1 ~oh-~orri~é1
Uncorrected
CR2000/18
InternationalCourt Courinternationale
ofJustice deJustice
THEHAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2000
Publicsitîing
held on Wednesday21June 2000,at 10am., atthePeace Palace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding
in the caseconcerningMaritime Delimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbetween
QatarandBahrain(Qatarrain)
VERBATIMRECORD
ANNEE2000
Audiencepublique
tenuele mercredi21juin 2000,s,auPalais de laPaix,
sous laprésidM.Guillaume,président
en l'affairedelaDélimitationmaritimeetdesquestionsterritorialesentre QataretBahrein
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBemirdez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésents:M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBemiudez
Fortier,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierTheState of Qatar isrepresentedby:
H.E.Dr.Abdullah bin AbdulatifAl-Muslemani, Secretary-Genera olfthe Cabinet,
asAgentandCounsel;
Mr.Adel Sherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr.SamiAbushaikha,Legal Expert,
as Counsel;
Mr.EricDavid, ProfessorofInternationalLaw,Université librede Bruxelles,
Dr.Ali bin FetaisAl-Men, DirectorofLegal Department,DiwanAmiri,
Mr.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec,Professor of International Law at the University of Paris 1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr.Jean Salmon, Professoremeritusof InternationalLaw, Université libde Bruxelles,Member
of the Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr.R. K. P. Shankardass, SeniorAdvocate, SupremeCourt of India, Former President of the
International Bar Association,
SirIanSinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,BarristeratLaw, MemberoftheInstituteofInternationalLaw,
SirFrancis Vallat,.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Professoremeritusof International Law, University of
London,Memberemeritusofthe Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr.RodrnanR. Bundy,Avocatà la Cour d'apped le Paris, Memberof the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Ms NanetteE. Pilkington,Avocatà la Courd'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
as CounselandAdvocates;
MsCherylDunn,Member oftheState Barof California, FrereCholmeley~EvershedsP ,aris,
MsInes SabineWilk, Lawyer before the GermanCourt of Appeal,Member of the Chamber of
Lawyers ofBerlin, Germany,
as Counsel;
Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations,MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland
(United StatesofAmerica),
Mr.RobertC. Rizzutti, Project Manager, MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland(United Statesof
America),
Ms StephanieK.Clark, SeniorCartographer, MapQuest.comC , olumbia, Maryland (United States
of America),
asExperts;
H.E.SheikhHamad binJassimbin JaborAl-Thani,Minister forForeign Affairs,
H.E. Mr.Ahrnedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud, Minister of Statefor ForeignAffairs,
as Obsewers.
TheState of Bahrainis representedby:
H.E.Mr.Jawad SalimAl-Arayed, Ministerof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
asAgent;L 'Etatde Qatarestrepreséntépear :
S. Exc.M. Abdullah bin AbdulatifAl-hr;uslemani,secrétairegénéral gouvernement,
commeagentet conseil;
M. Adel Sherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,
comme conseils;
M. EricDavid, professeurde droitinternationàll'Universitélibrede Bruxelles,
M. Alibin FetaisAl-Meri, directeurdes affairesjuridiques du conseil del'émir,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M. Jean Salmon,professeur émérite de droit internatiànl'université libre deBruxelles,membre
de 1'Institut dedroit international,
M. R. K. P. Shankardass, avocat principaà la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'AssociationinternationaleduBarreau,
Sir Ian Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., avocat,membrede l'Institutde droitinternational,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E.,K.C.M.G., Q.C.,professeur éméree droit internationala l'université
de Londres,membreémérite de l'Institutde droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy,avocatàlaCourd'appelde Paris,membredu barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington, avocaà la Cour d'appel de Paris, cabinet FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,
Paris,
comme conseilset avocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de 1'Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mme Inès SabineWilk,avocat prèsd'une cour d'appel d'Allemagne,membre de la chambredes
avocatsàBerlin,Allemagne,
comme conseils;
M. Scott B. Edmonds, directeur du service des levés cartographiques,sociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland (Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
M. Robert C. Rizmtti, administrateur de projet, société MapQuest.com, ColumbiaM , aryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K.Clark, cartographe hors classe, société MapQuest.com, Columbia M, aryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
comme experts;
S.Exc. le cheikhHarnad bin Jassim bin JabAl-Thani,ministre desaffairesétrangères,
S. Exc. M.Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministredYEtatauxaffairesétrangères,
comme observateurs.
L'EtatdeBahreïn estrepresentépar :
S.Exc. M. JawadSalimAl-Arayed,ministred7Etatde lYEtatde Bahreïn,
commeagent;Dr. Fathi Kemicha, Member ot fhe Barof Paris, Kemicha& Associés (Tunis),
ProfessorSirElihuLauterpacht, Q.C.,C.B.E.,Honorary Professor ofthe UniversityofCambridge,
Member oftheInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr.Jan Paulsson,FreshfieldsP, aris,Memberofthe Barsof Parisand theDistrictof Columbia,
Professor Michael Reisman,Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law of Yale Law
School,MemberoftheBarof Connecticut,AssociateoftheInstitutdedroitinternational, 4
Mr.Robert Volterra, Freshfields, LondonM, emberof theBarofUpperCanada,
Professor Prosper Weil, Emeritus Professoartthe University of ParisII (Panthéon-Assas), Member
of the Académiedes sciencesmoraleset politiques (Institutde France),Memberof the Institut
de droitinternational,
as CounselandAdvocates;
Sheikh Khalidbin AhmedAl-Khalifa, First Secretary, Ministry of ForeigA nffairs of the State of
Bahrain,
Commander Christopher Carleton,M.B.E., Headof the Law of the Sea Division of the United
KingdomHydrographieOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields, Paris, Member oftheBarsof ParisandBeijing,
Mr.Graham Coop, Freshfields, Paris, Barrister and Solicitorhfe High Courtof NewZealand and
Solicitorofthe SupremeCourt ofEnglandand Wales,
Mr. AndrewNewcombe, Freshfields, ParisM , emberof the Bar of BritishColumbia,
Dr. Beth Olsen,Advisor,Ministryof State oftheStateofBahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson, Former Reader atthe University of Oxford, EmeritusFellow, St.Hugh's
College, Oxford,
as Advisors;
H.E.SheikhMohammedbinMubarakAlKhalifa,MinisterforForeignAffairs,StateofBahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Azizbin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Ambassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E.Dr. MohammedJaber Al-Ansari, Advisorto HisHighness,the Arnirof Bahrain,
Mr.GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, State ofBahrain,
Her Excellency SheikhaHaya Al Khalifa, Ambassadorof the State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr. YousefMahmood,DirectoroftheOffice of the Foreign MinisterS , tateof Bahrain,
as Observers;
Mr.JonAddison, Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Ms MaisoonAl-Arayed, Ministry of State otfhe Stateof Bahrain,
Mr.NabeelAl-Rumaihi,Ministry of Stateof the State of Bahrain,
Mr.HafedhAl-Qassab,Ministry of State ofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms AneesaHanna,Embassyof Bahrainin London,
MsJeanetteHarding, Ministry of Stateofthe State of Bahrain,
Ms VanessaHarris, Freshfields,
MsIvaKratchanova,Ministry of State otfhe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Mr. KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr. YasserShaheen,SecondSecretary,MinisûyofForeignAffairsofthe StateofBahrain,
asAdministrativeStafîM. Fathi Kemicha,membredu barreau de Pans, cabinet Kemicha & Associés,Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E., professeur honoràil'universitéde Cambridge, membre de
l'Institutde droit international,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membre des barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. Michael Reisman,professeurde droit internationaàl'universitéde Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associéde l'Institut de droit
international,
M. RobertVolterra,cabinetFreshfields,Londres,membredubarreauduHautCanada,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émériteà l'université deParis II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de
l'Académiedes sciencesmorales et politiques(Institutde France), membre de l'Institutde droit
international,
commeconseilset avocats;
Le cheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, premier secrétaire,ministèredes affaires étrangèresde
1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Le capitainede frégateChristopherCarleton, M.B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droit maritimedu
bureau hydrographiquedu Royaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfïelds,Paris,membredesbarreauxde Pariset de Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseillerde la Coursuprêmed'Angleterreet duPays de Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinetFreshfields,Pans, membre dubarreaude laColombiebritannique,
Mme BethOlsen,conseiller,ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancien maître de conférenceà l'université d'Oxford, membre éméritedu
CollègeSaintHugh,Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S.Exc. lecheikhMohammedbin MubarakAlKhalifa,ministredesaffairesétrangèresdeBahrein,
S.Exc. le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etat de Bahrein aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc. M.MohammedJaber Al-Ansari, conseiller deSonAltesse l'émirde Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi, sous-secrétairdYEtataux affaires étrangèrse1'Etatde Bahreïn,
S.Exc. la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etatde Bahreïn auprèsde la République
française,
M. YousefMahmood,directeurdu bureauduministredes affairesétrangères de Bahreïn,
commeobservateurs;
M. Jon Addison,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed,ministèredYEtat de 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M.NabeelAl-Rumaihi, ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. HafedhAl-Qassab, ministèred'Etatde I'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme AneesaHanna,ambassadede Bahreïn, Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding,ministèredYEtatde I'EtatdeBahreïn,
MmeVanessaHarris,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministèred'Etatde I'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg, cabinetFreshfields,
M. KevinMottram,cabinetFreshfields,
M. YasserShaheen, secondsecrétaire,ministère desaffairesétrangèrde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
commepersonneladministratif: Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest ouverte et je donne la parole à
M. Bundy au nom de l'État de Qatar pour qu'il termine l'exposéqu'il avait commencéhier.
MonsieurBundy,vousavez la parole.
Mr. BUNDY: Merci,Monsieur le Président.
51. Mr. President,Membersof the Court,when the Courtrose yesterday1hadjust finished
speakingaboutthe relevance ofthe 1913Anglo-Ottoman Conventionand the 1914Anglo-Turkish
Convention andthisbrings me quitenaturally to the 1916Treatybetween Qatarand GreatBritain.
Once again, this Treaty demonstratedthe Al-Thani régime'scapacity to enter into international
agreements- in otherwords, to actas an independent politicalentity regardlessof whether it was
termed a"State"or not. The 1916Treatyalso demonstratedthetemtorial integrityof Qatar.
52. Counsel for Bahrain complained that when in our first round Qatar referred to the
1916Treaty as coveringthe "wholepeninsula"of Qatar that we had gratuitouslyadded theword
"whole"to the description whichdid not appearin the Treaty.If 1may quote from Mr. Paulsson's
remarks last week: "Inother words,or so Qatarsuggests,the 1916Agreementwiththe Shaikhof
Qatarmust meanmorethan what itsays." (CR2000112,p. 9.)
53. Mr.Paulsson then allegedthat Sheikh Abdullah Al-Thanihimself, in 1934, was said to
have concededthatthe 1916Treatyonlydealtwiththe interiorof Qatarbutnot thecoast. (Ibid.)
54. Once again, Mr. President, 1 regret to Say that our distinguished opponents have
neglected to place the documentsin their proper historical context. This is particularlysurprising
becausethe documentwhich my opponent citedfrom was a documentfimished by Bahrain itself
in its Counter-Mernorial. [PlaceCounter-Mernorialof Bahrain, Vol.,pp. 411and412 on screen.]
55. The relevant documentisnow being placedon the screenand Membersof the Courtwill
also find itn tab 15 of your folders. Here is the bit whichMr.Paulsson relied on as part of an
exchangebetween theQatari Ruler andthe BritishPoliticalResidentand there youwill seethatthe
Ruleris recordedas saying [enlargerelevantquoteon screen]:
"At any rate 1have not yet done anything contrary to the terms of the [19161
Treaty and would leave matters for discussion whensuch terms are being infiinged
The Treaty does not include the interior but only the coast and 1 have some other
arrangementwith Bin Sa'udaccordingto which nooneventures to encroachupon my
temtory." 56. What Mr. Paulsson failed todisclose was that on the very next pagethe documentwent
on to record the Political Resident's reactionto what the Ruler of Qatar hadsaid. [Placerelevant
quoteon screen.] Andthe Political Resident repliedas follows:
"According to Bin Sa'ud'sTreaty with the British Govemment he cannot
interfere in your affairs and it iscause of your Treaty with the Govemment that he
cannotdo anythingand if he does,the Govemment will preventhim. Andyou arethe
Ruler ofal1Qatar and theTreaw [the 1916Treaty] extendsto the whole of Qatar."
(Counter-Memorialof Bahrain,Ann, 122,Vol. 2,p. 412.)
57. What could be clearer evidence of how the 1916 Treaty was viewed by the British?
Bahrain's contention that Al-Thani rule was somehow circumscribed by the 1913 and 1914
Conventionsor by the 1916Treatyis flatly contradicted,1wouldsuggest,by the record Qatar was
recognized as a long-standingand separatepoliticalentity under Al-Thani rule covering theentire
peninsula Necessarily, as an independent entity, that territory was entitled to a 3-mile belt of
territorial watersunninground its coastunder internationallaw asit stood atthe time.
58. In these circumstances, was it necessary for the Al-Thani Rulers to exercise
simultaneously over al1of their dominions sovereignty absentany competingclaim or presence in
Qatar? The answermustbe no. Whileour distinguished opponents have quoted extensivelyfiom
Judge Huber's Awardin the Island of Palmas case, there is one telling passage fiom that Award
that they have passed overand, with the Court'sindulgence, 1am now putting that passageon the
screen [placetext on screen]. It reads:
"Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, itis true, different forms,
according to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle,
sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of temtory.
The intermittence and discontinuity compatible withthe maintenance of the right
necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or
regions enclosed within temtories in which sovereignS is incontestablydisplayed or
againregionsaccessible from, forinstance,the high seas." (UNRIAA,Vol.II, p. 840.)
59. It isquite true that Qatar at the time, and indeed still today, is a relatively unpopulated
country. But the situation in Bahrain was not materially different even though Bahrain was a
compact groupof islands. As a MilitaryReport forthe British War Officein 1904noted: "Al1the
large towns [that is of Bahrain] are at the north end of the island" (Reply of Qatar,Ann.11.37,
Vol.2, p. 21 1). The southand south-easterncoastsof Bahrainwererelativelybarren. 60. 1 trust that the Court will thus appreciatethat there is a double standardin Bahrain's
arguments. On the one hand, counsel for Bahrainharp on the fact that most of the populationof
Qatarwas locatedon the east Coastof Qatar. Andonthe other,counselpass over in silencethe fact
that thesouth and south-east coastsof Bahrain- these are the coasts that lie across the sea from
the Hawar Islands - were also sparselypopulated. But these facts are not very important. What
the evidencethat 1have reviewed does show,however,is thatAl-Thanisovereignty repeatedlyand
consistently was recognized as encompassing al1 of the areas included as part of the Qatar
peninsula.
4.The rnapevidence
61.At thisjuncture, Mr. President, itis appropriate toSaya few words about the mapsand,
in doing so, 1would like to respond to points that Sir Elihu Lauterpachtraised in his presentation
on the subject. Before entering into details, permit me first very briefly to comment on what
M.. Paulssonhadto Sayaboutthernapevidence.
62. Accordingto my distinguishedconfrère said, "The rnapgame can be played ininfinite
permutations." Indeed,he acknowledged that, "Anyonecan inundate the Court with inconclusive
maps." (CR 2000112,p. 12.) Counseladdedthatthe CaptainIzzetmap, and1quote,is "a farmore
interestingrnapthan ones drawnupby ItaliansorAustralians,sittingat theirdesks faraway" (ibid.,
p. 11).
63. Butwithrespect, Mr. President, themapsare not a game. Themaps are senous evidence
of what a distinguished Tribunal sitting in the Eritredemen case called "general opinion or
repute" (Awardin the First Phase, para.381). Theonly reasonwhy Bahrain denigratesthe mapsis
because they sirnplydo not supportBahrain's case.The Courtcan be assuredthat if Bahrain had
been able to muster any rnap evidence supportingits contentions,it would have done so. Indeed,
Bahrain did introduce four maps in its Supplemental Documentsof last March, al1of which 1 r
showedin my first round presentationto be withoutrelevance; and 1am happy to seethat counsel
for Bahrain,in their presentation,id not returnto any of thesemaps to try to resurrectthem. The
one-way direction ofthe maps, consistentlyandovenvhelminglyin Qatar's favour, is telling in and
of itself. 64. Moreover,to attemptto downplay thesignificance ofthe mapsby sayingthat theywere
preparedby foreignerssittingfar awayattheir desksin chanceriesis to ignorethe factthat manyof
the States under whose auspices the maps were prepared had important strategic interests in the
Gulf at the time. One needlook no furtherthan the decisionin the SharjaWDubaiArbitrationto
see that the Arbitral Tribunalin thatecisionexpresslytook note ofthe factthat European Powers,
such as France, Germany,Russia - not to mention Great Britain- al1had important interestsin
the Gulf area in the late nineteenth century.(SharjaWDubai Award, 91ILR., at p. 560.) It was
thus hardly surprisingthat officia1cartographersand expert map-makersfrom these countries took
pains to depictthe ten-itorialsituationinthe Gulfwith accuracy.
65. Bythe sametoken,Sir Elihu's complaint that many of the mapsare of a small scalein no
way diminishesthe probativevalue that should beattached tothem. As 1have noted,the mapsthat
Qatar has introducedwereproducedby officialgovernmentagenciesand cartographieinstitutes of
the highest order. Thesewere not impressionistpainters spreadingpigment across acanvas; these
were professional map-makers whose reputations dependedon the accuracy ofthe maps that they
produced.
66. Remember, Mr.President and Members of the Court, if you will, that a significant
number of themaps thatQatar hasproducedin its Map Atlasare actually of a muchlarger sizethan
appear there: we had to reduce the maps for the Map Atlas in order to present them in a
manageable size. The fact remains that the maps are of a sufficient size which permitted the
map-makers clearly to distinguish Qatar, including the Hawar Islands and Zubarah, fiom the
separate entity of Bahrain. Similar maps werepresented during the course of the Eritredemen
case in order to depict islandswhich werein fact even smallerthan the Hawar Islandsin this case.
There, the Tribunal hadno hesitation in observingthat: "Theseislands are large enough to find a
place quite often-though by no means always- on even relatively small-scale maps of the
region." (Award in theFirstPhase, para. 490.)
67. Next, Sir Elihutook issue withthe colouringthat appears on the maps. Here, he rested
his case on the fact that "the Tribunal in the Eritredemen case thought it necessaryto enter a
qualificationas to the evaluationof the colourof maps" (CR2000114,p. 10). What my colleague
neglected to point out, however, was that when the Tribunal, in Eritredemen, made thatobservation, it did so only with respect to maps that were prepared before 1872 when
hand-colouringwas still used ina secondstageof the preparation ofmaps. (Eritrea/Yemen,Award
in the First Phase, para. 370.) That method of map-making was outmoded by the end of the
nineteenth century and certainly by the early twentieth century when the maps that Qatar has
introduced were produced. As 1 noted in my first intervention,the Court need have no qualms
about the technicalaccuracyofthe mapsthat Qatar has introduced.
68. SirElihuthen tookissue with the fact that the mapsdepicted the political statusof Qatar
and the Hawar Islands. To make this point, he showed the rnap that is now being placed onthe
screen, arnap thatwas publishedin 1884. [Placeenlargement ofrnap 11of Qatar'sMapAtlas on
the screen.]
69. Counsel'sargumentcentred on the fact that the word "OMAN"appears at thebottom of
thernap under Qatarand thatthere was noboundarydrawnbetweenOman and Qatar (CR2000/14,
pp. 10-11). Counsel concludedfrom this thatthe rnap "manifestlydoes not supportthe ideathat as
a matter of generalrepute, Qatar was as a result of the 1868Treaty a separate, recognized State"
(ibid.,p. 11).
70. 1would respectfully submit that there are two flaws with this line of argument. First,
counsel overlooks the fact, which Lorimer in fact had expressly recognized in 1908, that the
southemborder of Qatar at thistime was indeterminate. Hence,it is hardly surprisingthat the rnap
refersto Omaninthe far south: and secondly,the rnapstilldemonstrateswith admirableclaritythe
fact that Qatar andBahrain were distinct entities. The rnapalso shows that the Hawar Islands and
Zubarahwerenotdeemedto appertainto Bahrain. TheywereQatari.
71. Counsel advanced an even more untenable argumentwith respect to the rnap that now
appears on the screen: this was a rnap prepared in 1910 by the cartographic Companywhich
actually acted as the cartographerto the British Crown. [Placeenlargement of rnap41 in Qatar's
Map Atlas on the screen.] While counseladrnittedthat thereis a difference in colouringbetween
Bahrain andthe Hawar Islands,he suggestedthat because the Hawars are there labelled "Warden
Islands"on the map, that the drafter of the rnap in 1910musthave had, or been refemng back, to
Lieutenant Brucks'srnap of 1829 which used the same narne. He then jumped to the quiteextraordinary conclusionthat, "on a correct interpretation,this map, by implication shows the
Hawarsasbeing Bahrain's"(CR2000114,p. 12).
72. Suffice it to Say that counsel did not introduce a shred of evidence to support this
remarkable process of deduction. To Saythat this rnap supports the appurtenance of the Hawar
Islands toBahrainis plainlywrong. And to attach any significanceto the Brucks'smap, whichwas
prepared 80yearsbeforethis rnap was preparedand, indeed,40 yearsbefore the 1868Agreements,
is alsomisconceived.
73. Bahrain then shifted to another tack Counsel for Bahrain claimed that distortionsof
colour can emergein the process of enlarging themaps, and he took the rnap that appears on the
screen- this same map- as an example; he then showed the sarne rnap as enlarged on a
Bahrainicomputerwhich looked like this [placeBahrain'senlargementofthe rnaponthe screen].
74. It is not for me to Saywhether Bahrainneeds new computers. The fact of the matter is
that Qatar's cartographers used a far more technicallaccurate way of reproducing the maps and
preparingthe enlargementsthathave been furnishedto the Court. Qatardid not simplyenlargethe
maps on a computer. It took close-range photographs ofthe maps in question which produced
high-resolution reproductions andwhen this processis followed, thereis minimal distortionin the
depictionofthe maps.
75. This brings meto the Britishrnapthat was preparedin 1920to illustrate Britain'sviews
as to the temtonal issues affecting islands attached to the Arabian peninsula. [Plarnap 58 fiom
Qatar'sMapAtlasonthe screen.]
76. Clearly troubled by this map, Bahrain spent a considerableamount of time trying to
downplayits significance.
77. As 1mentioned in my first round presentation,the rnap was prepared to illustrate the
Treaty that Britainproposed to enter intowith concernedparties as part of a peace settlementwith
Turkey. The relevant part of that drafl treaty was Article 2 and it has been reproduced, for
convenience,attab 16ofthejudges' folders.
78. SirElihu questioned whether thernapreally was prepared toaccompanythe draft treaty
(CR2000114, p.13). 1would suggest thematter is veryclear. Article 2of the Treaty described a
linewithin whichthe Arabian Peninsula, includingtheir appurtenant islands, was deemedto lie. Ifwe focus on the notation thatappearson the rnap [enlargered caption in the middleof the map], it
can be seen that the rnap was described as "showingthe sea line within which lies the Arabian
Peninsula". Preciselywhat Article 2 said it was doing, and itis thus abundantlyclear thatthis was
the rnap which Britainusedto illustratetheirproposalof the Treaty.
79. Next, counsel observed that the chart number which appears on the
rnap-No. 748 - does not correspondwith the chart numbers that are referredto in Article2 of
the draft (CR2000114,p. 14). [Place Art.2 on the screen.] Thisis quite true. But once again,the
reason whythis is so isverystraightforward.
80. The Court will observe in looking at Article 2 thatarious Admiraltycharts are referred
to. [Underline in red the charts referredto in subparagraphs(a),(c),(d), (e)anda.] Thesewere
large-scale charts used to identify the individual locations that are referred to in each of the
subparagraphsof Article2. When it came to depicting the entire line within which the Arabian
Peninsula and its islands were deemedto lie, obviously a smaller-scalernaphad to be used. That
explainsthe differentchartnumbers.
81. Counsel then turned to thered enclave which so clearly surroundsthe Bahrain islands
[place enlargement from rnap 58 of Qatar's Map Atlas on the screen], although he declined to
speculate as to what this red enclave might signify (CR2000114,p. 14). Again, the answer is
straightforward.
82. The Court will recall that, according to Article 2 of the Treaty, the straightred line
depicted Britain'sviews of the tenitories which were includedas part of the Arabian Peninsula
The Prearnbleto Article 2 clearly stated that the Arabian Peninsula includedthe islands, whether
previously Turkishor not,lying withinthat red straightline.
83. Had Bahrain not been enclaved by a red circle, the rnap would have given the false
impression thatthe BahrainIslands formed part ofthe ArabianPeninsula Obviously,the British
considered Bahrain to be a separate entity which did not fa11within the domains of the mainland
mlers on the peninsula The clearest way to depictthis situationand to highlightthe existence of
Bahrain's separatestatuswas to drawa line aroundthe Bahrain Islands. Significantly,this enclave
did not includethe HawarIslands. Nonetheless,the Hawar Islandswere still seen as appertaining
to the Arabian Peninsulaby virtue of the fact thatthey fellwithinthe straightred line. If the HawarIslands were thus consideredto appertainto the ArabianPeninsula, whoelse could they belong to
other than Qatar,for it wasQatarin the 1913and 1914Conventionsandin the 1916Treaty, which
hadbeen identifiedasa separatetemtorial shaikhdom coveringthe entirepeninsula?
84. Moreover, counselconspicuously failedto mentionthat, in 1933,Rende1of the Foreign
Office prepared the rnap which now appears on the screen. [Place enlargement of rnap 77 from
Qatar'sMap Atlas onthe screen.] This omission was particularlystrange given that Mr.Volterra
had referred inhis presentationto Rendel'smemorandumto whichthis rnapwas attached. Bahrain
included the Rende1memorandumas tab 53to itsjudges' folders butit did not include in that tab
this map, whichwas attachedto that memorandum.If Bahrainwishes to rely on the memorandum,
1assume also that they are preparedto rely on the map. Having seen the rnap again, perhaps one
can appreciateBahrain'sreluctancetoproduceit.
85. 1 need only Saythat this rnap is entirely consistent with the red line rnap that 1just
discussed as well as the other maps that Qatar has introduced Qatar and Bahrain are clearly
identified as separatepolitical entities. The HawarIslands, Zubarah and Janan fa11outside of the
temtory whichwas consideredtobe Bahraini. They wereanintegralpart of Qatar.
5. Conclusions
86. Mr.President, Members of the Court,this brings me to the end of my presentation. 1
would submit that the evidencethat 1 have reviewed yesterdayand this morning in response to
Bahrain's contentionssupportsthe following five conclusions[place conclusionsone-by-oneon the
screen]:
1. The 1868 Agreements formally recognized theexistence of Qatar and Bahrain as separate
political entities.
2. Following those Agreements, Bahrain exercisedno sovereignrights on the Qatarpeninsula,
includingthe HawarIslandsandZubarah.3. Ottoman andQatari title overthe entirepeninsulawas recognized in the histoncal documents
ofthe time.
4. The 1913 and 1914 Conventions, and the 1916 Treaty between Qatar and Great Britain
confirmedthispre-existingstateof affairs. Qatar'stitlewas neverdisplaced.
5. The map evidence overwhelminglyconfirms Qatar'stitle to the Hawar Islands, Janan and
Zubarah.
1 wish to thank the Court for their patience in hearing me and 1 would be grateful,
Mr. President,if youcould cal1onMr. Shankardassto continue Qatar'spresentation. Thankyou.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much Mr.Bundy. 1 now give the floor to
Mr. Shankardass.
Mr. SHANKARDASS:
TERRITORIA ELTENTOF QATAR AND BAHRAIN ANDTHEOILCONCESSIONHISTORY
Oilconcessionsterritory: 1933Britishcorrespondence
1. Mr. President, distinguishedMembers of the CouM.. Bundy has taken you through
developmentsin regard to the temtonal integrityof Qatarto the Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916and
shown you that the position as it was at that time with regard to the extent of both Qatar and
Bahraincontinuedto be generallyrecognizeduntil the30s,that is up to the tirnewhen Rende1of
the Foreign Officennotated an official mapclearly showingthat the Bahrain group of islands did
not include theHawarIslands.r.President,1have alreadyaddressedthe Court at some lengthon
the developmentsfollowing the prospects for the discoveryof oil in the 1920sand 1930sand the
impact on the extent of the two Sheikhdomsto be covered by oil concessions. In this brief
presentation, 1propose to offer my cornmentson just a few of the issues raised by counsel for
Bahrainin an effortto completethe rebuttal thatMr. Bundyhas beenmaking.
2. In my presentationto the Court on 30 May on the extent of Bahrain and Qatar as shown
by the history of oil concession negotiationsin the 1930s, 1 had cited four British documents
(CR200016, pp.23-26)to supportmy submissionthat the British viewin 1933clearlywas that the
Hawar Islands were part of the temtory of Qatar. My learned fiienMr. Paulsson sought todiscount the value of one of those documents. This was a telegram (Memorial of Qatar,
Ann. 111.88,Vol. 6, p. 449) from Loch,then the Acting Political Resident, stating that the British
couldacceptthe Sheikh of Bahrain'sconditionthat the BahrainIslands shouldnot be named (inthe
concession in view of his alleged clairnto Hawar and otherplaces on the Qatar coasts), "as the
HawarIsland is clearly not oneof the Bahrain group". Mr.Paulssoncontended in effect, that this
was merely an accurate statement of a geographicalfact and that Lochwas not saying Hawar did
notbelong to Bahrain.
3. Mr. President,1believeit wouldbe helpfulto the Courtif1wereto describethe contextin
regardto the view expressedby Lochin his telegramandof some of the otherviews of the British
officialsconcemedat the time.
4. Qatarhas shown in its pleadings(Reply of Qatar,paras. 4.203-4.206)that afier a meeting
with Holmes, then acting for BAPCO, early in May 1933, the Ruler of Bahrain was greatly
disturbedto discoverthat his unallotted land area was much less than what he had imagined. In
fact in aletterto the Political Agent of28 May 1933,he stated "it now appears that the additional
area does not amountto morethan 38,000acres" (Replyof Qatar, Ann. 111.44, ol. 3,p. 277),that
is,afierdeductingBAPCO's100,000acres.
5. As Qatar has shown (Memonal of Qatar, paras;6.16-6.20), subsequent, more precise
calculationswere made by British authorities in Londonin 1933. These clearly showed that the
remainingacreage,that is, Bahrain'sunallottedarea,was actuallyaround44,768 acres,whichcould
not therefore possibly include the Hawar Islands. Clearly, not even the Ruler himself was
includingthe HawarIslands in his own estimateof the remaining 38,000 acres. Qatarhas shown
that the calculationsin London were therefore obviously one of the important reasons why the
Britishofficialsin London or the Gulf, and theoil Companyrepresentativesconcemed,considered,
in 1933,thatthe Hawar Islandswere notpart of Bahrain's unallottedarea or of Bahrain (Memorial
of Qatar, para. 6.20).
6. The next piece of evidence of particular relevance, is the Political Agent's letter of
30July 1933, (Memorial of Qatar, Ann. 111.87,Vol. 6, p.449, a part of which Mr.Paulsson also
refened to (CR2000112, p.33, para. 149). This records hisdiscussionwith the Sheikhof Bahrainandhis sonon 29 July,whenthe Sheikhsobjectedto the BahrainIslandsbeing specificallynamed
inthenew concession. Theletterstates:
"TheyexplainedthattheislandsoffQatarwerethe causeofthis hesitans, (here
the Shaikh added- accordingto the Political Resident- that the Foreign Office
knewthattheseislands arethedependenciesof Bahrainandthat thereis a ninety-year
oldagreementsomewheretothiseffect)and,therefore, toavoid anymisunderstanding
by the omissionof these islands, they would like the area to be called 'Bahrain
Islands'."
7. So here, Mr. President,we have the Ruler of Bahrain,soon after oil was discoveredin
Bahrain in 1932, and he himself having just discovered,two months earlier, that he had only
38,000 acresor so left, obviouslyattemptingto explore the possibility ofadding to his territov,
that is,some"islandsoffQatar".
8. His own informationabout the so-called "ninety-year-old document somewherew " as
obviously as much based on hearsay as was that of the Political Agent, Prideaux,from his
conversationwith a fishermanin Hawarin 1909,that 1havereferred toon a number of occassions.
But the Court will recallthat, contrary to what the Sheikh of Bahrain was saying, Prideaux's
conclusion was, consistent with the entry in Lorimer, that Hawar was a dependency of the
mainland, thatis,partofQatar.
9. It is Qatar'ssubmission thereforethatit is againstthis background that British authorities
wouldnot consider,in 1933,thattheSheikhofBahraincouldhaveanyrightsin theHawarIslands.
This was the commonview of Britishofficialsin each of the 1933documents1referred to on
5 June. The Courtwill recall that the fourth document that1 listed, a letter of 9August 1933
(Memorial of Qatar,Ann.111.91,Vol.6, p. 461)fiom Laithwaiteof the India Office, expressly
excluded the HawarIslandsfiom the temtories of the Ruler of Bahrain,on the ground, not only
that the islandswere geographically part ofQatar,but alsobecause,he said, the Ruler of Bahrain
exercisedno controlover them. Myrespectful submission therefore is, Mr. President,that the four
Britishdocuments1listedin my earlier presentation,takentogether, leaveno doubtof the British
view in 1933ofQatar's ownershipofHawar.The1923Holmes maps
10. My learned fiiend MI- . aulsson also contended(CR 2000/14, pp. 22-23) that the rnap
prepared and signedby Holmes and attachedto the draft Bahrain Oil Concession Agreementof
1923,(whichis at tab 19in the judges'folders,in the first round, which is now on the screen),was
unreliable, merelybecause,he said, it was attachedto a draft concession. The Court will recall 1
referred to thisrnap as evidence ofwhat was understoodat the time (andstated in the draft) as "al1
the islands forming part of the Shaikh's Dominions"to be regarded as "conceded territory", and
marked inred onthe rnap(Memorialof Qatar, Ann.111.66V , ol. 6,p. 327).
11. With great respect to Mr.Paulsson, and contrary to what he suggested, the conclusion
must surelybe that if Mr.Holmes was attempting tosecure a concession overas much temtory as
possible, there wouldbe noreason for himto excludethe Hawar Islandsif anyone had thought,at
thetirne,that theywere partof theSheikhof Bahrain's"dominions".
12. 1 am grateful for the correction pointed outas to the date of the second rnap which 1
showed(andis attab 20in the judges'folders,inthe firstround), andthat is, that it was preparedin
1923but onlypublishedby Rihaniin 1928,and 1should not therefore havereferred to it as a 1928
map. However, 1would like to draw the Court'sattention to the fact that the maps prepared by
Holmesin 1923,and showing Bahrainonly as the group of islands painted in red, were obviously
assumed to be correct, as one of them was publishedby Rihani in 1928 (which is at tab 68 of
Bahrain's judges' folders) and again published by Professor Wilkinson in 1991 (at tab 69 of
Bahrain'sjudges' folders). Now, even the rnap shown to us by Mr.Paulsson from the book by
ThomasWard - which rnap is now on the screen- (CR2000114,p. 24) (and at tab 70 in
Bahrain'sjudges'folders), appearsto have been basedonthe maps preparedby Holmes andused in
variousoil concession,or concession negotiations includingthose for the Bahrain concessions,for
itsunallottedarea. The onlydifferenceis that thismap, publishedin a book in 1965,and shownto
the Courtby Mr.Paulsson, showsthe extentof the newBahrain concession,it says so, signedafier
the British decision of July 1939, which included Hawar. In other words, in my respectful
submission, these maps, taken together, reflect the position both before and after the British
decisionof July 1939,whichwrongly decidedthat Hawarwas part of Bahrain.Thegeologicalandconcessionmaps
13.May 1now turn to the other two mapsthat 1showed theCourt duringmy presentationin
the first round. These are at tabs 21 and 22 of the judges' foldersin the first round and now
togetheron the screen. As to the geologicalrnapof 1933(at tab 21) and preparedby geologistsin
comection with Qatar'soil concessionof 1935,Sir Elihu submittedto the Courtin his presentation
on 8 June (CR2000111,p. 18)there is no reasonto believe that the geologicalunity suggestedby
Qatarbetween the peninsula and the Hawars,which of courseis based on this rnap on the screen,
does not also extendto the Bahrain main island as well as to SaudiArabia and even to Iran. We
thenhad Mr. Paulssondrawingthe Court'sattention (CR2000112,p. 37, para. 167)to whathe calls
"a rather withering comment"of Mr.Walton of the India Office in his letter of 14May 1936
(Memorial of Bahrain, Ann.248, Vol.5, p. 10763to the effect that the rnap attached to the
concessionwas irrelevant,as its objectwas only to draw the southem boundary ofthe concession.
Mr. Paulsson drew particular attention to the commentby Waltonstating: "Incidentallyit marks
the Bahreinislandsas well as Hawar." (Ibid.) Surelythe answer to both SirElihuLauterpachtand
Mr. Paulssonis the same. Neither the geological map, nor the concessionmap, was preparedfor a
concessionover Bahrain, Saudi or even Iraniantenitory. The objectof the geologicalrnapwas to
assessthe geologicalprospects for oil in Qatar including Hawar; and that of the concessionmap,
was to define the area ofthe concessionas constituting "thewhole area" overwhichthe Sheikhof
Qatar ruled. The Court willrecall this concessionrnap was infact based on the geologicalrnap
showing Hawaraspart of Qatar. Furthermore,it was alsomeantto showthe area whichtheBritish
undertook to protect under the guarantee of protection of 11May 1935. These two maps,
Mr. President,whichare onthe screen,thereforeshowedtheterritoryof Qatar,asunderstoodby al1
concemed,includingthe British Government,who expressly approved the concessionto whichthe
rnapwasattached.
Qatar'sexerciseof authority; British recognition; Bahrain acquiescence
14.We have heard agreat dealabout Bahrain'seflectivités,but may1say,Mr. President,that
the unchallenged action ofthe Ruler of Qatar,before Bahrain's claimto Hawar was made in1936,
in grantingexplorationnghts over Qatarin 1932,in authorizing,in 1933, a geologicalsurveyover
Qatar specifically including the Hawar Islands, as the rnap on the screen clearly shows, andeventually grantingin 1935,a concessionover the whole areaoverwhich he ruled,amountedto the
most important and well-documentedexercise ofauthorityoverQatar includingthe Hawar Islands,
and of courseZubara. Al1of theseactivitieshad expressBritishrecognitionor sanctionas well as,
at least acquiescence on the part of Bahrain, who never protested against the Ruler of Qatar
undertakingany of these activitieswith regard to Hawar or Zubara. Al1that eventhe British ever
heard of was recorded in the British Political Agent Loch's leîter of 29 May 1933
(Counter-Memorialof Bahrain, Ann.59, Vol.2, pp. 203-206)to a part of which Mr.Paulssonalso
referred (CR2000112,p. 18,para. 80),that with regard towhatwere considered "nebulous claims"
of the Ruler of Bahrainto areas on the Qatar coast, Loch had "heardmutteringsthat the explorers
of (APOC) in Qatar have examined places to whichthe Rulerof Qatar had no rightto allow them
to go"(Counter-Memorial ofBahrain,para. 215). This clearlyshows, Mr. President,that the Ruler
of Bahrain was fullyawareof the geologists'activitiesauthorizedby the Rulerof Qatar, but simply
chosenotto protestand engagedonly inwhat hasbeen referredto as "mutterings".
15. There is that history of Bahrainmaking claims from time to time of certain rights in
Zubarah, but none in the nineteenthcentury, and not in factuntil 1936, to Hawar. The adrnitted
recordclearlyshowsthattheRulerof Bahrainexpresslydisclaimedany rights flowingfrom Qatar's
oil concessionof 1935in Zubarah,not only under the Agreementof 1944(theonlyagreementever
signed by the two Rulers) but also in terms of his leîter to the British Foreign Secretary,
Mr. ErnestBevin, of 24 June 1948(Memonal of Qatar, Ann.III.260, Vol. 8, p. 283, at p. 291). In
thisletter, the Court will recall, four years later, he specificallypointed out that he had "never at
anytime claimed suchrights" in Zubarah.
16.Qatar'stemtorial and other rightsto the Hawar Islands,which were also covered by the
Qataroil concession, wereno different. The Rulerof Bahrainacquiesced,as he madeno protest,in
the Ruler of Qatar grantingthe explorationand surveyrights,andthe oil concessionbetween 1932
and 1935. Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, al1of these were of equal significancefor both
Zubarah and Hawar- and of coursehad British sanction.The1935 concessionmap
17. Both Sir Elihu Lauterpacht(CR2000111, p. 19, para. 19(9)) and Mr.Paulsson asked
whythe Ruler of Qatar did not refer to the map attachedto the 1935 oil concessionas evidenceof
his "claim" to Hawar in the so-called "arbitration". Apart fiom the fact that it would simply not
have occurred to him to do sowhen hewas complainingaboutaggressionon his temtory, the fact
isthat PCL did specifically referto the mapin their very firstterof 29 April 1936,wheninitially
protestingthe Sheikhof Bahrain'sclaimto the Hawar Islands. It was to this letter that Mr.Walton
of the Indian Office replied on 14May 1936,(Memorial of Bahrain,Ann.248, Vol.5, p. 1076)
containingwhat Mr.Paulssoncalls the "witheringcomment"(CR2000112, p.37, para. 167)that 1
havejust referred to, and simply dismissedthe map as irrelevant. As 1have already shown, by
then, the 1933 British view that Hawar belongedto Qatar had been reversed- forthe reasons
whichcounselforQatarhavealready fullyexplainedto theCourt.
Thenatureofthe HawarIslands
18. Mr.President, Membersof the Court,the fact simplyis that the Hawar Islands were of
no significanceuntil it was thought thattherewas a good possibilitythat oil mightbe foundthere.
As Mr. Paulsson himself said, "The fact is that no one much cared who controlled this empty
scorched land- until, that is, it was thoughtthere might beminera1riches below the sands." 1
trust1have shownthat the Rulerof Bahraindid begitn o curewhenhe discoveredin 1933that only
38,000acres or so were left for which he could grant his second concession. As Belgravewrote
soon afler, upon the Ruler'sdirection, to the Political Agent, that the Ruler had sufferedfiom a
"grave misapprehension regardingthe additionalarea" virtually blarning theBritish for misleading
him into thinking that another half of his temtory- in other words some additional
100,000acres - was stillavailablefor the secondconcession(Replyof Qatar,paras.4.203-4.206).
The Court will recall that thiswas also the time,as SirIan Sinclairhas shown, when the financial
I
position of Bahrainwas causingthe Rulergraveconcem. Thesearethe eventsthat ledto the saga1
havealready referredto - leadingeventuallyto the Britishdecisionof 11July 1939.
19. But what of thereafter. The recordnow also showsthat once prospects foroil from the
Hawar Islands virtually disappeared, Bahrain simply abandoned the islands for al1 practical
purposes. As Qatar has show (Reply of Qatar, paras.4.189-4.192), throughout the 1940s and1950s,the islands were usedonly as a penal colony,to which the more junior members of the
rulingfarnilycouldbe banished for misbehaviour,or for seasonalhunting as in the past. The Court
will no doubtnote that thiswas the positionspiteal1the "improvements"canied out by Bahrain
from 1937onwards. In fact,the HawarIslandswere virtuallyforgottenuntil more recenttimes.
20. TheCourt willtherefore see thatthe HawarIslands were only detached,ronglythat is,
fromthe temtory of Qatar,pursuantto the complexpolitical andcorporateambitions,to acquireas
much as possible of the new wealth that oil was expectedto bring. In al1the circurnstancesthat
Qatarhas explained tothe Court,there is no reasonwhythey shouldnot now be finallyreturned to
Qatar.
21.Mr. President, distinguished Membersof the Court, its, for me, been a great privilege
to appear beforethis Courtagain, constituted as it is of members of high distinction,universally
acknowledged andto have an opportunityto pay tributeto the great work this Court canies on in
thepeacefulsettlement ofintemationaldisputes. 1thank you once again and respectfully ask that
you mightnowcal1uponmy distinguishedcolleague, SirJanSinclair. Thankyou.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, M. Shankardass. Je donne maintenant la parole à
SirIan Sinclair.
SirIan SINCLAIR:Mr. President,Membersofthe Court.
QATAR' SOSITIVECASEON HAWAR
1.This morning,1propose to respond to aseriesof points which counsel for Bahrain have
advancedonmy earlierremarkson Qatar's positive case for titleover the HawarIslands.
SummarystatementofQatar's positivecaseonHawar
2. Before 1 do so, however, 1 propose initially to present asummary statement of Qatar's
positive case onHawar. This will take the form of a series of propositions which set out Qatar's
position within the broader historical perspective, for Qatarbelieves that it is only within that
broader historical perspectivethat the genesis of the disputeover Hawar may be discemed and
fully understood. These propositions necessarily have to be expressed at a level of generalitywhichmay excludeminorqualifications,and 1now showthem on the screen. The first proposition
is as follows:
(1) Bntain recognized Qatar as an entity separate fiom Bahrain in 1868, that recognition
necessarily encompassing acknowledgementthat the Al-Thani Rulers of Qatar exercisedor
were entitledto exercise authorityover the whole of thepeninsulawhich, in thesubmissionof
Qatar, must have included, for reasons explained more fully in proposition(7) below, the
HawarIslandswhich lie whollyor partially within a 3-milebelt of territorial sea appertaining
to the mainland.
(2) After 1868,Bahrainceased to have any rightor title to exerciseany form of authority in or
overQatar, includingthe HawarIslands,their Ruler havingbeen specificallyforbiddenby the
Britishauthontiesfiom breachingthe maritime peaceby interferingin Qatar.
(3) In the latter yearsof the nineteenthcenturyand the early yearsof the twentieth century,some
members of the Dowasir tribe wereno doubt present in the HawarIslands duringthe winter
months to engage in fishing activities,but Qatar deniesthat this intermittent presence,in any
event interruptedduring the voluntary exile of the tribe in SaudiArabia during the 1920sand
early 1930s,amountedto possession of theterritoryonbehalfoftheRuler of Bahrain.
(4) The Anglo-Ottoman Treaties of 1913 and 1914, and the 1916Treaty between Britain and
Qatar acknowledgethe authority ofthe Rulers of Qatar overthe whole of the territory of the
peninsula,includingislands situatedwithinthe territorialseaappertainingto the peninsula.
(5) Bahrain committed a series of wrongful acts in 1937by occupying,and, as it now admits,
establishing militarydefenceson, the main island of Hawar. That defacto situation continues
until today.
(6) The British decision of 11 July 1939,deciding that the Hawar Islands belongedto Bahrain,
was rendered invalidby reasonof the fundamentalprocedural defectsaffectingthe conductof
i
the enquiry by the then Political Agentin Bahrain in 1938and 1939to which referencehas
been madein Qatar's written pleadings. To this must, of course,be added the lack of consent
by the Ruler of Qatar to the making of such a decision by the British Government. The
decision was not an arbitral award andis not resjudicata, and Qatarhas never acquiescedin
the continuing occupationofthe main HawarIslandby Bahrain sincethe late 1930s.(7) Proposition7, and 1am sure the Court willbe glad to hear that this is the final one: Qatar's
title to the HawarIslands is based ontheir location whollyor partially within a 3-mile beltof
territorialseaextendingseawardsftom the low-watermark onthe mainlandof Qatar opposite
the islands, thisbeing the seaward limit of Qatar's territorialsea in the relevant period, andon
the principle of proximity as properly understood, this principle entitlingQatar to assert
sovereignty over the small number of uninhabited islands in the Hawar group which lie
marginally outsidethe 3-mile limitof its territorialsea.
3. Mr.President,1do not propose atthis late stageto enlargeon each and every one ofthese
propositions of fact andlor law, copies of which have been put in the judges' folders for this
moming as item No. 18, under tab 18. Someof my colleagues have alreadydone so, or will be
doingso inthe courseof respondingto Bahrain'sfirstroundarguments.
Proposition(3)
4.1 wouldhowever liketo test the strength of at least oneof thesepropositions- and thatis
propositionNo. 3 - againstthe documentaryevidenceofthe behaviourof the Dowasirtribe in the
1920s and the 1930s. Qatar has set out, in paragraphs3.82 to 3.92 and 3.94 of the Qatar
Counter-Memorial,the evidence of the contumacious behaviourof the Dowasir in Bahrain in the
early 1920sleadingto theirvoluntaryexileto Dammam inSaudiArabia. Bahrain,in its Reply, has
not sought to challenge this documentary evidencebut clairns that in 1927 those discontented
Bahraini Dowasirwho had left Bahrain in 1923returned fiom Dammam andexpressly affirmed
their allegiance to the authority of the Ruler of ~ahrain'. Bahrain cites no source for this
proposition,whichis in any event wholly inconsistentwith the evidence containedin the Bahrain
Government'sAnnualReport for 1932to 1933where it is stated [showon screen; copy injudges'
folders]:
"The town of Budeya is gradually being re-inhabited by members of the
Dawasir tribe who returned one by one fiom Dhammam. Ahmed bin Abdullah, the
son of the late Shaikh of the Dawasirs makes every effort to prevent his followers
fromreturningto ~ahrain."~
'Replyof Bahrain,p. 23,para.33.
'ReplyofQatar,Ann.111.4, ol. 3, p.270. 5. The Court will recall that Sir Elihu asserted,in his statement on 8June, that the Dowasir,
having gone into voluntary exilefiom Budeya (not the Hawars) in 1923,"soughtthe permissionof
Bahrain to return to the Hawars in about 1928"~. This is, 1 am afraid, patently untrue on two
counts,as the passage1havejust citedfülly proves:
(1) Someofthe Dowasir were stilldriftingbackto Budeyain Bahrain in 1933;
(2) Theywere drifting backto Budeya on themain islandof Bahrain wherethey had theirhouses,
not - and 1repeat,not- to "the Hawars".
Qatar reaffirms the picture of the status and allegianceof the Dowasir in the early 1930swhich it
presented to the Court in paragraphs 3.82 to 3.92 and 3.94 of the Qatar Counter-Mernorial,and
would in addition point out that Bahrain has presentedno credible evidenceof the return of the
Dowasir to their customary habit of visiting Hawar in the winter months after their penod of
voluntaryexile in Dammam, whichstill persisted,at least for some of the tribe, until1933or later,
as the evidencewhich1havejust read out to you fullysupports.
CornparisonbetweenBahrainandQatar: 1929
6. In this context, Mr. President, Qatar conceivesit to be its duty, at this final stage of the
oral hearings, to seek to find whatever common ground there may be between the Parties on
disputed issues of fact and law. Now this is particularly difficult in a case such as the present
where there are few uncontested facts, and where, even though there may be a measure of
agreementon applicablelegal principles, thereis strongdisagreementas to their application inthe
particularcircumstancesof thecase.
7. But let us see how far wecan get in narrowingthe differencesbetweenthe Partiesat least
on the factual aspects of the territorial issues- the Hawar Islands and Zubarah. In a sense,
Mr. Paulsson was right,in his historical exegesison 8 June, to concentrateon seeking to provide
the Court with apicture of developmentsin thispart of the Gulf in the 1930s. However and with
al1respect, Qatar believes that the picture whichMr. Paulsson presented tothe Court was a false
one - rather akin to the peculiarimage of oneself whichone may encounter when peering into a
distortingmirror in a funfair. But this is by the way. Qatar would like to put to the Court a
3~~ 2000/11,p.24,para.1.photographin wordsof thetwoParties - Bahrainand Qatar - as they were inthe threekey years
of 1929, 1934 and 1939. We already know from the video presentationand from some of the
photographs presented in evidence in this case-particularly of reefs, shoals and low-tide
elevations- that such materialscan present highly misleading images. So let us turn to the year
1929,andpresent a picturein words. First, 1take Bahrain.
8.Bahrainhadacquired a foreign financial adviserin 1926 - Mr.Charles Belgrave. He had
begun thedifficulttask of modemizingthe administrativestructureof the sheikhdomandputtingin
place certain financial controls.TheBahrain archipelago,as Belgravehaddescribedit in hisarticle
in the Journal of the Central AsianSociety in 1928,consistedof "a group of small islands about
seventeenmiles off the Arab Coasthalf-way down the Persian Gulf' (Reply of Qatar, Ann.11.81,
Vol. 2, p. 567). No mention here of the Hawar Islands or indeed of Zubarah. In case we are
confionted yet again with the threadbare argumentthat this is a geographicaland not a political
description, let me remind the Courtthat, only a few years later- on 3 May 1933,Laithwaite of
the India Office who later became Sir Gilbert Laithwaite,the Permanent Under-Secretaryto the
Commonwealth Relations Office, hestates that the dominionsof the Ruler of Bahrain (and1ask
you to notethe word "dominions")maybe regardedas consisting of"theIslandof Bahrein, andof
the adjoining islands ofMuharraq,Umm Na'assan,SitrahandNabi Salih ..."(Memonal of Qatar,
Ann.111.84,Vol. 6, p. 431). He later adds in the same letter that "in considering any grant of a
concession in respect of his 'dominions'or 'Bahrain' it would seem necessaryto have a clear
understanding as to precisely what is covered". Nothing could be clearer. Neither the Hawar
Islands nor Zubarahareto be consideredpartof the Rulerof Bahrain's "dominions".
9. In the 1920s,Bahrain was certainlyricher than Qatar. It was the centre of commercial
activity in the Gulf. Bahrain'seconomy was much more prosperousthan that of Qatar until the
1950s when the balance was redressed by the developmentof oil in Qatar. This was attributable
partly to the fact that Bahrain possessedmore fertile land which meant that it could sustain a
diversified system of agriculture; but,more significantly, it was due to the British interest in
seeking to develop Bahrainas the trading and strategic centre of the Gulf (Mernorial of Qatar,
para. 3.63). 10. In the auturnn of 1929, the great economic recession began to hit the Gulf region.
Almost simultaneously, as indeed MI- P.aulsson admits, the revenues of Bahrain fiom pearling
began to fa11off drarnaticallyas a result of the development of culturedpearls in Japan. He States
(and here Qatar can agree with him entirely) that the pearling industry, which in fact was as
importantto Qatar as it was to Bahrain, "declinedrapidlyin the 1920s" and that "the pearl banks
weredepleted"as a result of the developmentofthe culturedpearl (CR2000111,p.45,para. 8).
11. Now you may ask, what about oil, that Pandora'sbox which was to transform the
economies of Saudi Arabia, Iraq,Iran and thesmall sheikhdomsin the Gulf? Bahrainhad already
granted a concession to EGS in 1925, which was transferred to BAPCOin 1928. As is well
known, Major Frank Holmes made an application forwhatwas termed Bahrain's"unallotted area"
in 1928. The extent of the unallotted area was unclear. You will have heard from
Mr.Shankardass,the Ruler of Bahrainhad beenunder the misapprehensionthat the unallotted area
comprised half theland territory of the main island of Bahrain. This was clearly wrong, andthe
Ruler had to be informed, much to his annoyance, that he had misunderstood the position
(Memorial of Qatar, paras. 6.15-6.19, withrelevant Annexes). So,in 1929,the Ruler of Bahrain
was lookingaroundfor new sources ofadditionaloil revenues.
12. What about Qatar in 1929? By comparisonwith Bahrain,Qatar was, in 1929, a typical
Gulf sheikhdom of the time, poor in naturalresources, dependentin large measure upon pearling
for its revenues,and with a smallpopulation which,outsideDoha and other small settlements,was
nomadic or semi-nomadicin its lifestyle. It lackedmost of the attributesof what might be termed
twentiethcentury"civilization"; and its peoples,poor thoughthey mightbe in materialterms,were
proudof their heritageand determinedto maintaintheir independence.
13.Qatar suffered as much as Bahrainfiom the declineinrevenues frompearlingduringthe
recession years; but,unlike Bahrain,hadnocompensatingrevenuesfiom oil concessionsto relieve
its poveriy. Qatarcan in no way accept that its then Ruler exercisedno authorityor control over
the WestCoastof the peninsula at this tirne; indeed, as Ms Pilkingtonreminded the Court during
%
the first round, SheikhAbdullah maintained thefiontier posts in the southem border area which
had already existedin his father'stime (CR200015,p. 61,para. 82). It may indeedbe the case that
largeareas of the interior and ofthe west coastof Qatar wereempty of settled hurnanhabitationatthe tirne. This would indeed in part explain why, as Qatar has consistently maintained,the
Hawar Islandswere essentially uninhabitedapartfromwinter visitorssuchas the Dowasir,anxious
to engage in fishing activities. But, of course, the Dowasirwere still in Dammam at this tirne,
1929,although some may have been inthe course ofretuming to Budeya. Fractions of nomadic
tribes, some of whom acknowledged allegianceto the Ruler of Qatar (and some of whom were
more likelyto have acknowledged allegianceto Ibn Saud),were accustomedto wander with their
camels andgoats throughthe unsettledregionsof the peninsulaat this time. The Court will recall
the lengthycitation which my learnedfiiend ProfessorSalmonmade from a letter of 4 May 1934,
from the Ruler of Qatar to the then Political Agent, explaining the position (CR2000/5, p. 42,
para. 27).
14.In 1929, oil was simplynot a factorin Qatar. The oilcompanieshad not yet even begun
to assess the geological prospects of the presenceof oil-bearing structureson the mainland of the
peninsula.
CornparisonbetweenBahrainandQatar: 1934
15. So now, Mr. President, we turn to the year 1934. By this time, the effects of the
economicrecession were beginningto bite hard in Bahrain. Belgrave,in his letter to the Political
Agent of 29 April 1933, covering the Bahrain budget for that year, adrnits that the financial
position of Bahrain causeshim very graveconcem; both thenew budgetand the figures for 1932
"reveal a verydisastrousconditionof affairs"(Replyof Qatar,Ann.111.42V , ol. 3, p. 257). Acopy
of thisletter is in thejudges'folders as item 19. Belgravegoes into considerabledetail about the
economieswhich he hashad to make. Smallcutshadbeen made in the Civil List. Expenditureon
education had been reduced by 25 percent and other savings had been made in some of the
departmentalexpenditure. Belgravegoeson to complain aboutthe proportion ofthe budget which
he has had to devote to the Civil List. He concludesby makingwhat is almost a desperate appeal,
and here1showon the screenan extractfiom his letter. He says:
"Ifthis State [BahrainIfindsitself in seriousfinancialdifficultiesit will depend
upon the Governmentof India for monetary assistance. Excludingthe possibility of
increased revenuefiom oil it appears to me inevitable thatwithin a year or two the
State willbe approachinga conditionofbankruptcy."1thinkit was Dr. Johnson, the noted Englishlexicographer, whois reported to have said that "the
prospect of a hangingin a fortnight concentrates themind wonderfully". Could it not be that the
prospect of bankruptcy within a year or two may have concentrated the minds of Belgrave and
others into seeking ways and means to secure increased revenues from oil for their master, the
Ruler of Bahrain? For example,by mountinga claim tothe HawarIslands, thought at the time to
be oil-rich?
16.1tum to Qatar in 1934. In Qatar 1934was the year in which the negotiations for an oil
concessionto be grantedby the Rulerof Qatar to APOCwere in progress. It was also the year in
which Fowle (thePolitical Resident)had anacrimonious exchangewith the Ruler of Qatar. It was
on this occasion- 12March 1934- thatthe Ruler of Qatar claimedthat the 1916Treaty did not
includethe interiorbut only the Coast,to which, as Mr.Bundyhas reminded you al1this moming,
the Political Resident'srobust reply was: "And you are the Ruler of al1Qatar and the Treaty
extendsto the wholeof Qatar." No equivocalgeographical qualification here.The Rulergrumbled
about being compelledto givethe concessionto the Anglo-PersianOil Company,even if he were
not satisfiedwith theterms that they mightoffer; and he boldly asserted, and here 1show on the
screena passagefromthe report: "if 1amnot allowedby the Govemment to give itto others1will
leavethe oil in itsplaceand giveit to no one.1livedal1this timewithout oil." (Counter-Memorial
of Bahrain,Ann.122,Vol. 2, p. 410.) Thisis hardly the view of someoneobsessedwith the riches
which anew oilconcession might bring.
CornparisonbetweenBahrainandQatar: 1939
17.Finally,letus look at the year 1939. For Bahrain,it wasa year of triurnph,cloudedonly
by a small speckonthe horizon. The triumphwas of course the British decision of 11July 1939,
statingthat the HawarIslands belongedto Bahrain. The Court, of course, will have notedthat the
Bahrain Governmenthad already received advance notification in Apnl 1939, that this was the
solutionwhich wasbeing recommendedby the personappointed tolead the so-called enquiry,that
is toSayWeightman,since Belgravehadbeen shownWeightman'sreport in draft. And here1refer
to the extracts from Belgrave's diaryentry for 22 April 1939 (Memonal of Qatar, Ann.111.143,Vol. 7, p. 223). The small speckon the horizon was the discoveryof oil on the mainlandof Qatar
inFebruary 1939,ironicallyon the Dukhanpeninsula opposite Hawarbut a bit furtherto the south.
18. For Qatar, the picture in 1939 was, not umaturally, somewhat different. Early in the
year, therewas the encouragingnews of a show of oil in the Dukhan oilfield. Later in the year,
however, Qatarwas faced with the outbreak of war between Britain and Germany which wasto
lead to the closing down of oil operationsin Qatar the followingyear. The result was that Qatar
wasdeniedthe benefits of revenuefiom oilproductionon its temtory untilthe late 1940s.
19. For the word-picture ofHawar in 1939, we have to turn to the Belgrave diaries and
Bahrain GovernmentReports. As faras the Belgravediariesare concerned, Qatarwoulddirect the
attention of the Membersof the Court to paragraphs 4.178and 4.188 of the Qatar Reply. Qatar's
word-portrait of the Hawar Islands at this time is also confirmed by the evidence of Alban,
Weightman'ssuccessor as Poiitical Agent in Bahrain, whichis reproduced at paragraph 4.176 of
the Qatar Reply and which is based on a visit which Alban paid to the main island of Hawar in
December 1940. Alban'sreport- an extractfrom whichisnow on the screenand a copyofwhich
is inyour foldersas itemNo. 20- as recordedin the IntelligenceSummaryof the Political Agent,
Bahrain, for the period 1to 15December 1940(Reply of Qatar,Ann.111.94V , ol. 3, p. 575)States
intea rlia:"Afew Dawazir fiom Zellaq were in residence; they apparentlylike Hawar in winter
andreturn to Zellaqin summer." The picture which Bahrain seeksto paint of conditionsin Hawar
at this time is blatantly contradicted even by Belgrave himself who, in his diq entry for
1 April 1938, recordsthe headrnan of those present on the main island of Hawar (and these were
presumably members of the Dowasir tribe)as resenting the Bahrainis for "having developedthe
place which in the past was never visited and which they seem to consider their own property"
(Memonal of Qatar,Ann.111.143V , ol. 7, p.213). The Court will haveto determinewhetherthis is
not a more accurate description of the positionon Hawar at this time than that presented by the
self-servingstatementsof elderly formervisitorsto Hawar fromthe Dowasirtribe. In this context,
the Court will alsono doubt bear in mind the evidenceof Pnor, who succeededFowle as PoliticalResidentin September 1939,and whowas convinced that the Britishdecisionof 11July 1939was
"agrave miscarriageofjusticeM4.
Mr. President,this might be a convenientmoment at which wecould take ourcoffeebreak,
if youagree.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie,sirIan. La Cour suspendpourun quart d'heure.
L'audience estsuspendue de 11h 20à 11 h 45.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvousasseoir. Laséanceestreprise. Sir Ian,you havethe floor.
SirIan SINCLAIR: Merci,M. le président.Mr. President, Membersof the Court,before the
coffee break 1had completed a comparativeword-pictureof Bahrain and Qatar in the three key
yearsof 1929, 1934and 1939. If 1canjust now surnmarizewhatthe position was.
ComparisonbetweenBahrainandQatarinthe 1930s: summary
20. So, in the 1930s we have a sheikhdom - Qatar- still deeply rooted in and deriving
sustenance fiom the traditional Arab societiesby which it waspartly surrounded. This no doubt
serves to explain, at least in some measure,the close relations which the then Ruler of Qatar
maintainedwith Ibn Saud when compared withhis distrust of the British Government - a distrust
which was unfominately to be justified by events in 1938and 1939. Oil was hardly a factor in
Qatar at this time. By way of comparison,we have Bahrain, which was, alreadyin 1932,to
becomethe first oil-producingStateonthe southernside of theGulf. Bahrain'sadministrationwas
in process of becoming modemized followingthe arriva1of Belgrave as Adviser to the Ruler of
Bahrain in 1926. But the fat years of the late 1920sand early 1930swere about to be followedby
the lean years of 1933and 1934. The Rulerof Bahrain was desperate toincrease bis oil revenues,
and was bitterly disappointedto hearthat the extentof the "unallottedarea" availableto himto be
offered for a new concession was considerablyless than what he had thought it to be. His eyes
began to tum to the Hawar Islands. He (orBelgrave) had alreadyno doubt heard reportsthat the
4~emorial of Qatar,para. 6.101,p. 126.IPCgeologistshaduncoveredevidenceof apotentialoil-bearingstructureon the Dukhanpeninsula
which couldextendinto the HawarIslands.
OmissionsinBahrainipresentationonprincipleof proximity
21. Mr. President, against this background,1 can turn to SirElihu'scriticisms of my first
round presentationon the geography of the HawarIslands and the principle of proximity. There
are certainly some(no doubt inadvertent)omissionsin Sir Elihu'sanalysis ofthe legalposition as
regards title to islands locatedhin the territorialsea of a State. For example,at paragraph29 of
his presentationon 8 une',SirElihu cites a passage fromparagraph239 of the first Award in the
Eritreanemen arbitration. 1show that passage onthe screen, but 1also add to itthe irnmediately
followingtwo sentences,someelements inwhich1have causedto be underlined:
"The modem intemational law of the acquisition (or attribution) of temtory
generallyrequiresthattherebe: an intentional displayof power and authority over the
territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and
peacefulbasis. The latter two criteria are tempered to suit the nature of the temtory
and the size of its population,if any. The facts alleged by Eritrea and Yemen inthe
present case must be measured againstthese tests, with the following.qualification.
Not onlvwerethese islandsfor long uninhabitedandun?ovemed or. ifat all. govemed
in the most attenuated sense, but the facts on which Eritrea relies were acts by its
predecessor,Ethiopia,whichwere not 'peaceful' ..."
Now, that part ofthe qualificationwhich 1have caused to be underlined in the passage shownon
the screen is precisely what Qatar says was the position in the Hawar Islands prior to 1936.
Mr. Shankardasshas gone over the evidence again and 1 think you will agree that, prior to that
year, the HawarIslandswere essentiallyuninhabitedand certainly"ungovemed"by Bahrain,inthe
sense of the application to Hawar of the administrativerules and structures applied in the main
island of Bahrain.
22. Again, in the same paragraph 29 of his statement, Sir Elihu cites a passage from
paragraph 241 ofthe first Award in the EritreaIYemencase about the requirement of evidenceof
intention to claimthe islands à titre de souverain. The Court will certainly wish to take into
account the fact that despite its claim to have exercised eflectivitéson or in relation to the
Hawar Islandsfor a period of more than 200years,Bahrain never displayed any intention toclaim
the islands à titre de souverain until 1936, when the claim was advanced for the first time
5C~2000111,p. 23, para.29.specificallyin connectionwith the ongoing negotiationsfor an oil concessionover the temtory of
Bahrain which is not includedin the 1925 oil concession. Thismust inevitably cast doubt on the
good faith of Bahrain in advancing this claim for the first tirne in 1936. For ease of reference,
copies of the full texts of paragraphs 239and 241 of the firstAward in the EritredYemencase are
in thejudges'folders undertab No. 21.
23. Then, at paragraph 31 of hisaddressto the Court on 8 June, Sir Elihu, in criticizingthe
points madeby Professor Salmonand Mr.Shankardasson the Kasikili/Sedudu Islandcase, sought
to distinguishthe facts in that case fromthe factsin the presentcase6. 1will not seekto respondto
Sir Elihuonthis point, as Mr.Shankardass has alreadydoneso, in some detai17.1wouldonly add
that, as 1have already pointedout earlier in this statement, Sir Elihuis clearly in errorin arguing,
as he did in paragraph 31 of his statement of 8June, that the Dowasir "sought the permissionof
Bahrain to return to the Hawars in about 1928".To return to Budeya on the main island of
Bahrain - yes. But to theHawars-no.
24. It is noteworthy that Sir Elihu cites in support of his argument the passage from
Judge Huber'sAward in the IslandofPalmascase whichis citedwith approvalin paragraph 104of
the EritreaRemenfirstAward,yet he failsto drawattention to whatis saidin paragraph 105of the
Award, where, after recalling that Yemen hadrelied primarilyon a "historietitle", the Tribunal
reflects on the meaning of "title" and States [show on screen]: "It is a matter of law, not of
possession,though it would nomally indicatea right in law to have possessioneven ifthe factual
possessionis elsewhere." This is of course somewhatreminiscentof a view already expressedin
the 1960sby a noted professorof internationallawat thetime [showfirst citationfromJenningson
screen]:
"Yet if the legalright toterritorialsovereigntyis to have anyreal significanceit
must on occasion at least be capable of subsisting even when divorced from
possession; it must mean that the State in which is vested the right can vindicate it
beforea Court and beenabledto recover apossessionofwhich it hasbeen deprived."
You will find a copy of that Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, in yourjudges' folders as item
No. 22.
-- --
6~~ 2000/11,p.24,para.31.
'CR 2000/17,pp.25etseq. 25. This is of course a citation fiom a book (Acquisitionof Territory in International Law
(1963) p. 5), published in 1963 by a former President of this distinguished Court,
SirRobertJennings when he was still professor of international law at Cambridge.
Professor Jemings (as he then was) indeed goes on to Sayin the sarne work: "when occasion
demands,the law does recognizean abstracttitle presently divorced froma material display". He
gives the exarnple of the long-established rule that a belligerent occupant does not acquire
sovereignty until afterdebellatio.
Rebuttal of SirElihu Lauterpacht's arguments on Qatar's positive case
26. Mr. President, 1turn now to Sir Elihu's critiqueof my presentation on Qatar'spositive
case for sovereignîyoverthe HawarIslands. He begins byquestioningmy statementthat 11out of
the 17islands identified by Belgrave as comprising the Hawar Islands in the "preliminary
statement" which he subrnittedto Weightmanon 29 May 1938lie "wholly or partially" withina
3-mile limitdrawn fromthe low-waterlineon the mainlandof Qataroppositethe HawarIslands. 1
must admitto being franklypuzzledby this criticism. Thereis of coursea clear difference ofview
between the Parties about Janan Island, Bahrain regardingit as formingpart of the Hawar Islands
and Qatar denying this. It is clear in any event that the Britishauthoritiesin 1947 did not regard
Janan Islandas fallingwithinthe scopeof the British decisionof 1939whichpurported toattribute
the Hawar Islands to Bahrain. SirElihu'sargumentappears rather to be that the glass should be
described as half-empty rather than half-full. He seems to want to concentrate on those islands
which fa11outsideorpartiallyoutsidethe 3-milelimitratherthanthe greatmajoritywhichlie inside
the limit. And the Court will rememberthat 1quite deliberatelychose Belgrave's1938list of the
Hawar Islands as my point of deparîure. Inthis context, Qatarwould certainly take the view that
any island which falls partially within a 3-mile limitdrawn from the low-water line along the
mainland enjoys the benefit of the régime applicable to islands located whollywithin that 3-mile
limit.
27. To return to Sir Elihu'scritiqueof Qatar'spositive case,he offers what he sees as three
reasonswhythe legalargumentsdevelopedin paragraphs4.35to 4.71 of the Qatar Replyshouldbe
rejected. First, he saysthat there is noabsoluterule that islands located withinthe temtorial seabelong to the coastal State.Andthenhe cites apassagefromthe firstAward in theEritrea/Yemen
casewhichsuggeststhat theruleapplies onlyin the absenceof any cleartitle beingshownto them
by another state8. But he failsto cite another passagefromthe firstAward in the EritreaIYemen
case whichexpressesin even stronger termsthe burden of proof whichhas to be dischargedby a
Statewhichseeksto challengethe presumptivetitle of thecoastalStateto islandslocatedwholly or
partiallywithinits temtonal sea. Thisoccursinparagraph 474of the first Award (showon screen,
copyin judges'folders,itemNo. 23)wheretheTribunalstates:
"Thereis a strongpresumption thatislandswithinthe twelve-milecoaStalbelt
will belongto the coastalstate unlessthere is a fully-establishedcase to the contrary
(as, forexample,in the caseofthe ChannelIslands)."
28. So, "astrongpresumption": and there has to be a "fully-establishedcaseto thecontrary"
to displace it. Qatar does not put fonvard the rule upon which it relies as an absolute rule.
Obviously,there will be minor exceptions toit as where,for exarnple,there is an island located
whollyorpartially withinthe limitsof the temtorial seaofa State,titleto whichhasbeen vestedin
another Stateby virtue of a treaty to which thecoastal Stateis aparty or has succeeded. lndeed
this is thepositionwith respectto a numberofthe exampleswhichSirElihu gavein his addressof
8 une^. Thisis certainlythe caseof the Greekislandsoff the AnatolianCoastof Turkey,title to
whichwastransferredto Greecebyvirtue of the TreatyofLausanneof 1923or,in the specificcase
of the DodecaneseIslands,by virtue of the Treatyof Peacewith Italyof 1947. It is also the case
with St.Pierre and Miquelon, title to whichis vested in France by virtue of an early eighteenth
centurytreaty. It seems likelyto be the casewith otherof Sir Elihu'sexamples,for example,the
Penguin Islands.Butthat is not ofcoursethecasehere. Bahrain relieson no conventionaltitle. It
simplyoccupied the Hawar Islandsin 1937. At that time, as Mr. Shankardasshas demonstrated,
there wasno long-standingBahrainipresenceon any of theHawarIslands. Theywere essentially
unoccupied,and,as the Courtwill beaware,Qatar strongly deniesthat Bahrainhad exercisedany
activities titredesouverainonany of the Hawar Islands priorto 1936and 1937,eitherdirectlyor
as a result ofthe winter presence of some members of the Dowasir tribe on the main island of A
Hawar. Itwill of coursebe a matterfor the Courtto determinewhetherBahrainhas been able to
8~~ 2000/11,p.29,para.54.
'CR 2000/11,p35,para.75.persuade them that it has a "fully-establishedcase to the contrary" on the basis of the pre-1936
effectivitéswhich it has invoked, sufficient to displace the "strong presumption"that the Hawar
Islands belong tothe coastalState,that is toay,Qatar.
29. Sir Elihu took meto task forhavingput aninterpretationon Judge Huber'sAward inthe
Island of Palmas case which he found not verymuch to his taste. The question is whether
JudgeHuber was expressing a negative propositionor a positive proposition. Frankly, 1 do not
think it muchmatters. Judge Huber hadexpressedhis thoughtin negativeterms: "it is impossible
to showthe existenceof a rule of positive internationallaw . ..".So 1naturally referred to itas a
negative proposition. The important pointis the scope of this proposition, whether negativeor
positive. It appliesto "islands situatedtsidetemtorial waters",the clearimplicationbeingthat it
does not, or does not necessarily, applyto islands situated within territorial waters. Of course,
Qatar is aware that the islandof Palmas was, certainly at the time of the Awardin the case, in the
high seas and nowhere near the temtorial sea of either Party. If, as Sir Elihu contends, al1that
Judge Hubermeant to convey was the non-existenceof a rule of positiveinternational law to the
effectthat islands situatedin the higheas shouldbelongto the nearestState,he would surely have
confined his dictumto that very simple proposition. Buthe didnot do so. He obviouslywishedto
preserve the application,orpotentialapplicationof the principleof strong presurnption thatislands
located withinthe territorial watersof a State should belong tothat State: and that, Qatar would
submit, is precisely what he did. 1am sure that even Sir GeraldFitzmaurice, whose memory 1
revere, would have accepted that a meaning must be given to every phrase in a judicial
pronouncement,justas it must be given,as he himself counselled,to everyphrase in a treaty; and
one cannot simplyread a phrase out of a sentence withoutdistortingthe meaning of that sentence.
In otherwords, the phraseto which SirElihutakesexceptionis an integraland essentialpart of the
rulewhichJudgeHuberisputting forward.
30. SirElihu also cited a fewpassages fiom an articlewrittenby SirHumphreyWaldock in
the BritishYearBook ofInternationalLawfor 1948. 1wouldonlyventureto remindthe Courtthat
the article in which this passage occurred was concemed with "Disputed Sovereignty in the
Falkland Island Dependencies", andthat the article was directed pnmarily towards cnticizingsectorclaims in theAntarctic,asthe followingextract fromthe article will indicate. It comesfrom
nearthe end of the article(showon screen):
"If the above appreciation of the place of continuity and contiguity in
intemational law is correct, sector claims in the Antarctic, being merely forms of
continuity or contiguity, can have no legal significance independentlyof an exercise
or displayof stateactivityinregardto the sector."1°
31.1must Saythat 1foundrather surprisingSir Elihu'sdenialthat a coastalState mighthave
securityconcems about the presence of foreignStates on islands located within its temtorial sea.
Many States are today concemed about the potentially dangerous activities of what have been
stigmatized,at least inthe tabloidpress, perhaps somewhatsimplistically,as "rogue States". But 1
am sure that they would prefer to contract or treat with the representativesof such "rogue States"
on their own far-distanttemtoxyrather than if they were installedon an island located withinthe
temtorial sea ofthepotentialtarget State.
Distinction between rules governing attribution of land territory and those governing
maritimedelimitation
32. There is one additional observation1 must make on Bahrain's systematic attempt to
undermineQatar'sreliance on the significance,as regardstitle, of the location of islands withinthe
temtonal sea of a Stateor othertemtorial entity. This indeed gives methe oppominityto reiterate,
iffurtherexplanationis necessary,that Qatarinvokes primarily theprinciplethat islandsso located
fa11under the sovereigntyof the coastal State,and, only subsidiarily,the principle of proximity,the
latterjustimng the attribution to Qatar of the remaining islands in the Hawar group located
marginallyoutsidethe 3-mile temtorial sea limit appliedby both Bahrain and Qatarin the 1930s.
However,my leamed confrère,Professor Weil, professed puzzlementas to why Qatar hadopted
for the notion of location within a 3-mile limitrather than location within a 12-milelimit". The
reasonis of coursethat Qatar seesa clear distinctionbetween therules govemingthe attributionof
land temtory and those goveming the delimitation of maritime boundaries. In the case of the
former,the applicationof the principles of the inter-temporallaw requires that title totemtory be
established in accordance with the law contemporary with the acquisition of such title. In the
"25 BYZL (1948)p.345.
"CR 2000115 ,.21,para.9.present case, that would havebeen a period in which the 3-mileterritorial sea limit was widely,if
not universally, applied and in which it was certainly being appliedby both Bahrain and Qatar.
Lest it should be argued by Bahrain that, even if Qatar had acquired title to the islands in this
manner, she had subsequently abandonedit by failing to perform anyacts a titre de souverainon
the contestedislands at the relevant time,Qatarwould submitthatQatar'stitle couldnot have been
replacedby a Bahrainititle based upon theeffective occupation of theislands by Bahrainin 1937,
since that occupation resulted from a violation (indeed a continuingviolation) of Qatar territov.
ProfessorWeilappearsto thinkthatmy theoryinvolvesthe application ofconceptsandruleswhich
belong completely to the past. But, Mr. President, Members of the Court, application of the
principlesof the inter-temporallawto the acquisitionof territorial sovereigntynecessarilyinvolves
an appreciation of whatthe law was at the time when such sovereignw was said to have been
acquired. ProfessorWeil will, 1hope, berelievedto hear,however,that Qatar fullyacceptsthat the
maritimedelimitation betweenthe two States inthe present case shouldbe effected in accordance
with the rules of internationallaw applicablein the matter as between the two Parties in the year
2000.
Fringe ofislandsconcept
33. Finally, Mr. President,Membersof the Court,Qatar wouldsuggest that there maybe an
alternativeway of lookingatthe HawarIslands. Itwillbe recalled that, when 1addressedthe Court
forthe first time on 30 May onthe geographyof the HawarIslands andthe principleof proximity,1
devoted part of my statement to the macrogeographyofthe islands12 - a word whose origin we
all,as internationallawyers,owe 1may Sayto JudgeOda. In thatpart of my statement,1referred to
the HawarIslands as the piecesrequiredto completethecurveof the western coast of Qatar. 1put
up on the screenon 30 May an illustrationofthis notion,and 1do so again today [showmapNo. 2
in the Memorial of Qatar and draw closing line aroundthe outer area of the Hawar Islands]. The
Court may, on reflection, note somethingrather familiaraboutthe closingline which is now being
put onthe screen,and indeed about theHawarIslandsthemselves. Canthey not beconsideredas a
fiinge of islands so closely associatedwith the mainland coast as to be considered part of it? In
1CR 200016,pp.33-34,para.2.other words, Qatar would invite the Court to consider carefully the alternative theory that the
Hawar Islands may constitute "a fringeof islandsalong the Coastin its immediate vicinity"within
the meaning of Article7, paragraph 1, of the 1982United Nations Conventionon the Law of the
Sea,with al1the consequenceswhichwould flowfromthat concept.
34. In short, Qatar remains unimpressed by the criticisms made by our opponents of the '
applicationin the presentcase of the basicprinciple(or, if oneprefers, strongpresumption)that an
island located withinthe temtorial sea of a Stateappertains to the coastal State. Any necessary
qualifications which have beenmade to the application of that principle to accommodate cases
where anotherStatemay alreadyhave acquiredtitle to such an island by virtue of a valid treatyor
by virtue of having othenvise made out a "fully-establishedcaseto the contrary" (in the words of
the fust Awardin the Eritrea/Yemen case) can be met in the formulation ofthe principle. Qataris
satisfied that Bahrain has not been able to develop, to the satisfaction of the Court, a
fully-establishedcase for its own claim of title based upon the alleged pre-1936 efectivitéson
which itrelies.
Bahrainbasepoints on spit ofHawar Island
35. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, before 1yield to the next speaker, there is one
matter of cartographiedetail to which 1must refer. In his commentaryaccompanying the video
presentationmade by Bahrain on 13June, Mr. Volterra took up again Qatar's depictionof the tail
of Hawar on its map No. 5 submitted with the Qatar Mernorial, and showed us various images
purportingto show that, at low tide,the end of the tail of Hawar remains "a significant distance"
from the Qatari shoreI3. Mr. President,there is a saying, at any rate in the English language,that
"the camera neverlies": but, as 1have alreadyobserved, itcansex-iously mislead. 1do not propose
to subject the Membersof the Court to further visual distortions, bu1 would ask them to look
carefullyatthe followingmaps andcharts,someofwhich indeed1showedto the Courton 30May.
Qatar preparedits map No. 5 using editionNo. 2 of the Bahrainmap in the 1:50,000series, that is
i
to Say,the edition publishedin 1986. 1now put upthe relevant portion ofthat map on the screen.
Beside it,1 put up the relevant portion of Bahrainnautical chartNo. 5005, publishedin 1987. As
' 3 2000113,p.32,para.XXVI.youwill see,the depictionof thetail of Hawar onthe chartonthe right,is well-nighidentical to the
depiction of the sarnefeature on edition No. 2 of the Bahrain rnapin the 1:50,000senes. 1now
show on the screenthe relevant portionof the revised 4theditionof the Bahrainrnapof the Hawar
Islands in the1:50,000series. This was publishedonly in 1997andwas notaccordingly available
to Qatar at the time when it prepared rnap No. 5 submitted with the Qatar Memorial. The
differences between the two maps are very apparent. In the more recent 4th edition map, the
representation ofthe spit has been modifiedto show that itmay not be above water at al1Statesof
the tide, particularly athigh tide; but it does showthe apparentlow-watermark extendingoutto a
point about 250 m from the mainlandof Qatar.
36. The question still is: whatis the distancebetweenthe low-waterline on the mainlandof
Qatarandthe nearestlow-waterline on theso-called tail of Hawar? Qatarinsists thatthat distance
is no more than 250m, and no arnount of video misrepresentationor photographicmanipulation
can changethat. This distance,1may Say,is not much more, as the crow flies,than the distance
between the Court's newbuilding and the entrance to its grounds. The Court may in any event
wish to note someof the base points which Bahrain is claiming aroundthe HawarIslands for its
territorialseaoundary [showrnapNo. 110in Bahrainjudges'foldersfor 15June]. 1now showon
the screen a copy of the rnap which ProfessorReisman put up on 15June to illustrate the base
points which it is claiming for the delimitation of its territorial sea boundary withQatar in the
southemsector. As the Court willsee, Bahrainis stillclaiming threebasepoints- now illustrated
by arrows- on the spit ofHawarpointing towardsthe mainland, includingone right at theend of
the tail. Bahrainis presurnablynot claiming a submarinebasepoint.
37. Qatar maintains that its own positive case for sovereignty over the Hawar Islands is
well founded in fact and in law, resting, as itdoes, on the seven general propositionswhich 1
advanced at the beginningof my statement, combinedwith the other arguments, presentedby my
colleagues, Professor Salmon, Mr.Shankardass,Ms Pilkingtonand Mr.Bundy over the past three
or four weeks. Qatar'scase on the HawarIslandsrestson a combinationof historical,geographical
and legal arguments whichmy colleaguesand 1 have soughtto present toyou inOuroral pleadings
as well as in Ourwritten pleadings. Given that the outcome of this case, at least so far as the
question oftitle to the HawarIslandsis concemed,maydependupon an assessmentby the Courtofdisputed questions of fact, Qatar would ask the Members of the Court to study carefully, the
documentaryand other evidencewhich has been presentedto them, tnisting that they will be able
to distinguish-as 1amsuretheywill- betweenproof and mereassertion.
Mr. President, that concludesy presentationthis morning. Withyourpermission,1suggest
that youmight now cal1ProfessorDavidto therostrum. Thankyou.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, sirIan, et je donne maintenant la parole au
professeur Eric David.
Monsieur DAVID :Je vous remercie, Monsieurle président,de me donner à nouveau la
parole.
ZUBARAH
1. Monsieur le président,Madameet Messieursde la Cour,j'avais commencémon exposé,
le5 juin dernier, endisant que,dans le présent différend, la revendication de Bahur la région
de Zubarah n'étaitpas la partie la plus compliquéedu dossieà présenter. Mon opinionn'a pas
changéaprèsavoir entendulesplaidoiriesde nos adversaires surce sujet,même si nous avonstous
apprisavec grand intérêqtueGilgameshavait trouvé à Bahreïnle secretde lajeunesse éternelle',et
on comprend que quelques siècles plus tard, les Al-Khalifah l'aient suivi dans cette île
merveilleuse.
2. Plus sérieusementj,e vais reprendrele planque M. Shankardassetmoi-même avions suivi
initialement en examinant, aussi succinctement que possible, conformémenatu Règlementde la
Cour et aux pressantes recommandationsde son président,les réponses-du moins les plus
pertinentes-ou les absencesde réponsede Bahreïnaux arguments de Qatar.
3. Je ne reviendrai pas sur le caractère artificielet tactique de la demande de Bahreïn sur
zubarah2, sinon pour observer qu'assez curieusement, ahreïnn'hésitepas à présentà adresser le
mêmereproche à Qatar à propos de sa revendicationsur les îles Hawar. Pour M.Volterra, cette
Z
revendication ne servirait que de contrepoids à la revendication, supposée réellecelle-la, de
'M.J.Paulsson,CR200011,8juin2000,.44,par.5.
CR 2000/8, j5in2000,. 51-5par.1-4.Bahreïn sur zubarah3. La Cour apprécieraqui, de Qatar ou de Bahreïn, utilise le règlement
judiciaire des différends des fins essentiellementtactiques, mais en gardanà l'esprit que les
tentatives répétéepsar Qatar de soumettre la questiondes îles Hawar au règlementarbitral ou
judiciaire remontent 1964~'alors quela volontépar Bahreïnde soumettrela question de Zubarah
à un telrèglementn'a été introduieu'en 1988~.
D'ailleurs, Bahreïn lui-mêmene semble guère croire en sa revendication sur Zubarah
puisqu'il n'a pas hésitéqualifier l'action judiciairede Qatar d'«aventuresans risque))où Qatar
«n'avaitrien àperdre en déposant unilatéralemen sta requête»(les italiques sontde moi). Je me
garderai biende tirer des conclusions hâtivesde ce bel accès de lucidité,saufpour constaterque si
Bahreïn estime que Qatar ne court aucun risque en soumettant ce contentieux au règlement
judiciaire, c'est que Bahreïnaccorde bien peu de créditses propres demandes,et notamment à
cellesurZubarah.. .
4. Je ne reviendraipas non plus sur la questiondes originesde Zubara: le pointn'est pas
essentiel pour démontrerla souveraineté de l'une ol'autre des Parties, mais il demeure que les
éléments produitspar les Parties tendent à montrer que Zubarah existait avant l'arrivéedes
Al ~halifah'mêmesi Bahreïnprésentecertainsdeces élémentscomm« espéculatifs»*.
5. Je peuxà présentaborderle fondde ce qui continueàdiviser Bahreïnet Qatarà propos de
Zubarah, et comme au premier tour, j'exarninerai successivement lamanière dont Bahreïn
considère [l .l] ie fondementdu titre de Qatar sur Zubarah (1),[1.2]la confirmation de cetitre (II)
et [1.3] l'absence de rôlejoué par l'allégeancedes Naïm envers l'émir deBahreïn (III). Je
commencedoncavec lefondementdutitre deQatarsurZubarah.
1.LE FONDEMENTDUTITREDE QATAR SUR ZUBARAH [2.1]
6. En ce qui concerne l'acquisition par Qatar de son titre sur Zubarah à travers
l'établissement de l'autoriées Al-Thanisur l'ensemblede la péninsule,Bahreïn a insistésur le
3 ~R. Volterra,CR2000113, 13juin 2000,p. 10,par. 10.
CR 2000/8,5 juin 2000,p. 51-52,par. 1-4.
Ibid.
CR2000/11, 8juin 2000,p. 10par. 16.
'CR200018,5juin 2000,p. 53, par. 7.
M. J.Paulsson,CR2000111,8juin 2000,p. 46,par. 21.fait que la péninsule deQatar étaitune dépendancede Bahreïnjusqu'en 1 86g9,et qu'ensuite, ilne
voyait pas commentQatar, en émergeant géographiquemen etn 1868-je reprends les termesde
M.Paulsson -, aurait pu étendresa souveraineté à Zubarah ou aux îles ~awar". A moins de
recourir à une quelconque théoriedes ((frontières naturelles))ou d'une «unitégéographique
prédestinée»",M. Paulsson a dit qu'il était ccimpossible»pour Qatar de prouver que sa
souverainetés'était étendue à Zubarah et auxîles ~awar'~.
La répliqueestpourtantsimple.
7. En ce quiconcernela souveraineté - disons plus correctement,l'autonté- de l'émirde
Bahreïn sur la péninsuleavant 1868,Qatar amontré dans ses écriturese,t Me Pilkingtonl'a répété
en cette enceinte, [2.2]à quel point cette autoritérestait éminemment théoriqueJ .e ne reprendrai
pas tout ce quiaété écritI3et ditàce sujetI4.
8. En ce qui concernel'extensionde l'autonté deQatar à Zubarah en 1868,là aussi, on ne
peut quese référe r ce qui a déjàété largementexposé. Si l'autoritédu cheikh de Bahreïnsur la
péninsule deQatar est symbolique,[2.3] celle des Al-Thani sur ce mêmetemtoire est constatée
dès1862par un visiteur étrangerI5e ,lle est reconnuepar les Britanniques, commel'a rappeléhier
M.Bundy, [2.4] à travers le traitédu 12 septembre 186816,et elle est encore confirméedans le
témoignagede Lorimerqui voit en Muhammad-bin-Thaniqui signece traité aunom des tribusde
Qatar [2.5]«l'hommele plus influent detoutle promontoire»'7(les italiques sont de moi). Ces
faits, que Bahreïn n'a d'ailleurspas contestés,permettent de constaterl'évidence, àsavoir quela
révolte des tribusde Qatar contre le cheikh de Bahreïn et la signature des traitésde 1868
Ibid., CR2000112,9 juin 2000, p. 19, par.85; aussi sir E. Lauter, R2000111, 8 juin 2000, p.16,
par.19.1.
'M.J.Paulsson,CR2000/12,9juin2000,p. 19, par.86.
"Ibid.,par.84,88.
lIbid.,par.84.
'3~ontre-mémoidre Qatar,vol. 1,par.2.2-2.7;réplde Qatar,vol. 1,par.2.5; voiraussice qu'écrivenltes
Britannique:Lorimerpourlapériode1823-1840,dansmémoird eeQatar,annexe11.5,vol.3,p. 201suiv.;oulerésident
politique en1868,dansmémoirdeeQatar,annexe11.7,vol.4,p. 53.
14~.N. PilkingtoCIJ,CR200015,p. 49,par.17suiv.
lIbid.
lIbid.,p. 52,par.32 ss.
l7Mémoird eeQatar,annexe11.5,vol.3, p.208.transforment l'autorité defactodes Al-Thani sur la péninsule[2.6] en une autoritédejure qui
comprend ipsfoacto et ipsjoure Zubarahet lesîles Hawar.
Je disais, il y a deux semaines, que l'accessoire suitle principal18;presqu'en écho,le
professeur Reismanrappelait la semainepasséeque,pour l'arbitre de l'affairede l'lle dePalmas, si
un groupe d'îles est considéréen droit comme une unité-et c'est à fortiori le cas d'une
péninsule -, «le destinduprincipal entraînele destin dureste»I9.
Qatar a donc fait la démonstrationque la péninsulese détachecomplètementde Bahreïn
en 1868,et contrairement à ce que soutientsir Elihu ~auter~acht?',c'està Bahreïn de prouverque
Zubarah serait pourtant restésous son autorité. A supposer que Bahreïn réussisse à faire une
démonstration quel'on n'a trouvéejusqu'à présentni dans ses écritures,ni dans sesplaidoiries,on
a vu que les événements postérieuà rs1868confirmaientque le destin de Zubarah suivait ledestin
de lapéninsule.
9. Il est donc vain aussi de s'interroger, commele fait M.Paulsson, sur l'allégeancedes
tribus localesauxAl-Thani,avantceque M. Paulssonappelle ((l'attaquede1937~~'.
Le pouvoirdes Al-Thani surl'ensemble dela péninsuleest,pourreprendreun vocablecher à
Bahreïn,uneeffectivitéq , uivaut toutesles allégeances dumonde.
La suitedes événementlse confirme.
10. Lors du premier tour des plaidoiries, Qataravait montréque, mêmesi l'on prétendait
isoler le cas de Zubarah du reste de la péninsule,l'histoire montrait que le titre de Qatar sur
Zubarahavaittrouvéunelarge confirmation [2.7]entre 1873et 1878. Surces événementspourtant
capitaux, Bahreïnn'a rien répondulorsdu premiertour de plaidoiries; toutau plus trouve-t-onune
vagueallusion àces événementc shez M. Paulsson lorsqu'il lesqualified'«incidentsisolésau cours
desquelsdes tribus étaient envoyées à Zubarah par les Ottomans et par les Al-Thanilors de l'une
ou l'autredeleurs tentativesinfmctueusesd'y imposerleurautorité»22.
CR 2000/8,juin2000,p. 55,par12.
lCR 2000115,1juin2000,p. 11par.44.
2CR 2000111,juin2000,p.16,par.19.2.
21CR 2000112,9jui2000,p.18,par.84.
"~bid.,p17,par.76. Monsieur le président,voilà un momentoù il estdur de se pàvotre désir,pourtant sage,
de ne pas répéter qui a étédit car il est tentantpour le plaideur deconfronter encoreune foisla
réalitéavec la version qu'en donnent nos adversaires. Maisra lex sed lex, je respecterai le
Règlementde la Couret votre souhait.
f
11. En conclusion, Bahreïn n'a pas apporté l'ombred'une contestatàoces élémentsde
faits que constituel'absence de pouvoir réel desAl-Khalifahsur la péninsulede Qatar avant 1868,
avantle développementdu pouvoirdes Al-Thanisur cettepéninsulàpartir des années1850, surla
révoltede toutes les tribus de la péninsule contre les Al-Khalifah en 1867-1868s,ur la conclusion
en septembre 1868 de traitésséparés par la Grande-Bretagne d'ucôté avecAli-bin-Khalifah,
présentécomme «le cheikh de Bahreïn)),de l'autre avec Mahobin Sanee,présentécomme«le
chef d'El-Kutm. Ces faits sonthistoriqueset ils conduàsune conséquencejuridique simpleà
savoir que c'est toute la péninsule de Qatar,y compris Zubarah et les îles Hawar, qui forme
désonnais,en faitet en droit,ensemble géopolitiquedistintt indépendant de Bahreïn.
II. LACONFIRMATION DUTITRE DE SOUVERAINETÉ DEQATAR SUR ZUBARA H3.1]
12. Lors du premier tour de plaidoiries, Qatar avaitmontréque son titre sur Zubarah avait
trouvéconfirmation, d'une part [3.2] dans l'exercice par Qatar de sonautoritéà Zubarah (A),
d'autre part[3.3] dans la reconnaissance générale de cteitre par les autres Etats, ainsi que par
Bahreïn lui-même (B). Examinons à nouveau, si vous le voulez bien, ces deux aspects de la
confirmationdutitre.
A. L'exercice par Qatarde son autoritàZubarahaprès1878[4.1]
13. Commeje l'ai dit,je ne reviens pas sur les années 1873-1878puisque Bahrn'a pas
répondu a ce quenous avons diàce sujet lors dupremiertourdesplaidoiries.
Pour la période postérieure1878,je distinguerailes faits d'autoritéde Qatar contestéspar
Bahreïn (1) et ceuxqueahreïninvoqueen sa faveur(2).1. Lesfaitsd'autorité deQatarcontestés parBahreïn[4.2]
14. Qatar avait choisi, comme exemples particulièrementsignificatifs d'exercice de son
autoritéà Zubarah après 1878,des événements survenus en 1889, 1892, 1895, 1911, 1935 et
1937~~.Bahreïnn'a discutéque des événements de 1895et 1937. Je ne parlerai donc que de ces
derniersetne reviendraipas sur les autresdontla valeurprobanten'apas été contestéepar Bahre'in.
15. En ce qui concerne l'accueil à Zubarah en 1895, par Jasim-al-Thani, de la tribu des
Al-bin-Ali [4.3],et la décision des Britanniqud'envoyerun navire de guerresur les lieux afinde
prévenir une éventuelle invasiod ne Bahreïn par les forcesde Jasim, j'avais critiqué l'analyse de
Bahreïn consistant à dire que l'action des Britanniques était motivée parun titre de l'émirde
Bahreïn sur la régionde ~ubarah~~. M. Paulsson m'a réponduen citant une lettre datéedu
23juillet 1895où le commandantdu navire britannique écrit àun fonctionnaireturc que Zubarah
est une des villes appartenant au cheikhde ~ahreïn~~;en outre, M. Paulsson invoqueun rapport
turc de 1897disant que, selonlesBritanniques,Zubarahseraitsousle contrôlede ~ahreïn~~.
16.Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieursde la Cour,j'avais dit, lors du premier tour
de plaidoiries, qu'en slalomant adroitement à travers les innombrables documents britanniques
consacrés à Zubarah,il étaitpossiblede trouver,çà et là, l'une ou l'autre déclarationfavorableaux
thèsesde ~ahreïn~'. Les deux documentscitésen sont des exemples. Nos adversaires auraient
mêmepu citer, à propos de cet épisode,un autre document britannique affirmant que l'émid re
Bahreïn voyait dans l'installation des Al-bin-Ali à Zubarah «un empiètement injuste sur ses
temtoires ancestraux»28.
Il reste quequandon prendla peine d'examiner tousles documentsrelatifs àcette affaire, la
lettre de l'officier demarine britannique citée par nos adversairest un exemple atypique qui ne
trouve aucun appui dans le reste de la correspondance relative à cet événement. Cette
correspondance confirme aucontraire que le seul et unique souci des Britanniques étaitnon de
préserver une prétendue souverainet de Bahreïn àZubarah,mais simplementd'assurer la sécurité
- -
23~R2000/9,5 juin 2000,p. 13-15,par.25-26.
241bid.,. 13-14,par.26.
"CR2000/12,9 juin 2000,p. 18,par.78.
261bid.p,ar.79.
2 7 2000/9,5 juin 2000, p. 17,par.35.
"24 mai1895,mémoiredeQatar,annexe11.41,vol. 5,p. 139.de l'île contre une éventuelle agressiondes tribus de Qatar. Zubarah apparaissait alors,pour
paraphraser ce que Napoléondisait à propos du port d'Anversvis-à-vis de l'Angleterre,comme
«un pistolet braqué surle cŒurde Bahreïn~. La Cour trouvera en référence [4.4] plus d'une
demi-douzained'exemples- j'en montre certainsici à l'écran- montrantque l'action militaire
des Britanniques en 1895contrele cheikhJasimAl-Thanin'avait d'autremotifque la seulecrainte
d'une attaque contre Bahreïn des tribus rassemblées à Zubarah; il ne s'agissait nullement-et
pardonnez-moide le répéter - de protégerun quelconque titrede souveraineté de Bahreïnsur la
région29.
Lors desévénements de 1937,dontje parleraidansuninstant, le résidentpolitique écrira:
((l'actionprise en 1895par les bateaux de SaMajesté dedétruireles boutreshostiles à
Zubarah visaient à prévenirl'invasion de Bahreïn depuis Qatar et n'appuyait en
aucunemanièrela revendicationde Bahreïnsur~ubarah))~'.[4.4a]
17. Quant au documentturc disant que, pour les Britanniques, Zubarahrelève deBahreïn,
nous venons de voir que celane correspond nullement à la position officielledes Britanniques sur
Zubarah. Ce document n'implique enoutre aucune reconnaissancepar la Turquie de ce qui est
affirmépar le capitaine britannique. Outre les très nombreux documents turcs montrant que
Zubarah est considérécomme un nahiye, un sous-district du kaza de Qatar, donc comme un
territoire sousjuridiction ottomane3',la phrase qui suit celle citéepar nos adversaires affirme:
((Cependant le Gouvernement ottoman n'a encore nullement reconnu la prétention de la
Grande-Bretagnequ'elle a ledroitdeprotégerOmanet lesîles de ~ahreïn.)?~
Ce documentest doncsanspertinence pourla thèsedeBahreïn.
Bahreïnajoute toutefois que cen'est pas parce que lesOttomans présentaient Qatarcomme
une entitéentièrement contrôlée par eux que c'étaitréellementle cas :toujours selon la Partie
adverse, l'Iraqa dit la mêmechose du Koweït et l'Iran de ~ahreïn~~.Il y a toutefoisune grande
différenceentreces exemples caricaturauxet la présenteespèce : les Turcs étaientà Qatar, ce qui
2%émoird eeQatar,annexe11.39(par.3). 40 (par.3 et6), 42 (par.2 et4), vol. 5,p. 131-14et44,exe111.42
vol. 6, p. 195 et203.
3%4émoid reQatar,annexeIII.135,vol. 7,p. 180.
31~épliqudeeQatar,vol. 1,p. 243-244;voir.aussiDr.A. AI-Meri,CR2000/6,30 mai2000,p. 9-12,par.5, 19et
21.
32~émoird eeBahreïn,annexe63a), vol.2, p. 269.
33~.J.Paulsson,CR2000/12,9juin2000, p. 9,par.40.n'est pas le cas aujourd'huide l'Iraqau Koweïtou de l'Iran à Bahreïn. Certes, il n'y avait pas un
soldat turc sur chaquemètrecarréde sol qatarien,mais faut-il encorerappeler cette jurisprudence
désonnais classiquequ'évoquaitla semaine passéele professeur ~eil~~,évoquée encore tout à
l'heure par M. Bundy, et qui admet que, selon les circonstances, surtout pour des temtoires
faiblement habités,un exercice intermittentde la souveraineté n'affectepas la validité dutitre3'?
Or, qui douterait encoreque lesAl-Thaniont exercéleurautorité à Zubarahchaque foisqu'ils l'ont
?
18.J'en viens aux événementd se 1937 [4.5] età la soumission forcéed'une fraction des
Naïm, les Al-Jabr, par l'émirde Qatar, soumissionque nos adversaires s'évertuent à présenter
comme une manifestation de l'expansionnisme de Qatar- en quelque sorte un remake de La
conquête d e'Ouest- et en outrecommeune violation de l'interdictiondu recoursàla force dans
les relations internationales3'. Jevoudrais cependantpréciserque l'action de Qatar, malgréla
gravitéde sa qualificationpar Bahreïn, n'apas fait à l'époque, dans la pire des estimations,plus
d'unedouzainede victimes departet d'autre3*m , êmesi,bien sûr, c'estdouze victimesde trop et si
l'existence d'une«agression» internationa~e~ne se mesurepas au nombrede victimes.
Quoi qu'il en soit, sirElihuLauterpacht aparu surpris de ma discrétionsur les événements
de 1937~'.Monsieurle président,Madame etMessieurs de la Cour,sije suis restédiscret sur ce
point, c'est parce que je dois avouer que jamais je n'aurais imaginé quela qualification
d'«agression» internationale qui figurait dans la réplique de ~ahreïn~', à l'endroit que j'avais
précisément qualifié il, a quinzejours, de «chef-d'Œuvreabsolu de refusde la réalité»4j2 a,maisje
3CR2000115,14juin2000, p. 47,par.63.
"II~de Palmas,4 avril1928,RSA,II,p. 840et 867;GroenlandOriental,5 avril1933,C.P.J.I.sérieAB no53,
p.46, 50 et51;TempledePréahVihéar,C.I.R.ecueil1962,p. 29-30;Rannde Kufch,19fév1968,RSA,XVII,p. 564
et 569; Dubai/Sharjah,19 octobre1981,ILR, 91, p.624; Kasikili/SC.I.uRJcueil1999,opinion dissidedee
M. Rezek,par.15.
3 6 200019,5juin2000,p. 13-15,par.25-26.
37~.Al-Arayed,CR2000111,8 juin 2000, p. 8-9, par.8, 10 et 21; sir Elihu Laut, id., p. 22, 38-41,
par.23, 89-99.
38~épliqudeeQatar,vo1,p. 245,note38.
3g~épliqudeeBahreïn,vol. 1,par.272.
4 0 2000111,8juin2000, p. 38,par.89.
41~épliqudee Bahreï, o1,par.272.
4 2 200019,5juin2000, p.25,par.55.n'aurais cru que cette qualification allait revenirdans ce prétoireet donner liàutrois pages de
développementet dix minutes de plaidoirie devant la Courinternationale de ~ustice~~.Lorsque
l'exagération devienbtoursouflure,je pensealors à Cyranode Bergerac se moquant de sonnez qui
devient dans la célèbre tirade queje cite de mémoire :«C'est un pic, c'est un cap, que dis-je un
cap, c'est unepéninsule..»
19. Monsieurle président,nul ne songe à contester qu'en 1937, le Pacte de la Société des
Nations de 1919et le pacte Briand-Kellog de 1928avaientdéfinitivementmisla guerrehors-la-loi
commemode de règlementdes différends internationaux.Nous sommes plusieurs dans cette salle
à l'enseignerou à l'avoir enseignéchaqueannée àdes cohortesd'étudiants, etjene vais doncpas
contrediremon savantcontradicteursurce point. Il n'en restepas moins extraordinaire- et c'est
un euphémisme-de soutenirque l'action de l'émir de Qatar à Zubarah, en 1937, violait
l'interdictiondu recoursàla force :d'une part,cette conclusiontient pour acquisce qui n'a pas été
démontré, à savoirque Zubarah serait restéeune possessionde Bahreïn alors que ce n'étaitplus le
cas depuis quelque 70 ans - ce que les Britanniques reconnaissent à l'époque44 [4.5a]; d'autre
part, cette action n'était sifférentede celle qui avaitéjàété menée à Zubarah en 1878sans la
moindre opposition des ~ritanni~ues~~,enfin, cette conclusion implique alors que la
Grande-Bretagne auraitviolé l'article3 [4.6] de la convention du 31mai 1861qui l'obligeait«à
prendre les mesures nécessairespour obtenir réparationde tout dommage ...infligé.. àBahreïn
ou àses dépendances dansle ~olfe))~~n,ous sommesen 1861;si la Grande-Bretagneavait violé de
manière aussi flagranteses obligations internationales, on l'aurait su; or cela semble avoir
totalement échappé aujx uristes éminentsdu Foreign Officeet de 1'IndiaOffice !...Et pour cause,
le résident politique écrt 5 mai 1937: Yuridicallythe BahrainclaimtoZubarahmustfail'".
20. On ne manquera pas d'observer,en passant, que la thèsede la violation, en 1937,de
l'interdiction du recoursà la force soutenuepar nos adversaires, thèse qui d'ailleurs auraitété
correcte, si d'aventure,les Al-Thani avaient débarqué à Manama en 1937, cette thèse, disais-je,
43~iE.Lauterpacht, R2000111,8juin2000,p.38-41,par.89-99.
"Mémoire deQatar,annexe111.12,ol. p. 131.
45~émoirdeeQatar,annexe11.5,vol.3, p.224-225.
"blémoiredeQatar,annexe11.20,vol.5,p.45.
47~émoirdeeQatar,annexe111.126,ol.7,p. 132;auibida.nexe111.135,ol. 7,p. 179.confirmeque Qataret Bahreïn étaient àl'époquedeux Etats indépendants puisque l'interdiction du
recours à la force ne s'applique que dansles relations internationalesdes Etats; sur ce point,
sir Elihu Lauterpachtrejoint le professeur Salmonet donne tort à son collègue Me Kemicha qui,
pour les besoinsde l'utipossidetis, s'est efforcé vainde démontrerle contraire.
21. En conclusion, l'interprétation par noasdversaires des événements de 1895et de 1937
n'infirmeet n'affaibliten aucunemanièrelaportéedesactes d'autorité deQatarsurZubarah.
Voyons àprésentsi, de soncôté, Bahreïn peutinvoquerun quelconque acted'autoritéou de
souveraineté à Zubarah.
2. Les faits d'autoritérevendiqué psrBahreïn[5.1]
22. Bahreïn se prévautdes relationsd'allégeance desNaïm avec les ~l-~halifah~~[5.2]. Il
invoquemêmedes pétitionsde personnesprésentées comme des résidentd se Zubarah et attestant
de leur allégeance à l'émir de~ahreïn~~.J'ai montrélors du premier tour de plaidoiriesque ces
relations d'allégeanceétaientimpuissantes à fonder un titre de souverainetéen la présente espèce
[5.3]eu égard à la variabilitédes allégeancesdes Naah, à l'absenced'autoritéréelle des émird se
Bahreïn sur cette région,et à la présence parmiles Naïm de fractions qui faisaient allégeance à
l'émirde ~atar".
Sans beaucoup se soucier des argumentsdéveloppésparQatar sur ce point,M.Paulsson se
réfêr àe une sourceque Bahreïn chérittout particulièrement,le Mémoiredu capitaineBrucks 15.41
qui, pour la période 1821-1829constate que les habitants des villages de la côte entre RasRakkan
et Zubarah relèvent del'autoritéde ~ahreïn~'. Ce qu'on ne nous dit cependant pas, c'est qu'à
l'époque,l'ensemble dela péninsule étais tupposésoumis à l'autoritéde Bahreïn, même sicette
4s~irE.Lauterpacht, C2000/11,8juin2000,p. 16par.19.1;M. 1.Paulsson,CR2000J12,9juin2000,p.16,
par.66.
49~. J.Paulsson,CR2000/12,juin2000,p.21,par.93.
''CR2000/9,5juin2000,p.19et suiv., 39ret suiv.
"M. J.Paulsson, C2000/12,9juin2000,p.16,par70.autorité, comme on l'a vu, était très théorique (supra par. 715*. De fait, le mémoire du
capitaineBrucks cite une douzaine d'endroits dont les habitants sont tousprésentéscomme des
sujets deBahre'in[5.5] et ces endroits comprennentnon seulement Zubarahet les deux villagesde
*
pêcheurs de laprincipale île Hawar, mais aussi Doha, Wakrah, Fuwairat, Khor Hassan,
P
Zakhnuniyah, etc53. Si le mémoiredu capitaineBrucks est pertinent pour la période antérieure
à 1829, il n'a pas de significationplus particulière pour Zubarahou pour les îles Hawar que pour
n'importe quelautreendroit de lapéninsulepuisquec'est l'ensemblede celle-ci quiétaitsoumise à
l'époque à l'autorité nominaledu cheikh de Bahreïn. En outre,ce mémoiren'est guère significatif
pour la périodepostérieure à 1829,etafortioripourcellequisuit les événementd se 1868.
23. M. Paulsson nous dit encore que les Naïm payentdes taxes à l'émir deBahrein et lui
rendent divers services54[5.6]. Cet argumentquifiguraitdéjàdans le contre-mémoirede Bahreina
été largementrencontrédansla réplique de ~ata?~. On ajoutera que M. Paulssonne précisepas de
quels Na'irnil s'agit, mais detoute façon, Qatar aégalementmontré,documentsàl'appui [5.7],que
l'émirde Bahreïn, contrairement à celui de Qatar,ne levaitpas d'impôts à zubarahS6. Ce sont les
exemplesque la Cour peut voir à l'écran.
24. M. Paulssoninvoque la présence desNaïm àZubarah ou leurs déplacements saisonniers
de Bahrein à zubarah5' [5.8]. Indépendammentde ce qui a déjàété dit sur l'allégeance et
l'identificationesdits ~aïrn", des déplacements de personnes privées n'ont évidemme aucune
significationpour l'établissement de la souverainetés9. Permettez-moi, Monsieulre président,de
rappeler sur ce point des extraits de la jurisprudence internationalerécentequi sont sans doute
familiersàla Cour. Dans l'affaireBotswana/Narnibi[ e5.9],la Cour a di:
«Il n'est d'ailleurspas inhabituelque les habitants de régionsfrontalièresen
Afiique traversent les frontièresen question,pour desraisons liéesà 17a@cultureou
52~ontre-mémoid eQatar,vol. 1,par.3.122.
S3~émoird ee Bahreïn,annexe7,vol. 2,p. 97-101.
5 4 ~2000/12,9 juin2000,p. 16,par.71.
55~épliqudeeQatar,vol. 1,par.6.49et suiv.
5 6 ~2000/9,5 juin2000,p.1par.43.
"CR2000/12,9 juin2000,p. 16-17,par.66et73.
"CR2000/9,5 juin2000,p. 23 etsuiv.,par.49 etsuiv.
59~épliqudeeQatar,vol. 1,par.6.44. au pacage, sans que les autoritésd'un côtéou de l'autre de ces frontières s'en
alarment.»60(Les italiquessontdenous.)
Afortiori en va-t-il ainsi dans la régiondu ~olfe~'où comme le rappelaient, en 1981,les
arbitresde l'affaireDubai/Sharjah, [5.10]«le conceptde frontièreausens occidentaldu terme était
jadis totalementinconnudespeuplesnomadesdecette région»62[.Ma traduction.]
«Al'exception de lafrangecôtière,la populationétaitnomadeou semi-nomade,
et pour ces gens, le concept moderne de ((frontière)n )'avaitpas de signification. Ils
n'étaient concernés quepar les secteurs ou les localités dans lesquels ils se
déplaçaient.»63 [Ma traduction.]
De manièreproche, dans l'affaireErythrée/Yemen en 1998,letribunalarbitral observe[5.11]
«que les idées occidentales de souverainetétemtoriale sont étrangères à des
populationsélevées dans la tradition islamiqueet habituées à des notions de temtoire
trèsdifférentesde celles reconnues dans le droitinternationalcontemporain»64.[Ma
traduction.]
Le tribunal ajoute que, dans ce contexte, toute sentence doittenir compte des ((traditions
juridiques régionalesnb5.Autrement ditjacus predit actum. Tout ceci s'applique,bien sûr aussi,
auxîles Hawar.
Pour cesraisons,les déplacements occasionnels à des finsprivéeset récréatives des émid re
Bahreïn à ~ubarah~~ne pouvaient non plus apparaître comme un empiètement à l'autorité
territoriale de Qatar sur la régionde Zubarah telle qu'elle résultait des événementn s,otamment
de 1868 à 1878. Comme le rappellent encore les arbitres de l'affaire Dubai/Sharjah, c'est
l'exploitationdupétrolequi a rendu nécessaire l'établissemed nt frontièresclaireset précises entre
les émirats6'. Auparavant, les gens se déplaçaient librementd'un territoire à l'autre. Cela ne
voulait cependant pas dire qu'il n'existait pas, pour autant, une notion et une conscience de
souverainetétemtoriale, ainsi que le rappelait M. Salmonil y a 15jours6*. D'où l'importancedes
élémentspermettandte définirl'étenduede cette souverainetécommepar exemple,dans le cas des
6011ee Knsikili/Sedudu,C.I.J.Recueil1999,Arrê13décembre 1999,par.74.
61~ocumentssupplémentairese Qatar,doc.no16.
6219octobre1981,ILR,91,p.562.
63~bid.,587.
64~entencdu 9octobre1998,par.525.
651bid.
&M. J.Paulsson,CR 2000/12,9juin2000,p.17-18,par75 et80.
6719octobre1981,ILR,91,p.562.
6 8 ~2000/5,29mai 2000,p.42,par.27.îles Hawar, le désintérêt totdal Bahreïn pour ces îles avant les annéestrente ou les témoignages
d7Albanou de ~nor~~.
25. M. Paulsson signaleencore que beaucoup de famillesNaïm avaientdes maisons à la fois *
à Zubarah et à ~ahreïn~',que desmembres un peu turbulentsde la familledes Al-Khalifah étaient
D
parfoisexilés àZubarahtandis qued'autresyvivaientenpermanence7'[5.12].
Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, si des faits de ce genre devaient
constituer des actes de souveraineté, lamoitiéde la Côte d'Azur appartiendrait à la plupart des
Etats d'Europe, d'Amériqueou du Moyen-Orient dont les ressortissants ont cédéau charme du
climat et des paysages méditerranéens[5.13]... Le roi Albertde Belgique aune maison àGrasse :
la Belgique serait bien reçue par la France si elle revendiquait cettepropriétécomme temtoire
belge ! Il eût été sansdoute plus intéressantque Bahreïn produise des extraits de son cadastre
commencédanslesannéesvingtet terminéau débutdes annéestrente72,mais de ce côté-là,le seul
document que Bahreïna réussi à fournir concerne une seule demanded'inscription au cadastrele
23 avril1937~~p ,lusieurs semainesaprèsle débutdes tensions à Zubarah. Et Bahreïnne dit rien de
la suite réservéeà cette demande. Pour Hawar non plus, Bahreïn n'a produit aucun document
cadastral.
26. Nos adversairesdisentaussi que les émirsde Bahreïn ont continué àgouvernerZubarah
tout au long duXIX'siècleaprèsavoir quittélaville [5.14]~~.Les seulespreuves qu'ilsapportent à
cet effet consistent en une référencaux paragraphes104 à 112 de leur mémoire. On ne voit pas
trèsbien ce qu'ilsveulentprouvercar ces paragraphesne concernentquele XVIII"siècle[5.15].
27. M. Paulsson évoqueencore plus de vingt exemples de relationsprivilégiées entre l'émir
de Bahreïn et les Naïm, exemplescitésdansla réplique de ~ahreïn~~.Rassurez-vous, Monsieurle
président,je ne vais pas répondreà chacun de ces exemples,maisje voudrais iciattirer l'attention
%4érnoirdeeQatar,annexe111.2et 229,vol.8,p. 125etp. 127.
''CR2000/12,9juin2000,p. 17,par.73.
7'~bi par.75.
72~émoirdeeBahreïn,annexe227, vo4,p. 968.
73~émoirdeeBahreïn,annexe118,vol. 3,p.638.
74~ir. . Lauterpac, R2000111,8juin 2000,p. 16,par.19.1;M.J.Paulsson,CR2000112,9juin2000,p. 16,
par.65.
"CR 2000/12,9juin2000,p. 16,par.71.de la Cour sur un mode d'argumentationassez habile auquel Bahreïn a eu fréquemmentrecours
dans sa réplique :c'est ce quenous avonsappeléla techniquede larépétition et du ((point-boulet».
Bahreïnreprend uneliste de faitsdéjàdéveloppéd sans ses écrituresantérieures,et il lesadditionne
afin d'impressionnerle lecteur parleur nombre (la quantitéprimantla qualité) et illeur donneune
apparencede vérité scientifique en référençant chacun d'eux [5.16]. En réalité,es référencessont
de simples renvois à des affirmations ou des arguments du mémoireou du contre-mémoirede
Bahreïn et il n'est nullementtenu compte,ou trèspeu, des réponsesfourniespar l'adversaire. Or,
si les humoristes pratiquent ce qu'on appellele comique de répétition,les juristes savent que
répéteré, numéree rt additionner,ce n'est pas argumenter. Il n'est donc guère utile,et d'ailleurs
impossible dans le laps de temps imparti aux plaidoiries, de répondre aux vingt-quatre
«points-boulets))auxquels M.Paulsson renvoie. Je dois malheureusementlaisser à la Cour latâche
difficileet fastidieuse,j'ai presqueenviede dire le traitement inhumain,de séparerle bon grain de
l'ivraieenretournantaux écritureset documentsdesParties.
28. Un autre exemple frappant de cette méthode d'argumentation apparaît ainsi au
paragraphe 72 de la présentationfaite par M. Paulsson le 9 juin dernier76. M. Paulsson ne craint
pas d'évoquerce qu'il appelle sixéchecsde tentatives d'expansion deQatar àZubarah entre 1874
et 1903,et il seréfèreà la section2.7 du mémoirede Bahreïn sansautre développement.Or, bien
que ces soi-disantéchecs detentativesd'expansion aient faitl'objet d'une réponse appropriéa eux
paragraphes 5.17et 5.18 du contre-mémoirede Bahreïn,cela n'a pas empêché Bahreïnd'y revenir,
d'abord dans sa réplique7'puis dans ses plaidoiries orales, et chaque fois, comme si, entre-temps,
rien n'avait étditàce sujetpar Qatar ! Je ne vais donc pas reprendre l'argumentetje ne peux,ici
aussi, que renvoyer la Cour aux écritures des Parties etlui demander dejuger sur piècela valeur
des arguments présentés dp eart et d'autre. J'aborde présentla reconnaissancedu titre de Qatar
surZubarah.
76CR2000112,p. 17,par.72.
77~épliqudeeBahreïn,vol. 1,par.239 et247. B.La reconnaissancedu titre deQatarsurZubarah[6.1]
29. Je distinguerailes reconnaissancesfaitespardes Etatstiers au différendde cellesqui ont
été faitespar Bahreïn lui-même.
O
1. Les reconnaissancesémanand t'Etatstiers [6.2]
%
30. Les exemplesde reconnaissancepar lesBritanniques,les Turcset d'autres Etats,quej'ai
citésà l'appui du titrede Qatar sur ~ubarah'~,n'ont guèresuscitéde contestation de la part des
conseilsde Bahreïn. Qatar enprend acte.
Seule l'invocation parQatar des traités anglo-turcsde 1913et 1914a fait réagir ~ahreïn'~.
M. Bundy a expliqué,hier, pourquoices traitésétaient pertinentset confirmaientl'appartenance à
Qatar de toute la péninsule.Je n'y reviens doncpas.
3 1.M. Paulssona toutefoismentionnécertains textes qui, selon lui, tendraiànprouver que
les Britanniques auraient reconnu les droits de Bahreïn surzubarahso. Ces textes font partie du
slalom,du gymkhanajuridique auquel Bahreïn doitse livrerpour trouver l'un ou l'autredocument
apparemment défavorableaux thèsesde Qatar. En relisant ces documents et en les situant dans
leur véritableperspective,on constate cependantqu'ils n'ont nullement l'effetque nos adversaires
prétendentleurattribuer.
Examinons-lesensemblesi vouslevoulez biendans l'ordre chronologique.
32. M. Paulsson se réfèreà un télégramme du résidentpolitique datédu 18 août 1932et
concernant la recherche d'un terraind'atterrissagepossibleà ~atar~'[6.3]. Selon M.Paulsson, ce
télégramme indique que si les Britanniques n'obtenaientpas de l'émirde Qatar une autorisation
d'attemr, les Britanniques établiraient une pistd'urgence à Zubarah ou à Dohat Faisakh, deux
endroits ((prochesde ~ahreïn»8*. Etant donné, toujoursselon M. Paulsson, que l'autorisationdes
Al-Thani n'était pas requisepour attemr à ces endroits-Zubarah et Dohat Faisakh-, cela
signifiequ'ils faisaientpartiedu territoire deBahreïnpuisque lesBritanniquesdisposaient déjà de
droitsd'cittemssage àBahreïn. Deuxobservations :
I
CR 2000/9,5 juin 2000,p. 16-19,par. 29-38.
"M. J. Paulsson,CR2000/12,9 juin 2000,p. 19-20,par. 88-89.
"~bid.,p. 18,20-21,par. 80-81,91-92.
'Irbid.,p. 18,par. 81.
s2~épliqude Bahreïn,annexe 1,vol.2,p. 1. Primo, en disant que ces sites d'attemssage sont ((prochesde Bahreïn» [6.4], on a quelque
peine à voir dans ce texte une reconnaissancepar les Britanniques de l'appartenance de
Zubarahet de sesenvirons à Bahreïn;
Secundo, Dohat Faisakh est en outre mentionné- avec l'île Hawar d'ailleurs-dans le
rapportde reconnaissance aérienne de la péninsulede Qatar faitpar les Britanniquesen 1934~~.
Ce rapport nementionne pas Zubarah, mais rien dans le texte ne suggère qu'unepartie de la
péninsulene relèverait pasdeQatar, mais relèveraitde Bahreïn.
33. La Partieadverse invoqueune letire de l'agent politique Loch, du 29 mai 1933,disant
que les prospecteursde 1'Anglo-PersianOil Company se sont rendus en des lieux où l'émirde
Qatar ne pouvait pas les laisser aller.6]et que les gens de Bahreinutilisent comme villégiature
estivaleg4. Le texte perd toute portée lorsqu'onle confronte à des documents postérieursg5 que
M. Shankardass a évoquésau débutde nos plaidoiriesg6et encore ce matin, documents qui
démontrentque,pourles Britanniques,les temtoires du cheikh de Bahreinvisés dansla concession
pétrolièrequ'il avait accordéeen 1925se limitaientaux temtoires sous son contrôle, donc sous le
contrôle du cheikh de Bahreïn, ce qui, comme l'écrit Laithwaitede 1'IndiaOffice le 9 août 1933
[6.7], ((sembleclairement exclure leszones de Qatar etsans douteaussi Hawar qui, de toute façon
appartientgéographiquement àQatar...»g7[Traductiondu Grefe.]
34.L'extraitde la lettre de l'agent politiquedu 29 mai 1933citée par Bahrein ajouteencore
[6.8]: «de fait, il a été ditque l'annéedernière encore(1932) le souverain de Qatar admettaiten
public que certains secteurs de la côte quatarienne relevaient de ~ahreïn.»~* [Traduction du
Greffe.]
«Il a étédit»,Monsieur le président,'litis said: ce ne sont pas sur des ((11a étdib)qu'on
fonde un titre, notammentquandl'histoireréellede Zubarah montre àquel point ce lieu relèvede
l'autorité de l'émidre Qatar. Monsieurle président,je constate que le gong vient de sonner à ma
83~émoird eeQatar,annexe111.9,ol. 6,p.486.
s4CR 2000/12,9juin2000,p. 18,par.80.
ss~émoiredeQatar,annexe111.8à88,vol. 6,p.440-451.
86CR2000/6,30 mai2000, p.23-25,par.37.
"~émoiredeQatar,ann.111.91,vol.6, p. 467.
"M.J.PaulssonCR 2000/12,9juin2000,p. 18,par.80.montre, qu'il est treize heures et je ne voudrais pas vous infliger un traitement inhumain et
dégradantselon les termes de laConventioneuropéennedes droits de l'hommeou la Déclaration
universelle des droits de l'homme,en vous demandant de prolonger encorecet exposé. Peut-être a
quevous préférereqzueje m'interrompea cetendroit-ci demaplaidoirie.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie. Nous ne pouvons que nous en remettre au gong de
votre montre et par conséquentvous terminerez cet exposédemain matin. Je vous remercie,
Monsieur le professeur. Ceci met un terme aux plaidoiriesde Qatar pour ce matin.La Cour se
réuniraà nouveaucet après-midi àquinze heures pour rendresonjugement surla compétencedans
l'affaire de l'Incidentaériend10 août 1999 (Pakistan c.Inde). Dans la présente affaire,elle se
réunirademain matin à dix heures pour entendre lasuite et la fin de la présentationde 1'Etatde
Qatarpour le deuxième tourdeplaidoiries. Je vous remercie. La séanceest levée.
L'audienceest levéeà 13heures.
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 21 juin 2000, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président