Non-Corrigé
Unco rrected
International Court Courinternationale
deJustice
ofJustice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2000
Public sitting
heldonMonday13November 2000, at10am, atthePeace Palace,
PresidentGuillaumeesiding
in theLaGrandCase
(Germanyv.UnitedStatesofAmerica)
VERBATIMRECORD
Audiencepublique
tenuelelundi 13 novembre2000,0heures,auPalaisdelaPak,
souslaprésidendeM. Guillaume,président
en l'affairerand
(Allemagnec.Etats Unisd'Amérique)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Registrar CouvreurPrésents:M. Guillaume, résident
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,uges
M. Couvreur,reffierTheGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicof Germanyisrepresentedby:
Mr. GerhardWestdickenberg,Director General for Legal Affairs and Legal Adviser, Federal
ForeignOffice,
H.E.Mr.EberhardU.B. von Puttkamer,Arnbassadorof the Federal Republicof Germanyto the
KingdomoftheNetherlands,
asAgents;
Mr.BrunoSimma,ProfessorofPublic InternationalLaw atthe UniversityofMunich,
as Co-AgentandCounsel;
Mr.Pierre-ManeDupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas)and atteEuropeanUniversity InstituteFlorence,
Mr. DonaldFrancisDonovan,Debevoise& Plimpton,NewYork,
Mr. Hans-PeterKaul,HeadofthePublic International LaDivision,FederalForeign Office,
Dr.DanielKhan, UniversityofMunich,
Dr.AndreasPaulus,UniversityofMunich,
as Counsel;
Dr.EberhardDesch,FederalMinistryofJustice,
Dr.S.JohannesTromrner,Embassy oftheFederal Republic ofGermanyintheNetherlands,
Mr.AndreasGotze,Federal ForeignOffice,
asAdviser;
MsFiona Sneddon,
asAssistant.
TheGovernmentofthe UnitedStatesofAmerica isrepresentedby:
Mr.James H. Thessin,Acting LegalAdviser,UnitedStatesDepartmentof State,
asAgent;
Ms CatherineW. Brown,AssistantLegalAdviserfor Consular Affairs, UnitedStatesDepartment
of State,Le Gouvernemend t e laRépubliquefédéra de4llemagneestrepresentépar :
M. GerhardWestdickenberg, directeur générd als affairesjuridiques et conseillerjuridiquedu
ministèrefédéraldesaffairestrangères,
S. Exc.M. Eberhard U. B.von Puttkamer,ambassadeur de la République fédérale d'Allemagne
auprèsdu Royaume desPays-Bas,
commeagents;
M. BrunoSimma,professeurde droitinternationalpublial'universitédeMunich,
commecoagentet conseil;
M.Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit international public à l'université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assase)tàl'Institut universitaire européen, Florence,
M.DonaldFrancis Donovan,du cabinetDebevoise & Plimpton,NewYork,
M.Hans-Peter Kaul, chefde la division dudroit international public du ministère fédral
affairesétrangères,
M.Daniel Khan,del'universitédeMunich,
M. AndreasPaulus,del'universitédeMunich,
commeconseils;
M. EberhardDesch,duministèrefédéradlelajustice,
M. S.JohannesTrommer,de l'ambassade de la Républiqu fedérale'Allemagne aux Pays-Bas,
M. AndreasGotze, duministèrefédéral deasffairesétrangères,
commeconseillers;
MmeFionaSneddon,
commeassistante.
Le Gouvernementdes Etats Unisd'Amérique estrepresentépar:
M. James H. Thessin, conseiller juridique par intérim du départemdt'Etat des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique,
commeagent;
Mme Catherine W. Brown, conseillerjuridique adjoint chargé des affairesconsulaires au
départementd'EtatdesEtats-Unis d'Amérique,Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, United States
Departmentof State,
asDeputyAgents;
1
TheHonourable Janet Napolitano, Attorney-Genera Slt,ateofArizona,
ProfessorMichaelJ. Matheson, Professor of InternationLlaw,Schoolof Advanced International
Studies,Johns HopkinsUniversity; formerActingLegal Adviser,UnitedStatesDepartmentof
State,
Professor Theodor Meron, Counselloron InternationalLaw, United StatesDepartment of State;
CharlesL. DenisonProfessorof International Law,New York University; Associate Member
ofthe InstituteofInternationalLaw,
ProfessorStefanTrechsel,Professorof CriminalLawandProcedure, Universityof Zurich Faculty
ofLaw,
as CounselandAdvocates;
Professor ShabtaiRoseme, Memberof the Israel Bar; HonoraryMemberof theAmericanSociety
ofInternational Law; Membeo rfthe InstituteofInternational Law,
MsNorma B. Martens,AssistantAttorney-General,StateofArizona,
Mr.PaulJ.McMurdie,AssistantAttorney-General,Stateof Arizona,
Mr.RobertJ. Erickson, Principal Deputy Chief, Appellate Section,Criminal Division, United
StatesDepartmentof Justice,
Mr. AllenS.Weiner, Counsellorfor Legal Affairs,Embassyofthe UnitedStatesofAmericain the
Netherlands,
Ms JessicaR. Holmes, Attaché, Officoef the Counsellor for Legal Affai, mbassyof theUnited
StatesofAmericain theNetherlands,
as Counsel.M. D. Stephen Mathias, conseiller juridique adjoint chargdées questions concernant les
Nations Unies au département'Etatdes Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
commeagentsadjoints;
L'honorableJanetNapolitano,Attorney-Generadle 1'Etatde l'Arizona,
M.MichaelJ. Matheson,professeurde droit internationaàla Schoolof AmtancedInternational
Studiesde la Johns HopkinsUniversity, anciconseillerjuridique par intérdu département
d'Etatdes Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
M.Theodor Meron,conseillerchargédesquestionsde droitinternationalau département'Etatdes
Etats-Unis d'Amériquet,itulaire de la chaire CharL.sDenison de droit internationaà la
New YorkUniversity,membreassociéde l'Institutde droitinternational,
M.Stefan Trechsel, professeur dedroit pénalet de procédurepénale à la facultéde droit de
l'universitédeZurich,
commeconseilsetavocats;
M.Shabtai Rosenne, membre du barreau israélien, memb hrenoraire deI'AmericanSociewof
Internationalaw,membredel'Institutde droit international,
MmeNorma B.Martens, Attorney-General adjoidte1'Etatde l'Arizona,
M.PaulJ.McMurdie,Attorney-General adjoint de 1'Etatde l'Arizona,
M. RobertJ. Erickson,chef principal adjointàla sectiondes recours dela divisiondu droitpénal
du départemendte lajusticedesEtats-Unisd'Amérique,
M.AllenS.Weiner, conseiller auxaffairesjuridiquesl'ambassade desEtats-UnisauxPays-Bas,
MmeJessicaR. Holmes,attachée au cabined tuconseillerauxaffairesjuridiquesl'ambassadedes
Etats-UnisauxPays-Bas,
commeconseils. LePRESIDENT :Veuillezvousasseoir. Laséanceestouverte.
La Courseréunit aujourd'hue inapplicationdes articles 4347 de son Statutpourentendre
L
les Parties en leurs plaidoiries dans l'affaire LaGrand (Républiqufédérale d'Allemagnc e.
Etats-UnisdAmérique).
La République fédérad l'Allemagne a porté la présenteaffaire devant la Courpar une
requêteintroductive d'instance contre leGouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amériqu deéposéeau
Greffe le 2 mars 1999, en raison de violations alléguéedse la convention de Viennesur les
relationsconsulairesdu 24 avril1963. Danscetterequête, l'Allemagnfeait valoir quedeuxde ses
ressortissants,. Karl LaGrand et M. Walter LaGrand,ont été déclarés coupabled se certains
crimeset condamnés à mort dans 1'Etatde l'Arizona aux Etats-Unis d'Amériqu sens avoir été
informésdes droitsà l'assistanceconsulaireque leur garantissaitl'alinéab) duparagraphepremier
de l'article36 de la conventionde Viennesur les relationsconsulaires. LaRépubliquefédérale
d'Allemagne soutenait que les Etats-Unis d'Amérique avaien ptarlà mêmevioléplusieurs
obligationsdécoulandtu droit international.
Pour fonder la compétence dela Cour, l'Allemagne invoquaitd ,ans sa requête, l'article
premierdu protocole de signaturefacultativeconcemant lerèglementobligatoiredes différends,
qui accompagne la conventionde Viennesur lesrelations consulaires. Cetrticle estainsi libellé
«Les différends relatifsà l'interprétation oà l'applicationde la convention relèventde la
compétenceobligatoire dela Cour internationalede Justice,qui,àce titre,pourra êtresaisiepar
une requêtede toute partie au différendqui sera elle-même partie au présentprotocole.)) Et
l'Allemagnede préciserque tant lesEtats-Unis qu'elle-mêm etaient partiesla convention de
Vienneet auditprotocolede signaturefacultative.
Le jour même dudépôt de sarequête introductivd e'instance,l'Allemagnea également
déposéune demande en indicationdemesures conservatoires atitre de l'article 41 duStatut de la
Cour. Dans sa demande,elle indiquait queKarl LaGrandavait été exécut le 24 février1999et
quela datede l'exécutiondeWalterLaGrandavaitété fixé au lendemainde la demande, àsavoir
le 3 mars 1999. Compte tenude l'extrême urgenc et du fait que l'exécutionde WalteraGrand
auraitportéun préjudice irréparablaeux droitsrevendiqués par l'Allemagne acas particulier, laCour a rendule 3 mars 1999une ordonnanceindiquant desmesures conservatoires conformém ent
l'article41de son Statutetau paragraphe premier l'article75de son Règlement.Auxtermesde
cette ordonnance, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique devaient prendre toutes les mesures dont ils
disposaientpour que M.WalterLaGrandne soit pas exécuté tan qtue la décisiondéfinitiveen la
présenteinstancen'aurait pas étéendue,et devaient porterla connaissancede la Cour toutes les
mesuresquiauraient étéprisesen applicationde ladite ordonnance.
Par lettre du mars 1999, l'ambassade deE stats-Unisd'Amérique a informéla Cour des
mesuresprises relativementà cette ordonnance. La lettre précisait, eneutre, qu'une copie de
l'ordonnancede la Cour avait éttransmisepar le départementd'Etatau gouverneur del'Arizona
lejour même où celle-cil'avaitrendue; que,compte tenudel'heureextrêmemen tardiveà laquelle
l'ordonnancede la Cour avait étreçue,aucune autredémarche n'avaip tu êtreentreprise;et que,
dansla soiréedu 3mars 1999, M. WalterLaGrandavaitété exécuté.
Par ordonnancedu 5 mars 1999,des délais pourle dépôtd'un mémoirede la République
fédérale d'Allemagne etd'un contre-mémoiredes Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont étéfixés; ces
documents ont étédûmentdéposés dans les déla psescrits. A lasuite du dépôt deces pièces,le
présidentde la Coura rencontré les agents dParties en applicatiode l'article du Règlement
de la Cour,afin de s'informerde leursvues concernantles questionsde procédureen l'espèce;
l'Allemagne a indiqué, ac uours de cette réunion, qu'ellesouhaitaitpas produirede piècede
procédureadditionnelleet lesEtats-Unisont ajoutéqu'il en était dès lorsmêmeen ce qui les
concerne. L'affaire s'est donc trouvée entatet les dates de laprocédureorale ont fixées, la
CourayantconsultélesPartiessurl'organisation decetteprocédure.
Par lettre reçueau Greffe le 26 octobre2000, l'agentde l'Allemagne aexprimé levŒude
son gouvernementde produire cinq documents nouveaux conformémen at x dispositions de
l'article56 du Règlement dela Cour. Copiede cettelettre et desdocuments qui étaientjointsa
été communiquée à l'autrePartie, pour lui permettre de formutoutes observations qu'elleeût
souhaitéfaire en vertudu paragraphe premierde l'article56 du Règlement dela Cour. Par lettredu6 novembre2000, l'agentdes Etats-Unisd'Amérique a faitsavoià la Cour que lesEtats-Unis
acceptaient la productiondes premier et deuxième documents,mais non celle des troisième,
quatrième et cinquièmedocuments;dans cette lettre lesEtats-Unis d'Amériquent réservéleur
droità soumettreun ouplusieursdocumentsen rapportavecles documents nouveaux produits par
l'Allemagne, conformémea nt paragraphe3 de l'article56 du Règlementde la Cour. Dans une
lettre datéedunovembre 2000, l'agendt e l'Allemagne a formuldesobservationssur cette lettre
de l'agent desEtats-Unis d'Amériquea ,uxquelles celui-ci a réagidans une nouvelle lettre
égalemend t atéedu7 novembre2000.
En l'absence d'objectionde la part des Etats-Unis d'Amériquel,a Cour n'avait pas,
conformémentau paragraphe 1 de l'article56 du Règlement,à autoriser formellement la
productiondes premieret deuxième documents.En ce qui concenieles troisième,quatrièmeet
cinquièmedocuments,la Cour a décidé, en application du paragraphe de2l'article6 de son
Règlement, d'autoriserleur production par l'Allemagne, étant entendu que les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique auraient, conformémen atuparagraphe3 de l'article56du Règlement,a possibildeé
présenterultérieurementesobservationsà ce sujet etde soumettredesdocumentsàl'appuideces
observations. Cettedécision aétdûmentcommuniquée aux Partiespar lettresdu Greffieren date
du 9 novembre 2000. En outre,je souhaiteraisà présent préciser que, l'Allemagne n'ayant fait
connaître que très tard son souhait de produire des documents nouveaux,les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique pourronts ,'ils le désirent,soumettre leurs nouveaux documents ainsi que leurs
observationsà cet égardnon seulement lors de la procédure orleais encoreaprèsla clôture de
celle-ci, par écrit.
.
Aprèss'êtrerenseignée auprèd ses Parties, la Cour a enfin décidé, conformément aux
dispositionsdu paragraphe 2de l'article de son Règlement, quedes exemplairesdespièces de
procédureet des documentsannexésserontrendusaccessibles aupublic àcompterde cejour. En
outre,conformément à lapratiquedelaCour,lespièces de procédurseansleurs annexesfigurerontdès aujourd'hui sulre site Internet de la Cour et seront ultérieuremetubliées dansla Série
Mémoiresp ,laidoiries et documentsde laCour.
Je constatela présence dans salle des agentset desconseilsdesParties. Conformémentà
l'usage, la République fédérale d'Allemagn en, sa qualitéde demandeur,sera entendue la
première.Je vais doncmaintenantdonnerla parole àM.Westdickenberg,agent del'Allemagne.
Monsieurl'agentvous avez la parole.
Mr. WESTDICKENBERG:
1.INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, as Legal Adviser of the German
FederalForeign Officeit is anhonourformeto appearbefore you onceagain. Please permit me to
introducemy colleagueswhowillarguethis casetogetherwith me:
- Prof.BrunoSimmaof theUniversityofMunichasCo-Agent,and - ascounsel -
- Prof. Pierre-MariDupuyoftheUniversity of Paris-Assas,
- DonaldDonovan,fiomthelawfirmDebevoise and Plimpton,
- Hans-Peter Kaul,Head of the Divisionfor PublicInternationalLaw at the GermanForeign
Office,
- Dr. Daniel Khan and Dr. Andreas Paulus, assistants to Prof. Sirnma at the University of
Munich.
2. Thecase beforeustodayis specialinmanyways:
- First,it has arisenbetweentwo Stateswhich are close allies and partners; their peoplesare
bound in fiiendship;theirpeoplesandgovernmentssharemutualvalues.
- Second,it deals with legal proceedishat ledto thedeath oftwomen,the Gennannationals
Karl and WalterLaGrand,the first executedby way of lethalinjection,the secondin the gas
charnberin the Stateof Arizona. However, itis not the fact of their death- as sad and regrettable as this is and as much as it is today on the mind of my colleagues and
myself-that isat the centre ofthis law suit. Nor is our Application directedagainstthe
r
practice ofcapitalunishmentas such,even thoughitsconsequencesclearlyhavea significant
impactonthelegalmatterswearedealingwith today.
- Third,this case is the first casein whichthis Courthas issued an Order on its ownmotion,
pursuantto Article75,paragraph1,of itsRules. Acting literally withinhoursafterithadbeen
seised by Germany on 2 March1999, the Court decidedon provisionalmeasures,without
havingheld ahearing,foroneessentialreason: the life ofa manwasin imminent danger.
3. Al1this demonstratesthatthis case concems high pnnciples: why else shouldGermany
feel forcedto sueits close ally, theUnitedStates? Whyelseshould the Courtfeelthe necessityto
actin suchan unprecedentedmanner? Weareheretodayto obtainthe decisionofthe WorldCourt
on legal issues of great significance. No longer of great significance, unfortunatelyf,or the
LaGrandbrothers,but of great significance forconsularrelationsand thus for individualsbut also
States worldwide-not justGermany. We are dealing with questions of intemational law:
nothing more,but also nothingless! 1 am emphasizingthis because some observersmight be
temptedto neglect precisely this point. This is not a criminaltrial. Germanyis not accusing
anyone, least of al1the US Administration. As Applicantswe are seeking a judgment of the
InternationalCourtof Justiceonmatters concerningthe Vienna ConventiononConsular Relations
and the United States isthe Respondent. Stressingthe internationallegal aspects- as Germany
does-should not be mistaken for a lack of empathyeither with the victims ofthe crimes
committed by Karl and Walter LaGrandor withthe destinyof the two brothers. Thisemphasisis
rather based on respect for the high principles and tasksguiding this Court, which is not an
appellatecriminalcourt,but, as followsfiom the OptionalProtocolto the Vienna Conventiont ,he
guardianof the latter's observation and practice.
4. Let me make it perfectly clear: Germanydoes not want todo hm in any way to its
relations withtheUnitedStates; theserelationsareexcellent and shall stathatway. Theveryfact
that the United Statesand Germany can litigate before the Internationl ourt of Justice without
prejudice to their relations is evidenceof how good and close those relations areand of the
existenceof a highlydevelopedlegalculturein bothcountries. Both are committedto the rule oflaw,domesticallyandintemationally.Letme add that theCourt has decidedin a gooddozencases
betweenalliednations.
5. Onthe intemationalplane,the ViennaConventionis an importantpillarfortheprotection
of each country'snationais and their rights abroad. We would like to emphasizehere, as we
alreadydidin our~emorial', that it isnotjust Germany butalsotheUnitedStates,with morethan
4 millionof itsnationalsabroadail aroundthe world,whichhas a vital interestin thisCourt being
given the opportunityto pronounce itselfon the interpretationof one of the key noms of the
Viema Convention. This will increasecertaintyin the lawand is in the interestof both States,
because a jument of the Court will enhance the applicationof the Viema Conventionand
contribute tothe protectionof ourcitizens. Thisviewseemsto be sharedby the United States.To
quotethe US StateDepartment: "We fully appreciate thatthe United Statesmust see to it that
foreign nationalsin the United States receivethe sametreatmentthat we expect for our citizens
overseas. Wecannothavea double standard ... It isentirely appropriattoraise [suchcases]with
Us."*
6. As 1have alreadysaidand as wehave emphasizedin our ~ernorial~,the present caseis
not about the death penaltyin general or its applicationin any particular country. However,
Germany'sstanceon capital punishmentis clear: together with its EUpartners,Germanyhas for
many years been working towardsits abolition worldwide. The Federai Governrnentand the
GermanBundestag bothviewthe death penaltyas an infiingementof the fundamentalhumanright
to life. We areofthe opinionthat thisformof punishmentcannotbejustified, neither ethically nor
legally. Nordowebelieve thatit hasprovento be a viablemethodofcrime control.
7. Nonetheless,it is up to the Statesin their sovereign capacityto decidewhetherto permit
or abolishthe death penalty within theirjurisdiction.nderinternational lawthere is noobligation
to abolishthe death penalty. Whatwe do see, however,is a global trendtowards itsabolition.
Morethan half ofal1Statesin the worldhave abolished capital punishmene titherdefacto or de
jure. Germanyplayed a majorrole in initiating theSecondOptionalProtocolto the International
'~emorial,para..07.
'~ew YorkTimes,30 October2000,pageA 20.
3~emorial,para.1.08.Covenanton CivilandPolitical Rightson the abolitionofthe deathpenalty,whichhasnowentered
into force in 42States. As 1said,the death penaltyas such may not be contrary tointernational
.
law. Butthe limitscodifiedinArticle 6 ofthe Covenantmustberespected.
8. In the 41member Statesof the Councilof Europe the deathpenaltyhas defacto been
abolished, and, followinProtocol No.6 to the EuropeanConventionon HumanRights,alrnostal1
of themhave nowalso abolishedit dejure. Countrieswishingto accedeto the Council ofEurope,
inwhichthe UnitedStateshas observerstatus,are obliged [email protected].
9. Mr. President, distinguishMembersof theCourt,atthis point1wouldliketo emphasize
againthat we do not questionthe crimescornrnittedby the LaGrandbrothers. We deeplydeplore
the greatsufferingthey inflictedonthe victims andthoseleftbehind. However,we are alsoaware
of the importance of consular protectiofor therightsof Germanand Americancitizensabroad,
especiallywhen irreversible decisionsuchas the impositionandexecutionofthe deathpenaltyare
at stance. This iswhywe areseekingclarificationofthe obligations ofStatesparties arisingunder
Article36 of the Vienna Convention.We are doingsonot onlyfor the sakeof the citizensof our
twocountries,butforthebenefit of hurnan beings worldwide.
10. It has been no easy decisionfor us to take the case of the LaGrandbrothers to the
International Courtof Justice. For us,it wasa meansof last resortafteral1otheravenueshad been
triedin vain.Afterthe Germanauthoritieshadbeeninformed ofthe casein 1992by the brothers
themselves,our effortsto corneto their assistancefirst focusedon the ongoingdomesticjudicial
proceedings out of respect for the independence ofthe judiciary. In the course of these
proceedings,Karl andWalterLaGrandaddressedthe violationofthe Viema Convention,butto no
avail. Only afieral1domesticlegalremedieshadbeenexhaustedat the end of 1998,afterthe US
SupremeCourt had denied certiorari, and the datesof executionhad beenfixed by the Arizona
supreme Court on 12January1999,only then did Germany askfor clemency. Diplomatic steps
were pursued at al1political levels and includedletters from the Federal Minister forForeign
Affairs and the Minister of Justice to their US counterparts,various approachesmade to the
Govemor of the State of Arizona, andeven letters fiom the Federal Presidentand the Federal
Chancellorto President Clinton. At first,al1thesediplornatic effortsrelied on politicalandmoral
appealsto obtainclemency. Thegrantingof suchclemency wouldhave distinctlydiminishedtheconsequences of theviolationsof the Vienna Conventionby the United States. It would have
preventedthe first executionof a German citizenin the United States sincethe founding of the
FederalRepublicof Germany, backin 1949.
11. We initiallylimitedourselvesto thesediplornatic appeals and did nobtringthe case to
theInternational CourtofJusticefortwomainreasons: firstly,wetrustedthat theUS courtswould
remedythe violationsof the ViennaConvention raisedby the LaGrandbrothers,and secondly, we
expectedclemencyto be granted.
12. Whenthe ArizonaBoard of Executive Clemency,in its hearingon 23 Febnüiry 1999,
rejected the petitions of KarlLaGrand, it became clear,however, that clemency could notbe
expected. During that hearing the Gerrnan Government learned for the first time that the
authorities ofthe State of Arizona had beenaware of the Germannationalityof the LaGrand
brothersfromthe verybeginningand had thus grossly neglectedîheir dutyto informthe brothers
abouttheirrightsunderthe ViennaConvention. ItwasthenthatGermany decidedto bringthe case
beforetheInternationalCourtof Justice.
13. We acknowledge thatthe Court acted so speedily and indicated in its Order on
Provisional Measures of3 March1999that theexecutionof WalterLaGrandshouldbe stayeduntil
the Court reachedits final decision. Regrettably, WalteLraGrandwas executedin spite of this
Order.
14.Germany has aMer reason to appearbefore thisCourt. We hopethat itsjudgment
will also confirmwhat in our view is of the greatest importanceto the dealings ofthis Court,
namelythat an Orderfor Provisional Measures issued underthesecircumstancesis binding. Only
whenthis principleis upheld isit possibleto preventthat decisionsof theCourton substance are
rendered meaninglessby the interveningactionof a partypriorto the finaldecision. Wealsofeel
the necessityto continue withthe casebecause,followingthe execution ofthe LaGrandbrothers,
we believe that there is ample proof of continuedand widespreadfailureby the United States
authoritiesto live upto the international obligationsder Article36 of the Vienna Convention.
Despiteal1effortsby the US authorities- efforts whichwe expressly acknowledge - to improve
the observanceof the obligationto notificationpursuantto Article36 of the Vienna Convention,
rightwhile1speak,German nationalswho have beendeprived oftheir consularrights areheld inUS jails. We know of atleast 24cases in which Germannationalshave beenarrestedwithout
being informed oftheirrightsunderArticle 36 whichoccurredin 1998or thereafter,that is,since
the UnitedStatesbeganto takestepstoirnproveobservanceofArticle36. Thus,a caselike thatof •
the LaGrandscouldhappenanytimeagain.
15. This state of affairs is of greatsignificancenot just for Germans,but for ailforeign
nationalsarrestedin theUnited States,andcouldhaveparticularly tragicconsequencesin casesin
which, like in ours,the death penaltymay be imposed. Accordingto AmnestyInternational,in
June 2000there wereno less than 87 foreignnationalscondemned to deathin US prisons. Since
1993, 14foreign nationals havebeen executedin the United States: in no less than 11 of these
cases violationsof Article36 of theViennaConvention wereasserted4. 1 would liketo mentionin
this contextthe namesof FranciscoAngelBreard,the Paraguayan citizen executed in April 1998,
whose casewas heardby this Court,andthe Canadiancitizen Joseph StanleyFaulder executeidn
June of lastyear and the Mexican MiguelAngelFloreswho was putto death in Texasfour days
ago.
We hope that theseproceedingswill leadto importantclarificationsand will strengthenthe
roleofthe ViennaConvention on ConsulaR r elationsandhustheprotectionofpeopleworldwide.
16.Monsieur le présidentM , adameet Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi dveous indiquer
comment et dansquelordre la délégatioa nllemande abordera les différentes questions débattues
laprésente audience.
17. Le professeurBruno Sirnrnacommencerapar exposer les élémenf ondamentauxde
l'affkireavant decommentercertainesdivergencesdansl'interprétation deces faitsparles Parties.
ViendraensuiteM.DanielKhanqui traiterades questions de compétence ed terecevabilité
soulevéesdanslecontre-mémoiredeE stats-Unis.
Il sera suivi deM.Hans-PeterKaulqui analysera les violationsauxtermes du paragraphe1
de l'article36 de la convention deViennesur les relations consulaires, commised sans l'affaire
LaGrand.
4~mnestyInternationl,eyTopics,ExecutionofForeignNationalsbytheUSAasof 23June2000,availableat
hnp://www.amnestyusaorg/abolition/mnat.html. Puis M. Andreas Paulus fera valoirqu'en appliquantleur loi nationale les Etats-Unisont
égalementviolé le paragraphe del'article36de la conventionde Vienne.
Le professeurSimmareprendrala parolepour démontreq rue le droit l'informationprévu
par l'article36 de la conventionde Vienneconstitueun droit individuel et quece droita caractère
de droit dela personnehumaine en tantquegarantiede procédure spécifique impérative dans les
affaires de peine demort.
L'après-midi,M. Donovan commencera parrépondre à l'allégation du défendeu srlon
laquelle l'Allemagne n'estasparvenue àdémontrer quelesviolations reconnuesde la convention
deViennedans l'affaireLaGrandonteudesconséquencesnégatives.
Le professeurSimmareviendra ensuite surla questionde la responsabilité des Etats-Unis
concernant lesviolationsde la conventionde Vienne,faisantvaloirenparticulierqueceladonne
l'Allemagne non seulement leroità unedéclarationdelaCourrelative àcesviolationsmaisaussi
ledroit d'obtenir desassurancesetdesgarantiesdenon-répétition.
Pour finir, le professeurPierre-Mariepuy traitera de manière exhaustive de toutes les
questions intéressant l'ordonnanceleCouren datedu 3mars 1999et sa non-observationpar les
Etats-Unis.
18. Compte tenude la complexitéde cette affaireet du peu de temps qui nous est imparti
aujourd'hui, l'Allemagne invita Cour à se reporteraux pièces de procédure critespour toute
question qui pourrait nepasêttraitéeàlaprésenteaudience.
19.Avecl'autorisation dela Cour,nouséviteronsdurantcetteprocédureoralededonner les
références decsitationsauxquelles nous recourrons. Ces référesosntindiquées dans les copies
communiquéea su Greffe.
20. Nous avonségalemenr temis àla Courles dossiersdesjuges contenant certaines pièces
f~ndamentalesparmi lesquellesse trouvent les conclusisoumisesàla Cour dont le textea subi
certains aménagements.
21. Monsieur le présidentM, adameet Messieurs lesjuges, je vous remerciepour votre
attention durantmon introductionetje vous priede bien vouloir donnerla parole au professeur
BrunoSimmapour qu'il poursuive l'exposd éel'Allemagne.Mercibeaucoup. Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur Westdickenberg et je donne maintenant la
parole au professeur M. runoSimrna.
M. SIMMA: Merci, Monsieurleprésident.
II.THE FACTS OF THE CASE
1.Mr. President,distinguishedMembersof the Court,it is a greathonourto appearbefore
you again, this time representingrny own country in a case which is of utmost importanceto
Germany. My firsttask today is to review thefactsof the case. Germanynotes with satisfaction
that most of these facts arevirtuallyundispute1.will startmy presentationby briefly recalling
thiscomrnonground.
2. In January1982the two GermannationalsKarl and WalterLaGrandattempted anarmed
bank robberyin MaranaJArizona,in the course of which the bank managerwas murderedand
another bank employee seriously injuredU. ponthe arrest of thebrothers,the Arizona authorities
did not inform themabout their rightsunder Article36 of the Vienna Conventionon Consular
Relations. Neitherdid the authorities notifi the arrest and detention of the LaGrandsto the
GermanConsulate. TheLaGrandsthemselves werenot awareof their rightsto consularadvice. In
Annex2 to our Memorial you willfind the Presentence Reportswhich prove that Arizona
authoritieshadknownof the Germancitizenshipof thetwobrotherssinceApril 1982atthe latest.
Tenyears later, in June 1992, German consular officers were made aware of the caseby the
LaGrandbrothers themselves. They had learnt of their rights fiom two other German prison
inrnates,and notfiom the Arizona authorities.At that time Karland WalterLaGrandhad already
beentried and sentencedtodeath. Inthe criminalproceedingsleading tothese sentencesthelack
of consularadvicehadnotbeen raisedby thebrothers'attorneysor anybodyelse. Whenfinallyput
forward much later in the habeascorpusproceedings, theirclairnof violationof Article36 was
consideredto be procedurallydefaulted. Claimsregardingthe inadequateperformanceof earlier
counsel, especiallyin the case of KarlGrand,and other shortcomingsof theproceedings atthe
State level met asimilar fate. Thus, due to the lack of timely consular notification andthe
subsequentapplication of thedoctrine of procedural default, ermany wasunable to assistthe
brothersin theirlegal efforts effectively. Despiteal1imaginableefforts made on thejudicial aswellas at the consular, diplomatic,and finally,the political plane, Karland WalterLaGrandwere
executedinFebruary and March1999. Walter LaGrand'sexecutiontookplace afier thisCourthad
issuedan Orderon 3 Marchindicating,inte alia, that "[tlheUnitedStatesof America shouldtake
al1measuresat its disposa1to ensurethat WalterLaGrandis not executed pendingthe finaldecision
in thesepr~ceedings"~.WhatUS authoritiesdid immediatelyafier theissuanceof thisOrderwas
thefollowing: first,the StateDepartmenttransmittedtheûrder to the GovernorofArizonawithout
any comment; second,the SolicitorGeneral arguedbeforethe United StatesSupreme Court that
"an order of the International Court ofJustice indicatingprovisional measures isnot binding'16;
third, the US Supreme Court deliveredthe judgment which adoptedthis view7; fourth, the
Governor ofArizonadecided notto useher discretionary power to staythe executionin spiteof a
recommendationto thiseffectby the ArizonaBoard ofExecutiveClernency; and finally, Arizona
oEcials executedWalterLaGrandin disregard ofthe ûrder of the Court. Mr. President, Members
ofthe Court, thesearethe essentialfacts ofthe case.
3. Although- as theRespondentrightly points out- "the facts of this case are less
complex andless contested than thosein other casesnowbefore thecourtw8,PartII of theUnited
States Counter-Memorias lhowstbt certain differencesdo exist. Let mebegin with someminor
points.
4. TheRespondentconcludesfiomlettersof theGerman President andthe GermanMinister
of Justice to their United States counterpartswritten in the weeks before the executionsgthat
Germany had acknowledged that thebrothers had received a fair trial. It is true that
President Herzog'sletter of 5 February1999did not express doubts as to "thelegitimacyof the
convictionnor the fairness of the procedure"'O. But, Mr.President, Members ofthe Court,
President Herzog's letterwasclearly a pleafor clemencyand not a legalbnef. It served apurpose
differentfiom that of takinga positionon a complex legal issue,and it was-certainlynot aimed at
'orderof 3 March1999,. .J.Report1999p. 16.
'secMernorial,M. 28.
'~eeMernorial,M. 32.
8~ounter-~emorialp,ara.13.
'secMernorial, nns.14and20.
'O~ounter-~emoriap,ra.14.evaluatingthe lawfulnessof the conduct ofthe United Statesunder internationallaw. Thisissue
wasraised ina letterwrittenby German Foreign Minister Fischeo rn 22 February1999" - a fact
not mentionedby the Respondent. Let me add that Germanydoesnot intend,withinthe present
proceedings,to raise any questions concerning the legitimacy ofthe convictionsor the faimess of
theprocedure underthe lawoftheUnitedStates. Wearebeforethe highestinternational court and
our claims relate exclusively tointernationallaw. What Germanyrequests isa judgrnentof this
Court declaringthat actions andomissions of organs of the UnitedStatesviolated certainrules of
international lawandspeciQingappropriate internationallegalremedies.
5. The Parties further agree on the circumstancesof the LaGrands'birth, their extremely
difficult childhood,partly spent in fostercare both in Germanyand the United States, andtheir
difficult and troubled lives as teenagers. Finally,there is no disagreement thatKarl and
Walter LaGrand were German nationals fkom birth to death and never acquired any other
nationality. However, whatthe United States does attempt is to minirnize the relevance of
nationalityforthe presentcase. TheCounter-Mernorias laysthat atthe timeofthe murderin early
1982:
"thebrothersappearedin al1respectsto benative citizensofthe UnitedStates ... my]
their appearance, mannerisms,and characteristics ...[and] were fully Americanin
o~tlook'"~.
We ask ourselveswhat the United States wants to demonstrate withthis description. It
certainlycannotcal1into questionthe fundamentalprincipleof internationallaw, confirmedby a
settledpracticeof this Court,accordingtowhich nationalityis a legal bond basedon certain social
factors. The Respondent doesnot contestthat descentfiom a German mother constitutes such a
legitimatelink. Neithercanthe so-called American "appearancea "nd "characteristics" servas an
excusefor US non-compliancewith theobligationto informthe brothers of their rightsto contact
the GermanConsulate. Upon their detention, Karl andWalterLaGrandhad filled in an Arrest
Information Sheetindicatingthat theirplace of birthhad been Germany.Youwill findtherelevant
formfor Karl LaGrandin Annex 1 of theGerman Memorial.It is thereforesurprising,to put it
mildly,that the responsibleofficials,in a country whose nationalilaws arebasedonthe principle
"~eeMemorialA , nn. 18.
'2~ounter-~emorial,aras.16, 17.of iussoli m,ighthavemistakenthe LaGrandbrothersas "native citizensof the Unitedstates"13.1
have also mentioned already thatthe Presentence Reports statedexplicitly that Karl and
Walter LaGrand were Germannationals. Finally, beforethe Board of ExecutiveClemency on
23February1999, ArizonaStateAttorney Peasleyadmittedin no uncertainterms thatthe Arizona
authorities had been aware oftheGermannationalityofthebrothersfiom the verybeginning.
6. The UnitedStatesMer emphasizesthe multiplicityof appellateproceedingsinthe case
of the brothers. Again,we wonderwhat the intentionbehindthis mightbe. 1ssuch a reference
aimedat convincing theCourt that,due to the qualityand quantityof the proceedingswithinthe
judicialsystemof theUnited States,justicehadbeen doneandthatthereforeno interferencebythis
Courtis necessary? Thiswould totallydistortthe purposeof the German Application:Germany
doesnot in the leastintendto placethe International Courtin a line with thenumerousUS courts
that dealt with this case. Germany brings before the Court nothing but questionsrelated, and
confined,tothe interpretationandapplication of certainrulesof international lawina specificcase.
Both Partieshave acceptedas bindingthe OptionalProtocolto the Vienna Convention, according
toArticle 1of which: "[dlisputesarisingout of theinterpretation andapplicationof theConvention
shall lie within thecompulsoryjurisdictionof the International Court ofJustice". Further, itis of
no relevancein our context that,to quotethe Counter-Memorial,"appropriatejudicialauthorities
determinedthat the LaGrands'defencelawyershad provided aconstitutionallysufficientlevel of
representation"14.This issimplynot atissuehere. Whatwe claimis that, due to the omission of
notification, Germany was deprived ofits rightunderthe Vienna Conventionto assistthe brothers
in obtaining adequatelegal assistance. That the so-called "constitutionallysufficient level of
representation" wasfar fiomadequateis anentirelydifferentproblem.
7. Let me now make a few observations relatingto ChapterIII of Part II of the
Counter-Memorialentitled"Effortsby theUnitedStatesto improve c~m~liance"~~ I.nthis chapter,
the United States gives an account ofvarious steps undertakenin order to improve domestic
cornpliancewiththenotification requirements otfheVienna Convention.1regretto Saythat thisis
----- -
"counter-~emorial, ara.16.
'4~ounter-~emorial,ara.19.
'5~ounter-~emorial,aras.20 etseq.not the first timethat counselfor theUnitedStatesreportsaboutsucheffortsto this Court. More
than two and a half years ago, in her oral statementon 7 April 7 1998 in the Breard case,
Ms Brown,counselfortheUnited States, saidamongotherthings:
"[TlheUnitedStateshas also intensifiedits long-standingeffortsto ensurethat
al1federal, state, and lolawenforcementofficialsinthe UnitedStatesareawareof
and complywith the consular notification and access requirements of Article36.
Guidanceontheserequirementshas beenissued regularlyby the Departmentof State
formanyyears."'6
Andafterlisting andspecifyingrecent effortsinthisregard,MsBrown concluded:
"Throughtheseand otherefforts,the United Statesis both acting tocorrectthe
circumstancesthat ledto the failureof consular notificationMr. Breard'scase and
actingina mannerconsistentwithstatepractice. Nothingmoreis required.""
1repeat,"Nothingmoreisrequired."
8.Mr. President, Membersof the Court,it is impossiblenot to see theparallelbetweenthis
statementand that in the Counter-Memorialin the presentcase. 1 am sure that tomorrow our
Americancolleagueswillonceagaindescribethesevariousefforts. Of courseGermany welcomes
eachand everymeasure takeninthisregard. However,what ultimatelycountsare positiveresults,
in other words, compliance. And here 1 am sony to Saythat we are still very faraway from
satisfactory results. If one looks at the list of cases involving Germancitizens most recently
detainedin violationof Article6 - a list thatyouwill findinyour folder- one mustconclude
that the efforts mentioned by the Respondent have not achieved anything resembling regular
observance. What we do see is a continuing pattern of neglectof Article36 by US law
enforcement authorities.Our listis, by the way, far from comprehensive. First, it oincludes
casesof personsarrestedafter 1January1998,thatis sincethe United States,accordingto itsown
testimony,steppedupitseffortstocomply withthenotification requirements.Andsecond,ourlist
can,of course, only coverthose casesin whichGermanofficials somehowreceivednoticeof the
arrestand detention. Inotherwords,we can be surethat thereis a considerablenumberof cases
yetunknown. A roughestirnateby our Consulates inthe UnitedStatesledto the conclusionthatat
present,despite the efforts describedby the Respondent, lessthan 25 percent of al1German
'6~iennaConventionon ConsularRelations (Parav. UnitedStates of America), Provisional Measures,
Pleadings,CR98/7,7pri1l998,ara..27.
"ibid.citizensarrested in the United States havebeen dulyinformedof their rightsunder the Vienna
Convention. And, as 1said,this estimatecannottake into accountthe undetected breaches. Still
concerningthe listbeforeyou, 1wouldliketo drawyour attentiontothreespecificpoints.
9. First, as evidenced by case No. 1 on that list, even in potential capital caseslaw
enforcement authoritiesstill appear insufficiently sensitto the notificationrequirementunder
theViennaConvention.
10. Second,ifwe concentratefora moment onthe examplesfkomCalifomia, weconsiderit
alarming thatnot even repeated protestson behalfof Germany havesucceededin changingthe
practice of disregard for Article36. In a letter of 7 July 1999 to the Governorof California,
Germany protested against non-notificatioin the caseof KatharinaGrant (this wascaseNo. 14).
This letterremainedwithoutresponse. Nordid the Governorappearto take any stepsto improve
complianceby the Californiaauthoritieswith the notificationobligation. If hehad done so, it
wouldnot havebeennecessaryforGermanytoprotesttimeandagainin similarinstances. Letme
just mentionourlettersdated2 March,23June,27July and29Augustof this year(1referto cases
Nos. 7, 9, 2 and 10inthe list). TheCalifornian response in the case of Ns immelsbacher(case
No.7) openly admitsthat thereasonforthefailure tonotifjMr. Himmelsbacherwas probablythat
theauthoritiesweresimplyignorantof therightsanddutiesarisingunderthe ConsularConvention.
Apatternof neglectfor Article36 suchasthat appearingin Californiais less surprising,of course,
if one reads the communication ofthe Californian Attorney-Generailn the case of the German
nationalUdo Mardis dated 13Septemberof thisyear(caseNo.2 onthe list). A copy ofthis letter
hasbeensubmittedto theCourt. Thelettersaysamongotherthings:
"California Penal Code sectio834cwhichimplementsthe ViennaConvention
in Califomia, did not takeeffectntil January 1, 2000. Therefore,that provisionof
law and its mandate to California law enforcement officials did not apply in
January1999whenyousuggest Mr.Mardiswasarrested."
In fact, of course, the Vienna Convention hasbeen in force, and has thus to be applied
betweenthe UnitedStates andGermany, since 1971. Andthe Californianauthoritieswerebound
byits obligationsnot onlyas amatterof internationallawbutalsopursuantto the USConstitution.
Now, Mr.President,if, aftermorethantwo and a halfyears ofanallegedly intensivecampaign for
the promotionof compliancewith the Vienna Convention,not eventhe ChiefLaw Officer oftheStateof Californiais familiarwiththe stateofthe law,howcanthe Respondentseriouslymaintain
before this Court that"nothingmore isrequired"?
11. With this 1arrive at the third and 1st point concemingour list: it mentionsa whole
series of letters in which US authoritiesresponsiblefor thebreaches of Article36 express their
apologies. You will understand,Mr.President, thatGermanycan no longer be expectedto be
satisfied withsuch attemptsto take an easyway out of international responsibility.The mles of
internationallaware thereto berespected,andnot simplyto formthe basis forapologies following
their breach. An apologymay constitutean adequateremedy inisolated cases,but it is neither
sufficient nor appropriatif illegalconduct has becomea consistent pattern asis unfortunatelythe
casehere.
12.Finally, letme turnto ChapterIV of Part II of theUS Counter-Memorial,which accuses
Germanyof making"speculativeandunjustifiedclaimsaboutthe impactof consularassistance"'*.
13.The firstUSargument in supportofthis allegationis an expression of doubtwhetherthe
LaGrandbrothers would have contacted theGerman Consulate atal1if they had been properly
informedoftheirrightto doso. In Gerrnanyfs viewthis is anentirely irrelevant point. Beside, e
canno longerunfortunately ask Karl and WalterLaGrandwhatthey would havedone,and itis - 1
am sorryto Say- rathercynicalon the part ofthe Respondent,after havingremoved,as it were,
the only reliable source of evidence,now to maintain that Germany is to cany the burden of
establishingthe relevant facts. Germanyconsiders itselfunderno legal obligation whatsoever to
enter intoa macabre discussionon the hypothetical conduct of its two nationals. But let mejust
remind youthat as soon as Karland WalterLaGrandhad finally foundout abouttheir rights in
1992, they immediatelygot in touch with the German Consulate. Why, then, should it be
"implausible",as the US Counter-MemorialsaysI9,that they would have acted inthe sameway
immediatelyafter theirarrestsometen years earlier?
14.The United States further callsthe German claimthat early consular assistance would
have made a decisive difference "speculative and unjustified". he Counter-Memorial considers
that theroleof a consulina caselikeoursis
'8~ounter-~emorial,aras.24seq.
'9~ounter-~emoria1, ra.27. "oftenquite differentfrom the idealizedportrait presentedin the Memorial. Most
importantly, consularofficerscannot actas lawyers. The assistancetheyprovideto a
defendantin criminalproceedingsis limitedto assistingin obtaininglegalcounsel and
thenassisting legal~ounsel."*~
Mr.President,if you readthe GermanMemorialyou will see that nowhere dowe describe
the role of our consularofficersin as exaggerated away as the Counter-Mernorialwantsyou to
believe. Of course, consular officers cannot actas lawyers. But they can and will assist their
fellowcitizensin obtainingadequate legal counsel.This iscertainlyone ofthe rightsconferredon
consular officersundertheViennaConvention. Itispreciselythe denialof theserightswhichis at
stakehere.
15.Further,the doubts ofthe United Statesas to whetherthe Germanregulationsin forceat
the timeofthearrestof the LaGrandbrothers corresponded to today'ssituation,is unfounded. The
Circular Orderof the German Foreign Ministryin force at the time of the arrest didnot merely
authorizeGermanconsularofficials to providethe kind of legal assistancejust mentioned. The
Orderexpressly required thatin circumstanceslike ours "asuitableand reliablelawyer shouldbe
appointed"21.Further, Article7 of the Gennan Consular Lawin conjunctionwith the Circular
Ordermadeit "theduty of missions abroad to assistGermannationalsheldon remandor servinga
prisonsentence".TherespectiveOrderin forcesince 1998explainstheraiso d'êtreofthis dutyas
follows: "[alrrest represents a particularlysevere encroachment on a person's individual
fieedom, ... It is thereforeextremelyimportantthat Germansunder arrest abroadare provided
with fast, professional all-rousupportby GermandiplomaticmissionsabroadWuand as 1have
indicated,wehave providedthe CourtwithEnglish translationsof both of these documents. You
will notice thattherelevantprovisionsofthetwoOrdersarevirtuallyidentical.
16.WhenGerman consularofficialsfinally becameaware of the detention of theLaGrand
brothers in 1992,the trial andsentencingphase of their criminalproceedingshad alreadybeen
completed. Atthat stage,due to certainfeaturesof US law - to whichwe willturnlater- it was
neitherpossiblenor necessaryfor theGermanconsulateto undertake anyimrnediateurgent action.
However,Germanydid takeal1themeasuresthat onecouldreasonablyexpectof it. Unfortunately,
20~ounter-~emoriapl,ara.28.
"para.4 ofthe1975CirculOrder.
"para. 1oftheCirculOrderonassistancefor Germsetainedabroa(Am. 47 totheGermanMemorial).in 1992, eight yearsafter Karl and WalterLaGrandhad been sentencedto death, there was not
muchleftto do. Mr.President, this bringsus right backto the decisivepoint: itwasthe USfailure
to inform the LaGrandswhich deprivedGermany ofits right and of the abilityto render more
effective andtimelyassistancetothe twobrothers,inparticularby helpingthemto obtain adequate
legal representation inthe decisive phasesof their trial. Mr.President, it really turns the facts
upside down when the United States argues that: "[ilt is also importantto remember thatthe
LaGrands'defence was at al1times the responsibilityof their defence attorneys",and "[bloth
defence lawyersknewthat the LaGrandshad been bornin Germany,but apparently electednotto
seek evidenceabouttheir earlychildhoods there"23.We donot questionthe primaryresponsibility
of defencecounselfor handling thecase. But whatwe do complain about isthat Germany was
deprived ofits rightto help itscitizenschoose adequate legal representationand then assistthem
duringtheirtrial.
17. In this context,the Respondentnghtly emphasizesthe extremely important rolewhich
defence lawyersplay in American criminal procedure-a role whichgoes far beyond that
attributedto defencelawyersin most other legal systems of theworld. A recent editorialin the
renownedBritish weekly, The Economist,focusingon deathpenalty casesin the United States,
comrnentedas follows:
"Americahas had hundredsof thousandsof murdertrials since 1976. Mostof
them were potentially capital cases. In practice,the public prosecutorssought the
deathpenaltyin fewer than 5%of the cases. Facing experienced and diligent defence
lawyers, prosecutors rarely seek the ultimatp eunishment. But when they do so, it
tends to be not because of the severity ofthe crimes committed,but because the
defence lawyer lookseasygame."24
Mr. President, the LaGrands'defence lawyerswere precisely such "easy game". The
ArizonaSupreme Court attested Karl'sattorney "exceedinglylow profile",althoughthe Supreme
Courtcouldnot Say"thathisperformance wasso deficientas to compromisethe adversarial nature
of the trial"25.The attorneyhimselflater acknowledgedhis inadequacyfor handlingthe complex
issues involved ina capital case,andhe expresslyadmittedthathe shouldhavedonea lotofthings
23~ounter-~emoriapl,ara.32.
2410June2000,atp. 16.
"~ee Mernorial. nn4.differently.1invitetheCourt toexaminewithme theaffidavitof KarlLaGrand'strial lawyer,tobe
foundin Annex46 to the GermanMemorial, thatis onpages1013et seq. The lawyerstatedupon
oath, amongotherthings:
- thatwhenhe wasappointedto defendKarlLaGrandit was the fist tirnethat herepresented a
defendantina capital murdercase;
- that he hadno specialCLE,that is ContinuingLegalEducation, trainingin handling a capital
case;
- that he was uninformed ofthe level of experience,tasks,tactics and strategieswhich capital
casesrequired;
- that he initiallyapproachedthe KarlLaGrandmurdercaseas he hadhis previous cases:likea
"normalfelony",just asa "drugcaseora robbery";
- that in hindsight,he realized that hewas neitherpreparednor informedas to what wouldbe
involvedand that hewas overwhelmed bothby thehighprofile natureof the caseand by his
lack of experience;
- that hehadneverhadaninvestigatorworkingonthecase;
- that heneverspoketofamilymembers;
- that he never comprehensively researched, investigateodr developedany evidence regarding
thepetitioner'smentalstate; and finally
- that heneverconsidered impulsivity ortemporaryinsanityas a viable defence.
Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, 1 do not wantto comment upon theview of the
ArizonaSupremeCourt, shared by theUS ~ounter-~emorial~~ accordingto whichthis kind of
defenceis still to beregarded as "a constitutionallysufficientlevel of representation". The only
remark 1want to make is that it is beyondreasonabledoubtthat the poor qualityof the defence
contributed,to Say the least, to the brothers LaGrand finding themselves amongthe less than
5 per cent ofpotentialcapital casesinwhich American public prosecutorssoughtthedeathpenalty:
andthis aftemoon, Mr. Donovanis goingto take up thispoint inmoredepth.
26~ounter-~emorial,ar19. 18.Does the United States really want thCourt to believethat it is mere speculationthat
Germany - if it had been informedof the arrestof the LaGrandbrothersin ti-e would have
assistedits citizensto obtainbetter legal counsel,andavedecisively increasedtheir chanceof
belongingto the 95per cent of defendantsnot sentenced to deathafier having committed similar
crimes? Or, puttingit theother way round, does the United States really want to Say that
Germany- a countryparticularly committed to achievingthe worldwide abolitionof capital
punishment - wouldhave allowedits citizensto be representedby a lawyerwith such a low and
inadequateprofileincriminalproceedingswheretheir lifewasat stake?
19. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, thus are the facts upon which Germany
respectfully asks the Court to base its decision, and a few comments on the differences of
interpretationofthese facts betweenthe Parties. May 1now ask you to cal1upon my colleague
Mr. DanielKhanto developourargumentsonjurisdictionandadmissibility.
LE PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, professeurSimma. Je donne maintenantla parole à
M. DanielKhan.
Mr.KHAN:
111JURISDICTIONANDADMISSIBILITY
1.Merci, M. le président.Mr.President, distinguished Members otfhe Court, it is a great
honourandpleasurefor me to addressyou forthe first time. My task is to dealwith questionsof
jurisdictionand admissibility. Germanyhas treatedthese issues comprehensivelyin its Memorial.
To avoid repetition,my following presentationwillthereforebe limitedto a criticalassessment of
issuesandproblemsraisedinthisregardintheUSCounter-Memorial.
2. Before enteringinto the subject-matter,Germany wouldlike to state its satisfactionwith
the decisionof the United Statesnot to raise any preliminaryobjections. This fact demonstrates
thatbothParties doconcurin theobjective of havingthe presentdisputesettledas expeditiouslyas
possible.
3. Unfortunately, however,suchcommongrounddoesnot reachvery far. When itcornesto
the scope and nature of theenvisagedjudicial settlement,whatwe seeis that Germanyaspirestoacomprehensive solutionof al1the substantive legalissues involved. The United States on the
contraryis only willingto submita small proportionof these questionstojudicial scrutiny.Asto
the wide rangeof furtherissues raisedin our case, the United Statetries to hide behind abroad
smoke-screen ofwhatit calls "inadmissibility". However, al1the questions Germanyhasraisedare
not only of importance withregard to the fate of the LaGrand brothers but are, unfortunately
enough,of continuing relevance.The scenariothathas led to the presentlitigationhas repeatedly
occurredin the pastandwill also hauntus in thefutureif this Courtdoesnot stopit. Justconsider
theBreard case,the recentproceedingsbeforetheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,thecase
of theCanadiancitizen StanleyFaulderor that of the Mexican MiguelAngelFlores executedjust
four daysago,theenormousechowhichthesecaseshave producedinthe internationalcornmunity,
and finally, andmostimportantly,the deplorablesituation inwhichhundredsof foreign nationals
on death rowin theUnited Statesand elsewhere find themselves.In lightof the facts thatbecarne
apparentin the cases and proceedings mentioned,it is safe to assumethat the great majorityof
these individuals had no chance to enjoy the procedural safeguards providedin the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. Hence, the time is ripe for a clear and unequivocal
pronouncenientbytheworld's highestjudicial authority.
1.Jurisdiction
4. Mr. President,of coursethe desirability, indeed urgencyo,f a comprehensive settlement
cannotreplace thejurisdictional basisfor a pronouncementof the Court. We al1know that "the
Court'sjurisdiction is always a limited one" - as the PermanentCourt observed back in the
Chonbw Factorycase2'. In theMemonalwe demonstratedthat Article1of the OptionalProtocol
tothe Vienna Convention establishetshe Court'sjurisdictionfor al1the claimswhich Germanyhas
raised. We notewithsatisfactionthat theUSCounter-Memorial expressly shareo surview,atleast
with regard to the German claims conceming Article 36, subparagraph1(b), of the Consular
convention2*. However, the UnitedStates does challenge jurisdictionas regards diplomatic
protection29.Germany,on the otherhand,takesthe viewthat "application ofthe Convention"in
27~actoTvt Chorzbw,Jurisdiction,JudgrnentNo.8, 1927,P.C.I.J.,Serieap. 32.9,
28~ounter-~emonapl,ara.47.
29~ounter-~emoriapl,aras.73etseq.the sense of the Optional Protocol very well encompassesthe consequencesof a violation of
individualrights underthe Convention, including the espousal of respective claim by the Stateof
nationality. Besides, accordingto Article 5 of the Consular Convention,the protection of the
interestsofnationalsof the sending Statetakesa prominentplaceamongconsularfunctions. Asto
Germany'sremaining claims,the United Stateschoosesnot to address theissue of jurisdictionat
all, followed, however,by a warningin the Counter-Mernoriat lhat this silenceis to be "without
prejudice to its position in any mer proceedings in this casew3'. Now, we hope that the
Respondent is aware of the principle, emphasizedby ProfessorRosenne, according to which
objections prelirninaryin character should alwaysbe raisedbefore the interestedpartyjoins issue
on the merits or, at the latest, simultaneouslywith the filing of the ~ounter-~ernorial~'. Thus
Germanyis confident thatthe United Stateswill refrain fiom taking the unusual, indeed highly
questionable, stepof challengingthe Court'sjurisdictionat this final stageof the proceedings- a
stepwhichwouldbedoomed to failureanyway.
II.Admissibility
5. We observe also that therestraint which the Respondent exerciseswith regard to the
Court'sjurisdiction strictu sensu does not extend to the questionof adrnissibility. The United
Statesattemptsto usethis notion torid itself ofal1responsibilityfor whatit has donewrong,with
the only exceptionof its breach of Article 36, subparagraph 1(b), of the Convention. Thus, the
UnitedStatestries to convinceyouthat itwouldbe inappropnateforthe Courtto decideuponthe
following three claims madeby Germany: (a) the claimthat the way US law was appliedin the
case of the brothers LaGrand violated Germany'srightsunder Article36, paragraph2, of the
ViennaConvention; (b) the claimthat the United States violatedits internationallegal obligation
to abideby the Orderon ProvisionalMeasuresissuedby the Courton 3 March 1999, and finally;
(c)the Germanrequestfor the grantingofjudicial relief goingbeyondthe mere proclamationby
the Courtof the illegality of thebreachby the UnitedStatesof Article36, subparagraph1 (b),of
the ConsularConvention.
30~ounter-~ernoria,ara.48.
"S. Rosenne,TheLawandPracticeof the Internatil ourt,Vol.II,Jurisdic(1997)at p. 864. 6. With regard to al1of this, theUnited States maintainsthat "significantfactors weigh
against admittingthe claims thatunderlie Germany's second,third, and fourth submis~ions"~~.
Frankly,1findthe "significantfactors" invoked by the UnitedStatestosupportitsrequestfor such
a sweepingdismissalofmostof Germany's claims anythingbut convincing.
7. Let mestartwith anassessrnent ofthe truly exorbitant conceptof "admissibility"which
lies at the basis of the Respondent'sargumentation. Following this 1 will proceed to an
examinationof the three "significant factors".It will certainlynot surprise youthat Germanywill
arrive at the conclusion that al1three objectionsto the admissibility ofour case are legally
untenableand that, therefore,eachand everyclaim Germanyraises in the present proceedings is
admissible.
8. "Adrnissibility",ccordingtothe Counter-Memorial,"requiresthe Courtto weighwhether
characteristics ofthe case beforeit, or special circumstances relatedto particular claims,may
render either the entire case or particular claims inappropriate forfurther consideration and
decisionby the Theratherauthoritative toneof this staternentstandsin markedcontrast
to the total lack of referenceto the jurisprudenceof this Courtor any other sourcein its support.
Thus, we maybe allowedto ask whethersucha sweepingunderstanding of "admissibility"reflects
the truestate ofthe law.
9. Mr.President,Mernbersofthe Court,a carefulanalysis of thejurisprudence otfhis Court
and its predecessoronthe matterof admissibility hasled usto concludethat thepicturedrawnby
the UnitedStates doesnot correspondto the Court'sownperceptionof this issue. It is certainly
true that, as the Court emphasizedin the NorthernCameroonscase34,the judicial function is
circumscribedby inherentlimitationswhichmay be difficultto catalogue. However,we discem
fromthejurisprudence ofthe Court atleasttwo essentialfeatureswhichthrow lightonthe way in
which this Court and its predecessorhavh eandledissues of admissibilitythroughout.
10.First of all,the Court has accepteda plea of inadmissibilityonlyif basedon specialand
peculiar circumstances. Thereforet,he conceptof "admissibility" introduced by the United States
32~ounter-~emorial,am49.
33~bid.
34~ortherCameroons,Prelimi- Objections,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports1963,atp.30.is mistaken in its implicationthat al1there is to do in order to determine whethera case is
appropriate for further consideration and decision by the Court is a simple weighing of
characteristics. Rather therule seemsto be in the natureof a presumption accordingto whichthe
existenceof ajurisdictionalbond betweenthe partiesin a givencase implies the admissibility of
the claims raised therein. This presumption can be rebutted only under very specific
circumstances. Indeed,this Courthas neverclaimed discretion whetherto entertaina contentious
caseor not. TheCourthas refusedtodo soonlyinveryparticular circumstances andafier"mature
consideration",to usethe wordsof the PermanentCourt in the Judgment intheFreeZonescase3'.
11. Second, a concept of "admissibility"as vague and broad as that put forwardby the
United States could lead one to assumethat the groundsfor admissibility or inadmissibility of a
caseor of certain claimscannotbe concretizedinany foreseeableway. Thisis simplynottrue. A
closerlook at thejurisprudenceof the Courtreveals thatit has always,and in very explicitterms,
treated the safeguardingof its judicial integrity as a crucial benchrnark for the evaluationof
admissibility. In the Northern Cameroonc sase,the Court described itselfas "theguardianof [its
own]judicial integrit~"~~I.n the Nottebohmcase,the Courtconfineditsroleto the "administration
of justiceN3'a,sthe Permanent Courthad alreadydoneintheFreeZonescase whereit hadstressed
itspositionas a court ofjustice - a qualificationwhichmadethe Court somewhatreluctantto act
"outsidethe spherein whicha court ofjustice, concemed withthe applicationof the rulesof law,
canhelp in the solutionof disputesbetween two tat tes"^F i.ally,in theHaya de la Torrecase,
this Court refused to make a choice betweenseveral alternativesbased on considerationsof
practicability or of political expediency,causeit feltthat "itisnot part ofthejudicial functionto
makesucha ch~ice"~~T . hisclearlineof reasoninggoeshandinhandwith ajustifiedreluctanceof
the Courtto enter intothemeritsofa caseif it foreseesthat itsjudgmentwouldremain ineffective.
Let merefer, forinstance,to the Court'sdecisionin theMonetaryGoldcase4',wherethe absence
35~reeZones of UppmSavoy andtheDistrictoGex ,udgment,1932,P.C.I.J.,SeriesWB,No. 4atp.161.
?'%orthernCameroons,Preliminas, Objections,Judgment,I.. eports196atp.29.
37~ottebohmP, reliminaryObjection,Judgment,I.C.J.Reportsatp. 122.
"Free Zonesof UpperSavoyandtheDistrictofGex,Judgment,1932,P.C.I.J.,SeriesMB,No. atp.162.
39~ayade la Torre,Judgment,I.C. eports195atp.79.
40~onetas,GoldRemovedfromRome in1943, JudgmentI,.C.J.Reports1954atpp.19etseq.fromproceedings of Albania, whose legal position constitutedthe very subject-matterof the case,
made it foreseeablethat nothing would come of any possiblejudgment by the Court. In the
Northern Cameroonscase the Court declinedto decide merelyhypothetical questions lackingany
real purpose41.Finally,in the Nuclear Testscases,the Courtheld that "[ilt does not enter intothe
adjudicatory functionsof the Courtto dealwith issuesin ab~tracto"~~.
12.If we translatethe case-lawthus describedinto more abstractterms,we could Saythat in
the practice of this Court, admissibilityis concemed with the question whether in al1 the
circumstancesit is compatible withthe Court'sstatus as the principaljudicial organ ofthe United
Nations, with its judicial function or with thejudicial character of its decisions, to enter into or
pursueproceedingsonthe meritsin a givencase43.
13.In light ofthis, andturningto Ourpresent case,1must confessthat 1amreally at a lossto
seehow the presentaffair or anyof the claimsGermany raises in its contextcouldpossiblyfit into
thejigsaw of precedents on inadmissibility. Al1Germanyis doing is to raise in an ongoing legal
disputea nurnber ofclaimsbased on purely legal arguments. First, Germanyrequeststhe Courtto
fmd the United Statesin breachof certainrules of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Second,Germany asksthe Courtto find thatthe United Statesviolated the'order of the Court of3
March 1999. In both instances, what Germany seeks is a declaration of this Court as the most
appropriateremedy for the wrong it had suffered. Third, Germany demands,as a Mer, separate
legal remedy, safeguards against repetitionin order to prevent future violations of its own rights
andtherights of itsnationals.
14.Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, can our raising these purely legal questions affect
the judicial integrity of this Court in any conceivable way? Certainly not! On the contrq,
Germany would submitthat there have been few instancesin which the Court was calledupon to
settle a dispute so fiee of political implicationsas is the case here, instances in which clearly-
definedinternational legal issueswere at stake,allowingthis Courtto act strictlywithinthe sphere
4'~orthernCarneroons,Prelirniny bjections,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1963a,tpp.33et seq.
42~uclearTests (Austrav.France), Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1974,at p. 272, para.59; andNuclear Tests
(New Zealandv.France),Judgrnent,.C.J.Reports 1974,atp.477, para.62.
43~fS.Roseme,The Law andPracticeof theInternationalCourt,Vol. II,Juris(3d.ed.1997),atp.546.of its judicial function,that is, deciding upon concrete rathethan abstract, actual rather than
hypotheticallegalquestions,andtherebysettlinganongoinglegaldispute.
15.To concludemygeneralremarkson thequestion of admissibilityn ,oneofthelegal issues
dividingthe Partieshaveyet beensettled: Germanyhasnotreceived declaratory relieb fy wayof a
pronouncementof this Court; it hasnot received the assurances andguaranteeswhichit hadasked
for; and finally therittenpleadingsreveala considerablenumberof legaland factualissues that
arestillindisputebetweenthe Parties.
16.Letme now tum to thethreespecificobjectionswhichthe Respondenthas raised against
the admissibilityofcertainof Germany'sclaims.
17. In the first of these objections,the United States argues that "[tlhe Court need only
address Germany's first submissioinnorderto dojusticebetweenthe Parties", andthat ajudgrnent
on Germany'sfirst submissionwould"resolveanddojustice as to the central disputebetweenthe
Parties and affirm the importance of the Vienna Convention in international relation^"^^.
Mr.President, distinguished Membero sf the Court,this is indeed asurprisingand- as far aswe
can see- unprecedented assertion. When a State submitto s the Court, as we do, four distinct
claims, itis certainlynot for the Respondent todecidewhich of these claims are "central"and
which are not. The simple fact is that the present dispute encompassesmore than the
subject-mattercovered by Germany'sfirst submission. Germanyfor its part is not primarily
interestedin a general statementof this Courthing the importanceof the Vienna Convention
in internationalrelations. Rather,ou prime objectiveis to seekjustice in our specificcase- a
case which happens to raise questions of the interpretationand application of a variety of
internationalnoms. In Germany'sview,a comprehensivejudicialsettlementofthepresent dispute
canonlybe reachedifthe Courtaddressesthemeritsof al1of Germany's claims.Andtoreachsuch
a comprehensivejudicial settlement is preciselywhatthe Courtitself has alwaysconsideredto be
itsveryfunction.
18. This leads me to the second objection, according to which the Court shoulddeclare
certainclaims ofGermanyinadmissible because,intheview oftheUnitedStates,they would result
"~ounter-~emorial, ara.50 (emphaadded).in the Court having "to assume an inappropriateand unauthorizedrole as the overseer ofUS
national
19. Mr.President, distinguishedMembersof the Court, be assured that Germanyis well
aware that the function of this Court is not to act as a court of criminal appeal. You have
emphasized this yourselfin your Orderson Provisional Measures bothin the Breardcase andin
our presentcase. Atthe risk ofspinningthe prayer wheelonce again, let me emphasizethatthe
claimswhich Germany has brought befory eou aimat nothing butthe settlementof an intemational
legaldispute arising outof the interpretation and applicatof theViennaConvention. Whatwe
respectfullyaskthis Court todois: (a)to follow our interpretatioof certainmles of intemational
law; (b) to adjudgeand declarethat the conduct of the Respondentt,hat is, in the wordsof the
Optional Protocol, the "application" of the Consular Convention by the United States, was
inconsistentwith its international legal obligations towards Germany; a nd)to draw fiomthis
failure certain legal consequencesprovided for in the internationallaw of State responsibility.
Hence,thepresentproceedingsareinnowayaimed at interferingwith the administrationofjustice
withinthe UnitedStatesjudicial system.NordoesGermanyrequestthat this Courtoverruleanyof
the USdomesticjudgmentsdeliveredinthe caseoftheLaGrandbrothers.
20. Mr.President,we consider it self-evident and amatter of simple logic thatthe legal
operationwhichweask theCourtto undertakemustnecessarilyincludea criticalassessrnentofthe
conduct of organs of theUnitedStates,including itsjudicial andlegislativebranches. The only
reason why Germany addresses question osf the interna1law of the UnitedState- criticizedby
the Counter-Memorialas "lengthydiscussions ofUS domestic la^"^^- is to demonstratethat
certainfeaturesof US law and its applicationin the present case,in particularthe doctrine of
"procedural default",have led to violationsby the UnitedStates of legalobligationsarisingnder
the Viema Convention. There is nothing special or problematic in attributing breaches of
internationallawto a State'sjudiciary. A statemen bty the InternationalCourtaccordingto which
US domesticcourts participatedin, or contributedto, such breachesis neither inappropriatenor
unauthorized - on thecontrary.
4S~ounter-~emoriapl,aras.5seq.
46~ounter-~emorial,ara.52. 21. Mr.President,in its third objection the UnitedStateschallengestheadrnissibility ofOur
submission relating tothe Order of 3 March 1999~'.Let me recallwhat Germanyrequests there:
we ask the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States violated its international legal
obligationto complywith this Order.
22. Now, if we regard the argumentsof the United States on this point, we find that the
Americancriticism is directed againstthe Courtrather than against Germany. The United States
complains that "Germany'sdecision to file as it did resulted in the Court setting aside some
fundamentalaspects of judicialprocedure"48.The Respondent further deplores "a failure of
justice" in the procedure followedby the Court, and finally accuses the Court of not having
observed"basicprinciplesofthejudicial process"49.
23. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, wecannot let theseaccusationspass
unchallenged. Werealize that it musthavebeena difficult stepfor the Courtto issue an Orderon
Provisional Measuresin such a procedurally unprecedented manner.You have certainly done so
onlyafterassessingthe situationas one of "incontestableurgency",as the former President ofthis
Court,Judge Schwebel,recognizedin the Breardcase5';andafteradmittingthe presenceof cogent
"humanitarianreasons", to use the words of Judge0da5'. Germany very much appreciatesthis
decisionwith whichyou brought your judicialauthorityto bear for the protectionof a humanlife
whichwas virtually in your hands. We can onlyregret that the United Statesdid not honourthis
difficultand responsible decisionby giving effectto the Order. We simply cannotexcludethat in
the futurethe Courtmay again be confrontedwith exceptionalsituationswhichleave it no choice
but to vary established patterns of procedure, if this is the only way to do justice in cases of
extremeurgency. Germany is convincedthat the Court has kept within the limits of a correct
47~ounter-~emoriapl, ras.55etseq.
48~ounter-~emoriapl,ara.63 (emphasisadded).
49~ounter-~emoriapl,aras.64and66.
"~ienna Conventionon ConsularRelations (Paraguayv. United Statesof America), ProvisionalMeasures,
Orderof9April1998, declaratiofPresidenSt chwebel,.C.J.Reports1998,p.259.
"lbid., declaratof JudgeOda,I.C.J.Reports 1998, p.260, para.8; andLaGrand Case (Germanyv. United
StatesofAmerica), ProvisionalMeasures,erof 3 March1999,declarationofJudge OdaI,.C.J.Reports 1999,p.20,
para.7.applicationof therulesin question. Thisdecisiondeservesthe highestrespectof the international
cornrnunity.
24. In viewof what1have said,it is difficultto graspthe objectand purposeof the United
States objection.Doesthe Respondent wantthe Courtto invalidateits own Orderon accountof
alleged procedural deficiencieso, r is the Court to treat the Order as somehow defective, and
thereforeof diminishedlegalrelevance?
25. Mr.President, itwas thisCourtwhich decided autonomously to proceedas it didandto
issuethatOrder. A discussionof the scopeandlegalrelevanceofthis Ordercertainlydoesnot fa11
underthe topicofadmissibility. Weshouldnot atthispoint takeup any questionswhich belong to
the meritsof our case, and shouldavoid a Shakespearean "play within a play", to quote our late
colleagueandfiiendKeith~ighet".
26. In conclusionof my treatment ofthe questionof admissibility,let me Saya wordabout
what the Respondent calls "Gemany's choice of timing". As we explain in our Memonal,
Germanyhad goodreasonsto actintheway itdid. Besides,as the United Statesrightlyremarks,
"thereis no unifom 'statuteof limitations'in internationallaw, nor are there clearrequirements
dictatingwhen a case must be filed with this ~ourt"~~.Thus,both Parties agreethat latenessas
suchdoesnot constitute abarto admissibility.
27. Whatthe UnitedStatesapparentlydoesconsiderto be such a bar is that Germanycould
have beenaware of al1relevantfactsof the case,among themthe fact that theArizonaauthonties
knewfiomthe verybeginningthatthe LaGrandbrothers were Germannationals,if only Germany
had paiddueattentionto theso-called Presentence Reportsof1984. Butmay 1respectfûllyremind
youthat it was only in1992thatGermanconsular officiaisfirst becameaware of thearrestof the
LaGrandbrothers? Thiswas no lessthan eightyears after the sentencing proceedings hadtaken
place and the PresentenceReports had been produced. It is true that, as far as the LaGrands'
defence lawyers were concerne4 they did not pay attention to the indication of the brothers'
nationalityinthesereports. Thiscastsindeed a negative lightonthe qualityoftheir defenceat the
S2~andand MaritimeBoundarybetween CameroonandNigeria (Cameroonv. Nigeria),ProvisionalMeasures,
Pleadings, R98/4,6 March1998,p.62,para.28.
53~ounter-~emoriapl,ara.58.time. But,Mr.President,Germany'spointisprecisely thatthe defenceofKarlandWalterLaGrand
wouldhavebeenmuchmoreeffective ifa German consulate had hadtheopportunityto seeto it.
28. In lightof the foregoing,the only questionthatakes sense at al1in this context is
whetherGermanofficialsdid or did not have easy accessto the Presentence Reportsin 1992 or
thereafter. Althoughwe do not atîributeany conclusiveweight tothis issue,we can provideyou
with a clear answer. We have filed with the Court a Memorandumregardingthe Presentence
Reportsissue in the LaGrandmatter, draftedby the Federal Public Defenderfor the District of
Arizonaat the requestof the GermanConsulate Generalin Los Angeles. Letme summarizewhat
this Memorandumsays: Accordingto a local rule of the Pima Couniy Superior Court, the
Presentence Reports concerning Karl and WalterLaGrand were filed under seal and kept
confidentialevenafter sentencing. WhentheFederalPublic Defender triedto locatethis reportin
Juneofthisyear,they couldnot be found. Inthewordsofthe PublicDefender:
"The exhibits clerk at the superior court advisedthat the clerk did not have
pre-sentencereports informationon eitheraGrand,and theyhad no idea wherethe
pre-sentencereportswerefiled. It appearsthatthe pre-sentence reparenot even in
thesuperiorcourtfile."
Mr.President,ifnot eventhe competentUS authontymanagedtoretrievethereports,doesit
makesenseto Say,as the Counter-Memorial does,that it is "hardto understandhow thesereports
were not already farniliar to German consular ~fficers"'~?Can one really accuse a foreign
consulateof negligencewhenit failed togethold ofdocumentswhich could noe tvenbetracedby
thecompetent localauthonties?
29. In viewof the foregoingandwithreferenceto the furtherexplanationsin our Memorial,
Germanytherefore respectfullyrequeststheCourt todeclarethat it hasjurisdictionto hearthis case
andthateach andeveryclaimGermanyhas raisedis admissible.
Monsieurle PrésidentM, adameetMessieurs delaCour,je vousremerciedevotre attention.
Mr.President,1thankyouandthe Membersof the Court foryourattention. May1nowinvite you
to cal1upon my colleague Mr.Kaul to address the Court on the US breaches of Article36,
paragraph1,ofthe ConsularConvention.
"~ounter-~emoria, ara.60. Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie beaucoup. LaCour va toutd'abordsuspendre pour dix
minutes.
L'audienceest suspenduede 11h40 à Il h55.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest reprise etje donne maintenantla
parolepourl'Allemagne à M.Kaul.
Mr. KAUL:Merci,M.lePrésident.
IV. ARTICLE 36, PARAGRAPH 1,OF THEVIENNACONVENTION
ONCONSULARRELATIONS
1. Mr.President, distinguishedMembersof the Court, it is my honour and privilegeto
appearbefore you on behalf of Germany. My task is to assess the violationsof paragraph1 of
Article36 of the Vienna Conventioncommittedby the United States. In doing so, 1will, first,
briefly recall the rights embodied in Article36 and the content and structureof this crucial
provision. Second, 1will set outwhy the acknowledgmentof the violation of theConventionby
the UnitedStatesis insufficientto meetits obligationstowardsGermanyand that it isbasedon a
restrictive and very problematic interpretatiof Article 36.In conclusion, 1 will showthat
Article36, paragraph1, has been violated by the United States not only with regard to
subparagraph 1 fi)but alsowithregard to subparagraphs (a) and (c).
2. Mr. President, the dispute betweenthe United States and Germanyturns around one
central problem:the UnitedStatesreadsArticle36 ofthe Vienna Conventionin a verynarrowand
restrictiveway. As the case ofthe LaGrandbrothersclearly demonstrates,this can deprivethe
right of foreignnationals tobe informedoftheir right to consularcommunication ofmost of its
practical meaning.
In contrast, Germany maintaintshatArticle36providesa régimethat guaranteesforeigners
effectiveaccessto consularadvice,and second,that this régime also inclus minimumstandard
for national lawsand regulationsto renderthe right to consularcommunication meaningfua lnd
effective.1.Article36 ofthe Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations
3. Mr.President, what are the rights embodied in Article36, what is the content and
structuralbuild-upofthisprovision?
As you are aware Article36, paragraph 1,contains severalrights of foreignnationals to
ensure communicationand contact with their consulate, thisin three subparagraphs,namely
Article36,subparagraphs1 (a), 1 (b)and 1(c).
As the distinguishedMembersof the Cowrthave the exact wording of Article36 of the
ViennaConvention before them,it is not necessaryto readoutagainthe fulltext of this important
provision. Instead,let mebrieflyrecall
- subparagraph1(a) containsthe right ofconsularofficersto cornrnunicate anto have accessto
their nationalsandvice versa;
- subparagraph1 (b)establishesthe specificrightsof the sendingStateand oa national of this
Stateso that in caseof an arrestese rightsto communicate andto have accessto each other
canbe used effectively. Thisitdoesby ensuring
- that the arrestedperson is informedwithout delay abot is rightto comrnunicatewiththe
consulate;
- if he sowishes,the competentauthorities ofthe receivingStatemust then, againwithout
delay,informthe consulate,whichin tur nannowmakeuse ofits nght of communication
andaccessto itsnationalsasset outin
- subparagraph1 (c):the consulatecan use itsnght to visitthe detained national,to correspond
withhim, and - mostimportantly - to arrangeforhis legalrepresentation.
Now, when we regard the content and structure of Article36, paragraph1, in our
examinationof the caseof the LaGrandbrothers,whatisthe decisivepoint?
Mr.President,the decisivepoint, indeed,theabsolutelycrucialtest is whetherthe authonties
informthe arrestedpersonwithoutdelayofhisrightto contactthe consulate.
Whyisthis sodecisive?
Because - and1cannotstressthis point toomuch - whenthis obligationof the receiving
State is violated, the other rights contained in Article36, paragraph1, become in practice
irrelevant,indeedmeaningless. It is decisive that the foreignerbe informed about his rightto establish contact with his
consulate. Itis essentiallyhroughthisprovision thatthe Conventionensuresthat the otherrights
containedin Article36,paragraph 1, canbe implemented effectively.This concemsboththe right
to communicationwith the consulateunder subparagraph 1(a) and the right of the consulateto
visitthe detainednational, to correspond withhim, and,most importantly,to arrange for hislegal
representationunderArticle36, subparagraph 1(c).
To surnup: respect forthe obligationto informthe foreignerabout his right to establish
contactwith his consulate is a prerequisite forthe effective useof the other rightsembodiedin
Article36,paragraph1. Withoutthefulfilmentof thisconditiosinequa non,consularassistanceas
foreseen in Article36, subparagraphs 1(a) and(c), becomes an abstract principle, dead letter,
withoutanypractical meaning.Aswe see,this canhavethemost deplorable, fatal consequencea ss
inthe case ofthe LaGrandbrothers, especiallyina countryinwhichthe deathpenaltyis fiequently
applied. In such a case, a restrictiveand incorrect interpretationof Article36 cm, as our case
demonstrates,literallytip thebalanceinamatteroflifeanddeath.
4. Mr. President,1now turn to Article 36, paragraph2. Article36, paragraph 2, dealswith
the important questionof the implementation ofthe rights just set out in the interna1law of the
receivingState. Theparagraph reads:
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercisedin
conformitywith thelawsandregulationsof thereceiving State,subjectto theproviso,
however,that the said laws and regulationsmust enablefull effectto be givento the
purposesforwhichtherights accordedunderthis articleareintended."
It is clear that Article 36, paragraph2, in no way limits or reduces the obligationsof the
receiving Stateunder Article 36, paragraph 1. Itonly deals with the modalitiesof their exercise.
Onthe onehand,paragraph2 makesit plainthat Article36 doesnot affectthe validity ofnational
laws and regulations. On the other hand, andthis is absolutely central to Germany'scase,
Mr.President,Article36, paragraph 2, puts the receivingStateunder a specificobligation. This
State must enactlaws and regulationsthat do render effectivethe exercise of the rights under
Article 36. Paragraph 2requiresthat thepurposeof Article 36be fulfilled,namelythat foreigners
actuallydo haveaccess to the servicesof their consulateif they so wish. Therefore,the receiving
State must shape its domestic law in a way that renders the actual exercise of the rights ofArticle36 effective,meaningful andpracticable. Wewillshow,Mr.President,thatUS lawfailsto
do so by virtueofthe existenceand application ofrulessuchastheruleof "proceduraldefault" and
theAnti-Terrorism and EfectiveDeathPenalqAct.
5.Mr.President,Germanynoteswithsatisfaction, limited satisfaction t, at theUnitedStates
s
has acknowledged thatit failed to informthe LaGrandbrothers in 1982,upon their arrest and
detention,of theirright to contact their consula,s requiredby Article 36, paragraph1. But, of
course,faced with clear and unequivocal evidence containeidn the Presentence Reportsthat the
Arizona authorities were aware of the Germannationalityof the brothers al1along, the United
States acknowledgmentonly adrnitsthe obvious: that the LaGrand brothers were of German
nationality; that the Arizonaauthorities,infull knowledge of that fact, fo informtheGerman
authorities; that thereforetheUnitedStatesisresponsible forthisailue ofthe Arizona authorities
to live upto Article36.
II.The interpretationofArticle36,paragraph1
6.Mr. President,1nowturntomysecond question:
How canthe United Statesaffirmsucha nmw andrestrictive interpretation ofArticle36as
ithas doneinthe Counter-Memorial?
Weare concerned,Mr.President,that certain remarksin the Counter-Mernorialon,kt, the
"withoutdelay"requirement, then, onthe draftinghistory andfinallyon State practice conceming
Article36 castseriousdoubtonthe unequivocalcornmitmentof the UnitedStatesto acknowledge
that violation. Therefore, in spite of the US admission of a breach of Article36,
subparagraph 1 @), Germany finds it necessary to clarifi the interpretation of Article36,
paragraph 1.
1. Therequirementto inform"withoutdelay"
7. Mr. President, the restrictive and incorrectUS interpretation ofthe "without delay"
requirementin Article36isparticularly obvious.
Referringto the wording of Article36, subparagraph 1 (b),requiringnotification"without
delay", the United States quite surprisinglytakes the view that such notificationmay also be
postponed,resultingin "notificationoccurringaftercriticaleventsin a cnminal investigationhaveo~curred"~~T . he UnitedStateseven argues that Article36 and other consular agreements"donot
tie consular notificationto anyparticularstageof aninvestigationorprosecution"56.Mr.President,
is "without delay"- inthe US view - somethingelsethan "withoutdelay"? Doesthis approach
not flyinthe face of theeffective implementationof Article36,subparagraph1 (b),as requiredby
the Vienna Convention?If itwere correct, one could regard n aotificationjust before theexecution
ofthe convictedas sufficient! TheLaGrandcaseshowsthatsucha strange,indeedalmostcynical,
view of "compliance"is not merely theoretical: the brothers were informedof their right to
consularnotification briefly afierthe end of the habeas corpusproceedings inwhich their last
appealwasdeniedby SupremeCourton 21 December1998-more than 16yearsaftertheirarrest
and lessthanthreemonths before they were executed.
8. TheUnited Statesis correctto state in paragraph 86 ofthe Counter-Memorialthat the
Vienna Conventiondoes not "obligate consular officials to gant any measure of substantive
consularassistance". But this observation,again,is beside thepoint. Whatis decisiveis that the
Conventionaccords the right to provide such support. Article36, subparagraph1(c), provides
consularofficers"to arrangefor [the]legal representation" of adetainee and to correspondwith
him, includinggiving advice on his conductduringthe trial andthe assistance bycounsel. To
effectivelyexercisethis right, the notificationmust be "without delay",that is, timely enoughto
allow for effective legal representation tbe arranged fiom the very beginning of thecriminal
process. Again: informingdetaineeslater than that does not conform to the requirement that
notificationshallhappen "without delay", that is, immediatelay fter the arrest. By informingthe
LaGrandbrothers of theirright to informthe consulate morethan 16years afier their arrest,the
United Stateshastherefore clearlyfailedtomeetthe standardofArticle 36.
2. Theabuseofthe travauxbythe United States
9. Then,Mr. President,the United States triesto limitthe scopeof Article36by referringto
the draftinghistory of the provisionand State practice. As we have shown and will continueto
5S~ounter-~emorial,para.84.
S6~bidn.,ote90.show,the UnitedStateshas badly misinterpreted the travauxbyrelyingonproposals flatly rejected
bytheConference. Atthispoint 1 willlimitmyselftojust one exarnple, a telliexarnple indeed.
10.Thedraftinghistoryof theprovisionon theright tobe informed ofone'sright of contact
withthe consulatewas difficult. Nevertheless,as far as the prohibition ofdelayis concerned, itis
quiteclear. Therequirementto notie the consulateof the receiving Statewithout delay wasfirst
proposed bythe ILC. But the ILC still demanded information of the consulate "withoutundue
delayWs7F .ollowing aproposa1of the UnitedKingdom,the SecondCornmitteeof the Diplomatic
Conference removed the word "undue". It thus strengthened the obligation of prompt
notification5*,nd the result is that Article36, paragraph1(b), does not allowfor any delay in
informingthe detaineeofhis rights. Itwas acornmonopinionopiniojuristhat a foreignerhas an
individual rightto receive without delaythe assistanceof his consulate,the idea was that the
notificationof the detaineeof hisrights shouldbe mandatory,that it shouldbe effective andthatit
mustnotbe discretionary.
3. Statepractice
11. Mr. President, why can State practice neither support nor justi@ the restrictive and
incorrectinterpretationofArticle 36bythe UnitedStates?
- First,Statepracticeis scarceand inconclusive.
- Second,none of the existingcases,none deals, asour case does, with the specificquestion,
whether imposition of the death penalty impairedby a violation of the right to consular
assistance should be open to review or not (the only exception being the Breard case
well-knownto thisCourt).
- Third,mostviolationsof Article 36 happenin minorcases, andarethenresolvedinthe course
of criminal proceedings, as in the two German cases cited in the United States
Counter-Mernorial.
"~nited Nations Conferenceon ConsularRelations,UnitedNDoc.NCONF.25/16/Add.l (1963),Vol.II,
atp.24, draftArticle36,paragra(b).)
58~bi dol.IIat 85(amendmentproposedby tUK, UnitedNationsDoc.NCONF.2VC.X.107 (1963);ibid.,
paragraph106(c)atp. 131. Most of the few cases referred to by the United States deal with the specific question
whether evidence obtained by without informationon consular assistance can be used in the
criminal proceedings for a convictionor not. This has of course very little to dowith the
fundamentallydifferentquestionwhether imposition ofthe death penalty impairedby a graveand
sustainedviolation ofthe right toconsularassistance shouldbe opento review ornot.
With regard to the impact of a violation of Article36 on criminal proceedings, US
Judge Boochever,inhisvigorousdissentintheLombera-Camorlinga case, stated:
"1 agree with the majority's conclusionthat 'a foreign national's postmest
statementsshouldnot be excluded solelybecausehe made them before beingtold of
his right to consular notificatio... But whenthe foreign nationalcan showthat he
or she has been prejudicedby the failure to advise him or her of such a right, that
prejudiceshouldbe rectified ...""
If this is correct, Mr.President,is it not evenmore necessaryto rectifj the prejudicein
questionif it concemscircumstancesleadingto thepronouncement ofthe deathpenalty?
To be very clear,Germanyhasnot demandedautomaticreversa1of al1convictionsimpaired
by a violationof Article36 and itdoesnot intendto do so now. WhatGermanydoesrequest,and
what we will set out in detail later,is that a convictionor sentenceimpairedby a violationof the
right of a foreign nationalto notificationcan be reviewedin the courseof later proceedings,in
particularin casesinvolvingthepronouncementofthedeath penalty.
III.Theviolation ofArticle36, paragraph1,bythe United States
12. Mr.President,1nowtumto mythirdand1st question.
Why is the lirnitedacknowledgmentby the United States of a violation of Article 36not
sufficientto dojustice between theparties?
The answer is: first, the United States fails to admit the violations of Article 36,
subparagraphs 1 (a) and(c), that go along with the violation of Article 36, subparagraph 1 fi);
second, the United States does not admit that its laws and regulations do not live up to the
standards requiredby Article36, paragraph2, of the Vienna Convention because they do not
enable full effect to be given to thepurposes for whichthe rights in Article 36, paragraph1, are
established; third, the United Statesdoes not recognize that Article36 creates individual rights,
Sg~ounter-~emoria, nn.9,p.5.that their violationalso infiingesupon Germany'sright of diplornatic protection,and that these
factors aggravate the original violation.
13.Asto the violationsof Article36, subparagraphs1(a) an(c)subsequentto the lack of
consular information, reawhat shallonethinkof the USobjectionsto the effectthat Germany's
respectiveclaimsareto beregardedasmere"add-on"claimsandthus "misplaced"?
It isomrnonplacethat oneandthe sameconductmayresult in severalviolationsof distinct
obligations. If the obligationto informthe detaineeof hisrightsandto himpestablishcontact
with his consulateis violated,the detainee cannot establish ct ith his consulate,he cannot
communicate withthe consulate, he cannotreceive visitsfiom consular officers, he cannot be
supportedby adequate counsel,becausehe is not awareof his right. Therefore, violation of this
right is boundto imply violationof the other rights. Asmeobvious inthe LaGrandtrial, the
brotherswereonlyableto contact the consulatein 1992,whenit was toote. Afterconvictionand
sentencing,German consular support coulno longerhave anyeffect,especiallynot with regard to
the imposition of the death penalty. Hence, later observance of the rights of Article36,
subparagraphs1 (a)and (c)couldnotremedythe previous violationofthoseprovisions.
Mr.President, eventuallythe resultwas the death of therandbrothers. In the caseof
Walter LeGrand,these seriousviolationsof the ViennaConventionwere then furtheraggravated
by a deliberate violationofthebindingderof thisCourtof3 March 1999.
14.Mr. President, distinguishedMembersof the Court,1would now kindly askyou to cal1
upon my colleague, Mr.Paulus, to show that the United States has also violated Artic36,
paragraph2. 1thankyou.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, M. Kaul. Je donne maintenant la parole à
M.AndreasPaulus.
Mr. PAULUS:
V. ARTICLE 36, PARAGRAPH 2,OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
1.Mr. President, distinguisMembers ofthe Court,it is a greathonourformetorepresent
Germanybefore thisCourt. I willargue that,inthe caseoftheLaGrandbrothers, theUnitedStateshasviolatedArticle36 oftheViema Convention, especially paragraph 2 thereof,bytheapplication
of itsdomesticlaw. In itsMemorial, Germanyhasset outingreatdetailthereasonswhyit regards
the applicationof the principleof procedural default andof the Antiterrorismand Effective Death
Penalty Act as a violation of Article 36, paragraph2, of the Viema Convention. In the present
pleadings,Mr.President, 1will notgo too deeply intothe detailsof US domesticlaw. In fact, our
analysisof USlawhas remained largely undisputed inthe Counter-Memorial.Whatthe Partiesare
in disagreementabout is the conformity vel non of US law with the rights of foreignersunder
Article36, subparagraph1 (8) and paragraph2, of the Vienna Convention. That issue is one of
internationallaw,and,Mr.President, thatispreciselythe issuewhichisbeforeyoutoday.
2.1 shalldevelopthe German argumentconcemingtheviolation ofArticle36,paragraph2,
inthreestages:
- My first argument will be that the interpretation of Article36, paragraph2, its object and
purposeas well as itsdraftinghistory, demonstrate that theprovisionwas intendedto ensure
the primacy of the international obligations flowingfiom Article36 over intemal laws and
regulationswhich do not give full effectto the purposesfor which the rightsaccordedunder
Article36 areintended;
- second,1will arguethat US law and practicedo not givefull effect to these rights and are
thereforein violationofArticle36,paragraphs1and2; and,
- third,1willarguethatthere are noexceptions as to theprimacyof Article36 over nationallaw
andthatthereforetheUnited Statesneedsto change eitherits laws or theapplicationof its laws
in awaythat ensuresthat,inthe future, Article36will berespectedin domesticproceedings.
The PRESIDENT: May 1 intenupt you for one secondto ask you to speak a little more
slowly,becausethe interpretershavesomeproblem with your speed.
Mr.PAULUS: Excuseme,Mr. President.
1.Interpretationanddraftinghistory
3. Mr.President, the wordingof paragraph 2of Article 36 leavesno doubt concerningits
meaning: on the one hand,the provision demandsthat "[tlherights referred to inparagraph1 ofthis article shall be exercised inconformitywith the laws and regulations ofthe receiving State".
That is stating the obvious: Article36, paragraph1, does not permit disregardof domesticlaw.
Forinstance,takingup anexampleusedby the InternationalLaw~ommission~~ d,omesticruleson
prisonvisits have to be followed. 3
4. On the other hand, however,those laws and regulationsmust not impedethe effective
exercise of the rights under paragraph 1. This is the "proviso" contained in the second
half-sentenceof paragraph2: the domesticlaws and regulationsin questionare "subjectto the
proviso, however,that the said laws and regulations mustenable full effect to be given to the
purposesfor which the rightsaccordedunderthis articleareintended". In thisway,theprimacy of
internationallaw over domesticlaw isconfirmedand maintained. In addition, whatis required
here is a purposive reading of paragraph1, that is, the rights accordedunder paragraph 1must
effectivelyachievetheirpurpose,inother words,ensureeffective communication andsupportfrom
the consulateto the detainednational. Hence,we are facedhere with a provisionthat makesthe
effectiveness of international lawthe yardstick for its implementationby domestic law. As
Germanywill show,US law doesnotmeetthatrequirement.
II.The rnisreading of thetravauxbytheUnitedStates
5. Mr.President,before1gointothedetailsofthe failureofUSlawto liveup to thestandard
of Article36, paragraph2, let me briefly react to the analysis of the drafting history of the
provisioninthe Counter-Memorial.A look atthetravaux willrevealthatthe readingsuggestedby
the UnitedStatesiscontradictedbythedraftinghistory.
6. The Counter-Mernorial refers tothe Commentary ofthe ILC on its draft of Article36,
paragraph2, and argues that the ILC intended tolimit the proviso to "the mechanicsof prison
viSitsll.lBut this conclusionis based on a plainly incompletereading of the ILC Commentary.
Actually,paragraph(5) of the Cornmentaryto draflArticle36 refersto prisonvisitsas an example
ofcircumstanceswhichshouldbe subjecttointemallawsandregulations. However, paragraph (7)
~LC Commentary to draft article 36, in: United Nations Conferenceon Consular Relations, United Nations
Doc.A/CONF.25/16/Add.l (1963),Vol. II,at 24, para.(5).
6'~ounter-~emonal, para.80.of the Commentary refersto al1nghts containedin draftArticle36. Therefore,the provisowasto
concemal1the rightsenurnerated inArticle 36, paragraph162.
7. Besides,the Commentary of theCommissionreferredto its own draft, not to Article 36,
paragraph2, of the Conventionas it now stands. TheILC draft onlydemanded thatintemal laws
and regulations"mustnot nullifi" the rightsunderArticle3663. Obviously,the ILC proposa1was
weaker than the final textof the Convention,whichrequiresnot onlythe non-nullification ofthe
rights offoreignnationals,but that "full effe...be given to the purposesfor which the rights
accorded under this article are intended". The UK delegate, Mr. Evans, explainedthe UK
a~nendment~ ~hichwaslateradoptedbytheConferenceasfollows:
"Itwas realizedthat consulatesmustcomplywith lawsandregulationson such
matters as prison visiting and what might be given to the prisoner. It wasof the
greatest importance, however,that the substance of the rights and obligations in
paragraph1must bepreserved."65
Thus,contraryto whatthe UnitedStatesmaintainsin paragraph80of its Counter-Memorial,
what is decisiveis not whetheran impemissible law concems prison visits or other mattersbut
whetheritwould hamperthe exercise oftherightsunderArticle36,paragraph1. As Gemany will
demonstrate,Mr. President,that isexactlywhatUSlawdoes.
8.Inhis defenceofthe proposa1whichwasto becomeArticle36,paragraph2, of the Vienna
Convention,the UK delegateadded:
"TheUkrainian delegationhad impliedthat municipallaw shouldprevail over
international law; but that objection could not applyto the rights recognized in
paragraph 1of article6."66
Thus,the wording of Article36,paragraph2,requiresananalysisofnationallaw inthe light
of the objectandpurposeof Article 36, notmerelyan analysiswhetherthe wordino gfthe rights is
expressly counteractedby national law. It is thus far too narrow whenthe Counter-Memorial
contendsthat
"~nited Nations Conference on Consular Relations, OficiRecords, Vol.II, United Nations
Doc.A/CONF.25/16/Add.l(1963),atp.24.
%nited Nations Doc.A/CONF.25/C.2/1.07 (1963), in UnitedNations Conferenceon ConsularRelations,
United NationsDoc.A/CONF.25/16/Add.(l1963),Vol.II,atp.85.
6S~niteNationsConference ConsularRelations,op.cit., Vol.1,p. 347,para.47.
66~niteNationsConference ConsulaRelations,op.cit., Vol.1,p. 348,para.10. "[tlhereis no suggestionin the text .. .that the mles of criminallaw and procedure
underwhicha defendant wouldbe triedor have his convictionand sentencereviewed
by appellatecourtsarealsowithinthe scope ofthis provision"67.
Rather,the "purposes"phraseis sufficiently broad to include al1domesticprovisionswhich
couldhamperthe exerciseof the rights underArticle36. Indeed,giventhe differentlegal systems
oftheworld,an enumeration of mattersof domesticlawto whichArticle36,paragraph2, refersis
neithernecessarynorpossible.
9. Mr. President,in its Counter-MemoriatlheUnitedStatesmakesa greatdeal of the Soviet
and Byelorussian oppositionto the wording of Article 36,paragraph2. It thus relies on the
positionof States that voted against this provisionand did not ratify the Conventionuntil 1989
precisely because they - correctly- believed that Article36, paragraph2, would require
considerablechanges of their laws and practices- steps thewere not readyto take. As the
Ukrainiandelegateto the 1963Conferenceputit: "Thewordsinquestionentailed aseriousdanger
of pressureby internationalrulesonnational legislation.. ."68
How such objections by opponents of a provisioncould "reflect a publicly stated
understandingof the negotiators",as the Counter-Mernorialasserts6',is difficultto see. If the
positionof the opponentsof Article 36 proves anything,it is that those States,whentheyrealized
the far-reaching implicationsof this provision, opposedit and, ultirnately, remainedoutsidethe
treaty. It was only after a fundamentalchangeof politicalcircumstancesthat the Soviet Union,
Belanisandükraine accededto theConventionmorethan25yearslater''.
10. To repeat, Mr.President,the United States reading of Article36, paragraph2, is so
narrow as to render Article36 ineffectiveas against domesticlaws, whereas the interpretation
advancedby Germany ensures the effectivenessof the provision. Under the correct reading,
Article36,paragraph2,makes al1domesticlaws and regulationssubjecttothe effectiveexercise of
the internationalrights and dutiesunderArticle36,paragraph1. That is exactlywhy thisproviso
67~ounter-~emorial,ara.79.
"~nitedNationsConferenceonConsularRelations,op.c.,ol1,p.42, para.47.
69~ounter-~emorial,ara.1.
'%ultilateralTreaties Deposiwiththe Secretary-General, UndationsDoc. ST/LEG/SER.E/18(Vol. 1)
(2000C),h.III.wasproposedby the ILC,and wasthen even strengthenedin the deliberationsof thefuture States
partiesattheViennaConference.
III. The effectsof USdomesticlaw on the rights under Article 36
11. Mr.President, let me now tum to the question of whether United States lawsand
regulations as appliedby United Statescourts in the LaGrand case live up to the standards of
Article36. In its Memorial, Germany hassetoutin detailthe impactof the municipal law doctrine
of proceduraldefaultand theAntiterrorismandEffective Death PenaltyAct. As faras we cansee,
the United States has by and large accepted our description of its domestic law and
jurisprudence - indeed, its only criticismwas that we had depictedrecent developmentsin too
positive a light7'. Indeed, if we review US jurisprudence, includingjudgments rendered after
Germany's Memorial was deposited,we cannot exclude the possibility that effective
implementation of Article 36 may require somelegislative changes and not only an altered
applicationof the laws currentlyin force. Butthis is nothing exceptional.As the PermanentCourt
of InternationalJustice stated in its Advisory Opinion on the Exchange of Greekand Turkish
Populations,in interpreting a treaty clause expresslyprescribingthe adaptation ofdomesticlawto
international obligations:
"This clause.. . merely lays stress on a principle which is self-evident,
according to which a State which has contracted valid international obligationsis
boundto make in its legislationsuchmodificationsas may benecessary toensurethe
fulfilmentof theobligations~ndertaken."~~
And as JudgeHersch Lauterpacht explained in his separateopinionin theNorwegian Loans
case:
"National legislation... may be contrary, in its intentionsor effects, to the
international obligations ofthe State. The question of conformity of national
iegisiationwithinternationallawisamatterof international la^."^^
"~ounter-~emorial, aras.76etseq. andpara.91,foomote96.
72Ex~hangoef Greekand TurkishPopulations,Advisory Opinion,P.C.I.J.,Series.B, No. IO,at p.20. Oficial
translation.he authentiFrenchtextreads:"Maiscette clausenefait que mettreen relief unprincipe allantde soi,
d'après lequelunEtatquia valablementcontractédes obligations internationalesesttenuà'sa législation les
mod$cations nécessairpour assurerl'exécutdesengagementspris."
%se of CertainNorwegianLoans,Judgrnent,.C.J.Reports1957,p. 9, separateopinion,Lautert,tp.37. 12.The present case,Mr.President,is not aboutUS lawas such. Domesticlaw constitutes
for internationallaw nothing but facts. In the famouswordingof thejudgment of the Permanent
Courtof InternationalJusticeon Certain GermanInterestsinPoIish UpperSilesia:
"Fromthe standpointof internationallaw and of the Court whichis its organ,
municipal laws are merely factswhich expressthe will and constitutethe activitiesof
States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures. The
Court is certainlynot called upon to interpret the Polish law as such, but there is
nothing to prevent the Court'sgivingjudgment on the question whetheror not, in
applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards
Germany ..."74
That is exactlywhat Germanyrequests the Courtto do, Mr. President. Wedo not ask the
Courtto interpretUS law as such, but weinvitethe Court togive a judgrnenton the question of
whether,in applyingits ownlaw,the United States actedin conformitywithits obligationstowards
GermanyunderArticle36 oftheVienna Conventionon ConsularRelations. Germany submitsthat
it didnot.
13.To put it briefly, Mr. President,US lawprevents raisingthe violationof the notification
requirement in appellate proceedingsafier a conviction. That is the heart of the matter: once a
violationof Article36 has occurred, andthe defendant hasnot raised the violation ofhis rights
beforethe trial court, thereis noopportunityto review.the impactofthe violationon thejudgment
handeddownwhilethe defendantdidnotknowofhisrights. Thus,US lawcreatesa viciouscircle:
thedefendantcannotraisethe violation ofhis rightsunderArticle36,becausehe doesnot laiowof
thisright,butthe failureofthe authontiesto informthe detaineeofhis rights cannotbe rernediedin
laterproceedings,becauseUS domesticlawwill preventitscourtsfiomevenlookingatthismatter.
14.Two institutionsofUS law - establishedfor entirelydifferentpurposes- leadto this
result: first, the doctrine of procedural default which appliesin many state and in al1federal
appeals and habeas corpus proceedings, and, second, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. Under the doctrine of procedural default, a defendant canno rtaise any
mistakemade inthe trial proceedingson appealif he didnot do so alreadyin thejury trial. While
74~.~.I.~, eriesA, No. 7,a19. Inthe authenticFrenchtext: 'Yuregarddu droit internationalet de!a Cour
qui en est l'organe,les lois nationales sontde simples faits, mangestationsde la volontéet de l'activité desEtats, au
&me titre que les décisionsjudiciaires ou les mesuresadministratives. La Cour n'estcertainementpaà appelée
interprétla loi polonaisecommetelle; mais riennes'opposeà ce qu'ellese prononcesur la question de savoirsi, en
appliquantladite loi, la Pologneagit ou nonenconavec les obligationsque la Conventionde Genèveluiimpose
enversl'Allemagne."this rule does make sense where it concemsrights of which the defendant or his attorney were
aware, it has perverse consequenceswhen applied to a right tobe infomed of another right. A
right to information, like that contained in Article 36, subparagraph 1(b), of the Viema
Convention,serves to remedy the ignorance of a detainee. If this obligationto inform is not met,
the detaineewill not know ofthis right, neitherwill he be able to raise this failure before the trial
court. In this case, in contrast to other procedural rights,the right to information can only be
properly enforcedif it can still be raised after the end ofthe first trial. A measure or rule entirely
justified in cases wherehis rights areknown to the defendantamountsto an impermissibledenial
of rights in cases of a right to information. Germanydoes not claimthat US courts contemplated
sucha result when theyintroducedthe doctrineof procedural default. Butthis doesnot remedythe
catastrophic consequences ofthe doctrine forthe right to information. As DouglassCassel has put
it:
"To bar a late claim under the Convention as procedurally defaulted, when
consularrights couldhavebeen tirnelyasserted,hadthe statecompliedwith its duty to
advise the foreign national of his consular rights 'without delay',is to penalize the
foreign nationalforthe state'sbreach. It is no answerto blamethe defensecounsel. If
the state had complied with its duw to advise, the defense counsel'soversight would
not have mattered."
And further:
"If the US had done its duty ... [the foreign national] wouldhave been in a
position to assert his consular rights at the right time and place. By allowing ...
restrictions on habeas corpus or considerations of domestic federalism to thwart
Convention claims, the US fails to give 'full effect' to the purposes of consular
right~."75
15. In addition, instead of creating incentives for the State authorities to meet their
obligations under Article 36, the doctrine of procedural default provides a shield for State
authorities. Whenthe authorities meettheir obligation toinformthe detainees of their rights, they
couldfacea muchbetter infonned defendant and might lose a casethey mightotherwisehave won.
On the other hand, if they fail to meet their obligation,they donot even risk condemnationby a
higher court. Mr. President, distinguished Members ofthe Court, this state of affairs cannot be
regardedas effectiveimplementationofArticle36.
"D. Cassel,JudicialRemediesforTreatyViolationsinCriminalCases: ConsularRightsof ForeignNationalisn
UnitedStatesDeathPenaltyCases,12MIL (1999)851,atp. 885. 16.The adoptionof the AntiterrorismandEffective Death PenaltyAct of 1996(AEDPA)~~,
has madeit evenmore difficult to challenge aStateconviction. Ahabeaspetitionerallegingthat
he is held in violation of treatylaw will not even be granted an evidentiaryhearing to establish
prejudice77. Thus, in the Breard case, the US Supreme Court referred to the first phrase of
Article 36, paragraph 2, only- apparently disregarding the second phrase - and applied the
domesticrules ofprocedural defaultand theAEDPAtojustify its refusa1to deal substantivelywith
Breard'sclaim of a violation of Article3678.
17. Inthe caseof the LaGrandbrothers, boththe procedural defaultrule andthe application
of the said act prevented federal courts, indeed, any courtf,romactuallydealingwith the question
of whether lack ofconsularnotification had vitiatedthe pronouncementof the death penalty. The
jurisprudence described earlier made it impossibleorthe LaGrandbrothersto effectivelyraisethe
issueof the lackof consularnotificationafterthey hadat lastleamedoftheir rightsand established
contactwith the Germanconsulatein Los Angelesin 1992. On 16January 1998,the US Courtof
Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that the claim of violation ofthe Vienna Convention was
procedurally defaulted,eventhoughthe violationitselfwasnot in dispute79.The courtdidnot even
discussthe substantive argumentto the effectthat additional mitigationmight have preventedthe
pronouncementofthe death penalty.
18. Mr. President, the application of the procedural default rule in the LaGrand case
constitutesno exceptionbut rather confirms therule of the non-enforcement of Article 36,by US
courts. Regrettably,the US Counter-Memorialis correctin statingthat thetrendvisible in the first
Lombera-Camorlinga decisionofthe 9th Circuit Court atthe timewhenthe GermanMemorial was
written has not been continued. Recent judgments and scholarly analysis show that there is
unlikelyto be a changeof the jurisprudenceon the matter without a change in US federal lawS0,
76~~bL. .NO.104-132,110Stat.1214(1996).
7728U.S.C.,paras.2254(a), (e)(2)(ii)(Supp. 1998);forthetextseeMemorial,footnote188 topara.4.34.
"~reard,37International egalMaterials826,828 (1998).
79~a~randv.Stewart, 13F.3d1253,1261 (9thCir.1998),Memonal,Ann.10.
"~ee, e.g., E. LunalD.Sylvester,Beyond Breard,17 BerkeleyJournalof InternationalLaw (1999) 147;
H.Schiffman,Breard andBeyond: The Statusof ConsularNotificationand Access underthe ViennaConvention,
8 CardozoJ.Int&lComp.L.(2000)27.even though some commentatorsmaintainthat such a changemight still come abouts'. However,
in the present contextwhat countsis not whetherthe US courtdecisionsare or are not correct fiom
the standpoint of domestic US law. And so far it is for the United States to decide how to
implementArticle 36. But such implementationmust meetthe minimumstandardof effectiveness
requiredby Article36,paragraph 2. As Germanyhas shown,theserequirementsarenot metby the
way in which the US legal system currently deals with violations of Article 36. In the words of
JudgeBoochever's vigorous dissent to the decision of the full 9th Circuit Court in
Lombera-Camorlinga,the interpretation of the Vienna Conventionby themajorityof US courts
"is equivalentto securingenforcementby a toothless, clawlesslion. Defendantswho
actually have been prejudiced by the failure to be notified of their Article36 rights
may suffer imprisonment and otherpunishrnentsto which they would not havebeen
subjectedhad their rightsbeen observed. Such an interpretationof the treaty hardly
conformsto the due process principles embodiedinthe United States~onstitution.~~"
Neither, one might add, do they conformto the Convention itself. However, regrettably,
JudgeBoochever'sis not the dominant position of the US judiciary. A violation of Article36,
especially the failure of US authorities to inform the foreign national of his rights, cannot be
effectively remedied before US courts- or, indeed, anywhere else. This is- as our case
shows - boundto leadto fatal consequenceswhenthe death penaltyis imposed.
19.Mr.President,we will laterset outthe safeguardsGermany seeksin orderto remedy that
situation. In addition,Mr. Donovanwill explainto you how informingthe consulate earlierwould
have affected the judgment, especially the pronouncement ofthe death penalty. However, one
thing is crystal clear alreadyat this point: thepurpose of Article36, that is, to informthe foreign
detaineeof his rights under the Convention,cannot befulfilledif the possibility of raisingthe lack
ofnotificationis limitedto the originaltrial. Thatis whereUS law is defectivefiom the standpoint
of Article36, especially regardingthe requirementof paragraph 2. Thus, Germany agreeswiththe
opinion of KeithHighet,who wroteshortlybeforehis death:
"The purposes of consular access rights are quite obviously to protect the
criminal defendant nationals. To cut off the right of appealon the basis of failureto
,raise the questionof lack of consular accessunderthe Conventionin state court,when
notificationof such consularaccesswasthe duty of the arresting(receiving)State and
8'~chiffman,ibid., at 58.etseq.; D. Cassel, Judicial Remedies forTreaty Violations inCriminal Cases:
ConsularRightsof ForeignNationsin UnitedStatesDeathPenalty Cas12LeidenJIL(1999)851,atpp. 884etseq.
"~nited StatesCounter-Memorial,Ann9,p.5. was not in fact performed,is as absurd as Catch-22but not in the least amusing. Itis
in fact the precise opposite of the performance ofthe duty to 'enablefull effect to be
givento the pqoses for whichthe rights accordedunderthis articleare intended'."83
The casebeforeyou providesa uniqueopportunityto ensurethe effective performanceof that duty
bythe UnitedStatesinthe future.
20. Mr.President, distinguished Membersof the Court,uld now kindly ask you to cal1
upon Professor Simma to demonstratethat Article36 contains individual rights. Thankyou for
your attention.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, M. Paulus. Je donne maintenant la parole au
professeurBruno Simrna.
M. SIMMA :MerciM. le président. Monsieurle président,j'aimeraiscommenceravecune
remarque de nature procédurale. Nous sommes un peu en retard et je vous demande de bien
vouloirm'interrompre quandvous souhaiterezquela Cour suspendela procédureusqul'aàséance
de l'après-midi.Merci, Monsieurleprésident.
M. ARTICLE 36 OFTHEVIENNA CONVENTIO ANSAN INDMDUAL AND HUMAN RIGHT
1.~r.'President, Membersof the Court, inthe following,1will demonstratethat the right to
informationunder Article36 of the Vienna Convention constitutesan individual, indeed, ahuman
nght, and explainwhy this is not only a factor aggravating theviolationswhich have occurred,but
alsobringsintoplay specificproceduralsafeguardsin death penalty cases. Further,1will dealwith
therelevanceof otherumanrights forthe right to consularassistance: andin concludingthis part,
1will showthe impactofthe characterof Article 36as a hurnanright onthepresent case.
1.Article36 containsindividualrights
2.Inparagraph97 of its Counter-Memorial,the United Statesarguesthat Article 36doesnot
conferrights on individualforeignnationalsbut onlyon their homee. Germanywill arguethat
the right to informationcontained in Article36, subparagr(b)constitutesan individualright
of foreign nationals. But,of course, Germanyeeswith the United States,that, regardlessof the
83~Highet, The Emperor'sNew Clothes: Death Row Appeals to the World Court? TheBreard Case As a
Miscarriageof (International)Justice, in: In Memoriam JudgeJosé Maria Rudar,nanuscript,p. 6, GermanMernorial,
Ann.39.statusof Article 36,paragraph1,as an individual right offoreigners,it also establishesa right for a
State party to the Conventionto see this provision respected. Consequently, al1the conclusions
Germany has drawn, andwill draw, fiom the violation of Article36 are valid independently ofthe
question whether Article 36 provides individual rightsto foreignnationals in additionto rights for
Statesparties.
3.Mr.President, the understanding of the rights under Article36 as individual rights is
confirmedby al1the rules on interpretation of internationaltreatiesthat we find in Article 31of the
Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. First, it shouldbe clear enough that the "ordinary
meaning" ofthe words "his rights" usedin Article36, subparagraph 1 (b), refers to an individual
person. Second, the context of Article36 relates to both the concems of sending and receiving
States and those of individuals. It is individuals who are accorded fieedom with respect to
communicationin subparagraph 1(a), it is individualswho have the right to request or notrequest
the notification of the consulate pursuant to subparagraph 1 (b),it is individuals who are to be
informed of that right and, lastly, it is individuals who have the right to oppose a prison visit
accordingto subparagraph 1(c). The chapeau of Article36 which links those rightsto the consular
functiondoes not change thispicture. Nor does the paragraph in the Prearnbleto the Convention
which providesthat
"the purpose of [consular] privileges andirnmunitiesis not to benefit individuals but
to ensure the efficient performance of functionsby consular posts on behalf of their
respectiveStates".
What this paragraph clearly deals with,Mr.President, is "privileges and immunities" of
consularpersonnel, a matterwholly unrelatedto Article 36. It was intendedto ensurethat consular
personnel would observe itsobligationstowardsthe receivingState andthat, if necessary, consular
privileges couldbe waivedby the sendingState. Thishasnothingto do with Article 36. Third,the
purpose of Article36, paragraph 1,is to give individualsthe right to inform their consulate or to
abstainfiom so doing. Can there be a clearer indication of an individualright than the placing of
its exercise squarely into the hands of the individual? To conclude our textual analysis, it is
difficult to see, Mr.President, why something which lookslike an individual right, feels like an
individual right and smells likean individual rightshouldbe anythingelse but an individual right.
As this Court has explainedin its Advisory Opinions first in the Arbitral Award of 31July 1989case and on the Competenceof the General Assemblyfor theAdmission ofa State to the United
Nations case: "If the relevant words in their natwal and ordinary meaningmake sense in their
context,that is an endof themat~er."~~
4. But there is still more evidence. An analysis of the drafting history of ow provision
revealsthat it was not introducedthrough some sleight of hand. On the contrary,it embodiesthe
carefùlly considered solution to a problem which had occupied the participants of the Vienna
Conferencefor a long time. On the one hand, they intendedto do everythingto render Article36
effective. Onthe other, they did not want to havethe consulate informedif a foreigner did not
wish so: and the solution to this problem was the individual rightto informationon the right to
notification. In our Memorial,we quote severalState representativeswho sharedthat viewg5,and
the one or two sources which the US Counter-Memorialadduces against this intepetati~n~~are
eithernot tothe pointornot representative.
5. Thus, the receiving State is under an obligationto informthe detainee, without delay,of
his nght - a genuineright - to have the authoritiesor himself informthe consulateof his arrest
or detention. At a previous occasionbeforethis Court, theRespondenthad no doubtaboutthis. In
the case concerning United States Diplornaticand ConsularStaf in Tehran,the United States
pleaded that Article36 contained an individual right,and let me quote from the Memorial in this
case:
"Article36 establishesrights not onlyfor the consularofficerbut, perhaps even
more importantly, for the nationals of the sending State who are assured access to
consularofficersandthroughthem to others.""
The US ForeignAffairsManual also speaks"of the arrestee'sright to communicatewiththe
American Germanyagrees, Mr. President. Language,context andpurposeof Article36
makethis conclusion imperative.
"cornpetence of the General Assemblyfor theAdmissionof a tothe United Nations,Aàvisory Opinion,
I.C.J.Reports 1950, p.4, at 8. The autFrenchtext reads:"Silesmotspertinents, lorsqu'onleur attribueleur
significationnaturelleet ordinaire,ont unsens dans leur contexte,l'examendoit s'arrêtelrà." Confirmedin thecase
concernintheArbitralAwardof31 July1989,LC.J Reports1991,p.53,atp.72.
s5~emorial,paras.4.101et seq.
86~ounter-~emoriapl,ara.100.
87
1.C.JR.eports1980,p.174.
assection7 FAM411.1,Ann.MG 59,atp. 1284. 6. Now, inthe opinion of the United States,20 years after the TehranJudgment, "evenif
Article36 in some sense establishesindividual rights,there is no requirement thatthose rights be
justiciable in national criminal justice systems":thus the Counter-Memorial. But Article36,
paragraph2, clearly requires domestic law to protect the individual right of foreigners to be
informedon their right to consular notificationin an effectiveanner. It is difficultto imagine,
Mr.President, how thistask couldbe achieved otherwisethan by providing a rightthe violationof
which entailslegal consequencesin domesticlaw. Hence,Germanytakes the viewthat Article 36,
paragraph2, requires the recognition of the right of an individual to seek remedies for the
violations of the Vienna Convention. And in light of what Mr.Paulus just said, Article 36,
paragraph2, further obliges Statesto refrain from imposinganyprocedural bar orpenalty for the
failureto assertsucharight prior to the time theyprovidedthe required notification.
II.Article36 as a humanright
7. Mr. President, Germany mer submits that, in the light of the development of
internationalhuman rights law subsequentto the conclusion of the Vienna Conventionin 1963,
Article36 has assumedthe character of a human right pertaining to foreigners. As a preliminary
point inthisregard,1willrecallthe principleof dynarnictreaty interpretation. And secondly,1will
tum tothe substanceofmy argument.
1. Theprincipleofdynamic treaty interpretation
8. Mr.President, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides in Article 31,
subparagraph3 (c), that, together with the context of a treaty provision, "any relevant niles of
international law applicablein the relations between the parties" shall be taken into account.
Regarding human rights of foreigners, both Germany and the United States are parties to the
International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights which prescribesdue process of the law, in
particular in connection with the application of the death penalty. In addition, numerous
documentson the individualrightsof foreigners, which expressly includethe rightunderArticle36
of the Consular Convention, havebeen agreed upon inthe United Nations. 1will retum to these
texts in a moment,ormaybe inthe afternoon. 9. Further, Mr. President,the ConsularConvention is a living instrument,which mustbe
interpretedin the light of subsequentdevelopmentsof internationallaw. As thisCourt pronounced
in itsamibiaAdvisoryOpinion,referring to a League of Nations Mandate,
"the Court must take into considerationthe changes which have occurred in the
supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannotremain unaffected by the
subsequentdevelopment oflaw, throughthe Charterofthe United Nations andby way
of customary law. Moreover,an international instrument hasto be interpreted and
applied within the fiameworkof the entirelegal systemprevailing at the time of the
interpretation"89
More recently,this Court has confirmed thisview in its Judgmentin the Gabëikovo-Nagymaros
case, regarding the impact of the development of international environmentallaw on the
interpretationof a bilateral treatygO.There can be no doubt in my view, that such necessity of
dynamic interpretation also appliesto the field ofurnanrights.
10.Indeed,where humanrights are at stake,these considerationsare even moreimperative.
Both the EuropeanCourt of HumanRights and the Inter-AmericanCourt ofHurnanRightshave
interpretedhumanrightstreatiesin a dynamicfashion. In the wordsofthe AdvisoryOpinionof the
Inter-Arnerican Courtof HumanRights of 1Octoberof last year, on the Rightto Informationon
ConsularAssistance in theFrameworkoftheGuaranteesoftheDueProcessofLaw, the guidance
oftheNamibiaOpinion is:
"particularlyrelevant in the case of internationalhuman rights law,which has made
great headway thanks to an evolutive interpretation of international instruments of
protection. That evolutive interpretationis consistentwith the generalrules of treaty
interpretation establishedin the 1969ViennaConvention. Boththis Court ... [thatis
the Inter-Arnerican Court] and the European Court of Human Rights ..., among
others,haveheld thathumanrights treatiesare livinginstrumentswhose interpretation
must considerthe changesovertimeandpresent-day condition^."^'
89~egalConsequencesfor States of the ContinuedPresence of SouthAfiica in Namibia (Soutt fiica) -
notwithstandingSecuriv CouncilResoIution276 (1970),Advisov Opinion,I.C.J.Reports 1971,p. 16,atp.31,para.53.
"~ab~ikovo-~agyrnaros~roject(Hungary/Slovakia)J,udgment,I.C.J.Reports1997,p.7, paras.139f.
g'~nter-~mericanourtof HumanRights,AdvisoryOpinionOC-1611999p,ara.114,assubmittedbyGemanyto
the Court;citingIACHR,Inte~pretatof the AmericDeclarationoftheRightsand DutiesofMan,Advisory Opinion
OC-10189of 14July1989, SeriesA No. 10, para.43; CourEuropéenneT ,yrerv.UK, Judgmentof 25 April1978,
SeriesA No. 26, pp. 15-16,para.31; Marckx,Judgmentof 13June1979,SeriesA No. 31,p. 19,para.41; Loizidouv.
Turkey(PreliminarObjections, udgmenotf 23Mach 1995,SeriesANo. 310, p.26,para.71. In the contextof the interpretationof the obligationto inform a detainee"withoutdelay",the
Inter-American Court has also emphasizedthe role of the principle to give "eflet utile",
"appropriateeffect",to the provisionsof atreaiyto ensurethat it is implementedeffectivelyg2.
11.And this is even more appropriatein the casenowbefore you, Mr.President,because,as
far as Article36 ofthe Consular Conventionis concemed,the subsequent developmentsthat 1 have
described do not change an established interpretation. Rather they confirm the textual
understanding of our provision. Mr.President, Germany will now show that the subsequent
development of international hurnanrights law Mer strengthens the character of Article36 as
establishingan individualright.
2. Furtherdevelopmentof thehumanrightsof foreigners
12.First, in 1985,a "Declarationon the humanrights ofindividualswho are not nationalsof
the country in which they li~e"~~was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by
consensus. Amongthe rightsmentionedtherein,onecan find,inArticle 10,the provisionthat
"[alny alien shallbe free at anytime to cornmunicatewiththe consulateor diplomatic
missionof the Stateof whichhe or she is anational or,inthe absencethereof, withthe
consulateor diplomaticmissionof any other Stateentrustedwith the protectionof the
interests of the State of which he or she is a national in the State where he or she
resides".
Thus,accordingto this Declaration,the right of accessto the consulateof the home State,as
well asthe informationon thisright,is a humanright of"anyindividual whois not a nationalofthe
Stateinwhichhe or she is present"94.
13.There exist several other declarationsand documents which alsorecognize the right to
consular assistance as a human right. These documents include Paragraph16.2 of the Body of
Principles for the Protection of Al1 Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
approvedby the GeneralAssemblyin 1988,Rule 65 of the Rules of Detention ofthe Intemational
CriminalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia- containedby the way in a chapter on "individual
92~dviso~Opinion OC-16/99,para. 104.
93~nnexto resolut401144.
94~bid.,rt. 1.rights of detainee~"~-~ and, most recently, Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2000165 of the
UnitedNations Commissionon HurnanRights of27 Aprilof this yearon the questionofthe death
14.Finally, ayear ago, the Inter-AmericanCourtof HumanRights has expressed theview
that
"[tlhe bearer of the right mentioned.. . is the individual. In effect, this article is
unequivocal in stating that rights to consular information and notification are
'accorde&to the interestedperson."97
Al1American States appearingbefore the Court in this instance-El Salvador,Mexico,
Guatemala,the Dominican Republic, Paraguay,and Costa Rica- shared this interpretationwith
the lone exception of the United States,which was, at the time, already a party to the present
proceedings98.And,as the Counter-Memorialhas to admit, eventhe jurisprudence ofUS courts
does not explicitly deny that Article36 embodies an individual right. Hence, Mr.President,
Germanyconsidersthat there is overwhelming evidencethat Article36 constitutesan individual
rightof foreignnationalsandisto be regardedas ahumanright of aliens.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie,Monsieurle professeur. Je crois que nousallonsnous
arrêterlàpour cematin. LaCourreprendrasestravaux cet après-mid i 15heures.
L 'audience est levéeà 13heures.
9s~ompletenameRulesgoverningthe detentionofpersons awaitingtrial or appeal before the Triblrao
oiherwiseiietainedontheauthorityofthe International Tfarl theProsecutionofPersonsRespomiblefor Serious
Violationsof InternationalHumanitarLaw Committedin the Territoryof the FormerYugoslaviasince 1991, as
amendedon 17Nov. 1997,ITf38fREV.7R, ule65.
96~nitedNationsDoc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65p,ara.(4: TheCommissionon HumanRightsurges"al1States
thatstill maintainthedeath penal... (4to observethe Safeguardsguaranteeprotectionof the rightsof those
facingthe deathpenalyndtocomplyfuliywith their internatoblligations,inpartiwiththoseundertheViema
ConventiononConsularRelations".
97~dvisoryOpinionOC-16/1999,para.82.
'*~bid.,aras.26 et seq.
Audience publique tenue le lundi 13 novembre 2000, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président