership[ofthe HawarIslands] intothemind
of the Sheikhof ~atar"~. In the lightofthis expressionof PCL'sview, combinedwithLongrigg's
statement that PCL were preparedto take the risk of paying twice for the same thing, Fowle
withdrewhis proposa1for a postponementof the negotiations. Itis noteworthy that, atno time
duringthe discussions with PCLon 12April1938,was anyreference madeeven by India Office
officialsto the interestsof theRuler ofQataras opposed to theinterestsofPCL. It is obviousthat
if the oil concession negotiationsfor the unallottedarea were to be continuedwith the Ruler of
Bahrainalone, thiswouldinevitablybeprejudicial to theRulerof Qatar'stitle to theHawarIslands
n
which he had already made known to Weightrnan in February1938, even thoughthe latter
speciouslycontinuedto deny this as lateas 15May 1938~.Moreandmoreit wouldbe assurnedby .
the negotiators that the Ruler of Bahrainwas entitled togrant a concessionfor an area which
- -p -
'Memonal ofQatar,Ann.III.148,Vol.7,p.241,atp. 245.
3~emonalof Qatar ,nn. III.152,Vol.7,p.261.includedthe Hawar Islands; and less and less wouldthe negotiatorspay attention tothe British
Government'sforma1reservationof the right tomakea finaldecisionon the competingclaimsof
the two Rulers to the Islands. The negotiatorswouldcertainly calculate- they were intelligent
people - that, ifthe British Governmentwasencouragingthemakingofbids byboth BAPCO and
PCLto the Ruler of Bahrain for a concession coveringthe whole ofwhatwas now takento be the
"unallottedarea" or, as in the case ofPCL at alaterstage, forthe Hawar Islandsalone, they had
already decided finally infavour of the Bahraini claim to the islands and weresimply going
throughthe motionsof an enquiry.
8. Mr. President, subject to the dropping of tnitialproposa1 byFowlein April1938that
the oil concessionnegotiationsbe postponedpendinga final decisionon the ownership ofHawar
andFashtDibal,his scenariofortheenquirywasacceptedinprincipleby boththeIndiaOfficeand
theForeignOffice in London. Itwill benotedthatthe burden ofdisprovi Bnahrain's claimto the
Hawar Islands would thereforelie on Qatar. Thiswas an inevitable consequence ofthe British
Government's "provisional decision" of 1936A . lso, it will be noted that there was no room in
Fowle'sproposals for the Rulerof Qatar to be informed aboutthe evidenceon which Bahrain's
claim ofsovereigntywas based,nor tobe given theopportunityto rebutthat evidence. Finally,the
Courtwill certainly note that the proposalsadvanced byFowle in his memorandum tothe India
Office of 5 April 1938 were accompanied by the egregious comment in paragraph6 of the
memorandumthat: "Fromthe politicalpoint of view it will suitquite well if we give Hawar to
Bahrein,asthis willbalanceourpreviousdecisionofgivingZubara to~atar".~
Title totheHawarIslandsandtheoilconcessionnegotiations
9.Mr.President,itisatthispointin thenarrativethat 1wouldliketoremind Membersof the
Court of what1have termed"theinteractionbetween ...two separatebut related exercises", thatis
to Say,the question of title to the Hawar Islands,on the one hand, and the outcome ofthe oil
concession negotiations, on the other hand. The manner in which these two issues became
inextricablyentangledfiom May 1938onwardshas beenamplydemonstratedby Mr. Shankardass
in his illurninatingpresentati1st Wednesday. TheCourtwill no doubtconcludethatthe British
4~~onal of Qatar,Ann.I146Vol.7,p. 236.authoritiesin theGulfhadby thistimebecome socaughtup in a spider'sweb of their ownmaking
that theysimplycouldnot renderanobjectiveandimpartialdecisionon the issueoftitle to Hawar.
In effectthis meantthat theprovisional decisionof 1936had becomea finaldecisioneven before
the so-called "enquiry"into thequestionoftitlehad begun.
The questionsofbiasandprejudgment
10.It is noteworthythat Bahrainhas not directlycontested, in itswrittenpleadings, Qatar's
contention that there are two main elements underlying the rule which prohibits bias in a
decision-makeronthe international plane,namely:
(1) that no-one may be judge in his own cause (nernojudex in causa sua), whichis generally
understood tomeanthat thedecisionshouldnot be made onthe basis of the decision-maker's
self-interest, but withdue regardto the meritsof the respectivecases ofthe disputingparties;
and
(2) that thedecision-maker mustnotbe prejudicedfor oragainsteither of theparties: normust he
have prejudged the case,by makingup his mindbeforehaving giventhe partiesa proper and
equalopportunitytobe heard.
11. Now, the quite unnecessary comment in paragraph6 of Fowle's memorandumof
5 April 1938 clearly offends against the first element ofthe rule which prohibits bias since it
expressesa pointof view basedupon whattheauthordeemstobethe Britishself-interest. Norwas
this the firsttimethaa broadlysimilar point ofviewhad beenexpressedby seniorBritishofficials
in the Gulf; forthe Court will certainly recaltlhatLoch, thethenPoliticalAgent, had,in his letter
to Fowle of 6 May 1936, specifically put forward the argument that "it might in certain
circurnstancessuitus politicallyto haveas large anarea aspossibleincludedunder ~ahrain"'. As
Qatarhas already pointedout, whatwould suit theBritish Govemmentpoliticallyis not - repeat
not - a properconsiderationto betakeninto accountby an impartial decision-maker, particularly
if thatdecision-makeristhe British Govemmentitself.
12.1need do no more at this stagethan simply list eightother glaringinstances ofbias or
prejudgrnentin favour of Bahrain displayedby British officialsin the Gulf or in London in the
'~emonal of Qatar,Ann111.10, ol7,p. 27.course of or following the supposed enquiry conductedby Weightman into the question of
sovereigntyovertheHawarIslandsin 1938and1939:
(1) the indefensible actionof Weightmanin showingBelgrave,Advisorof the Ruler ofBahrain,
on 22 April 1939,in the absenceof any representativeof the Ruler of Qatar, a copy of his
report tothePolitical Residentofthat date (possibly eveninraft)on the sovereigntyissue;
(2) the failureof Weightmanto letthe Rulerof Qatar see,or even beinformedof, the contentof
the (uninvited) "preliminary statement"f29 May 1938ofthe Bahraincase on Hawar,despite
the fact that Weightman expressly identifiedthat documentas one of the documentsin the
case;
(3) the pressure put upon the Ruler of Qatar by Weightman, in his letter to the Ruler of
20 May 1938,to submit his claim to Hawar"at the earliest possiblemomentM6 r,esultingin its
submission on 27May 1938', only seven days later, when contrasted with the leisurely
timetable forthe submission of Bahrain's "counter-claim", whicw has not in fact submitted
until3 January1939,some4%monthsafterit hadbeenrequested;
(4) the similar pressure put upon the Ruler of Qatar to respond rapidly to Bahrain's
"counter-claim", acopy of whichwas transmitted to theRuler of Qatar, but inEnglishonly
(whichthe Ruler couldnotunderstand)on 5 January 1939';
(5) the evidence of directprejudgmentofthe issueof sovereigntyby Weightmanhimselfwhen,in
hisletterto Fowleof 12February1939,discussingthe relativefinancialbenefitsto Bahrainof
theBAPCO offerforthe wholeunallotted areaand thePCLofferfor the HawarIslandsalone,
together withtheirterritonalwaters,he Statesthat, sofaras Hawaris concemed, "therecanbe
littledoubtthat sovereigntyrestswithBahrain"and discusseswhatwill be theposition"when
onceHisMajesty'sGovemmentaward Hawarto ~ahrain"~;
(6) the evidence of Fowle'sprejudgmentof the issue of sovereignty when,in his letter to the
Secretaryof State forIndia of 3November1938,he argues that a decisionby His Majesty's
6~emonalof Qatar,Ann.II156V,ol.7p.279.
'~ernonalof Qatar,Ann.111.V7ol.7p.285.
*Memoriaolf Qatar,Ann.111.V7ol.7p.393.
g~ounter-~emorialfQatar,Ann111.4V7ol.3p.265(atparas.(ô)and9 (b)). Government topostponethe oil concession negotiationswill be taken as a move to prevent
"theBahrainState fiom increasingits income considerably"; andwhen,in the sameletter,he
admits that "Hawar geographicallyis outside the Bahrain area and adjoining Qatar, where
[PCL] alreadyhave a concession"and yetrecommends that pressurebe put on the Rulerof
Bahrainto granta concessionoverHawarto PCL";
(7) the letter fiom Peel (India Office) to Bagallay (ForeignOMice)of 6 July 1938,which
considersinteraIiawhethertheRuler of Qatar shouldbe invited to presenthis observationson
the Bahrain "counter-claim", andcontainsthe statementthat:
"for practicalreasons there wouldbe no advantagein inviting the Sheikhof Qatar's
observationson the Bahrein case since it is pretty clear that he has no evidenceto
bringforwardin his ownsupport"' '.
Thisletter is a prime exarnpleof prejudgment, evenif an interventionby Beckett,then second
Legal Adviserat the Foreign Office,eventuallyensuredthat a copy ofthe Ruler of Bahrain's
"counter-claim"was in duecoursetransmittedto theRulerof Qatar forhiscomments;
(8) finally, there is the extraordinary language used in Weightman's letter to Prior of
5 December193912coveringthe Packer Report,in whichWeightmanalmost seemsto relish
aneventualmurderattemptontheheir-apparent of Qatar,SheikhHamad,when he succeedsto
SheikhAbdullaas Ruler.
13.1have toapologizeto the Court forhaving to remind them ofsomeof the instances of
bias in favour of Bahrain or prejudgment ofthe issue of sovereignty overHawar displayedby
Britishofficiais in the Gulf andin Londonduringthis significantperiod between1936and 1939.
Indeed,1have to Saythat the final exarnpleof Weightman's almostparanoiacattitudetowardsthe
ruling family of Qatar of the tirne,brings to my memory a fragmeno t f verse which 1must have
learntinmy childhoodmore than60years ago. It runs,and1am notquitesure howthiswillcome
acrossin translation,but itruns:
"1donot likethee,Dr.Fell,
Thereason why1cannottell."
'%fernoriaolfQataAnn.III1.0,Vol. 7,p. 351.
"~emorialofQatar,Ann.111.16V4ol7,p.323.
'Z~ounter-~emoriolfQatar, nn.111.V8ol. 3,p.275.ForWeightmangives noreal explanationforhisrooteddislikeof thethenRuler ofQatar and,more
particularly,ofthe heir apparent, Sheikh Hamad. Hemakescomplaint ofthe "avarice"ofthe then
Ruler, conveniently forgetting that Qatar was hardlyenjoyingany oil revenues in 1939and was
much poorer at that time than Bahrain. He also grumblesabout the "impositions"of the heir
apparent. But none of this beginsto justify his going onrecord as calmly welcoming a possible
assassinationattempton the heir apparent. Afler all, Belgrave,in hisprivate diariesas we know,
was fromtimeto time highlycriticalof the extravagantexpenditureof someof themembersof the
ruling family of Bahrain during the recessionin the early 1930s; but he did maintaina proper
discretionin the matter,even if onlyin his self-interest, and he certainlydoes not canvass,even in
his privatediaries,assassinationasa possibleremedy.
14.Mr. Shankardasshas of course drawn attentionto the evidencethat British officialsin
Londonand inthe Gulf wishedin 1938to securea division of whatwas assumedto be Bahrain's
"unallottedarea"so that PCL obtained a concession ovetrhe Hawar Islandsat least,whileBAPCO
would be awarded a concession overthe remainder of the unallotted area. But these would be
concessionstobe grantedby theRulerofBahrain.Bahrainwouldhavethe exclusivebenefitof the
oil revenues,notQatar. Tosuggest,as Bahraindoes,thattherecord displaysno evidence ofbias in
favourof Bahrainand againstQatar inthe matterofthe conflicting claimsto sovereignty overthe
Hawar Islandsis to straincredibility tobreakingpoint. Bahrainin the 1930swas, as Weightrnan
certainly arguedin his letterto Fowleof 18October1938,consideredbythe BritishGovemmentat
this time to be "the one loyal Sheikhdomin the ~ulf"'~. Bahrain was also a staging-postfor
Imperia1Ainvayson their increasinglystrategicairrouteto India. So,in a sensequiteirrespective
of the conduct of particular officials,there was almost an inherent Britishbias on the issue of
Hawarin favourof BahrainwhoseRuler wouldin additionenjoyrelieffrom the financialwomes
which had beset him in the early 1930sif Hawar were awarded tohim. This leaningtowards
Bahrain was, if anythmg, reinforced in 1938 and 1939 when Britainwas confronted withthe
loomingprospectof a secondworldwar againstGermany,whichwouldunderlinethe importance
to Britainofitscommunicationslinkswith IndiaandAustraliathroughtheGulf.
-- -
I3~eplyof QataAM. 111.79V,ol3,p. 487,atp. 492. 15. The result was, however,a flagrantmiscarriage of justice committedby the British
Govemmentof the timeonthebasis of a slanted and flawed assessmeno tf thepositionbythethen
British Political Agent in Bahrain, Weightman. That slantedassessment may well havebeen
helled, amongother things,by the deep-seated prejudicewhichWeightman continued throughout
to holdagainstthe Al-ThanirulingfamilyinQatar.
16.In the light of al1the circumstancessurroundingthe conductof the so-called"enquiry"
conductedby Weightmanin 193811939into the question ofsovereigntyover the Hawar Islands,
and havingregard to the Award of the arbitral tribunalin theDubai/Sharjaharbitration,Qatar
entertainsno doubt that the British Govemment's decision of 11July 1939 cannot possibly be
characterizedas an arbitral award. Furthemore, as it was givenwithout the prior consent ofthe
two Rulers, it was not binding onthem, and was certainlynever accepted by the then Ruler of
Qataror any ofhis successorsaspossessinganybindingforcewhatsoever. Qatar's legal arguments
on this aspect of the casehave beenfully set outin its successivewritten pleadings,and 1would
respectfullyrefer MembersoftheCourtto therelevant sectionsofthosewritten pleadings.
Mr. President, this completesmy remarks on the 1936 and 1939 British decisionson the
Hawar Islands. 1 would wish tothank Members of the Court for their kind attention to my
presentation, and 1 would respectively suggest, Mr. President, that you now cal1 on
Mr. Shankardassto present Qatar'sargumentsonBahrain'sallegedpre-1936efectivités.
ThePRESIDENT: ThankyouverymuchSirIan. 1nowgivethe floorto Mr. Shankardass.
*
Mr. SHANKARDASS: ThankyouMr.President. Mr.President,distinguishedMembersof
theCourt: REBUTTA OF THE ALLEGEDEFFECTMTÉS PRE-193 6LEGALANDFACTUAL)
1. In my earlier presentation, 1 drew the Court's attention to the extensive evidence
establishing the limitedxtent of the temtories of Bahrain, consisting essentially of a compact
groupof islands, whichnever includedthe HawarIslands.
2. My task today is to address you on Bahrain'salternative contentions presented in an
attemptto supportits claim to the HawarIslands,on thessumptionthat the Court will bepleased
to reject Bahrain'sprimary subrnission that the issue is determined by the British decision of
July 1939.
3. Bahrain claims,in the first place, that the "historical genesis"of its title to the Hawar
Islands,is Bahrain'soriginaldominanceandauthority overal1the temtories in the Gulf of Bahrain
and the Qatar peninsula.1would respectfully suggest,Mr President and Members of the Court,
that Qatar has alreadydemonstratedin its writtenpleadings,that Bahrain hadno such dominance
andauthority',andnot in any event, over theQatarpeninsulaor its adjoiningislands, afterthe 1868
Agreements.
4. The secondaspect of this alternative contentionis Bahrain'sattemptto invoke efectivités
in support of its claim, asserting that it has submitted evidence ofmore than 70 "examples" of
Bahrain's exerciseof authority over the Hawar Islands during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries2. Bahrainhas listedhese so-called "examples"in its Reply in what1might cal1a "bullet
points" strategy. In my respecthl submission, a great majority ofthese bullet points are simply
bald assertions, without any supporting evidence and therefore hardly deserving of serious
consideration. None of them constitutes an act performedby or on behalf of Bahrainà titre de
souverain.
5. There are only three so-called "examples" ofacts claimed to have been performed by
Bahrain before 1936-1937,when Bahrain illegally occupiedthe Hawar Islands, which warrant
more detailed consideration.These are, Mr.President,frstly, the claim of an Al-Khalifa grant of
permissionto the Dowasirtribe to settlein the HawarIslandssoon aftertheAl-Khalifa conquestof
Bahrain in the eighteenthentury; secondly,that the Bahrainicourts decidedcases relating toland
'ReplyofQatar,par4.120-4.133.
*ReplyofBahrain,par28-29.rightsand fishingtrapsin Hawar; and thirdly,that Bahrainiauthorities couldorderthe arrestof or
compelattendancein Bahrainicourtsof persons stated tobe "residents"of the Hawar Islands.
6. The first contention relates to Bahrain's claithat its sovereignty overthe Hawar Islands
is supportedby the evidence ofthe continuous presencein the islands of a population subject to
~ahrain~,that is,a branch ofthe Dowasir tribe, from around1800,after theyhad soughtandbeen
given permissionto do so by the highest rankingreligious and legal officia1of the Al-Khalifah
family,the Qadi ofzubarah4. Bahraincontendsthereforethat its "jurisdictionand control over
HawarIslandsthuscommencedtwocenturiesagoW5I.t mustfollow inthe first placethat ifBahrain
hadnojurisdictionor control beforethatdate,ithadno authoritytomakethe supposedgant to the
Dowasir.
Bahrain also claims that in 1845,what it calls "the Hawar Dowasir" were invited by the
Ruler of Bahrainto settleon the main Islandof Bahrainwhile, atthe sametime, continuingtheir
life on the Hawar 1slands6. As evidence forthis contention, Bahraincites an observationof
~orimer'regardingthe arriva1of the Dowasirin Hawarand Bahrain;and correspondencein 1909
from the British Political Agent, Prideaux, tothe Political Resident with regardto the gant of
permissionto the Dowasirto residein Hawar. It is Qatar's submissionM, r.President,that noneof
this evidencesupportswhat Bahrainis seekingto establish.
7. A reference tothe cited observationin Lonmer's 1908 Gazetteer shows, firstly, that
Lorimerwas describingthenurnerouslocationswherethe Dowasirtribe wasto be found,andthere
is no mention of Hawarin his list; secondly,that the Dowasir of Bahrain are stated to have
imrnigratedfrom Najd from where "they gradually moved eastwarda snd, after spendingseveral
years by the way of Zakhunaniyah Island, finally arrived in Bahrain about 1845 under the
leadership ofthe grandfatherof theirpresentShaikh" - this is Lorimer. In the same observation,
Lorimeralsonotesthat someofthe Dowasir settledin Dohain Qatar andin Kuwaitand thatsome
"offshootsfromtheBahraincommunity"of Dowasir settledonthePersiancoast.
3~emorialof Bahrain, ara.345.
4~emorialof Bahrain, pars.46and413.
'MernoriaolfBahrain, par3.6-37.
6~emorialofBahrainp, ara.417.
'~ernorialofBahrain, ara.417 andMemonalofBahrainAnn. 74, Vo3,p. 378. 8. The Courtwill notice thereis no mentionby Lorimer of the Dowasir arriva1in or via
Hawarin 1800,or of the "HawarDowasir"being invitedin 1845 bythe Ruler of Bahrainto settle
on the main islandof Bahrain. On the otherhand specificmentionis made of Zakhnuniyahand
even of Dohah, Kuwaitand the Persiancoast.Accordingly,apart from somehearsay referencein
the PoliticalAgent,Prideaux's letters of 1909 t, which 1willshortlyrefer,thereis noreal evidence
of Dowasir "occupation"ofHawar ortheirpresenceinthe island either upon an Al-Khalifa grantor
otherwise from 1800. And certainlynone of any Bahraini invitation to the so-called "Hawar
Dowasir"in 1845.
9. Qatar has already shown that even after a part ofthe Dowasir tribe began tolive in
Budaiyaand Zellaqon the north-westcoast of Bahrain main island, they remained a particularly
independentcornmunity. Theydidnot acceptthe political authority ofthe Rulersof ~ahrain~;and
when in the 1920s,the Ruler attemptedto introduce certainrefonns in the pearlingindustrywhich
would affectthem,they regardedthis as an encroachmenton their independentstatusand simply
left Bahrain forSaudiArabia. Many ofthem finally returned to Zellaq, but some were stid llrifting
back aslate as 1933~.Furthermore, KingIbnSaud regarded themas his "Duwasirsubjects" when
he maderepresentationsto the Britishand theRuler of Bahrainin 1928concerning their rightsin
~ahrain". Bahrain has therefore not established that the Dowasir constituted at the time a
"populationsubjectto Bahrain"nor thattheirs was an"unintempted occupation" of Hawar.Infact
Bahrain now itselfalso admitsthatthe Dowasir livedin Buddaiyaor Zellaqon the mainislandof
Bahrain, andonlyseasonallyvisitedthe HawarIslands forfishingand hunting1'. BahrainMer
Statesthat afterthedevelopmentofoil in the 1930~~ "lifeon themainlandbecamemore attractive"
andindicatesthat whatever activity therw e asonHawar,alsodeclinedl*.
10. Let me now turn to the only evidence- the only evidence - that Bahrainoffers in
support of the allegedAl-Khalifahgrant of permissionto the Dowasirtribe to occupy the Hawar
Islandsin around1800.
8~ounter-~emoriaolf Qatar, par3..82-3.95.
9~eplyofQatarp, ara.4.164; ReplyofQatar,Ann.111., ol.3,p. 270.
%eply of Qatar, ara.4.164; Counter-Memorafl Qatar,Ann.111., ol.3,p. 179.
"MemorialofBahrain, par4.19; see, also,Replyof Qatar,paras.etseq.
'2~emorialofBahrain,para.38. 11.This evidence consistsof two letterswrittenby the BritishPolitical Agent,Prideaux,on
20Marchand4 April 1909. Bahraincontendsthis evidence also showsthatthe writtendecisionof
the Qadi dating fiom around 1800,was still preservedby the ~owasir" in 1909. Theseletters
appearto be fundamentalto Bahrain's claimto the HawarIslands and copiesof them havebeen
placedin thejudges'foldersat Nos.44 and 45. With theCourt's permission1 , proposeto show on
thescreen just a fewof themore importantextractsfiomtheseletters.
12.Tobeginwith,1wouldrespectfullysubrnitto theCourtthat thecorrespondenceonwhicb
Bahrainrelies, was neither intendedto, nor does it amountto any kind of credible evidence to
supportBahrain'sclaimsto Hawar. Its objectivewasquitedifferent. A reading ofPrideaux'stwo
letters of 20 March1909'~and 4 April 1909'~clearly shows that he was concemed at that tirne
aboutwhat he calledefforts of Turkish officialsto establishtheir authoritymore securely inthe
rather vaguely defined district over which they ruledI6and in that connection decidedto visit
Zakhnuniyahandthe HawarIsland tocheck for signsof any increasedTurkishactivityinthearea.
After his visit, he reported to the Political Residentin an unofficial handwritten letter of
20 March 1909 that he had learnt that a Turkish Mudir had visited Zakhnuniyahand tried to
persuadethe Dowasirwhomhe foundthere to recognizethemselvesas Turkishsubjectsaswell as
flythe Turkishflag on the island; and that the Dowasir repliedthat they couldonly followtheir
ownheadmanresidentin Bahrain, andresolutelydeclinedto haveanythingto do withtheflag.
13. In this first handwrittennote, the HawarIslandsare initiallymentionedwhenPrideaux
statesin a passage,which isnowonthe screen:
"Thefacts are that Dowasir of Budaiya and Zellaq on the north-westCoastof
Bahrainare in the habit ofeverywinterpartiallymigratingto Zakhnuniyaand Hawar
Islandsforfishing(sharksaswellas ediblefish)and hawking."
14.Theonlyotherreferenceto Hawaris madeby Prideauxin the contextof whatappearsto
have been his real objective which he indicates in the following words, whichare now on the
C
screen:
'3~emorialofBahrain, aras.413and424andfootnote484.
'4~emorialofQatar,Ann.111.51, o6,p.233.
's~emonalofQatar,Ann.111.53V, ol.6,p. 245.
161bid. "IfShaikhEsais willing to claim sovereigntyover Zakhnuniyo aurpositionwill
be fairly plain sailing,but the Dowasir especiallyas regards Hawar are inclined to
considerthemselves the independent ownero sn the strength of acenturyold decision
of a Kazi of Zubara(who however of course was anofficia1under the al-Khalifa)so
thepositionmayrequiresomeconsideration.
1 strongly deprecate letting the Turks keep Zakhnuniyaa ,s they will then
naturallybe encouraged togo on to Hawar,but if ShaikhEsa doesn'twant ordare to
asserthis sovereignty overHawar we shall be in rather a quandary. However 1, hope
nextweekto be able to give a satisfactoryreport abouthisattitude."
15.Prideaux's main objective therefore seems to hav been to thwart what wasseen to be
Turkish territorialexpansionismin this part ofthe Gulf. As 1will shortly show, he succeeded in
doing so, thoughonly temporarilyas it happened,in respectof Zakhnuniyah,but not in respectof
Hawar,becauseShaikhEsaonlymade aforma1claim of ownershipto Zakhnuniyah and clearly did
not "wantor dare to assert his sovereigntyover Hawar". The Court will observethat Prideaux
nonethelessconfirms that theDowasirfiom Bahrainonly went every winterto Hawar for fishing
and hawking. He makes what is clearly only a passing reference to the Dowasirclaim of being
"independentowners on the strength of adecisionof a Kazi of Zubarah". Whilehe mentions,in
effect, that the Kazi, over 100years earlier,was likelyto be an officia1underthe Al-Khalifa, he
confines himselfto recomrnendingthat: "so theposition may requiresomeconsideration".
16. Prideaux sent his forma1 report to the Political Resident regarding hisvisit to
Zakhnuniyahand Hawarby his secondletter of 4 April 1909. This he did onlyafter he had met
ShaikhEsaandascertainedwhathe referred toin his informa1letteras "his attitude" withregardto
theislands".
17. On Zakhnuniyah, he wrote that he had found a few fishermenon the island living in
temporary mathuts; andnoticed theTurkishflagrolledup andattachedtothebottomof themast.
Healsoreportedthat theDowasirtribesmenhadreplied,to an enquiryfiomtheTurkishMudir,that
they had decidednot to accept the Mudir'sadviceto recognize themselvesas Turkishsubjects,as
theymightthenperhaps losetheir possessionsin Bahrain. In other words,they consideredit was
open to them independentlyto do so but chosenot to, for fear of annoyingthe British Political
Agent or the Ruler ofBahrain whoseShaikhdomthe Turks alsoclaimed. It is also clearthat the
- --
"~emonal of Qatar,Ann.111.5, ol.6,p. 245.Dowasir placed much more value on their possessions in Bahrain than on whatever goods or
chattelsthey might have had withthemduringtheirseasonalvisitsto Zakhnuniyah.
18.Prideaux furtherreported thatafterZakhnuniyah he proceededto Hawar Island,where
the Dowasir hadtwo similarwinter villages; hehad foundin one locality a collection of40 large
huts underthe authority of a cousinofthetribal Shaikh. The Courtwillnotethiswas a referenceto
the cousin of a local Dowasir Shaikhand clearly not to the Ruler of Bahrain. Prideaux further
noted that this individual, EsabinAhmedDosiri, "is also related by mamiage to
ShaikhEsa bin Ali". Bahrain seems tohave assumed this marriage might in some way have
formed the basis of ShaikhEsa's sovereignty over Hawar, bu1 t believe the Court will conclude
Prideauxwas not suggesting anythingof thekind. Prideauxwent onto state in his reportthatthe
Dosiriwhomhe metalsotold him, and this excerpits nowonthe screen:
"[He also] told methat Zakhnuniyawas undoubtedly a possession of the Chief
of Bahrain, but that the DowasirregardedHawaras their own independenttenitory,
the ownershipof this island havingbeen awardedto the tribe by the Kazi of Zubara
morethan 100years ago,ina writtendecisionwhich theystillpreserve."
19.Having statedin his letterof 20March1909that in view of the Dowasir claimofbeing
"independentowners"of Hawar, "theposition mayrequire some consideration", Prideaux,in his
officialreport of 4 April, now expressedhis own opinionthat as the Kazi of Zubara wasin those
days an official of the Al-Khalifah and,in wordswhich are nowon the screen, "theislandwould
seem tobe a dependencyof the mainlandState, whichthe Chief of Bahrainstill claimsas morally
andtheoreticallyhis".
20. Prideauxwasof coursefullyawareof theeffectof the Agreements of1868andthefacts
recordedby then, in 1909,in Lorimer'sGazetteerof 1908about the "mainland State"beingthe
separateentity of Qatar. Bahrainwas, and is of course,wholly insularin its compositionandthe
description "mainlandState"could not by definitionapply toit. The "mainland State"whichthe
,
Chief of Bahrain still claimed, in 1909,in Prideaux'svery careful words "as morally and
theoreticallyhis"wasthereforeobviouslytheseparateentity ofQatar.
21.Pndeaux hadreasonto be careful. As SirIan Sinclair has shown, while dealing withthe
geographicalextentof theBahrain Principality,Prideauxt,henPolitical Agentin Bahrain,is stated,
in Lorimer'sGazetteerof 1908,to have "suppliedver=full informationregardingal1placesin hisjurisdiction...". Therecord alsoshowshe wasactively associatedin 1907with preparing the final
versionof the descriptionof thePrincipalityinthe ~azetteer". As a result,the Hawar Islands were
viewed as being an integral part of the west side of Qatar and as having no connectionwith
Bahrain. This conclusionis strongly reinforcedwhen it is realizedthat no referenceat al1is made
to the Hawar Islandsin the articlein Lorimer'sGazetteeron the Bahrain Principality.But a few
years before this final informationwas incorporatedin the Gazetteer,in 1905, when the British
authorities in the Gulf were consideringvarious policy options for thearea, one of the three
suggestionsmadeby Prideauxin a memorandumto MajorCox,the Political Resident (upon which
Bahrain places some reliance)I9,was thatthe suzerainty of the Ruleof Bahrain couldbe reasserted
over most ofthe Qatar peninsula; and another suggestion, torecognizeTurkish sovereignty over
Qatar subject to British control over theCoast. These suggestions wererejected not only by the
PoliticalResident, as is clear fromhis letterof 16July 1905to Mr.S.M.Fraser, Secretary tothe
Govenunent of 1ndiaZ0 but also by his superiorsin the Govemment of1ndia2'. One comment
recorded in the file was that: "As to the proposalsput forwardby CaptainPrideaux, Major Cox
does not apparentlycommend themto seriousnotice. .."and that the objectiveswhichPrideaux
contemplated couldbe amply fulfilledby measures including"the conclusion of a protectorate
treatywith ... ElKatr". Afurthercommentwasthat:
"Themain endeavourof CaptainPrideauxseemsto be to prove that the order
issuedin 1875; reading: litwas shownthat the Chiefof Bahrein hadno possessions
on the mainland of Gutter and that his rights there were of a very uncertain
character - to ColonelRoss,is not correct. Any data provingthe reversewould no
doubt be of importance,but CaptainPrideaux'sfinal reportin this respect will alone
showhowfarhisviewsarecorrect ..."
Thereis nothingontherecord to showthatsuchreversa1was evercontemplated.
22.Fraser'sfinalcommenton Prideaux'ssuggestionreads:
"1agree that no action is required. The historicalfacts collectedby Captain
Prideaux wouldnot in the least affect the policy which the Defence Cornmittee may
recornrnend,as they willbe influencedmerelyby expediency with regardto the state
ofpoliticsinthepresentday.
'8~emorialofQatar,Ann.11.3,Vol.3, pp.61,87.
'g~ounter-~ernonaolfBahrain,para.120;ReplyofBahra, ara.197.
20~ernorialfBahrain,Ann.71,Vol. 3,p.355.
21~upplementaDlocumentsof Qatar,doc.4,p. 10. Weneed not therefore sendhomethe reportby weeklyletter. Indeed,1should
be rathersony for CaptainPrideaux'sstate thathis very wildsuggestion . ..shouldbe
broughttothe noticeof theIndiaOffice."
23. Returningto Prideaux'sofficial letter of 4 April 1909to the Political Residenton his
visits to Zakhnuniyahand Hawar,he also reported thatupon being informed of the result of his
trip, ShaikhEsa"atonce saidthat he desiredto make awrittenproteston the subject oftheTurkish
occupationof Zakhnuniya ...that his father Shaikh Alihad built the fort [there.. .and that for
some years he had kept a garrison on the island.. ." Prideaux also reported that another
possession,outside of the Bahrain Islands, which the Chief held, was the reef named Labainat
includingtwoisletswherethe Shaikhtook atax fiom al1theboatswhichcollectMle shellsonthe
islets; and thatif the Turks claimed Zakhnuniya, theymight also see fit to claim the two islets.
With his report of4 April 1909,Prideaux therefore enclosed atranslationof a letter from Shaikh
sa^*, which is in the judges' folders at iteNo.46, assertinghis ownershipto "Al Labaina"as
wellas "theislandof Zakhnuniya".
24. The Courtwill immediately noticethat no mention atal1is made by the Shaikh of
Bahrain, at thetime, of any claim tothe HawarIslands. Shaikh Esa had recitedno historyof his
fatherbuilding afort on Hawaror keeping agarrisontherenor of collectingtaxes from anyonein
Hawar; andhe was obviously unwilling tostake a claim to Hawaronly on the groundthat the
Dowasir periodicallyfish orhuntthere. Clearly, Prideauxhadbeenunableto persuadethe Shaikh
to "dare"to makesuch a claimto Hawar.
25. However, Bahrainnow seeksto rely on what hasbeen referred to as the Zakhnuniyah
parallelin supportof its claim to~awa?~. Bahrain claims thatbecauseBahrain Dowasirfishermen
seasonallyvisited both Zakhnuniyah and Hawar, andas Bahrain'srights in Zakhnuniyahwere
"recognized"at the time of the Anglo-TurkishConvention of 1913,its rights in Hawar must
similarlybe upheld. It is Qatar'ssubmissionthere is no basis whatsoeverfor this argument. As
Prideaux'sreport shows, any right even to Zakhnuniyahhad appeared in reality to have been
abandonedwellbefore his visit. MajorCox,the Political Resident,is reportedto have suggested
thereforethat the Sheikh shouldbe advisedto fly his flag therein Zakhnuniyahduringthe winter,
22~emoriaolfQatar,Ann.111.52, ol.6,p.241.
23~emoriaolfBahrain, aras.426-431.and to employ aregular custodianto take chargeof it fromamongthose of his Dowasirsubjects
whoannuallymigratethere24.In other words, evenin Zakhnuniyah,the Shaikhof Bahrain wasnot
exercisingany authorityand was beingadvised todo so to support his claimof ownership. Itis
inconceivable,Mr.President, thathe couldhave been exercising any such authorityin the Hawar
Islandswhichhewas noteven preparedto claimatthetirne.
26. The question ofZakhuninya,as the Court is aware, was finally decided under the
1913 Anglo-TurkishConventionin termsof which Ottomansovereigntyover Zakhnuniya, which
was practicallypartof the Hasamainland25 and therefore withinits territorialsea,was recognized.
As Bahrain has already pointed out (presumably because of the fuss made in regard to
Zakhnuniyah), under a side arrangementit received asum of £1,000for whatever claims it may
have had in ~akhnuni~a~~B . y contrast,as the Ruler ofBahrainapparentlydid notwantor dare to
make a similar claim tothe HawarIslands, these islandswere noteven mentioned andno attempt
was made by the British authorities tosecure or protect the islands for him. One cannot help
thinkingthat ifthe Rulerof Bahrainhadclaimed theHawarIslandsin 1909,he mightjust possibly
havebeenricherby a few additionalpoundsby 1913; andnoneof us wouldbe heretoday. Inthe
event however, the Hawar Islands continued to remaina "dependency ofthe mainlandState"and
thus a partof Qatar. As Qatarhasshown,it was notuntil oilbecame a factorin the Gulfareathat
the Ruler of Bahrain,27 years later, did in fact "dare" (in circumstancesQatar has already
explained)tomakea claim to theHawarIslands.
27. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, onthe basisof this evidence,Qatarwould suggest
the following conclusions:
1. Pndeaux's letters clearlyshow thathe was concemed onlywith containing Ottomantemtorial
expansion.
Thereis nocredibleevidence,historicalor other,of the grantof any Al-Khalifah permission
2.
in 1800to the Dowasirto occupythe Hawar Islands. The Courtwill inany event recall thatin
24~upplementalocumentsof Qatar,doc.5,p. 13.
25~ounter-~emorialf Qatar,An11.25,ol.2,p. 149.
26~ernorial fBahrain,paras.410and430.1800,Bahrainitselfwasengagedina battle forsurvivalwiththe Imamof ~uscat" sothat theAl-
Khalifah Chief ofBahrainwashardlyin a positionto be makingsuchgants. The onlyso-called
"evidence"whichBahraininvokesin this contextis a casual conversation between Prideaux anda
Dowasir fishermanduringthe former'svisit to the Hawar Islandsin March 1909. Prideaux merely
repeated whatthe Dowasir fisherman - "the cousinof the tribal principal Shaikh"who also
happenedto be "relatedby maniageto ShaikhEsa" - hadheard andhad told him; he didnotsee
the "writtendecisionwhich they still preserved" and hedoes not Saythat it was theAl-Khalifah
whograntedthe permission,butmerelyrecordedwhatcouldclearlyonlybehis guessthattheKazi
of Zubarahwas in those days (over 100 yearsearlier) anofficialof the Al-Khalifah. Pndeaux's
ownconclusionin factwas that "theislandwouldseem tobe a dependencyof the mainlandState
(that is Qatar), whichthe Chief of Bahrain stillclaims[, according to him,] as morally and
theoreticallyhis" (andnot actuallyas underthe 1868Agreementshe couldno longer exerciseany
rightsthereacrossthe sea). TheCourtwill no doubt take into accountthe fact thatin 1868or on
whicheverearlierdate Bahrain ceasedto have anyrights in the mainlandShaikhdomof Qatar, it
mustalsofollowthatany Bahrainirights to orinanydependency ofmainlandQatarsirnilarlycame
to anend.
The only otherdocument citedby Bahrainin this comection is Weightman's Reporo tf
22Apnl 1939, madeduringthe so-called "arbitration" to which 1had occasion to refer,wherehe
simplyrepeats thehearsayaccountreportedby Prideauxbut does go on to Saythat "The Political
Agentmentioned a written decisionwhichhowevernowseemsto have di~appeared."~' In other
words, while Prideaux, in 1909,was told that the 100years old decision was still preserved,
Weightmansomehowcametotheconclusion,30 years later,thatithaddisappeared.
DespitePndeaux'spromptings,the thenRulerof Bahraincouldnot be persuadedin 1909to
advancea claimto the HawarIslands. Nordidhe makeany reservation of rightswith respectto
Hawar. On thecontrary,his conductin 1909 canonlybe construedas amountingto acquiescence
in the HawarIslands beingregardedas a dependencyof mainlandQatar. Following theCourt's
27~emorialof Qatar,para.3.24 and Memonal of Qatar,Ann.11.5,Vol. 3, pp.248Reply of Qatar,
para.3.10andReplyof Qatar,Ann..6, ol.2,p. 365.
28~emonalof Bahrain,Ann.281, Vol.5,p. 1168.decisionin the caseconcemingthe TempleofPreah Vihear,Qatar wouldrespectfullysubmit,the
Ruler of Bahrain'sfailureto make a claimto the Hawar Islandsin 1909clearly amountedto "an
acknowledgementby conduct"ofQatar'srights to Hawaa rsa dependencyof the rnai~~land~~.
And, acquiescencein Qatar's rights, following the Court's Judgmei nt the Minquiersand
~crehos~'case where the Court held in favourof GreatBritain, based in part, on the fact that
Francehad failedto claim sovereigntyover the Ecrehoo sn severaloccasions.
We nowalso have Belgrave's entryin his diarieson 23 April1936,to which Sir IanSinclair
has already referred, thatthe Al-KhalifahShaikhs,five daysbeforethe forma1claimwasmadeon
28 April 1936,did notin fact themselvesbelievetheyhad asustainableclaimto theHawar Islands.
28. Mr.President, may1nowturnto the second ofthe "exerciseof authority"examplesthat
Bahrain relies upon to supporitts claimto sovereignty, namely,that "even beforethe First World
War, Bahrain manifestedits authority overthe Hawar Islandsthrough the decisions ofits courts
[and that] the cases related to land rights and fishing traps in the ~slands"~'. In Bahrain's
"preliminarystatement" of29 May 1938,suppliedby Belgraveto Weightman(and of whichno
copy was ever shown to the Ruler of Qatar),in the course of the so-called "arbitration", itwas
claimedthat "disputes, whichwere fiequent,regardingfishingrights andgrazinghave alwaysbeen
referred to and judged by the Ruler of Bahrain, the Bahrain Shar[i]a Courts and, latterly,the
existingCivil Courts. These cases can be produced"32.But by the time Bahrain came tofileits
forma1counter-claimof 3January1939(Le.,seven monthslater),it soughtto explainthat as there
was noregularfilingsystemorpreservationofrecords,a searchfor old casesregardingHawarhad
been unproductiveandtherefore, only the twojudgments couldbe produced33.No otherjudgments
were producedbefore the British authoritiesin 1938 with Bahrain's counter-claim and the same
twojudgments arethe onlyonesreliedupon in the present proceedings. The Court willno doubt
see that theseso-calledjudgments, which Weightmanin his crucialletter of 22 April 1939on the
ownership of the Hawar Islands referred toas "two judgments dating from some thirty years
----- -
29C..J.Reports1962,p.23.
301c..J. Reports1953,p.47.
3'~eplyofBahrain, ara.28,atp. 15; MernorlfBahrain,paras.433437,476478 and480-482.
32~emonalofBahrain,Ann.261, Vol.5,p. 1108.
33~emorial fBahrain,Ann2.74, Vol.5,p. 1133.ago ... of unquestionable authenticity" hardly represent what he characterized as "important
evidenceof the exercise ofjurisdictionby the Shaikhof Bahrainfor yearspast"34.Furthermore,it
is difficult,if not impossible, to see how Weightman cameto the conclusionthat eventhese two
"judgments" wereof "unquestionable authenticity". Bahrain's communicatio of 3 January itself
containedan admissionthat there had been no regular filingsystemor preservationof records at
the time in Bahrain and there was no explanationhow eventhese two so-called judgments,from
"even before theFirst World War" had been found. For what they are worth, Bahrain'sown
Dowasir witness~tatements~p ~oint out that if theDowasirhad disputes, which were usually about
fishingrights andfish traps,theywentto thetribalelderto solveit as the "Dowasir alwayslikedto
settletheirdisputesbetween themselves". Itis claimedonlyif they couldnot solve a dispute, they
went to the Ruler of Bahrainor his descendants to solve it,presumablyas arbitrators. Inal1the
circurnstancestherefore,Mr.President,theauthenticity ofthe twojudgments that were"produced
by Belgravemustbe open toseriousdoubt.
29. The first of these two j~dgments~~ of 1909 - both the judgments are in the judges'
folders at itemsNos. 47 and 48 - "by the Qadi of the Shar[i]a Court", in Bahrain names one
Ahmadbin ShahinDosariandthree otherswhoappeared before him, and "disputed the ownership
of landand seaproperties inHawar. AhmadbinShahinclaimedtheseto be his propertyinherited
fromfathersandforefathers; Jabr andBati claimedthem tobe theirpropertiesand thattheyheld a
document .. ."
30.In the secondcase of 1910,thejudgment, unlike the 1909judgment, begins:
"Bythe orderof ShaikhAbdullabinIsaAlKhalifah,Ahmad binShahinDosari
and Isa bin Ahmad Dosari appeared before mein a dispute about land and sea
propertiesin Hawar ..."
31.Boththejudgments areshownto have been signedby Sharafbin Ahmad,the Qadi ofthe
ShariaCourt.
,
32. Anexaminationof thesetwojudgments shows they both relate to the samelandand sea
propertiesin Hawarof the sameindividual,Ahmedbin ShahinDosari,who had a disputeover his
34~ernonaolfBahrain,Ann.281, Vol.5,p. 1165.
3SMemona olf BahraAnn. 313(a),Vol.6,p. 1363,Ann.315(a)p. 1392andAnn.316(a)p. 1400.
36~emonalof Bahrain,Annexes238-238A,Vol.5,pp. 1049and1049(a).allegedlandand sea propertiesin Hawar with two differentparties. Both disputes were decidedin
his favour,the 1910decisionbeingbased onthe 1909decision. Inotherwords,the twojudgments,
even assumingtheir authenticity, together really representjust one instance of a Kazi dealing with
an individual'srights of inheritancein a particular land and sea property, which appears to be a
description of a fish trap. As 1have just indicated,these were also the only two judgments taken
into account by Weightman in his attempt to bolster his sweeping conclusions in his letter of
22April 1939.
33. Even as they stand, the two judgments arehardly evidence of any exercise of State
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is Qatar'ssubmissionthat it is wholly inappropriateto apply western
conceptsto thejurisdiction exercisedby a Qadi,whichjurisdictionwas only exercised inpersonam
over individualswho were Muslims.
34. The Court will have seen that the then Political Resident,C. G.Prior, in his letter of
26 October 19413'pointed out thatduring his ownpresencein Bahrain forthree and half years-
during 1929-1932 - he had never heard anythng to suggest that the Hawar Islands belonged to
Bahrain and believed them to belong to Qatar, which, he noted, was a view also supported by
Lorimer. In the same letter,he also assertedthat "by agreementparties can take their casesto any
QadhiandtwoIraqis onthe Trucial Coastcouldtake a disputeto Kerbalaifthey wished . .."
35. Qatar has now alsofiunishedthe opinionof a distinguishedexpert in Islamic law to the
effect that
"if two Muslim contenders standbefore the qadi and ask him to settle their private
dispute, he has to assume jurisdiction for adjudicatingthe case in dispute. On the
other hand, a qadihasto considerhimselfcompetentto decide any disputeas long as
none ofthe contendersobjectsto pleadingbeforehim . .."
He pointsoutthat this is the viewtakenby al1fourschoolsof Mahomedan law. In support hecites
a case of a land dispute broughtbefore the Prophetwhere "the contenderswere from Yemen, the
landwas inYemen, but the case wasbroughtto theProphetwho wasin ~edina"~~
36. Accordingly, a Qadi Sittingsomewhere in Bahrainand deciding private or inheritance
related disputes between Dowasir Sunni fishermen who seasonally visited the Hawar Islands,
"~emorialof Qatar,Ann.111.229,ol.8,p.127.
''~e~l~ofQatar,AM. 111.98,ol.3,p.604.thoughnonnally residentin Bahrain,is in no sense an exampleof "exerciseof authority"by the
Rulerof Bahrainin the Hawar Islandsand suchpractice thereforeoffersno supportwhatsoever to
Bahrain'sclaim of sovereigntyover theseislands.
37. The third eflectivitérelied upon by Bahrain consistsof the following exarnplesof the
a
claimed exercise ofjudicial or quasi-judicial powersby Bahrainauthoritiesin relationto persons
claimed toberesidentsof~awd~:
- First, the arrest and compelled attendancein Bahraincourts of the so-called Hawar Island
residents4';
- Second,the compelled attendance bythe Ruler ofBahrainof a HawarIslandresidentin a civil
caseat therequest ofBritain,noless,in 19114';
- Third, a 1932 case before the Bahrain courtsin which Hawar Islands residents were
s~b~oenaed~~ a;nd
- Fourth,a 1932casebeforetheBahraincourtsbetweentwoHawar Islandsre~idents~~.
38. As regards the anest and compelled attendance ofpersons charged with criminal
offences,in Bahrain courts,the only specific instancereferredto is alleged to have occurredin
1936. The document relied upon in this c~nnection~~ (which is in the judges' folders at item
No. 49), is statedto be "a recordof the Bahrain Police Directorateseizingthe Bahraincourts of a
violent dispute over fishingtrapsin the Hawar~slands"~~T .his documentprovidesno evidence of
sucharrestor compelled attendance. Itis merelyan unsignedtypewrittensheet purportingto be a
report addressed to "the Court" and containinginformation aboutthe disputed ownershipof certain
fish-traps located "betweenBahrain and Qatar and near to Hawar". There is a reference to a
warning to the disputantsand the report supposedly bears"thurnbprints"of two individuals. No
original is produced and the Court will no doubt conclude that the document can have no
3%eplyofBahrainp, ara.28,pp. 15-16.
40hlemoriaolf Bahrain,par4.79-480.
4'~emonalofBahrainp , ara.436.
42~emonalofBahrainA , nns.242and243,Vol.5,pp. 1065and1066.
43~emonalofBahrainA , nns.244(a)-24(c)Vol. 5,pp.1067-1069.
"MemonalofBahrainA , nn.245,Vol.5,p. 1070.
4S~emonalofBahrainp , ara.480.evidentiaryvalue whatsoever. In any event, itoffers no support for any "arrest and compelled
attendanceinBahrainCourts".
39. The other documents relied upon46 under this item are Belgrave's letter of
28 Apnl 1936~' (containingBahrain'sfirstforma1claimto the HawarIslands), theNote(thatis the
Preliminary Statement) of 29 May 1938~~~ and Bahrain's so-called "Counter-claim" of
3January 1939~~ al1of whichmakegeneral assertionsin the context of Bahrain'sclaimto Hawar.
The secondof thesedocumentsStatesthat "inthe past the 'fidawis'of the Shaikhof Bahrain were
sent whennecessaryto arrestpeople ofHawarwhen theywere requiredto appearbefore Bahrain
authorities",and that "since the present regirnesummonsesare served in the usual way on the
inhabitants ofHawar".There is no evidence whatsoeverto supportthese assertions. In any event
the practice of sending"fidawis"to "arrest" individualsin another Shaikh'stemtory providesno
supportto a claimof sovereignty. Asthe former Political Resident, Prioagain,pointedouts0when
protestingthe 1939decision,Bin Jiluwiof Saudi Arabiafrequently sent mento Bahrainand Qatar
to arrestpeoplewhenhe wasinBahrain.
40. Withregard to the seconditem relating to the "compelledattendanceby the Rulers of
Bahrain of aHawar Island resident at the requestof Bntain in 1911"(in fact a requestby the
PoliticalAgent,Major Knox), theonlyevidence reliedupon is a letter from the Rulerof Bahrain
himselfto thePoliticalAgent (whichis in thejudges' folders atitemNo. 50) which appearsto be a
response to arequest for securing attendance of aseaman who was then in Hawar, whomthe
PoliticalAgent seemsto havehelpedsecureemploymenttogo outpearldiving5'.
41. There is no reference in thisletter to appearancein a court and this is in no sensan
instance of"arrestandcompelledattendancein Bahrain CourtsofHawarIslandresidents".
42. In support of the third and fourth items relatingto cases in 1932 in Bahraincourts
involving "Hawar island residents", Bahrain merely relieson a set of typewritten sheets in
4%emonalofBahrainp , ara.479.
47~emonalofBahrain,Ann.246, Vol. 5,p. 1071.
48~emonalofBahrain,Ann.261,Vol. 5,p.1108.
4%emorialofBahrain,Ann.274,Vol. 5,p. 1133.
5%emonalof QatarAnn.111.229, ol.8,pp. 127, 130.
"MernoriaolfBahrain,Ann.239 (a),Vol.5,p. 1050.~n~lish~~ofwhich one documentis a translation. (Copiesof these are also includedin thejudges'
folders at item Nos. 51 and 52.) These were prepared by Belgrave in connection with Bahrain's
claim and, in Qatar'ssubmission, have no evidentiary value. They certainlydo not demonstrate
"the subpoena powers that Bahraincourts exercised over the residents ofHawar Islands". They
mention lettersto a partyin a case or a request tothe Ruler to arrange foran individual to appear.
In fact, the contents of the documents suggest that despite repeated "requests" the persons
concemed simply did not appearbefore the court. In any event, nothinghere suggests that any
court in Bahrain had territorialjurisdiction overHawar.
43. The 1932 case before the Bahrain courts between what are termed two "HawarIslands
residents"(Case 611351)~r ~efers totwo persons,each describedas "livingin Hawar anda Bahraini
subject". Since it is dated March 1932, the record appears to havebeen madeduring the winter
season when the Dowasir fishermen could in principle have been present in Hawar. Moreover,
there is no evidence that the persons concemed did appear in court while they were "residentin
Hawar", since it is recorded that the defendant was "sumrnoned again" and the hearing was
rescheduled. This in factrathertends to suggestthat the individual concemedmay not even have
retumed fiom Darnrnanatthetimewhen hispresencein court was required.
44.In summary,therefore,Bahrainhas producedno evidence eitherof arrestsin Hawar orof
compliancewith subpoenasor summonses (which in any case is a Westem concept) addressed to
persons described as "residentin Hawar" who wenow knowwere in fact temporary visitors to the
islands. Furthermore, as the Court will be well aware there is a recognized practice whereby a
State may send surnrnonsto someone in another country without any implicationsin relation to
sovereignty. The only "evidence" of court judgments conceming property in Hawar remains the
1909 and 1910judgrnents analysed by me earlier and which, 1 tmst 1 have shown, to be of
questionableauthenticityand in any event of no evidentiaxyvalue in supportof Bahrain's claimto
sovereigntyover Hawar.
5Z~emonalof Bahrain,Anns.242and 243,Vol.5,p. 1065andp. 1066.
S3~emorialof Bahrain, Ann.244(a), Vol. 5,p. 1067. 45. The remaining itemss4invoked by Bahrainare in no sense examples of exerciseof
authorityand, as1said earlier, hardlydeservingof any serious consideration. They referto the
Dowasir tribe's seasonal stay in Hawar, evidenceof their activities or presence in Hawar,their
allegiance and nationality,andthe so-called British,Ottomanor otherrecognition ofsomeof these
alleged facts. Prideaux'stwo letters of 1909which1analysed earlierare again invoked for what
Bahrain terms as British confirmation and recognition ofthe Dowasir habitua1presence and
activitieson the Hawar Islands. A nurnber of other subsequent Britishdocumentsare cited tothe
sarneeffect.
46. Qatar does not denythat the Hawar Islands were usedby the Dowasirat leastpnor to
1923whenthey departedenmasseto Dammanin SaudiArabia; whatit does deny isthatthetribe
had morethana seasonalpresencein the islands,thatthe Dowasir wereexclusiveusersof~awd',
or thattheir presencein the HawarIslandsand theirprivateactivitieswerein any senseindicative
of Stateactivity. In Qatar's submission,uchactivities didnot constituteevidenceof effectivitéas
noneare acts à titredesouverain.
47. The Court will recall,withregard to Hawar,that Belgravehimself recordedin his diary
on 1April 1938(nearly 30 yearsafter Prideaux's statemeno tf Dowasirassertion of ownershipof
Hawar)that the Dowasir"resent ushavingdevelopedthe place whichin the past was nevervisited
and which they seem to consideras their own property"s6.They could therefore, Mr. President,
hardlybe regardedas actingfor or onbehalfof Bahrain.
48. Even assuming that the Dowasirwere'subjectsof or owed allegiance to the Ruler of
Bahrain, the nature of their seasonal activities of fishing and hawking cannot in law sustain
Bahrain'sclairnto sovereigntyover the Hawar Islands. The Court will recall that in the recent
Eritreaflemen arbitration, the Tribunal found that although there was substantial evidence of
individual fishingpractices,tdidnot "constituteevidenceof effectivitéfsor thesimplereasonthat
noneofthesefunctionsare actsàtitrede souverain ...'"'
54~eplyofBahrain,Sect.2.3.
5S~eplyofQatar,para.4.1(d).
56~eplyofQatar,para.4.178.
"ReplyofQatar,para.4.182. 49. These principles nowfind clear confirmationin this Court'sown Judgmentin the case
conceming Kasikili/Sedudu Island (BotswandVamibia) to which my leamed iîiend,
ProfessorSalmon,hasalreadyreferredholding that theMasubiadidnotoccupythe islanda titrede
souverainwhen using it intermittently,accordingto the seasons and theirneeds, for exclusively
agriculturapurposes58.
50. It is Qatar'ssubrnissionthat this rule adoptedby the Court appliesmutatismutandisto
the issue ofBahrain'sclaim to sovereigntyin this case, basedas it is on the natureof the Dowasir
seasonalpresence forfishing orotheractivitiesontheHawarIslands.
51. Bahrain also makes what 1 can only describeas a faint claim of British, Ottoman and
evenQatari recognitionthat theHawarIslandsbelongto Bahrain.
52. As for Britishrecognition,Bahraincites, firstly, theBruckssurveywhich alsorefers to
the fishing villageson Hawar and which,as Bahrainadmts, dates from the 1820sand thus from
long before the emergence of Qatar as a separate entify. The next reference is to the "British
confirmationin 1909thatthe HawarIslands belonged to ~ahrain"~~r,elyingupon thetwoPrideaux
letters. From what 1have shown above,Prideaux's letters, and fot rhat matter, CaptainBmcks's
Swey, inno senseamountto such"British confirmation"orrecognition. Theclaimof recognition
by Ottoman authonties,who in fact claimed sovereignty over Bahrain itselafnd, evenby theRuler
of Qatar,are,to Saytheleast bold,but inrealityhavenocredibility whatsoever.
53. Mr. President,1trust tha1haveshowntheCourt thatthereis no evidencewhatsoeverof
any Bahrain State activity in the nature of legislation,jurisdictionor evenadministration,in the
periodbefore April 1936; and that the seasonalvisits of the Bahrain Dowasirto the Hawarmain
island andtheiractivitieson that island,did notin anysensearnountto efectivitésas suchactivities
were notcanied onàtitredesouverain.
Mr. President,this concludesmypresentationand1 am mostgratefulforthe attention1have
received. May 1suggestthat you cal1upon Sir Ian Sinclairfor his next presentation,but perhaps
first,thisisnappropriatetime fortheCourt'smomingbreak.
"1.c.J. Reports1999,para.98.
5g~eplyofBahrain, ara.2atp. 15. The PRESIDENT: Je vousremercie, M. Shankardass. La séancede laCour est suspendue
pour un quart d'heure.
L'audienceestsuspenduede Il h 20àII h50.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoirLa séanceest reprise et je donne maintenant la
paroleà Sir IanSinclair.
SirIan SINCLAIR: Merci,M. le President.r.President, Membersofthe Court:
BAHRAI NCTIVITIESPOST-1936: CRITICA LATE: STATU SUOCOMMITMENTS:NO
ACQUIESCENCEBY QATAR
1.You may well be relievedto hear that thisis the final presentation which Qatar will make
in the first round on the issues which have to be determined by the Court in the context of the
disputewith Bahrain concemingtitle to the HawarIslands.lowingon fromthe presentationjust
made to you by Mr. Shankardasson Bahrain'spre-1936 effectivit, will analyse corresponding
Bahrain effectivitéspost-1936, and assess what weight, if any, the Court should attachto them in
determiningtitleto the HawarIslands.willthenhave a fewwordsto Sayon the relevance in this
context of what has been termedtheritical date orthe critical period, and onthe role whichthis
notion or indeedany comparablenotion can play in the present case in the evaluationof evidence.
It would also be appropriate for me toeal in this statement with the related question of the
continuingbreachesby Bahrainof its solernncommitrnentsto respectthe statusquo dating backto
1983. Finally, 1 will conclude by demonstrating that, contrary to the persistent but wholly
unsubstantiated allegations made by Bahrain, Qatar has never at any time acquiesced in the
Bahraini occupationof the HawarIslands. This,then, 1fear, will bea mixed bagof goodiesthat 1
presentto you.
2. Thereis,however,onegeneralpoint which1wouldwishto make atthe outset. Oneof the
most significanteatures of the history of Qatar overthe past 150years has been that therewas
never any British officia1 presence in Qatar on any permanent basis until 1949, when
Mr. John Wilton was appointedas theirst BritishPolitical Officerin Qatar. By way of contrast,
the first British Political Agent in Bahrain had been appointed as early as 1900 and there wasalways a British Political Agent residentin Bahrainuntil that State achieved its independencein
1971. Also, from 1926onwards the Ruler of Bahrain had available to him the services of
Mr. CharlesBelgraveas his advjser. This was incontrast to the situationin Qatar, whose Ruler
had no outsideadvisersworking directlyforhimuntil 1950. Until1949,itwas theBritish Political
1
Agent in Bahrainwhoreportedto London fromtime to timeon eventsin Qatar,but, ashe andhis
superior in the Gulf, the Political Resident, onlyvisited Qatar on infiequent occasions, their
knowledgeof the ruling familyin Qatar, and ofconditionsin whatwas, prior to the discoveryand
exploitation of oil in Qatar in thelate 1940sand 1950s, a barren and inhospitable land, was
inevitablylirnited. Thus,it can occasion littlesurprisethat, as MsPilkingtonhas alreadypointed
out, evidencefrom British officia1sources(or indeed fiom other sources)of conditionsin Qatar
during the periodbetween 1916 and 1936is very sparse. There was continuingand continuous
contact during this period betweenthe residentBritish Political Agent andthe Ruler of Bahrain;
but there wasno correspondingandcontinuouscontactwiththeRulerof Qatar.
3. There is accordingly, M.. President, a wealth of written documentation fromBritish
officia1sourcesabout conditionsin Bahrainduringthis period and aboutthe activitiesofthe ruling
family in Bahrain. Thisis supplementedby the Belgravediarieswhich cover at least partof this
penod and which are an invaluable source for the dayLto-daylife of what can be termed the
Bahrain "establishment". Butthere is no such written documentation about conditionsin Qatar
prior to 1949,except for a fewisolatedpapers suchas the Packer Reportof 1939on which Qatar
has commentedextensivelyin its written pleadings'. Preciselybecauseof this contrast, itneednot
occasion surprisethat thereis no written evidenceof visits by members ofthe Al-Thanifamilyto
Hawar during this period. There may well havebeen such visits but they remain unrecorded.
There is of course evidencein one of the SupplementalDocumentsfiledby Qatar on 1Marchof
this yearof a visitby thethen Ruler of Qatar, accompaniedby Salehel Mana,to Zekritin January
of 1938, no doubt in order to inspect theactivities of the oil Companyworking the Qatar oil
'~emorial of Bahrain, Ann.292, Vol.5, p. 1190, cornmentedon in Counter-Memonalof Qatar,
paras.3.133-3.142.concession2; and the Court willof course recallthat Zekrit is on the mainland of Qatar just
oppositeHawar.
4. Whatis astonishing, however,is that, despitethe wealthand varietyof writtenmaterials
relatingto Bahrainwhichweregeneratedduringthis period,there isnot one officia1document to
be foundin the British archives ofthe time whichindicatesany officia1activityby or onbehalf of
therulingfamilyof Bahraininor inrelationto theHawar Islands.
5. In contrastto the singular lackof evidenceof Bahrainigovernmentalor officia1activities
on or inrelationto the HawarIslandspriorto 1936,Saveforthecourtjudgments of 1909and 1910
whichmy leamed friendMr.Shankardasshas thismoming dissectedso convincingly, thereis of
course a massof evidenceof Bahrainiofficialactivitieson orin relation to the islandsafier their
clandestineoccupationby Bahrainpoliceandother guardsin 1936or 1937. Bahrainof coursewill
not admitthat the occupationby Bahrain took place atthis time,since to do sowouldbe wholly
inconsistentwith Bahrain's argument that tHawarIslandshad beenregularlysettledby members
of the Dowasirtribe for some 150years prior to 1936. Bahrain'soriginal contention was that
membersof the Dowasir tribe hadbeenpermanentlysettledon Hawar throughoutthis penod, but
they were obliged to withdrawthis claim in the face of the incontrovertible evidencethathose
members of the Dowasir tribe resident in Zellaq and Budeya hadgone into voluntary exile in
DammamS , audiArabia in 1923,refusingto retum until 192811929 at the earliest. Indeed,some
werestilldriftingback toBudeya inBahrain as lateas 1933~.
6. What Qatar has consistently maintained is that certain members of the Dowasir tribe
residentin Bahrain may before 1923or indeedafter 1936have visited Hawar during the winter
monthsin order to engagein fishingactivities; butthat thesewere by no means the only winter
visitorsto Hawar by fishermen, since fishingwas at that time an activity which was practisedin
comrnonby tribesmen from various Settlements onthe southemcoast of the Gulf, and was not
accordinglyan activityengagedin by or onbehalf of Bahrainà titrede souverain.Now 1tum to
post-1936 Bahrain activitiinandaroundHawar. 1start withbeaconing.
2~upplementDlocumentsof Qatar,doc. 15.
3~eeReplyof Qatar,Ann.111, ol. 3,p.257,atp.270. Post-1936 Bahrain activitiesinandaroundHawar:beaconing
7. The beaconingby Bahrain ofislands,islets, rocks,and indeed low-tideelevationsin and
around the HawarIslands was one of the earliest activitiesengaged in by Bahrain after their
occupation ofthemain Hawarislandin 1936or 1937. Thisis freelyconcededbyBahrain itself. In
theMemonal of Bahrain, itis statedthat"Bahrainimonumentsor markershavebeenerectedon al1 a
of these maritime features since the 1930s"~. By "these maritime features"Bahrain is clearly
referring here to"al1of the maritimefeatures situated in the Gulf of Bahrain fromthe Hawar
Islandsin the southto FashtadDibalin thenorthU5.Indeed, Bahraingoes evenfurther,expressing
itsclaimin thebroadest possibleterms:
"The areasof sea,and the insularandother legallyrelevantformations,situated
betweenthe peninsula [of Qatar]and the main islandof Bahrain,togetherwith those
peninsular areas that were Bahraini, continued to be part of the political entity of
~ahrain."~
8. Qatar has already demonstratedin its Memorial that these beaconing activities were
undertaken on behalf of Bahrain,at the instigation of Belgrave, during the winter months of
1937-1938in a clearattemptto givesomesemblanceofcredibilityto theBahrainiclaimto ~awar'.
The Courtwill also recallthat, in its Judgmentin theMinquiersandEcrehoscase,it disregarded
completelythe placing by the French Govenunent of buoys outside the reefs of the Minquiers
groupand eventheerectionofprovisionalbeacons onsome ofthesereefs8.
Otherpost-1936 Bahrain activitiesinHawar: fort,mosqueand
attemptto drillartesianweii
9. Inthe imrnediateaftermathoftheBahrainioccupationofthemainHawarislandin thelate
1930~~ Bahrain alsoset in hand the constructionof a stone fort with tower, thebuilding of a
mosqueand an attemptto drill an artesianwell. In the "preliminarystatement"filedby Belgrave
on 29 May 1938, referenceis made to this stone fort; but it is not of courserevealed that its
constructionhadbeenbegunonlyin 1937,as is apparent fromthe GovernmentofBahrain'sAnnual
Reportfor the yearMarch 1937 - February 1938. In that AnnualReport,it is statedthat, among
4~emorial ofBahrain, para.575.
S~emorialofBahrain,para. 568.
61bid.
'~emorial of Qatar,paras.6.42-6.45and6.146-6.154.
81.~.. eports1953,p. 71.the "additional new works" undertaken during the year was the "Hawar Fort", for which
expenditureof 17,237rupees is allocated9.In the same AnnualReport,it is also statedthat "the
fort andpier at Hawar werecompletedat the end of the year withthe exceptionof some workon
the courtyard wall". Arnong the public works estimated for the forthcoming year
(March1938-February1939)is a sumfor the "Completionof Hawarpolice station"; in addition, a
sumof28,400rupeesis setasideto cover inter aliathe needfora govemmentmotorlaunchwhich
"hasbecome moreurgent sincethe increaseddevelopmentin theHawarislands".
10. The Govemment of Bahrain's Annual Report for the following year,
March 1938-Febmary1939, also records some interesting facts. Actual expenditure on
"Completionof HawarFort"was 11,069rupees, butincluded in thissumwas "thecostof erecting
about twentyStonebeacons on various islands in the Bahrain waters". It is also statedin this
AnnualReport that a policelaunchbuilt duringthe year is "used forcoastal patrol workand for
plying betweenBahrainand Hawar"; and that "abarbed wire fencewas built aroundthe Fort at
Hawarand severalof the water cisternswererepaired". Afurtherentry disclosesthat "the main
Islandof [the] Hawar Groupwas surveyedanda mapof the island hasbeenmade"").
11. 1 do make my apologies to the Court for recounting these petty details of early
expenditureby the Governrnentof Bahrain onconstruction activitiesin Hawar after 1936. But 1
have recounted themquite deliberately. Preciselybecause they are so petty, one would certainly
anticipate conesponding items of expenditureon small projects in Hawar pnor to 1936 if, as
Bahrain claims, the Hawar Islands had appertained to Bahrain since before the year 1800. But
whatdowe findif we consultearlierGovernmentof BahrainAnnualReports? Wefind absolutely
no referenceto eventhe smallestofficia1expenditureon projectsin Hawar. Doesîhismake sense?
It makes sense only if you discount entirely thewholly unproven assertion by Bahrain that
members ofthe Dowasirtribe had been in permanent,or even regular, occupation ofthe Hawar
Islandsfor over 150years before 1936, andthat they had occupiedthe islands on behalf ofthe
Rulerof Bahrain. And,even on this basis,it makes sense only if youaccept in its essentialsthe
casewhich Qataris urgingupon you: narnely,that, pnor to the unlawfulBahrainioccupationof
'l2eplyof QatAnn.111.59, ol. 3,p.361.
'keply of Qatar,An111.8,ol. 3,p. 545.the Hawar Islands in 1936or 1937,theywereuninhabited - essentiallyuninhabited - although
fishermenfrom severalneighbouringtemtories,including Bahrain,wereaccustomedto visit them
fiom time to time duringthe wintermonths inorder to engagein fishingactivities in thewaters
surroundingtheislands.
Criticaldate
12. Mr. President,1 turn now to discussbriefly the notion of the critical date and other
notions which may berelevant to theCourtin evaluating the adrnissibilitor opposabilityto Qatar
of post-1936 evidenceadducedby Bahrainto sustainits claimto Hawar. Qatar madeit clear inits
Counter-Mernorial thatit was deliberatelyrefiainingfiompositingthe notionof a specific"cntical
date" forthe crystallizationof thedisputebetweenBahrainandQataroverHawar. It did,however,
draw attention to the significanceof the date of 28April 1936,when Belgrave,on behalf of the
Ruler of Bahrain,first advanceda forma1claimto the HawarIslands as constitutingpart ofthe
State ofBahrainby meansof a letterto thethenPoliticalAgentin Bahrain.
13.Why is the date of 28 April 1936 sosignificantin this particularcase? It is because,up
until thatdate,the BritishauthoritiesintheGulfandin London hadunhesitatingly,by wordandby
deed, openly acknowledgedthat theHawarIslandsbelonged toQatar, ashasbeen demonstratedby
Mr. Shankardassin analysingthe lirnited extentofBahrain andthe earlyoilconcessionhistory. In
this context,1would askthe Courtagainto lookcloselyat thefour itemsof evidencedatingfiom
the surnrnerof 1933which wereinvokedby Mr.Shankardassin that statement. These items of
evidence are expressiveofthe viewsthenheldby both Laithwaiteof theIndiaOffice and Lochin
his capacity asActing PoliticalResident,whichwere contemptuously dismissive of any Bahraini
claim to the HawarIslands. Both Mr. Shankardassand 1have in additiondrawn attentionto the
RAFreconnaissanceof Qatar in 1934involving the overflight ofthe HawarIslands. Theconsent
of the Rulerof Qatar,but not- repeatnot - of the Ruler ofBahrain,wassoughtforthe canying
out of this reconnaissance.Then in 1935we havethe Qatar oilconcessionclearlypredicatedupon
the assumptionthat the HawarIslands,severalof whichare illustratedonthe sketch mapattached
to the concession, form an integral part of the Qatar Peninsulaand accordingly of the StateofQatar. Al1 this cumulative evidence demonstrates consistent recognition by the British
Govemment,at leastupuntil early 1936,ofthe appurtenance of theHawarIslands to Qatar.
14. Now, we know that neither Belgravenor the British authoritiesin the Gulf, nor indeed
PCL asQatar'sexclusiveoil concessionaire,revealedto the Rulerof Qatarin the springor surnmer
of 1936the existenceof this forma1clairn byBahrain to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands,nor
indeed the existence of the "provisional decision" of9 July 1936 bythe British Govemment in
favourofthe Bahrainiclaim. Al1this wasquitedeliberatelykept secret fromthe Rulerof Qatar.
15.It was no doubtin consequence ofthe British "provisional decision"of 9 July 1936that
the Bahraini authorities felt confident enough in late 1936 or indeed in 1937 to embark onthe
clandestine occupationof Hawar by Bahrainipolice and securityguards, which provokedthe first
strenuous protest from the Ruler of Qatar in February 1938, whenhe became fully informed of
what Bahrain hadbeendoingon his temtory.
16. In one sense, therefore, it can be argued that the forma1crystallization of the dispute
between the two sheikhdomsoverHawaronly occurred in February 1938,whenthe Ruler of Qatar
protested against Bahrain's buildingand other activities on Hawar. But this would be to mistake
the appearance for the reality. The fact that the forma1claim by the Ruler of Bahrain to the
HawarIslands advancedon 28 April 1936had been deliberatelywithheldfrom the Ruler of Qatar,
as had the British Govemment's"provisionaldecision" of 9 July 1936 in favour of the Bahraini
claim, obviously encouragedthe Ruler of Bahrain at the timeto take activemeasuresto occupythe
main Hawar islandby stealth in late 1936or in 1937. Qataraccordinglysubmitsthat evidenceof
any activitiesembarkedupon by Bahrain after 28 April 1936with a view to sustainingits claim of
title to the Hawar Islands must be regarded as wholly inadmissible, particularly since such
activities must be viewed as amounting to an illegal occupation and exploitation ofan island
hithertorecognized,evenby the BritishGovernment,as appertainingto Qatar.
17. Even if the Court is not prepared to go quite so far as to declare evidence of these
activitiesinadmissiblein limine,they are,in Qatar'ssubmission,clearly not opposable to Qatar, the
more particularly since, as 1 will be showing later in this presentation, Qatar never- repeat
never - acquiescedinthe wrongfuloccupationof the HawarIslandsby Bahrainin the late 1930s,
whichwasin any eventkept secret from theRulerof Qataruntilhe first heard ofit in early 1938. 18.Qataraccordinglyrequests the Courf torthesereasons
(a) not to attach any weightto evidence of officia1Bahrainiactivities in or in relationto the
HawarIslands conducted after 28April 1936;
(b) in the alternative,to regard any such officia1Bahraini activities as not- 1 repeat not-
1
opposableto Qatarin thedeterminationofthe issueof sovereignty overthe HawarIslands.
Hawarin the 1940s
19.Beforeturningto considerationoftheextentto whichBahrainhasobserveditsstatusquo
commitments,there is one further point which Qatar mustmake on the relevance, if any, of
activities engaged in by the Bahrain Governmentor by Bahrain nationals on Hawar since its
occupationbyBahrain in1936or 1937. 1do not intendto go overthe groundso fullycoveredin
paragraphs3.143to 3.158 of theCounter-Memorial of Qatarand in paragraphs4.173 to 4.192 of
Reply of Qatar which are responsive tothe arguments advancedby Bahrainbased upon alleged
Bahraineffectivitéson Hawar bothpre-1936 andpost-1936. 1would however particularly drawthe
attention of the Courtto two pieces of evidence submittedby Qatar in its Reply whichprovide
strong confirmationof what Qatarhas been consistentlymaintaining conceming conditionson
Hawarin the 1930sand 1940s. The first relates to the visit whichlban,the newPoliticalAgent
in Bahrain, paid to the main Hawar island on 13December1940, less than two months after
Weightrnan'sdeparturefrom the Gulf. In paragraph4.176 of its Reply, Qatarhas reproducedhis
briefreport onthat visitasrecordedinthe IntelligenceSumrnaryof the Political Agent,Bahrainfor
the period 1to 15December1940. 1nowshowon thescreenthatbrief report. [Showpara. 132(v)
of Replyof Qatar,Ann.111.94 on screen.] Youwill see that it conhs what 1have alreadysaid
this morning aboutthe new fortand the barbedwire fence; more interestingly,however,Alban
recordsthat "a few Dawasir fromZellaqwere in residence; theyapparently likeHawarin winter
and retm to Zellaq in summer". This entirelysupportswhat Qatar has been constantlysaying
aboutthe Dowasir fiomZellaqbeingwintervisitorsonly. Thesecondpiece of evidenceconcems
s
the use madeof Hawarin the 1940sby the then ruling familyin Bahrain. In its Reply, Qatar has
producedevidenceto showthat, duringthe 1940sand early 1950s,the main island ofHawarwas
usedby Bahrainasa convenientplaceto which tobanishunrulyand recalcitrantjuniormembersofthe mling family, particularlythosewho had engagedin drunkenbehaviour. In paragraph4.189 of
its Reply, Qatar has cited apassage fromthe IntelligenceSurnrnaryof the PoliticalAgent,Bahrain,
for the period from 16to 31March 1940. The Court will note that the Political Agent during this
period was, in fact, still Weightmanwho signed thatIntelligence Sumrnary. 1 now show on the
screen Weightman'sbrief report of one of those incidents of drunkenness. [Show para.33 (i) of
Reply of Qatar, Ann.111.91on screen.] 1 draw particular attentionto the final sentence of this
report: "Thepleasures of Hawarare confinedto watching afew fishermen gut their catch,and the
result of thisaction shouldbe admirable." Now,Mr. President,this pictureof conditionson Hawar
in early 1940 is in noticeable contrastto the description of conditions on Hawar contained in
Weightman'skey letter to Fowle of 22 April 1939, onwhich the British Government relied so
heavilyin reachingtheir decisionof 11July 1939.
Statusquocommitments
20. Mr. President, 1turn nowto considerationof the extent to which Bahrain has observed
the status quo comrnitmentswhich it undertook to observe,initially, in the Second and Third
Principlesof the FrameworkPrinciplesproposedto the two Partiesby King Khalid of SaudiArabia
in 1983, andapproved on 22May 1983. The Secondof these Framework Principles providedfor
the maintenance of the statusquo anddeclaredthat any actto changethe statusquo wouldhave no
legal effect. The Secondand Third Principleswere later embodied in the 1987Agreement which
the Court itself, in its Judgmentof 1July 1994on jurisdiction and admissibility,has characterized
as an international agreement "creatingights andobligationsfor the Parties". The secondpoint of
the 1987Agreement providesthat,until a finalsettlementof the disputedmatters is reached, Qatar
and Bahrain shall abide by theprinciples of the fiameworkfor a settlementon which they agreed
on 22 May 1983,and by the followingin particular. [Showon the screen the second point ofthe
1987Agreement at Memorialof Qatar, para. 1.18.1
Mr. President,Membersof the Court, the second point ofthe 1987Agreementis now on the
screen. 1drawto the attentionofthe Courtinparticularthe contentof sub-paragraph (a):
"(a) Each party shall undertakefiom to-date to refrain fromany action that would
strengthen its legal position, weaken the legal position of the other party, or
change the status quowith regard to the disputedmatters. Any such action shall
be regarded [as]nul1andvoid andshallhaveno legal effectin this respect." 21.Notwithstandingthese clear and indeedperemptory provisions,Qatar has felt obliged,
duringtheentirecourseofthepresent proceedingsbeforetheCourt, to drawto the Court'sattention
new military and civilian activities undertaken by the Bahrain Govemment, or by private
companieswith the approval of that Govemmento , n the main island of Hawar and indeedin the
*
disputed maritime areas. Paragraphs1.16 to 1.23 of the Qatar Memorial, together with
Appendices 1, 2 and 7, provide details of the numerous protests made to Bahrain aboutthe
continuingbreaches ofthe statusquo comrnitments bythe Bahrain authorities. Paragraph 1.37of
the Qatar Counter-Mernorial,togethew r ithAppendices 1and 3 to that Counter-Memonal,draw to
the attentionof the Courtevidenceof extensivefurther constructionby Bahrain of both military
and civilian installationson Hawar in violation of the status quo comrnitments. Finally,
paragraphs1.39 to 1.44 of the Qatar Reply, together with Appendices 3and 4 to that Reply,
providefurtherevidenceof newactivitiesby Bahrainwhich are inclear violation ofthe statusquo
commitmentswhich Bahrain has formally undertaken toobserve. Reference to the relevant
passages in the Qatar Memorial,Qatar Counter-Memorial and Qatar Reply, together with the
Appendices tothese written pleadingswill be found in the transcriptof this mornings verbatim
record. To this longlitanyof Bahrain's actioninbreach ofits statusquocomrnitments, theremust
nowbe addedthe constructionby Bahrainin theearlymonthsof thepresentyear ofthreeartificial
isletsin the watersoff the westernCoastof the mainHawarisland. Qatarprotestedto Bahrainon
21 March2000 about this furtherclear breach of the status quo comrnitments which it had
undertakenas longagoas 1983,and lodgeda copyof thisprotestwiththeCourt.
22. Paragraph1.42 of the Reply of Qatar shows that it is only in recent years, and
particularlysincethe filingof Qatar's Applicationto the Court,that Bahrainhas begunto develop
civilianfacilitieson themain Hawar islandin addition tostrengtheningand extendingits military
capabilities. A palace, together with associated buildings, was constructepior to 1991. But in
recent years, there has been a considerable increasein construction activities, including the
buildingof a new military camp, a harbour, a jetty, ahotel, two groupsof chalets and othernew %
buildings. 1need not go into further detail on these continuing breachesby Bahrain ofits status
quo commitmentsas HisExcellencythe Agent for Qatar,in his opening statement, has given a
striking demonstrationofwhatBahrain hasbeendoinginrecentyearsin an efforttopresentHawaras a vital part of Bahrain's economy.
Qatar submits that, because Bahrain's more recent
construction activitieson Hawar, both military and civilian, were begun long afier the critical
period in this case, they cannot in any event, be taken into account as evidencing or confming
Bahrain'stitle to the Hawar Islands; themoreparticularlyis this so since al1constructionactivities
on Hawarby Bahrain since 1983havebeenconductedin openand flagrant breach of the statusquo
commitments which bothparties have undertaken to observe. The Court will have noted that, in
Section2.11of the Bahrain Reply, at paragraphs173to 180,Bahrain seems to take positivepride
in variousplanned or ongoing projectsforthe further economicdevelopment of Hawar,despitethe
fact that activepursuit of these projects in advance of a judgment from the Court upholding
Bahrain'stitle to Hawar would certainlyconstitute a furtherbreach by Bahrain of its status quo
commitments. It is noteworthy that, so far as Qatar canjudge, Bahrainmakes no mention of its
status quo cornrnitrnentsin any of itswrittenpleadings, andhas not soughtto respond in any way
to Qatar'srecurring charges that Bahrainis in open breach of these commitmentsby reason of its
constructionand otheractivities on Hawar. The Court will nodoubt wish to give full effectto the
second of the two FrameworkPrinciples agreedby the two Parties in 1983,as furtherclarifiedby
sub-paragraph (a) of point 2 of the 1987Agreement, already characterized by the Court in its
Judgrnent of 1July 1994 as an international agreement creating nghts and obligations for the
parties. Qataraccordinglysubmitsthat evidenceof al1constructionand other activitiesby Bahrain
on Hawar since 1936,whether militaryor civilian,has to be totally set aside, and indeed regarded
as having no legal effect, in the contextof the determinationwhich the Court has to make as to
which of the two Stateshas sovereigntyover the Hawar Islands.Having saidthis, 1would simply
wish to remind the Court of the assurance whichHis Excellencythe Agent for Qatar gave atthe
end of thatpart of his opening statementwhichwas devoted to Bahrain's continuing breaches oi fts
statusquo commitments.
NoacquiescencebyQatar
23. Mr. President, the constantly repeated chargeby Bahrain that Qatar has somehow
acquiescedin Bahrain's unlawful occupationof the HawarIslands does not bear examination for a
moment. Qatar has already given chapterandverse forthenumerous protestsmade by the RulerofQatar against the British decision of 11July 1939. The first such protest was made on
4 August 1939ina firm,but dignifiedletterto the Political Resident. A copyof this letteris now
on the screen, and you will find a copy in thejudges' folders [Mernoriao lf Qatar,Ann.111.21 1,
Vol. 8,pp. 50-521.TheCourtwill notethat theRulerassertsforcefullythat theHawarIslands
i
"do not belongto Bahrain accordingto their naturaland geographical position; that
they neither were detachedfrom theirmother Qatar, nor didthey cut themselvesoff
fromher; andthe Governent ofBahrainneither conquerednor invaded them except
in recent times when they found circumstances tobe favourableand transgressedon
the Islands with aview to usurpingthemunder a false claimwhich is contraryto al1
facts andprinciples".
The Ruler then goes on to point out that he could have physically prevented the unlawful
occupationof theislandsbyBahrain:
"1 was able to prevent them fromdoing this transgressionat the time, but 1
resorted to commonsense and relying upon the fkiendship of His Majesty's
Govemmentand theirsupport in rightfulquestions, and withthis belief, 1submitted
myprotestand acomplaintto theproperquartersonthis subject."
This is of course a reference to the oral protest which the Ruler made to Weightmanin
February1938about Bahrain'sactivitiesonHawar,includingthe building ofa fort; and the Court
is certainlyawarehow Weightman didnotevenreportthis oralprotestin writingto his superiorin
the Gulf, Fowle, until 15May 1938, some three months later. No wonder that Prior, who
succeededFowle asPoliticalResident,atthebeginning of September 1939w , ashorrifiedwhenhe
saw the file, commenting in a manuscriptminutethat "1havelittle doubt thata grave miscarriage
of justice has occurred"". Although the Rulerasked for the question to be reconsidered,Prior,
despitehis private sympathyfor the Ruler andbarely concealeddistaste for the machinationsof
Weightman, repliedto thisprotest on 25 September1939,statingthat the decisionof 11July 1939
was final and could not be reopened. Possibly anticipatingthis response, however, theRuler
concludedhis letterof4 August 1939byrese~ng forhimself his"rightsto theHawarislands until
the true position has becomeclear". He wouldnot have anticipatedthen that more than 60 years
wouldelapsebeforethe truepositionhadbecomeclear.
24. The Ruler of Qatar was of course far from content with Prior's reply of s
25 September1939to his initial letter of protest. So he penned another letter of protest to the
"~emorialofQatar,Ann. 111.21V,ol. 8,p. 53.Political Resident dated18November 193912.[1now showa copyof this letteron the screenanda
copy of the leîter will similarly be found in the judges'folders as document No. 54.1 The Ruler
displays some anger at the dismissive replywhich he had received fiom the Political Residentto
his first protest-of 4 August 1939, but continues by saying, among other things, that "it is
impossible for me to keep quiet and to submit in such a matter". Despite the evidence to the
contrarywhich shouldalreadyhave becomeapparentto him,he continues:
"1cannotperceivethat HisMajesty'sGovement would forcibly takethe rights
of one to giveto the otherbecauseof my knowledgeof their honourable attitudein al1
matters."
But possibly anticipatingthat his renewed protest would not be heeded, he irnrnediately follows
this bymakinga comprehensive and sweepingreservationofhis rightswith respectto Hawarinthe
followingterms:
"1therefore begto informYour Honourthat 1neither recognize nor submit that
the Bahrain Governmenthavethe leastlawfulconnectionwith the HawarIslands,and
that 1 view whatever measure which have been lately taken by the Bahrain
Governmentas a challengeandan encroachmentuponmy rights against which 1most
strongly protest, and therefore, as 1have informedyou before, 1reserve my rights to
the Hawar Islands while not recognizing any measure which may be taken in
them.. ."
There could hardly be a more comprehensive reservation ofrights than this. Moreover, the
language used demonstratesthat it was designed tobe a once-for-al1reservationof rights applying
to al1 subsequent actions by Bahrain in or in relation to the Hawar Islands which couldbe
interpreted as encroaching upon or adversely affecting the Rulerof Qatar's continuing rights to
sovereigntyoverthe islands.
25. The Ruler of Qatar nonetheless returned to the chargeon 7 June 1940, when he sent a
further letter of protest to Weightman as Political Agent inBahrain, this time complaining of the
abductionof a number of Qatari citizensfromthe WestCoastof the mainland of Qatarby the crew
of eightboats whichusually anchorat Hawar. TheRuler viewedsuch acts as "a clear aggression",
andthreatenedto take effectivemeasures touphold Qatar'shonourand his own and to preservehis
rights against repeatedaggressionby Bahrain againsthis coasts13
I2h?emorialof Qatar,Ann.113,Vol.8,pp. 62-63.
'3~emorialof Qatar,Ann.111.2, ol8,p. 85. 26. In response to an enquiryfrom the PoliticalAgent inBahrainin early July 1946as to
whetherhe claimedtitle to Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah, the Ruler of Qatar replied in the
affirmativeon 13July 1946. But he took thisopportunityto reiterate his claimof titleto the Hawar
i
Islands: "You see that Qatar hasbeen treatedunjustlyin her clear rightin the questionof [the]
*
HawarIslandswhich 1amstilltenaciousto claim their ownership ..."14
27. Finally,wehavethe Ruler ofQatar'sresponse of 21February1948,to the letterfromthe
Political Agentin Bahrainof 23 December 1947,notikng himofthecourseofthe so-called " 1947
line"delimitingthe boundarybetween the areas of seabed appertainingto the Ruler of Qatarand
thoseappertainingtotheRulerof Bahrain.
Two exceptionsofcourseweremadeto the 1947line itself:
(i) the areasoftheDibalandJaradahshoals whichare abovethe spring-tide low-water level
areregardedasfalling withinthe"sovereignrights" ofthe Ruler of Bahrain;
(ii) HawarIsland, theother islandsof the Hawargroup (butnot Jananwhich is not regarded
as being includedin the islandsof the Hawargroup), andthe territorial waterspertaining
to suchislands,are alsoregardedas falling within the "sovereign rights" otfhe Ruler of
Bahrain.
Inresponseto thisnotification,the Ruler of Qatar,in his letterof 21February1948to thePolitical
Agent in Bahrain (whichis now being shownon the screen and a copy of which is also in the
judges'folders asdocumentNo. 55)revertsto his consistent positiononthequestion ofsovereignty
overthe HawarIslands:
"However,1like to invite Your Excellency'sattention to the correspondence
exchanged some ten years ago on the subject of Hawar (Island)and the clear
representation1maderegarding itspositionin my letter submittedto His Excellency
the Political Agent,[in]Bahrain,atthe time, inwhich1expoundedmy points ofview
in regard to thisIslandwhich is a part of Qatar andin which 1expressedmy protest
against thebehavioursof [the]BahrainGovernment. ButH.M.'sGovenunentactedas
they wished, and1hadnothingbut to submit, reserving in themeantimeto myselfmy
own rights."'5
28. Now,Mr.President,1have two observationsto make on this citation fiom the letter of
21 February 1948. In the firstplace, the cross-referencemade bythe Ruler of Qatar is clearlyto
'4~emonal of Qatar,Ann111.24V,ol8,p.203.
'S~emonalof Qatar,Ann.111.25V,ol.8p.277.his earlyprotest letter of 27 May 1938to the Political Agent, following up hisfirst protest letterto
the PoliticalAgent of 10May 193816.In hisfollow-upletter of 27 May 1938,the Ruler Statesinter
alia that: "The Bahrain Governmenthave onlyrecently occupied[the Hawar islands] which fact
made memove in the matterand submitprotestsagainstit."I7 The Rulergoes on to state:
"1 do not know on what ground the Bahrain Govemment took such steps in
these islands recentlywhich mademe objectagainstthem. O! Political Agent! for a
long time this island was free fiom any interference or undertakings which attract
attention and cause resentment, but remained like other islands. Some fishermen,
however,visit this islandwhentheygoto thesea for fishingasthey do in otherislands
whichis considered ausual practice."
29. The secondobservation1wouldmakeon the Ruler of Qatar'sletter of 21February 1948
is to draw attention to the sentence which immediately follows his clear protest against the
behaviour of the Bahrain Government. That sentence reads: "ButH.M.'sGovernment actedas
they wished, and 1 had nothing but to submit, reserving in the meantime to myself my own
rights."18 The use of the word "submit"in this sentence,if read in isolation from the rest of the
letter, could in theory be read as suggesting a degree of acquiescenceon the partof Qatar in the
situation resulting fiom the British decision of 11July 1939. But this would be a wholly false
interpretationof the Ruler'sthought. As Qatar haspointed outin its Memorial,the word "submit",
when considered in the context of the rest of the letter "conveys not the sense of voluntary
acceptancebut of pure incapacity toprocurea reversa1of what had been decided" by the British
30. Al1these separatepieces of evidence,Mr.President, showconclusivelythat the Ruler of
Qatarnever acceptedor acquiescedin theBritishdecisionof 11July 1939in favour of the Bahrain
claimto the Hawar Islands. This is notjust Qatar'sview of the matter. It is also the analysisof the
British Governent in the year 1964. In that year, Mr.Frank Brenchley,the then head of Arabian
Department, in the Foreign Office, put up a submission to his Assistant or DepuQ
Under-Secretary- 1 cannot remember exactly what he really was at the time- Sir Stewart
Crawford, on the BahraidQatar seabed dispute on 6July 1964. Although the submission
'6~emorialof QataAnn. 111.15, ol7,p.253.
"~emorial of QatarAnn.111.15, ol7,p.285.
'*~emorialof QataAnn.111.25, ol.8p.277.
I%lemorial f Qatar, p6..242.concentratedonthe seabed dispute,it referredincidentallyto the dispute over the Hawar Islandsin
the following tems (the relevantpart of this document is now being shown on the screen, it is
Qatar'sSupplementalDocument No. 17)and1quote fromthatdocument:
"TheRuler of Qataris likely, whenpresented withthe Bahraini claim,to make
the counter-proposa1that Hawar Island should also be included in the tems of
reference of the arbitration. Hawar Island,which lies close to the Western coast of
Qatar and is almost linkedwith it at low tide, was awarded byH.M.G. to Bahrain in
1939 in a manner similar to that used for the 1947 line, and the Qataris havenever
acquiescedin that award. Were it to be included in the arbitration and awarded to
Qatar, the BahraidQatar median line would be much simplerto dra~."~' (Emphasis
added.)
31. Here then is clear recognitionby a senior official in the Foreign Office that Qatar had
never acquiescedin the British Govemment'sdecision of 11July 1939in favour of the Bahraini
claim to the HawarIslands. To set against it, Bahraincan onlyinvoke a hearsay report mentioned
in a letter fiom Mr. MorganMan in the British Residency, Bahrain, to Mr. Beaumont of
21 February 1961,that "ShaikhAhmad toldthe Political Residentrecently that he did not contest
Ourdecisionon~awar"~'. As thisunlikely second-hand report irnmediately follows a reference by
Mr. Man to "ShaikhAhmad'sthreatto take both Hawarand Zubarato internationalarbitration",no
credence can be attached to it. Qatar has already characterizedMr.Man's statementto the effect
that Hawar "isatleast one problemwe managedto get settled"asbeing "pure wishfùlthinking",no
doubt stimulatedby his wish not to see a combination of thedisputes over Hawar and Zubarah
goingto arbitration.Unfortunately,Mr. Man'sdesire for a quietlifehad an adverse effect uponhis
judgment atthe time.
32. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, this concludesQatar's firstround presentationon
the question of the Hawar Islands. 1would respectfullyrequest you,Mr. President, tocal1now on
ProfessorDavidwho will begintoaddressyou onthe issue of Zubarah.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir Ian. Je donne maintenant la parole au
5.
ProfesseurDavid.
ZO~upplemenD taolcumentsofQata, oc. 17,para.10.
"~emorial ofBahrain,Ann.299,Vol. 5,p. 1212. M. DAVID : Merci Monsieurle président. Monsieurle président, Madame, Messieurs de la
Cour,
1.C'estun honneur pour moi,non seulementde comparaître à nouveau devant la Cour,mais
aussi de m'exprimerau nom de 1'Etatde Qatar. C'est presqueun plaisir carje ne pense pas quela
partie du dossierqu'ilm'appartient de traiter,c'est-à-direlarevendicationde Bahreïn sur larégion
de Zubarah, soitlaplus compliquée à présentermême sielleest sansdoute laplus surprenante.
Monsieurleprésident, Madame,Messieurs lesjuges,
Cette revendication a hantéa ,u proprecomme au figuré ,es relations entre Bahreïn et Qatar
pendant trois quarts de siècle,de 1873 à 1954, et on la pensait totalement éteintedepuis 1954'.
Certes, Bahreïn avait réintroduitcette revendication auprèsdes Britanniques en 1957 et en 1961,
mais ceux-ci l'avaient chaque fois rejetée[dossier d'audience, n0Y8-591, et les Britanniques
n'avaient même pas jugé utiled'aviser ~ata? de cette revendicationtant ils considéraient cette
affairecommeréglée depuis longtemps.
2. D'ailleurs, lorsqu'en 1964 Bahreïn et Qatar avaient tentéde trouver un accord pour
soumettre au règlementarbitral ou judiciaire l'ensemble de leur contentieux territorial3,Bahreïn
n'avaitpas fait la moindre allusionàZubarah,et il allait encores'écouler vingt-quatreans, de 1964
à 1988,avant que Bahreïn n'exhume un revenanq tue l'on croyaitemportépar le vent du désert et
le souMede 17~istoire4.
3. Il s'agitd'ailleurs autantd'unrevenantque d'unmutantcar l'objet de la revendicationn'a
cesséde varier au fil des ans selon les humeursde Bahreïn :présentée au départ,en 1873,comme
une réclamation desuzerainetésurune tribufréquentantlarégionde zubarahs, la revendicationva
devenir une réclamationde souverainetésur lesite de zubarah6,puis revenir à une réclamation de
droits dejuridiction personnellesur lesNa'ïmde 2ubarah7,puis se limiter à une réclamationsoitde
'MémoirdeeQatarp, ar.8.51S.
'MémoirdeeQatar,par.8.52-8.54
3~émoirede Qatar, compétenecterecevabip,ar.3.01 ets.
4 .
Ibid.,annexe11.2, ol. III,p. 141.
'~émoiredeQatar,annexeILS,vol.4, p. 187.
'?bid.,p. 189.
'MémoirdeeQatar, annexe11.297v,ol. 8,p.491.droitsde propriété privéesur des ruines dezubarah8, soit dedroitsde pâtureet d'usage depiègesà
poissons à zubarah9,avant deprendreen 1988la forme,pour le moins originale, d'une réclamation
indéfinieoù Bahreïn se réservele droit de demander le maximum possiblesans autre précision'0.
Bref, on ne peutpas dire que la rigueur et la sécuritjuridique ontété les vertus dominantes d'une
réclamation quidéfietout effort dequalification.
4. Maisil n'y a pas quel'objetde la revendication,Monsieurle président,qui a variédansle
temps; il y a aussison étendue. Si, aujourd'hui, c'estla souverainetéque Bahreïn revendiquesur
zubarah", le revenant a pris du corps puisque la revendication qui portait au déparstur le site de
l'ancienneville de Zubarah, s'étend désonnais à un temtoire qui correspondàplus du tiers de la
principaleîle de Bahreïn et àprèsdu quadruple de la surfacedes îles Hawar, comme vouspouvez
le constater!
Quand on sait que déjà,en 1948, les Britanniques disaient, non sans ironie, que cette
revendicationn'avait pas plus de valeur que celle de l'Iran sur ~ahreïn", on comprendqu'il n'est
pas nécessaired'épiloguerlonguementsurle sérieuxd'une réclamation quiintervient dans de telles
conditions : il s'agit d'une tactique judiciaire dont S. Exc., l'agent de Qatar, a déjà expliqué
l'objectif. Le seul résultatmatérielde cette stratégieconsiste pour l'instanà alourdir et allonger
considérablement tant la phaseécritequelaphase oraledecetteprocédure.
Pardonnez-moi, Monsieurleprésident,de rappelerle contextede cette revendication,maisje
devais faire ce rappel pour expliquer le malaise que 1'011éprouve à présenterun ensemble
d'évidencespourquiconqueconnaît untant soitpeu la situationde Zubarah.
5. Une dernièreremarque :la revendication sur Zubarah remonte à 1873et les documents
d'archives qui s'y rapportent comprennent des milliers de pages; non - répétons-l e que la
question fûtdifficile puisque d'embléeles Britanniquesont estimé quela réclamationde Bahreïn
étaitsans fondement, mais il est vrai aussi que certains fonctionnaires britanniques ne l'ont pas
toujours dit avec suffisamment de clarté à Bahreïn, ce qui peut expliquer l'acharnement,
8~émoirede Qatar, annexe111.vo0. 8p. 291.
'Mémoirede Bahreïn,vol4,p. 798-799.
'OMémoirdee Qatar, compétenceet recevabilité,annex1olIIIp,203.
1Mémoirede Bahreïn,par. 34etp. 301.
12~émoirede Qatar, annexe1112vol. 8p. 298.l'obstinationde Bahreïn. Dansces conditions,et vu cette immense documentation, il est possible
de consacrerdes volumes entiers la seulequestion de Zubarahet de plaiderpendant desheureà
son sujet. Eu égard au tempimparti auxplaidoiries, laCournem'en voudrasans doutepas de me
confinerà l'essentiel etde ne pasaborderledétaildetouslespoints soulesar nosadversaires.
6. Le présentexposé,Monsieur le président, sera divisen quatre parties où j'aborderai
successivement l'histoire dsrigines deZubarah, puis lefondementdutitrede Qatar surZubarah,
ensuite la confirmation de ce titre, et enfin le fondement des argumentsde Bahreïn basés
principalementsurles liens tribauxde l'émirdeBahreïn aveclatribu desNaïm.
1.HISTOIR DEES ORIGINES DE ZUBARAH
7.Bahreïn prétend que Zubarah aurait été créar es AI-Khalifah13u,ne fraction de la tribu
desUtubi,venusdu Koweït,lorsqu'ilss'établirent sur cette partie de la pénuleQatar en 1766.
Bien que cette questionne soit pas fondamentale pour déterminer la souverastér Zubarah,on
observeranéanmoinsquecetteréclamationdepaternitésurZubarah par Bahreïnest déjàdouteuse.
S'il est certain que la ville de Zubarah s'est commercialement développaperès l'anivéedes
Al-Khalifah,il n'est nullementprouvéque c'est eux qui ontcrééla ville. Bien au contraire,
Lorimersuggèreque Zubarahexistaitdéjàen 1766,lorsqu'ilécrit que c'estàcette époque queles
UtubiarrivèrentàzubarahI4.
Arriver à Zubarah, ce n'estpas fonder Zubarah. Un auteur citépar Bahreïn reconnaît
d'ailleurs quela villeauraitpu déjà existerun siècleavant l'ades Al-Khalifahl5.Et si le lieu
d'origine d'une tribudevaitjustifier desdroitsterritoriauxparticulierssur ce lieu d'origine, onse
demande pourquoi Bahreïnne réclameraitpas aussi des droits sur les parties du Koweït d'où
provientlafamilledes Al-Khalifah.
8. Le développementcommercialrapide de Zubarah après1766 vaentraîner des rivalités,
puisun conflit ouvertavecles Perses quioccupaient alorsl'île de Bahreïn. Les Al-Khalifah, alliés
"contre-mémoire de Bahreïn,par.63.
''~émoirede Qatar,annexe11.4,vol. 3,p. 141.
15~ontre-mé~oideBahreïn,annexe 115-116,vol. 2,p. 366.à d'autres tribusqatariennes,vont alors envahirBahreïn en 1783.ls vonten expulserles Perseset
y transférerleurquartiergénéraqlui,jusqu'alors, étaitituàzubarah16.
La région n'est cependan ptas de toutrepos. En 1800,les Al-Khalifahsont chassés à leu Y
tour de l'île de Bahreïnpar Mascate;ils reviennentbrièvement à Zubarah, le temps de reprendre
leurs espritset surtout dereprendreBahreïnen 1801grâce àl'aidedeswahhabisl'.
9. Les jours de Zubarah sont désormaiscomptés. En 1809, ce sont les Wahhabisqui
s'installent dans laville et quirestent jusqu'en1811. Mascateprofite alors de leur départpour
prendreZubarahet l'incendier1*.
C'estla fin deZubarahen tant que villeeton n'enparle plusen dehorsd'unbrefpassage sur
le site alors déserten 1842-1843de deux cheikhs rivaux de~ahreïn'~. La chronique n'évoquera
plus Zubarahavant 1873,lorsque les Turcs exigentque les Naïmsprésents sur le site leurfassent
allégeance2'.
10. Cette brève évocationM , onsieurle président, des originse Zubarahtend à montrer,
premièrement,que les Al-Khalifahn'ont occupéZubarah que de manière brève etintermittente,
entre 1766et 1783,puisde 1800 à 1801et en 1842-1843,deuxièmementq ,ue lesWahhabis sesont
installés dansla villeen 1809,puis que celle-ci aété détrutar Mascateen 1811et qu'àpartir de
ce moment, la ville a cesséd'exister commetelle. Indépendammentdes événements qui vont
suivre, une occupationaussi fragmentairecaractérisée padres abandonssuccessifs dansune zone
de nomadisation neparaîtpas de nature àpouvoirjustifier des titres particuliersde propriétée,t
encoremoinsde souveraineté sur leslieux.
11.Bahreïnest d'autant moins fondé à seprévaloir desonpassage à Zubarah pour invoquer
des droits historiquessur le site que les Al-Khalifahn'étaientpas la seule tribu à fréquenter
Zubarah. Parmi les tribus présentessur les lieuxse trouvaient les Ma'adid dont faisait partie
Thanibin Muhammad,l'ancêtre éponyme de l'actuelle famillerégnandees ~l-~hani~làQatar.
"~émoiredeQatarp, ar.3.18 et8.10.
"~étnoiredeQatar,annexeIL5,vol. 3,p.248-249.
18~érnoireeQatar, ar.3.19;Mémoire eatar,annexe11.5,vol.3,p. 196-198.
IgMémoirdeeQatar,annexe11.5,vol. 3,p.206.
2Mémoird eeQatar,annexe11.7,vol.4,p.53.
21~ontre-mémoidreQatar,par.2.24. Ce n'estdonc pas l'histoiretourmentéedeZubarahde 17à61811,puis sonretour au désert
après 1811quipourraientjustifierlesactuellesprétentioBahreïn.
Je voudrais aborder, simplement aborder parce queje pense que le temps avance, la
deuxièmepartiedecet exposéquiestle fondementdutitrede Qatar surZubarah.
II.FONDEME NUTTITRE DE QATAR SURZUBARAH
12.Le fondementdutitrede Qatar surZubarahse confond avec l'établissement de l'autorité
des Al-Thani sur l'ensemblede la péninsule. Cette autorité, quiest reconnuedèsle milieu du
XIX' sièclez2,trouve une consécration officielle dans raitésconclus séparémentpar les
Britanniques avec BahreïnetQataren 1868,et encorelorsde lasoumissionde QatarauxOttomans
en 1871. Etantdonné que c'est l'ensemblde lapéninsule donton reconnaîtle détachement de
Bahrein,etnonune partiecommes'efforcede le fairecroirenos adversaires,la situationjuridique
de Zubarahsuitcellede l'ensemblede la péninsu:accessoriumsequiturprincipale(l'accessoire
suitle principal). Ce point,quisuffitàfonder letitre de Qatarsur Zubarah,aprésentépar
Me Pilkingtonla semainepassée,etmonexposépourraits'arrêteirci.
Mais, mêmesi l'on prétendisoler le cas de Zubarah dureste de la péninsule, l'histoire
montre queBahreinne peut seprévaloid'aucun droit surce lieuet que le titre deQatar vatrouver
une large confirmationentre 1873 et 1878, six années richesen événementsrubarah et qui
peuvent être divisées en trois pér:l'année1873,les années1874et 1875,et l'année1878.
Chacuned'ellesconfirmel'appartenancede Zubarah Qatar.
Monsieurle président, peut-êtqeue vous trouverezpréférabque je laisse ici planer le
suspensesur ce quis'est passéau coursde ces annéeset queje m'interrompeici sauf contre-ordre
devotrepart.
LePRESIDENT :C'estuneheureusesuggestion.Je vous remercie, Monsieurle professeur,
laCoursuspendsaséance,ellelareprendracetaprès-midià 15heures.
L'audienceestlevéea 13heures.
22~ontre-mémoee Qatar,par.2.25.
Audience publique tenue le lundi 5 juin 2000, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président