Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
Courinternationale InternationalCourt
deJustice ofJustice
LA HAYE THEHAGUE
Audiencepublique
tenue lejeudi 21fëvrier à010heures, auPalaisde laPaix,
sous laprésidencedeM. Guillaume,président,
en l'affairedelaFrontière terrestreetmaritimeentrele Camerounetle Nigéria
(Camerounc.Nigéria;Guinéeéquatoriale(intervenant))
COMPTE RENDU
YEAR2002
Publicsitting
heldon Thursday21Februaly 2002,ut IOam, at thePeacePalace,
President Guillaumepresiding,
in the caseconcerningtheLand andMaritimeBoundary behveenCameroonand Nigeria
(Cameroonv.Nigeria: Equatorial Guineaintervening)
VERBATIMRECORDPrésent: M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi, vice-président
MM. Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby,juges
MM. Mbaye
Ajibola,juges adhoc
M. Couvreur, greffierPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Judgesadhoc Mbaye
Ajibola
Registrar CouvreurLe Gouvernementde laRépublique du Camerounest représentp éar :
S.Exc.M. AmadouAli,ministred'Etatchargéde lajustice, garde dessceaux, %
commeagent;
M.MauriceKamto, doyen de la facultédes sciencesjuridiques et politiques del'universitéde
YaoundéII,membredela Commissiondudroitinternational,avocataubarreaudeParis,
M. PeterY.Ntamark,professeur àla faculté desciencesjuridiqueset politiques del'universitéde
YaoundéII,Barrister-at-Law,membrede1'InnerTemple,anciendoyen,
commecoagents, conseilsetavocats;
M.AlainPellet, professeur a l'universitéde Paris X-Nanterre,membre et ancien président dela
Commissiondu droitinternational,
commeagentadjoint,conseiletavocat;
M.Joseph Marie Bipoun Woum, professeur à la facultédes sciences juridiques et politiquesde
l'universitéde Yaoundé II,ancienministre, ancien doyen,
commeconseillerspécialetavocat;
M.MichelAurillac,ancienministre, conseillerd'Etathonoraire,avocatenretraite,
M.Jean-PierreCot,professeur àl'universitéde Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonnea), cienministre,
M.MauriceMendelson,Q. C.,professeur éméritedle 'université deLondres,Barrister-at-Law,
M.MalcolmN. Shaw, professeur àla faculté dedroit de l'universitéde Leicester, titulairede la
chaire sirRobertJennings, Barrister-at-Law,
M.Brno Simma, professeur à l'universitéde Munich, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
M.ChristianTomuschat, professeur à l'universitéHurnbold deBerlin, ancienmembre et ancien
présidentde la Commission du droit international,
M.OlivierCorten,professeuràla Faculté de droidte l'université libdeBruxelles,
M.DanielKhan,chargédecours àl'Institutde droitinternationalde l'universitédeMunich,
M.Jean-Marc Thouvenin, professeur à l'universitéde ParisX-Nanterre,avocat au barreau de
Paris,société d'avocaLtsysias,
commeconseilsetavocats; pThe Governmentof theRepublicof Cameroonis representedby:
H.E.Mr. AmadouAli, MinisterofStateresponsibleforJustice,Keeperofthe Seals,
asAgent;
Mr. MauriceKarnto, Dean, Facultyof Law and Political Science, Universityof YaoundéII,
memberofthe InternationalLawCommission,Avocat attheParisBar,LysiasLawAssociates,
Mr. PeterY. Ntamark,Professor,Facultyof Lawand PoliticalScience, Universityof Yaoundé II,
Barrister-at-Law,memberofthe Inner Temple,formerDean,
as Co-Agents,CounselandAdvocates;
Mr. Alain Pellet,Professor,Universityof ParisX-Nanterre, memberand former Chairmanof the
InternationalLaw Commission,
asDeputyAgent, CounselandAdvocate;
Mr. Joseph-MarieBipounWoum,Professor,Facultyof Law and Political Science,Universityof
Yaoundé IIf,ormerMinister, formerDean,
asSpecialAdviserandAdvocate;
Mr.MichelAurillac,former Minister,HonoraryConseillerd'État,retiredAvocat,
Mr. Jean-PierreCot, Professor, Universityof Paris1(Panthéon-Sorbonnef,ormerMinister,
Mr. MauriceMendelson,Q.C.,EmeritusProfessorUniversityofLondon,Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. MalcolmN. Shaw, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of InternationalLaw, Facultyof Law,
Universityof Leicester,Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor, University of Munich, member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Professor, Humboldt Universityof Berlin, former member and
Chairman,InternationalLawCommission,
Mr.OlivierCorten,Professor,Facultyof Law, UniversitélibredeBruxelles,
Mr. Daniel Khan,Lecîurer,InternationalLaw Institute,Universityof Munich,
Mr. Jean-MarcThouvenin, Professor, Universityof Paris X-Nanterre, Avocat at the Paris Bar,
LysiasLawAssociates,
as CounselandAdvocates;SirIanSinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law, ancien membrede la Commission du droit
international,
M. EricDiamantis,avocataubarreaudeParis,Moquet,Bordes & Associés,
6
M.Jean-PierreMignard,avocataubarreaude Paris, sociétéd'avocatsLysias,
M.JosephTjop, consultant àla sociétéd'avocatLsysias,chercheurau Centrede droit international
deNanterre(CEDIN), Université ParisX-Nanterre,
commeconseils;
M.PierreSemengue,générad l'armée,contrôleurgénéradlesmées, ancien chef d'état-majodres
armées,
M. James Tataw,générad le division,conseillerlogistique,ancienchef d'état-made l'arméede
terre,
S.Exc.Mme IsabelleBassong, ambassadeur du Cameroun auprès des pays duBenelux et de
l'Unioneuropéenne,
S.Exc.M. Biloa Tang,ambassadeurdu Cameroun enFrance,
S.Exc.M. MartinBelingaEboutou, ambassadeur, représentan ptermanentdu Camerounauprèsde
l'OrganisationdesNations UniesàNewYork,
M. Etienne Ateba, ministre-conseiller,chargé d'affaires a.ià l'ambassade du Cameroun,
àLaHaye,
M. Robert Akamba,administrateur civilprincipal,chargé de missionau secrétariatgénéral la
présidence dlaRépublique,
M.Anicet Abanda Atangana, attachéau secrétariat générd al la présidencede la République,
chargéde coursà l'universitédeYaoundéII,
M.EmestBodoAbanda,directeurdu cadastre,membrede la commission nationale desfrontières,
M. Ousmane Mey,anciengouverneurdeprovince,
Le chefSamuel MokaLiffafaEndeley,magistrathonoraire,Barrister-ut-Law,membre du Middle
Temple(Londres),ancienprésidentdela chambreadministrativede laCoursuprême,
MeMarcSassen,avocat etconseiljuridique,sociétéPetten, Tideman& Sassen(La Haye),
M. Francis Fai Yengo, ancien gouverneurde province,directeur de l'organisation du territoire,
ministère de l'administration territoriale,
M.JeanMbenoun,directeurde l'administrationcentraleau secrétariatgénéral dlea présidencede
laRépublique,Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law,former member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. EricDiamantis,Avocatat theParisBar,Moquet, Bordes & Associés,
Mr.Jean-PierreMignard, Avocatatthe ParisBar,LysiasLawAssociates,
Mr. Joseph Tjop, Consultant to Lysias Law Associates, Researcher at the Centre de droit
internationalde Nanterre(CEDIN),Universityof ParisX-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
GeneralPierre Semengue, Controller-Generaol f the ArmedForces, formerHead of Staff of the
ArmedForces,
Major-GeneralJamesTataw,LogisticsAdviser,FormerHeadof Staffofthe Amy,
H.E. MsIsabelleBassong,Ambassador ofCameroontotheBeneluxCountriesandto theEuropean
Union,
H.E.Mr.BiloaTang, Ambassadorof Cameroonto France,
H.E. Mr. Martin BelingaEboutou, Ambassador,Permanent Representativeof Cameroon to the
UnitedNations in NewYork,
Mr. Etienne Ateba, Minister-Counsellor, Chargé d'affaires.i. at the Embassy of Cameroon,
TheHague
Mr. RobertAkamba, PrincipalCivil Administrator,Chargéde mission, GeneralSecretariatof the
Presidencyof the Republic,
Mr. AnicetAbandaAtangana,Attaché to the General Secretariatof thePresidencyof the Republic,
Lecturer,Universityof YaoundéII,
Mr. Emest Bodo Abanda, Director of the Cadastral Survey, member, National Boundary
Commission,
Mr. OusmaneMey,formerProvincialGovernor,
Chief Samuel MokaLiffafa Endeley, Honorary Magistrate, Barrister-at-Law, memberof the
Middle Temple (London), former Presidentof the AdministrativeChamber of the Supreme
Court,
MaîtreMarcSassen,AdvocateandLegalAdviser,Petten, Tideman& Sassen(TheHague),
Mr.FrancisFai Yengo,formerProvincial Govemor,Director,Organisationdu Territoire,Ministry
of TerritorialAdministration,
Mr. JeanMbenoun,Director, Central Administration, GeneraSlecretariatofthe Presidencyof the
Republic,M.EdouardEtoundi, directeur de l'administration centrau secrétariatgénéradle la présidence
de laRépublique,
M.Robert Tanda,diplomate, ministèrdesrelations extérieures
I
commeconseillers;
M. SamuelBetahSona, ingénieur-géologue e,pertconsultantde l'Organisationdes NationsUnies
pour le droitde lamer,
M.Thomson Fitt Takang, chef de service d'administrationcentrale au secrétariatgénl e la
présidencedela République,
M.Jean-JacquesKourn,directeurdel'exploration, sociétéationaledeshydrocarbures (SNH),
M.Jean-Pierre Meloupou, capitaine de frégate, chef de laivision Afrique au ministèrede la
défense,
M. Paul MobyEtia, géographe, directeudre l'Institutnational decartographie,
M.AndréLoudet,ingénieur cartographe,
M.André Roubertou, ingénieur généd rell'armement,hydrographe,
commeexperts;
MmeMarieFlorence Kollo-Efon, traducteur interprèteprincipal,
commetraducteurinterprète;
Mlle CélineNegre, chercheur au Centrde droit internationalde Nanterre(CEDIN),Universitde
ParisX-Nanterre
Mlle SandrineBarbier,chercheurauCentrededroit internationaldeNanterre (CEDIN),Université
de ParisX-Nanterre,
M. Richard Penda Keba, professeur certifiéd'histoire, cabinetdu ministre de lajustice, ancien
proviseurdelycées,
commeassistantsde recherche;
M.BoukarOumara,
M. GuyRogerEba'a,
M.AristideEsso,
M. NkendeForbinake,
M.Nfan Bile,Mr. Edouard Etoundi,Director, Central Administration, General Secretaotf the Presidencyof
the Republic,
Mr.RobertTanda,diplomat,MinistryofForeign Affairs,
asAdvisers,
Mr.SamuelBetahSona,GeologicalEngineer,Consulting Expertto theUnitedNationsforthe Law
ofthe Sea,
Mr. Thomson Fitt Takang, DepartmentHead, Central Administration, General Secretariat of the
Presidencyofthe Republic,
Mr.Jean-Jacques Koum,Directorof Exploration,National HydrocarbonsCompan(y SNH),
CommanderJean-PierreMeloupouH , ead ofAfiicaDivisionat theMinistry of Defence,
Mr.Paul MobyEtia,Geographer,Director,Institutnationaldecartographie,
Mr.AndréLoudet,CartographieEngineer,
Mr.AndréRobertou,MarineEngineer, Hydrographer,
as Experts;
MsMarieFlorenceKollo-Efon, Principal Translator-Interpreter,
Ms CélineNegre, Researcher, Centre d'étudesde droit internationalde Nanterre (CEDIN),
UniversityofParis X-Nanterre,
Ms Sandrine Barbier,Researcher, Centred'études de droitinternationalde Nanterre(CEDIN),
UniversityofParis X-Nanterre,
Mr. Richard Penda Keba, Certified Professor of History, cabinet of the Minister ofState for
Justice,formerHead ofHigh School,
as ResearchAssistants;
Mr.BoukarOumara,
Mr.GuyRogerEba'a,
Mr.AristideEsso,
Mr.NkendeForbinake,
Mr.Nfan Bile,M. EithelMbocka,
M. Olinga Nyozo'o,
commeresponsablesde la communication;
MmeRenéeBakker,
MmeLawrencePolirsztok,
MmeMireille Jung,
MmeTete Béatrice Epeti-Kame,
commesecrétairesdela délégation.
Le Gouvernementde laRépubliquefédérad leuNigériaest représentépar :
S. Exc.l'honorableMusa E.Abdullahi, ministre dYEtat,ministre de la Justice du Gouvernement
fédéradlu Nigéria,
comme agent;
Le chefRichardAkinjideSAN, ancien Attorney-General de la Fédération, membre du barreau
d'Angleterre, ancienmembrede la Commissiondu droit international,
M. AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN, CON, commissaire pour les frontières internationales,
commission nationale desfrontièresduNigéria,ancienAttorney-Generalde laFédération,
commecoagents;
MmeNella Andem-Ewa,Attorney-Generalet commissaire àlajustice, Etatde CrossRiver,
M. IanBrownlie, C.B.E., Q.C.,membre de la Commission du droit international, membre du
barreaud'Angleterre,membrede l'Institut de droit international,
SirArthur Watts,K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, membre del'Institutde droit
international,
M. JamesCrawford,S.C.,professeurde droit internationaà l'universitéde Cambridge,titulairede
la chaire Whewell,membre des barreaux d'Angleterreet d'Australie,membre de l'Institut de
droitinternational,
M. GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire à l'Institut universitaire de hautes études
internatiorïalesde Genève,membrede l'Institutde droit international,
M. AlastairMacdonald,géomètrea,nciendirecteur deI'OrdnanceSurvey,Grande-Bretagne,
commeconseilset avocats;
M. TimothyH.Daniel, associé,cabinetD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,Mr.EithelMbocka
Mr.OlingaNyozo'o,
as Media Oflcers;
MsRenéBakker,
MsLawrencePolirsztok,
MsMireilleJung,
Mr.NigelMcCullurn,
MsTete Béatrice Epeti-Kame,
as Secretaries.
TheGovernmentof theFederalRepublicofNigeriais representedby:
H.E.theHonourableMusaE. Abdullahi,Ministerof State forJusticeoftheFederalGovemmentof
Nigeria,
asAgent;
ChiefRichardAkinjideSAN,Former Attorney-General of the Federation,Memberofthe English
Bar,formerMemberofthe InternationalLawCommission,
AlhajiAbdullahiIbrahimSAN,CON,Commissioner,InternationalBoundaries,NationalBoundary
CommissionofNigeria,FormerAttorney-Generalofthe Federation,
as Co-Agents;
Mrs.NellaAndem-Ewa,Attorney-GeneralandCommissionerfor Justice, CrossRiverState,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., Member of the InternationalLaw Commission,Memberof the
EnglishBar,Memberofthe InstituteofInternational Law,
Sir Arthur Watts,K.C.M.G., Q.C., Member of the English Bar, Member of the Institute of
InternationalLaw,
Mr. James Crawford,S.C., Whewell Professorof International Law, Universityof Cambridge,
Memberofthe EnglishandAustralianBars,MemberoftheInstitute ofInternationalLaw,
Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Honorary Professor,GraduateInstitute of InternationalStudies,Geneva,
Memberofthe Instituteof International aw,
Mr.AlastairMacdonald,LandSurveyor,FormerDirector,OrdnanceSurvey,GreatBritain,
as Counseland Advocates,
Mr.TimothyH.Daniel,Partner,D.J.Freeman, Solicitors, City of London,M. AlanPerry, associé, cabinD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
M. DavidLerer,solicitor, cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,CitydeLondres,
M. ChristopherHackford,solicitor, cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
MmeCharlotteBreide,solicitor, cabinetD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Ciîy de Londres,
M.NedBeale, stagiaire,cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,CitydeLondres,
M. Geofiey Marston, directeurdu département des études juridiqusu Sidney Sussex College,
Universitéde Cambridgem, embre dubarreau d'Angleterreet duPays de Galles,
commeconseils;
S.Exc.l'honorable Dubem Onyia, ministrd7Etat,ministredesaffaires étrangères,
M. MaxwellGidado, assistant spécial principal du président pourles affaires juridiques et
constitutionnelles, ancienAttorney-Generalet commissàlaJustice,Etatd'Adamaoua,
M.AlhajiDahiruBobbo, directeurgénéralc,ommissionnationaledesfrontières,
M. A. O.Cukwurah,coconseil,
M. 1.Ayua,membrede l'équipe juridique duNigéria,
M. F.A.Kassim,directeurgénérad lu servicecartographique delaFédération,
M. AlhajiS.M. Diggi, directeurdes frontièresinternationales, commissionnationale des frontières,
M. K. A. Adabale,directeurpour le droit internationalet le droit comparé,ee lajustice,
M. A. B. Maitama,colonel,ministèrede ladéfense,
M. Jalal Arabi,membre de l'équipejuridique du Nigéria,
M. GbolaAkinola,membredel'équipejuridique duNigéra,
M.K. M. Tumsah, assistant spécial dudirecteur génle la commission nationaledes frontières
et secrétairedel'équipejuridique,
M. AliyiuNasir, assistantspécial du minidYEtat,ministre delaJustice,
commeconseillers;
M. ChrisCarleton,C.B.E.,bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. Dick Gent,bureauhydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. Clive Schofield,unitéderecherchesurlesfrontièresinternationales, Univde Durham,
M. Scott B.Edmonds, directeurdes opérationscartographiquesI,nternational MappingAssociates,
M. RobertC.Rizzutti,cartographe principal,International MappingAssociates,Mr.AlanPeny, Partner,D.J.Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,
Mr.David Lerer,Solicitor,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,
Mr.Christopher Hackford, Solicito, .J.Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,
MsCharlotteBreide,Solicitor,D. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City ofLondon,
Mr. NedBeale,Trainee,D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityof London,
Dr.GeoffreyMarston, Fellowof Sidney SussexCollege,Universityof Cambridge; Memberof the
Barof Englandand Wales,
asCounsel;
H.E.theHonourableDubemOnyia, MinisterofStateforForeignAffairs,
Mr.MaxwellGidado, SeniorSpecial Assistantto thePresident(Legaland Constitutional Matters),
Former Attorney-Generaland Cornmissione rrJustice,AdamawaState,
AlhajiDahiruBobbo, Director-General,NationaBl oundaryCommission,
Mr.A. O. Cukwurah,Co-Counsel,
Mr.1.Ayua,Member, NigerianLegalTeam,
Mr. F.A. Kassim,Surveyor-General oftheFederation,
AlhajiS.M. Diggi,Director(InternationalBoundaries, ationalBoundary Commission,
Mr.K.A. Adabale,Director(Internationaland ComparativeLaw) MinistryofJustice,
ColonelA. B. Maitama,Ministryof Defence,
Mr.Jalal Arabi, Member,Nigerian LegalTeam,
Mr.GbolaAkinola, MemberN , igerianLegalTeam,
Mr. K. M. Tumsah, SpecialAssistant to Director-General,National Boundary Commission and
SecretarytotheLegalTeam,
Mr.AliyuNasir,SpecialAssistantto the Ministerof Statefor Justice,
asAdvisers;
Mr.ChrisCarleton,C.B.E.,UnitedKingdomHydrographicOffrce,
Mr.DickGent,UnitedKingdomHydrographicOffice,
Mr.Clive Schofield, InternationalBoundarisesearchUnit, UniversityofDurham,
Mr.ScottB. Edrnonds, Directorof CartographicOperations,International MappingAssociates,
Mr.Robert C.Riznitti, SeniorMappingSpecialist,International Mapping Associates,M. BruceDaniel, International MappingAssociates,
MmeVictoriaJ. Taylor,InternationalMappingAssociates,
Mme StephanieKimClark,InternationalMappingAssociates,
M.RobinCleverly,ExplorationManager, NPAGroup,
MmeClaire Ainsworth, NPAGroup,
comme conseillersscientifques et techniques;
M.Mohammed Jibrilla,experteninformatique,commission nationaledes frontières,
MmeCoralieAyad,secrétaire, cabineD t . J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
MmeClaire Goodacre,secrétaire,cabineD t .J.Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
MmeSarahBickell,secrétaire, cabineD t ..Freeman,Solicitors,CitydeLondres,
MmeMichelleBurgoine, spécialiste en technologie de l'information, cabinetD. J.Freeman,
Solicitors,CitydeLondres,
commepersonnel administratg
Le Gouvernementde la Républiquede Guinéeéquatoriale,qui est autorisée à intervenir dans
l'instance,est représentépa:
S.Exc. M.RicardoMangueObamaN'Fube, ministre d'Et&,ministre du travail et de la sécurité
sociale,
commeagent etconseil;
S.Exc.M.RubénMayeNsue Mangue, ministrede la justice et des cultes, vice-présidentde la
commission nationaledes frontières,
S.Exc. M. CristobalMafianaElaNchama, ministredes mineset de l'énergiev , ice-présidentde la
commission nationaledes frontières,
M.DomingoMbaEsono, directeur national de la société nationale de pétrole de
Guinéeéquatoriale,membredela commissionnationaledes frontières,
M. AntonioNzarnbiNlonga,Attorney-General,
commeconseillers;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit international public à l'université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assase )tàl'Institutuniversitaire europneFlorence,
M. DavidA. Colson, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau de 1'Etatde Californie et du barreau du district de
Columbia,
comme conseilsetavocats;Mr.BruceDaniel, International Mapping Associates,
MsVictoriaJ. Taylor,International Mapping Associates,
MsStephanieKimClark,InternationalMappingAssociates,
Dr.Robin Cleverly, Exploration Manager,NPA Group,
MsClaireAinsworth,NPAGroup,
as Scientzjicand TechnicalAdvisers;
Mr.MohammedJibrilla, ComputerExpert, NationalBoundaryCommission,
MsCoralieAyad,Secretary,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors, CiofLondon,
MsClaire Goodacre,Secretary,D.J.Freeman,Solicitors,Cityof London,
MsSarahBickell, SecretaryD, . J. Freeman, Solicitors,CityofLondon,
MsMichelleBurgoine,ITSpecialist,D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityof London,
asAdministrators.
TheGovernmentof theRepublicofEquatorial Guinea,whichhas beenpermittedto intervenein
the case,srepresentedby:
H.E. Mr. Ricardo MangueObarnaN'Fube,Ministerof Statefor LaborandSocialSecurity,
asAgentand Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Rubén MayeNsue Mangue, Ministerof Justice and Religion, Vice-Presidentof the
NationalBoundq Commission,
H.E. Mr. CristobalMaiïanaEla Nchama, Ministerof Mines and Energy, Vice-Presidentof the
NationalBoundaq Commission,
Mr. Domingo Mba Esono, National Director of the Equatorial GuineaNational Petroleum
Company,Memberofthe NationalBoundaryCommission,
Mr.AntonioNzambiNlonga,Attorney-General,
asAdvisers;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law atthe University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assasa)ndatthe European UniversityInstituteinFlorence,
Mr. David A. Colson,LeBoeuf,Lamb,Greene & MacRae,L.L.P., Washington,D.C.,memberof
the CaliforniaStatearand Districtof ColumbiaBar,
as CounselandAdvocates;SirDerekBowett,
commeconseilprincipal,
M.DerekC. Smith, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreau de 17Etat
deVirginie,
commeconseil;
MmeJannette E. Hasan, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia etdu barreau de 17Etatde
Floride,
M.Hervé Blatrym, embredu cabinetLeBoeuf,Lamb,Greene & MacRae,L.L.P.,Paris,avocatàla
Cour,membre dubarreaudeParis,
commeexperts juridiques;
M.CoalterG. Lathrop,SovereignGeographicInc.,Chape1Hill, CarolineduNord,
M.AlexanderM.Tait,Equator Graphies, SilverSpring,Maryland,
comme experts techniques.SirDerek Bowett,
asSeniorCounsel;
Mr. DerekC.Smith,LeBoeuf,Lamb,Greene& MacRae,L.L.P.,Washington,D.C.,memberofthe
District of ColumbiaBarandVirginiaStateBar,
as Counsel;
Ms JannetteE. Hasan, LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae,L.L.P., Washington,D.C., memberof
the Districtof Columbia Barandonda StateBar,
Mr. HervéBlatry,LeBoeuf,Lamb,Greene & MacRae,L.L.P.,Paris,Avocat àla Cour,memberof
theParisBar,
asLegalExperts;
Mr. CoalterG.Lathrop,SovereignGeographicInc., Chape1Hill, NorthCarolina,
Mr. AlexanderM.Tait,EquatorGraphies,SilverSpring,Maryland,
as TechnicalExperts. Le PRÉSIDENT: Veuillezvousasseoir. La séanceest ouverte etje donne laparole pour la
Républiquedu Camerouna M. leprofesseurNtamark.
Mr. NTAMARK:
1.THE LANDBOLINDARY
7. Bakassi
(b) Thecolonialadministration -its legalsignificance
(ii) Themandate and trusteeshipperiod (firstpart)
1.Mr. President, Membersofthe Court, wewouldlikein this pleadingto show howthe law
andpractice of the mandateand trusteeshipsystemsonfirmCarneroon'sposition onits boundaries
in general andthat in particularBakassifell withinthe territorialof the British Cameroons
as constituteduring this period, thus establishingthe territorial fiarneworkfor the application of
the principle of upossidet uipsn independence. 1will provide a general introduction toand
framework for the matter under discussion and ProfessorShaw will follow me with some further
cornments.
2. We will seek to demonstratethe following points. First, the international community
through international agreementsand practice affirmed theexisting conventional boundariesand
established the internationalundary as between the French and British Cameroons. Secondly,
this was monitored by an international supervisoryrégime,which paid particular attention to
territorial issues. Thirdly, and this is something that Professor Shawwill address, there was no
doubt and no disagreementas to which régimegovemed Bakassi, nor as to the placement of the
boundary line. The Bakassi Peninsula formed partof the mandatedand trusteeshipterritory of the
British Cameroonsand was so internationallyrecognizedandsupervised. Equally clearly, Bakassi
didnot fa11withinNigeriain anysovereignsenseat all. It is indeedtellingthat Nigeria simply has
notaddressedthe criticalpractice ofthis periodat al1in anyseriousfashion.
3. Although Ourprimary focus at this stage of the proceedings is upon Bakassi, itwill be
necessary to enter into a more general discussion of the Cameroons territories, particularly
SouthernCameroons.1. Theconfirmationofthetemtorial frameworkbytherelevantinternationalinstruments
4. FollowingtheFirst World War,it was decidedthatthe GermancolonyofKamerunshould
be administered in partitioned form by Britain and France under the framework of League of
Nations mandate arrangements. The mandate system, as indeed the trusteeship system which
succeededit, was predicatedupon a division of functions as betweenthe administeringpower and
the League of Nations, and later the United Nations. It was axiomatic in this structure that the
administeringpower did not have the power unilaterallyto disposeof such tenitory. In creating
the mandate system, the intention was to establish a recognized intemational status (the
InternationalStatus of South WestAffica case, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132),which necessarily
involved recognition of the international status of its boundaries. As the Court noted in the
LibyaKhad case(I.C.J.Reports1994,p. 26) "to 'define'a tenitory isto defineitsfiontiers".
5.In establishingthe boundaries ofthe Cameroons,the Leagueadoptedtheline set outin the
Milner-Simon Declaration of1919. This was reflected in Article 1 of the mandate agreements,
withBritain and France respectively,so thatal1of formerGermanKamerunthat layto theWestof
this line fell to Britain and the area east of this line fell to France. This incorporation of the
Milner-Simon Declaration into asecond international agreementgaveto the lineitself the status of
a boundary explicitly recognizedby the foremost internationalbody of the period. An objective
territorial régimeas thus established. The 1919 line was describedin greaterdetail in the 1930
Thomson-MarchandDeclarationaffirmedinthe Exchangeof NotesofJanuary 1931.
6. Accordingly,and with the exceptionof limitedmodifications authorizedby Article 1of
the mandate agreements (specifically in relation to the interests of the inhabitants or due to
inaccuracies in theMoisel map), the boundary line laid down in the agreements could only be
modified by the parties concerned with the express approval of the Council of the League of
Nations. This didnothappen. Thistemtorial definitionwas repeatedin the trusteeship agreements
which succeededthe mandatessystem after the SecondWorld Warwithout hiatusby virtue of the
resolution adoptedby the Assembly of the League of Nations on 18 April 1946 (LN doc.A.33,
1946, pp. 5-6).
7.Articles79and 85of the UnitedNations Charterprovidedessentiallythat any alterationor
amendmentto tnisteeship agreementshad to be agreedupon by the States directlyconcemed andapprovedby the General Assembly. This clearlycoveredthe definitionof the territory in question
so that States administering territoriesunder a trusteeship arrangementwere totally incapablein
law of unilaterally altering the boundaries of that temtory. Such boundaries benefited from a 1
double confirmation. On the one hand they were defined in international treatieslaying down
objective boundary régimesand, on the other, they were expressly recognized by the United
Nations. Article 1 of the Trusteeship Agreements for the British and French Cameroons
respectivelyrepeatedthetemtorial provisioncontainedinArticle 1of thetwo mandate agreements,
with the difference that the trusteeship agreement with the United Kingdom added to the 1919
Declaration areferenceto the 1931ExchangeofNotes.
2. The confirmatorypracticeofthesupervisoryorgans
8. In addition, the practice of the supervisory organsof the League of Nations and of the
. ..
UnitedNations supported and confirmedthe temtorial delimitation establishedby the mandateand
trust agreements. The Permanent Mandates Commission, established by the League, and the
Trusteeship Council, established by the United Nations, took considerable notice of what was
happening in the mandated and trusttenitories in question. This was markedly so where issues
relating both to the constitutionalstatus of the temtory and to the boundary delimitationof the
temtory were involved. Accordingly,this practiceis undeniably confirmatoryof the conventional
title as already recognizedby therelevantmandateand trust agreementsthemselves.
9. Practice clearly shows that any possibilityof a modification of the accepted boundaries
would be rigorously analysed and the fundamentalrule that no changes could take place without
the approvalof the Leaguewas noticeablyupheld. Indeed, one of the recurringthernesthroughout
the mandate and trust period was the serious attention given to the possibility of minor
rectificationsof the Franco-British lineof 1919asclarifiedinthe Thomson-MarchandDeclaration.
In suchmannerwas thetemtorial integrityof themandatedareaspreservedin practice.
10. Forexarnple,on a nurnberof occasions,the Commission concerned itselfwith proposals
of a relatively minor nature to adjust the line so as to respect ethnic groupings. Of course, one
cannotexaggeratethe effortsmade andal1tookplace withinthepossibilityreservedin the mandate
instrumentsfor minor modifications. Nevertheless, itis strikinghow from timeto time questionsas to tribesdivided acrossborderswereraised. For instance,there were discussionsover a number
of years concerning the history of the Kentu, commencing in 1928 (Mernorial of Cameroon,
Ann.150)and continuing in 1933(Memorial of Cameroon, Ann.164) and not concluding until
1937, at which time the Commission noted thatit "would be glad to receive an assurance that
despitethe use of the word 'transfer',this operation hasnotresulted in any changein the statusof
the districtor of itshabitants"(MemorialofCameroon,Ann.171).
11.As this discussion emphasizes, theCommission concerneditself consistentlywith what
were in effect relativelyinor questionsasto the positionof the boundary lines andthe possibility
of slight adjustrnentsin order to reunite divided tribes. We look in vain for any discussion
concerningthe peoplesof the BakassiPeninsula,or as Nigeria would have us believe,the people
belongingto the Calabarentity splitas it wereby the linemaintainedby the UnitedKingdom. The
system operatedby the MandatesCommission was gearedto the welfare of peopleswithin a clear
territorialframework. Itwould havebeen interestedin theBakassisituation,had itbeen as claimed
by Nigeria. The Commissionwas determined not to let pass any attempt, real or perceived, at
modifyingthe boundariesof the mandatedtemtories, however inconsequential. Thefact that the
territorial régimewasamatter of deepand continuinginterestfor the League cannotbe denied.
12.The sarne situation appliedto the Trusteeship Council, the relevant supervisoryorgan,
and to the United NationsFourth Committee,whichpossesseda cornpetencein suchareas. Indeed,
from its very first workingsession,the FourthCommittee demonstratedits interestin the territorial
definition of the Carneroons tmsteeship agreements. To this interest, the British representative
replied that any modification ofthe boundary would obviouslybe brought beforethe Trusteeship
Council (Memorialof Cameroon,Ann.183,p. log), thus maintainingthe consistent approachof
the United Kingdom authorities that the territorial definitionof the Cameroons was a rnatter of
continuing international concern.
13.The reports produced to the Councilexplicitly referred to the definitionof the relevant
boundaries. These invariably reproduced the terms of Article 1 of the trust agreements and
discussed efforts at demarcation. In other words, the boundary issue was constantly and
consistentlybeforetheTrusteeship Counciland often the subject of question and discussion. 14. The boundary betweenthe British Carneroons and Nigeriawas alluded to on occasion,
particularlywith regardto revenue andimmigrationissues. Forexample,in discussionsin 1954 at
theTrusteeshipCouncil,itwas notedthatthe administeringpowerwas givingserious consideration a
to whether it should restrict immigration into the trust temtory, particularly fiom Nigeria
(Memorial of Cameroon,Ann.200); a matter of particular concem,it maybe said, withregard to
Bakassi.
15. Thus we may Sayat this stage the following. First, the temtories under British and
French administration were temtorially defined, partly by confirmation of the pre-existing
boundariesofthe GermanKamerunin sofar as relevantto the new, dividedCameroonsand partly
by express incorporation of the 1919 line as between the British and French administered
territories. Secondly, the agreementsin question incorporatedterritorial guarantees, in that the
administeringpowers were unable to alter the boundaries without the consent of the necessary
internationalbody, and wereobligedtocany outtheirfunctionsin accordancewith thetermsof the
international mandate andtrusteeshipmechanisms. And thirdly,that the supemisoryorgansof the
Leagueand the United Nations consistentlymonitoredthe implementationofthe mandateand trust
agreements,notleastwithregardto themaintenanceofthe territorialintegriîy.
Thank you for your attention, Mr.President, and 1 would ask you to cal1 upon
ProfessorShawto continuethis presentation.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, ProfessorNtamark. 1givethe floorto Professor
Malcom Shaw.
Mr. SHAW: Mercibien, Monsieurle Président.
1.THE LANDBOUNDARY
7. Bakassi
(b) Thecolonialadministration-its legalsignificance
(ii) Themandateandtrusteeshipperiod(secondpart)
1.Mr.President, Members of the Court,we haveseen howthe mandateand trust agreements
confirmedthe internationalstatus of the temtories concemed and how this was reinforcedby the
establishment and practiceof the internationalsupemisory organs. In particular, and this needsemphasizingright atthe start,bothmandate and trusteeshipsystemsoperatedonthe clear basisthat
the adrninistering powers were unable in law to alter unilaterally the status and temtorial
configuration oftheareas consignedto them. 1will nowtum to look ina littlemore detailat some
of the special arrangementsas they concernedthe territorial issuesand as they are relevant for Our
purposes.
1. Special administrative arrangements agreed within the recognized territorial framework
2. Nigeria focuses its argument upon efectivités. The relationship of such practice to
conventional title has been discussedby the Court in the Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali case
(1C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 586-587). Where efectivités correspond to title, such practice is
confirmatory only. Practice contrary to the conventionaltitle gives way to the latter and cannot
overrule it. Afortiori, practice that was recognized at the relevant time as not challengingthe
conventional title cannot subsequently be used in such a fashion. But, that is precisely the
approach taken by Nigeria. In brief terms, Nigeria seeks to turn certain British administrative
arrangements, expressly permitted under the mandate and trust agreements,and specificallystated
as not affecting the question of territorial status, into affirmations of a territorial claim that
contradictsthe conventional title. In sofar as Bakassiis concemed, the essential claimis that its
sovereignty flows fiom sovereign acts in the peninsula, including acts performed by the
United Kingdom during the mandate andtrust periods. Nigeria has sought to bypass completely
the international constitutional régimewhich protected the territorialintegrity of mandated and
trust territories. It attempts to create the impression thatthe fact that Bakassiwas administered
together with regions of Nigeria during the mandate and trusteeship periods must be taken as
evidence of its title to the peninsula (see,e.g., Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, pp. 184-186, 197,
199,206). No need to consider the legal structure and requirements of the mandate and trust
systems,of course.
3. Nigeria notes, for exarnple,that: "during the Mandate and Trusteeshipperiods up to the
time of independencein 1960,Bakassihas consistentlybeen administeredfiomNigeria" - so far,
so good- but Nigeria adds: "and as part of the Nigerianpolitical entity" (Rejoinderof Nigeria,
p. 66). Oh no, Mr.President; absolument pas. Bakassi, as we shall see, was legitimatelyadministeredtogether with the neighbouring Nigerianregion, but never as"part ofthe Nigerian
political entity", for this suggests an arrangement incorporatingtitle or sovereignty. It is another
example ofNigeria's slippery argumentation.
4. We need to consider carefully the legal situation. Article22 of the Covenant of the
6
League of Nations provided that in the case of class "B" mandates,such asthe Cameroons,Togo
and Tanganyika, the mandatory powers were able to adrninisterthe territory in question as an
integral part of adjoiningterritones. Such arrangementsdidnot, however,affect the international
status of the territories or thendariesas established. Whatthey did seek to do was to enablea
more efficientexercise of bureaucratiecontrol as requestedby the relevant administeringpower.
Such arrangementswereaccomplishedpursuantto express authorizationscontainedinthe mandate
and trust agreements.
5. Article 9 of the two Mandate Agreements respectively expressly permitted the
administeringpower to: "constitute the temtory into a customs,fiscal or administrativeunion or
federation with the adjacent temtories under his sovereigntyor control, provided always that the
measures adoptedto that end do not infnnge the provisionsof this Mandate". Thus,the power to
establish the administration of the British Cameroons fiom the neighbouring Colony and
Protectorate of Nigeria was both derived fiom and expresslylimited by the Mandate Agreement
itself. Thatthis was clearly understoodby the Britishovernmentcanbe seen fiomthe letterdated
14November 1922 to the Govemor of Nigeria. Article9 of the Mandate Agreement is quoted
verbatimandthe suggestionis madethat thetwonorthem areasof the British Cameroonsshouldbe
administered fiom the Northem Provinces of Nigeria. But it is specifically declared (in
paragraph5 of this letter)that: "of coursethey wouldremainsubjectto the restrictions imposedby
the terms ofthe Mandate" (Memorialof Cameroon, Ann.129).
6. Britishlegislation itself supports this approach. TheBritish CameroonsOrderin Council
of 1923 established thatthe Northem and Southem Cameroonswould be administered"as if they
formed part of' respectively the Northem and Southern Provinces of Nigeria (Memorial of
Cameroon, Ann. 130). To make this clear position even more obvious,the British Reporton the
Cameroonsfor 1924,emphasizedthat: "while themandatedarea is administeredin accordancewithArticle 9 of the Mandate,
as thoughitformed an integralpart [thisphrasewas indeedunderlined in the original
text] of Nigeria, this administrative arrangement implies neither fusion nor
incorporation. The position is,therefore,in strict accordwith the letter and the spirit
of the Mandate" (Memorialof Cameroon,Ann. 137: seealsothe Reportfor 1925,for
example,Memorialof Cameroon,Ann. 144).
7. The position is thus crystal clear. The mandate arrangements forthe British and French
Cameroons permitted the mandatory powers to administer the territories as integral parts of
adjacent possessions,providedthat the measures adopted tothat end did not infringethe terms of
the mandate agreement. It was, in fact,only the Britishthat utilized Article but in so doing the
legislative authorizationfor this expressly acknowledgedthat suchjoint administrationcould not
affectthe statusof the mandatedtemtory sojoined. The Orderin Council did not provide for the
joint administration of the two parts of the British Cameroons "as part of' the two respective
provinces of Nigeria. No. Not at all. The telling phrase used was that the tenitories would be
adrninistered"as if they formedpart of7the Nigerianprovinces. This is a crucial difference andit
isuponthis differencethatNigeria'sclaimsimply falls apart.
8. As themandate systemgaveway afterthe SecondWorldWar to the trusteeshipsystem,so
precisely the same situation was replicated. The relevant organs of the United Nations were
scrupulousin seekingto ensurethat whilethey understood thereasons forthe administration ofthe
BritishCameroons together withthe particular regions of Nigeria,suchjoint administrationcould
not and did not affect the status atal1of the British Cameroonsas a trust temtory. That trust
temtory did not become part of Nigeria and did not by any subtle process of bureaucratic
conveniencealterits internationaljuridical characteras atrusttemtory. Sucha process wouldhave
renderedthe veryconceptofa trusttemtory hollowindeed.
9. Article5 (a)of the Trusteeship Agreement (Memorial of Cameroon,Ann.182)permitted
joint administration of the trust temtory with neighbouringareas and in its annual reports to the
UnitedNationsTrusteeshipCouncil,theBritish Governmentregularly referredto the constitutional
statusof thetemtory. In 1951,forexample,the Britishrepresentative explicitly declaredthat:"the
AdministeringAuthority had repeatedly stated that it would preserve the TrustTemtow of the
Cameroons as a separate entity in accordancewith the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement" and "while the Administering Authority wished to bring about agradua1evolution ofthe
Temtory's people towards self-government in collaboration with their Nigerian
neighbours,the measure [andhere,Mr. President,we weretalking aboutthe entry into
forceof the newNigerian Constitutionin 19501in no way alteredthe TrustTemtory's
status".
This wasreinforcedby the opinionof the Council itselfwhich calledupon the administeringpower
to "takespecialprecautions toensurethat the interestsofthe TrustTemtory arenot prejudiced nor
submergedby thoseofNigeria" (Memorial ofCameroon,Ann. 198).
10. Duringthe trusteeship years,thenature oftheinstitutionallinksbetweenthetemtories of
the British Cameroons and the neighbouring regions of Nigeria underwent a variety of
modifications. In each case,thesewerereportedto theTrusteeshipCouncil,whichwas particularly
concemedto ensurethatno formof institutionaldriftmightoccur which would prejudice implicitly
if not explicitly the international status of the trust territones. This applied to the
CameroonsMigeriaarrangementsno lessthan any other similar arrangement.
11. Indeed, it is fair to Say that Britain took some care to explain the nature of its
administrative arrangements with regard to the trust temtory and the consistency of such
arrangements with international obligations. The Council itself regularly discussedthe reports
made and the answers provided to questions asked. Practice showsquite clearly that it was both
well awareof the nature of the administrative arrangementsconcemingthe British Cameroons and
approved them in its capacity as supervising organ of trusttemtories in general. For example,
Trusteeship Council resolution293(VII) concluded as to British Cameroons that: "the existing
arrangements are not disadvantageous to the Territory, but that they deserve nevertheless the
constantattentionoftheCouncil".
12.To surnrnarize: the iawand practiceof the LeagueofNations and United Nationsorgans
demonstrates absolutely clearlythat whilejoint administrative arrangementsand associationswith
neighbouringtemtories were permitted under the termsof the mandate and trust agreements,such
arrangements hadto be consistentwith and had to respectthe particular international statusof the
mandatedand trust temtories. In no circumstancescouldthe actualpractice ofjoint administration
be understoodto constituteor lead to a change in suchstatus. Accordingly, thefact that the parts
of the British Cameroons were administeredtogetherwith the neighbouring partsof Nigeria could
not possibly mean that those tenitories lost their separateinternational status andmerged simplyand by stealth into Nigeria. Not only did the terms of the international mandate and trust
agreements specificallyexcludethis, butthe practiceand approachof the international supervisory
organswas intended precisely toavoidany suchpossibility. Any suggestionthereforethat Nigeria
can find any support at al1for its thesis that British eflectivitésunderpin its claim to sovereignty
over Bakassi since the Southem Cameroons was administered together with the neighbouring
regionof Nigeriais pure mischievousfantasy.
2. TheSouthernCameroonsincluded Bakassi
13. 1 tum now to make some brief but specific comments with regard to the Bakassi
Peninsula itself. Therewas never any doubt in the minds of the British authoritiesthat Bakassi
formedpart ofthe mandatedandthentrusteeshiptemtory ofthe Cameroonssince it had, of course,
formedpart of German Kamerunpursuantto the 1913treaty. Bakassiwas an integralpart of the
areaof the BritishCameroonstermedSouthem Cameroons. Nigeria itself in its Counter-Memorial
acknowledgesthat British officials accepted that Bakassi was part of the mandated territory,but
seeksrather lamelyto blamethis on simple errorby the officialsin question (Counter-Memorialof
Nigeria, p. 185). It is perhaps a mistake,Mr.President, to assumetoo readily that govemment
officialsare alwayswrong.
14. The British view that the Cameroons included Bakassican be evidenced by the full
reportpresentedby Mr. F.B. Carr,an actingdivisional officer,in 1922on "TheFish Townsinthe
Rio-Del-Rey Area", a report that my colleague Professor Tomuschat referredto yesterday in a
differentcontext. Bakassi was oftentermed"FishTowns"duringthe inter-warperiod. Thisreport
Statesunequivocally that:
"The district isbounded on the north by the Issangali and Archibong peoples,
on the north west by the Akwa Jafe which forms the boundary between the Calabar
Provinceandthe Cameroons. The southernboundaryis formedby the Bight of Biafra
and the open sea." (Reply of Cameroon, Ann.3, para. 6; Counter-Memorial of
Nigeria,Vol. VI,Ann.114.)
15. During the inter-war yearsin particular,there were moves on a local level to movethe
administration of Bakassifiom Victoriato Calabar. Nigeriatries to make something of this,but in
fact much of the material simply emphasizesthat Bakassi was not administeredat a local level
fromacrossthe international line. In 1932,DistrictOfficerRileytook up this campaign,as Nigeriadetailsin its Counter-Memorial(pp. 189et seq.). He complainedof the difficultyof administering
Bakassi from Victoria, îurther to the east and suggestedmoving the administration. But what is
crucialfor ourpurposesisthatthe note clearlyStatesthat:
"1am aware however that difficulties arisewhen dealingwith the transfer of an
area from the mandated territory: couldnot Fishtowns remain in the Cameroons
Province (an earlierterm for Southem Cameroons,Mr. President)but be administered
fiom Calabaror Eket?" (Ibi d..,90.)
In otherwords, it was clearlyacceptedthat Bakassi waspart of the mandatedterritory of Southern
Cameroons.
16.1 provideone additionalexarnple. On27July 1936,theActing Secretaryof the Southern
Provinces wrote a letter to the Govemor of the Nigeria Protectorate in Lagos. The letter
commenced: "1amdirectedby the ActingChief Comrnissionerto informyou of the unsatisfactory
position regardingthe administrationofthe areaknown as the FishTowns in the Victoria Division
of the Cameroons under British Mandate ...". Rather a clear assertion of status, one would have
thought. Paragraph 7 of this letter posedthe following question: "whether inprinciplethe transfer
of the Fish Townarea to theCalabar Provincefor administrativepurposes,during the continuance
of the mandate, wouldbe acceptableto Govemment ..."(Counter-Memorialof Nigeria,Vol. VII,
Ann. 132). ïhis receivedthe followingreply fromthe authoritiesdated 16September 1936 - this
lettermay be foundin thejudges' folderasdocument45 (document4517):
"1amdirectedby the Govemorto informyou thatthere arecertain objectionsto
the transfer of a portionof mandatedterritory onthe coastto a Provinceof Nige..a.
Apart from minor legislative dificulties and the complications which would
invariably arise fiom smuggling operations in the Fish-Town area, there is the
possibility of the action being misconstrued at Geneva andthe suggestion of some
ulterior motiveput forward." (Counter-MernoriaolfNigeria,Vol.VII,Ann.133.)
17. This exchange is important in revealing two things. First, there was no doubt in the
minds of either the responsible officiaisin the area or in that of the Govemor of the Nigeria
ProtectoratethatBakassi waspart of themandated tenitory of theBritish Cameroons. No question
that it might beart of Nigeria, no questionthat it might be outside of the mandate arrangements.
Secondly, therewas some sensitivity at the highest level to thefact that the Permanent Mandates
Commissionin Genevamight interpretthe suggestedaction, eventhough it was nothingmore than
an administrative arrangementwell withinthe competence ofthe mandatorypower, as an attemptto annexBakassito Nigeria. Even the possibilitythat this might,incorrectly,be thought, appeared
sufficientto prevent the suggestedchange. My colleague,Professor Mendelson,will address the
Courtfurtheronother aspectsof this correspondence.
18. British practiceduring the trust period similarly demonstrated the understanding that
Bakassiwas part of Southem Cameroons. The Nigeria (Constitution) Orderof 1954(Memorialof
Cameroon, Ann.201) is particularly critical here since it defined the Northern and Southem
Cameroons, a definition that was incorporated in the Northern Cameroons (Administration)
(Memorial of Cameroon, Ann. 222) and Southem Cameroons (Constitution) Orders of 1960
establishingnew constitutional arrangements during the process to independence (Memorialof
Cameroon, Ann. 223). The 1954Order defined the eastem boundary of the Eastem Region of
Nigeria, which became the intemational frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria after the
incorporationof the Southem Cameroons intothe Republic of Cameroon, as follows: "fiom the
sea the boundary follows the navigable channel of the River Akpa-Yafe, thence follows the
thalwegof the aforesaidRiver Akpa-Yafe ...".
19. The recognition that Bakassi fell within the mandated and trust territory of the
BritishCameroonsis also evidencedby examiningthe relevant maps. 1need Sayno more at this
stagethan that Bakassi is consistentlyplacedwithinthe BritishCameroonsthroughoutthis crucial
period (see for example, Memorial of Cameroon, map No. 7 and Memorial of Cameroon,
Ann. 383, mapsNos. 36, 38, 41, 43, 45, and 46). Some examples of these maps, Mr.President,
maybe found in the judges' folderat documentsNos.46 to 49,but ProfessorCot will address the
Courtseparatelyon maps.
20. The conclusionis clearand incontrovertible. The conventionalboundariesof Cameroon
are confirmed. First, those boundaries that had their origin in the 1919Declaration were
concretizedby incorporation intothe relevant mandateand trust agreements. Second,the practice
of the adrninistering powers attested toch boundaries. Third,the practice of the international
supervisoryorgansconfirmed suchboundaries. Fourth,there was never anydoubt in the minds of
eitherthe British mandatoryortrust authoritiesnorinhose ofthe supervisingorgansofthe League
andthe UnitedNations that Bakassiformedpart ofthe BritishCameroons.(c) Theprocess ofaccessionto independence
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 tuni now to consider the process whereby the
British Cameroons exercised self-determinationand became independentas two units. It matters
because this processwas undertaken throughinternational supervisionand was formally accepted
intemationally; because it reinforces al1 that has been said thus far about confirmation of
Cameroon's conventional title: because it constitutes clear proof that Bakassi belongs to
Cameroon. What is particularly interesting is that such a critical intemational process is hardly
considered in Nigeria's pleading. One finds only the merest of passing statements,ignoring the
criticalissues involved,of course(see Preliminary Objectionof Nigeria,Vol. 1,p. 10,para. 15and
Rejoinder of Nigeria, Vol. 1,p. 135,para.3.181). Whilebrevity of expressionis a virtue, brevity
to the pointof invisibilitydoesraise eyebrows.
1. Themodalitiesforthe termination oftrusteeships
2. Since neitherthe UnitedNations Charternor the specifictrusteeshipagreementscontained
express provisions conceming termination of trusteeshipstatus, it followed that the hand over of
power could only be accomplishedby thoseto whom powerhas been entnisted, that is by thejoint
action of the admmisteringpowerand the GeneralAssembly. This is indeed what happenedin al1
cases; a form of combined decision-makingby the trust power and the General Assembly that
endowedthe processwith a particularly effectiveformofinternationalrecognitionand legitimacy.
2. Theterminationofthe Cameroonstrusteeships
3.The endingof the trusteeshipoverthe French Cameroonswasachievedwithoutparticular
difficulty and requires no further comment. However, the situation with regard to the
BritishCameroons was less straightfonvardin view of division of the territory into two parts,
administered togetherwith the neighbouringregions ofNigeria. Thequestion ofthe dispositionof
the British Cameroons thus becarne critical once the decision had been announced in 1958that
Nigeria would be granted independence on 1October 1960. Accordingly in 1959 the
GeneralAssembly called for the holding of separate plebiscites in the Northem and
SouthernCameroons under UnitedNations supervision (resolution 1359(XIII)).A plebiscitewasheld in Northem Cameroonsin 1959and showeda majorityfor defemng a decisionuntil a later
date. TheUnited Nations PlebisciteCornmissionerreported thatthis operationhadbeenconducted
efficientlyandimpartially (Memorial of CameroonAm. 217,p. 33). TheGeneralAssemblythen
recommendedthat a second plebiscite be held, asking whether the voters wishedto join the
independent Federation of Nigeria or the independent Republic of Cameroon
(resolution 1473XIV)); andthisplebiscitetookplaceon 11and 12February1961.
4. Theprocesswithregard toSouthemCameroonswasthe subjectof a memorandumbythe
UnitedNations Secretq-General in 1959("TheFuture of the Trust Tenitoy of the Cameroons
underUnitedKingdomAdministration: Organisation of the Plebiscitein the Southem Partof the
Temtory", 5Oct. 1959,NC.41418; Memorial ofCarneroon,Ann.216). This carefullysurveyed
the concerns of the population ofthe Southern Cameroons. These includedissues such as the
actualquestionsto be put in the proposed plebiscite and thequestion ofthe electoralregister and
the qualifications of voters. A variety of concems are recorded, but no petitioner, no
representative,no State,no oneraisedthe issue ofthe existingboundariesof SouthernCameroons.
Theywereclearlynot indoubt.
3. The territorial definition oftheSouthern Cameroons
5. Followingthe firstplebiscitein theNorthem Cameroons,in November 1959,a processof
separation betweenNigeriaand the temtories of the British Cameroons wasset in motion. This
wasintendedto deal withthe impending independence of Nigeriaandto assist in the carryingout
ofthe secondplebisciteinthe northandthe firstplebisciteinthe south. This processinvolvednot
onlyadministrativeandconstitutionalchanges(seethe Northem Cameroons(Administration)and
the Southem Cameroons(Constitution) Orders of 1960, Memorial of Carneroon, Anns.222
and 223), but also includeda clear territorial definitionof the borders between Nigeria and the
Cameroons.
6. As we have seen, the Northem and Southem Cameroonswere describedin tems of a
reference tothe Nigeria (Constitution)erin Council 1954,which in turn referred generally to
the territorial definition contained in the tmsteeship agreement. Paragraph4 of the Second
Schedule tothe Order defining Southem Cameroonsin its tum referred back to the NorthemRegion,WesternRegion andEasternRegion(Definitionof Boundaries)Proclamation1954, which
had come into force the daybefore (Memorialof Cameroon,Ann.202). Thewestern boundaryof
the Southern Carneroons,which became the Cameroon-Nigeriainternational boundary after the
incorporation of that temtory into Cameroon, is, as we have seen, defined in terms of the
"navigablechannelof the RiverAkpa-Yafe",that isthe boundaryas affirmedby Cameroon andas
challenged now by Nigeria. This was further reinforced by the terms of the Plebiscite Order
of 1960 (Memorial of Cameroon, Ann.221), which came into force on the date of Nigeria's
independence. This providedfor the holding ofthe plebiscitein the temtory and dividedthe area
into26 plebiscitedistricts.
7. Thus,powerful evidenceexistedas to the relevant boundariesin the period imrnediately
preceding theholding of the plebiscites. The importantpoint to emphasizeat this juncture is that
theadministeringauthorityput into effectlegislation whichreaffirmedthe boundariesin question a
short time before the holding of the United Nations supervised plebiscite. The United Nations
authorities were not only aware of what was happening, butas we will see, the United Nations
supervised plebiscite process expressly relied upon the voting districts established in the
1960PlebiscitesOrder.
4. Theplebiscite
8. On 1October 1960,Nigeria became independentand the three 1960 Orders came into
effectestablishing a constitutionfor the SouthernCameroons,providing for the administrationof
the Northern Cameroons as a separate entity and laying the groundwork forthe holding of the
plebiscites. The plebiscites were held on 11 and 12February 1961 in the temtories. A clear
majorityinthenorth votedtojoin Nigeriaand a clearmajoriîy votedin the southtojoin Cameroon.
9. In his report to the TrusteeshipCouncil of 3 April 1961,the United Nations Plebiscite
Commissionerapproved theprocess (UnitedNations doc. T11556; partially extractedin Memorial
of Cameroon, Ann. 224). The General Assembly adopted resolution 1608(XV)on 21 April 1961
endorsingtheresults of theplebiscites,and concludingthat thepeoples of the two parts of the trust
temtory had freely and secretly expressed their wishes withregard to their respective futures in
accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions (resolution 1352 (XIV) and1473(XIV)). The imrnediateimplementationof the plebisciteswas called for. The effectof this
resolution- resolution 1608- has already been discussed by the Court. In the Northern
Cameroonscase,the Court notedthat: "there was no doubt - and indeed no controversy - that
the resolution had definitive legal effect" (I.C.J.Reports 1963, p. 32), a determinationthat was
reaffmed in the case conceming Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru (1Vauru v. Australia)
(PreliminaryObjections,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1992, p. 251). Such "definitive legal effect"
related not only to the constitutional statusof the Northem and Southem Cameroons,but also to
their territorial definition. The plebiscite and thus the appropriate decision-makingprocess took
placewithin an acceptedandunchallengedterritorialframework.
10.The pointcan be furtherconfirmedas follows. The processof arrangingand holdingthe
plebiscite meant thatthe areas that fell within the Northem and Southem Carneroonshad to be
ascertained. Voting districts were established and are carefully described in the Report of the
UnitedNations Plebiscite Cornmissionerof 3 April 1961and the Court will find relevant pagesof
this Report in thejudges'folder- this is documentNo. 50. The voting districts in questionwere
in fact precisely the same as those establishedin the 1960Plebiscites Order, which indeedin turn
reflected earlier constituencies. There were 26 districts in al1 [projection No. 11. The rnap
appendedto the Report of the Commissioner, which can now be seen behind me, and a copy of
which is also contained in the judges' folder as document No. 51, described the voting
arrangements. Thisrnapwas alsoprojectedin my pleadingon Mondaymorning. May 1this time,
projectan enlargementof the notationat the very end ofthe rnap - it can't really be seenon this
rnap - demonstrating that it is of United Nations provenance and indeed Map No. 1199Rev 1
United Nations of March 1961 [end projection No. 1 - projection No.2ldocument No.48/71. 1
hope that's just a little bit clearer, Mr.President. The important thing of course, 1 wish to
emphasize,is that the rnap isof United Nations provenance,the rnap attachedto the reportof the
UnitedNations Plebiscite Commissioner[endprojectionNo. 2 - retum to projectionNo. 11.
11. Further, the RegistrationOfficers divided the plebiscite districts into registrationareas
and 294 of these were establishedin all, with a total ofover 4,500 staff being involved inthe
plebiscite supervision process(United Nations doc.Tl1556, 3 April 1961). The plebiscite was
conductedby thePlebiscite Administratorworking to the directionof the Plebiscite Commissioner.A series of observationposts were establishedin each plebiscite district and an observerplaced in
each suchpost. Our interestcentreson the Victoriadistrict in the south-eastcomer of Cameroon.
This was divided into VictoriaNorthEast; VictoriaNorth West; VictoriaSouth East and Victoria
SouthWest. From themap enclosedin the Commissioner'sReport, and still projected behindme,
t
it is immediately clear that the Victoria South West plebiscite district included the Bakassi
Peninsula. This district, it is provided, consistedof seven registrationareas.
This is a striking
affirmation that the peninsula was recognized by the United Nations as constituting part of
SouthemCameroonsatthe criticaltime pendingitsdispositionunder international supervision.
12. The Report of the Plebiscite Commissioner- the relevant pages are in document
No. 50- reveals that the final register of voters for the plebiscite process included 6,813 for
Victoria South West. Theresult of the plebisciteis shown in South WestVictoriaand we can see
from the report that 2,552people votedto join Nigeria and 3,756peoplevoted tojoin Cameroon.
And, if 1can repeat, this United Nationsmap accompanyingthe report - actually annexedto the
report- clearlyrevealsthat Bakassifell within theVictoriaSouth Westplebiscitedistrict.
13.The plebisciteprocesswas endorsedbythe UnitedNations Plebiscite Commissionerand
by the GeneralAssembly. No protestswere madeby any Stateas to the territorialdefinition of the
temtories of Northem and Southem Cameroons. It is abundantly clearthat the plebisciteprocess
was carefully organized and supervised. It is equally clearthat Bakassi fell within the plebiscite
temtoq. Nigeria did not claim at the time of the plebiscites or in the periods immediately
precedingor succeedingthese plebiscites thatthe territorial compositionof the plebiscite districts
was flawedin that theyincludedNigeriantenitory.
14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is how the trust territory of the British
Cameroonscame to independence. By virtue of United Nations supervisedplebiscites and within
clearly published and accepted boundaries and in the light of the transparent activities of the
adrninistering power, the Northem and Southem Cameroons voted respectively to join the
independentNigeria and the independentCameroon. The process was open and internationaland
uncontested. What is above al1beyond question is the temtorial framework within which the
independenceprocess took place. Territorial titles established in part by the 1913Treaty and inpart bythe 1919Declaration incorporatedin theMandateand Trust Agreementswere confirmedby
the processof comingto independence.
1thank the Court for its attentionand would ask you,Mr. President, tobe so kind asto cal1
nextProfessor Mendelson.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou verymuch, ProfessorMalcolmShaw. 1 now givethe floorto
ProfessorMaurice Mendelson.
Mr. MENDELSON: Thank you, Mr.President.
1.THE LAND BOUNDARY
7. Bakassi
(d) Cameroun's effective administration of Bakassi and the impact of Nigeria's alleged
effectivités
1. Introduction
1.Mr. President, Membersof the Court, itis a greatpersona1honour for me to appearbefore
you. But as 1rise to address you, for the firsttime, on the Cameroonian and alleged Nigerian
eflectivités,it is, 1must confess, with a slightfeelingof discomfort. The reasonfor my discomfort
is to be found in the Chamber'slapidary explanationof the role of eflectivitésin the case of the
Frontier Dispute (BurkinaFaso/RepublicofMali),thepertinentpartof which,asyou know,begins
as follows': "Where the act corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is
additionalto the utipossidetisjuris, the onlyrole ofeffectis to confirmthe exercise oftheight
derived from a legal title." Pausingthere, this is precisely Cameroon's situation: having agood
title,nyevidenceofeflectivitésthat it adducesaremerelyconfirmatory. Inoursubmission,on the
otherhand,Nigeria falls squarelywithin the second sentence:"Wherethe act doesnot correspond
to the law, where theterritory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administeredby a
State otherthan the one possessingthe legal title, preference shouldbe given to the holder of the
title." That being so, logically,there is little more to be said. Hence my mild embarrassrnentat
addressingyouonthissubject.
'I.c.J. Repo1986pp.554,586-587. 2. Nevertheless, in its Rejoinder, Nigeria has persisted in ignoring the very real legal
objectionswhich Cameroon has made toitsapproach, andhas insisted on pilingup examplesof its
alleged efectiviit néorder to bolster its spuriousclaim to sovereigntyover the Bakassi Peninsula
by means of its so-called "historic consolidation oftitl1shall therefore submitto you thatthe
1
legal frarneworkwithin which Nigeriaseeksto situate its efectivi(t aédsthose of Cameroon)is
tendentious and misleading; and Mer, that the facts relied upon by Nigeria do not have the
significance which itseeks to attach to them. The reliability of at least some of the evidence
adducedby Nigeria is also open to question,but it isnecessaryto go into that Mer now,even
if time allowed. For it isur case that much of that evidence- even if valid- when properly
analysed, supports Cameroon'scase, not Nigeria's; and Mermore, that the remainingNigerian
alleged efectivia treinsufficient to give it sovereignty. We alsoSay that, on the other hand,
Cameroon's own exercises of sovereign authority corroborate,if corroboration is needed, a title
firmly based on treaties and other instruments, recognizedby the entire organized international
comrnunity and, not least,by Nigeria itself; and, we further submit that these Cameroonian
efectiviat rémore than sufficientto counterour opponents'claimthat Cameroon acquiescedin
the exercise of sovereign authority by Nigeria.1 shall not repeat the evidence of Cameroonian
efectiviit néexhaustive detail in the limited time 1 have: many instances are found in the
~emorial~,and especiallyin the ~e~l~~.
3. But before 1turnto the facts, 1shouldlike, as 1said,to make some brief submissionson
the misleading legal fiarnework within which Nigeria has soughtto locate the question of
efectivités.
2. Themisleading legalfrarneworkofNigeria'sclaims oneffectivités
4. Mr. President,the concept of "historic consolidation oftitle" plays a number of different
roles in internationallaw and, in the way thatNigeria has deployedit, wallpapers over anurnberof
serious cracks. No doubtthe conceptcanbe useful in certaincontexts,such as where it is not clear
which of two competing States had the original title. It may evenbe of some use as a sort of
'vol.1,pp.486-496,paras.4.420-4.456.
3~nparticul, ol1pp. 307-312,paras.5.215-5.237.shorthand term describing a number of differentrules about, for example, modes of acquisition.
But there are circumstanceswhere good old-fashionedconcepts like occupation (in the civil law
sense of occupatio - original acquisition) and prescription are perhaps more illurninating. In
particular,the distinctionbetweenthem helpsto clari@thatdeterminingwho has titleis notsimply
a matter of counting the acts of sovereignty on each side, and adjudicating title to one with the
largest pile. The authoritiesandthe State practiceare clear: the quantityand qualityof eflectivités
neededto displacean existingtitleare far greaterthan is requiredby a State whichalready holds a
title by virtue of cession, State succession, or (though it is irrelevant in the present case),
occupationof terranullius.
5.Nigeria evidentlythinksthat the conceptof historicconsolidationof title suitsit quitewell
because it enablesit to blur overthat important distinction,and also toblur overthree analytically
separateelementsin its claimto sovereigntyoverthe BakassiPeninsula.
6. The first elementin its claimis the continuing consolidationby Nigeria ofthe allegedtitle
of the Kings and Chiefs of Old calabar4. There is, of course, a fatal flaw in thatreasoning. For
even if there ever was a time whenthis allegedentity wielded sovereign authorityover Bakassi -
which Cameroondenieson variousgrounds already explainedby my colleagues - and evenif-
which Cameroonalso denies- this alleged authority had continued during the period when the
Britishwere consolidating theirownpower intheir colonyand protectoratein Nigeria - evenif al1
of this were true (which it is not), there was a completehiatus when the Mandatewas conferred.
For, as my colleagueshave shownvery clearly,the British Crown did not rule in Bakassi as the
agent of these "Kings and Chiefs",nor even asa sovereignin its ownright. Rather,Great Britain
administeredthe British Carneroons under a League of Nationsmandate. So the chain wasbroken
and there ceasedto be any title to consolidate. The title of the "Kingsand Chiefsof Old Calabar"
couldno longer existand so couldnot be consolidated.
7. The second basis of Nigeria's claim of historic consolidation blurs into the first. This
basis is that there was an effective and uncontested exerciseof sovereignty over Bakassi by the
United Kingdomitself,as the rulerof Nigeria- not as thecontinuationof the "Kingsand Chiefs",
4~ejoinder,Vol1,p. 91para3.54.but as the ruler of Nigeria- and that Nigeria is the successorto that title1 shall touch on this
very briefly in my analysis of the facts, but it is quite clear, as my learned friends
ProfessorsNtamark and Shaw have already submitted toyou, that the British adrninisteredthe
peninsulaas atemtory legally distinctfromNigeria- as indeedthey wereobliged to do. The fact
1(
that the administering authority ofSouthem Cameroons, includingBakassi,was at the same time
the ruler in Nigeria was, fiom a legal point of view, entirely coincidental. That the
United Kingdomwas permitted, for thesake of its administrative convenience,to conductsome of
that administrationfiom eastem Nigeriais irrelevant. If it hadchosen to administerBakassi from
Accra, that would not have made the peninsula part of Ghana. The Court will recall, from its
recent Qatar/Bahrain case, that for a long time British jurisdiction in and over the Arabian Gulf
Stateswas exercisedbythe BritishPolitical Residentin Bushire,which is inPersia. Didthat make
the Gulf sheikhdomspart of Persia? So this head of the historic consolidationclaim,this reliance
onthe effective exerciseof State authorityby the UnitedKingdomfiom areasofNigeriaduring the
timeof the mandate andthe trusteeshipis fatally flawed, also.
8. Indeed, we cm, and must logically, go further. Because Great Britain's authority over
Bakassi under the mandateand trusteeshipwas legally distinctfiom its authority overNigeria, it
follows inevitably thatal1of the acts of effective administrationperformed by the British over
Bakassi, so far fiom strengtheningNigeria's title, actually weakenit- fatally- and, instead,
fullyconfirmCameroon'stitle. Forthe administrationwasnot carried outonbehalf ofNigeria, nor
onbehalf ofsome "acephalous"(andweSay,body-less too)group of localsovereignswithin it,but
under a quite different title. The United Kingdom was acting as the mandatory power under
Article22(1) of the LeagueCovenant, thatis to Say,on behalfof the internationalcornmunityand
of the inhabitantsof Southem Cameroons,including Bakassi. And it is precisely tothis title that
the Republicof Cameroonhas succeeded. Cameroon is therefore, logicallyand inevitably in my
submission,entitled to treatal1of the eflectivitésof its British predecessorin title as its own, and
converselyNigeria cannotrely uponthemat all.
9. The third use, Mr. President, madeby Nigeria of theconcept of historic consolidationof
title is rather sottoce,but the Rejoindergoes on to Saythat Nigeria invokes the concept: "To
provide, if this were to prove legally necessary, an independent sourceof title based upon theprocess of peaceful possession, acquiescence,and historical consolidation in the period since
~nde~endence."~The dreaded word which Nigeria is shrinking fiom using here is prescription.
Perhapsit shrinksfiom it forreasons ofwhat we mightconsider"political correctness",because it
knows that prescription is a process by which one State gains title by possessing what was
originally, by definition, thetenitory of another State. But probably its reticence is more
pragmatic, andisdue to itsrealizationthat,for prescriptionto occur,the adverse possessor needsto
passanumber of stringenttests whichNigeria cannothope to satisfy.
10. For the moment,we can summarizethesetests in this way. The acts of the Statewhich
doesnot hold the title must be carriedout in a sovereign capacity,under a claim ofright, openly,
peacefully, without protest or competingactivity by the existing sovereign, and for a sufficiently
longtime. Sofaras this timeelementisconcemed,how muchtimeneedsto have elapseddepends
on circumstances,such as the remotenessof the region and the intensityof activity. Accordingto
some authors, it is also necessary that there should have been acquiescence by the existing
sovereign; andcertainly protestwill preventprescriptionoccuning. 1think 1need citeno authority
in support ofthesepropositionsto thisCourt, for they are elementary. 1shallretum in due course
to the applicationof these criteriato thefactsof thepresent case. Sufficeit to Say,forthe moment,
that theyeliminateavery largenumberofitems fiomNigeria'slist ofefectivités.
11. Mr.President, there is one further advantage which Nigeria apparently hopes to gain
from the use of the concept of "historic consolidation of title", and that is to circurnvent the
problem of what we might cal1the "legal burden". For in a case of prescription, if there is a
conflict of eflectivités,"preference should be given to the holder of the title", as the Charnber
succinctly put it in thBurkin Faso/Republicof Mali case. This encapsulates what has always
beenthe rule in intemationallaw. Soitwill not doforNigeria to pile up instance afierinstanceof
allegedeffectivitésin one panof the scales,so to speak,andthenpoint out that Cameroonhas cited
fewer. The lawrequires this Court to tilt the scalesof justice infavour of the title-holder,and it
will require a great deal to displace that title6. For othenvise, there would be no pre-eminence
givento sovereignty,and anyonecouldacquire title merelyby "creatingfacts" on the ground.
'vol.1,p.91,para.3.54.
%ee,forexample,theSovereigntyoverCertainFrontierLandscase(I.C.J.Reports1959,p. 209). Mr.President, 1have cometo a break in my presentation. 1do not know whether this is a
convenientmomentfor the Courtto rise?
The PRESIDENT: If it is a convenient momentforyou, it is a convenientmoment forthe
Court. L'audience serasuspenduepour une dizainede minutes. Je vousremercie.
L'audienceest suspenduede 1Ih 15 à II h25.
LePRESIDENT : Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest reprise et je donneà nouveau la
paroleauprofesseurMendelson.
Mr.MENDELSON: Merci,Monsieurleprésident.
3. Thefacts
12.Mr. President, Membersof the Court,1now tum to the facts. With your permission,1
shall not deal in completely separate sectionswith the Carneroonianefectivitéson the one hand,
and the alleged Nigerianeflectivitéson the otherAlthough, as 1havejust explained,jwidically
they have different qualities, depending on who had title at the relevant time, in terms of
subject-matterand chronologythey are ofienmore convenientlydealtwith together - though,for
convenienceof exposition,1shallnot adhererigidlyto this scheme. 1should addthat, both forthe
reasons 1have just outlined, and also for reasonsof time, it is simply not possible for me to deal
with anythinglike al1of the individual acts,or even classesof acts, of sovereigntyrelied upon by
thetwosides. 1shallsimply concentrateon someimportantpoints.
(a) The Germaneffectivités
13. Logically, one should begin with the German eflectivités,since Germany was the
grandfather in titleso to speak, of Cameroon. However,it was shown to you yesterday, in
Professor Tomuschat's pleading, that, contrary to Nigeria's assertions, Germany did in fact
exercisesovereign authorityoverthe BakassiPeninsuladuringthe shortperiod inwhich it wasable
to remainthere, andthere is no need formeto repeat what he said. You will recall that he cited
British documents fiom the Nigerian bundle which proved that Germany had indeed exercised
sovereignty and performed acts of administration in the peninsula. Rather than speculate, asNigeria did, on the possible reasonsfor the alleged absence of Germanyfiom the peninsula7-
whichit did in its Counter-Memorial,for example - Nigeriamight perhapshave moreprofitably
soughtthe truthin the documentswhichit itselfannexedto thewrittenpleadings,albeitfor a quite
differentreason.
14.1 mention thisbecauseit is by no meansan isolatedexample. Nigeria has presented the
Courtwith a hugemassof documentationin supportof its caseon "historic consolidation oftitle".
But if one works one's way through what is sometimesa rather tediousmass of, for example,
80-year-oldbureaucratie correspondence,one not infiequently finds that, far fiom proving the
assertion which Nigeria seeks to make, these documents, whencarefully analysed, prove the
opposite. 1shalldraw attentionto someexamplesshortly. Sometimes,again, a documentwhich
Nigeria has annexedforonepurposeactuallysupportsCameroon'scontentionson a quitedifferent
matter. An example is the document cited yesterdayby Professor Tomuschat, namelyActing
Divisional OfficerCm's Assessment Reportonthe Fish Toms of Febniary 1922'. Depositedby
Nigeria in support of a far-fetchedargument basedon the ethnic origins of some of those who
fishedin Bakassiwaters, itin fact furnishesus withthe evidenceof previousGermaneHectivités.
SectionII ofthe samereport,incidentally(i.e.,Cm's reportof 1922),alsoshowsusthattherewas
no royal or chiefly organizationin Bakassiat that time, 1922- it expressly says so. So if the
mythic"Kingsand Chiefs ofOld Calabar"everdid exerciseauthority therein a mannerwhichhad
any significancefiom the point of view of internationallaw- an assertion which Cameroon
denies- certainlytheyhadvanishedfiomthestoryby 1922,and probablylongbefore,contrary to
whatNigeria expresslyasserts9.
(b) Britishadministration,1922-1961
15. Following theexpulsion of Germany, the United Kingdom soon imposed its own
authority,in its capacityas the League7smandatory. My fiiends ProfessorsNtamarkand Shaw
have already addressed you on the history of the mandateand trusteeship, and on the events
surroundingthe plebiscite,on several occasionsfor differentpurposes and 1 shall not try your
'counter-MernorialofNigeria,Vol.1,pp. 177-180,paras.9.2-9.3.
'~ounter-MernorialofNigeria,Vol.VI,Ann. 114,p. 975.
or exarnple,Counter-MemorialofNigeria, Vol.1,p. 182,para.9.12.patience by going over the same ground yet again. 1would simply point out that some of the
documents thatthey have referred to illustrate onceagain the unfortunate propensityof Nigeria to
deposit documents which it confidently allegessupport an assertion,when in fact they prove the
opposite. Mr.President, Members of the Court, a greatswathe of documentshasbeenpresentedto
youin order to persuadeyou that Bakassi was ruledas part of the Nigerian protectorateor colony
andthat this reflectedsocialand ethnictiesandthat, somehow,al1ofthis is significantlO.But ithas
already beenshownto you a few minutes agoby my colleagues,that althoughsomejunior officers
may have wanted to move the administrationof Bakassi to Calabarfor the sake of convenience,
their superiors resisted, being well aware of the legal differences between thewo tenitories and
beingnervous ofreactionsin Geneva.
16. There is no need for me to repeatthat demonstration. But before we leave these same
Nigerian Annexes,there are two other features to which 1 should like briefly to draw to your
attention.
17. First, the correspondence relied upon by Nigeria records a debate, you will recall,
between various British officialas to whether Victoriain the Southern Cameroonswas a better
place to rule Bakassi fiom than Calabar (or indeedEket) in Nigeria. But whereas Cameroonian
territory could, under the mandate, be lawfully administered eitherfiom the Cameroons or fiom
Nigeria, as you well know, depending on convenience, Nigerianterritory- 1 repeat, Nigerian
temtory - couldonly be administeredfromNigeria. (1am not talking about internationallaw, 1
amtalking aboutBritish colonial law andpractice.) Nigerian temtory could only be adrninistered
fiom Nigeria. If that is the case, how come that British officials are solernnly sitting there
discussingwhetherto rule this allegedpieceof Britishterritory fiomVictoria,which wasplainlyin
the Southem Cameroons. Itsimply doesnot make sense. So onceagain the Nigerian evidence,so
farfrom supportingits case, actually provesthe opposite,aswellas, incidentally, helpingto refute
Nigeria's extraordinary assertionthat"those officialswho believedthat at least in theory Bakassi
waspart of theMandatedTemtory weresimplymistaken"".
10~ounter-~emorialfNigeria, Vol. VI,Anns.114-13975; Vol.VII,p1105.
"counter-~emorial ofNigeria, p9.19,Vol.1,p. 185. 18.Thereis a secondinterestingfeaturein this block of correspondencebecauseas wellas
the questionof where Bakassi was tobe adrninistered fiom, therewas the age-old,the perennial
problemofcollectingtaxesfiom Bakassifishermen,whowerenot over-anxiousto paytaxes - not
surprisingly, you may think. A typical example fiom this correspondence is a report of
25 March 1935 by the District Officerfor the Victoria Divisionin Southem Cameroons,which
Nigeria has tendered12,and which ProfessorTomuschat alsoreferred to yesterday in order to
corroborate whathe said about Germany collectingtaxes. Of course, the document is mainly
concemed,as are most of this group,with the collectionof taxes by the British authoritiesafter
Germanyhadleftthe scene. May 1drawthe Court's attentionto paragrap4 of thisAnnex,which
is AnnexNo. 125 to the NigerianCounter-Memorialand which perhapspresents the issue rather
more succinctlythan do the other documentsin this grou- though they al1supportwhat 1am
about to Say. First, some fishermen were avoiding payingtax altogether, so the authorities
mountedwhatthey called "taxraids"to preventthefishermenfiom hidingwhen thetimecamefor
them to pay their taxes. The problemwas complicatedby the fact that many of the Bakassi
fishermenhad a main residencein Calabarand were alreadypaying taxin Calabar. The British
authorities feltthat it would beairto makethesepeoplepay tax in two places, in Calabarand
Bakassi. However, they showedno disposition toallow Calabar fishermen simplyto pay taxin
Calabar,andnothinginBakassi,nothingin the Southem Cameroons.Mr.Bridgesthereforesaysin
paragraph 4:
"[Albout 120men are paying 4 shillingsto Calabarand 3 shillingsto Victoria
[whichis of coursein the SouthemCameroons]. About 140 to145 are paying (or
should be!)Fis words]3 shillingstax to Victoriaand about120 or more are paying
nothingandjust runaway. Itmaybe statedas a generalrule thattheregularFishtown
dwellersprobablypaytheir CalabarandVictoriataxesin full."
Sowhat we have here is the clearestpossible evidence,fully corroboratedby manyof the other
documentsin this group submittedbyNigeria,ofthe levyingof taxationin Bakassiby the British
authoritiesof SouthemCameroons,very muchseparatelyfiomthe Nigeriantax system. And what
is more, taxingeven Calabarcitizens,though othercorrespondencein this series showsthat they
weregiventhe benefitof a sort of doubletaxationarrangement betweenthe authoritiesin Nigeria
'2~ounter-~emorialofNigeria,Ann.125,Vol.VII,p. 1063.on the one hand,and Southern Cameroonson the other. Butthe documentsclearly showthat there
wasno propensity for the authoritiesin Southern Cameroonsto forego their taxes in Bakassi. The
documentsalso show that at various times the Southern Cameroonsrate was different fiom the
Calabar rate- as indeed was the case in the particular letter fiom which 1 have just quoted:
4 shillingsin Calabar,3 shillingson Victoria. Noneofthis wouldhave madesense ifBakassiwere
part of thesame sovereigntyas Calabar. So once again,documentsadducedby Nigeriain support
of a far-fetchedargumentbased on ethnicties and of its manifestlyincorrect assertionthat British
oficials administeredBakassiin right ofNigeria, turn out to provideus with good evidenceof the
exercise of sovereign power,the powerof taxation,by Cameroon'spredecessor in title, andalso of
the sharpest possible distinction being made in Bakassi between the tax temtory of Southem
Cameroonson the one hand,and that of neighbouring Calabaronthe other.
19.As well as its misplacedrelianceon Britishadministration, Nigeriastronglyemphasizes
the ethnicorigins and tribal affinities of many of the inhabitants,especially the fishermen,on the
peninsula. My fiend ProfessorBipounWoum has already addressedthe Court on the irrelevance
of ethnic ties and nationality; but perhaps1might be permittedto add a very brief observation,
from the perspective of a non-Afiican, in the context of both pre- and post-independence
effectivités.
20. Mr.President, Members of the Court, one of the firstthings that stnkes a visitor to
Cameroonis the very large number ofNigerianswho live there,even in parts of Cameroonwhich
are far removed fiom the Nigerian fiontier and whose sovereigntyhas never been contested by
Nigeria. This is very much the case for example in Bamenda, the capital of the North West
Province, far fiom the boundary. And 1do not meanNigeriancitizens with merely ethniclinks to
Nigeria (thoughNigeria's pleadings often fail to make this elementary distinction). 1mean that
these people whom you see in Bamendaare actualNigerian citizens, whoare either permanently
settledin Cameroonor - in many cases- come andgo betweenthe two countries. Poor people
are often more hospitablethan rich ones,and there is a longandhonourabletradition in Cameroon
of allowingNigerians andpeoplefiom other neighbouring Afiicancountriesto comeandlive there
and try to make a living. But this does not mean that the Nigerian fishermencarriedNigeria's
sovereign authority with them in their canoes, any more than do the large number of "guestworkers" in cities in Europe,North America and elsewhere. Andthis so, even if they form a
majorityofthe population.Thispropositionthatthemere factthat people ofonenationality livein
another doesnot turn thattenitory into partof the countryfkomwhichtheycomerings particularly
tnie in the light of the Court'sruling in the El Salvador/Hondurascase that "e_ffectivités,here
relevant,haveto be assessedin terms of actualevents,not theirsocialorigins"13.SoNigeriaisnot
ableto build aplausiblecaseon the factthat suchpeople havelived on the BakassiPeninsula,that
they held Nigerian passports,that they seasonallycornrnuted,as it were, between Calabar and
Bakassi and paid taxes in both places andthat they had links of allegianceto a varietyof tribal
groupsoutsideCameroon.
21. In this connection, Nigeria also seems to have overlooked the significance of
ArticleXXVI of the Anglo-GermanAgreementof 11March 1913- an article which it has not
soughtto repudiate. ArticleXXVI providesas follows: "XXVI.The fishing rightsof the native
population of the Bakasi [sic] Peninsula in the estuary of the Cross River shall remain as
heretofore." Accordingly, even afierthe Bakassi Peninsula wastransferredfiom GreatBritainto
Germany, theinhabitantsonthe Nigeriansidewereentitledto continueto come andfish(andvice
versa). This radicallyundermines the probativeeffectof the evidenceon which Nigeriarelies so
heavily.
22.1 comefinallytothepost-independenceperiod.
(c) Thepost-independenceperiod
23. Mr.President, Members ofthe Court,Nigeriahas presentedyou with averylong listof
its alleged eflectivités. Many of them do not quali% as proper eflectivités,for reasons 1 have
already outlinedand for otherswhich 1 shallmentionshortly. Still,superficially,it is a long list.
Cameroon'sis shorter. Deliberatelyso, however. Forthe legalreasons 1have alreadyput before
you Cameroon, as the pariy with the title, needs to prove very little (if anything) by way of
corroborationof its title. Soit has deliberatelykainedfromplaying Nigeria'sgame, considering
it quite inappropriateto go down the path of amassingone example after another. Furthemore,
whenone is athome in one's ownterritory,onedoesnot makea point of pilingup evidenceofthe
'%c.J R.eport1992,p.396,para58.obvious. From the time of the plebiscite andfor a considerable period thereafter,the conductof
Nigeria gave Cameroon no reason to suspect that it had designs on Bakassi, or that it claimed
Bakassi. On the contrary,Nigeria's statements at the timeof the plebiscite,its conduct in signing
the Yaoundé and Maroua Agreements in the1970s,andmany other instances,such as the consular
visits which1 shallrefer to tomorrow, ledCameroon tobelieve thatthere was not only no dispute
as to its sovereignty over Bakassi, but not even the smallest questionmark. And so why amass
evidence. And it must not be forgotten either that,with al1the problems which beset the young
Statein the decadeor so following independence,it is perhaps not surprisingif a relativelyremote
and inaccessiblepartof itstemtory didnotreceivethe sameattentionas,Say,Douala.
24. Mr. President, there is nevertheless a very significant type of Cameroonian activity
which began very soon after independence,namely the granting of pennits for hydrocarbon
explorationand exploitation overthe peninsulaitself and offshore. It isornmonground between
the Parties that nurneroussuch licences have been grantedby Cameroon. Indeed, severalof the
handsomemaps producedby Nigeria in support ofitsmaritime claimsdemonstratethis. 1refer, in
the first instance, to theeries of maps purporting to show the licensing history, which form
Chapter10of the ~ejoinder'~. Whilst Cameroonhas serious questions aboutthese maps in other
respects,you willnote that they show consistent licensingby Cameroon overthe peninsula and its
offshorewaters from 1963 onwards andvirtually no overlapping concessionsby Nigeria overthe
peninsula itself or its irnmediate offshore upto the terminal date ofhese illustrations, which is
1999. And on Figure 13.6,facing page 514 of Volume II of the Rejoinder you will see what,
accordingto Nigeria itself, are the actualCarneroonianwells drilled,tarting in 1967. Thisfigure
is now being projected [start projection], and you will also find a copy in your folders as
item537 (4. This very plainly shows numerous Cameroonianoilfields- the ones marked in
red- both in the waters to the Westof Bakassi, to the south, and above al1to the south-west.
Essentially,it is Nigeria's case regarding maritime delimitatithat the sinking of these wellsby
the two parties was uncontested, and they argue that a line between them should constitutethe
maritime boundary, if the Court holds that Bakassibelongs to Cameroon. That question ofmaritime delimitation will be dealt with bymy fiiend ProfessorKarnto tomorrow, and the
connected question of the offshore wells and concessions. But for present purposes, Le.,
sovereigntyovertheBakassiPeninsula,thepointis thatthesewellsweredrilledunderthe authority
of Cameroon,quite openly, andNigeriaby its own admissiondid not protest. It wouldmakeno
sense for it to have failed to protest if Bakassi belongedto Nigeria, and its counsel'svaliant
attempts to argue to the contrary are,if 1may respectfully say so, highly unconvincing[end
projection].
25.Ifwe now tum from the oillicenceswhichcontinuedfrom 1963onwards,Nigeria seeks
to argue that the otheractivities of Cameroonin Bakassican be broken down into three stages,
which it identifiesas: 1960 to 1972, 1973 to 29 March1994 (the date of the Cameroonian
Application),andthirdly,the subsequentperiod15.Cameroon,incidentally,as we willsee,doesnot
acceptthis self-servingclassification.
26. It will be convenient,for purposesof myexplainingwhy we do not accept it,to begin
with the lastperiod, theperiod afterthe deposit ofthe Application. Nigeria characterizes ssa
period startingwith the deposit of Cameroon's Application.In fact thecritical date shouldbe, at
the latest,thedate ofthe invasion of Bakassiin December1993to January 1994 - that shouldbe
the latest critical date. But, as a matter of fact, fiom the beginningof the 1990s we see an
intensificationof Nigerian attemptsto assert sovereigntyover Jabane and elsewhere,with the
obviousintention of building arecordof efectivitW éshathad largelyarnountedto mainlyverbal
assertionsof authoritynow found expressionin concerted action coupledwith a carnpaignto win
over theloyaltiesof theresidentethnicNigerian population. Attemptsto raise theNigerianflagin
1990 and 199116; a sudden influ of Nigeriansinto Jabane; measuresby Nigeria to sponsor
schools and health facilitiesI7; the appearance ofsigns claimingthe town as part of Nigeria in
January 1993"; the constructionof military installationsfollowingthe invasion; and preventing
Cameroonianauthorities fiom administering thearea, al1point to a concerted attempt by the
'S~ounter-~emoriolfNigeria,V1,pp.267-280,paras.10.154-10.186.
'6~ol.VII,Anns.MC362-363,pp.2909and2915.
"counter-~emorialofNigeria,para.10.100.
'*~emorialof Cameroo, ol. VII,An325, p.2709.Nigerian Governmentto build title to Jabane - and hence to Bakassi - by creating facts on the
ground. So any Nigerian activities fiom about April 1990,when Nigerian forces disembarked
severaltimes atJabane andreplaced theCameroonflag withtheir own, shouldbe treatedas taking
placewithin asuspectperiod.
27. By not listing post-Application efectivitésin that part of its pleading whichdivides the
post-independence practiceinto separateperiods,Nigeria appearsto acceptthat it cannotrely on
post-Application efectivités,which certainly oughtto be the case. However,in other parts ofits
Rejoinder it does invokepractice much later thanthe date ofthe Application. For instance,under
the heading "The exerciseof militaryjurisdiction", it refers to an arrest of smugglersin 1999,two
arrests of unlicensed fishing boats in 2000, and the rescue of passengers fiom a vesse1which
foundered(hardlyan efectivitéanyway)in 2000'~.Here, asso often in theseproceedings,Nigeria
seemsto be tryingto haveits cake andeat it.
28. A propos of military activity and the like, when in its pleadings Nigeria refers to
Cameroonian military activity on Bakassi in the decades preceding the Nigerian invasion, it
describes this Cameroonianactivity as harassment,or worse. Mr. President,each sidecan abuse
the other, but for Cameroonthis was the regular exercise, when needed, of State authority in its
owntemtory.
29. Havingestablishedthe temporal finishingline, we can now go back in timeto consider
the remaining years, whichbegan, according toOuropponents,with the independenceof the two
States. Nigeria,1remindyou, seeksto dividethis earlierperiodinto two parts,the firstof whichis
1960 to 1972, which it characterizes as a period where there is evidence of Carneroonian
acquiescencein Nigerian rule. So far as concernsthe secondpenod, which according to it runs
fiom 1973 to the date of the Application in 1994, it says: "From 1973onwards the evidence
suggeststhatthe Governmentof Cameroonhad decidedto seekto changetheNigerian characterof
the Bakassi region and to attemptto create evidenceof acertainlevel of Cameroonianpresencein
the region."20 Mr. President, one can certainly admire the audacity of our opponents in making
suchan assertion, whichisthe exactoppositeof whatis manifestlythe case.
I9~ejoinderofNigena, Vol.1,117-118,para3.130.
20~ounter-~emorialofNigeria,Vol.1,x,para.10.162. 30.Thefactisthat Cameroonhas consistently exercised its sovereignty£romthe veryfrst. 1
havealready mentionedthe grantingof oil concessionsfromthe early 1960s. Asubstantialnumber
of otherexamplesare given in Cameroon'spleadings21.They includethe collection of taxes; the
organization of electoral districts; the nomination of sub-prefects and other officials; the
preparationof economicreportsand regionaldevelopment plans; the opening ofschools andthe
provision of agricultural training; proposals and counter-proposals in 1971 to move the
headquartersof Jabane districtdue to therisk of fl~odin~~~ a,nd police actionsof variouskinds.
Otherexamplesof Cameroonianefectivitéscan be foundagaininNigeria'sownpleadings23.One
instance concems the seinire of three Nigerian soldiersand a flying-boat at Jabane in 1968~~.
Nigeria may, of course, complainthat this constituted a violationof what, rather later, very
belatedly,it cameto consideras its territorialsovereignty; but thatis preciseiywhat is in issue.
For Cameroon, it was simply vigorously exercising its sovereign authority and protecting its
temtorial integrity.
31.In viewofthe limitedtime available,1shallrefertojust one morepieceof Cameroonian
evidence, whichis the "VillageDictionaryof Ndian Division",publishedby theFrench OBce de
la RechercheScientiJqueet Technique Outre-Mer(ORSTOM)inJune 1973. Thisis Annex244 to
the ~emorial~'. Although entitledthe "Village Dictionary",it is in fact morethan a dictionary,
becauseit givesdetailsof localorganization,censusfigures andso on. Severalplaces in Bakassi
arelistedfor instanceon page 11. It saysonpage 5-on page 3 inthe French versionbecauseit is
bilingual- that theterritorialextent of Ndian Divisionhad been fixed in 1968, and refers to
specific decrees defining subdivisions dating backas far as 1965, 1969 and 1973. In its
Counter-Memorial,Nigeria saysof this report "it doesnot appearto have authoritativestat~s"~~.
Withrespect,thepointis a veryunimpressive one: thereport stateson its faceatpage 4 (page2 in
the Frenchversion),that it wasproducedwiththe CO-operation of Cameroonian authorities,and it
2'~emorial of Cameroon, Vo1,pp. 490-495,paras.4.430-4.454;Replyof Cameroon, Vol.1, pp.307-311,
paras.5.218-5.233,daccompanyingAnnexes.
22~eplyof Cameroon,Vol.IV,Ann.28,p. 395.
23~f.Counter-MemorialofNigeria,Vo1,pp.267-269,paras.10.157-10.161.
24~ounter-~emorial fNigeria,Vol.VIII,AM. 206,p. 1673.
25~01.V, pp.1987-2006.
26~ara.10.135.emanatesfrom a highlyrespected researchbodyof the French Republic,as can be seen fromthe
transmittalsheet followingtherepod7. This isjust oneofseveralpiecesof evidencetenderedasto
the exerciseof authorityby Camerooninthe firstdecadeofits existence,andbeyond.
32. Tomorrow,1 shall havethe occasionto make submissionsto you about a nurnberof
a
visits byNigerian consular and diplornaticpersonne l the peninsula. Aswell asconstitutingclear
evidence of Nigeria's acceptance of Cameroonian sovereignty over Bakassit,hey also provide
strongcorroborationofthe factthatitwas Cameroonwhichwas "at home" - "chezsoi" - onthe
peninsula,andnotNigeria.
33. TherewereoccasionalNigerian protests. But theywere aboutwhat it considered tobe
the severityof Cameroon'sconduct - for example,in arrestingthe three soldiersat Jabane and
seizingtheir flying-boat;or aboutperceivedharshnesstowardsthe "Nigerian"inhabitantsof some
Bakassivillageson occasion.Untila latestagethough, Nigeriadidnotseriouslyprotestagainstthe
very presenceof Cameroonon Bakassi.
34. But Cameroon,for itspart,did protestagainstNigerian conduct when it considered it to
infnnge its sovereignty. A typicalexampledatesfrom 1969,and is to be found in Annex 148to
the couriter-~emorial~~. These protests tend to be couched in terms of appeals to
good-neighbourliness,but theyareneverthelessprotests.
35. My remaining time does not permit a detailed examinationof alleged Nigerian
eflectivitésin the post-independenceperiod Butmany ofthemdo not counttowards establishing a
prescriptive title, which1 repeat,is the only form of "historicconsolidationof title" which even
remotely begins to be arguable in this case on Nigeria's behalf. For ifwe applythe criteriafor
prescriptionwhich 1briefly outlinedearlier,andrelate them in rathermore detailto the evidence
adducedbyNigeria, the followingobservationscan be made.First, possession hasto be peaceful:
hence al1of Nigeria'sacts sinceit invaded Bakassi,indeedal1of its forcibleacts evenbeforethe
full-blown invasion,do not count. This also applies to exercises of civil authoritytaking place
under theaegis of militaryoccupationand the like. Secondly,they haveto be sovereignacts. For 1
28~ol.VII,p. 1209. A copyoftheoriginalletterisatpp.1212-1213. SeealsoVol. V,Anns.RC62, p.623,and
Vol. VII,MC325,p.2709forotherexamples.instance,the provisionof schoolsor hospitalson Bakassiby privatebodies based in Nigeria, such
as churches, do not count. Thirdly, actswhich are not clearly attributable to aclaim of right over
the territory do not count. For example,issuing passportsto Nigeriansin Bakassi does not count,
any more than the issue of a passport to a British citizenby the British Consulin The Hague, Say,
could be treated as a British eflectivitéin the Netherlands. Fourthly,Nigeria cannot count acts
carried out with the permission of the territorial sovereign,which was indeed the case with the
provisionof passportsby Nigerian consular officials,for exarnple. Fifthly, actswhich arenot open
do not count either. On a peninsula wherethere are very many Nigerian citizens or people with
ethnic or similarties to Nigeria, it is not inconceivablethat someacts may have been canied out
without Cameroon's knowledge. Lest therebe any misunderstanding,let me emphasizethat 1am
not saying that aState which should have laiown what was happeningon its temtory can simply
rely on its iack of knowledge. What 1 am submitting is that, if in the circumstances of this
particularcase somethingwas done in thatarea, remotefrom themain centresof Cameroon,which
Cameroon could not reasonably have been expected to know about, this would not count asan
eflectivité.
36. Applying the foregoing five criteria will eliminate a very large nurnber of Nigeria's
allegedeflecrivités.It may beyof course,that someothers do notfa11fou1of these tests. But there
are still other hurdles for Nigeria to surmount. For, sixthly, protest will also preclude
prescription- and there were protests by Cameroon, as we have seen. Protest rules out the
possibilityof acquiescence,andin any casethere isno evidenceoftacit acquiescenceonthe partof
Cameroon. Seventhly, prescription does not "m" when the title-holder is itself exercising
sovereignauthoriîyin the temtory in question- which, as 1haveshown, was indeed the case for
Cameroon. And eighthly, the adverse possession hasto take place over a sufficiently longtime.
How much tirnewill depend on the circumstances; butin the circumstancesof this case, a mere
three decades between independence and the Nigerian decision to take over Bakassi in the early
1990s is far too short, especially when Cameroon was not sitting idly by but, as1 have said,
exercisingits ownsovereignty,not to mentionprotestingagainstNigerian infringementsof it.
37. As a matterof fact,Mr. President,if one wereto try andadd up al1of the efectivités,on
one side and the other, it would actually be Cameroon which would come out ahead,notwithstandingthe very long list submittedby Nigeria. For, 1 must remind the Court, as 1have
submittedalready, Cameroonis entitledto rely, not onlyonits ownpost-independenceacts,but on
all- all- of the acts of sovereign authority performed by the United Kingdom in right of
Carneroonover the nearlyfour decadesof the mandate andthe trusteeship, notto mentionthose of
the United Kingdom'spredecessorintitle, Germany. But asa matter of principle,for Cameroonto
demonstratethat it has, as it were, moreeflectivités,is supererogatory,becausethe rules of the law
conceming prescription,together with the very weighty principle of utipossidetis and, finally,the
probablyeven weightierprinciplethattitle to tenitory cannotbe changedby acts of unlawfulforce
al1leadtothe sameconclusion,thatCameroonhas a bettertitle.
4. Conclusion
39.By way of concludingmy submissionson the efectivités,Mr. Presidentand Membersof
the Court, 1 should like to make a general observation aboutthe picture which emergesfrom an
examinationof the lawrelating to effectivitésand the factsof this case. It may be thatNigeriacan
prove that it has performedsomeactsof administrationinBakassi- taking a census,for example.
This of coursedoesnot prove that Cameroondid not do thesame thing - and indeed,to take that
particularexample,1have already mentionedevidenceofCamerooniancensuses. Butthat doesnot
mean thatthe censusesof the two States,or other acts ofadministration, canceleachotherout. For
if the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabarnever had sovereignty over Bakassi,or if the British, by
their colonizationof Nigeria, extinguished any internationallegalpersonalitywhich the Kings and
Chiefs allegedly mightonce have claimed,or if Germany extinguishedthe Kings' and Chiefs'title
by conquest,or if Germanyacquiredsovereigntyover Bakassiby the London Agreementof March
1913, or if the League mandate andthe United Nations trusteeshipgave the British administering
authoritiespower overBakassiin right ofSouthem Cameroon(rather than in right ofNigeria),or if
the acts of British administrationof the Peninsula duringthe approximately40 years in question
did constitute effectivecontrol in rightof Southem Cameroons; or ifthe plebisciteand the process
accompanying it confirmed Cameroonian title;
or if the numerous acts of recognition and
acquiescenceby Nigeriaare opposableto it - if any of theseis the case(not if al1arethe case, but
ifany one of these is the case)- then the two sets of efectivitésare not ona par with eachother.On that hypothesis Carneroon is the sovereign and Nigeria is the interloper.In Cameroon's
submission,it wouldtake far more inthe way ofpeacefulNigerianactivities in Bakassi performed
à titre de souverainthan Nigeria can prove, and far more acquiescenceon the part of Cameroon
than Nigeria can demonstrate,over a significantly longerperiod, for title to change hancls. The
burdenofproof is onNigeria,andwe submitthat it hascomenowherenear to dischargingit.
40. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de votre
attentionàune plaidoirie qui,je le regrette, étaitplus longue qu'elle auraitpu l'êtNigériae
n'avaitpas essayédebouleverserlesrègles dedroit surles effectivitéset d'embrouiller les faits.
41. Monsieurle président,e vous seraisreconnaissantdebienvouloir passerla paroàmon
collègueet ami, leprofesseurJean-PierreCot.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Mendelson. Je donne maintenant la
parole auprofesseur Jean-PierreCot.
M. COT
1.LA FRONTIÈRE TERRESTRE
7. Bakassi
e) La confirmationcartographique
1. Prologue. Quellevaleurprobante attribuer A l'absence decartes?
Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, il me revient de traiter de la
confirmationcartographiquedutitre du CamerounsurBakassi. Mais auparavantje voudraisposer,
en guisede prologue,une question:quelle valeur probante attribàl'absence decartes?
1.Lajurisprudence internationaleest en effet abondante,bien établieen ce qui concerne la
valeurprobantedescartesdans leprocès international.
2. Mais,à ma connaissance, il n'existepas dejurisprudencesur l'absencede cartes. Que se
passe-t-ilorsqu'unepartie ne produit pas une seule caràl'appui de la frontière revendiquet
alors que l'autre partie en produit un nombre raisonnable Quelle conséquence tirer decette
désertioncartographique du prétoir? Est-ce un aveu? Est-ce un signe de faibless? Il vous
appartiendra d'appréciecette situation singulière,aussi bien dans lesecteur dulac Tchadque dans
celuide la péninsule de Bakassi. 3. Le Nigéria produitun somptueux matériau cartographique, notammend t ans ses deux
atlas, l'unen deux cent volumes, en voici un, annexé à son contre-mémoire (quatre-vingts cartes)
l'autre un peu plus mince mais plus abondant quant au nombre de reproductions (une bonne
centaine), annexé à sa duplique. Mais ces cartessont singulières, s'agissantd'illustrerles thèses >
d'unepartiedans un différendfrontalier. Et ellessont en effetsingulières,on y trouvedes croquis
bien faits, desfonds de carte avec dessurimpressions,desphotographiespar satellite,mais pas une
seule carte indiquant la frontièrerevendiquéepar le Nigériadans le lac Tchad, nous l'avons
constatél'autrejour, oudans la péninsule deBakassi.
4. Certes, il y aquelques cartesdans ces atlas portantun tracé frontalier. Mais elles datent
d'avant 1913 ou 1919,c'est-à-dire d'avant leinstrumentsétablissantlafrontièreconventionnelle.
5. Quant aux cartes annexées auxtraités,il faut aller les dénicherdans l'impressionnant
magma devolumesducontre-mémoireduNigéria,où ellessontenfouiesdans levolume v2'.
6. Deux beaux atlas sans une seule carte, convenons-en, c'estune prouesse. Le Nigéria
préciseau demeurant,je cite la duplique :«TheGovernmentofNigeriadoes not intendto trouble
the Courtwith a collectionofjudicial assessmentsof mapevidence~. C'est cequ'on appelle en
bon français unelitote,un euphémisme ,n «understatement»s,ije ne metrompe.
7. Le Cameroun, Monsieurle président,produit des cartes dans ses écritures. Des cartes
d'origine diverseet de valeur inégale,sans doute. Le Nigériasouligne que nombrede ces cartes
sont dressées à une échelle troppetite pour être significatives.Mais l'échelleest question de
proportion. Tout dépend du détail qu'il s'agit d'individualiser. Une échellesuffisante pour
individualiser la frontièrede1'Akwayafé ne conviendra pas pour choisir entre les deux bras de
1'Ebeji.
8. Pour m'en tenir aux écritures camerounaises, ycompris les annexes cartographiques
comprises dans le livre VI1de notre mémoire etle livre II de notre réplique,j'ai compté,sauf
erreur :
- trente-neufcartesindiquant la frontièrequenous revendiquons dansle lac ch ad^';
29 Contre-mémoirdeuNigéria,vol.V, annexesCMN46, 47, 40 et 54. Lacarteno50 de l'atlas anauxé
contre-mémoinredonnequ'undétaildelacarteMoisel.- cinquante-huitcartesindiquantlafrontièrequenous revendiquonsdanslesecteur de~akassi~'.
Certainesde ces cartes ontété produite s deux outroisreprisesetpeuvent serecouper ; ilne s'agit
pasici devous donneruneadditionmaisde vous livrerune impression.
9. Nous avons mêmeproduit deux cartes indiquant la frontièrerevendiquéepar le Nigéria
dans le secteur de ~akassi~*,cartes que le Nigéria n'a pascru bon de produire, car elles sont en
effetembarrassantespour lui,commenousle verrons.
10. Monsieur le président,je ne cherche pas dans cette affaire à établirune statistiquesans
grand intérêt.J'ajoute que nous aurionspu multiplier ces exemples : prenez n'importe quel bon
atlas dans la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix; vous y noterez les deux délimitations
caractéristiquesaunord de la frontièrede la ligne briséedans le lac Tchad et au sud de lafrontière
de1'Akwayafé.
11. Mais je me dois d'embléede souligner ce déséquilibre dans les moyens de preuve
cartographiqueavancéspar les deux Parties. Le Nigérian'a pas cherché à discuter les cartes
produitespar le Cameroun. Il a choisid'ignorerleproblème,de fuir les débats.Je vousdemande
d'enprendre acte.
12.Nous sommes dans une situationinverse de celle naguère examinée par votreChambre
dansl'affairedu D@rendfiontalier (Burkina Faso/Républiqud euMali). A l'époque,laChambre,
constatant qu'elleétaiten présenced'unemasse considérablede cartes, croquiset dessinsavancés
par les deux Parties, ajoutait qu'«aucuntracéfrontalier indiscutablene peut êtredégagé de cet
important matériau cartographique»33. Elle était comme submergée. Ici, le matériau est
appréciable - celuique nousavançons -, la frontièreindiscutable,commejevais essayerde vous
enconvaincre,pourle secteurde Bakassi.
30Mémoire,livre 1, cartes M5, M6, M7, M8, M12, M15, M 16, croquisno5; mémoire, livreVI1 (annexe
cartographique),cariesM2a,35,42,43,45,46,47,48, 51,54, 55,56, 58,59,61, 67, 71,73c, 74, 75,78,79,82, 83, 85,
88,89,91,92, 93a;réplique,livrei, carte R1.
31Mémoire,livre 1,cartes M5, M6,M7,M8, M9, M11,M12, M13, M14,M15, M17, M19, M20,M21, M22,
M23,M24; mémoire,livre VI (annexescartographique),cartesM 26b), 29b),31, 32'), 34, 35,36, 37, 38,39,40,41,42,
43,45, 46,47, 50àf),51, 52,55, 57, 58,59,60, 61, 67, 71,73a),75, 79,80, 81,83, 85, 86,87, 88,91; réplique, vol.1,
cartesR19,R29;réplique, v.I(atlas),feuilles27et 28.
32CarteM 18aet M 1Sb; mémoire,livre1,p. 305; livreVII,M 93aet 93b.
33C.I.J.Recueil 1986,p. 584,par. 58.2. Lescartesdelapéninsule deBakassi :généralités
13. Monsieur le président, rassurez-vous,je n'ai pas l'intention de présenter à la Cour
l'ensemble des cinquante-huitcartes produitespar le Camerounet confirmant sontitre territorial
sur la péninsule de ~akassi~~.Je me contenterai de commentercertaines des plus significatives
d'entreelleset de vous renvoyer ànos écriturespour lesautres(lesréférences seronten notedebas
de page du compterendu bien entendu). Mais je me dois d'abord de relever certaines critiques
faitespar leNigériaà nos productions dans saduplique.
14. Je préciseque nous n'entendons pasfaire dire n'importe quoi aux cartes et que nous
situons nos remarques dans le fil de la jurisprudence baliséeen particulier par les arrêtsBurkina
Faso/République du Mali et ~asikilil~edudu~~J .e constateque les cinquante-huitcartes quenous
avons produites situent toutes Bakassi en territoire camerounais. Comme l'a notéle tribunal
arbitraldans l'affairedu Canalde Beagle :
((Wherethere isadefnite preponderanceononeside,particularlyfit is a very
marked preponderanceand while of course every map must be assessedon its own
merits,the cumulativeimpactof a large numberof maps, relevantfor the particular
casethat tellthe samestory,especiallywhensomeof thememanatefiornthe opposite
party or fiom third counfries,cannot but be considerableeither as indicationsof
general,orut least widespreadreputeor belief;orelseas conJirmatoryofconclusions
reached,asin thepresentcase,independentlyofmaps.»
15. Le Nigériaconsidèrecurieusementque les cartesantérieures à l'indépendancedu pays,
en 1960,ne sontpaspertinentes36.C'estévidemmenttenterde rayerd'un traitdeplume leprincipe
utipossidetis en empêchantune partie de produire un des éléments de preuve du titre temtorial
héritéde l'indépendance.
16. Le Nigérianote de surcroîtque nombre de noscartes se répètent,sontcopiéesl'une sur
l'autre. C'estexactpour certainesd'entreelles. Mais cetélémend terépétitionest en même temps
un élémend te notoriété.Il rend d'autant plus inexcusable l'absence prolongéde protestationdu
Nigériaface à l'utilisation très générale, par le monde, de cartes nombreuses indiquant la
,
frontièrede lYAkwayafé.Ajoutons, Monsieur le président, quecertaines de ces cartes, à usage
professionnel, reflètentune pratiquesur le terrain [projetercarte, cote541. Ainsi,-parexemple,
34Duplique duNigéria,vo1p. 185par..328.
35C.I.J.Recue1986,p.584,par.8;C.I.J.Recue1999,par8.4.
Duplique duNigéria,vo1p. 185,par.3.327-3.328.la cartequevous trouverezsousla cote 54 dansvotre dossierde plaidoiries,cette carte géologique
qui date de 1964, qui établitque les ingénieursdu Nigériane considéraientpas la structure
géologiquede la péninsulede Bakassicomme lesconcernant. Ainsi encorela carte desréserves
forestières de1966exclutBakassidu patrimoineforestiernigérian[projetercarte, cote no 551. La
voici, c'est lacarte 55,Monsieurleprésident,dudossierdesjuges.
17. La carte marine, que vous trouverez dans votre dossier sous la cote no56, intitulée
((Approachesto CrossRiver)),estunecarte quidécrit lafrontièredansle chenalde 1'AkwayaféJ .e
note au demeurant que l'organisation maritime internationale, en accord avec l'organisation
hydrographique internationale, aconfié auService hydrographiqueet océanographiquede la
marine française, le SHOM, dont le siège est à Brest, la responsabilitéde la coordination
internationalede la zoneII de l'océanmondial. Ce servicemondial d'avertissement indique àla
date d'aujourd'huila frontièrede 1'Akwayafé commefrontière internationale entre leNigériaet le
Cameroun. Les cartesmaritimes internationalessond toncétabliesen conséquence.
3. Lescartesannexées à uninstrument international
18.La Cour accordera l'attention qu'elles mérite ntes cartes officiellesqui sontannexées
à un instrument. MaxHubernotaitdéjàdansl'affairede l'Ilede Palmas :"Aboveall, then,oflcial
or semi-oficial maps ..would be of special interest in cases where the- do not assert the
sovereignn,of the countryof whichthe government has causedthemto be issued." (RSA,vol. II,
p. 853.) Et,dans son arrêdte 1986,laChambredela Cour,dans l'affaireBurkinaFaso/République
du Mali, a noté que ces cartes peuvent acquérirl'autoritéd'un «document auquelle droit
internationalconfêreunevaleur intrinsèqueauxfins de l'établissement dd eroits 11
enest ainsipour troiscartesdanslesecteurdeBakassi.
19.Lacarte TSGS2240,feuille no2, dressée en 1905-1906par le capitaineWoodroffe (nous
l'avons déjàprojetée l'autrejour) pour la Grande-Bretagneet par le capitaineHermann pour
l'Allemagne, est annexée au traité du 11mars 1913 [projeter carte, cote no571. Le
professeurSimma a déjàcommentécette carte,qui est signéepar les deuxparties, et àlaquellele
traitéfaitexplicitementréférencdeansses articles18et 30.
37C.I.J.Recue1986,p. 582,pa54. 20. La carte annexéeà la déclarationMilner-Simon du 10juillet 1919 [projeter carte,
cote no591-c'est donc lacarteMoiselquej'ai retiréedu contre-mémoire duNigéria; d'ailleursje
remercie la Partienigériane pourcette assistanceà ma plaidoirie (vol. V, feuille G-1 Bueia)-a
sans doute pour objet principal de déterminer lafiontièreentre les deux mandats, britanniqueet
français. Elle neconcernepas directement Bakassi, mais, accessoirement, elledéfinitle temtoire
confié respectivement à chaquepuissance. Et vous voyez ici, avec cette carte G-1, le petit point
rouge-que la carte G-1Bueia de Moisel, telle qu'elle aétéauthentifiéepar les négociateurs
de 1919 - place très nettement la péninsule deBakassi au Cameroun britannique et non au
Nigéria. Telle étaistans doute la convictiondes négociateurslaconférence dela paix en 1919.
21. Postérieurement à l'indépendance,la carte3433 (dont nous entendrons parler plus
longuement à propos de la fiontièremaritime) lprojeter carte, cote no601a étéannexée à deux
instruments internationaux, la déclarationde Yaoundé II du 4 avril 1971 et la déclarationde
Maroua du 1" juin 1975. Elle est signéepar les deux chefs d'Etat :le présidentAhidjo pour le
Cameroun, legénéraG l owonpour leNigéria. Elle est même signée def uxis [projetercarte, cote
no611 :une premièrefois àYaoundépour déterminerle tracéjusqu'à la limite des 3milles; une
seconde fois àMaroua pour prolonger le tracéjusqu'à la limite,jusqu'au point G [projeter carte,
cote no621. C'est là une singularitéunique à ma connaissanceque la signature par deux fois, à
deux moments successifs, d'une carte annexée, d'un instrument uniqueà deux instrumenta
différents:la déclarationde YaoundéII et la déclaration deMaroua. C'estune curiositédu droit
internationalqui méritenotre attention sans doute. Cette carte constitue, c'est plus important, la
reconnaissancesolennelle et répétép ear les deux Parties, représentées au plusaut niveau, de la
frontièrede l'Akwayafé,deuxlustresaprèsl'indépendance.
4. Les cartesutiliséesdansle cadredumandatetdela tutelle
22. Les cartes transmises par la puissance administrante,en l'espècela Grande-Bretagne,
dansle cadredu mandat et de la tutelle,présententun intérêptarticuliercar elles reflètentla vision
qu'a la puissance adrninistrante de l'assiettetemtoriale du mandat puis de la tutelle et elle est
destinée,le cas échéant, provoquer laréactionde l'organisation internationale,SdN ou ONU,qui
exerce la surveillance du mandat ou de la tutelle. Et les professeurs Shaw et Ntamark vous ontexpliquéavecquelle vigilance la commission desmandats, puis le conseil de tutelle vérifiaientle
respect de l'assiette territorialedu mandat et suivaient les problèmesfrontaliers et, le cas échéant,
les rectifications defrontièresproposéespar les puissancesdministrantes. Or, toutes les cartes
transmisespar le Royaume-Uni,que cesoit àla SdNou à l'ONU,situentBakassi dans le périmètre
du territoire sous mandat.'ai inclusdans le dossierdesjuges, une des premièrescartes quenous
avons trouvées,produitepar le SurveyDepartment du Nigéria en 1926que vous trouverezsousla
cote 63. Et voici une carte transmiseau conseilde tutelle en 1949;je n'en ai gardéque la partie
méridionale.Elle est intéressanteparcequ'elle indiquebienesfish-towns, cesfish-towns quemon
collègueMalcomShaw citait tout àl'heure dans sa plaidoirie, lesfish-towns de Bakassi, du côté
camerounais de la frontière (iln'y a aucun douteà cet égard) [projetercarte, cote no641.Vous
voyez l'indicationfish-towns et la frontièrequi suit trèsclairementkwayafé.Je prie aussi la
Cour de se reporter aux cartesM41, M 45, M46 et M 47 que nous avons incluses dans notre
mémoireet qui vont dans le mêmesens. Je le répète :toutes les cartes transmisàsl'autorité de
tutelle, au conseil detutelle ou auparavànla commissiondes mandats, indiquaient bienBakassi
enterritoiresousmandatou soustutelle.
5. Les cartesétabliespardestiers
23. Lescartesétabliespardestiers n'ontpasun caractère officielen principe. Ellesreflètent
cependant la notoriété internationale dlea situation. Elles bénéfitussi d'une présomption de
neutralité,étantétabliespar des servicescartographiesde puissances quin'ont pas d'intérêt direct
dans le différend.
24. Il en est ainsi des cartesd'IGNFrance,dont la qualitéa été reconnpar la Chambrede
la Cour dansl'affaireduDzférendfiontalier (BurkinaFaso/Républiquedu ~ali)~~. Au demeurant,
les Etats riverainsdu lacTchad, dontles deux Parties,leNigériaet le Cameroun,n'ontpas hésité
confier à cet organisme, à l'impartialité reconnue,le soin de procéder aux opérationsde
démarcationdans le secteur. Or toutes les cartes de 1'IGN-vous en trouverez une d'avant la
seconde guerremondialedans le dossierdesjuges, cote no65 -, situentBakassi dans le territoire
sous mandat ou sous tutelle britanniqueet, depuis les indépendances,au Cameroun. Voici une
38C.I.J.Recue1986,p. 585-5par.61-62.carte récentedYIGNFrance qui est fort claire et que vous trouverez d'ailleurs sous la cote no66
dans le dossier des juges. C'est unecarte où l'on voit clairement que Bakassi estsituédu côté
camerounaisde la frontièrede 1'Akwayafé puisque Bakassi estindiquéen couleurs camerounaises
danscette carte,leNigériaétantindiquéenblanc [projetercarte].
25. La carte publiéepar le Geographer,l'organisme officiel du départemendtYEtatque voici
maintenant,est tout aussi nette [projeter carte, cote 671. Ce qui est au moins aussi intéressant,
c'estle commentaireinscritau bas de la cartequevous voyezmal maisqueje vais vous lire et qui
précisebien que la frontière«followsthethalwegof theAkpa-Yafeto a linebetweenBakasiPoint
and King Point on the Bight of Biaffa~. C'est donc une carte qui préciseles différents piliers
£rentièresétablissur la fiontièreanglo-allemandeet qui ensuiteindique clairement non seulement
lYAkwayafé mais le point d'arrivéede la frontièreentre KingPoint et BakassiPoint on theBightof
Biaffa.
6. Lescartesbritanniquesde la période du mandatetdelatutelle,puisauxcartes nigérianes
depuisl'indépendance
26. Je n'insistepas en effet surles carteséditées sotar la France du temps du mandat, soit
par la Partie camerounaisedepuis l'indépendance camerounaise.Ces cartes étant par définition,
des cartes qui émanentd'unedes Parties auprocès. Je note simplementen passant que toutes ces
cartes indiquent que Bakassi est du côté camerounaisde la frontière39. Le cas des cartes
britanniques de la période du mandat et de la tutelle, puis des cartes nigérianes depuis
l'indépendancem , e paraît plus intéressant. Produites prnedes Partiesau litige ou sa devancière,
elles lui sont en effet opposables en vertu de la jurisprudence que j'ai rappelée la Cour mardi
matin en traitant du rôle des cartes dans le secteur du lac ch ad^' E.lles peuvent constituer une
((admissionagainst interest))si elles contredisentlaposition présentede laPartie en litige. Comme
l'a noté leJudicial Cornrnitteeof the Privy Councilen 1927, dans l'affaire de la Frontièredu
i
Labrador :
«Thefact thatthrougha longseriesofyears anduntilthepresent disputearose,
al1themaps issuedin Canadaeithersupportedor wereconsistent withthe clairnnow
put forward by Newfoundlandis of some valueas showingthe constructionput upon
39VoirnotammentlescarteM 8,M 11,M78,M 80.
CR20021,p.36, par.64. the Orders in Counciland statutes bypersons of authoriv and by the general public
in theDominion. ))
27. Jusqu'audébutdesannées quatre-vingt-dix, toutelses cartes,je disbien toutes les cartes,
publiées parle Royaume-Uni, puis après l'indépendance publié par le Nigéria,toutes les cartes
reconnaissent que Bakassiest au Cameroun. Voici par exempleune cartenigérianede 1963 :la
feuille «Calabar» de la carte au 11250OOO[eprojeter carte,cote no681,(carte nigérianed'après
l'indépendance).Toutes les autres cartes britanniques ounigérianesdatantd'avant 1990 quenous
avonstrouvéesindiquent lamême frontière4'.Je ne les énumèrepas, vousen trouverez la listeen
note du compterendu.
28. Depuis 1990, il est vrai, il y a quelques exceptions,pas beaucoup-deux. Le
changementde position du Nigéria semble en effet dater cartographiquement de 1990. C'est la
carte ((AdministrativeMap ofNigeria)),dixième édition,de 1991,qui indiquepour lapremièrefois
lanouvellefrontièrerevendiquée par leNigéria[projetercarte,coteno691. Vousvoyez lafrontière
qui, tout d'un coup, décroche pourrejoindre le Rio del Rey en bas et donc laisser Bakassiau
Nigéria. Cettecarte est indiquée(denthedition)),dixième édition de la carteadministrative. Elle
estbonne pour le Nigéria celle-là, elle sertonnesi nous n'avionspas retrouvé la troisièmecarte
administrative, troisième éditiond ,atée de1956~~;la quatrième édition,datée de 1960~~;la
septième, datée de 1972~~ [projeter carte, coteno 701. Et vous voyez, vous pouvez indiquerla
frontière. Ceséditionsantérieuressituent toutes Bakassien territoire camerounais. Ilen est de
même,seconde exception, pour lacarte «Map of Nigeria. Thirty States))[projeter carte, cote
n071], nous voyons la frontièrequi décroche,qui donne Bakassi auNigéria, c'estla troisième
éditionqui datedu débutdesannées quatre-vingt-dixe ,llen'est pasprécisémenitndiquéemaiselle
date sans doute de là et elle situe Bakassi enterritoirenigérian. Malheureusemenptour la Partie
nigériane, la seconde édition des années quatre-vingt, intitulée ellef Nigeria. TwenQ One
States)),c'étaitavant la réforme administrativ,lle situe Bakassi en temtoire camerounais. C'est
le même coup,si je puis dire. Ces cartes, à priori favorablesau Nigéria,vous le voyez bien,
41VoirlescartesM 7, M9, M 13,M 1M,24, M 31,M 32, M 34, M35, M 3M,37, M38,M39, M 40M 41,
M 42,M 43, M45, M46, M 47,M 51,M 53,M 55,M 57,M 59, M60,M61,M 67, M 74,M 75, M 79M 81, M86.
42Mémoire du Cameroun, LivecarteM 19.
43Ibid arteM 20.
44Ibid .rteM 21.deviennentun élément à charge contre le Nigériaaujourd'hui, carelles enregistrent et datent le
revirement deposition duNigéria. Etl'onse souviendrasansdouteque pareilrevirementavait été
constatédans l'affaire de Palmas où l'on avaitpu constater aussi qu'unesériede cartes s'était
interrompue à unmoment pourêtre remplacéepar uneautre descriptionde laligne frontière.
29. Cescartes qui indiquentBakassiau Nigéria relèvent de ceque la Cour, dansl'affitiredes
Minquierset des Ecréhousa appelé«les mesures qui auraient étéprises en vue d'améliorerla
position en droit de la partientéressée E^^ls.ne peuvent donc pas êtreretenues au profit du
Nigéria,ellesauraientplutôttendance à l'accablermaisje n'insiste pas.
30. Ce queje veux en revanche souligner c'est quele Nigérias'est bien gardéde répondre,
depuis huit annéeset au terme d'une procédureécrite longue,prolixe devant vous, à ces faits
avancéspar le Cameroun dès sonmémoire,de 1995. Il n'a jamais tentéde s'expliquer sur ce
revirement deposition. Son mutisme en dit sans doute long sur l'embarrasde nos collèguesde
l'autrecôtéde la barre. Nous attendonsavec curiositéles explications quele Nigérianemanquera
pasde fournir àla Cour danslesjours àvenir. Cet ensembledecartes,Monsieurleprésident, vient
conforter l'analyse résultant u texte de l'accord du 11 mars 1913, ainsi que les décisionset
attitudes prises par les autoritésresponsables du mandat et de la tutelle et de la conduite
subséquentedesparties. Commel'a faitobserverla Courpermanentedansl'affaire de Jawonina :
«Il est vrai que les cartes et leur légenden'ont pas une force probante
indépendante vis-à-visdes textes destraités et desdécisions.Mais dansle casprésent,
elles confirment de manière singulièrement convaincanteles conclusions tiréesdes
documentset de leuranalysejuridique.)) (C.P.J.1.sérieBno8, p. 33.)
Et elle ne trouve certainement aucune contradictiondans aucun texte dans la présente affaire
Monsieurleprésident.Nousne disonspasautre chose.
31. Enfin, je dois souligner, ou revenir plutôt dessus, revenir sur l'étrangesilence des
autoritésdu Nigériapar rapport à cetteabondanteproduction cartographiquede toute origine. Le
Camerounet, avant lui, la France, les Etats tiers, les organisationsinternationales ont depuis tout
temps, avec constance et publiquement situéla péninsule de Bakassi en territoire sous mandat
,
britannique, puisen territoire camerounais. Pendant prèsde quatre-vingts ans, le Royaume-Uni,
puissance administrante,puis le Nigéria,puissance indépendante, n'ont pas cru bon de protester
45C.I.J.Recueil1953,p.59-60.contre ces cartes. Mieux, ils ont concouàuce consensusen produisant leurs cartes, donnant la
même indicationquantà la souverainetéterritordeBakassi,le Cameroun.
32. La France, puis le Cameroun, étaient endroit de faire confiancà la représentation
cartographique de la péninsule deBakassi par le Royaume-Uni, puis le Nigéria. Cette
représentationsituaitde manière répétée BakaasuiCamerounsous mandat britannique, puisdans
la Républiquedu Cameroun. Le Nigéria esm t al venu, aujourd'hui, decontestercettesouveraineté
camerounaise.
Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieurs dela Cour,je vousremerciedevotre attention.
Demain matin, ce sera le professeur Maurice Mendelsonqui présentera nos vues sur la
reconnaissancede la souveraineté camerounaieur Bakassisi vous levoulezbien.
LePRESIDENT :Je vousremercie Monsieurleprofesseur,cecimet un terme à la séancede
cematin. La Courreprendrasesaudiencesdemain matina 10heures. La séanceestlevée.
L'audience esltevéeà13heures.
Audience publique tenue le jeudi 21 février 2002, à 10 heures, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président