Audience publique tenue le mardi 20 juin 2000, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président

Non-Corrigé

Uncorrec ted

InternationalCourt Courinternationale
ofJustice deJustice

THEHAGUE LAHAYE

YEAR 2000

Publicsitting

held on Tuesday20June 2000,at 10am., atthePeace Palace,

PresidentGuillaumeesiding

in thecase concerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbetween
QatarandBahrain (Qatav.Bahrain)

VERBATIMRECORD

ANNEE 2000

Audiencepublique

tenue lemardi20juin 2000,0heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,

souslaprésidencdeM. Guillaume,président

en l'affairede la Délimitation met desquestionsterritorialesentrrtBahrein
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)

COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui

Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
ParraAranguren

Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBemiîrdez
Fortier

Regishar CouvreurPrésent: M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma

Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges

MM. Torres Bemirdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffierTheState of Qatarisrepresentedby:

H.E.Dr. AbdullahbinAbdulatif Al-MuslemaniS,ecretary-Generalofthe Cabinet,

asAgent and Counsel;

Mr.AdelSherbini, LegalAdviser,
Mr. SamiAbushaikha,Legal Expert,

as Counsel;

Mr.Eric David,Professorof InternationalLaw,Universlibrede Bruxelles,
Dr. Alibin FetaisAl-Meri,irectorof LegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professorof International Law at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr. Jean Salmon,Professoremeritusof InternationalLaw,Université librede Bruxelles,Member
ofthe Institutde droitinternational,

Mr. R.K. P.Shankardass, Senior Advocate, Supreme Courtof India, Former President of the
InternationalBarAssociation,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G., Q., amster atLaw, Memberof the lnstituteofInternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., Professor emeritus of Internatlaw,University of
London, Member emeritusofthe Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr. RodrnanR. Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appel de Pari, emberof the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
MsNanette E. Pilkington,Avocaa la Courd'appel deParis,rereCholmeley~EvershedsP,aris,

as Counseland Advocates;

MsCherylDunn,MemberoftheStateBarofCalifornia, FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Ms Ines SabineWilk, Lawyer beforethe German Courtof Appeal, Member of the Chamber of
LawyersofBerlin,Germany,

as Counsel;

Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(ünited StatesofArnerica),
Mr. RobertC. Rizzutti, ProjectManager, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland (Unitdtates of
America),
Ms StephanieK. Clark, SeniorCartographer,MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland (UnitStates
of America),

as Experts;

H.E .heikhHamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,MinisterforForeign Affairs,
H.E.Mr. Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahrnoud,Minister ofState forForeign Affairs,

as Obsewers.

TheState ofBahrain isrepresentedby:

H.E M.r.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,Ministerof Stateof theStateofBahrain,

as Agent;L'Etatde Qatarest represéntépear :

S.Exc.M.Abdullah binAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,secrétairegénérad lugouvernement,

commeagent etconseil;

M. AdelSherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,

comme conseils;

M.EricDavid, professeurde droitinternationalàl'universitélibredeBruxelles,
M.AlibinFetais Al-Meri, directeur des affairuridiquesdu conseil del'émir,

M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur dedroit international à l'université de Paris 1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M. Jean Salmon,professeur émérite de droit internationaluniversité lide Bruxelles,membre
de 1'Institut dedroitinternational,
M. R. K.P. Shankardass,avocat principal à la Cour suprême del'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'Association internationeuBarreau,

SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., avocat,membrede l'Institut de droiitnternational,
Sir FrancisVallat,G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,professeur éméritdee droitinternationàll'université
de Londres,membreémérite del'Institutdedroitinternational,
M. RodmanR. Bundy,avocat à laCourd'appelde Paris, membredubarreaudeNew York, cabinet
FrereCholmeley~Eversheds P,aris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington,avocatà la Cour d'appel de Paris, cabint rere Cholmeley/Eversheds,

Paris,

comme conseilset avocats;

Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de 1'Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere
CholmeleyEversheds,Paris,
Mme InèsSabineWilk,avocat prèsd'unecour d'appeld'Allemagne, membrede la chambredes

avocatsàBerlin,Allemagne,

comme conseils;

M. Scott B. Edmonds,directeur du service des levés cartographiques,sociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),

M. Robert C. Rizzutti, administrateur de projet,sociétéMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K.Clark, cartographehors classe, société MapQuest.com C,olumbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),

comme experts;

S.Exc.le cheikhHamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,ministre desaffairesétrangères,
S. Exc.M.Ahmed bin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministred'Etatauxaffairesétrangères,

comme observateurs.

L'Etatde Bahreïnestrepresentépar :

S.Exc.M.JawadSalimAl-Arayed, ministred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,

comme agent;Dr.FathiKemicha, Memberof theBarofParis,Kemicha& Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSirElihu Lauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E.,HonoraryProfessoroftheUniversityof Cambridge,
Memberof theInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr.Jan Paulsson, Freshfields,Paris,Member ofthe Bars ofParis andtheDistrictofColumbia,
Professor Michael Reisman,Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law of Yale Law
School,Memberof theBarof Connecticut,Associate of the Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr.Robert Volterra,Freshfields,London,MemberoftheBarof Upper Canada,
ProfessorProsperWeil, EmeritusProfessor attheUniversityof Paris II(Panthéon-Assas),Member
of the Académiedes sciencesmoraleset politiques (Institutde France),Member of theInstitut . ,

de droit international,

as Counsel andAdvocates;

SheikhKhalidbin AhmedAl-Khalifa,First Secretary,Ministryof ForeignAffairs of the Stateof
Bahrain,
CommanderChristopher Carleton,M.B.E., Head of the Law of the Sea Division of theUnited
KingdomHydrographicOffice,

Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields, Paris, Member of theBarsofParisand Beijing,
Mr.GrahamCoop,Freshfields,Paris, Barrister and Solicitoorf the HighCourtof New Zealand and
Solicitorofthe Supreme Court ofEnglandandWales,
Mr.Andrew Newcombe, FreshfieldsP , aris,Member of the Barof BritishColumbia,
Dr.BethOlsen, Advisor,MinistryofStateof the State of Bahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson, FormerReader at the University of Oxford, Emeritus Fellow,St. Hugh's
College,Oxford,

asAdvisors;

H.E.SheikhMohammed bin MubarakAlKhalifa,Minister forForeignAffairs,StateofBahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin MubarakAl Khalifa, Arnbassadorof the State of Bahrainto the
Netherlands,
H.E.Dr. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,Advisorto His Highness,the AmirofBahrain,
Mr.GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-SecretaryofForeignAffairs,Stateof Bahrain,
Her Excellency Sheikha Haya Al Khalifa, Ambassador of the State of Bahrain to the French

Republic,
Mr.YousefMahmood,Directorofthe Officeof theForeignMinister,StateofBahrain,

as Observers;

Mr. JonAddison, Ministryof StateoftheState ofBahrain,
Ms Maisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry ofState ofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi, Ministry of Statoef the Stateof Bahrain,

Mr.HafedhAl-Qassab,Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Ms AneesaHanna,Embassyof Bahrain inLondon,
Ms JeanetteHarding,Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
MsIvaKratchanova,MinistryofStateofthe StateofBahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Mr.KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.Yasser Shaheen, Second SecretaryM , inistryof ForeignAffairsof theStateof Bahrain,

asAdministrativeStafM.Fathi Kemicha,membredubarreaude Paris, cabinet Kemicha & Associés,Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E., professeur honoraiàl'universitéde Cambridge, membre de
l'Institutdedroit international,
M.Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris,membre des barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur dedroit internationalàl'université deYale,titulaire de la chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associé del'Institut de droit

international,
M. Robert Volterra, cabinetFreshfields, Londres,membrdubarreau du HautCanada,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'université deParisII (Panthéon-Assas), membre de
l'Académiedes sciencesmoraleset politiques(Institutde France),membrede l'Institutde droit
international,

commeconseilset avocats;

Le cheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa,premier secrétaire, ministèredes affaires étrangèresde
1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Le capitainede frégate Christopher Carleto, .B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droit maritime du
bureau hydrographiquedu Royaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfields,Paris,membredesbarreauxde Pariset de Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseiller de laCoursuprêmed'Angleterre etdu Paysde Galles,

M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinetFreshfields,Paris,membredubarreau de laColombiebritannique,
MmeBeth Olsen, conseiller,ministèred7Etatde lYEtatde Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancien maître de conférence à l'université d'Oxford, membre éméritedu
CollègeSaintHugh,Oxford,

commeconseillers;

S.Exc. le cheikhMohammed binMubarakAl Khalifa, ministredes affairesétrangères de Bahreïn,
S.Exc. le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etat de Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc. M. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,conseiller de SonAltessel'émirdeBahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,sous-secrétaired7Etatauxaffairesétrangèresde lYEtade Bahreüi,
S.Exc. la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 17Etatde Bahreïn auprèsde la République

française,
M.YousefMahrnood,directeurdubureauduministredes affaires étrangèred se Bahreïn,

commeobservateurs;

M.Jon Addison, ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,

M.NabeelAl-Rumaihi,ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. Hafedh Al-Qassab,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeAneesaHanna,ambassadede Bahreïn, Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding,ministèred7Etatde 17Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeVanessaHarris, cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministèred'Etatde 17EtatdeBahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg,cabinetFreshfields,
M. KevinMottram,cabinetFreshfields,

M.Yasser Shaheen,second secrétaire,ministère deasffairesétrangères d1'Etatde Bahreïn,

commepersonneladministratg Le PRESIDENT : Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest ouverte. Nous entamons aujourd'hui

le deuxièmetour de plaidoiriesdans l'affaire opposantBahreïn à Qatar et je donne la parole

immédiatementauprofesseurJeanSalmonquis'exprimeraau nom de lYEtatde Qatar.

M. SALMON :Monsieurleprésident, Madame,Messieursde la Cour.

1.A ce stade des débats,les positions opposéesdes Parties sont bien profilées.Avantde se

prononcer sur une délimitationmaritime, la Cour aura à déterminerl'appartenancede territoires

terrestresZubarah,dont elleauracomprisquecet objeta été soulevépou enterde contrebalancer

ce qui est la plus profonde pommede discordeentre les deux Parties:Hawar ;Hawar qui soulève

chezles deux Partiesautantdesentimentsprofondsquejadis l'Alsace Lorraine.

Concemant Hawar, laCoursait, maintenant,que Qatar estime qu'il possédait, avanlta saisie

de l'îleprincipale par Bahreïnen 1937,un titre originaire, reconnuintemationalement.Ce titren'a

pas été déplacpéar l'occupationillégaledontce temtoireàfait l'objet.

C'est,pour l'essentiel,ce que les exposésdes conseilsde Qatar montrerontune nouvellefois,

en s'attachantà répondreaux arguments de nos adversaires et à mettre en lumière les points

essentielsdu débat qui divise encorles Parties.

Dans la premièrepartie des exposésqui vont suivre les questions seront abordéesdans

l'ordresuivant:

Aprèsune introductiongénérale dema part, la première partiedes exposéssera consacrée

aux questions territoriales.M. Shankardass réfuterales soi-disant ((effectivités))bahreïnites.

M. Bundy traitera ensuite de l'intégrité temtorialde Qatar, de l'étendue temtorialelimitéede

Bahreïn, de la pertinence des cartes.Il sera suivià nouveau de M. Shankardass sur l'étendue

temtonale de Qatar postérieurement à 1916et sur l'histoire desconcessionspétrolière,uis il sera

suivide sirIan qui exposeralesaspectspositifsdes moyens invoquésparQatarconcernant Hawar.
.
Après un exposé surZubarah par M. le professeur David, sir Ian reprendra la parole sur les

décisionsde 1936-1939cettefois. .

Dans une seconde partie,beaucoup plus brève,le professeur Quéneudec montreraa la Cour

que la frontière maritimeuniqueque Qatar défendreprésente, dansles circonstances del'espèce,une délimitation permettant d'aboutàrune solution équitable.Les exposésdeQatar se termineront

par quelques réflexionde l'agentdu Qatar.

Yen viens maintenant à quelques questions générales. Et tout d'abord, celle de

l'utipossidetisjuris.

I. UTZPOSSZDETIS JURIS

2. Dans sa plaidoirie du 13 juin, le Dr. Fathi Kemicha a exprimé surle principe de

l'utipossidetis des considérationsgénéralesque l'on ne peut partager, ni en fait ni en droit.

Toutefois,commeelles sont largementhors sujet nous ne prendrons pas le temps de la Cour à les

réfuter.Nous nous bornerons aux aspects essentiels susceptibles de s'appliquer concrètemenatux

litigesdont la Courest saisie.

3. Il ne fait guèrede doute que la règlede l'utipossidetisjuris est aujourd'huiune règlede

droit intemational de portéegénéralee ,n ce sens qu'elle estliéeau phénomène de l'accession à

l'indépendanceoù qu'il se manifeste, et en vertu de laquelle les Etats nésde la décolonisation

succèdentaux limitesqui étaientles leurs quand ils étaient sous l'administratdenl'Etatcolonial

(que ces limites aient alors étédes frontièresétabliesintemationalement par des traités oude

simpleslimitesadministrativesdécidéeu snilatéralementpar lamétropole).

Comme l'adit la Cour dans l'affaire du Diflérendfrontalier (BurkinaFaso/Républiquedu

Mali), arrêtdu 22décembre1986 :

«En tant que principe érigeant en frontières internationales d'anciennes
délimitationsadministratives établiespendant l'époquecoloniale, l'utipossidetis est
donc un principe d'ordre général nécessaireme lntà la décolonisationou qu'elle se
produise.))(P.566, par.23.)

4. L'uti possidetis -principe de succession d'Etats- implique donc une accession à

l'indépendance,c'est-à-direl'émergenced'u nouveau sujet de droit,à l'issuede la décolonisation,

d'autrepart.

Aucune de ces deux conditions n'estprésentedans le cas d'espèce,ni en général dans les

Emiratsdu Golfe.

L'indépendance des émirsne fûtjamais contestée,seul l'exercice de certaines compétences,

essentiellement en matièrede relations extérieures,fut conventionnellement transférpar eux au

Royaume-Uni,sansque la substance de leursdroits, qu'ils soienttemtoriaux ou autres, en ait étéaffectée.Les traités de1971qui mirent fin aux relations spécialesde Bahreïn etde Qatar avec le

Royaume-Uni -nous examineronsleurtexte dansun instant-n'aboutirent enrien àla création

de sujets de droit nouveauxou de personnalitésjuridiques nouvellequi auraientpu êtreappeléesà

succéder aux droits établispar une puissance adrninistrante sur une colonie. Les personnes

juridiques existantesrécupérèrenstimplementl'intégralitde leurscompétences.

5. Jamais Bahreïn ni Qatar n'ontété considéré psr le Royaume-Unicomme des «colonies»

oudes ccprotectorats))e type colonial.C'étaient d((Etatsprotégés))',Iprotectstates",ce qui est

tout autre chose. La résolution660) de 1946de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies intitulée

((Transmissiondes renseignementsvisés à l'article73 e) de la Charte)),qui répertoritemtoires

non autonomes, mentionne, si j'ai bien compté, quarante-cinqtemtoires désignéspar le

Royaume-Uni, parmi lesquels ne figurent aucunEmirat du Golfe. Oman fut ajouté à la liste des

temtoires non autonomes en 1965 (rés. 2073 (XX)) mais pour des raisons particulières :

notammentlaprésencemilitaire britannique,mais ce ne futpas lecas pour lesautresEmirats.

La distinction entre«(protectorat»et «Etat protégé))n droit constitutionnelbritannique est

exposéecommesuit par A.B. Keith, constitutionnalistebritannique(dossierd'audience, doc.no 1):

«La caractéristiqueessentielle du protectorat estque la Couronne assume et
exerce une autoritésouveraine complète,sans toutefois annexer le temtoire. Dans le
cas d'Etatsprotégésl'autorité souveraineappartientau souveraine l'Etat,et enaucune
manièreàla Couronnebritannique,et le rôle de cette dernièredécouled'arrangements
concluspar traitésavec les Etats [concernésqui ne confêrent[à la Couronne]aucune
souveraineté sureux, mais lui attribuent des pouvoirset des obligations en ce qui
concerne soit les affaires intérieures et extérieures,soit les secondes presque

exclusivement.)) (Keith, Arthur, Bemedale, TheGovernmentsof theBritishEmpire,
MacMillan, London, 1935,p. 508.) [Notre traduction.]

6. Que les Emirats, y compris Bahreïn et Qatar, n'ontjamais étéconsidérés comme des

colonies ou des «protectorats» de type colonial ainsi défini,mais ont toujours conservé leur

indépendancerésulteaussibien dediversespositions officiellesdu Gouvernementbritannique.

Ainsi, lord Curzon,Vice-Roide l'Inde s'exprimacommesuit à propos de la côtede la Trêve
+

(Trucialcoast) (dossierd'audience,doc.no20):

((Chefs,sur la base de relationsqui furent ainsi crééest qui par votrepropre
consentement instituèrent le Gouvernement britannique en garant d'une paix
interîribale, se sont développés delsienspolitiquesentrele Gouvernementde l'Indeet
vous-même,par lesquels le Gouvernement britannique devint votre suzerain et
pro.tecteuret vous n'avez pas de relationsavec d'autrespuissances...» Nous n'avonspas saisi ou pris vos territoires. Nous n'avons pasdétruitvotre
indépendancemaisl'avonspréservée.. . La paix de ces eauxdoit êtremaintenue;votre
indépendancecontinuera à êtreassurée etl'influence du Gouvernement britannique
doit rester supérieure..

Le Gouvernement britannique n'a aucun souhait d'interveniret n'est jamais
intervenu dans vos affaires intérieures.))D. M., vol. 2, p. 203, citépar l'arbitrage
relatifà la frontièreDoubaïlcharjah, 19 octobre 1981, ILR,vol. 91 p. 561.) [Notre

traduction.]

Le tribunalarbitral dansl'affairede laFrontièreDoubaï/Charjah, d'oùj'ai tirécettecitation

de lordCurzonde 1902,entiraitla conclusionsuivante

«Bien sûr, le Gouvernementbritanniquepeut avoir eu l'idée, à un moment ou à
un autre,de renforcerlesliensjuridiquesentre les émiratset la Grande-Bretagne,mais
l'allocutionde lord Curzon de 1902à laquelle référence a été faiteau chapitre1de

cette sentence démontreque, en s'adressantaux souverainsde la région, il s'engagea
expressément àcontinuer à maintenirleurindépendance effective.

Il est dès lors clair qu'aucuntraitén'autorisait les autoritésbritanniques à
délimiterunilatéralementles frontièresentre les émirats etqu'aucune administration
britanniquen'a jamaisaffmé qu'elleen avait le droit. Le tribunal a, par conséquent,
abouti à la conclusionque le consentement dessouverains intéressés étan itécessaire
avant qu'aucune délimitationde la sortene puisseêtreentreprise.)) (Ibid.,p. 567.)

MêmeRende1dans son projet du 5 janvier 1933-que nos adversaires ont cru bon de citer-

parlant en générad les principautésde la côte de la Trêve('lprincipalitiesof the Trucial coastty

insistaitsur le fait que ces territoiresne faisaient pas partiede l'Empire britanniqueou de l'Indeet

quec'étaient «desEtats indépendants»(répliquede Qatar,annexe11.58,vol. II, p. 342).

La Cour notera la qualification dlEtats indépendants, cequi n'est pas la caractéristique

habituelled'unecolonie.

7. L'échange de notes constituanu tn accord entrele Gouvernement du Royaume-Uniet le

Gouvernement de l'Etat de Qatar relatifà l'abrogation du régime spécial dteraité entre le

Royaume-Uniet le Qatardu3 septembre 1971est aussitout àfait éclairant surcepoint.

((Altesse,

J'ai l'honneur deme référeraux entretiens que j'ai eus avec vous au sujet de

l'abrogationdu régimespécialde traitéentre le Royaume-Unide Grande-Bretagneet
d'IrlandeduNord et ltEtatdu Qatar et au désirqu'amanifestévotreGouvernementde
voir ltEtat du Qatar reprendre les pleines responsabilités internationalesen tant
qutEtatsouverain et indépendant.Cesentretiens ont aboutiaux conclusionsci-après :

1. Le régime spécial de traitéet tous autres accords, engagements, dispositionset
arrangements conclus entre le Royaume-Uniet 1'Etatdu Qatar dans le cadre du
régimespécialdetraitéentre lesdeux Etats cesseront d'avoir effecejour... 2. Le traité général du 3 novemb1 e16et les traités etengagementsque 1'Etatdu
Qatar a acceptés autitre dudit traité général tre le Royaume-Uniet 1'Etatdu
Qatar, qui est incompatible avec le plein exercice des responsabilités
internationales d'un Etat souverant indépendantp, rendrafin cejour.» (RTNU,
1972,no11811,p. 101.)

Le texteen langue anglaise avec Bahreïn datédu 15août 1971est identiquesousréservedesdates

des traitésspéciaux,bien entendu,qui étaient différentesIl y a une différencedans la traduction

française. Lemembredephrase "resume full internationalresponsibil"testtraduit, pourBahreïn,

par ((assumerune entièreresponsabilité surle planinternational" et,dans le texte relatif à Qatar,

par les mots ((reprendreles pleines responsabilitésinternationales)). Nous pensons que cette

secondetraductionest plusfidèleautexteanglais (resume).

Comme on le voit,ces textesne contestentpas un seul instantque Qataret Bahreïn étaient,

avant la signature de ces accords des Etats souverains et indépendants;ils prennent acte

simplementque leplein exercicede leursresponsabilités'Etatsouverainleurétaitrendu.

8.Les traités,dontla terminaison était constatée',avaientd'ailleurs jamaiseu pour effetde

mettre fin à l'indépendance des émirats en question. Ainsi, le traité entrele Gouvernement

britanniqueet le cheikh de Qatar, en datedu 3 novembre 1916,comportait diversengagementdu

cheikhnotammentde respecter les obligationspropres àlacôte dela Trêve.

Nulle part il n'étt uestion d'une administrationdirecteu indirectedu territoirede l'émirat

par SaMajesté,quin'aenvoyéde représentant àQatar quebien tard auxyeuxdes Qatariens. Sous

réserve de quelques engagements particuliers,l'administration intérieuredu territoire était

entièrements'ouveraine,seul l'exercice des relatiextérieuressevoyait limité par i'intermédiaire

obligédu Royaume-Uni(dossierd'audience,doc.no3) :

«Moi, cheikh Abdullah,je m'engageen outre a ne pas avoirde relationset àne
pas correspondre avec une autre puissance, ni à recevoir son agent, sans le
consentementdu Gouvernement britannique;sans un tel consentement,je ne céderai
pas non plus de terres à aucune autre puissanceni à ses sujets, que ce soit en les
affirmant,enlesvendant, enlestransférant,en les donnant oude toute autremanière.))
(Art.IV, mémoiredeQatar,annexe111.63v ,ol. 6,p. 90.) [Traduction duGreffe.]

Il est clairquece textene signifiepas quele Gouvernementbritanniquedevienttitulairedes

droits en question: ils demeurentceux de l'émir,mais ce dernier a besoin de l'autorisationdu

Gouvernementbritanniquepour les exerceà l'extérieur. En contrepartie,le Gouvernementbritannique s'engageait à protégerle cheikh, ses sujetset

son territoirecontre toute agressionpar la mer (aX). età prêterses bons offices en cas d'attaque

terrestre du territoirede Qatar(art.). J'invite respectueusementles membres de la Cour a relire

le texte complet de ce traité. Pour ceux qui ont vécu ce qu'étaiutne administration coloniale,

assimilercetétatde fait et de droàtune situationcolonialeest un non-sens.

Il enva demêmedutraitédu22 décembre 1880signé par le souverainde Bahreïn (mémoire

de Qatar, vol. 6, annexe 111.3, . 49 de la traduction du Greffe)et de celui du 13mars 1892entre

le cheikh de Bahreïn et le Gouvernementbritannique (mémoirede Qatar, vol. 6, annexe 111.41,

p. 55 de la traduction du Greffe)

9. L'histoiredes deux émirats montre d'ailleursque les relations extérieuresavec les pays

voisins échappaientquant au fond, dans une large mesure, au Gouvernement britannique.Ainsi,

dès 1935, l'Arabie saoudite déclarait quelui étaient inopposablesles traitésqui pourraientavoir

pour effet de l'empêcher d'entretenuirne correspondanceavec le Qatar (Husain Al Baharna, The

Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States, Manchester University Press, 1968, p. 75). Le

Royaume-Uniaprès avoirparticipéau débutdes négociations, ne fut tenu au courantqu'aprèscoup

de l'accordde Riyadh entre le Gouvernementde Bahreïn et le Royaume d'Arabie saoudite du

22 février1958sur la délimitationmaritime.Le Royaume-Unidonna son accord postérieurement

le 2 juin 1958(voir avis de sirLionelHeald queje cite un peu plus loin). C'est avantles accords

d'août-septembre1971 que furentconclu :par Qatar,sans en référer auRoyaume-Uni,son accord

avec l'Arabiesaoudite sur la délimitation de leurfrontièreterrestre et dans le Golfede Salwahdu

4 décembre1965,ou son accordavec Abou Dhabidu 20 mars 1969 (mémoirede Qatar, vol. 12,

annexe IV.259)et avec l'Irandu 20 septembre 1969 (mémoirede Qatar, vol. 12, annexe IV.260,

RTNLI,vol. 787, p. 165) et, par Bahreïnde son accord avec l'Irandu 17juin 1971 (mémoirede

Qatar,vol. 12,annexe IV.264). Si c'estcela que nos adversairesappellentun régime colonialn, ous

n'avons à l'évidencepas lamême conceptionde cette expressionjuridique.

10.La prétentionsoudaine de Bahreïn,qu'ilétait sousun régime colonialou de protectorat

impliquant qu'iln'a accédé à l'indépendance qu'en1971, est d'autant plussurprenanteque cecine

cadre aucunementavec les analysesqui ont pu êtrefaite de sonstatut par le Dr. Al-Baharnadansl'ouvrageque nous avons déjà eu l'occasiod ne citer et qui fait autoritéen lamatière(TheLegal

StatusoftheArabian GulfState). Cetauteurnote cequisuit(dossier d'audience doc.no4)

«en premier lieu, les traitéspassésavec les émirats, qui sont rédigé ds manière
rudimentaire, ne déclarentpas expressémentou formellement l'établissemendt'un
protectorat britannique sur aucun des émirats.. . En deuxième lieu, quoiquele
Royaume-Uni ait qualifié les émiratsd'«Etats protégés britanniques)) ,.. le
Gouvemementbritanniquea, dansdes déclarations off~ciellesfaites de tempsà autre,
décrit lesémiratscomme des ((Etatsindépendantssous protection britannique))ou
comme des ((Etats indépendants dans desrelations spéciales de traité)) ave lc

gouvemementde SaMajesté.)) (P. 78; les italiquessont de nous.)

EtleDr.Al-Baharnade conclure :

«On observerades déclarations qui précèdenqtue les émiratssontsoit qualifiés
dfc(Etatsindépendants))sousprotection britannique, soitd'«&ats dans des relations
spécialesde traitéavecle gouvernement deSa Majesté)). Etd ,ans lesdeuxcas, on se
réfèrespécifiquement à euxcomme(&tats»oucomme(&tatsindépendants))(.Ibid.)

11. Lapositionjuridiquequi a été développéiecimême, que Bahreïn éta sotumisà un statut

colonial,est d'autantplus inattendueque le Gouvemementde Bahreïn lui-même fit remettreau

ForeignOfficeun avisjuridique de sir Lionel Healddu 4 juillet 1963qui comprenait notamment

lespassagessuivants :

((Lorsquela Perse émiten 1927,des prétentions à la souverainetésur Bahreïn,
le secrétairebritanniqueaux affairesétrangères écrivit ce qsuuiitauGouvernementde
Bahreïn :«Les accords(entre La Grande-Bretagneet Bahreïn depuis 1820)ont tous
étéconclue sn considéranqt uele cheikhde Bahreïnestunsouverainindépendant) ...

Dans ces conditions,le simple faitque le gouvernementde Sa Majesté assure,
envertude décretsenconseil,la responsabilité desrelationsextérieuresdeBahreïnne
peut pas êtreinvoqué comme justificationd'une quelconque privation, parle
gouvemementde SaMajesté,desdroitssouverainsdu cheikh,y comprisses droitssur
le fondmarin. ..

On peut encoretrouverd'autres déclarationq sui montrentque le Royaume-Uni
a toujours traitéahreïncommeun Etat souverain indépendanteta toujourspris soin
d'exercertoutes sesactivitésdans les limitesdes dispositionsdes diverstraités quiont

été conclus. La détermination deslimitesde Bahreïn,telle qu'elle aété signifiée,doit
dèslors, à notre avis,être justifiableau regarddes termes deces traités.Dans le cas
contraire,elle n'a aucuneffetjuridique sur lesouveraindeBahreïn.

Les deuxtraitésvisésci-dessus [ceuxde 1880et 18921restreignent, entermes
négatifs,les relationsextérieures deBahreïn,mais ils ne prétendentpas transférerla
souverainetéde Bahreïn ni accorderau Royaume-Uniun droitpositif quelconque de
déterminerde quelquemanière que ce soitles frontières deBahreïn.. .» (Mémoirede
Qatar,annexe IV.248,vol. 11,pages 286-288de la traduction du Greffe;les italiques

sontdenous.) 12. La Cour aura compris que la Partie adverse confond funestement limitation de

souverainetéet absence de souverainetéL . a phrase suivantede conclusion deM. Kemicha sur le

caractèrecolonial esttrèsclairece propos :

((57. Quel que soit le qualificatif qu'on donne à la nature de ces «liens
spéciaux)),nul ne peutprétendrequeBahreïnet Qatardisposaientalorsde la plénitude

et de l'exclusivitédes compétences interneset externes qui sont les attributs de la
souveraineté.

58. Nier le fait colonial, etc.» (CR 2000113,p. 58 par. 57 et 58; les italiques
sont dansl'original.)

J'aile regretde fairepartaux Allemands,aux Britanniques,aux Espagnols,aux Français,aux

Néerlandais,et pourquoi pas aux Belges qui sont dans cette salle, que leurs pays respectifs sont,

selonles critèresdeM. Kemicha,sousprotectoratdesCommunautés européenneest donc dansune

situationcoloniale.

Trêvede plaisanterie.Au vu de ce quiprécède la Cour voudrabien sans douteconstaterque

Bahreïn et Qatar n'ont jamaisété descolonies,qu'il s'esttoujours agid'Etatsindépendants,aussi

bienavant qu'au moment de signerles accords de 197 1,qu'il n'ya pas eu depersonnalitéjuridique

nouvelle succédant aux droitset obligations d'une puissanceministrantequelconque, qu'iln'yeût

pas de successiond'Etatset, par conséquent,pas plus de ((legscolonial))que de(table rase)). J'en

viensàla secondepartie demonexposérelatifauxhésitations entredécisionet sentencearbitrale.

II.DE LADÉCISION A LA SENTENCEARBITRALE

13.L'appelàla notion de statut colonialetà la règle del'utipossidetis n'estpas innocent. Il

s'agitde sauver dunaufragela décisionde 1939. D'unepart, on nous dit qu'il s'agitd'unmodèlede

sentencearbitrale et on invoquele principe de la«resjudicata)). Mais, pour le cas où la Courne

serait pas bien convaincue,on retombe sur l'idée quece peut aussi êtreune décision politiqueou

administrative(sir Elihu Lauterpacht, CR 2000111, par. 19, subdivision 14,p. 15de la traduction

française).

Comme le dit encore M. Kemicha :«Que cette décision ait lecaractèred'une sentence

arbitraleou d'unedécisionpolitique ou même administrativeimporte peu !» (CR 2000113,p. 64,

par. 106.) Maisoui, commeLa Fontainele faisait dire à la chauve-souris selon les circonstance:«Je suisoiseau,voyezmes ailes ..je suissouris,vivent lesrats !» Sionne peut sauverla décision

commesentencearbitrale,essayons toujourslelegs colonial.

14. A vrai dire,commeon va le voir, c'est exact.Quecette sentenceait le caractèred'une #

sentencearbitrale ou d'unedécision politiqueou sadrninistrative,importepeu. Maispas pourles

raisonsinvoquéesparM.Kemicha.

Monconfrère sir Ian Sinclaira déjàexposé à la Courpourquoila décisionde 1939ne peut,

en aucun cas, êtreassimilée à une sentence arbitrale. Il donnera demain quelques indications

complémentaires sur cepoint.

Maisqu'il s'agissd'unesentencearbitraleou uned'unedécisionpolitiqueouadministrative,

en tout étatde cause, le Gouvernementbritannique a admis en 1965 quesa décision concernant

Hawar ainsi que celle concernant la ligne de 1947 pouvaient êtresoumises par les deux

gouvernements à un tribunal d'arbitrage neutre.Faut-il lesouligner, ceci s'estpasséalors que les

deux Emirats étaient encoresous le régime des traités créant dreeslations spécialesavec le

gouvernementde SaMajesté ?

Le Gouvernement de Qatar a déjàeu l'occasion d'invoquer cettq euestion devant la Cour

dans son mémoire concernantles questionsde compétenceet de recevabilité(par. 3.02 et 3.03).

Mais comme ceci est déjàun peu lointain, il n'est pasinutile de rappeler ici comment le

Royaume-Unien estarrivé àadopter cette position.

15.Dans son mémorandumsoumisau Gouvernementbritannique en 196p 1ourune revision

de la ligne de 1947, le Gouvernement deBahreïninvoqua la possibilité d'ua nccord entre lui et

celui de Qatar concernant la délimitation maritimsous l'égide dugouvernementde Sa Majesté.

«Lesouverainespèrequele gouvernementde SaMajestésera ainsienmesurede l'aideràparvenir

à un règlementjuste et satisfaisant sans avoirrecours à l'arbitrage international.)) (Mémoire de

Qatar, fond, vol. 12, annexe IV.254,p. 5 de la traductiondu Greffe). On se souviendraque ce

mémorandumne fut cependant transmis au Gouvernementde Qatar qu'à la fin août 1964,

c'est-à-diretrois ansplustard.

Entre-temps les hauts fonctionnaires britanniques réfléchissaient à la question. Le

24janvier 1962,Given,duForeign Office, écrivictequi suità Man, à larésidencepolitiquedansle

golfePersique : «maisje crois personnellement quecela pourrait, en finde compte,débouchersur la
mise en place d'unorgane quelconqued'arbitrage. Quoi qu'ie ln soit, il pourrait être
plus facile pour nous de nous écarterde la ligne de 1947 si les Qataris comme les
Bahreïnites nous demandaient de le faire.)) (Mémoire de Qatar,fond, vol. 11,
annexe IV.236,p. 237de latraductionduGreffe).

Dans un mémorandumdu 2 mars 1962, intitulé«la décision de1947 :la frontièreentre Qataret

Bahreïn sur le fondmarin)),Walmsley,du ForeignOffice,remarquait :

«Si nous voulons revenirsur la décisionde 1947(que nous avons maintes fois
réaffirmée) sans perdre la face,on voit difficilementcommentnous pounions éviter
de recouriràun arbitrage ou à un tribunalneutres.)) (Mémoirede Qatar, fond, vol. 11,

annexeIV.239,p. 249de la traductiondugreffe.)

11notait cependant :

«Une autrecomplication concernele faitque le souveraindeQatarprofiterait de
l'occasion pour contester la propriétédes îles (Hawwar) et des hauts-fonds en
question.)) (Ibid.)

Francis Vallat, alors legal adviser du Foreign Office exprima des doutes sur le droit du

gouvernement deSa Majesté de disposer dedroits territoriauxdes Emirats sans leur consentement

(Ephemeral,26 avril 1962,mémoire de Qatar,fond,vol. 11,annexeIV. 240, p. 252 de la traduction

du greffe) ; (texte anglais: Ephemeral dated26 April 1962, Memorial of Qatar, Merits, vol. 11,

Annex IV.240, p. 381). Ian Sinclair,alors assistant legal adviser, exprima les mêmesdoutes le

9 mai 1962(ibid.,p. 252-253)) ; (texte anglais:Ephemeral dated 9May 1962,Memorial of Qatar,

Merits, vol. 11,AnnexIV.240,p. 384-385).

Des discussionsapprofondieseurentlieu alorsau Foreign Officeconcernantles avantageset

les inconvénientsde rouvrirdes décisionscommecellesde la ligne de 1947et desîles Hawar(voir

mémoirede Qatar, fond, vol. 11, annexes IV.241 à 243, p. 255 à 266) ; (texte anglais : see

Memorial of Qatar, Merits, vol. Il, Annex IV.241to 243, p. 387 to 403). Elles montrent que les

autorités britanniquesétaient parfaitement conscientes que le règlementarbitral étaitde nature à

remettre en question diverses décisions, auxquelleson donnait parfois le nom ambigu de

"award" qui peut signifier aussi bien «sentence»que «décision» - et qui avaient étéprises

concernantles Emirats. D.C.I.Gracie, del'agencepolitique Doha,dansune lettre du 2juillet 1962

à Brown, de la résidencepolitique dans le golfePersique, rejetait toute idée dene soumettre à

l'arbitrageque laligne de 1947en déclarant :

«Le souverainet M. Kamelne consentiront sans doute pas à ce que la question
du fondmarin soit rouverte si le mandat n'inclut pasHawar etDibal, pour lesquelsil sembleau non-initiéqueje suis qu'ilsdisposent d'argumentssolides.» (Mémoirede
Qatar,fond,vol. 11,annexeIV.246,p. 278de latraductiondu Greffe.)

16. La prétentionde certains fonctionnairesdu Foreign Office que le gouvernementde

SaMajestépouvait déciderdes frontièresdes Emirats sur la base de ses pouvoirs relatifs aux

relations extérieurefit réduiteen pièces parl'avisprécitde sir Lionel Heald du 4juillet 1963

relatifàBahreïnmais dont leraisonnement s'appliquaiàt Qatar paridentitédemotifs (mémoirede

Qatar, fond,vol. 11,annexeIV.248,p. 284de la traductionduGreffe).

Par une lettre du 27 juillet 1964 adresséeau Foreign Office, le souverain de Bahreïn

relevait

((nousavons étéheureux d'apprendredu comte de Dundeeque le gouvernement de
SaMajestéserait disposéàprendredesmesures pour quelesquestionsen litige soient

examinées ettranchéesparune autorité neutre, sous réserque le souverainde Qatar
et nous-mêmes soyonsprêts à nous engager d'avanceà accepter toute décision ainsi
prise. Pour notre part, nous avonsdéjàfait savoir que nousaccepterionsune telle
décision, ceque nous confirmons présentement.»(Mémoirede Qatar, fond,vol. 12,
annexe IV.252,p. 3 delatraductionduGreffe.)

En tout étatde cause, lorsquele mémorandumde 1961 fut enfin transmis à Qatar à la

fin août 1964(mémoiredeQatar,fond,vol. 12, annexe IV.254,p. 5 de la traductiondu Greffe),il

donna lieu àune réponsede Qatarà l'agentpolitique du Gouvernement britannique à Doha sous

forme de noteverbale du 21 avril 1965 à laquelle étaitjoint un mémorandumdétailléqui se

terminait par la phrase suiva:te

«Le Gouvernement de Qatar se félicitede la possibilité d'obtenirp ,ar un

arbitrage international,le règlementdes différenentreles deux Etatset il est prêt,
dans un esprit de bon voisinageet conformémentà la Charte des Nations Unies, à
conclureavecle Gouvernementde Bahreïnun compromisd'arbitrageen vue d'obtenir
une décisiondéfinitivesurles questions mentionnéesans leprésentmémorandum, y
compris enparticulier la questionde Hawar.1) (Mémoirede Qatar, fond, vol. 12,
annexe IV.255,p. 29 de latraductiondu Greffe;lesitaliquessontde nous.)

La réponsede l'agence politiqueà Doha du 27 octobre est lumineuse (dossierd'audience,

doc.no6) :

«L'agentpolitiquede Sa Majesté britanniqueàDobaprésente ses compliments
au directeurgénéraelt conseillerjuridique du Gouvernementde Qatar et a l'honneur
d'accuserréception dela note verbaleet des piècesjointes, endate du 21 avril 1965,
qui ont ététransmises au résident politiquà Bahreïn pour être communiquéeasu
Gouvernementde Bahreïn.

Il est maintenant entendu quele Gouvernement de Bahreïn, comme le
Gouvernementde Qatar, souhaitent que laquestionsoitsoumise àl'arbitrage,et que le
gouvernementde Sa Majestéa donnéson accordà cetteprocédure d'arbitragp eour régler ledzférend. Le gouvernementde Sa Majestém'achargéde vous informer qu'il
devraêtreconsultéquant auxpersonnes choisies commearbitres neutres et qu'il devra
être tenu informé du déroulementdes négociations.)) (Mémoird ee Qatar concernant
les questions de compétenceet de recevabilité, vol.II, annexe 1.58, traduction du
Greffe, p. 146;les italiquessont de nous.)

Le 8 novembre 1965, le Dr. HassanKamel, directeur généralet conseiller juridique du

Gouvernement de Qatar, informa M. Boyle, agent politique de Sa Majesté à Doha, de la

désignation par Qatar du professeur Charles Rousseau ((comme son arbitre dans le différend»

(mémoire de Qatar concernanltes questionsde compétenceet de recevabilité,vol. II, annexe1.59,

p. 369).

La réponse de Boyle,du 12décembre 1965(dossier d'audience, doc. no 6) faisait étatque:

«Je suis heureux de vous informer que le gouvernement de Sa Majestéa approuvéce choix.))

(Mémoire de Qatar concernant les questionsde compétenceet de recevabilité,vol. II, annexe1.60,

traductiondu Greffe, p. 148.)

17.Cet échange de correspondance démontreplusieurs pointsessentiels

Primo, que le gouvernement de Sa Majestébritannique ne considéraitpas les décisions

de 1939et de 1947commedessentencesarbitrales. Sinon il n'auraitpas acceptéque des sentences

arbitrales rendues par lui soient soumises à nouveau à l'arbitrage sans toutefois relever cette

circonstance particulière qu'il s'agissait, en quelque sorte d'un «appel». S'il ne s'agit pas de

sentences arbitrales, il ne peut donc être question deres judicata et les longs développements

théoriquesquenous avonsentendus àce propossont absolument sanspertinence.

Deuxio,que le gouvernementde Sa Majestébritannique acceptaitque les deux décisionsen

question, qu'elles soient politiquesou administratives,fassent l'objetd'un arbitrage entre les deux

Etats du Qatar et deBahreïn. C'était donc admettreque les tentativespolitiques du gouvernement

de SaMajestéen vuede réglercesdeux questionsne s'imposaient pasen droit aux deux souverains

en présence. La thèsejuridique de l'incompétence du Gouvernement britannique à réglerles

conflitsfiontaliersde deuxEtatssouverainsdont il assurait seulementles relationsinternationales a

apparemment prévaluau sein du Foreign Office. La situation étaitdonc une matièreouverte, un

différend qui avaià êtreréglé directement entre ledseuxEtats souverainsqui y étaientparties soit

par desnégociationssoit par un arbitrage auquel leRoyaume-Uni n'avaitpas l'intentionde prendre

partà aucuntitre. Tertio, que si même,un problème de succession d'Etats devait être considérc éomme

s'appliquant enl'espèce-et nous pensons avoir montréqu'il n'en estrien - on se trouverait ici

devantune successionnon à une frontièreétabliemais à un dzflérendconcernant lafrontière. Les 8

exposésthéoriques quiontété faits sur lanotion d'utipossidetissont donc doublementhorssujet.

18.Sansdoute,ultérieurement,le Gouvernementde Bahreïna-t-il essayéde limiter l'objetde

l'arbitrage,pour en exclurela question desîles Hawar. Mais, commechacun lesait, cet élément fut

finalementinclus dans l'échangede lettres de décembre 1987 et dans la formuledite bahreïnite qui

fità son tour l'objetde l'accordde Dohadu25 décembre 1990.

La Cour,dans sonarrêtdu 15février1995,déclara :

«il est clair que desrevendicationsde souverainetésur les îles Hawaret sur Zubarah
peuventêtreprésentéep sar l'uneou l'autre desParties,dès lorsquelaquestiondesîles
Hawar et celle de Zubarah sont soumises à la Coum (Délimitationmaritime et
questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn, compétenceet recevabilité,arrêt,

C.I.J.Recueil1995,p. 22, par. 48).

S'ily a une resjudicata dans la présenteaffaire, c'estbien celle qui résulte del'arrte la

Cour du 15 février 1995.

111.LE RAPPORTENTRETITRESJURIDIQUESETEFFECTIVITÉS

19.Nous ne reviendronsque brièvementsur cettequestion, quenousavonstraitéele 29 mai.

Les deux Parties s'entendentpour prendre pour point de départn passagedel'arrêt dela Courdans

l'affaire duDzfîérendterritorial (Burkina Faso/Républiquedu Mali). La Cour avait envisagé

quatre hypothèses. Les Parties se fondent essentiellement sur les deux premières, mais ne

s'entendentpas sur les façonsde les appliquer l'espèce.

20. Premièrehypothèse : «Dans le cas où le fait correspond exactement au droit, où une

administration effective s'ajoute à l'utipossidetis juris, lf«effectivité»n'intervienten réalitéque

pour confirmer l'exercicedu droit néd'untitre juridique.)) (C.I.J.Recueil 1986, p. 586 et 587.)

Selon la Partie adverse son titre découleraitde l'utipossidetis : ((Quelleque soit sa nature

juridique)),nous déclareM. Kemicha, «la décision de1939fait incontestablementpartie intégrante

du legs colonial))(CR2000113, p. 64,par. 110;les italiquessont dansl'original).

Cette position n'estpas acceptable pour les raisons suivantes. Le seulfait dont puisse se

targuer Bahreïn est son occupation de l'îlà partir de 1937. En effet, comme le démontreraunenouvellefoisun desexposésquiva suivre,les prétendues effectivités antérieurà ecette occupation

ne résistentpas à l'examen. Le droit invoqué par Bahreïn seraitdès lorsla décision britannique

de 1939,rendue intouchablepar le truchementde l'utipossidetis.

Or nous avons montré, il y aun instant, qu'iln'est pasquestion ici d'uti possidetis. Au

surplus, il s'agittoujours de la même pétitione principe qui consiste s'appuyersur la décision

de 1939alors que dès l'origine Qataren a contestéla validitéet que ceci est le cŒurmêmedu

débat. Mon ami et confière, sir Elihu Lauterpacht, qui est prompt à voir des raisonnements

circulairesdanslesraisonnementsdes autres,tombe,me semble-t-il,

aisémentdanslemême travers (CR 2000/11,page 22,paragraphe42 de la traduction).

21. Deuxièmehypothèse envisagéedans l'arrêtde 1986 : «Dans le cas ou le fait ne

correspondpas au droit, où le territoire objetdu différend estadministréeffectivementpar un autre

Etat que celui qui possède le titre juridique, il y a lieu de préférerle titulaire du titre.))

(C.I.J.Recueil 1986,p. 587.)

C'estcette hypothèse queQatar demanderespectueusement àla Cour deretenir. Il a montré

àla Cour qu'ilpossédait un titre territorial sulr'ensemblede la péninsule y compriîles Hawar,

en particulier dans les décennies quiont précédé 1936N . os adversaires ont été incapablesde

prouver qu'auxyeux de la communauté internationalede l'époque, Bahreïn se composait d'autre

choseque d'ungroupe compact d'îlesau centre du Golfe. Ce n'estqu'en 1936que les îles Hawar

ont fait l'objetd'uneréclamation occulte puis,à partir de 1937,que l'îleprincipale de Hawar a

commencéà subirl'occupation deBahreïn. Selon un principe fondamentaldu droit international,

aucuntitre valable ne peut naître d'uneoccupationillégaleduterritoired'autrui. Ceci me conduità

répondreà un dernier point de nos adversaires celui des périodes pertinentes dans la présente

affaire.

IV.LES PÉRIODESPERTINENTES

22. C'est essentiellemen- encore que non exclusivement - en ce qui concerne Hawarque

noussouhaitonsrépondre àcertainespositionsdenos adversaires.

La période essentielleux yeux deQatar est celle quis'ouvreavec la réclamation occulte de

l'îlede Hawar par Bahreïn et son occupationà partir de 1937. C'esà ce moment qu'ilconvient dedéterminerquiétaitsouverainsurcetteîle ouplusprécisémenstur cet archipel.Si la Cour retientle

point de vue de Qatar, ce que Bahreïn appelle ses ((effectivités),ostérieuresà cette date, ne

peuvent être retenuesà l'appuid'un titre quelconquecar elles constituentun simple fait accompli

résultantd'uneoccupation illégale.

Comme ces prétendues ((effectivités)s)ontsurtout récentes,nous avons assiàune double

manŒuvrepour tenter deles légaliser.

23. La première consiste à caractériserles activités de Bahreïn postérieuresà 1971

d'«effectivitéspostcoloniales)). Le fait de rebaptiser une occupation illégaleen ((effectivités

postcoloniales»(même exposéde M. Kemicha(CR 2000/13,p. 65, par. 115 et suiv.) n'enfait pas

pour autant disparaître le vice originaireQatar maintient qu'il n'y a pas eu ici de phénomène

colonial,ni d'applicationde larèglede l'utissidetisjuris.

24. La seconde manŒuvreconsiste à interpréterle principe du statu quo dérivantde la

médiation saoudienne pour lui retirertoute valeurquelconque.e connaisde longuedate les talents

de mon confière et ami sir Elihu Lauterpacht, mais j'ignorais qu'il était aussi maître en

prestidigitation.

La Cour se souviendra,en effet, comment,dans son exposédu 8juin (CR 2000/11,trad.fr,

p. 25, par. 51) il a su faire disparaîtrelajuridicité du principe dustatu quo adoptér de 1983

dans le cadre de la médiationconfiée à Sa Majestéle roi d'Arabie saoudite. Alléguanqtue Qatar

avait violéce principe en étendantsa mer territoriale12milles marins,ce à quoi il sera répondu

plus tard, il ajoutaitcette surprenantedéclara:ion

«En tout cas, c'étaitau médiateur qu'il revenait d'intervenirnas d'allégation

de violation éventuelledustatu quo, ce qu'iln'ajamais fait, ni dans ce cas-ci ni dans
aucun autre. Bahraïn considèrequ'il n'y a pas lieu de s'attarder davantagesur la
question dustatu quo en l'espèce.»(Ibid.)

Et hop, le lapin disparaît dans le chapeau. Il convient de rappeler succinctement les textes

applicablesen lamatière.

Le 13mars 1978,le roi Khaledproposaunesérie de((Principespour un cadre de règlement.))

Le deuxièmeprincipeimposait unstatu quo :

«Chaque partie s'engage à partir de ce jourà s'abstenirde toute action qui
pourrait renforcer sa position juridique ou affaiblir la position juridique de l'autre
partie ou modifierle statu quo en ce quiconcerneles questionsen litige. Toute action de cette nature sera considéréecomme nulle et non avenue et n'aura aucun effet
juridique en la matière.)) (Mémoire de Qatar sur la compétenceet la recevabilité,
vol.III, annexeII.1.)[Notretraduction.]

"EachParty undertakesfrom this dateto refain from any action thatwould
betterifs legalpositionor weakenthe legalpositionof the otherParty, or changethe
status quo with regard to the disputed matters. Any action of this nature shall be

deemednul1and voidand havingno legal effectin thismatter".(Memorialof Qatar,
JurisdictionalAdmissibility,Vol.III,AnnexII.1,p. 3).

Ce cadre fut approuvéle 22 mai 1983par les représentantsde l'Arabiesaoudite,de Bahreïn

et de Qatar.

Le roi Fahd écrivit des lettres identiques aux émirs de Bahreïn et de Qatar le

19décembre 1987.Ellescontenaientles dispositions suivantes relativesaux ruptures du statu quo.

Vous trouverezce documentdans le dossier d'audiencecommedocumentno7.

«Jusqufàce que les questionsen litige soient régléedséfinitivement..,les deux
Etats frèresdu Qatar et de Bahreïn observerontles principes du cadre de règlement
dont ils sont convenusle 10/8 A403 de l'hégire- correspondantau22 mai 1983-
et enparticulier ce quisui:

a) chacune des parties s'engage dès maintenant à s'abstenir detoute action qui
renforcerait sa position juridique, affaiblirait celle de la partie adverse, ou

modifieraitle statu quo àl'égarddes questionsen litige. Toute actionen ce sens
sera considéréecomme nulle et non avenue et n'auraaucun effetjuridique en la
matière))(requêteintroductive d'instance de Qatardu 8 juillet 1991, annexe 4,
p. 47).

L'accordsuivant pour soumettrele différend à la Cour internationale de justice fut atteintet

signé le25 décembre 1990. L'accord (en formede «minutes»ou ((procès-verbal)))constatait :Il a

donc été convenu ce quisuit : ((1) réaffirmer ce dont les deux parties sont convenues

précédemment( ))equêteintroductive d'instancede Qatar du8juillet 1991,annexe 6,p. 57).

Dans sonarrêt (Délimitationmaritimeet des questions territoriales entre Qatae rt Bahreïn,

compétenceet recevabilité, 1"juillet 1994(C. I..ecueil1994,p. 120,par. 22),la Coura déclaré :

((22. Les Parties sont d'accord pour considérerles échanges de lettres de
décembre 1987comme constituant un accord international ayantforce obligatoire

dansleursrelationsmutuelles.))

Dans lemême arrêt,la Courdéclaraensuite :

((25.Le procès-verbal de1990comportedonclerappel d'obligationspassées;

Ainsi, ...cet instrumentn'estpas un simple compte rendu deréunion,analogue
àceuxétablisdansle cadre de la commissiontripartite.Il ne se bornepas à relaterdes
discussions et à résumer des points d'accord et de désaccord.Il énumèreles
engagementsauxquelsles Parties ontconsenti. Il crée ainsipour les Parties desdroits et des obligations en droit intenational.Il constitue un accord international.)) (Ibid.,

p. 121,par.25.)

Ceci fut répété par la Cour dans son arrêt du15 février1995 (p. 11, par. 24) dans les termes

suivants :

((24.Comme il a été rappeléci-dessus (paragraphe9), la Cour, dans sonarrêtdu
le'juillet 1994,a dit«queleséchangesde lettresentre leroi d'Arabiesaouditeet l'émir
de Qatar,datéesdes 9 et 21 décembre 1987e ,t entre le roi d'Arabiesaouditeet l'émir
de Bahreïn, datées des 19 et 26 décembre 1987, ainsique le document intitulé

«procès-verbal»,signé à Doha le 25 décembre1990 par les ministres des affaires
étrangèresde Bahrein, de Qatar et de l'Arabie saoudite, constituent des accords
internationaux créantdes droits et des obligations pour les Parties.))(C.I.J.Recueil
1995,p. 14,par. 24.)

Ces accords ne font en rien de l'intervention du médiateur une condition d'application des

obligationsainsisouscrites.

Lenumérodeprestidigitationdemonconfrèreet amisir Eli est doncraté.

25. Monsieurle président,Madame,Messieursde la Cour,

Arrivéau termede mon exposéjesouhaiteraisen résumerles constatations

1) Bahreïn etQatar ayanttoujourssubsistécommepersonnalitésjuridiques indépendantes d'Etats

souverains protégés,n'ontjamais été des «colonies» ni des ((protectorats))et le principe de

l'utipossidetis ne s'appliquepaàleursituation.

Les autoritésbritanniques,en acceptant que la question de Hawar soit soumise à l'arbitrage
2)
entre les deux Etats, ont reconnu quela décisionde 1939 n'avaitni le caractèrede sentence

arbitrale,ni de décisionadministrativeou politiqueayantun caractèreintangible.

3) La périodepertinente essentielle dans la présente affaireconcernant Hawar est celle qui

s'ouvre avecla réclamation occulte deîles Hawarpar Bahreïn et l'occupationpar Bahreïn de

l'îleprincipale de Hawaràpartir de 1937.Aucun effet ne peut êtredonnéaux conséquences

d'une occupationillégaleet donc aux activitésentreprises ultérieurement par Bahreïn pour

renforcersesprétendues ((effectivités)).

4) Le principede statu quo,s'impose àBahreïn - il faut ajout-r depuis 1983tant au nom des

conventionssouscritesquedesdécisionsde laCourde 1994et 1995.

Monsieur le président,Madame,Messieurs de la Cour, ceci étantma dernière intervention

dans la présenteaffaire, je remerciela Cour d'avoirbien voulu meprêterattentionavec patience.

Puis-jevousdemander, Monsieurle président,de donnerla parole à M. KumarShankardass. Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. 1 now give the floor to

Mr. Shankardass.

Mr. SHANKARDASS: MI-.President,distinguishedMembers ofthe Court.

REBUTTA LF BAHRAIN 'SFECTIVZTES -PRE-~%~

1. The Court has now heard repeated submissions anddescriptions of Bahrain's alleged

effectivitésor examplesof "exerciseof authority"from 1800to 1936on the Hawar Islands which

Bahrain summarizedand includedin its "bullet points" in the Reply (Chap.2, Sect 2.3). In my

presentationon thisubjecton 5 June(CR200018, p.16),1analysedthese and submittedthat apart

from the three categories of effectivités(and notjust three examples),narnelythe alleged grant of

permission by the Al-Khalifah in 1800 to the Dowasir to "settle" in Hawar, the exercise of

jurisdiction by courts, and the service of process on ort of "residents of Hawar", for which

there was nocredible evidence,the remainderwere in any casenotectivitéà titre de souverain.

These included the activities of members of the Dowasir tribe in seasonally visiting the Hawar

Islands forawkingor fishing,the existenceof their "largehuts", theircemeteries,etc. In support,

both Professor Salmonand 1invokedtheKasikili/SeduduIsland decisionofthis Court.

2. However,my learned fiiend, SirElihu Lauterpacht,soughtto distinguishthat decisionand

contendedthat the position in the presentcase is different (CR2000111, p. 23). Here, he claimed,

there was already a souverain of the Al-Khalifah rulers that existed pnor to the arriva1of the

Dowasir in Hawar and that it was that souverain fiom whom the Dowasir obtained by grant the

right to resideinHawar. This mustsurelybe wrong; becauseBahrain itself assertsin its Memorial

(Memorial of Bahrain, paras. 36-37) thatitsjurisdiction and control over the Hawar Islands"

commencedwith the gant of the alleged permission in around 1800. Be that as it may, 1have

already shownthat there is no credible evidenceeven of the grant of such permission, nor of the

arriva1of the Dowasirin Hawar in 1800,and that a casual reference tothese events by a fisherman

in Hawar to Prideaux in 1909(more than 100 years later) does not in any sense amount to such

evidence. These allegationsare in fact contradictedby Lorimer'spositive evidence to the effect

that the Dowasironly arrivedin Bahrainin 1845 fiomNajd via Zakhuniyah. Similarly,there is no

evidencewhatsoeverfor Bahrain's assertionthat the "Hawar Dowasir" wereinvited by the RulerofBahrain"to settleonthe main islandof Bahrain, while atthe sametime continuingtheirlife onthe

HawarIslands"(Memorialof Bahrain,para.417).

3. Furthermore, as my learned colleague MsNanettePilkington has shown (CR2000/5,

p.48), even in 1823 - when the British assumed that Qatar was Bahrain's dependency- the

BahrainSheikhswereclearly not exercisingany authorityat al1over the peninsula (Memorialof

Qatar, para.3.20). Bahrain'scounselhave simplyignoredthe factthat theauthorityofthe Bahrain

Sheikhsover the peninsulaof Qatarat this time amounted tonot much more than a paper claim,

and thatwhatevertheextentof suchauthority,it endedin 1868. Mylearned colleague,Mr.Bundy,

will address youfurtheron this issue. 1need only refer toLorimer'sobservationin the Gazetteer

that at that time "thepolitical comection, siich as it was betweenBahrain and Qatarcame to an

end"- 1868 (Counter-Memorialof Qatar, para. 3.30). Lorimer also went on to describe the

boundariesof Qataron the east, northand west as surroundedby the sea, withoutexcluding the

HawarIslands oranyother partofQatar.

1.THE INDEPENDENTSTATUO S FTHE DOWASIR

4. Qatar'ssubmission thereforeis that after 1868,thereneverwas anyAl-Khalifahsouverain

in or overQatar or overthe HawarIslands. Accordingly,the statusof the Dowasirandthe nature

of their activities on the main HawarIsland necessarily has tobe exarnined,to see whetherthey

amountedto Bahrainieffectivitéà titredesouverain.
1
5. Qatar has shown that the Dowasir were an independentsemi-nomadictibe and, as

recordedby Lorimer(MemorialofBahrain,Ann.74,Vol.3, p. 378)wereto be foundin numerous

locations on theArabian side of the Gulf including Qatar (butnot Hawar) and even in Iran.

Furthermore,the principal occupationof the Dowasirlivingin Budaya and Zellaqwaspearlingin

thesurnmermonthsandfishingindifferentlocationsin thewintermonths. Someofthoselivingin

ZellaqtravelledtoHawar duringthewinterto engagein fishing and hawking.

6.As Khuri, awell-knownauthorontibes inthe area,writes:

"Al-Dawasirof BudayyaandZallaq ...were themostpowerful, influential,and
autonomousof al1tribal groupsbecausethey were relatively numerous, ealthy,and,
above all, ableto mobilize a widevariety of tribal allianceson the mainland. Other
tibes exercised autonomy as granted them by the Al-Khalifa ruler."
(Counter-Memonalof Qatar,Ann.11.74,Vol.2,p. 408.)AndLorimergoeson:

"The Dawasirof Bahrainare a practically independentcornrnunity;they pay no
revenue to the Shaikhof Bahrain on accounteither of their pearl boat5 or their date
gardens ..." (Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.74,Vol. 3,pp. 382-383.)

7. It is entirelyunlikely thereforethat they would have accepted any regulationor paid any

taxes for any fishing or other activity in Hawar. The Ruler of Bahrain did not trust the Dowasir

either. As Lorirnerreports, when Colonel Ross,the Political Resident,met the Rulerof Bahrainin

March 1879, the Ruler "referred to an intention on his own part of chastising the Dawasir of

Bahrain,whomhe suspectedof treasonand of collusionwith the BaniHajir" (Counter-Memorialof

Qatar,para.3.116).

8.Afterthe forcedretirementof ShaikhIsaas Ruler of Bahrainin 1923,SheikhHamadwho

succeeded him, and who enjoyed British support, sought to introduce reforms in the pearling

industry. As a result, the Dowasir simply lefi Bahrain for Dammam. Asthe same writer, Khuri,

records:

"Tribal chiefs and pilots considered the reforms an encroachment on their
sovereignty and a limitation of their 'freedomin pearl production'. To them the
sovereignty of tribal groups was synonyrnouswith that of independent states. They
abhorred the idea of being treated like other subjects in the country, as the reforms

proposedto treatthemwithreferenceto taxesand courtsofjustice.

Being the strongest tribal group in Bahrain, the Dawasir never recognized
Shaikh Hamad assuccessor,nor didthey pay taxes to the Al-Khalifa regime,on the
grounds that such payrnent implied a submissive status in tribal politics."
(Counter-MemorialofQatar, Ann. 111.55, ol.3, pp. 325-326.)

9. As to the Rulerof Bahrain'sown attitudeto the Dowasir,the Political Residentinformed

the SecretaryofStateforthe Colonieson4 January1924:

"Nowthat the whole Dawasir tribe has left, 1may remarkthat Shaikhis greatly
relieved anddoesnot want themback at anyprice. In this 1think he is right and that
he is wellrid ofthem." (Counter-Memorialof Qatar, Ann. 111.28, ol. 3,p. 147.)

10. As the record shows, Ibn Saud regarded the Dowasir who left Bahrain as his own

subjects (Counter-Memorial of Qatar,Ann.111.34,Vol. 3, p. 179) and on their behalf pressed

SheikhHarnad of Bahrainin 1928to return their properties in Bahrain.his is hardly consistent

with Bahrain's contention thatthe Dowasir had owed uninterruptedand unswerving allegiance to

successiveRulersof Bahrain since about 1800(Memorialof Bahrain, paras. 36, 38,346and351).ConditionsofDowasirreturnto Bahrain

11. SheikhHamad of Bahrain felt disgracedbefore the Arab tribes for having forfeitedthe

propertiesof the Dowasir, and, in 1927,wishedto let them retum (Memorialof Qatar, Ann.111.73,

Vol. 6, pp. 383, 386). But the British were reluctant to let him do so. In his letter of

27March 1927, the British Political Resident (Memorial of Qatar, Ann.111.72, Vol. 6, -.

pp. 379, 381) setout the conditionson whichthe Dowasirwouldbe permittedto retum to Bahrain.

The letter in which these were set out is at tab 8 in thejudges'folders and on the screen. These

conditionsincluded:

"1. They [the Dowasir] must be obedientin every way to the Bahrain Government
and must neither claimnor exerciseany independentstatuswhatsoever;

2. they must paythe sametaxesas otheragriculturistsandtraders;

3. they must be submissive to the Courts in Bahrain established by Your
Excellency;

4. theymust acceptapolice postatBadaya;

5. they must accept any headman appointed by Your Excellency and
YourExcellency is to have full liberty to deprive their headmanof his post and
appointanotherifyou shouldsowish."

These conditionsfor the return ofthe Dowasirmake it clear that, priorto 1927,the Dowasir

had not been complying with any of them. They had not been obedient to the Bahrain

Government;theyhad not paidtaxes; theyhadnot been submissivetoBahrainicourts;theyhad not

accepted a police post even in Badaya- much less on Hawar; and they had appointedtheir own

headman. In short,the Dowasirhad acted independentlyof anyBahrainiauthority.

The Political Agentconcludeshis letterby saying:

"1 am sure that Your Excellency. ..is convinced thatthe retum of the Dowasir
under any other conditions wouldbe a danger to the safetyand good Govenimentof

the islands which are much too small to admit ofthe establishmentof any authority
whatever,independentof your own."

As counsel forBahrainalsonoted (CR 2000113, p.21, para. 56),the Dowasir didin facteventually

retum to their properties on the main island of Bahrain on these conditions (Memorial of Qatar,

Ann.111.73,Vol. 6,pp. 383,387); and this markedthe first occasion onwhich such of them as did

actuallyretum in the five or sixars after 1928could possiblybe consideredsubjectsofthe Ruler

of Bahrain. 12. The Court will see therefore thateven assumingDowasir activitieson Hawarprior to

1923-1933couldhave anyrelevanceto Bahrain'sclaim of territorialsovereigntyoverHawar, such

activitiesof a semi-nomadicindependenttribe couldnot sustainany rightsof the Rulerof Bahrain

in Hawarany more so than the activitiesof the Naim tribe in Zubarah. Furthermore,there is no

evidencethat the Dowasir resumed anyfishingor other activitieson Hawar aftertheir return to

Budayaor Zellaqin the 1920sortheearly 1930s.

13.The Courtwill not havefailed to noticethe clear implicationof the conditionson which

the Dowasirwereallowedto returnfrom 1928,that,beforethat date, they didnot evenacceptthe

jurisdiction of thecourts in Bahrain. Thisalonemustthrowseriousdoubton the relevanceof the

twojudgmentsof 1909and 1910of a kadiin Bahrainwhichare offeredby Bahrainas evidenceof

the exerciseof Bahrainijudicial powerover fish trapsin Hawar. In any event, Qatarhas shown

thatthese"judgments"dealtonly withprivaterightsinthe exerciseof ajurisdictioninpersonam.

14. Taking account of Qatar'ssubmissionson the activities of the Dowasir, counsel for

Bahrainalso asked: "Does Qatarwish toassertto the Court thatthere was an independentstate of

the Dowasir?"(CR 2000113,p. 22,para. 61) 1wouldsubmitmost respecthlly, Mr.President,that

this question is unfairlyaddressedto Qatar. Only Bahrain could have answered it if onlyit could

have had access to the "decision"of the year 1800 whichPrideaux reports he heard fiom a

fisherman"awarded""the ownership"of HawarIslands tothe Dowasir; on the otherhandBahrain

contendsthat it wasonly "permission"tothe Dowasir to "settle"in Hawar. The problemis that no

one has everseenthe "decision"or "award"or "permission"or whateverelse it was,or even if it

ever existed. The fact that there is nothingto show that anyKadi has power to make territorial

grants(ReplyofQatar,Ann.111.98V , ol.3,p. 601)is furthergroundfor totallydisbelievingits very

existence. Mr. President,wouldyouwishthistobethemomentfora break thismorning?

ThePRESIDENT: Thankyouverymuch. TheCourtwilladjournfor aquarterofanhour

TheCourtadjournedfrom 11.20a.mto 11.40a.m.

Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vousasseoir. La séance estreprise et je donne la parole à

M. Shankadass. Mr. SHANKARDASS: Merci, M. le présidentMr. President,distinguished Members of

theCourt.

II.THE PURELYPRIVATECHARACTEROF DOWASI R CTIVITIES
.
15.May 1now tum fiom the statusof the Dowasirto the activitiesof the Dowasir. Even

assuming,that they wereto be regardedas Bahraini"subjects", itis Qatar's submissionthat their

activitieswere of a purelyrivate nature and cannotsustainBahrain'sclaim to sovereignty over

Hawar.

(i) Fishingactivities

16.1would like to begin, if 1may, withfishing activitiesbut,with the Court'spermission,

may1first brieflydrawtheCourt'sattention totherelevant generalsettingwithregard tofishingin

the Gulfarea. It is Qatar's submission that fiwas the principalwinter activitywhichtribes,

such as the Dowasir,engagedin on the HawarIslands; andthat such an activitywas of a purely

privatenatureand didnothave anyrelevanceto sovereigntyover anyterritory,regardlessof what

mighthavebeenthe nationalityorallegiance ofthosewhoengagedin it.

17.TheCourtwillhave seenin Qatar'sReply (Replyof Qatar,para.4.181) the referenceby

a writeroninternationalandlegal problemsinthe Gulf(Amin,S.H., TreatiseonInternationaland

Legal Problemsof the Gulf, Reply of Qatar, Ann.111.100, ol. 3, p. 617) to the effectthat "the

fishingactivitiesof the Gulfhave beentraditionally govemedby Shariahor Islamiclaw". He also

pointsoutthatunder thegeneralShariahrules,individualsmay useandexploittheoceans,seasand

rivers, in a reasonablemanner,as much as required,and that no restriction couldbe imposedon

them withregardto the fishingindustry. Iniscontext,theCourtwillrecallthe observationof the

TribunalintheEritredemen arbitration:

"This traditionally prevailing situation redeeplyrooted culturalpatterns
leadingto the existence ofwhatcouldbe characterizedfiom auridical point of view
as res communispermittingthe Afiican aswell asthe Yemeni fishermento operate
withno limitationthroughouttheentirearea and tosel1their catch atthe local markets
on eithersideof theRed Sea..."

The Tribunal wentonto Say:

"The socio-economic and cultural patterndescribed above were perfectly in
harmonywith classicIslamiclaw concepts, whichpracticallyignoredthe principof 'temtorial sovereignty'as it developed arnongstthe European powers andbecarne a
basic featureof 19thCenturywestern internationallaw." (Paras. 128and 130.)

18.There is also extensiveevidenceof completefreedom of fishingin the Gulf area during

the nineteenthcentury and at leastup to the middleof the twentieth century. The Court will recall

that such rights were expressly protected, not only in the British decision of December 1947

establishingthe 1947line (ReplyofQatar, para. 7.23),but also in the proclamations issuedin 1949

by both Bahrain and Qatar on their rights over the seabed (ibid.). Furthemore, Bahrain'sown

claim to the Bu Saafa banks was rejected in 1951by Saudi Arabia as the historical freedom and

commonpracticeof fishingby anyonein the areawas acknowledged(Replyof Qatar, para.7.24).

19.The Court will have noticedthat thereis considerable evidenceon record of fishingas a

principal activity in the Gulf area. Even in thepages of CaptainBrucks'sSurvey produced and

relied upon by Bahrain, there are, apart from Hawar,numerous other locations where fishingis

specifically mentioned as an occupation in the 1820s (Memorial of Bahrain, Ann.7, Vol. 2,

pp. 92-109).

20. As for the Hawar Islands,the PersianGuZfPilotof 1864(Memorial of Bahrain,Ann.11,

Vol. 2, p.40),that is some35yearslater, containsthe entrythat the largest "islandis calledHawar,

and is about 10miles long, andfrequented byfishermen". They were clearly not exclusively

Dowasir fishermen: nor is there any suggestionthat they necessarily originated only in Bahrain.

The Court will recall Lorimer'ssimilar description of the Hawar main island which Bahrain's

counsel also quoted (CR 2000113,pp. 12-13),andto which quotation 1would liketo add the next

significantsentence. The quotewhichyou saw isnow onthe screen.

"[The main Island of Hawar is about] 10 miles long, north and south, and
roughly parallelto the QatarCoast. Thereare no wells, but thereis a cistem to hold
rain-water builtby the Dawasirof Zallaq inBahrain, who have houses at two places
on the island and usetheminwinter asshootingboxes."

And if 1may add the next few words,which are: "Fishermen alsofrequentHawar. " (Memorialof

Qatar,para. 5.38.)

21. Innone of these descriptions,including inBrucks'sSurvey is there any indication,as

indeed there cannot be, that the fishing around Hawar was restricted in some way only to the

Dowasirtribeand that otherswereforbiddento fish in thesewaters. Thisis the very fact whichthe

Ruler of Qatar tried, as it happenedunsuccessfully, togetWeightmanand the other Britishofficialsinvolved to recognize after his protest against the Bahraini incursions in Hawar (Reply of Qatar,

para.4.173 (d)). As the Court will recall,even Prideauxrecorded in his letter of 20 March 1909,

that "the Dowasir of Budaiyaand Zellaq on the north-west coast of Bahrain are in the habit of

every winter partially migrating toZakhnuniyaand Hawar Islands for fishing (sharks as well as
7
edible fish) and hawking". It is only because a Dowasir fisherman told him the story of "a

century-old decision of a Kazi of Zubara" whereby"the ownership of this island of Hawar"

(emphasisadded)had been "awarded tothe tribe" (Memorialof Qatar, Ann.111.53,Vol. 6, p. 249)

thatthe wholly unjustifiedinferencehas beendrawnbyBahrain thatthe Dowasir hadthe exclusive

right to visit and fishin Hawar. In any event thereis nothing to suggestthat the Dowasir stopped

anyone else fiom fishingin thewaters surroundingtheisland.

22. To summarizetherefore,no activities ofthe Dowasir by way of participating in fishing

in Hawarwaters couldconfer any sovereigntyon the Ruler of Bahrainor even the Dowasir. Even

ifthe Dowasir were "subjects"of Bahrain, theirmerepresence in Hawarfor fishing purposescould

not anddid not amountto presenceor sovereigntyofBahrain.

23. Apart fiom the fact, therefore, that there was no need for the Dowasir to obtain any

permission fiom the Ruler in 1800 or at any other time, to undertake any fishing activities in

Hawar, 1have alreadyshownthat in any event thereis nocredible evidence of anysuchpermission

or, as Prideaux puts it, the "award" of ownershipof the island upon which Bahrain relies so

stronglyfor its claimof title to Hawar.

24. Although Bahrainclaims "The granting and protection of fishing rights off the Hawar

Islands'shores by the Ruler of Bahrain"asan effectivit(Reply of Bahrain,p. 16),it has produced

no evidence in support. The two documents cited as "evidence" are Belgrave's Note of

29May 1938fiished in the course of the so-calledarbitration and his letter to PackPCLofof

31 January 1938(Memorialof Bahrain,Anns.249and250, Vol. 5,p. 1106andp. 10781.

25. Belgrave'sNote, written in the context of Bahrain'sclaim of title, Statesthat "Fishing

rights off the shoreof Hawar andthe other islandswereoriginally grantedto the people of Hawar

by the Shaikh of Bahrain."And then he goes on to Say"If these documents are availablethey will

be forwarded." (Memorial of Bahrain, Ann.261, Vol.5, pp. 1106, 1109). It seems that no such

documents were ever discovered or "fonvarded". It is also noteworthy that the next sentencecontainsBelgrave's statementthatthe Hawarfishtraps areregistered in the LandDepartmentofthe

Bahrain Government-a statement hewas later obliged to retract.So there is no evidence

whatsoeverto support these assertions.

26.Belgrave's letterto Packercitedby Bahrainonlycomplainsthat PCLstaffon theirwayto

Qatar had been stealingfish - fish fiom the fish traps belonging to "the Arabs living at Hawar".

(Memorial of Bahrain, Ann.250, Vol. 5, p. 1078). It is in no sense evidence of the State's

"grantingand protectionof fishingrights". Furthermorethe letter is dated January 1938,i.e., some

time afterBahrain'sillegaloccupationof Hawar.

27. Bahrain now states that after the development of oil in the early 1930s, there was a

decline in whatever activity there had beenon Hawar (Memorial of Bahrain,para. 38). Thismust

necessarily mean a decline in any seasonal fishing by the Dowasir in winter-further

demonstratingthat such fishingactivitiesby themselvescanhave no relevanceto sovereignty. If 1

may refer to an observation of the Tribunal in the Eritredemen case, "it may be expected that

population, and economic realities,ill changeover time. What may be important todayin terms

of fishingmay be unimportanttomorrow,andthe reverseis also true." (Para. 313.) As the Courtis

aware,in that case the Tribunalconcluded,as in factwasthe position in Hawar,that in the absence

of any State control of licensingor enforcement activities,the fishing practices of individuaisdid

not amountto effectivitésas theywere not actsà titre desouverain(para.315).

(ii) Thetwo villages

28. Mr. President, may1 also briefly retum to Captain Brucks' Survey in the 1820~~ upon

which Bahrain places so much reliance. Counsel for Bahrain invokesthe entry in this Survey

which states, with regard to Warden or Hawar Islands: "It has two fishing villages on it, and

belongs toBahrein." (CR 2000/13,p. 12.)

29. First, as to the qualityof this information:counselfor Bahrain informedthe Courtof the

meticulous care with which the Survey was prepared and quoted (CR2000/13, p. 11)

CaptainBrucks'sowndescriptionofhis methodologyinwordswhich arenow onthe screen:

"My information hasbeen obtainedin the followingmariner:1have proposed to
the chiefs certain questions relative tothe tribes, and their localities,of the revenues,
trade, &c, which 1 have noted, withtheir replies." (Memorial of Bahrain, Ann,7,
Vol. 2, p. 93.)1 would like, Mr. President, if 1may, to completethis quotation andreproduce the rest of the

paragraphwhichreads:

"This 1 have done to severalother personsat different periods,and then taken
such of the substanceas appearedto agree the best;but it is impossibleto trust the
native accountsin this partof the world, consequentlyitcan at best be considered but

an approximationtothe truth." (MemorialofBahrain,Ann,7,Vol.2,p. 93.)

30. Mr.President,as an indicationof what thethinkingwasat the time,Brucks'Surveyalso

stateswith reference to"RasReccan",which is the northernmostpoint onthe Qatarpeninsula, that

"From the point [Ras Reccan] to A1Bidder southward,and to Warden'sIslands [that is Hawar

Islands]westward,the authorityof the ShaikhofBahrainis acknowledged" (Memorial of Bahrain,

Ann.7, Vol. 2,p. 99). Mr.President, Membersof the Court,you will notice, he was including

most of the Qatar peninsula includingthe HawarIslands, together, under the Ruler of Bahrain's

authority,whicheven by 1830,aswehave shown,was extremelytenuousand endedaltogetherin

1868.

31. Counsel for Bahrainalso assertedthat this was acase where what was importantwas

humanhistoryand not physical geography.But as 1have said,Bahrain itself hasshownthat with

the developmentof oil andthe declineof any activityin Hawar,the Dowasirfarnilies- many of

whosemembersare undoubtedlydistinguishedmembersof Bahrain society - now livein Bahrain

(Memorial ofBahrain, para.38). Mr.Paulsson tellsus "HawarIslanders were there as children

many years before oil was discovered" (CR2000112, p.43, para.204). Even the witness

statements,for what they are worth, speak of the past, of houses (or huts) in ruins, obviously

having beenabandoned,so that whateverthe natureof their links theywere only of a number of

generationsago. The Courtwillno doubt appreciatethat cemeteries ofthosewho happenedto die

in the distantpast on the island, adultor children,easily fit into thispast history,but withoutany

implicationforclaims of sovereignty.

32. The Court will recall the images presented byBahrain in its video and photographs

which really show ruinsof tiny enclosureshardly fit for long human habitation. These images
I
seem really to fit in only with Lorimer's descriptionof "shootingboxes" which he recordedthe

Dowasirusedin Hawarinwinter.(iii)Quarryingof gypsum

33. Another example clairnedby Bahrain as that of exercise of authority is "Quarrying of

gypsum on the Hawar Islands during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries". It is Qatar's

submissionthat this is not an example of exercise of authority. The Costa report (Memorialof

Bahrain, Ann.310,Vol. 6,pp. 1348-1350)is reliedonfor the propositionthat "Hawar gypsum was

quarried throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and used as building material for

construction on both the Hawar Islands themselves and on the main island of Bahrain and

MuharraqIsland"(Memorialof Bahrain,para.454). However,the Costareportsays nothingofthe

kind. The section on gypsum begins "As it is known gypsum quarryingis reported on Hawar

islandby C.Belgraveand otherauthorities." No indicationis given of whenquanying mighthave

takenplace. Interestingly,the Report- dated 17January1995 - indicatesthat

"Sincewe are still awaiting the resultsof the chernical analysis ofthe samples
of gypsumand the plastercollected atHawar andBahrain,we are not yet to say[sic]
[presumablyin a position toSay]whetheror notthereis a factualrelationshipbetween
the building material quanied at Hawar andthe plaster preserved in the traditional
houses of Bahrain."

Bahrainhas notproduced the resultsof this analysis,andthe inferencemust bethat there isno such

"factual relationship". The Court willin any event no doubtbe aware that gypsum has alsobeen

quarried in the past at Rasbmq opposite SuwadalJanubiyah,so the originof whatever gypsum

mayhave beenused in the constructionofthe palace on Hawaris quiteuncertain.

34. Noneof the documents reliedon by Bahrainprovidesany supportfor gypsumquanying

in thenineteenthcentury, nor forBahrain's assertion that "gypsum quarrying in the HawarIslands

increased duringthe period between 1916and 1939"(Memorial of Bahrain, para.455). Belgrave's

Note of 29 May 1938 (Memorialof Bahrain, Ann.261, Vol.5, p. 1106) whichkeeps reappearing,

simply states, "The island is rich in gypsum" and is "brought by boats to Bahrain". And that

famous Weightman'sletter of 22 Apnl 1939 (Memorial of Bahrain, Ann.281, Vol. 5, p. 1169)

refersto the gypsumfound in Hawarbeing excavated under licence fiom Bahrain; and theBahrain

Govemment Report for 1937-1938 (Memorialof Bahrain, Ann.253, Vol.5, p. 1086)states that

"small sailing boats which used to carry passengers now bring ...juss fiom Hawar", meaning

gypsum fiom Hawar, suggesting that this is a very recent practice. The documents also al1

post-dateBahrain'sillegal occupationof Hawar. 35. Alsoclaimedas effectivitésare "Licensingof the gypsumindustryon theHawar Islands

by the Governmentof Bahrain at therequestof the HawarIsland residents" andregulationof the

tradein gypsumdunngthe 1930s.

36. There is nothingto suggestthat the "industry"was licensedbefore 1937. Indeed, a
?-
witnessstatement,(h4emorialof Bahrain,Ann.313(a), Vol.6,p. 1368)confirmsthatthe licensing

occurredafter constructionof the fort: "Thepermitswere issuedby the BahrainChief of Police"

who "used to stay on the main Hawar Islandin the police fort" (para. 23). But the Bahrain

Government Reportmakesno referenceto licensing; andno pre-1936 documentor licence to cut

gypsumon Hawar hasbeenput inevidencebyBahrain.

37. While Bahrain uses the vague expression "during the 1930sM,al1 the evidence is

post-1937,andinany eventnoneofitmentionsregulationofthetradein gypsurn.

(iv)Annual visitsto Hawar;

(v) Rescue of soldiers

38. Bahrain alsoclaims that Rulersof Bahrain used to make annual visits to Hawar fiom

1869to 1932. Thisisonlymentionedin Belgrave's Note (undisclosed,asthe Courtis aware, tothe

Rulerof Qatar)of 29May 1938 again,(Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.261, Vol.5, p. 1107)wherehe

alsorefersto theallegedrescuein 1873bythe Rulerof shipwreckedOttoman soldiers.There isno

evidencesuppliedin supportandthereis nothingin Belgrave'sdiariesrecordinganysuch visits. It

is of interestto note thatPrior regardedsuchvisits ofno consequence andstatedthat the Sheikhs

usedto pay an annualvisitto Lingeh andHasaandwenthawkingeven toZakhnuniyah(Mernorial

ofQatar,Ann.111.229V , ol. 8,p. 127). Astothe rescueofshipwreckedsoldiers,theTribunalin the

Eritreaflemen arbitrationnoted that sincethere is a generalized duty incumbenton any person or

vesse1in a positionto render assistance tovessels in distress,no legal conclusioncan be drawn

fiom suchevents(para. 286).

Other activities

39. As to the clairnof "ceremonialdisplayof Bahrainflagson the Hawar Islands"a witness

statementis citedto the effectthaturingtheEidfestival,thepeople would"flytheflagof Bahrain

from the dhow and roofs of houses",that is the flag of theplace that it came fiom (CR 2000/13,p. 26, para. 73). There is no claim that the flag was flown by way of Bahraini authority over

Hawar. The fact that Bahraini passports are claimed to have been issued to those who fished in

Hawarwas clearlybecausethey wereresidentsof Zellaqin Bahrain.

40. It is Qatar'ssubmission that the principle enunciatedin the Eritreaflemen arbitration

mentioned above, must also apply to a number of other activities pleaded as "bullet points" by

Bahrain as efectivités,such as the continued presence of the Dowasiron Hawar, confirmationor

recognitionin British documents of 1909, 1915and 1916, thatthe Hawar Islands were habitually

used by the Bahrain Dowasir, and that they had two villages on Hawar. None of these would

constituteefectivitésà titre de souverain. Some of the examples, such as, the registration of

pearlingboatsin Bahrainand paymentof registrationfeesby the Dowasirwho lived in Bahrain and

undertook pearling activities from there,even if true, can obviously provide no support for any

Bahraini sovereignty over Hawar, merelybecause the individuals concemed went to Hawar for

fishing in winter. Bahrain seeks to support many of the examples with witness statements. No

doubtthe Court willtreatthese statementsasalwayswith theutrnostcaution.

41. 1do not really consider that it would serve any useful purpose for me to continue this

analysis in detail of the many other alleged examples of efectivités which can be similarly

discounted or dealt with under other headings such as the acts relating to oil concession

negotiationsfor Bahrain'sunallotted area. Manyof courserelateto the periodafter 1936to which1

willrefer again.

Countingthe effectivitésand thepost-1936effectivités

42. Bahrain'scounsel complained (CR2000/13, pp. 36 and 48) that of the 80 eflectivités

listed by Bahrain in its written pleadings, in my presentation in the first round 1 dealt with only

three examples,whichby his reckoning,werereally20 examples. 1have to Say1am happyto have

been correctedto that extent as 1really was dealingwith three categories and not three items. Of

the 80 so-called examples of what Bahrain has called exercise of Bahraini authority listed in

Bahrain's Reply (para.28) and its SupplementalDocuments,by my count, at least half should be

eliminated because even ontheir face they are not such examples - such as a mere assertionof

Bahrain'sclaim,residenceand allegianceof the Dowasir andsome are even duplicates. These cantherefore be deleted fromthe screen. Of the remaining 40 items, in my respectful submission, at

least 19must be eliminated because, by Bahrain'sown admission,or on the basis of the evidence

presented, they occurredor may logicallybe assumed to have occurred,in 1937 or later, i.e., in

combinationwith orsubsequentto Bahrain'sillegaloccupationof Hawar.

43. Theseare:

- al1the public works,

- military,coastguard andpolice activities,

- oil activities,

- surveys,and

- wild life preservation.

Thesecan thereforealsobe removed fromthe list onthe screen.

44. Of theremaining 21or so, Mr. President,1 have alreadybeen givencredit for addressing

20 in thefirst round, and1believe 1havetoday addressed hy that might havebeen leftoutearlier.

So 1 believe1reallycan askforthese alsoto be deleted.

45. As regardsthe post-1936 efectivitéscited by Bahrain, Qatarhas already submitted,and

Professor Salmon reminded you this morning,that these cannot be taken into account after

Bahrain's illegal occupationof Hawar following its wholly unjustified claim to the islands in

April 1936. The Court will have noted that in these oral pleadings, Bahrainhas admittedfor the

firsttime that, in 1937,it began to buildup military defenceson Hawar,or at leastthat ishow they

addressthem (CR2000/11,p. 8,para. 8; CR 2000/13,p. 31, para.20).

46. Having said al1this, 1must Say1 am reminded once again of the observationby the

Tribunalin the Eritreah'emenarbitrationthat the evidence ofegectivitéspresentedin thatcase, and

seeminglyby Bahrain in the present case,"is voluminousin quantitybut sparse in useiûl content"

(para.239).

Theconspicuousabsences

47. Before 1leavethis subject, Mr.Presidentand distinguished Members ofthe Court,may 1

be permitted to draw the Court'sattentionto the kind of examples that are conspicuousby their

absence fiom Bahrain's list. These would be: references to any form of State administrativestructureor activities. Thereis no referenceat al1to any schools,medical or similar facilitiesand

numerousotheractivities suchas transport providedor carriedon in Bahrain and listed in Annual

Reportson Bahrain. Theabsenceof any suchfacilitiesin the Hawar Islands is clearlybecausethe

islandswere neverpart oftheBahrainiState.

48. Mr. President, 1 apologize for this somewhatlengthy analysis of Bahrain's alleged

effectivitébut1 felt it may furtherhelp the Courtin considering Qatar's principal submissiothat

noneof themare eflectivitésà titre de souverain.

Weightman'sletter of 22 April 1930

49. ProfessorReismansubmittedin his presentationon 9 June (CR2000/12,p. 48, para. 14)

that theCourtshould declarethe finalityof the 1939"Award"ashe called it, whichconfirmed,"on

the basis of theflectivitéthat Bahrain then adduced", thatthe Hawar Islands are the territory of

Bahrain. In aneffort to Savethe unreasonedaward by investingit with somekind of legality,he

arguedthat "theAward is comprisedof two documents"(CR2000/12, p. 55) namely, the detailed

eight-page review of the evidence by Weightrnan in his letter of 22 April 1939 (Memorial of

Bahrain, Ann.281, Vol. 5, pp. 1165-1172),which was never communicated to Qatar, and the

one-pageAwardof 11July 1939,whichwas.

50. My learned fkiend,Mr. Paulsson, also referredto Weightman'sletter of 22 April 1939

and declaredthat it was "the single most important document in the case" (CR2000/12, p. 39,

para. 181).

51. Onthe other hand,for the many reasons1referredto in my presentationto the Court on

31May (CR 2000/7, p. 44),1submittedto the Court that Weightman'ssummingup in his letter of

22 April1939was in effect a meaningless exercise. 1drew the Court'sattention to Weightman's

letterof 12February 1939and Fowle'sletter of 14February 1934 (items 42 and 43 in thejudges'

folders, in thefrrst round) which made it clear that by then "Britain'shands were tied" to the

position that not only would BAPCO have to be permitted to acquire a concession over the

unallotted area including Hawar, butthat it would be the Ruler of Bahrain who would grant the

concession. Furthemore, the process of negotiationsduringwhich this position was reached, ran

in parallel with the so-called "arbitration"on thenershipof Hawar. During this process, longbeforeWeightman satdownto writehis letterof 22 Apnl 1939, ithadbecome afirm assumption

that the so-called "arbitratiwould formallydeliverHawarto the Rulerof Bahrain. The strong

element of prejudgmenton Weightman'spart is evidenced by several other documentsthat 1

referred to, but one passage in his letter of 12February 1939 demonstrates clearlthat he was
2
hardlygoingto takean objectiveviewwhenhe said:

"WhenonceHis Majesty'sGovernent award Hawar to Bahrain,the Shaikhof
Qatar is nolongerconcemed. If by anychancehe wereto contesttheawardby force,
he could presumablybe 'dissuaded' withoutunduedifficulty."

Thisletterwaswritteneight weeksbeforetheletterof 22Apnl.

52. Sir Ian Sinclairwill address youon some of the other aspectsof Weightman'sletterof

22April in a later presentation; but1 need only to draw the Court'sattention to one item of

particular relevancein showinghowhe misconstruedthe evidenceto supportthe decisionthathad

alreadybeen made. Weightmanrefers in his letter to Prideaux'sletterof 4 April 1909(whichis

item 45 in the judges'folders,in the first round). The Court will recall,1analysedthis letterin

somedetailin mypresentationon5 June (CR2000/8,p. 20)and1drewthe Court'sattentiontothe

conclusionthat Prideaux reachedon the basis of whathe heard firsthand fiom the fishermenhe

met on Hawar about theownership of Hawar having been granted to the Dowasirin a written

decision"morethan a 100years ago". Prideaux'sconclusion was,that "the island wouldseemto

be a dep.'. iencyof the mainland State, which the Chief of Bahrain stillclaims as morallyand

theoretic: his". 1was also ableto showthe Courtthat heclearlymeantHawar as a dependency

of the mainland, and therefore a part of Qatar. On thebasis of the sarne casual conversation

mentioned in Prideaux's letter, Weightman however proceeds toreach a completely contrary

conclusion without anyjustification, toattributeHawar'sownershipto Bahrain. He then refersto

"the written decision" mentioned by Prideaux's source,and baldly States"which howevernow

seemsto have disappeared",but volunteersthat hehad received corroboration "of this story"fiom

the local Dowasir. Weightman carefullyavoidsanyreferenceto Prideaux'sletterof20 March1909

showingthattheDowasironlywentevery winterto Hawar forfishingandhawking.

53. Furthermore, the Court will recallthat Captain Prior (later Sir Geoffrey Prior)who

becamethe Political Resident soonafier the decisionof 11July 1939onthe ownershipof Hawar,

examined,the "reasons"given in Weightman'sletter and did not considerthem at al1valid. Withthe Court's permission,1would liketo read a few passages fromPrior'sletter of 26 October 1941,

which is inyour folderat tab 9. Priorbeganby saying [screen]:

"Themoment 1saw the decisionon the Hawar Islandscase 1told Fowle that 1
thought it most unfair to Qatar and the explanations he gave me for his
recornmendationswere not oneswhichwouldcary any weight withany Arab.

The Hawar Islands case has been decided according to westernideas, and no
allowancehas beenmade forlocal customand sentiment. During3%years in Bahrain

1neverheard anythingto suggest thatthese islands belonged to Bahrain, andbelieved
them to belongto Qatar, a viewsupportedby Lorimer."

He then examinedsomeof the specific reasons and expressedhis views on a number of them. He

clearly felt theywere unsustainable. Of particularerestwas his view asto the clairnof Dowasir

as Bahraini subjects; he simply pointed out theyonly acknowledged theirown chiefs- and this

was in 1941.

He alsowentonto Say- in a passagewhichis now onthe screen:

"HadQatar had a British Adviserthis claim couldnot have been made. As for
the Hawaris'indignationthat anyoneshouldsuggestthey were notBahrain subjects, it
willbe rememberedthere is a BahrainPolice post there!

The view of independent Arabs is that Hawar belongs to Qatar and 1 am
convincedthe decisionis inequitabl..."

54. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, as 1 have already shown, Prior

concluded it would not be "practical politics" to reverse the decision and risk senous

embarrassment. It is inthis background that Qatarhas submittedthatthe Court is now in a position

to restoreto Qatarwhatwas wrongfullytakenfromit andto restoreits territorialintegrity.

Mx-.President,that brings me to the close of this presentation. M1now respectfullyask

that you givethe floorto Mr. RodmanBundy.

The PRESIDENT: Thank youverymuchMr. Shankardass. Je donnemaintenant la parole à

Mr. RodmanBundy. Mr.BUNDY: Merci,M.lePresident.

THE TERRITORIALINTEGRITYOF QATAR; THELIMITEDEXTENTOF BAHRAIN
ANDTHEMAPS

1. Mr. President, Membersof the Court. My remarks this morning will be devoted to the F

followingfour issues which continueto dividethePartiesat this stage of the proceedings:

- first, the significance of the 1868Agreements entered into between Great Britain and the

Chiefs of Qatarand Bahrain,respectively;

- second, the docurnentaryevidencewhichatteststo the factthat the Al-Thaniand Ottomanrule

extended over the entire peninsula of Qatarto the exclusionof anyBahraini presence on the

peninsula followingthe 1868Agreements;

- third, the significance of the 1913Anglo-Ottoman Convention, the 1914Anglo-Turkish

Convention and the 1916Treaty between Great Britain and Qatar, al1 of which- al1 of

which - confirmed theextentand integrityof Qatari rule over the entirepeninsula, including

necessarilyitsterritorialwaters; and

- fourth and finally- and probably tomorrow,Mr. President - the map evidence, which so

conclusively disproves Bahrain'scontention whilenreservedly supporting Qatar'stitle to the

Hawar Islands andZubarah.

2. For the mostpart, 1willbe respondingto commentsandarguments thatwere advancedby

Mr.Paulsson and Sir Elihu LauterpachtonbehalfofBahrain,although1will also have a fewthings

to Sayregarding someof Mr. Volterra'scontentionson Bahrain'sso-calledefectivités.

3. So, with thatbrief introduction,letme turnto the firstpoint, whichis the significanceof

the 1868Agreements.

1.Thelegalsignificanceofthe 1868Agreements

4. The point of departurefor examiningthe 1868Agreementswas conveniently providedby

Sir Elihu the other day inhis introductory presentation,when he asked the following rhetorical c

question: "Howwill Qatar discharge the burden of proof that undoubtedly rests upon it ...of

showing how, when and in whatdegree Bahrain lost its title to the peninsula including,more

particularly,Zubarahand the Hawars?" (CR2000111,p. 16.) 5. Of course, Qatar does not accept that Qatar alone bears the burden of proof in this case.

But the short answer to counsel'squestion is that it was by virtue of the 1868Agreements that

Bahrain was obligatedto stay in its island and to respect themaritime peace, while the Al-Thani

ruler of Qatar was, for the first time, recognized as a sovereign in his own right possessing

temtorial rights in the Qatar peninsula. So,whatever vestigeof aBahrainipresence in Qatar had

existed priorto 1868- and Qatarhas shown thatBahrain'sinfluenceon thepeninsula and, indeed,

even at homewas seriouslyeroded bythattime - whatevervestige stillmighthave remainedasof

1868that presencewasterminatedby the 1868Agreements.

6. Bahrain has been unable to produce a single piece of evidence following the

1868Agreements that it exercisedany sovereignfûnctionson the Qatar peninsula There was no

Bahraini counterpart on the peninsula to the Al-Thani Ruler, who was described in the

1868Agreements as the "Chief of Qatar". There wasno equivalent to Shaikh Jassim bin-Thani

who, in 1874, was appointedas the kaimakam of the Ottoman province of Qatar. There is no

Bahrainidocument comparabletothe 1913or 1914Conventionsor the 1916Treaîy between Qatar

and Great Britain,al1of whichconfirmedAl-Thanirule overthe entirepeninsula And there areno

maps which supportthe theory that Bahrain retainedsome kind of temtorial presence in Qatar or

the Hawarsafter 1868.

7. These facts, 1would suggest,go a long waytowards explaining why Bahrain, in its first

round, scarcely mentioned the 1868Agreements. Mr. Paulsson passed over the Agreements in

silenceas if theynever existed: and SirElihudid not advancethe mattermuch further. He simply

assertedthat the Agreementof 1868betweenGreatBntain and Qatar did littlemore than to tell the

QatariRulerto "gohome and staythere"(CR2000/14,p. 9).

8. With greatrespect,1 believe SirElihuhas things backwards. It was the Ruler of Bahrain

who was told to go home andnot to breach the maritimepeace again. It was the Ruler of Bahrain,

not the Ruler of Qatar, who was ordered to pay substantial reparationsfor breaching his

predecessor'sundertakingin 1861to observe the maritimepeace. Andit was the former Rulerof

Bahrain,by virtueof the 1868Agreements,who wasdeposedfor breaching themaritimepeaceand

for attacking Qatarand for whomthe equivalentof an arrestwarrant wasput out. 9. Quite simply, the 1868Agreements markedthe end ofany Bahrainipoliticalconnection

with Qatar and the beginning of British recognition that Qatar was,thereafter, ruled by the

Al-Thani régime. Anda ,s 1shall presentlyshow, Bahrain'sargumentsthat Al-Thaniruledid not

corne to encompass the entire peninsula, including the Hawar Islands and Zubarah, are
.\cr
conclusivelyrebutted by a wealth of documentary andcartographie evidence: andthat rule of

Qatarhasneverbeen legallydisplaced.

2. The extentof Al-Thani authorityoverQatar; the 1878Ottomansuwey rnapand
correspondingOttoman andBritishdocuments

10. This brings me to the Ottoman presence in Qatar and the 1878 rnap preparedby

CaptainIzzet of the OttomanArmy- a rnap on whichOuropponentsbravelycontinueto rely as

evidenceof Bahrain's so-calledefectivi oveérstheHawarIslands. [PlaceBahrain'sversionof the

rnaponthe screen.]

11.Mr. Paulssoncriticizedme forputting wordsin B-ahrain'ms outh. He arguedthatBahrain

had never refened to the "blue"colouringon this rnap and the blue colouringof Bahrainand the

HawarIslands to supportBahrain'scontentionthat somehow- somehow- the rnap confmed

Bahrain'ssovereigntyover the Hawar Islands.

12.1 think the easiestway to respondto this argumentis to go back to what Bahrainsaid

about this rnap in its Memorial. Because it was there that Bahrain introduced the rnap and

advancedthe following thesis: [Placetext onthe screenunderthemap.]

"It was in this period (specifically 1878) that aCaptain Izzet of the Ottoman
Arrnyprepared a primitivebut highlyinstructivernap of the region,reproducedafter

page 6, which on the one hand showsthe HawarIslands as a part ofBahrain and on
the otherhand clearly locates 'Qatar'as a place in the far south-eastcorner of the
peninsula." (Memorialof Bahrain,para.21 .)

13. Now1think the Courtwill readily see that Bahrain wasrelying on CaptainIzzet'srnap

fortwopurposes: first,thernap wassaidto showthat "theHawarIslandsarepart of Bahrain"; andsecond, Qatar, it wasargued,was located"as a place inthe far south-east cornerof the peninsula".

Soletme takethesetwo propositionsin tum.

14.How,Mr. Presidentand Membersof the Court,does this rnap showthe Hawar Islandsas

forming part of Bahrain? The only possible way Bahrain could draw such a conclusion wasby

vimie of the colouringon thernap - the Hawar Islandsare in the sameblue shadingas Bahrain-

at least so they appear. Now, if one abandonsthis line of argument,as Mr. Paulssondid whenhe

said, "If we had claimed that Captain Izzet'srnap was evidence of a conscious attempt todefine

politicalboundaries,we wouldhave been wrong." And he said, "As far as 1know, Bahrainnever

usedthe word 'blue'for this purpose." (CR2000112, p.11 .) Were you to abandonthose two lines

of reasoning,then there is no possibleway that this rnap can supportthe argument thatthe islands

formpart of Bahrain. Since it is now comrnoncause betweenthe Parties that the blue shadingon

CaptainIzzet'srnap is totally irrelevant, Bahrain's first theorythat the rnap somehow supports

Bahrainisovereigntyover the islandsis demonstrably wrong:andwe cm knockone moreitem off

of Mr.Volterra'slist of effectivités.

15. As for Bahrain's second argument - that Qatar was limitedto a place in the south-east

cornerof the peninsula- this,too, 1would suggest,is misconceived.

16.Atparagraph20 ofits Memorial, Bahrain argued:

"Bahrain continued to exercise authority over the Qatar peninsula's tiny
populationof scatteredtribesuntil 1871,whenthe Ottoman Empiretookcontrolof the
area aroundDoha Town(referred toas the kazaor province of 'Qatar')."

And then Bahrainintroduced in the next paragraphthe CaptainIzzet rnap inan effort to showthat

the "kaza"ofQatar,the province of Qatar,was limitedto the townof Qatar,or otherwiseknown as

Al-Bida.

17. Now this argument conveniently overlooksthe fact that the Ottomans drew a clear

distinctionbetweenthe "kaza "or the province of Qataron the onehand, andthe "kasaba",and the

tom, central town of the "kaza"which was also sometimescalled Qatar, on the other. This was

demonstratedby an Ottomanrnapthat Dr.FetaisAl-Merishowedto the Courtin Qatar's first round

presentation but which our opponents have chosen to ignore. [Place rnap 15 from Qatar's Map

Atlason the screen.] 18.On this map,the "kaza')of Qatar, the province,can clearlybe seen to extendthroughout

the entire Qatar peninsula [highlightin yellow the words "ka of Qatar"on the map]. The tom,

or the "kasaba", of Qatar is subject to a specialinsert on the rnap where no less than twice the

"kasaba" itself is shown to be the townof Qatar, as opposed to the entire peninsula. So when
?
CaptainIzzet labelled Qatar in the south-eastportionof the map,he was referring to the "kasaba"

or town of Qatar,not the entire administrativedistrict of Qatar.

19. Now,it was not simplyOttomanmapswhichconhed the distinctionbetweenthe kaza

of Qatar, encompassingthe entirepeninsula,and the "kasaba" or town of Qatar. Indeed, Ottoman

reports concerningQatarrepeatedlymakethe samepoint. For exarnple,one report inthe recordby

an Ottomanofficial, KamilPasha, on Arabia describedQatar in the followingterms [placetexts on

screen simultaneously]: "The place called Qatar,on the coast at a distance of one hundred miles

from theOjeir land station,is a tongue projectingintothe seabetweenOman and BahrainIsland."

The report then went on to Say: "The administrativecentre of this kaza is the kasaba Al-Bida."

Once againyou seethe clear distinctionbetween thetwo overlookedby Ourcolleagueson the other

side.(Replyof Qatar,Ann.11.45,Vol. 2, p. 255.)

20. And in fact Bahrain's own documents disprove its thesis. For exarnple, we find a

1909Ottoman documentattachedto Bahrain'sCounter-Memorialwhich candidlyrecountsthe fact

that [place text on screen]: "The districts of Zubareand Udeyd are extensions of the Katar

subdivision of the province of Nejid and occupy important positions." (Counter-Memorialof

Bahrain, Ann.35 (b),Vol. 2, p. 113.) The subdivisionwas the province of Nejid,the district was

Qatar. Zubare and Udeyd as well as Al-Bidawerepart or toms or smallerunits withinthe district

of Qataras a whole.

21. So much for Mr. Paulsson's contentionthat Captain Izzet's rnap somehow supports

Bahrain'scase or that the Ottoman administrativedistrict of Qatarwas lirnitedtoDoha or Al-Bida

The documentsreally show nothingofthe sort. [Placefull Izzetrnap onthe screen.] Moreover,we

are stilleft wonderingwhy Bahrainsaw fit to producea manifestlyincompleteversion ofthe rnap

in itsMemorial if it was not to cover upthe fact thatthe blue shadingthat appears on the rnap and

used for Bahrain and the Hawar Islands also appearsin many other places on the map. My

colleague on the other side now says that "Bahrainwould have readily provided Qatarwith thenorthern half of the rnap if Qatar had only asked for it" (CR 2000112,pp. 11-12). But surely,

Mr.President,Qatar was entitledto believe that Bahrainhad compliedwith the Rulesof Court and

specificallyArticle50, which stipulates that if only parts of a document are relevant, only such

extracts as are necessary need be annexed, but a copy of the whole documentshall be deposited

with the Registry. Since Bahrain did not deposit the whole map, Qatar assurned that the rnap

providedby Bahrain in itsMemorialwas thewholemap, and we were subsequentlyto findout that

this wasnotthe case.

22. Mr.Volterra tried to shore up the Captain Izzet rnap by refemng to a 1879illustration

that was attached to CaptainDurand'sreport on Bahrain as somehow being consistent with the

Izzetdepiction. Here is theDurandrnapthat counsel referred to.

[Place 1879Durandrnap- Bahrain SupplementalDocuments,Ann.22 on the screen]

23. While it is true that Bahrain did indeed submit this rnap with its Supplemental

Documents lastMarch, it is curiousto say the least,that Bahrain did not see fit to attachthe report

to which thisrnapwas itself attachedin accordancewith the Rules of Court. Had Bahraindone so,

had it actuallyfurnishedthe report,the Court would havebeen able to seefor itself thatthe report

was no more than an archaeological and anthropological study of Bahrain with no political

ramifications whatsoever. CaptainDurand never travelledto Qatar and did not purportto express

any viewsasto its politicalstatus. Indeed,he acknowledgedthat the dottedline that appears onthe

rnap marked the limits of his ignorance. What Captain Durand did Say was that Bahrain was

surroundedby water on everyside - hardlya descriptionwhich accordswith Bahrainhaving any

territorialnghts on the Qatarpeninsulaor the HawarIslands.

24. Thefact remainsthat SheikhJassim AI-Thanr iuled the entireprovince of Qatar,and that

he govemedthe temtory both in his own right and as surrogate for the Ottoman Empire. There

was no correspondingBahrainipresenceon the peninsula,and no Bahrainiadministrativestructure

of any kind in Qatar or the HawarIslands. Thisstate of affairs was repeatedlyrecognizedboth in

the cartography(officia1andnon-official) of thetime as well as in the docurnentaryevidence. 25. If we turnto the early years of the twentieth century, a 1904MilitaryReport on Arabia

preparedby Britishauthonties clearlydistinguishedBahrain,onthe one hand,which wasdescribed

as being separatedby the sea fi-omthe mainlandlying to the south and south-east,in other words

separated by the sea from themainland of Qatar andthe rest of Arabia, that report distinguished
w
Bahrain on the one hand fi-omQatar, and Qatar was descnbed in the followingterms- this you

will find as No. 10 in the your folders (Reply of Qatar,n.11.37,Vol. 2, p. 214) [place text on

screen]: "The Katar peninsula to the east of the island of Bahrein is ruled by Sheikh

Jasimn-ib-Thani,a nch andpowerfulchief, whohas a following ofabout 2,000fightingmen."

26. What is strikingabout this Reportis that the islandof Bahrain was clearly differentiated

fiom Qatar. This, of course, was no morethan a confmation of the political state of affairsthat

had existed ever since the 1868Agreements. Moreover, the reference toShaikh Jassim'srule in

Qatarwas to the peninsull ying to the eastof Bahrain, notto somesmall portion of it. Therewas

no suggestion that Bahrain possessed any territorial pretensions on the peninsula impinging on

Al-Thanirule.

27. Shortlyafterwards,Lorimer'sfarnousGazetteerof the area whichcontained a sectionon

Qatarwas printed And the relevant extractsfromthat documentmay be found in under tab 11in

the dossier thatyou have today. Onepoint1would particularly like tostressabout this documentis

that it was not simply prepared byLorimerhimself, as the report says, it was compiled witb the

assistanceof the PoliticalAgent in Bahrainandthe Political Assistantin the Gulf Ithusreflected

not simply Lorimer'sviews but the consideredviews ofBritish officiaistationedin the area at the

time.

28. Now Lorimer startsby describingQatar as "aremarkabletongue of land projectingfiom

the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf'. Lest our opponents suggest that Lonmer was only

concemed with a geographicdescriptionof Qatar, thened sectionof his entryis very significant.

It is headed "Boundaries"and reads as follows[texton screen]:"Boundarie- sOn the east,north

andwest Qataris surroundedby the sea. Thesouthemboundaryis somewhat indeterminate."

29. Now Lorimerwent on to cataloguethe variousplacescomprisingQatar in bisreport,and

includedas part of the "Eastide of Qatar"were suchwell-knownlocalitiesunder Al-Thanirule asDoha or Wakrah. Includedunderthe heading"Westside of Qatar" were theHawar Islands,Janan

andZubarahamongstmanyothersand theseplacesweretreatedno differentlythan Doha.

30. Here we have, 1 wouldsuggest,Mr.Presidentand Membersof the Court, an authoritative

account of Qatar, compiled with the assistance of the Political Agent in Bahrain, which

unequivocallydescribedtheHawarIslands,ZubarahandJanan as fallingwithinQatar's boundaries.

31. As Mr.Volterra reminded the Court,Lorimer also referred to the factthat the Dowasir

had houses at two places on Hawar whichwere used in the winter. Lorimer when on to note that

fishermen - not necessarilyDowasir - butfishermenfrequentedHawar. Butthe important point

is that,despite these references to the Dowasir- in spite of these references- Lorimer still

includedthe HawarIslandswithinthe temtory of Qatar. Clearly,the authorsof the Lorimerreport

did notconsiderthat the presenceof the Dowasir inwinter months for fishingpurposesor, indeed

of other itinerant fishermenin the islands,meantthat the islands somehow appertainedto Bahrain

or thattheirpresence was à titrde souverain.

32. Moreover, this stateof affairs was confirmedby Prideaux in 1909when he travelledto

the Hawar Islands. The Court will recall that it was during the course of this visit that a local

Dowasir tribesman informed Prideaux that, while Zakhnuniya was undoubtedly a Bahrain

possession, the Dowasir regardedthe HawarIslands as their independent territory. This did not

mean that there was an independent State of the Dowasir, as counsel for Bahrain perhaps

rhetorically suggested, but rather that the Dowasirdid not view their seasonal presence on the

HawarIslands as having anythingto do withthe exerciseby the ruler of Bahrain ofany sovereign

functionsoverthe islands.

33. One would also havethought fromMr. Paulsson's descriptionthat travel within Qatar at

this time was exceedinglydifficult. However,in the same Lorimer report that you have,he notes

that "travelis not more difficultin Qatar thanin any otherbarren butopencountrywhichiswithout

inhabitants but not altogether without water" (Memorial of Qatar, Ann.11.4,Vol. 3, p. 140).

Moreover,the distance acrossQatar is not comparable,as 1believe Mr.Paulsson suggested,to the

distance between Washington DC and Califomia. The distance is perhaps more akin to the

distancebetweenThe HagueandUtrecht. 34. It is instructiveto comparethese accountsof Qatar with how Bahrain was viewed at the

tirne. Lorimer, for example, cataloguedthe BahrainPrincipality in 1908just as he had done for

Qatar. While Lorimer acknowledgedthat the "term" Bahrainhad once been more extensive, he

noted that[placetexton screen]:

"The present Shaikhdom of Bahrain [the present Shaikhdom of Bahrain]
consists of the archipelago formed by the Bahrain, Muharraq, Umm Na'asan,Sitrah
and Nabi Salih islands and by a number of lesser islets and rocks which are
enumerated in the articles upon the islands: taken al1together these form a compact
groupalmostin themiddle ofthe gulf whichdividesthepromontory of Qatar fromthe

coastof Qatif. .."(Memorialof Qatar,Ann.11.3,Vol. 3,p. 88.)

35. Counsel for Bahrain suggested that referencessuch as these were mere geographical

descriptions,not politicales (CR2000112,pp. 33 and 36). But this is not borne out either by the

language which Lorimer used or by a subsequent 1916Handbook of Arabia prepared for the

British AdmiraltyandWar Office. Those you canfmd at tab 12 of your folders, andboth of these

documentsspecificallyreferredto the "present Shaikhdomof Bahrain", apolitic daescriptionnota

geographical one. None of these accounts suggested in any way that the Bahrain Shaikhdom

extendedacross the seato the HawarIslands or Zubarah. To the contrary, al1of the contemporary

descriptionsof the politicalextent of Bahrainwere entirely consistentwith the map that had been

preparedby Bent forthe Royal Geographical Societyin 1890[placemap on the screen] as well as

with al1 the other cartographie evidence which Qatar presented in its pleadings and which 1

reviewedin the firstround.

3. The1913Anglo-OttomanConvention,the 1914Anglo-TurkishConventiona ,ndthe 1916
TreatybetweenGreatBritainandQatar

36. This, then, is the histoncal context within which the 1913Anglo-Ottoman Convention, .

the 1914Anglo-TurkishConventionandthe 1916TreatybetweenGreatBritainand Qatar fa11to be

examined. 37.The Courtwill recallthatthe relevantprovisions of the1913Anglo-OttomanConvention

are to befoundin Article 11. The firstpart of Article 11describedthe course of the line whichthe

partiesagreedwouldseparatethe SanjakofNejd "fromthe peninsulaof Al-Qatar". Article11then

went onto Saythe following[place texton screen inEnglish and French]:

"The Ottoman Imperia1Govemment having renounced al1 its claims to the
peninsula ofal-Qatar, it is understoodby the two Governmentsthat the peninsulawill

be governed as in the past by the shaykh Jasim-bin-Saniand his successors. The
GovemmentofHis BritannicMajestydeclaresthat itwill notallow the interferenceof
the shaykh of Bahrayn in the interna1 affairs of al-Qatar, his endangering the
autonomyofthearea orhisannexingit."

38. Here we have, once again, a clear recognitionby both the British Government and the

Ottomansthat the Qatar peninsula wouldbe governed,as in the past, by ShaikhJassim bin-Thani

andhis successors.

39. Bahrain is right to be troubled by this important document whichis so fundamentally

incompatible withitscase. ThusMr.Paulssonraisedtwo argumentsin an attempt todo away with

the 1913Convention. First, counsel remindedthe Court thatthe 1913Convention hadneverbeen

ratified and he concluded that it was thus irrelevant. Second, Mr. Paulsson argued that the

1914Convention, which was ratified, didnot refer to the "peninsula"of Qatar or to Al-Thani rule

over the Qatari peninsula, although it did include a specificreference back to Article 11 of the

1913Convention(CR2000/12,pp. 8-9).

40. Each of these argumentscanbe readilyrebutted.

41. With respect to the first point, the non-ratification ofthe 1913Treaty, thiswas largely

due to the outbreak of war. But the important point - the important point- is that the

1913Treaty, while not creating binding rights and obligationson the parties by virtue of its

non-ratification,id accuratelyreflectthe parties'commonview as to the territorial situationat the

time andthe statusof the Al-ThaniRulersas governedin the past,and as stillgoverning,the entire

Qatar peninsula The fai1u1.e of the Treaty tocome into effectin no way diminishesthe probative

value of that document as contemporary evidence of how the interested parties viewed the

territorialsituation. 42. In the Eritredemen case, the Arbitral Tribunal was faced with a similar question

involving the probative value to be given to two agreements between Great Britain and Italy

undertaken, respectively,in 1927and 1938. Neither of thoseagreementsever came intoforce.

43. Nonetheless, as to the 1927 Agreement,the Tribunalacknowledgedthat it couldnot be *

regardedas beinga binding treatybetween States. Nonetheless,the agreementwas [place text on

screen]:

"an accurateaccount of whatboth partieshad agreed and wassigned by them as such.
It is simply evidence of the thinking of the time- this time by both parties-in
much the same way as the Tribunal has been presented with a myriad of other

evidence in non-treaty form .. . It is diplornatic evidence, likeany other, but of an
undoubted interest becauseit reflects whatwas recorded by bothparties as that which
they had agreedto." (Awardin First Phase,para 172.)

44. As to the 1938 TreatybetweenGreatBritain andItaly, whichalso never came intoforce,

the Tribunalnoted much the samething. It stated [placetext onscreen]:

"Thereis no evidence, however,that either Italy or the United Kingdom failed
to proceedwith registration [of the Treaty] for any reasonother than the approaching

war clouds. The text of the treaty still has significance,which the Tribunal may
properly takeaccount of, asto the understandingof the partiesin the autumn of 1938
regarding the correct position of the islands and their intentionat that moment as to
how they shouldcontinuetobe treated." (AwardinFirst Phase,para. 183.)

45. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, the samereasoning,1would respectfully subrnit,

appliesmutatis mutandis, to the 1913Anglo-OttomanConvention. It is relevant as contemporary

evidenceof the viewsof Great Britain andthe Ottomansasto the statusand extentof the authority

of Al-Thanirule inQatar.

46. As for Mr. Paulsson'ssecond argument- that the 1913Convention says two things,

"peninsula" and"southemborder",while the 1914Conventiononlysays that the "southemborder"

of Qatar willbe inaccordance withthe 1913text - this argumentis of even lesshelp to Bahrain's

casethan the firstargument.

47. Mr. Paulsson criticized Qatar for not including the 1914Convention in the judges'

folders. 1am happyto say that we have now complied with counsel's wishes,and the Court will
*
findboththe 1913and 1 914Conventionsin tab 13in its folders. Mr.Paulssonassertedthat "There

is nothing in the ratified Convention of 1914 that could be said to incorporate a recognition of

Al-Thani rule over a Mtary Qatari peninsula". He then went on to conclude, somewhatominously,that "it seems we mustbe very carefulwhen examiningthe alleged interrelationship of

historicaldocuments" (CR2000/12,p. 9).

48. Indeed, we do have to be careful,Mr. President. Unfortunately, my distinguished

colleague failed to point out that the actual language used in Article III of the 1914Convention

referredto a line which separatedthe "temtory"-the "temtory"- of the OttomanSanjakofNejd

fromthe "temtory" of Qatar. And this reference to "temtory" was very significant. Forif weare

to pay heed to my colleague's concem about the "interrelationshipof histoncal documents",we

shouldnot forgetthat in 1934,whenthe British werestudying Qatar'sboundaries,a Foreign Office

analysis of the 1913 and 1914Conventionshad the following interesting thingto Say [tab 14 in

judges'folders,p. 2,para. 31[placetext on screen]:

"A second point whichhas emergedis that the 1914Convention speaks of the

blue line as separating the Turkish territory from the 'temtory' of Qatar, and not
merely, as in the case of the 1913Convention,from the 'peninsula' of Qatar. Weare
now of opinion that this further strengthens our case for contending that the
negotiators of the Convention intended to regardthe temtories to the east ofthe 'blue
line' as politically appertaining to the Sheikhdom of Qatar and not merely as
geographically attached to the Qatar peninsula." (Counter-Memorial of Qatar,

Ann.111.41V , ol. 3, p. 228.)

49. So, if anything,the Britishviewwasthat the 1914Convention was even more explicitin

confiming the politicalextentofthe temtory ofQatarthanthe 1913Convention.

50. At this point, Mr.President, 1have twofurther issues with which 1would wish todeal

with. One would be naturally to talk about the 1916Treaty between GreatBntain and Qatar,

which is highly relevant, and the last section of my presentationdeals with the map comments

made by our colleaguesin their first round presentation. Giventhat it is shortly before 1o'clock,

perhapsit would be betterto takeup those subjectstomorrowmoming.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie beaucoup,M. Bundy. Ceci met un terme ànotre séance

de ce matin. La Cour se réunira à nouveau demain à 10heures pour entendre la suite de la

présentationde Qatar. La séanceest levée.

L'audience estlevée à13heures.