Uncorrected Non-corrigé
CR 2000/2
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2000 ANNEE 2000
Public sitting Audience publique
held on Tuesday 4 April 2000, tenue le mardi 4 avril 2000,
at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
President Guillaume, sous la présidence
presiding de M. Guillaume, président
in the case concerning en l'affaire de
Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 l'Incident aérien du 10 août 1999
(Pakistan v. India) (Pakistan c. Inde)
_______________ ____________
VERBATIM RECORD COMPTE RENDU
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Present: Presdilatume Présents : M. Guillaume, président
Vice-President Shi M. Shi,vice-président
Judges Oda MM. Oda
Bedjaoui Bedjaoui
Ranjeva Ranjeva
Herczegh Herczegh
Fleischhauer Fleischhauer
Koroma Koroma
Vereshchetin Vereshchetin
Higgins Mme Higgins
Parra-Aranguren MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans Kooijmans
Al-Khasawneh Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal Buergenthal, juges
Judges ad hoc Pirzada MM. Pirzada
Reddy Reddy, jugesad hoc
Registrar Couvreur M. Couvreur,greffier
__________
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is Le Gouvernement de laéR publique islamique du
represented by: Pakistan est represeét par : Mr. Amir A. Shadani, Ch argé d'affaires a.i., M. Amir A. Shadani, chargé d'affaires par
Embassy of Pakistan, The Hague, intérim à l'ambassade du Pakistan aux Pays-
Bas,
as Acting Agent;
faisant fonction d'agent;
Mr. Jamshed A. Hamid, Legal Adviser, M. Jamshed A. Hamid, conseiller juridique
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, au ministère des affa ires étrangères à
Islamabad,
as Co-Agent;
comme coagent;
Mr. Moazzam A. Khan, First Secretary, M. Moazzam A. Khan, premier secrétaire à
Embassy of Pakistan, The Hague, l'ambassade du Pakistan aux Pays-Bas,
as Deputy Agent; comme agent adjoint;
H.E. Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, Attorney General S. Exc. M. Aziz A. Munshi, Attorney
for Pakistan and Minister of Law, General du Pakistan et Ministre de la
justice,
as Chief Counsel;
comme conseil principal;
Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C.,
Q.C., Honorary Professor of International professeur honoraire de droit international à
Law, University of Cambridge, and Member l'Université de Cambridge et membre de
of the Institute of International Law, l'Institut de droit international,
Dr. Fathi Kemicha, Doctor of Law of Paris M. Fathi Kemicha, docteur en droit de
University, avocat at the Paris Bar, l'Université de Paris, avocat au barreau de
Paris,
Mr. Zahid Said, Barrist er-at-Law, Ministry
of Law, Justice and Human Rights, M. Zahid Said, avocat , ministère du droit,
de la justice et des droits de l'homme,
Mr. Ross Masud, Deputy Legal Adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, M. Ross Masud, conseiller juridique adjoint
au ministère des affa ires étrangères à
Mr. Shair Bahadur Khan, Deputy Legal Islamabad,
Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Islamabad, M. Shair Bahadur Khan, conseiller juridique
adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères à
as Counsel; Islamabad,
comme conseils ;
Miss Norah Gallagher, Solicitor, Mlle Norah Gallagher, Solicito,
______________
The Government of the Republic of India is Le Gouvernement de la R pubéique de l'Inde est
represented by: représent éar :
H.E. Mr. Prabhakar Menon, Ambassador of S. Exc. M.PrabhakarMenon, ambassadeur
the Republic of India to the Netherlands, de la République de l'Inde aux Pays-Bas,
The Hague,
comme agent;
as Agent;
Dr. P. S. Rao, Joint Secretary (Legal & M. P. S. Rao, secrétaire adjoint (affaires
Treaties) and Legal A dviser, Ministry of juridiques et traités) et conseiller juridique
External Affairs, New Delhi, du ministère des affaires extérieures à
New Delhi,
as Co-Agent and Advocate; comme coagent et avocat;
Ms M. Manimekalai, Counsellor (Political), Mme M.Manimekalai, conseiller (affaires
Embassy of India, The Hague, politiques) à l'ambassade de l'Inde aux Pays-
Bas,
as Deputy Agent;
comme agent adjoint;
H.E. Mr. Soli J. Sorabj ee, Attorney General S. Exc. M. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney
of India, General de l'Inde,
as Chief Counsel and Advocate; comme conseil principal et avocat;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A.,
Member of the International Law membre de la Commission du droit
Commission, Member of the English Bar, international, membre du barreau
Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public d'Angleterre, professe ur émérite de droit
International Law, University of Oxford, international public (chaire Chichele) à
l'Université d'Oxford,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Profe ssor, University of
Paris X-Nanterre and In stitute of Political M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université de
Studies, Paris, Paris X-Nanterre et à l'Institut d'études
politiques de Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
comme conseils et avocats;
Dr. B. S. Murty, Formerly Professor and M. B. S. Murty, ancien professeur et doyen
Dean of Law, Andhra and Osmania de la faculté de droit, Universités d'Andhra
Universities, Advocate, Hyderabad, et Osmania, avocat, Hyderabad,
Mr. B. Sen, Senior Advocate, Supreme MB. . en, avocat principal à la Cour
Court of India, New Delhi, suprême de l'Inde, New Delhi,
Dr. V. S. Mani, Profe ssor of International M. V. S. Mani, professeur de droit
Space Law, Jawaharlal Nehru University, international de l'espace, Université
New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, New Delhi,
Dr. M. Gandhi, Legal Officer (GradeI), re
Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, M. M. Gandhi, juriste (I classe), au
ministère des affaires extérieures,
New Delhi,
as Counsel and Experts;
comme conseils et experts;
Mr. Vivek Katju, Joint Secretary (IPA), MV.ivKkatju, secrétaire (IPA), au
Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, ministère des affaires extérieures,
New Delhi,
Mr. D. P. Srivastava, Joint Secretary (UNP),
Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, M. D. P. Srivastava, secrétaire (UNP), au
ministère des affaires extérieures,
as Advisers; New Delhi,
comme conseillers;
Ms Marie Dumée, Temporary Research and Mme Marie Dumée, attachée temporaire
Teaching Assistant, University of Paris X- d'enseignement et de recherche à
Nanterre, Paris, l'Université de Paris X-Nanterre, Paris,
as Research Assistant. comme assistante de recherches.
__________The PRESIDENT: Veuillez-vous asseoir. L'audience est ouverte. The Republic of India will have the floor this
morning to make its oral presentation of the case, and I shall thus give th e floor to the Agent for the Republic o f
India, Ambassador Menon.
Mr. MENON: Mr. President, honourable Members of the Interna tional Court of Justice, it is a privilege for me to
appear before the Cour t as the Agent of the Government of India in the case concerning the Aerial Incident o f
10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India). I take this opportunity of conveying the greetings of the G overnment of India
and my own greetings to the honourable Court.
I would like to begin by introducing the members of the Indian delegation. Dr. P. S. Rao is the Legal Adviser of the
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and a member of the International Law Commission. He has the
honour of appearing before you as the Co-Agent, counsel and advocate in this case. Ms.M.Manimekalai,
Counsellor in the Embassy of India in The Hague, appears in this case as the Deputy Agent of India and Adviser.
I take pleasure in introduci ng the other members of the I ndian delegation who are here to participate in the oral
hearings on behalf of India. His Excell ency Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, the Attorney General of India, appears before the
Court as the chief counsel for India. He is well known not onl y in India but also internat ionally for his work in the
field of human rights. As chief counsel for India, he wi ll present an overview of the Indian case which requests the
Court to adjudge and declare that it has no jurisdiction to consider the Application of the Government of Pakistan,
given the objections communicated to the Court by the Government of India. He will also set out the reasons why
India rejects the arguments advanced by Pakistan to sustain the jurisdiction of the Court.
The submissions of the chief counsel will be followed by presentations from Mr.IanBrownlie, Q.C.,
Professor Alain Pellet and Dr. P. S. Rao in that order. Mr.Brownlie is a me mber of the Englis h Bar and Emeritus
Chichele Professor of Public Internati onal Law at the University of Oxford. Pr ofessorAlainPellet is a professor at
the University of Paris X-Nanterre. Both are members of the International Law Commission and appear before this
Court as counsel and advocates on behalf of India.
I have the honour also to present to the honourable Court Dr. B. S. Murty, Advocate, High Court of Andhra Pradesh,
formerly senior fellow at the Yale Law School, and a well-known author on international law. He appears here today
as counsel and expert consultant.
I would next like to present Mr.B.Sen, Senior Advocate, Supreme Cour t of India, and formerly the Secretary
General of the Asian-African Legal C onsultative Committee. Mr.Sen is a well-known author on international law
and is appearing here in his capacity as counsel and expert consultant. May I also present Dr. V. S. Mani, Professor
of International Space Law, JawaharlalNehru Universit y, NewDelhi. Dr.Mani is no t new to the Court, having
appeared before it as Agent and counsel in the Phosphate Lands in Nauru case. He appears before the Court today
on behalf of India as counsel and expert consultant. Let me also present Dr. M. Gandhi, Senior Legal Officer in the
Legal and Treaties Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, who appears as counsel and expert.
I next introduce two of my distingui shed colleagues from the Ministry of External Affairs, NewDelhi.
Mr.VivekKatju is Joint Secretary in charge of matters concerning Iran, Paki stan and Afghanistan, and
Mr.DinkarP.Srivastava is Joint Secretary in charge of matters concerning the United Nations. Both are here as
advisers to the Indian delegation.
Finally, I would like to intr oduce Ms.MarieDumee, Assistant Lecturer, University of Paris X-Nanterre, who is
associated with the Indian delegation as research assistant.
Excellencies, in the present case the Government of India has already conve yed its preliminary objections to the
jurisdiction of the Court by its letter of 2November19 99 in response to the Appli cation of the Government o f
Pakistan dated 21 September 1999. Further, India has submitted its comments by way of a Counter-Memorial dated
28 February 2000 on the observations submitted by Pakistan in its Memorial dated 7 January 2000, in respect of the
objections presented by India.
Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, I thank you for your attent ion, and would like to request the
President of the Court to call upon the Attorney General of India, His Excelle ncy Mr.SoliSorabjee, to address the
Court. Thank you, Sir.
Le PRESIDENT: Merci beaucoup, Votre Excellence. Now I give the floor to His Exce llency Mr. Soli Sorabjee,
Attorney General of India.Mr. SORABJEE: Mr. President and honourable Members of the Court, it is indeed a pr ivilege and I am greatly
honoured to have this first opportunity to address this distinguished Court on behalf of India.
Before I begin, may I, on beha lf of India and myself, offer warm feli citations to you, Mr.President, and to you,
Mr. Vice-President, on your elections to the distinguished positions you occupy, and also to the new Members of the
Court, Judge Al-Khasawneh and Judge Buergenthal. May I also convey our best wishes to the ad hoc judges, Judge
Sharif Uddin Pirzada and Judge B. P. Jeevan Reddy.
Mr. President, at the outset I reiterat e my country's policy of promotion of peaceful settlement of international
disputes. May I also reaffirm my country's deep respect for this honourable Court and its judgments and orders. This
is reflected in India's continued acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in accordance with the terms of its
declaration. In view of the specific terms of this honourable Court's Order dated 19 November 1999, whereunder the
question of jurisdiction to ente rtain Pakistan's Application "shall first be addressed", my learned friends and I will
make submissions exclusively focusing on the legal issues concerning jurisdiction. We do not propose to circumvent
the Court Order by attempting to make submissions on merits. We shall refrai n from making statements of purely
political nature, as th at would reduce the high level of proceedings before this honourable Court to a partisan
political debate and would be a clear abuse of the judicial process.
Mr. President, it is necessary to remove a certain misconception.
Plea of lack of jurisdiction cannot imply lack of good faith, nor lead to the inference that a country who raises that
plea has something to hide. If that were a correct proposit ion, every country which has th e right to raise a plea o f
lack of jurisdiction would incur the odi um of acting in bad faith; and judging by the judgments of this Court, the
number would be quite sizeable. This submission ma de on behalf of Pakist an is an argument in terrorem and
indicates weakness of its case in meeting the plea of lack of jurisdiction.
However, I take this occasion to deny all allegations ma de by Pakistan with regard to the aerial incident o f
10August1999 which took place in western India in the Kutch region in the State of Gujara t. Pakistan is solely
responsible for the incident and must bear the consequences of its own acts.
May I now proceed to refer to certain principles of international law which are deeply embedded in the jurisdiction
of this honourable Court and that of th e Permanent Court of International Justice of which you well aware, but may
be useful to restate them very briefly. I will not trouble the Court with citations in support of my submissions, which
will be found in the transcript. The submissions, in brief, are that:
I.
(a) In the case of all conten tious disputes the principle of consen t plays an essential and fundamental
role. "The consent of States parties to a dispute, is the basis of a Court's jurisdiction in contentious
cases" (I.C.J. Reports 1950 , p. 71).
(b) The Court can exercise jurisdiction over a State only with its consent ( Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. I.,.J.
Reports 1952 , pp. 102-103; Ambatielos I,C.J. Reports 1953 , p. 19;Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru ,
I.C.J. Reports 1992 , p. 260; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) ,.C.J. Reports 1995 , p. 101).
(c) Numerous judgments show the Court as "bearing in mind the fact that its jurisdiction is limited, that
it is invariably based on the consent of the Respondent and only exists in so far as this consent has been
given" (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court
(London, 1958), p. 91).
(d) "Declarations of acceptance of a compulsory jurisdiction of the C ourt are facultative, unilateral
engagements, that States are absolutely free to make or not to make. In making the declaration a State is
equally free either to do so unconditi onally and without limit of time fo r its duration, or to qualify it
with conditions or reservations." ( Military and Paramilitary Ac tivities in and against Nicaragua ,
(Nicaragua v. United States of America Ju),sdiction and Admissibility Judgme,t I.C.J. Re,orts 1984 ,
p. 418, para. 59.)
(e) States enjoy a wide liberty in formulating, limiting, modifying and terminating their declarations of
acceptance of the compulsory juri sdiction of the Court under Articl e 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
(Fisheries Jurisdiction S(ain v. Canada), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 ,para. 44). (f) It is for each State, in formul ating its declaration, to decide upon the limits it places upon its
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court: "The jurisdiction only exists within the limits within which it
has been accepted" ( Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74 , p. 23).
(g)In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court governments are free to "limit its jurisdiction in a drastic
manner". This has been well es tablished in various citations which I will find in the transcript. (Judge
Lauterpacht, in his separate opinion in Certain Norwegian Loans I.C.J. Reports 1957 , p. 46.)
Mr. President, now I turn to the question of reservations. I have four submissions to make.
II. Reservations
(a) The reservations do not by their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given. They operate
to define the parameters of the State's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
(b) A reservation is an integral part of a declarat ion accepting jurisdiction. All elements in a declaration
under Article36, paragraph2, of th e Statute which, read together, comprise the acceptance by the
declarant State of the C ourt's jurisdiction, are to be interprete d as a unity, applyi ng the same legal
principles of inte rpretation throughout. Declaratio ns and reservations are to be read as a whole
(Fisheries Jurisdiction (pain v. Canada J),gment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , paras. 44 and 47).
(c) The intention of a reserving State may be deduced no t only from the text of the relevant clause, but
also from the context in which the clause is to be read, and an examination of evidence regarding the
circumstances of its preparation and the purposes intended to be served ( ibid., para. 49).
(d) A reservation to a declaration of acceptance of th e compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is to be
interpreted in a natural and reasonable way, with appr opriate regard for the intentions of the reserving
State and the purpose of the rese rvation and should be interpreted in a manner compatible with the
effect sought by the reserving State ( ibid., paras.52 and 54). This is well brought out in the case
concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction S(ain v.Canada) .
III. The validity of the reservation of India concerning Commonwealth
The third topic is about the validity of the Commonwealth reservation. In our respectful submission Mr.President,
the Commonwealth reservation is not contrary to any of the provisions of the Charter, nor is it repugnant to
Article 36, paragraph 3, or any other Article of the Statute as contende d by Pakistan. The argument that the
Commonwealth reservation has become obsolete is, with respect, far-fetched. It has no legal basis. Despite changes
in the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth exists and the re servation remains intact a nd cannot be wished away.
These aspects and the legal infirmities in Pakistan's submissions will be pointed out and elaborated by my
distinguished learned friend Mr. Ian Brownlie, Q.C.
IV. Question of severability
Mr. President, may I now address the Court on the important question of severability? Pakistan's contention that the
Court should ignore the reserva tion because of its alleged invalidity and still hold juri sdiction on the basis of its
declaration under Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute is unacceptable be cause a reservation made cannot be
isolated from the declaration itself. There is a close and necessary link betw een the declaration and the reservation.
Together they constitute an integral whole, a unity, reflect ing the intention of the party regarding the limits within
which the jurisdiction of the Court is accepted.
It is our respectful submission that to ignore the reservation and to maintain the binding force of the declaration as a
whole would be to ignore an e ssential and deliberate condition of the acceptance as a whole ( Certain Norwegian
Loans, I.C.J. Reports 1957 , pp.57-58). As Rosenne has noted, "to read a declarati on as if an incompatible
reservation simply did not exist w ould thwart the intention of the St ate making the decl aration, acting
unilaterally" (Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of th e International Court 1920,1996 , Vol.II, Jurisdiction ,
1997, fn. 91, p. 770).
Mr. President, the doctrine of severability in its application to statutes has been the subject of consideration in India,
and in other countries. In our respectf ul submission, the principl es enunciated in that be half are relevant and
applicable in considering the question of severability of the reservation from the declaration as evidence of a generalprinciple of law in accordance with Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of the Statute of the Court.
The underlying principle is that the test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it
had known that the rest of th e Statute was invalid. If the valid and the invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed
up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the
Act in its entirety(RMDC . vnion of India, 1957 SCR 930 at 950-951).
Applying this test, it is beyond doubt th at India would not have made th e declaration accepting compulsory
jurisdiction without the reservation. It is manifest that India re garded the Commonwealth re servation as crucial as
evidenced by its repeated making of the reservation with full consciousness. Its acceptance of the obligations under
the optional clause of Article 36 was inextricably linked with the Commonwealth reservation. Thus this reservation
is an integral and inseverable part of the declaration. It is not possible to sever the reservation from the declaration.
If the reservation has withered away as argued by Pakistan, then so has the declaration of which it is an inextricable
part. The declaration and the reservation stand or fall together. Pakist an cannot selectively invoke the declaration
and at the same time conveniently ignore the reservat ion on any one or more of the grounds urged by it.
Mr. President, if I may be permitted to express this thought in a homely proverb, Pakistan cannot have its cake and
eat it too.
V. General Act of 1928
Now, may I deal with the General Ac t of 1928. The Government of India's position that it was at no stage bound
since Independence by the General Act of 1928 is well known and which has been communicated to this Court by a
letter dated 4 June 1973, in the context of an earlier case, therial of Pakistani Prisoners of War .
In brief my submissions are as follows:
(a) The General Act was a political agreement a nd was therefore not transmissible under general
international law.
(b) Neither India nor Pakistan could automatically succeed nor have they succeeded to the General Act
of 1928.
(c) The Indian Independence (Inter national Arrangements) Order 1947 did not and, indeed, could not
provide for the devolution of treaty rights and obligations which were not capable of being succeeded to
by a part of a country, which is severed from the parent State and established as an independent
sovereign Power, according to the practice of States. This is the vi ew of the Pakist an Supreme Court
dealing with a case relating to Pakistan's obligations in its Judgment in the case of Yangtze (London)
Limited v. Barlas Brothers (Karachi) and Co. , Judgment of 6June1961 (C ivil Appeal No.139 of
1960). (See United Nations Legislative Series , Materials on Succession of States , UN
ST/LEG/SER.B/14, pp. 133-141, at p. 137.)
(d) With the termination of the League of Nations the General Act of 1928 has lost its legal efficacy.
(e) Pakistan was never a Member of the League of Nations and has not succeeded to British India as a
Member of the League or otherwise. It is thus debarred from becoming a pa rty to the General Act by
virtue of Article 43 of that Act.
(f) The conduct of India and Pakistan together with other evidence demonstrates that neither country has
considered itself bound by the General Act of 1928. The instances of this conduct, inter alia, can be
deduced from the following :
(i) In 1947, a list of treaties to which the Indian Independence (International Arrangements)
Order 1947 was to apply was prepared by "Expert Committee No. 9 on Foreign Relations".
Its report is contained in Partition Proceedings , Volume III, pages 217 to 276. The list
comprises 627 treaties in force in 1947. The 1928 General Ac t is not included in that list.
The report was signed by the representatives of India and Pakistan.
(ii) In several differences or disputes betw een India and Pakistan before 1973 the General
Act of 1928 was not relied upon nor cited either by India or by Pakistan. (iii) The Government of India in its letter to the Secretar y-General of the United Nations
received by him on 18September1974, inter alia, unequivocally stated that "India has
never been and is not a party" to the General Act of 1928. It is significant that Pakistan
never objected to this well known position adopted and made known by India.
Mr. President, my respectful submission is that it is immaterial whether th e Indian communication of
18September1974 is a formal denunciation or not. The crux of the matter is that the communication
evinces India's clear intention and there was no objection by Pakistan.
Reliance has been placed by Pakistan on the General Act of 1928 for conferra l of jurisdiction in this honourable
Court; it is misconceived fo r several reasons which will be pointed out and elabor ated upon by my distinguished
learned friend Professor Alain Pellet.
VI. Simla Agreement
Next I turn to the Simla Agreement. This Agreement on Bilateral Relati ons of 1972, popularly known as the Simla
Agreement, affords no legal basis for invoking this honourable Court's jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter of
dispute. It is submitted that the Ag reement on Bilateral Relati ons does not contain a comp romissory clause and is
not concerned with the judicial settle ment of disputes. The emphasis in th e Simla Agreement is on the bilateral
approach to the resolution of the differences between India and Pakistan. The general purpose of the agreement was
to promote confidence- building measures. The phrase in the Simla Agreement "or by any other peaceful means
mutually agreed upon between them", only refers to those ot her choice of means of settle ment of differences other
than bilateral negotiations, as may be expressly agreed upon between India and Pakistan in future. It may be noted
that the Simla Agreement does not refer to the General Act nor can it be interpreted to mean to include the same.
It is also not without significance that the Simla Agreement does not appear in the ch ronological list of instruments
notified to the Registry which is published in the Yearbook of the Court ( I.C.J. Yearbook 1996-1997 , p.126 at
p. 140).
VII. Applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969
Mr.President, my next submission is about the applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties o f
1969. In brief, Pakistan's submi ssions in this behalf are contrary to the well-settled principles of interpretation o f
declarations under the optional clause and are contrary to the Judgment of this honourable Court in Spain v.Canada .
I do not want to take up any more time on that, the issue is settled bySpain v. Canada.
VIII.
Mr. President, other remaining issues like estoppel, implie d residual jurisdiction ba sed on the United Nations
Charter will be addressed by my learned friend Dr. P. S. Rao.
IX. The "multilateral convention reservation" invoked by India
My next topic is the multilateral convention reservation. It may be recalled that this is a reservation which both India
and Pakistan have made in their respective declarations. As both Indi a and Pakistan maintain this reservation,
Pakistan cannot object to that reservat ion. Detailed submissions will be made on this aspect by my distinguished
learned friend Mr. Ian Brownlie, Q.C.
X. Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. President and Member s of the Court, may I reiterate that where jurisdiction is sought to be
derived from the consent of the parties jurisdiction "m ust be proved to the hilt" (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The
Development of International La w by the International Court (London, 1958), p.91). Jurisdiction cannot be
squeezed out by tortuous and far-fetched interpretations of the provisions of the Unit ed Nations Charter or the
Statute of the Court.
It is India's respectful s ubmission that this honourable C ourt should adjudge and declare that it does not have any
jurisdiction to deal with the present Application and the same may be dismissed.
May I sincerely thank the honourable Court for its patient and attentive hearing.Mr. President, may I request you now to call upon my dis tinguished learned friend Mr.IanBrownlie, Q.C., to
address the Court.
Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie Monsieur l' Attorney General . I now give the floor to Professor Ian Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is an honour and a privilege to represent the Republic of India
in this case.
My tasks are as follows:
Firstly, in the context of Article 36, paragr aph 2, of the Statute, to demonstrate th at the position of Pakistan is in all
respects incompatible with the principle of consent.
Secondly, to reaffirm the validity of the Commonwealth reservation of India.
Thirdly, to reaffirm the validity of the multilateral treaty reservation of India.
And so in the first place the Government of India contends that the Applicat ion of Pakistan and its jurisdictional
assertions are fundamentally incompatible with the principle of consent.
The truth of the matter, Mr. President, is that the Applicat ion of Pakistan is essentiall y similar in purpose to the
Applications of the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1950s whic h were effectively unilateral proposals
of judicial settlement, the le gal efficacy of which was contingent upon the respondent State's ad hoc consent to
appear or conduct producing the effect of forum prorogatum.
Two examples are indicated in the transcript. First the Antarctica cases:
(a) Antarctica (United Kingdom v. Argentina), Order of 16 March 1956, I.C.J. Reports 1956 , and
Antarctica (United Kingdom v. Chile), Order of 16 March 1956, I.C.J. Reports 1956 ; removal from the
List. And secondly, the
(b) Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952, Order of 14 March 1956, I.C.J. Reports 1956, removal from the
List.
Of course, the Rules of Court (Article 38, paragraph 5) now provide that such cases do not go into the General List
until the necessary conditions have been fulfilled.
The applicant State itself acknowledges the similarity. Thus, in the Memorial (paras.5 and6) the Government o f
Pakistan asks India to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court voluntarily.
Given the difficulties which Pakistan faces, the Court's requirement th at the Applicant addresses the issues o f
jurisdiction first is understandable.
The principle that the basis of jurisd iction is the consent of the parties is universally recognized, and substantial
elaboration would be out of place.
Accordingly, I shall confine myself to certain points concerning the modali ties of determining the existence o f
consent.
As a background it is safe to say th at the Court has tended to a degree of caution in determining the issue o f
jurisdiction.
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht confirmed this appreciation of the question in 1958. In his words:
"The temper of caution exhibited by the Court in it s formulation and exposition of the law manifests
itself with some persistence in its attitude of restraint in relati on to the question of its own jurisdiction.
A very substantial number of the decisions of the Court have been concerned with that question. When appearing before the Court as de fendants under a clause giving it ob ligatory jurisdiction, Governments
show no reluctance to plead that they have not in fact conferred upon it jurisd iction in regard to the
matter in dispute."
And he continues,
"The Court has examined such pleas with meticulous care. It has em phasized repeatedly the necessity
for extreme caution in assuming juri sdiction, which must be proved [a s the Attorney-General has said
this morning] up to the hilt."
And Lauterpacht continues:
"Numerous Judgments show the Court as 'bearing in mind the fact that it s jurisdiction is limited, that it
is invariably based on the consent of the respondent a nd only exists in so far as this consent has been
given'." (The Development of International Law by the International Court , London, 1958, p.91;
footnote omitted.)
Now strictly speaking, the Court is a juge d'exception . Jurisdiction exists within the terms of the grant of jurisdiction
by the individual State exercising its political discretion.
As President McNair observed in his separate opinion in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., case:
"A State, being free either to make a Declaration or not, is entitled, if it decides to make one, to limit the
scope of its Declaration in any way it chooses, subject always to reciprocity." ( I.C.J. Reports 1952 ,
p. 116.)
And Judge Lauterpacht, in his sepa rate opinion in the case concerning Certain Norwegian Loans, (I.C.J. Reports
1957, p. 46) expressed the same view. He said:
"In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court Government s are free to limit its jurisdiction in a drastic
manner. As a result, there may be little left in the Acceptance which is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court. This the Governments, as trustees of the interests entrusted to them, are fully entitled to do. Their
right to append reservations which are not inconsistent with the Statute is no longer in question."
However, the juge d'exception analysis should not be overstressed and it is probably the case that just as there is no
presumption of jurisdiction, so also there is no presumption against the existence of consent.
But, Mr. President, one thing is very clear and that is that the practice of making reservations is a part of the system
and reservations are compatible with the consensual bond which is the basi s of both Article36, paragraph1, and
paragraph2, of the Statute. It is wo rth recalling that the Lea gue of Nations actually encouraged the making o f
reservations in order to "diminish the obstacles which prevent States from committing themselves . . .".
And Dr. Hambro observed in 1948:
"Not only have states made reservat ions of different kinds, but the A ssembly of the League of Nations
discussed the reservations at differ ent times and definitely adopted th e point of view that exceptions
should be permitted so as to facilitate acceptance of the 'optional clause'." ( British Year Book , Vol.25
(1948), p. 143; footnote omitted.)
This policy was adopted by the Fifth Assembly of the League in 1924 and by the Ninth Asse mbly in 1928: the
history is conveniently presented in Hudson, The Permanent Court of In ternational Justice 1920-1942 , New York,
1943, pp. 452-453 (para. 450).
At the San Francisco Conference the practi ce of making reservations was considered to be so well established as to
make it "unnecessary to modify paragra ph 3 in order to make express reference to the right of Stat es to make such
reservations". (See UNCIO , Vol. XIII, pp. 391-392; and Hambro, op. ci.,supra , p. 143.)
When all is said and done, the test of th e expression of consent is intention as manifested in the relevant declaration
of acceptance and, in certain cases, as evidenced by conduct.As Dr. Shabtai Rosenne points out,
"the Court will look at the underlying intention of the State making the declaration, the declaration itself
being the expression of a unilateral act of policy to accept the jurisdiction of the Court for disputes
coming within its scope" (Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the In ternational Court, 1920-1996 ,
3rd ed., 1997, Vol. II, p. 812).
As Rosenne emphasizes (pp. 812-814), the Court makes considerable effort to explore the intentions of the declarant
State.
Thus, in the Phosphates in Morocco case, the Permanent Court observed:
"The principal duty of the Court is to examine the conditions which determine whether the objection
submitted by the French Government is well-founded. The question whether a given situation or fact is
prior or subsequent to a particular date is one to be decided in regard to each specific case, just as the
question of the situations or facts with regard to which the dispute ar ose must be decided in regard to
each specific case. However, in answering these questions it is necessary always to bear in mind the will
of the State which only ac cepted the compulsory jurisdiction within specified limits, and consequently
only intended to submit to that ju risdiction disputes having actually arisen from situations or facts
subsequent to its acceptance." ( P.C.I.J., Series A/B,No. 74 , p. 24.)
The present Court stressed the importance of the intention of the declarant State in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., case.
As the Court stated:
"But the Court cannot base itself on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text. It must seek the
interpretation which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable wa y of reading the text, having due
regard to the intention of the Government of Ir an at the time when it accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court." (.C.J. Reports 1952 , p. 104.)
And in the same Judgment the Court referr ed to: "the princi ple that the jurisdiction of the Court to de al with and
decide a case on the merits depe nds on the will of the Parties" ( ibid., p.103). This approach has been consistently
followed by the Court.
Thus in 1978 in its Judgment in the Aegean Sea case the Court confirmed the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court
and the Anglo-Iranian Judgment ( I.C.J. Reports 1978 , pp. 28-29, para. 69).
And, of course, more recently in 1998 the principles were reiterated by this Court in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case.
In the words of the Judgment:
"Spain and Canada have both rec ognized that States enjoy a wide liberty in formulating, limiting,
modifying and terminating their decl arations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
under Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute. They e qually both agree that a reservation is an integral
part of a declaration accepting jurisdiction." (Para. 42.)
After summarizing the views of the Parties the Court observed further:
"The Court recalls that the interp retation of declarations made unde r Article36, paragraph2, of the
Statute, and of any reservations they contain, is directed to esta blishing whether mutual consent has
been given to the jurisdiction of the Court.
It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon the limits it places upon its acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Court: 'This jurisdiction only exists within the limits within which it has been
accepted' (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74, p. 23)."
The Court continued in 1998:
"Conditions or reservations thus do not by their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given.
Rather, they operate to define the parameters of the State's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court. There is thus no reason to interpret them re strictively. All elements in a declaration under
Article 36, paragraph2, of the Statute which, read to gether, comprise the acceptance by the declarant State of the Court's jurisdiction, are to be interpreted as a unity, applying the same legal principles of
interpretation throughout." (Para. 44.)
And thus at this stage, Mr. President, it is appropriate to a pply the criterion of inte ntion to the Commonwealth
reservation of India. Since the time of Independence there have been f our declarations by I ndia in force which
included the Commonwealth reservation. After Independence in 1947 the declaration of 1940 was maintained.
Subsequently, in a letter da ted 7 January 1956 addressed to the Secretar y-General, the Indian Government gave
notice of the termination of its declarat ion of 1940 and by an instru ment of the same date the Government accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes arising after a certain date but excluding: "(ii) disputes
with the Government of any country which on the date of this Declaration is a member of the Commonwealth o f
Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties ha ve agreed or shall agree; . . ." ( I.C.J.
Yearbook 1,55–1956 , pp. 186-187).
This declaration was terminated by a notice of 8 February 1957 and in 1959 India depos ited a new declaration
containing a modified version of the reservation of before. This referred to: "(2)Dis putes with the Government o f
any State which, on the date of th is Declaration, is a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations" ( I.C.J.Yearbook ,
1959–1960, p.242). And finally, in the current Indian declarati on deposited in 19 74, there is a slightly modified
formula, namely: "(2)dis putes with the government of any State which is or ha s been a Member of the
Commonwealth of Nations;" ( I.C.J. Yearbook 1,74–1975 , p. 59).
Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, the in tention of the Government of India could not be clearer.
The post-Independence reservations orig inate in the declaration of 1940. Sinc e Independence it has appeared in
three successive declarations. Moreover, the variations in the formula confir m that on each occasion the reservation
was specifically reviewed. More especially in 1974 the formulation was carefully extended in scope.
In face of the realities, including the fact that reservations form part of the expression of the will of the parties, and
the clarity of that expression in this case, the applicant State ha s had no alternative but to propose the invalidity o f
the Commonwealth reservation. After all, the reservation is clear and an assertion of invalidity was the only means
of attack.
In its Memorial Pakistan argues that the reservation is contrary to the provisions of Articles 92 and 93 of the Charter
(pp.13-14 and 18). In the ke y passage (p.13), Pakistan ar gues that a State which is a party to the Charter and the
Statute is automatically a party to the compulsory jurisd iction. This argument is distinguished only by its ambition.
As Rosenne wrote in 1965:
"By making a declaration a State, already subject to the obligations and enjoying the rights of the
Charter and Statute, takes upon itself further obligations which otherwise it would only assume by virtue
of treaties and conventions in force for it -- obligations for th e judicial settlement of disputes defined
generically with parties defined generically" ( Law and Practice of the In ternational Court, 1965,
Leyden, p. 412; second revised edition, Dordrecht, 1985, pp. 412-413) (emphasis added).
The argument of Pakistan ignores the fact that a State being a party to the Statute of the Court does not create a basis
of jurisdiction: if that were so, then the optional clause system would not be necessary.
The Statute of the Court forms "an integral part of the Char ter". It must follow that a reservation which is accepted
as valid for the purposes of the Statute is compatible also with the provisions of the Charter.
The Statute is the only standard of legality in practice, although in theory reservations might appear which would be
repugnant to human rights standards.
There is no issue of validity here. As individual Members of the Court have pointed out, reservations should not be
repugnant to the Statute. The referen ces will appear in the transcript. ( Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 195 7 , pp.43-45, separate opinion of JudgeLauterpacht; ibid, pp.68-70, dissenting opinion of Judge
Guerrero; Interhandel, Preliminary Objecti ons, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959 , pp.54-59, separate opinion o f
Judge Spender; ibid., pp.76-78, dissenting opini on of Judge Klaestad; ibid., pp.90-94, dissenting opinion of Judge
Armand-Ugon; ibid., pp.101-119, dissenting opinion of JudgeLa uterpacht.) The cases involved were Certain
Norwegian Loans and Interhandel .
In passing it ma y be noted that the issue of com patibility with the Statute in thes e cases concerned Article36,paragraph 6. No such issue arises in the present case. The Commonwealth reservation is not repugnant to the Statute
and it is not repugnant to Article 36, paragraph 6.
Mr. President, there is no so und principle of legal polic y according to which the va lidity of the Commonwealth
reservation could be called into questi on. Seven States other than India currently have d eclarations which include
versions of the Commonwealth reservation. They are: Barbados, Canada, Gambia, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius and the
United Kingdom.
In relation of the Statute of the Court, Pakistan relies in particular upon Article 36, paragraph 3.
The argument in the Memorial is as follows:
"D (1) Declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute ca n be made unconditionally or under
specified conditions. The permissi ble conditions have exhaustively been set out in Article36,
paragraph 3, as (i) on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or (ii) for a certain
time. The reservation of the Government of India excluding all disputes with 'Any State which is or has
been a member of the Commonwealth of Nations' is in ex cess of the conditions permitted under
Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute which is a binding obligation between India and Pakistan and
indeed between all Commonwealth members. This condition, being ultra vires of Article36,
paragraph 3, has no legal effect. However, to the extent that the Declaration of the Government of India
is in accordance with Article36, pa ragraph3, it stands and confer s compulsory jurisdiction on the
Court."
Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is no evidence whatsoever that the reservation is ultra vires Article 36,
paragraph 3.
The fact is that it has for long been recognized that within the system of the optional cl ause a State can select its
partners. The definitive statement can be found in Hudson's famous treatise:
Hudson says,
"Paragraph 3 of Article 36 states e xpressly that a declaration 'may be made unconditionally (in French,
purement et simplement ) or on condition of reciproc ity on the part of several or cert ain Members or
States'. This seems to contemplate not a limitation of the jurisdiction accepted but a condition as to the
operation of the declaration itself; its effect is il lustrated in Brazil's declaration of November1, 1921,
the operation of which was to begin only when compul sory jurisdiction had been recognized by at least
two of the States permanently represented on the C ouncil of the League of Nations. Yet paragraph3
raises a question as to the possibility of a declarant's excluding disputes with a particular State or States.
Though paragraph2 envisages a recogni tion of jurisdiction 'in relation to any other Member or State',
each of the members of the Brit ish Commonwealth of Nations except Ireland excluded 'disputes with
the government of any other Member of the League which is a Member of the British Commonwealth
of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties may have agreed or shall
agree'. Iraq excluded from its declar ation 'disputes with the Government of any other Arab State, all of
which disputes shall be settled in such a manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree'. Rumania
recognized the Court's jurisdicti on 'in respect of the Governme nts recognized by Rumania', and
Yugoslavia made a somewhat simila r declaration. Poland's declaration excluded disputes with States
which refuse to establish or to maintain normal re lations with Poland. Such action by so many States
may be taken to have established the possibility of a St ate's making its declarat ion to apply only to
certain other States." (Hudson, Th e Permanent Court of Internat ional Justice, 1920-1942, New York,
1943, pp. 466-467.)
The distinguished commentator Hugh Thirlw ay after a careful examination of the travaux préparatoires concludes
that Article 36, paragraph 3, contemplates a principle of reciproc ity in the form of a c hoice of part ners (see
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XV (1984), pp. 103-107).
And so, in the Report of the Third Co mmittee to the League Assembly in 1930, the effect of Article36 as finally
adopted was described as follows:
"It gives power to choose compulsory jurisdiction either in all the questions enumerated in the Article or
only in certain of these questions. Further, it makes it possible to specify the States (or members of the League of Nations) in relation to which each Government is willi ng to agree to a more extended
jurisdiction."
A number of jurists have referr ed to this application of Article 36, paragraph 3, without offering any criticism. The
jurists include the following: Dr. Edvard Hambro, British Year Book , Volume25 (1948), p.133 at page151; Sir
Humphrey Waldock, British Year Book , Volume32 (1955-1956), page244 at pa ge248; Professor Herbert Briggs,
Recueil des Cours, 1958, at page 302. The doctrine is unanimous. Over a time span of 50 years nine jurists who have
examined the reservation make no suggestion that it is of questionable vali dity. The references will appear in the
transcript. The jurists include two former Members of the Court, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Mr. Sette-Camara, the
French authority, ProfessoCr harleRousseau and Dr . Shabtai Rosenne. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, (ed.) of
Oppenheim's International Law, Vol.II, (L ondon, 7thed., 1948), p.60; Professor R.P. Anand, Studies in
International Adjudication (Delhi, 1969), pp.43 -45; Professor J. G. Merrills, British Year Book of Internationa l
Law, Vol.50 (1979), p.87, at pp.103-104; Professor Renata Szafarz, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice ( Dordrecht, 1993), pp.45, 50, 56-57; Professor J. G. Merrills, British Year Book o f
International Law, Vol.64 (1993) p.197 at pp.221 -222; Dr.Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the
International Court, 1920-1996, Vol.II: Jurisdiction, The Hague, 1997, p.802; Professor Charles Rousseau, Droit
International Public, Vol.V, Paris, 1983, pp.455-456; Judge Sette-Camara, in Bedjaoui (ed.) International Law:
Achievements and Prospects, Dordrecht, 1991, p. 536; Professor I. A. Shearer, Starke's International Law, 11th ed.,
London, 1994, p. 454; Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Reservations in Unilateral Declarations Accepting the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the Inter national Court of Justice , Dordrecht, 1995, p.120; Professor MalcolmN.Shaw,
International Law, 4th ed., Cambridge, 1997, p. 762.
To this evidence of the views of juri sts may be added evidence of recent State practice. The earliest declaration still
in force is that of Kenya (1965). The two most recent declarations are those of Barbados (1980) and Canada (1994).
The declarant States concerned involve all the regions of the world except Australasia and the Pacific. And no State
has challenged the validity of the reservation in proceedings before th is Court, or otherwis e in communications to
the Secretary-General, that is, until the appearance of Pakistan's Memorial in these proceedings.
In summary, there is no legal basis for challenging the validity of the Commonwealth reservat ion of India. It is a
classical reservation ratione personae . It is stated in unambiguous terms. It involves no subversion of Article36,
paragraph 6, or any other provision of the Statute.
That is the position of the Republic of India and in my submission my distinguished opponent Sir Elihu Lauterpacht
has not produced any convincing arguments to the contrary.
In his submission, the Commonwealth reservation is "obsolete" and therefore, apparently, invalid (CR 2000/1, p. 27,
para.5). Counsel for Pakistan heape d criticism on this reservation. He said , it is "unprincipled" (p.38), it was
obsolete, inexplicable and a busive (p.40). And elsewhere in the same passa ges, it is described as artificial and
abusive and highly arbitrary.
My learned colleague described the use of this reservation, and of course eight States stil l employ it, as "abusive"
with a frequency which itself was virtually an abuse.
This argument on behalf of Pakistan can only be described as fanciful. If the obsolescence is so clear and the result
so legally offensive, why then was no reference made to these matters in the recent Memorial of Pakistan?
Sir Elihu made reference to the opinions of writers, and specifically referred to Professors Merrills and Macdonald.
But none of the writers asserts that the reservation is invalid on the ground of obsolescence or on any other basis.
I have cited nine jurists covering a span of 50 years. None of these jurists of fers a legal opinion similar to that now
offered on behalf of Pakistan. And this includes the jurists writing in the last decade, Dr.Rosenne,
Professor Shearer, Professor Shaw and Judge Sette-Camara. No expert has suggested that the reservation is invalid.
My next observation is this. If I may say so, the legal argument was not clearly articulated, there was a great deal o f
history and assertions of fact, but the legal argument was not clear. It was sometimes placed in the context o f
unilateral acts and it was sometimes in the context of the law of treaties. More over, the nebulous concept o f
opposability was invoked but its precise relevance was not explained.
Mr. President, it will not do simply to assert that the reservation is obsolete. There must be an applicable law which
constitutes the framework of the anal ysis. In my submission, the actual subject-matter is that of a unilateral act, andtherefore the applicable law is not that of the law of treaties. Couns el for Pakistan referred to the Nicaragua case
(Military and Paramilita ry Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) ,
Preliminary Objections I.,.J. Reports 1984 , p.418, paras.59-60). There the Cour t applied the law of treaties by
analogy (pp. 419-421) in order to decide whether a declarant could modify its declaration.
But this comparison does not help the argument based on obsolescence. The declaration accepting jurisdiction
remains a unilateral act, as the Court emphasized in Nicaragua .
The subject-matter to which the argument of Pakistan applies is the declaration of India, which is a single expression
of intention. The subject-matter of the argument is not the reservation isolat ed and it is not the consensual bond
resulting from the filing of an Application. It is the declaration of India as a whole to which the argument must apply
and this constitutes the subject-matter of the argument, if there is an argument.
There is no general law of unilateral acts , as there is a general law of treaties and acceptances of jurisdiction form a
very specialized type of unilateral act, with their own applicable law.
Now, of course, the applicable law is th e law of the Court's Statute as interpre ted in the jurisprudence of the Court,
such as the Fisheries Jurisdiction case.
Even if a principle of obsolescence were applicable, for the sake of argument, it could only apply to:
(a) the expression of intention; and
(b) the expression of intention in the form of the declaration as a whole, including the reservation.
But, Mr.President, the expression of intention only dates back to 1974 and the Government of India could replace
its 1974 acceptance at any time. The legal tests of applicability are the ambit of intention as expressed in the
instrument as a whole and its compatibility with the Statute. There is no question of obsolescence on the facts.
Counsel for Pakistan has, in my submission, not produced an analysis which is even on the margins of an effective
argument based upon obsolescence, even if the applicable law recognized such a doctr ine, which is extremely
doubtful. I may, if its considered necessary, follow that question up in the second round.
I must now advance to my thir d task this morning, which is to respond to the arguments of Pakistan relating to the
multilateral convention reservation.
The relevant passages in the preliminary objections of India will appear in the transcript:
"iii) The Government of India also submits that sub-paragraph7 of paragraph1 of its
Declaration of 15September, 1974 bars Pakistan from invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court against India concerning any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of
a multilateral treaty, unless at the same time all the parties to such a treaty are also joined as
parties to the case before the Court. The reference to the UN Charter, which is a
multilateral treaty, in the Appl ication of Pakistan as a basis for its claim would clearly fall
within the ambit of this reservation. India further asserts that it has not provided any
consent or concluded any special agreement with Pakistan which waives this requirement.
3. In view of the above, the Government of India respectfully requests the Court:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ii) to adjudge and declare th at Pakistan cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in
respect of any claims concerning various pr ovisions of the UN Ch arter, particularly
Article 2(4) as it is evident that all the States parties to the Charter have not been joined in
the Application and that, under the circumstan ces, the reservation made by India in sub-
paragraph7 of paragraph1 of its Declaration would ba r the jurisdiction of this
Court." (Letter dated 2Novemb er1999 from the Ambassador of India to the Netherlands:
Pakistan's Application dated 21September1999 be fore the International Court of Justice:
Preliminary Objections of the Government of India to jurisdiction.)This multilateral convention reservat ion is based upon an objective conditi on and India has not waived the
requirement set forth in the reservation.
A similar reservation has been made by Malta (1966), the Philippines (1972), the United States (1946), and Pakistan.
Pakistan has included the reservation in declarations of 1948, 1957 and 1960.
The reservation is clearly accep ted as valid by the applicant State in view of its own adoption of the reservation in
three successive declarations. Such acceptance of the validity of this type of reservation surely debars the applicant
State from challenging the Indian rese rvation. The two reservations are in essentially identical terms. The
reservation forms part of a unilateral declaration which be comes part of a consensual bond when an application is
filed.
The Court has affirmed that legal obligations may arise fr om unilateral acts if in th e circumstances the unilateral
mode would be regarded as the normal way of creating a legal obligation. And the Chamber made an observation on
this point in theFrontier Dispute case and that will appear in the transcript.
"In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual
circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the
view that since the applicant Stat es were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of
atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had 'conveyed
to the world at large, including th e Applicant, its intention effectiv ely to terminate these tests' (I.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the
French Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral
declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each
of the applicants without ther eby jeopardizing its contention th at its conduct was lawful." ( Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 574, para. 40.)
The making of a declaration within the system of the optional clause is essentially similar in character. The maker o f
the offer is creating an obligation which is in origin unilateral. It is potentially consensual in effectecisely because
it is, in the first place, binding as a unilateral act.
In these circumstances Pakistan cannot both rely on its ow n declaration (which include s a replica of the Indian
reservation) and assert the invalidity of India's reservation. The position of Paki stan in this respect is incompatible
with the principle of good faith and contrary to the equitable doctrine of approbation a nd reprobation, which
doctrine is, in essence, a restatement of the principle of consistency.
A substantial number of authorities refe r to this reservation without any sugge stion that the reservation is invalid.
The list of authorities will appear in the transcript: Hersch Lauterpacht (editor), Oppe nheim, International Law,
Vol.II, 7thed., London, 1948, p.63; B.S.Murty, in Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law , London,
1968, p. 709; D. P. O'Connell, International Law , Vol. II, London, 1970, p. 1085; J. G. Merrills, British Year Book ,
Vol. 50 (1979), p. 107; J. G. Merills, British Year Book , Vol.64 (1993), pp.230-232; Bengt Broms, The United
Nations , Helsinki, 1990, p.780, fn.14; Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court , second
revised edition, Dordrecht, 1985, p.404; StanimirA.Alexandrov, Reservations in Unilat eral Declarations
Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice , Dordrecht, 1995, pp. 112-119; Shabtai
Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996 , The Hague, 1997, pp. 803-804.
The version of the reservation filed by the United States along with its declaration was interpreted and applied by the
Court in the Nicaragua case, (Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp.29-38). The Court did not seek to question the
validity of the reservation. However, th ere was a difference between the then United States reservation and the
present Indian reservation. While the reservation made by the United States excluded from its acceptance o f
jurisdiction "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty unless (1) all parties to the treatyfected by the decision are
also parties to the case before the C ourt" (emphasis added), paragraph7 of th e Indian declaration is more general
and excludes from the Court's jurisdic tion "any dispute arising from the in terpretation or the application of a
multilateral treaty, unl ess at the same time all the parties to the treaties are also joined to the case before the
Court" (emphasis added).
This difference in the drafting of both declarations has no bearing on their respective validity, but it makes a
difference as to the stage of the proceedings when the Court must take it into consideration. In the Nicaragua case,
the Court, without questioning its validity, declared "that the objection based on the multilateral treaty reservation of
the United States Declaration of Acce ptance [did] not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusivel ypreliminary character" ( I.C.J. Reports 1984 , p. 425). But it did so solely because of the "ambiguities" of the phrase
"all parties to the treaty affected by the decision" whic h was, the Court said, "at the centre of the present doubts",
while it expressly noted that "certain ot her declarations of acceptance, such as those of India, El Salvador and the
Philippines, refer clearly to 'all parties' to the treaties" , p. 424) and, therefore, did not raise the same doubts as to
their scope. In contrast to the United St ates reservation, the reservation of India refers to an objective condition that
requires to be fulfilled and has nothing to do with arguments on the merits, as Pakistan has attempted to allege.
As indicated above, Pakistan is not in a position to mount a credible attack on the va lidity of this reservation,
because the applicant State us es the same reservation. Neve rtheless, the other party claims that the reservation is
ultra vires Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statut e, together with Article 38 (Memor ial of Pakistan, para. H (4)). The
considerations set forth in that paragraph, in so far as they are comprehensible, are irrelevant.
There is, however, a second objection advanced by Pakistan (Memorial of Pakistan, para. H (1)). This is to the effect
that the multilateral treaty reservat ion cannot exclude the applic ation of the principles of customary or general
international law, when such principles "have been ensh rined in the Charter of the United Nations". In this
formulation the applicant State recognizes that the governing norm is the Charte r, which incorporates the principles
of customary law.
Mr. President, in this context it is clea r that the view of the app licant State coincides with that of India, which view
is that the intention of the governments concerned was to exclude jurisdiction in respect of causes of action which,
in the final analysis, are based upon the United Nations Charter.
As my colleagues will now de monstrate, there is no basis of jurisdiction to be found in any other Ar ticle and, in
particular, in Article 36, paragraph 1, and Article 37 of the Statute.
Mr. President, it has been a special pl easure for me to appear in front of you in your ne w office. I would thank you
and your colleagues for your customary patience, and ask you to give the floor to my colleague, Professor Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Pr ofessor Brownlie. I think the Court will suspend for 15 minutes before
giving the floor to Professor Pellet.
The Court adjourned from 11.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séance est reprise et je donne la parole au professeur Alain Pellet.
M. PELLET : Merci, Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges,
C'est toujours un grand honneur et un plaisi r de se présenter devant vous. Permette z-moi, Monsieur le président, de
dire que ce l'est tout spécialement aujourd'hui.
Il m'incombe, en réponse à ce qu'ont dit hier M. Kemicha et sir Elihu Lauterpacht, d' établir que la Cour n'a pas
compétence pour se prononcer sur la requête du Pakistan en vertu de l'Ac te général d'arbitrage du 26 septembre
1928.
Selon le Pakistan, la Cour aurait en la présente espèce compétence pour se prononcer sur le fondement de l'article 17
de l'Acte général de 1928 pour le règl ement pacifique des diffé rends internationaux, lu conjointement avec les
articles 36, paragraphe 1, et 37 du Statut.
Je relève du reste au passage que le Pakistan croit pouvoir dénier à l'Inde "any procedural right to amend, alter o r
supplement its preliminary objections to the Jurisdiction of the Court or to invoke any new grounds in an attempt to
oust the jurisdiction of the Court" (mémoire, p. 21, par. 7). Mais en même temps, ce pays n'a pas hésité, pour sa part,
à amender sa propre requête, qui ne prétendait, à l'origine, fonder la compétence de la Cour que sur les dispositions
des paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'article 36 du Statut (requête du 21 septembre 1999, p. 3), sans faire la moindre allusion à
l'Acte général d'arbitrage.
Outre que l'on voit mal pourquoi le Pakistan pourrait s'arroger un droit d'amendement qu'il ne concède pas à l'Inde, il
faut croire que la base de compétence qu'il prétend fonder sur l'Acte général d'arbitrage ne lui était pas apparue avec
la clarté de l'évidence lorsque la requête a été rédigée.
Comme on le comprend, Monsieur le président ! Non seulement on peut avoir plus que des doutes sur la validité et,en tout cas, le maintien de «l'efficacité» de l'Acte général de 1928, mais encore et de toutes manières, il est clair que,
fût-il toujours en vigueur, cet acte ne li erait pas l'Inde indépendante. Elle n'y est jamais devenue partie; le Pakistan
non plus: il n'a pu ni y succ éder à l'Inde britannique ni y accéder. Au surplus, et si l'on admettait pour les seuls
besoins de la discussion, que l'une ou l'au tre des Parties devait être considérée comme un Etat successeur de l'Inde
britannique en tant que part ie à l'Acte général, les réserves formul ées en1931 par le Gouve rnement de l'Inde
britannique excluraient, de toutes manières, la compétence de la Cour en la présente affaire.
Si vous le voulez bien, Monsieur le président, je vais revenir sur les deux premiers de ces points et je n'évoquerai le
troisième que pour mémoire, puisque, dans ses plaidoiries d'hier, le Pakistan n'a pas cru devoir aborder. Je
m'emploierai donc à montrer, dans un premier temps, qu'il est pour le moins douteux que l'Acte général d'arbitrage
de 1928 soit «un traité ou une c onvention en vigueur» au sens des articles36, paragraphe 1, et37 du Statut de la
Cour. Puis, dans un second temp s, j'établirai qu'en admettant qu'il soit en vigueur, il ne l'est certainement pas dans
les relations entre l'Inde et le Pakistan.
I. L'Acte général d'arbitrage de 1928 n'est pas «un traité ou une convention en vigueur»
au sens des articles 36, paragraphe 1, et 37 du Statut
Monsieur le président,
Il existe, pour le moins, des indices convergents qui donne nt à penser que l'Acte géné ral d'arbitrage de 1928 n'est
plus en vigueur et que, le serait-il, il ne saurait être efficacement invoqué pour fonder la compétence de la Cour.
L'Acte général de 1928 a été adopté dans le contexte bien particulier, de la Société des Nations de la fin des
années vingt, et il comportait de multiples liens avec l'Organisation disparue.
Comme l'a rappelé le juge Morozov dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Eg é «l'analyse du texte de
l'Acte montre qu'il était, par sa nature et son contenu, un élément inséparable de la structure et des mécanismes de la
Société des Nations et, celle-ci une fois disparue, il a perdu toute validité» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1978 , p.54; voir aussi
l'opinion individuelle du Juge Tarazi, ibid., p. 55). Si vous le voulez bien, Monsieur le président, je m’abstiendrai de
donner les références de mes citations, je suis sûr que conformément à ses bonnes habitudes le Greffe y pourvoira
dans les comptes rendus et je l’en re mercie par avance. Même les auteurs de l'opinion dissidente commune jointe
aux arrêts de 1974 dans les affaires des Essais nucl éires et sur laquelle M. Kemicha s'est exclusivement fondé hier
matin, en conviennent, alors même qu'ils défendent l'applicabilité de ce traité contre la majorité de la Cour :
«Il reste que l'Acte général de 1928 était un produit de l’époque de la Société des Nation s et il était
pratiquement inévitable que les mé canismes de règlement pacifique qu' il instituait por tent, à certains
égards, la marque de cette origine.» (Opinion dissidente commune de MM. Onyeama, Dillard, Jiménez
de Aréchaga et sir Humphrey Waldock, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 331.)
Par ailleurs, s'il est vrai que les mécanismes de l'Acte général ne sont pas intégrés dans le système de la SdN, celle-ci
n'y est pas moins mentionnée à de très nombreuses reprises (cf. les articles 6 et 7, 9, et 43 à 47) sans même parler de
la Cour permanente, dont il est loin d'être certain que toutes les fonctions qui lui sont dévolues, par l’acte, à elle ou à
son président, aient pu passer à la Cour actuelle. Et, comme l'ont relevé les juges dissidents de 1974 cités pa r
M. Kemicha (CR 2000/1, p. 51, par. 21), l'un de s effets de la disparition de la SdN a été de fermer à jamais le cercle
des Etats parties puisque l'article 43 lim itait la participation à l'Acte général de 1928 aux seuls Etats Membres de la
Société ou à ceux que l'Assemblée de la SdN avait invités à y accéder.
Cette particularité a été relevée aussi bien par la France que par la Turquie lorsqu'elles ont, l'une et l'autre, fait l'objet
de requêtes prétendument fond ées sur l'article 17 de l'ancien Acte géné ral. Dans sa communi cation en date du 10
octobre 1978, le Gouvernement turc écrivait :
«L'Acte général faisait partie intégrante du systèm e de la Société des Nations. Elaboré en son sein,
adopté par son Assemblée, il n'était ouvert qu'à ses Membres et aux Etats invités par son Conseil. Il était
son Œuvre et la Société ne l'avait conçu qu'en vue des buts défini s par le Pacte, soit la paix, le
désarmement et la sécurité. Il a toutefois reçu un accuei l très réservé, vingt-t rois adhésions de 1929 à
1935, et aucune autre depuis lors. Il mettait en place des mécanismes qui faisaient constamment appel
aux organes de la Société et qui n'ont pas été employés une seule fois en cinquanteans.» [Soixante
douze à la date d'auj ourd'hui] (Affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Eg é ,C.I.J. M méires,
plaidoiries et documents , t.149, p.597; voir aussi l'annexe à la lettre de l'ambassadeur de France au
greffier de la Cour du 16 mai 1973, affaire des Essais nucl éires ,bid. , t. 147, p. 349.)Ces liens sont encore accrus par le fa it que plusieurs Parties avaient expres sément subordonné leur acceptation des
mécanismes de l'Acte général et, en pa rticulier, de l'article 17, à l'attente d'une décision du Conseil de la SdN. Tel
avait été le cas du Royaume-Uni, du Ca nada, de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle -Zélande, de l'Italie ou de l'Inde
britannique (cf. Traités multilat éaux d poé s aépr s du èecr étaire g é éal , Etat au 30 avril 1999,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, n° de vente F.99.V.5, p.1015-1018). J'y reviendrai en ce qui concerne ce dernier pays; ce qui
nous intéresse pour l'instant, ce sont les liens intimes qui en résultent entre le système du Pacte d'un côté et celui de
l'Acte général de l'autre.
Il n'est donc pas étonnant que, suite à une initiative be lge (cf. doc.A/AC.18/18/Add.1), l'Assemblée générale ait
entrepris, en1948, de «restituer à l' Acte général du 26septem bre 1928» «son efficacité première», pour reprendre
les termes de la résolution268A(III). Pour ce faire, l'Assemblée générale subs titue systématiquement les
NationsUnies et leurs organes à la Soci été des Nations et ses organes, la Cour internationale de Justice à la Cour
permanente.
Il est clair que de telles modifications n'auraient pas été nécessaires si, de l'avis des quarante-cinq Etats Membres qui
ont voté cette résolution, l'Acte général de 1928 était toujours en vi gueur, pour ne rien dire des six voix contre. Les
auteurs de l'opinion dissidente commune de 1974 dont le Pakistan fait si grand cas (cf. CR 2000/1, p. 49-53) ne sont
pas de cet avis et ils ont affirmé que l'«on trouve dans les comptes rendus des débats les déclarations d'un certain
nombre de délégations qui m ontrent que celles-ci consid éraient alors l'Acte de1928 comme en vigueur; personne
n'est venu les contredire» (C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 336, par. 49). Avec tout le respect dû aux juges dissidents, ce n'est
pas exact Monsieur le président; non seulement aucun Etat, à ma connaissance n'a dit clairement que l'Acte de 1928
demeurait en vigueur, j'y revi endrai, mais encore six délé gations, celles de l'Union sovi étique et de ses amis, ont
clairement protesté, durant le s débats, contre cette tent ative de résurrection de cet «instrument périmé» (cf.
e
Documents officiels de l'Assemblé e g é éale, troisième session , 199 séance plénière, 28 avril 1949, comptes rendus
analytiques, intervention de M. J. Malik, URSS, p. 196).
Telle a du reste été la positio n sans équivoque de l'Inde dont , à la suite de la précédent e tentative du Pakistan pour
ressusciter le défunt Acte général, le ministre des affair es étrangères a adressé, le 18septembre1974, une
communication au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. Il faisait valoir que :
"The General Act of 1928 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was a political agreement
and was an integral part of the League of Nations system. Its efficacy was impaired by the fact that the
organs of the League of Nations to which it refers have now disappeared. It is for these reasons that the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 28April1949 adopted the revised General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of In ternational Disputes." ( Multilateral Treaties Depos ited with the Secretary-
General, Status as at 30 April 1999, ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales N° E.99.V.5, fn. 11, p. 978.)
Ni l'Inde, ni le Pakistan n'ont, à ce jour, adhéré à ce nouvel Acte général.
Ceci étant, il faut admettre, Monsieur le président, que l'«opération» de 1949 n'est pas allée sans quelque équivoque,
que le titre même de la réso lution 268A(III) reflète bien pui sque, comme je l'ai dit, il est intitulé «Restitution à
l'Acte général du 26septembre1928 de s on efficacité». Cela pourrait signifier qu'en tant qu'instrument l'Acte
général de 1928 n'est pas considéré comme mort. Et il faut reconnaître que les travaux préparatoires de la résolution
et le texte même de celle-ci sont ambigus.
En revanche, et sur cela aucun doute n'es t possible, ils établissent que, faute d'être mort, l'Acte général est tenu par
tous comme, au moins, moribond. Il a, selon tous les interv enants, perdu son «efficacité» du fait de la disparition de
la SdN et il faut la lui «restituer».
Cela ressort d'abord de la proposition belge elle-même. Selon la Belgique
«l'Assemblée générale se borne rait à permettre aux Etats de rétabli, de leur propre gré, la validité de
l'Acte.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De l'avis du représentant de la Belgique, le consen tement des parties n'est pas nécessaire puisque, dans
sa forme définitive, sa proposition ne supprime ni ne modifie l'Acte général tel qu'il a été établi en 1928,
mais au contraire le laisse intact ainsi que, par voie de conséquence, t ous les droits que les parties à cet
Acte pourraient encore en tire r… G râce à quelques modifications, le nouvel Accord général restaurerait, au bénéfice des Etats qui y adhéreraient, l'ef ficacité première du dispositif créé par l'Acte
de1928, Acte qui, bien que t oujours théoriquement valide, est devenu en grande partie
inapplicable.» («Etude des méthodes destin ées à favoriser le dével oppement de la coopération
internationale dans le domaine politique», doc. A/605, 13 août 1948, par. 46, p. 31 ; les italiques sont de
nous; voir aussi le texte de la proposition belge,ibid., p. 37-38.)
Telle a été aussi la position de tous les Etats qui se sont exprimés en faveur de son adoption, au sein de la
commission politique spéciale ou de la commission plénière, qu'il s'agisse des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni, de
l'Uruguay, ( Documents officiels de l'Assembl ée g é éale, troisi èe session , commission politique spéciale,
26 séance, comptes rendus analytique s, p.306, 308, 319), de l'Equateur ( Documents officiels de l'Assembl ée
e
gé érale, troisième session , comptesrendus analytiques de la commission plénière, 199 séance plénière, 28 avril
1949, p. 190) ou de la France ( ibid, p. 193).
Dans la droite ligne de ces positions, l'Assemblée générale considère
«que l'efficacité de l'Acte général pour le règlement paci fique des différends internationaux, du
26 septembre 1928, se trouve diminuée du fait que les organes de la So ciété des Nations et la Cour
permanente de Justice internati onale, auxquels il se réfère, ont aujourd'hui disparu» (résolution
268 A (III), préambule, al. 2).
C'est dire clairement que l'Assemblée estime que l'article37 du Statut de la Cour ne suffit pas à redonner vie aux
dispositions de l'Acte général de 1928 qui donnaient compétence à la Cour permanente. Et cela est confirmé par
l'alinéa suivant du préambule a ux termes duquel: «les amende ments indiqués ci-apr ès [ils portent, je l'ai dit, su r
toutes les dispositions visant soit la Société des Nations soit la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, y compris
l'article 17] sont de nature à restituer à l'Acte général son efficacité première», étant entendu que
«ces amendements ne joueront qu'entre les Etats ayant adhéré à l'Acte général ainsi revisé et, partant, ne
porteront pas atteinte aux droits des Etats qui, parties à l'Acte tel qu'il a été établi le 26 septembre 1928,
entendraient s'en prévaloir dans la mesure o iù pourrait encore jouer » (les italiques sont de nous).
Qu'en déduire ? Au moins deux choses :
1) que l'Assemblée générale a des doutes sérieux sur le maintien en vigueur continu de l'ancien Acte
général qui, de toutes manières, a «pe rdu son efficacité première» du fait de la disparition de la SdN et
de la CPJI; et,
2) que cette «inefficacité» est le fait de l'ensemble des dispos itions de l'Acte de1928 renvoyant à ces
deux instances.
Il s'en déduit aussi,a contrario mais nécessairement, que les parties à l'ancien Acte géné ral qui n'ont pas ratifié le
nouveau ne peuvent s'en prévaloir que «dans la mesure où il pourrait encore joue r», c'est-à-dire dans la mesure – et
seulement dans la mesure– où les dis positions modifiées ne sont pas en cause. Or, je le répète, l'article17 qui
confère compétence à la CPJI fait partie des disposit ions qui ont été modifi ées et ni l'Inde, ni le Pakistan ne sont
devenus parties au véritable «Lazare juridique» qu'est l'Acte général de 1949. Ni l'une, ni l'autre ne peuvent donc, en
tout état de cause, se prévaloir de la clause de juridiction de l'article 17.
Ceci est du reste confirmé par le fait que, contrairement à l'Ac te général revisé de1949 , celui de1928 n'est pas
mentionné dans la «Liste ch ronologique des autres instruments régissant la compéten ce de la Cour» figurant dans
l'nnuaire de la Cour internationale de Justice (cf. l'nnuaire 1996-1997 , p. 134 et 137).
e
Certes, comme l'écrivent les juges dissidents de 1974, dans l'un des rares passages de l’opinion que M Kemicha n'a
pas cru devoir citer hier, «la pr emière liste de traités mult ilatéraux, pour lesquels le S ecrétaire général exerce les
fonctions de dépositaire, publiée par lui en 1949, mentionnait l'Acte général ( Signatures, ratifications, acceptations,
adh éions, etc., aux conventions et accords pour lesquels le Secr taére g n é é exerce les fonctions de d posiéaire ,
publications des Nations Unies, 1949, vol.9)» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p.333). Mais il est très révélateur qu'après
l'adoption de l'Acte revisé de 1949, l’acte de 1928 disparaît de la liste et il ne fera sa réapparition qu'après 1973. Ce
n'est en effet qu'après l'affaire desssais nucl éires , que l’acte de 1928 est à nouveau mentionné dans la précieuse
publication intitulée Traités multilat éaux d poé s aépr s du èecr étaire g é éal , état au 30 avril 1974
(ST/LEG/SER.D/8, p. 530; n° de vente F.75.V.9 ). Il est clair qu'auparavant le Sec rétaire général, comme c'esttoujours le cas du Greffe, estimait que l'Acte de 1928 n'était plus en vigueur et avait été remplacé par celui de 1949.
e
Il est vrai, Monsieur le président, que, depuis lors, quelq ues Etats, mentionnés hier par M Kemicha (CR 2000/1,
p. 47-48, par. 8-10), se sont employés, de temps à autre, à tenter de ressusciter notre Lazare en liaison toujours avec
des affaires portées devant votre Cour, mais jamais ces Etats n’ont obtenu de la Cour le «Lève-toi et marche» qui eût
conforté leur position en matière de compétence.
Dans l'affaire relative à Certains emprunts norv gieés de 1957 la France av ait mentionné, sans s'y arrêter, l'Acte
général de 1928 comme constitu ant une base possible de comp étence de la Cour (voir Certains emprunts
norv éiens C,I.J. M moéres, plaidoiries et documents, 1955, vol.I, p.172, 173 et 180 et vol.II, p.60). L’arrêt du
6 juillet 1957 n'y fait même pas allusion.
Nouvelle tentative, de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande cette fois, à l'occasion des affaires des Essais nucl éires .
Et même silence de la Cour qui, dans ses ordonnances du 22juin1973, ne s'estime pas en mesure «d'aboutir à une
conclusion définitive», au stade des mesures conservatoires, sur l'applicabilité de l'Acte général ( C.I.J. Recueil 1973 ,
p.103 et 139)-- radicalement écart é comme base de compétence possi ble par le juge Ignacio-Pinto ( C.I.J. Recueil
1973, opinion dissidente, p. 129). Dans ses arrêts du 20 décembre 1974, la Cour n'aborde pas la question.
De même, ni dans son ordonnance du 11 septembre 1976 sur les mesures conser vatoires, ni dans son arrêt du 19
décembre 1978 relatifs à l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Eg e é , la Cour ne se prononc e sur la validité ou
«l'efficacité» de l'Acte général de 1928. Dans l’ordonnance, la Cour se born e à considérer qu'il ne lui est pas
nécessaire d'aboutir «à une c onclusion définitive en la pha se actuelle de la procédur e au sujet des questions …
soulevées relativement à l'applicabilité de l'Acte de 1928…» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1976 , p. 8). Et, dans son arrêt de 1978,
elle constate qu'une réserve grecque invoqu ée par la Turquie au titre de la réci procité avait pour l'effet d'exclure le
différend de l'application de l'article 17 de l'Acte général (C.I.J. Recueil 1978 , p. 37), si bien qu'il ne lui était «plus
indispensable de dire si l'Acte est actuellement en vigueur avant de pouvoir st atuer sur la compét ence de la Cour
pour connaître de la requête» ( ibid., p. 17). Elle s'en est, en effet, abstenue.
De plus, le Pakistan a, lui aussi, te nté d'invoquer, une première fois, l'Acte général de 1928 dans l'affaire des
Prisonniers de guerre avant de se désister de sa requête. A cette occasion, l'Inde a réagi avec netteté en faisant valoir
que:
"The General Act of 1928 is either not in force or, in any case, its ef ficacy is impaired by the fact that
the organs of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of In ternational Justice to which it refers
have now disappeared" (Statement of the Government of India in Continuation of its Statement of
28May1973 and in Answer to Pakistan's Le tter of 25May1973, affaire relative au Proc è des
prisonniers de guerre pakistanais C,I.J. M moéres, plaidoiries et documents , vol. 146, p. 143).
Telle est aussi, Monsieur le président, la position de l'Inde en la présente instance.
Ainsi, depuis 1945,
z aucune affaire n'a été soumise à la Cour avec succès sur la base de l'article 17 de l'Acte général de 1928;
z en admettant que celui-ci soit, résiduellement, toujours en vigueur, ce ne pourrait être que pour ce qui est de
ses dispositions ne renvoyant ni à la SdN, ni à la CPJI; et,
z s'il n'est pas tombé en désuétude, le moins qu’on puisse dire, Monsieur le président, est qu'il est «tombé en
incertitude».
Votre Cour, Madame et Messieurs les juges, a cependant toujours évité de lever cette incertitude. La présente affaire
pourrait être l'occasion de le faire une fois pour t outes. Mais ce n'est pas inéluc table. Vous pouvez aussi, comme
dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Eg e é , prendre la question autrement et constater votre incompétence
pour d'autres motifs, qui vous dispenseraie nt de trancher, d'une mani ère générale, les questions de la validité et de
l'efficacité de l'Acte de 1928.
Il vous suffit pour cela de c onstater, sans qu'il soit besoin de s'interroge r sur la question de sa voir si et dans quelle
mesure l'Acte général d'arbitrage constitue, in abstracto , un traité ou une convention en vigueur au sens des articles
36, paragraphe 1, et 37 du Statut, il ne l'est en tout cas pas dans les relations entre l'Inde et le Pakistan.
II. L'Acte général d'arbitrage de 1928 n'est pas un traité ou
une convention en vi gueur entre l'Inde et le PakistanMonsieur le président, pour que la C our soit compétente sur le fondement d'une clause de juridiction, il faut non
seulement que cette disposition figure dans un traité en vigueur, ma is encore qu'il le soit entre les deux Parties au
différend. Ce n'est pas le cas ici, pour de très nombreuses raisons.
Avant de les exposer, je souha ite toutefois introduire un élém ent de clarification. Selon la définition généralement
admise, «l'expression «succession d'Etats» s'entend de la substitution d'un Etat à un autre dans la responsabilité des
relations internationales d'un territoire» (art. 2, par. 1) commun aux conventions de Vienne de 1978 et 1983).
En 1947, deux phénomènes de succession d'Etats, simultanés mais distincts, se sont produits. En premier lieu,
devenant indépendante, l'Inde s'est substituée à l'Inde britannique, en ce sens, elle lui a «succédé». En second lieu, le
Pakistan s'est détaché de l'Inde pour devenir, lui aussi, un Etat indépendant ce qui a donné lieu à un autre phénomène
de succession d'Etats, du Pakistan par rapport à l'Inde, cette fois.
A ces deux phénomènes de succession d'Etats, s'appliquent des règles différentes codifiées d'ailleurs dans des parties
distinctes de la convention de 1978 sur la succession d'Et ats en matière de traités. Cette convention est entrée en
vigueur le 6 novembre 1996, elle n'a été ratifiée ni par l'Inde, ni par le Pakistan, même si celui-ci l’a signée en 1979.
Il n'en reste pas moins que, pa r exemple, dans l'affaire du Différend frontalier , la Chambre de la Cour y a vu une
«convention de codification» (arrêt du 22 décembre 1986, C.I.J. Recueil 1986 , p. 563, par. 17) et que, dans son arrêt
du 25septembre1997, la Cour a considéré que certaines de ses dispositions reflétaient des règles de nature
coutumière (voir C.I.J. Recueil 1997 , p. 72, par. 123).
Au sens de cette convention, l'Inde est, en 1947, un «Etat nouvellement indépenda nt», qui hérite de la personnalité
de l'Inde britannique; le Pakistan, p our sa part, se sépare de l'Inde et son accession à l'indépendance pose d'autres
problèmes, régis par d'autres règles, c odifiées par les articles31 et suivants de la même convention. En d'autres
termes, alors que l'Inde est l'Et at continuateur de l'Inde britannique, ce n'est pas le cas de la Partie pakistanaise, qui
se détache de l'Inde et hérited'elle. Telle a d'ailleurs été aussi la position du conseiller juridique des NationsUnies
dans un avis de 1947 sur lequel je reviendrai tout à l'heure (Nations Unies, communiqué de presse, PM/473, 12 août
1947, reproduit in «La succession d'Etats et la qual ité de Membre des Nations Unie s», mémorandum publié par le
Secrétariat, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international , 1962, vol. II, p. 119).
Il faut donc examiner séparément les deux aspects du problème, Inde, d’une part, Pakistan, d’autre part.
A. L'Inde n'est pas et n'a jamais été liée par l'Acte général
En ce qui concerne l'Inde d'abord, il convient d'appliquer les règles générales de la succession d'Etats en matière de
traités et, en particulier, cel les codifiées par les articles 16 et 17 de la convention de 1978. Aux termes de l'article
16 :
«Un Etat nouvellement indépendant n'est pas tenu de maintenir un traité en vigueur ni d'y devenir partie
du seul fait qu'à la date de la succession d'Etats le traité était en vigueur à l'égard du territoire auquel se
rapporte la succession d'Etats.»
Par conséquent, aucun automatisme. L'Etat nouvellement indépendant peut établir, en principe, sa qualité de partie,
mais uniquement par une notification de succession comme le précise le premier paragraphe de l'article 17.
Ces deux dispositions (art.16 et17) reflètent sans aucun doute le droit c outumier. Je me permets, Madame et
Messieurs de la Cour, de vous renvoyer à cet égard aux démonstrations, très argumentées, du rapporteur spécial de
la Commission du droit international, sirHumphreyWaldock, sur les projet s d'articles 6 et 7 qu'il proposait
(troisième rapport sur la succes sion en matière de traités, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international , 1970,
vol.II, p.34-47) et au commentair e des projets d'articles 15 et 16 de la Commission elle-même (devenus
respectivement les ar ticles 16 et 17 de la convention) ( Annuaire de la Commissi on du droit international , 1974,
vol. II, première partie, p. 217-225).
L'Inde n'a jamais fait la notificati on de succession expressément prévue par la règle rappelée au paragraphe 1 de
l'article 17 et réglementée par l'ar ticle 22 de la convention. Davantag e même: par sa communication du 18
septembre 1974 au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, le ministre indien des relations extérieures déclarait :
"The Government of India neve r regarded themselves as bound by the General Act of 1928 since her
Independence in 1947, whether by succession or otherwis e. Accordingly, India ha s never been and is
not a party to the General Act of 1928 ever since her Inde pendence. I write this to make our position absolutely clear on this point so that there is no doubt in any quarter." (ultilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary-General, Status as at 30 April 1999 , ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales N° E.99.V.5, fn.10,
p. 977.)
On peut vraiment difficilement être plus clair.
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht a soutenu hier qu e la constatation ainsi faite par l'Inde étai t erronée: "So far as India was
concerned, there was no succession; there was continuity" (CR 200 0/1, p. 55, par. 8). Oui, l'Inde est le continuateur
de l'Inde britannique. Elle hérite de sa personnalité. Elle continue sa participation aux organisations internationales
dont celle-ci était membre. Mais ceci dans le cadre des rè gles de la successi on d'Etats, dont je viens de montrer
qu'elles n'impliquent au cune automaticité (sauf s'agi ssant des traités à por tée territoriale), faute de quoi c'est la
souveraineté même de l'Etat nouvellement indépendant qui se trouverait hypothéquée.
Mais il y a plus. Non se ulement l'Inde, en l'espèce, n'a pas notifié son intent ion de continuer à êt re liée par l'Acte
général, non seulement elle a clairement indiqué qu'elle ne s'était jamais considérée comme ayant été liée depuis son
indépendance, mais encore, même si elle l’avait voulu, elle n'aurait pas pu être liée.
L'Acte général relève en ef fet de la catégorie générale des traités intransmissibles ; de ceux qui ne sont pas
susceptibles de passer à un Etat successeur par la voie de la succession d'Etats du fait de leur objet et de leur but.
Hypothèse qui est du reste expressément réservée par le paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la convention de 1978.
Telle est la position, par ex emple, du grand spécialiste du droit de la succession d'Et ats qu'était le professeur
O'Connell, qui précise que le s traités de ce type ne sont pas transmissibles en donnant expressément l'exemple de
l'Acte général de 1928 ("Independence and Succession of States", BYBIL 1962, p. 132; voir aussi, du même auteur,
State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law , vol.2, International Relations, Cambridge U.P., 1967,
p. 213). D'autres auteurs et non des moindres, comme Castren ou sir Robert Jennings et sir Arthur Watts, prennent la
même position en ce qui concerne les traités d'arbitrage (E. J. S. Castren, «Aspects récents de la succession d'Etats»,
RCADI 1951-1, vol.78, p.435 ou sir Robert Jennings et sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law , précis,
p. 211).
Il est du reste frappant qu' aucun Etat nouvellement indépendant n'a jamais fait de notificat ion de succession
concernant l'Acte général. En revanche, comme celui de l'Inde, le Gouvernement dominicain a adressé au Secrétaire
général des Nations Unies, le 24novemb re1987, une communication à son sujet. Par celle-ci, il déclarait que, «en
tout état de cause, l'Etat libre asso cié de la Dominique ne se considère pas lié par cet Acte depuis son accession à
l'indépendance» ( Traités multilat éraux d éposés aupr ès du Secr étaire g é éral , état au avril999,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, n° de vente F.99.V.5, p. 1019).
Il y a là une «dénonciation de précaution» comparable à celles de la France, du Royaume-Uni ou de la Turquie, qui
ne sauraient, assuréme nt, démontrer que ces Etats cons idéraient que l'Acte général ét ait en vigueur à la date à
laquelle ils ont adressé leur communication au Secrétai re général des Nations Unie s, contrairement à ce qu'a
prétendu hier M.Kemicha (C R 2000/1, p. 46, par. 5). Le Royaume-Uni préc ise que sa notification de dénonciation
ne préjuge pas ses vues «quant au maintien en vigueur de l'Acte général» ( Trait é multilatéraux d éos séaupr sèdu
Secr éaire g é éal , état au 30 avril 1999, ST/LEG/SER.E/ 17, n°de vente F.99.V.5, p.1020). Quant aux
Gouvernements français et turc, ils ré affirment la ferme position qu'ils avai ent prise respectivement durant les
affaires desEssais nucl éires et duPlateau continental de la mer Eg eé (id. , p. 1019 et 1021).
Selon mon contradicteur et ami sirElihu, la notification de l' Inde serait de nature différ ente en ce sens qu'elle ne
pourrait s'analyser en une dénonciation de l'Acte géné ral (CR2000/1, p.54, par.6). C'est faire preuve d'un
formalisme très excessif. Nous sommes en droit international public, dont l' une des caractéristi ques, soulignée à
l'envie par la jurisprudence et la doc trine est justement, son absence de formalisme (cf. arrêt du 19 décembre 1978,
affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Eg eé ,I.J. Recueil 1978 , p. 39, par. 95 ou arrêt du 1rjuillet 1994, affaire
de la D éimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahre n C.ï ,. Recueil 1994 , p.120 ou
e
P. Reuter, Introduction au droit des trait é , 3 éd. par Ph.Cahier, PUF, Paris, 1995, p.27 ou Oppenheim's
International Law, précis, p. 1207). L'intention, seule, compte. Du reste, si l'article 45 de l'Acte général prévoit que
sa dénonciation «se fera par notification écrite adressée» au dépositaire, il n'impose à cette notification aucune forme
particulière. L'Inde a adressé une telle notification au Secrétaire général de s Nations Unies; elle va plus loin qu'une
simple dénonciation mais il n'est pas raisonnable de ne pas reconnaître qu'elle est au moins cela.
Voici donc où nous en sommes, Monsieur le président: 1) l'Acte général n'est plus en vi gueur ou, à tout le moins, il a per du toute «efficacité judiciaire» depuis
la disparition de la SdN et de la Cour permanente;
2) il n'a pu passer à l'Inde indépendante par voie de succession car, traité d'arbitrage, il relève d'une
catégorie de traités dont la doctrine s'accorde à penser que, par nature, ils ne sont pas transmissibles, ce
que confirme la pratique en ce qui concerne précisément l'Acte général;
3) quand bien même il n'en irait pas ainsi, ce que je n'admets que pour les besoins de la discussion, il ne
saurait être question de succession automatique en l'absence de toute notification de succession de la
part de l'Inde indépendante, qui, certes, «continue» la personnalité juridique de l'Inde britannique, mais
n'en est pas moins un «Etat nouvelle ment indépendant» auquel s'applique nt les règles générales de la
succession d'Etats;
4) l'Inde a, au surplus, clairement déclaré en 1974 qu 'elle ne s'était jamais considérée comme étant liée;
et,
5) à titre subsidiaire, cette déclar ation peut, en tout état de caus e, s'analyser comme une dénonciation
parfaitement valide au regard de l'article 45 de l'Acte de 1928.
A cette liste, assez impressionnante, de ra isons qui chacune excluent que l'Acte soit en vigueur à l'égard de l'Inde,
s'en ajoute une autre ou, plutôt, une série d'autres, que le Pakistan a soigneusement pa ssé sous silence dans ses
plaidoiries d'hier, alors pourtant que l'Inde les a fait valo ir clairement dans son cont re-mémoire (p. 11-12, par. 25-
28). Ces raisons tiennent aux réserves formulées par le Gouvernement de l'Inde brit annique au moment de son
adhésion à l'Acte général, en1931. Nous aurions beaucoup aimé , Monsieur le président, de ce côté-ci de la barre,
savoir ce que la Partie pakistanaise avait à dire à ce sujet. Nous avons été frustrés et je ne peux guère que résumer ce
que l'Inde a écrit et vous prier, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, de bien vouloir vous y référer.
Trois de ces réserves de 1931 présentent une importance particulière en ce qui nous concerne :
z celle du paragraphe 1 iii) de l'instrument de l'adhésion de l'Inde britannique portant sur
"Disputes between the Governme nt of India and the Governme nt of any other Member of
the League which is a Member of the Bri tish Commonwealth of Nations, all of which
disputes shall be settled in such a manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree";
cette réserve exclurait donc la comp étence de la Cour po ur tout différend opposant l'Inde au Pakistan,
membre du Commonwealth;
z deuxième réserve pertinente, celle contenue dans le paragraphe 1 v) qui concernait:
"Disputes with any Pa rty to the General Act who is not a Member of the League of
Nations" ( Multilateral Treaties Deposited with th e Secretary-General, Status as at
30 April 1999, ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales N° E.99.V.5, p. 975),
cette réserve exclurait donc aussi la compétence de la Cour à l'égard du Pakistan qui n' était pas et qui
n'est pas devenu membre de la SdN (j'en redirai quelques mots sous un autre angle);
z et, troisième condition, celle qui est posée au paragraphe 2 de l'acte d'adhésion, par laquelle le Gouvernement
de l'Inde britannique se réservait de suspendre l'application de l'article 17 à l'égard des différends dont le
Conseil de la SdN était saisi – condition qui est devenue inopérante depuis la disparition de la Société des
Nations, mais qui était une condition de l’adhésion de l’Inde britannique à l’Acte général, ce qui confirme, si
besoin était, que l'Acte de 1928 n'est plus en vigueur à l'égard de l'Inde depuis lors.
J'ai dit, en commençant cette digression relative aux réserves de l'Inde brit annique, que nos cont radicteurs ne les
avaient pas évoquées hier matin. Ce n'est pa s tout à fait exact, Monsieur le prés ident. A vrai dire, sirElihu y a fait
une allusion puisqu'il a affirm é que dans un geste de généro sité (a "liberal gesture", CR 2000/1, p.60, par.27), le
Pakistan y avait renoncé en1974… Je ne suis pas vraiment sûr que cette renonc iation soit aussi désintéressée que
l'on veut vous le faire croi re… Mais indépendamment de ceci, l'interprétation que le Pakistan donne à son «geste»
est tout à fait intéressante puisque, et je cite à nouveau son cons eil, cette «renonciation» aurait signifié: "we don't
need to adhere to the reservations, we don't want to limit the efficacy of the General Act as thus inherited" (ibid.,lesitaliques sont de nous). C'est un ave u, Monsieur le président: les réserv es de1931 seraient passées aux très
hypothétiques Etats successeurs (si succession il y avait) et ces réserves «limitent» votre compétence —mais
sirElihu est britannique et donc maître de l' understatement ; cette «limite» constitue ic i, purement et simplement,
l'exclusion de la compétence de la Cour.
Au demeurant, Monsieur le président, il va de soi que l'Inde n'invoque les réserves de1931 qu' à titre subsidiaire
puisqu'à ses yeux elle n'est pas, et n'a jamais été, liée par l'Acte général depuis son accession à l'indépendance. Il
n'en reste pas moins que si elle avait hérité de l’Inde britannique, elle l’aurait fait avec les réserves de 1931 et, a elle
seule, chacune de ces réserves suffirait, s'il en était besoin, pour écarte r la compétence de la Cour en la présente
espèce.
B. Le Pakistan n'est pas et n'a jamais été lié par l'Acte général
Il est tout aussi évident que le seul fa it que l'article17 ne puisse être invoqué par le Pakistan à l'encontre de l'Inde
suffit, Madame et Messieurs les juges, à exclure votre juridiction. Ce n'est donc que pour surplus de droit que je vais
examiner maintenant la situation du Pa kistan cette fois, à l'égard de l'Acte général de 1928. Cet examen conduit du
reste à une constatation similaire: en admettant que l’Acte général demeure en vigueur, quod non , le Pakistan n'y est,
de toutes manières, pas non plus partie. Mais pour des raisons qui pour l’essentiel sont différentes.
L'une, il est vrai, est commune. Il s'agit de celle qui tient au ca ractère intransmissible de l'Acte général lui-même.
L'Inde ne pouvait, pour cette raison y succéder, le Pakistan, à fortiori, ne le peut pas non plus.
Pour le reste, le problème se présente différemment. Alors que l'Inde continue la pers onnalité juridique de l'Inde
britannique ce que semblent admettre nos contradicteurs (CR2000/1, p.55, par. 8), le Pakistan, lui, s'en sépare.
Comme l'a relevé le Secrétai re général adjoint des NationsUnies chargé des affaires juridiques dans un avis du
8 août 1947 approuvé et rendu public par le Secrétaire général (que sir Elihu a cité très partiellement hier, ibid.) :
«Du point de vue du droit internati onal, on se trouve en présence d'un cas où une partie d'un Etat se
détache de lui et devient un nouvel Etat. Sous cet angl e, il n'y a pas de changement dans le statut
international de l'Inde; elle demeure un Etat et c onserve tous les droits et toutes les obligations
découlant des traités… Le territoire qui se détache, le Pakista n, sera un nouvel Etat, qui n'aura pas les
droits et obligations conventionne ls de l'ancien Etat…» (Nations Unies, communiqué de presse,
PM/473, 12 août 1947, reproduit in «La succession d'Etats et la qualité de Membre des Nations Unies»,
mémorandum publié par le Secrétariat, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international , 1962, vol. II,
p. 119.)
La Cour suprême du Pakistan s'en est d'ailleurs montrée bien d'accord dans l'arrêt du 6 juin 1961 rendu dans l'affaire
Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Brothers (Karachi) and Co. que Monsieur l' Attorney General de l'Inde a mentionné
tout à l'heure Selon cet arrêt (je suis désolé, je vais être amené à faire d’assez longues citations en anglais),
"the Indian Independenc e (International Arrangements) Orde r1947 did not and, indeed, could not
provide for the devolution of treaty rights and obligations which were not capable of being succeeded to
by a part of a country which is severed from the parent state and established as an independent
sovereign power, according to the practice of States . . . [A]s far as it can be gathered, the consensus of
opinion amongst international jurists seems to be in favour of the view that as a general rule a new State
so formed will succeed to rights and obligations arising only under tr eaties specifically relating to
territories, e.g., treaties relating to its boundaries or regulating the navi gation of rivers or providing for
guarantees or concessions but not to rights and obligations under treaties, affecting the State, as such, or
its subjects, e.g., treaties of alliance,rbitration or commerce. An examinati on of the said Order also
reveals no intention to depart from this principle." (Doc umentation concernant la succession d'Etats,
Série é gislative des Nations Unies , 1967, ST/LEG/SER.B/14, p. 137-138; les italiques sont de nous.)
Cette constatation faite, la Cour suprême cite l'annexe à l'Order de 1947 et elle en déduit :
"Under these provisions it is significant that Pakistan . . . did not automatically become a member of the
United Nations nor did she succeed to the rights and obligations which attached to India by reason of
her membership of the League of Na tions at Geneva or the United Nations. It is di fficult therefore, to
appreciate how clause 4 of the said Order can be said to be applicab le to all kinds of international
agreements or that it intended to provide for the su ccession to rights and obligations of the parent State
which did not normall y devolve upon a State established by succession from the parent State under the rules of International Law or which attached to the parent State as a consequence of her membership of
an international organisation." (Ibid., p. 138.)
Et la Cour suprême de conclure que, dès lors, le Pakistan ne pouvait accéder à la convention de 1927 pour
l'exécution des sentences arbitrales étrangères ratifiée par l'Inde britannique en 1938 :
"The ratification could thus be ma de by only a member State [of the L eague of Nations] and had to be
deposited with the Secretary-Genera l of the League of Nations. In th e circumstances if Pakistan could
not under the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Or der succeed to the rights and
obligations acquired by British Indi a by virtue of her membership of the League of Nations or its
successor organisation – the United Nations – it foll ows that Pakistan could not be deemed to have
succeeded to the right of ratification that British India possessed as a member of the League of Nations
and the ratification of the Protocol by British India could not enure to the benefit of Pakistan." (Ibid., p.
139.)
Ce raisonnement est en tous points transposable à l'Acte général de 1928.
Celui-ci, il faut le rappeler, est un tr aité fermé, auquel, en vertu de l'arti cle 43, paragraphe 1, seuls peuvent adhére
les Membres de la Société des Nations et les «Etats non membres à qui le Conseil de la Société des Nations aura, à
cet effet, communiqué une copie.» Comme l'ont fait remarquer les auteurs de l'opinion dissidente commune de 1974,
si séduisante aux yeux des conseils du Pa kistan et qui est soucieuse de faire produire à l'ancien Acte général des
effets particulièrement étendus :
«l'Acte de 1928 n'a eu qu'un nombre limité de parties et il n'a été ouvert à l' adhésion que d'un groupe
restreint et bien défini d'autres Etats, alors que l'Acte général revi sé est ouvert à l'adhésion d'un groupe
d'Etats beaucoup plus vaste et qui c ontinue à s'élargir» (affaire des Essais nucl éires ,.I.J. Recueil
1974, p. 339, par. 58).
Contrairement à l'Inde, le Pakistan n' était pas membre de la SdN et, comme l'a bien très bien montrée la Cour
suprême pakistanaise, il n'a pas succédé à l'Inde à cette qualité, pas davantage qu'il n'a succédé aux traités que l’Inde
a conclus à titre de Membre de la SdN. L'Acte général n’est donc pas opposable au Pakistan et il n'a pas vocation à y
devenir partie. Sa communi cation du 30mai1974 ne peut donc être cons idérée ni comme une notification de
succession, ni comme une adhésion; celle-ci ne lui était pas ouverte.
Le Pakistan ne figure d'ailleurs pas dans la liste des Etats qui «peuvent adhérer» dressée par le Secrétaire général des
Nations Unies (voir Traités multilat éaux d poé s éupr s duèSecr étaire gé éral , état au 30 avril 1999,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, n° de vente F.99.V.5, p. 1018).
Et, bien entendu, l'«accord de dévolution» cons titué par l'accord indo- pakistanais intitulé Agreement as to the
Devolution of International Rights and Obligations upon the Do minions of India and Pakistan , annexé à l'Indian
Independence (International Agreements) Order du 4 août 1947, cet accord de dévolution ne change rien à l'affaire.
Comme l'a bien vu la Cour suprême du Pa kistan, il illustre, au contraire, le s situations, bien différentes, dans
lesquelles se trouvent les deux Etats.
D'une part, comme cela ressort de l'article 8 de la convention de 1978 :
«1. Les obligations ou les droits d'un Etat prédécesseur découlant de traités en vigueur à l'égard d'un
territoire à la date de la succession d'Etats ne deviennent pas les obligations ou les droits de l'Etat
successeur vis-à-vis d'autres Etats pa rties à ces traités du se ul fait que l'Etat pr édécesseur et l'Etat
successeur ont conclu un accord stipul ant que lesdites obligations ou lesd its droits sont dévolus à l'Etat
successeur.
2. Nonobstant la conclusion d'un tel accord, les effets d'une succession d'Etats sur les traités qui, à la
date de cette succession d'Et ats, étaient en vigueur à l'égard du territoire en que stion sont régis par la
présente convention.»
Et cette thèse, approuvée par une doctrine unanime qui comprend d’ailleurs les meilleurs esprits, y inclus mon
savant contradicteur (E. Lauterpacht, "State Succession and Agreements for the Inheritence of Treaties", ICLQ , vol.
7, 1958, p. 527; voir aussi M.G. Marcoff, Accession à l'ind épendance et successi on d'Etats aux trait és
internationaux , éditions universitaires, Fribour g, 1969, p. 322-342; Z. Mériboute, La codi fication de la successiond'Etats aux traités — D célonisation, s céssion, unification , PUF, Paris, 1984, p. 104 ou si r Robert Jennings et sir
Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law , 9th. ed., vol. I,ace , Longman, Londres, 1992, p. 231), correspond
en effet à la pratique de s Etats comme le montrent les auteurs qui se sont penchés sur la question (ibid.)et les
travaux préparatoires au sein de la Commission du droit internat ional (voir notamment le deuxième rapport de sir
Humphrey Waldock, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international , 1969, vol.II, p.54-62 et le commentaire
final du projet d'articl e8 par la Commission, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1974, vol. II,
première partie, p.187-193). Du reste, lors de la prem ière partie de la conférence de Vienne, en 1977, les
représentants et de l'Inde et du Pakistan ont approuvé la rédaction retenue (conférence de Vienne sur la succession
d'Etats en matière de traités, Comptesrendus analytiques des s éances pl né èes et des s é ances de la
commission pl né è ,premi re èession , Vienne, 4 avril-6 mai 1977, vol. I, A/CONF.80/16, pp. 84 et 87).
D'autre part et de toutes manières, l'Inde ne pouvait pas «partag er» avec le Pakistan quel que chose qu’elle n’avait
pas. Elle ne pouvait partager que ce qu’elle avait. Plus «scientifiquement», l'accord de dévolution (conclu, je le
rappelle, entre l'Inde et le Paki stan - pas entre le Roy aume-Uni et le Pakistan – ce qui est naturel puisque c'est à
l'Inde que le Pakistan succède) - cet accord de dévolution ne pouvait, évidemment porter que sur les traités auxquels
l'Inde elle-même avait succédé à l'Inde britannique. Or, comme je l'ai montré tout à l'heure, ce n'était pas le cas de
l'Acte général de 1928.
Et c'est pourquoi, Monsieur le président, l' Expert Committee N 9 °n Foreign Relations , composé d'experts indiens
et pakistanais, qui a préparé la déjà fameuse annexe 4 à l'Order de 1947 n'a pas inclus l'Acte général dans la liste des
traités susceptibles d'être maintenus en vigueur à la suite de la partition.
Monsieur le président, permettez-moi, d'ouvrir une brève pa renthèse à ce sujet pour rassu rer la Partie pakistanaise.
Sir Elihu nous a dit hier que "[r]egr ettably Pakistan cannot find its copy of this volume of the Partition
Proceedings" (CR 2000/1, p. 57, par.18). C'est regrettable, en effet, mais le Pa kistan ne peut certainement pas
reprocher à l'Inde de lui a voir caché quelque chos e qu'il aurait ignoré comme son c onseil l'a fait à mots à peine
couverts à plusieurs reprises hier (ibid, p. 58, par. 22 et p. 61, par. 33) : le Pakistan en avait (au moins) une copie; il
l'a perdue; et, en 1973, son Chief Counsel , M. Bakhtiar, n'a pas éprouvé de difficulté à commenter les travaux de ce
comitén°9, en relation avec une question que lu i avait posée sir Humphrey Waldock à ce sujet ( C.I.J.M méires,
plaidoiries et documents – Affaire relative au Proc sèdes prisonniers de guerre pakistanais , 1976, p.83). Mais
enfin, puisque, entre temps, le Pakistan a égaré ce document, M.l'agent de l' Inde se fera, avec votre autorisation,
Monsieur le président, un plai sir et un devoir de lui en fa ire parvenir une copie par l' intermédiaire du greffier. En
même temps, nous nous proposons d'en déposer une autre co pie pour les membres de la Cour dans l'hypothèse, pas
invraisemblable où il serait difficile de se le procurer à La Haye. Voici qui devrait ra ssurer sirElihu, ce document
n'a rien de secret; il existe – je l'ai rencontré : il est ici !
Bien. Les experts des deux Par ties ont donc entrepris, dans le cadre de ce comité n° 9, de dresser la liste nominale
"of Treaties Conventions, Agreements etc., Affecting India or Applicable to India to Which She Is a
Party" (Partition Proceedings , vol.III, précis, p. 217). Ils en ont dénombré six cent vingt-sept qu'ils ont répartis en
trois catégories: l'une concerne les trai tés "of exclusive interest to the rest of India"; une autre ceux "of exclusive
interest to Pakistan"; et la dernière les traités "of common interest". L'Ac te général d'arbitrage de 1928 ne figure
dans aucune d'entre elles (cf.Partition Proceedings , vol. III, p. 217-276).
Certes, l'accord de dévolution ne re nvoie pas à cette liste, su r laquelle les négociateurs des deux Parties étaient
d'accord, alors qu'ils divergeaient sur d'autres aspects. Elle n'en a pas moins constitué la base sur laquelle l'accord a
été négocié. Elle constitue l'élément essentiel des travaux préparatoires et témoigne de l'accord des négociateurs sur
le sort des traités cités. Elle établit aussi qu'à leurs yeux l'Acte général ne relevait pas de la succession.
Le Pakistan a, à nouveau, témoigné de cette conviction lorsque sa mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
«a fait savoir au Secrétaire général qu'en raison des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'annexe à l'ordonnance
de1947 relative à l'indépendance de l'Inde (accords internationaux) le s droits et obli gations assumés
aux termes des accords ci-a près énumérés ont été transmis au Pa kistan et que, «en conséquence, le
Pakistan se considère partie à ce s accords»» («La succession d'Etats et les conventions multilatérales
générales dont le Secrétaire gé néral est dépositaire», Mémorandum préparé par le Secrétariat,
A/CN.4/150, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international 1962, vol. II, p. 128, par. 16; voir aussi
le paragraphe 18, ibid.).
L'Acte général ne figure pas parmi «ces accords».Et il y a, je l'ai montré, de bonnes raisons à cela, à commencer par la nature même de l'Acte général. Du reste,
commentant l'accord de dévolution de 1947, le professeur Oscar Schachter écrivait, dès 1948 : "it has been clear that
no succession occurs in regard to right s and duties of the old Stat e which arise from its po litical treaties such as
treaties of allianceor of pacific settlement " ("The Development of International Law Through Legal Opinions of the
United Nations Secretariat", BYBIL , 1948, p. 91). Telle a été au ssi, assurément, la ferm e conviction du Pakistan
jusqu'en 1973, date à laquelle il a, brusqueme nt, changé d'avis pour les besoins de sa cause -- contre l'Inde déjà ! --
dans l'affaire desPrisonniers de guerre .
Quant à prétendre, comme le fait le Pakistan (mémoire, p. 8), que l'accord de Simla aura it, en quelque sorte,
«verrouillé» la base de compétence soi-disant constituée par l'Acte général, il s'agit là d'une idée originale mais très
singulière. Il faudrait, pour cela, non seulement que cet Acte fût, à l'époque, en vigueur en tre les Parties -- et j'ai
montré que ce n'était pas le cas -- , mais il faudrait aussi que cet accord puisse, raisonnablement, être interprété ainsi,
ce que ni son texte, ni son contexte, ni ses travaux préparatoires ne permettent. M. Rao va y revenir dans un seconde.
Au surplus, si l'on imagine un instant le contraire, l'Inde et le Pakistan n'auraient, à cette date, été liés que
moyennant les conditions résultant des réserves de l'Inde br itannique de 1931 -- elles ex cluaient que l'article 17 de
l'Acte général pût s'appliquer dans les relations entre les deux Etats.
Pour résumer, Monsieur le président, et j’en ai presque fini, même en admettant pour les seuls besoins de la
discussion, que l'Acte général de 1928 serait toujours en vigueur, le Pakistan n'y est pas davantage partie que l'Inde
elle-même :
1) l'Acte de 1928 est un traité fermé qui, par sa nature, ne se prête pas à une succession d'Etats;
2) en tout état de cause, le Paki stan, comme l'a constaté sa Cour suprême, n'est pas le continuateur de
l'Inde britannique et ne remplit pas les conditions pour adhérer à l’Acte générale fixées par l'article 43;
3) de toutes manières, la succession à l'Acte général ne saurai t être automatique et l'accord de
dévolution de 1947 n'a pas opéré ipso facto une telle succession; et
4) l'Accord de Simla de 1972 est sans pertinence aucune en la matière.
De quelque manière que l'on envisage la prétendue base de compétence que constituerait l'article 17 de l'ancien Acte
général, les choses sont claires, Monsieur le président : une telle base n'existe pas :
z l'Acte de 1928 n'est plus; en tout cas, il n'a plus d'«efficacité judiciaire»;
z ni l'Inde, ni le Pakistan, n'y sont parties et (ni n'y ont jamais été parties); et
z de toutes manières, les réserves faites par l'Inde britannique en 1931 excluraient la compétence de la Cour.
Madame et Messieurs de la C our, je vous remercie très vi vement de votre attention et je vous prie, Monsieur le
président, de bien vouloir donner la parole à mon collègue et ami M. P.S. Ra o, coagent, conseil et avocat de la
République de l'Inde.
Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remerc ie, ProfesseurPellet. I now give the floor to Dr.P.S.Rao, Legal Adviser of the
Ministry of External Affairs of India. Dr. Rao, you have the floor.
Dr. RAO: Mr. President and Members of the honourable Court,
1. It is a great honour and privilege for me to appear befo re the Court as a Co-Agent, counsel and advocate of the
Government of India. My distinguished colleagues have al ready demonstrated that juri sdiction of the Court is not
available to Pakistan on account of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court or the General Act of 1928.
2. I shall now submit that Pakistan ca nnot invoke the jurisdiction of Court on the basis of (i) the United Nations
Charter, (ii)Article 36, paragraph1, of the Statute of the Court, or (iii) the Simla Agreement of 1972, and in this
connection, I shall show that Pakistan cannot rely upon the principles of estoppel, preclusion, or acquiescence.
3. Pakistan contended at paragraph 6 (B) of the Memorial and I shall not quote it, but it will appear in the transcript:
"B. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Ju stice is also founded on the provision contained in
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court which states, 'The jurisdiction of the Court comprises
all cases which the parties refer to itand all matters speciall y provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.' The said Article of the Statute is to be read with Article
1, paragraph1; Article 2, paragra phs3 & 4; Article33; Article36, paragraph3, and Article92 of the
United Nations Charter. The obligations undertak en under Article1 of th e agreement on bilateral
relations between India and Pakistan of 2 July 1972, reaffirms this ba sis of jurisdiction in Article1,
which states that "The principles and purposes of the Un ited Nations Charter shall govern the relations
between the two countries." (Memorial of Pakistan, pp. 9-13, para. 6 (B).)
4. The basis of the jurisdiction referring to Article36, pa ragraph1, of the Statute, and referring to a number o f
Articles of the United Nati ons Charter. It puts special emphasis on the words "all matt ers specially provided for in
the Charter of the United Nations" referred to in Article 36, paragraph 1. I will first deal with the meaning and scope
of the words "all matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations" which is referred to in
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Reference to the United Nations Charte r separately from other "treaties and
conventions in force" in Ar ticle 36, paragraph1, of the Statute may, Shabta i Rosenne remarks, at first sight appear
to be an error in drafting (see Shabtai Rosenne , The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, Vol. 2:
Jurisdiction (1997), p.692). However, he explains, ha ving regard to the drafting hist ory, it appears to have been
retained initially in the expectation that some matters within the scope of the Charter would fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court. At the end of the San Francisco Conference, as this expectation was not met, the reference
to the Charter in effect remained wi thout any meaning. There was an effort at the San Francisco Conference to
require the Security Council to refer "justiciable" disputes to the Court. However, this effort was not successful, as
was a related attempt to make the Court's jurisdiction compulsory. The Dumbarton Oaks text was revised "to make it
absolutely clear that the Council itself could not refer a dispute to the Court, but could only recommend this
procedure to the parties" (s ee Goodrich, Hambro and Simons , Charter of the United Nations: Commentary an d
Documents, 1969, p. 282). The draft of Article 36, para graph 1, of the Statute was left as it was, having no practical
effect.
5. Kelsen examined this question and he did not consider it possible to read into Article36, paragraph3, of the
United Nations Charter, being the only provision which c ould come into considerati on in terms of Article36,
paragraph1, of the Statute of the Court, any compulsory jurisdicti on of the Court. (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations (1951), p. 517.) Mr. President, with your permission, I will not read the citations but they will appear
in the transcript, to save time. A separate opinion of se ven judges of the In ternational Court of Justice in the Corfu
Channel case between the United Kingdom an d Albania-- the only instance in which the Securi ty Council had
recommended that the dispute be referred to the Court -- observed:
"The arguments presented on behalf of the United Ki ngdom to establish that th is was a new case of
compulsory jurisdiction–which arguments the Agent and Counsel for the Albanian Government sought
to refute-- have not convinced us . In particular, having regard (1) to the normal meaning of the word
recommendation, a meaning which this word has retained in diplomatic language, as is borne out by the
practice of the Pan-American Conf erence, of the League of Nations, of the International Labour
Organisation, etc., (2)to the gene ral structure of the Charter and of the Statute which founds the
jurisdiction of the Court on the consent of States, and (3) to the terms used in Article 36, paragraph 3, of
the Charter and to its object which is to remind the Security Council that legal disputes should normally
be decided by judicial methods",
and after giving a lengthy explanation, they came to the conclusion that:
"it appears impossible to us to accept an interpretation according to which this article, without explicitly
saying so, has introduced more or less surreptiti ously, a new case of compulsory jurisdiction." ( I.C.J.
Reports 1948 , pp. 31-32 )
6. A commentator, who had an occasion to deal with this matter later, said:
"Evidence thus leads to the conclusion that Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Charter has not been regarded
and accepted as an additional basis of the Court's jurisdiction either by the judicial or political organs of
the United Nations and the position advanced by the United Kingdom at the time of the Corfu Channel
case (Preliminary Objections) appear somewhat strained." (See G unter Weissberg, "The role of the
International Court of Justice in the United Nations System: The Firs t Quarter Century", in Leo Gross
(ed.) The Future of the International Court of Justice (New York, 1976), Vol. I, p. 168.)
This is a view also shared by leading authorities on the subject and we refer to them in paragraphs 41 and 42 of our
Indian Counter-Memorial of 28Februar y 2000. Accordingly, it is India's submission, that there are no "mattersspecifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations . . ." relating to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court.
7. Mr. President, this brings me to take a close look at Article1, paragra ph 1, Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and
Articles33 and 92 of the Charter to co nsider their effect on the jurisdiction of the Court to see if there is any
substance to the claims of Pakistan.
8. Article 1 deals with the purposes of the United Nations . Article 1, paragraph 1, highlights the maintenance o f
international peace and security as the primary purpose of the United Nati ons. (See the separa te opinion of Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice in the case concerning Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter), Advisory Opinion I.C,J. Reports 1962 , pp.230-215). To that end, several paths were suggested in that
paragraph. One of the paths indicated is "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of in ternational disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace" . (See Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary , 1995, p.52; Hans
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations , 1951, p.282.) The language of the Article is necessarily set out in general
terms as it is dealing with broad purposes, leaving it for ot her Articles of the United Na tions Charter to provide for
their implementation in more specific terms. Articles 2, paragraphs3 and 4, 24, 33 and Chapters VI, VII, VIII and
XIV would be relevant to see how these purposes are elaborated and are to be implemented. (Goodrich, Hambro and
Simons, pp. 29 and 42.)
9. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter is a corollar y to Article 2, paragraph4. Ar ticle 2, paragraph 3, requires
States, as a general principle -- and I may say so, as a matter of fact statement -- to settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security a nd justice are not endangered. Once again
this highlights the concern of the United Nations with main tenance of international peace and security. Reference to
"justice" in Article 2, paragraph 3, is to indicate support to the policy of prevention of appeasement at the expense of
small States. (Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter , 1958, p. 658.) Article 2, paragraph 3, is
directly related to Article 33 of the Charter, accord ing to which parties to any disput e are required "first of all" to
seek a solution by "peaceful means of th eir own choice". The main effect of Article 2, para graph3, is thus not to
impose upon parties to the dispute any compulsory method or means of settle ment at the instance of one of the
parties. This is well explained by Goodrich, Hambro and Simons:
"The obligation to settle internat ional disputes by peacef ul means does not incl ude the obligation to
settle particular kinds of disputes by particular means or to follow any particular order of priority in the
choice of methods. ... it is also stated that in article 36 (3) in making recommendations to the parties
the Security Council should take in to consideration that legal disput es should 'as a general rule' be
referred by the parties to the Inte rnational Court of Justice. A memb er is not obligated, however, to
submit a legal dispute to the Court except in t hose cases where it has agreed in advance to do
so." (Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., p. 4).
10. Article 2, paragraph 4, does not require any comment as it only deals with the prohibition of threat or use o f
force.
11. Article 33 emphasizes that States should settle their disputes by peaceful means of theirown choice. The 1970
Principles of International Law Conc erning Friendly Relations a nd Co-operation also highli ghts this point (United
Nations General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970). Several methods of settlement of disputes are
provided as part of a menu under Article 33 for the parties to so choose freely. The principle of free choice of means
is thus central not only to Article 33, but also to the entire Chapter VI. It is observed that:
"Article 33 is open to the interpretation that the Council is restricted to calling upon the Parties to seek a
solution through peaceful means of their own choice, a nd that it may not call upo n them to resort to a
particular procedure" ((i) Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, p.264; ( ii) J. G. Merrills, International
Dispute Settlement (1991), p. 182; and (iii) Gunter Weissberg in Leo Gross (ed.), p. 132).
The scheme of things as provided for in the Charter and particularly in Article 33, as already noted, does not indicate
any system of compulsory jurisdiction which, it is suggested by Simma's commentary, is "foreign" to the Charter of
the United Nations (Simma (ed.) , supra, p. 512).
12. For these reasons, I submit that there is no strength in the contentions advanc ed by Pakistan that there is an
implied obligation to submit legal disput es as a general rule to the Intern ational Court of Ju stice (Memorial o f
Pakistan, p. 10). It is therefore incorrect for Pakistan to suggest that "The spirit and underlying obligations of the United Nations Charter, in any case, raise the presumption
of a residual jurisdiction of the In ternational Court of Justice in the case of legal disputes, in
circumstances when one party has re fused to resort to any of the ot her peaceful mean s of settlement
enumerated in Article 33 of the Charter." (Memorial of Pakistan, p. 11.)
13. It can also readily be seen that Article 92 equally does not establish any compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. The fact that the Statute of the Court is made an inte gral part of the Charter does not
amount to establishing a compulsory jurisdiction. On the ot her hand, it only states th at the Court shall act in
accordance with the Statute. This means that the consent- based jurisdiction of the Court is recognized under Article
92. As I have already noted, al l efforts to establish compulsory jurisdicti on at the San Francisco Conference failed
and that it was eventually decided to re tain the optional clause in essentially the same form as it appeared in the
Statute of the Permanent Cour t of International Justice. (Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, p.547.) The fact that the
Court was made one of the principal j udicial organs of the United Nations and that all Members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute, did not alter the situation and Leo Gross noted this and said that "the
jurisdiction of the Court remained optional" (LeoGross, "The International Court of Justice: Consideration o f
Requirements for enhancing its role in the International Legal Order", in Leo Gross (ed ) p. 30).
14. There is, however, one specific conclusi on to be drawn from making the Statute an integral part of the Charter.
That is, "the Statute enjoys the same primacy over intern ational agreements accorded to the Charter itself in
Article 103" (Goodrich, Hambro and Simons p. 552). It is not correct and hence not open to Pakistan to equate the
"bilateral relationship" arising out of two unilateral declarations filed u nder Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute
with that of an international agreement, with a view to bringing them within the scope of Article 103. (Memorial o f
Pakistan, p. 8, para. 6 (F).) They relied upon the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case -- and I submit that
that case did not equate such bilateral arrangements to international agreements.
15. This matter was even more correctly stated by the Court itself in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, and I need not
bother you with further material on that. (See case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.Canada) , Judgment, 4
December 1998, p. 22.)
16. Mr. President permit me now to address the plea of estoppel, preclusion and acquiescence put forward by
Pakistan (Memorial of Pakistan, pp.17 -18, para. 6(E).) I have already indi cated that the United Nations Charte r
does not contain any provision imposi ng compulsory jurisdiction upon memb er States, even by implication.
Professor Brownlie pointed out that such a compulsory jurisdiction exists vis-à-vis India only within the narrow and
strict confines of the declaration of India of 1974 and that the "Commonwealth members" reservation is valid. Under
the circumstances, it is elementary to note that the parties to the Simla Agreement can only assume those obligations
of the United Nations Charter and the St atute of the Court which they actually stipulate, and th e question of India
attempting to "oust" the peaceful methods of settlement of disputes in relation to Pakist an, in contravention of the
terms of the Simla Agreement, as alleged by Pakistan, does not arise at all (Memorial of Pakistan, p. 17).
17. At this stage I would like to refer to Article 1, subparagraph (ii), of the Simla Agreement:
"The two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral
negotiations or by any peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them."
The point is worth repeating that this provision of the Simla Agreement is no more th an an arrangement between
India and Pakistan first to enter into negotiations in case of any difference, and following such negotiations, to refer
the matter to any other method of settlement to the extent that there is any further and specific agreement between
the parties. Such arrangeme nt under Article1, subparagra ph(ii), is not a compromi ssory clause, which is a
precondition to the reference of a disput e covered by a treaty to arbitration or to the Court. (See B.S.Murty,
"Judicial Settlement" in MaxSorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law, 1968, at pp.687-688; also
R. P. Anand , International Courts a nd Contemporary Conflicts, 1974, p.209.) This arrange ment does not and
cannot impose upon India an obligation to c onclude an agreement on a particular method of settlement. It would be
entirely for the parties to agree upon a particular method of se ttlement of disputes, ha ving regard to all the
circumstances of the case.
18. Pakistan's attempt to read the General Act of 1928 into this text, is c ontrary to logic and all accepted principles
of interpretation of international arrangements and agreements. The word s "any other peaceful means mutually
agreed upon between them" mu st be read along with "bilateral negotiations" . To equate a mult ilateral agreement
with a bilateral arrangement and to get the latter incorporated into the former will only do violence to the natural and
plain readin g of the text. Furthermor e, the intention of the parties could not have been to effect an y suchincorporation. Moreover if they had decided that the obligat ion of judicial settlement be incorporated, they could
have directly referred to the provisi ons of the Statute of the Court— International Cour t of Justice— instead o f
harking back to a multilater al agreement of 1928 which had never been in force fo r Pakistan or India, as
Professor Pellet has so clearly pointed out. The improbability of the parties intending to incorporate the General Act
of 1928 into the Simla Agreement of 1972, Mr.President, coupled with th e specific language of Article1,
subparagraph(ii), renders the argument of Pakistan totally baseless. It is clear therefore that the plea of estoppel,
preclusion or acquiescence made by Paki stan is not only irrelevant but ina pplicable to the present question o f
establishing the jurisdiction of the Court. Particularly, the plea that the Simla Agreement estops India from pleading
the Commonwealth reservation as provided in its decl aration of 1974, as SirElihu Lauterpacht has contended
yesterday, does not hold any water.
19. Mr. President, a mere reference to the United Nations Charter or the Statute of th e Court to which India is a
party, is not sufficient to raise the pl ea of estoppel, preclusion or acquiescence, particularly if India's conduct is in
conformity with the provisions of those instruments. The Chamber of the Court in the Gulf of Maine case explained
the terms well:
"The Chamber observes that in any case the concepts of acquiescence and est oppel, irrespective of the
status accorded to them by international law, both follow from the fundamental principles of good faith
and equity. They are, how ever, based on different le gal reasoning, since acquiescen ce is equivalent to
tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent, while
estoppel is linked to the idea of pr eclusion. According to one view, precl usion is in fact the procedural
aspect and estoppel the substantive aspect of the same principle. W ithout engaging at this point on a
theoretical debate, which would ex ceed the bounds of its present conc erns, the Chamber merely notes
that, since the same facts are relevant to both acquiescence and estoppel, except as regards the existence
of detriment, it is able to take the two concepts into consideration as different aspects of one and the
same institution" (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in th e Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1984, p. 305).
It essentially pointed out that "the same facts are relevant to both acquiescence and estoppel, except as regards the
existence of detriment, it is able to take the two concepts into consideration as different aspects of one and the same
institution". Earlie r the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases also rejected an argument that the
equidistance rule for the delimitation of continental shelves for which provi sion was made in Article6 of the 1958
General Convention on the Continental Shelf had become binding on the Federal Republic of Germany by virtue o f
her conduct, notwithstanding that the Federal Republic of Germany had not beco me a party to that convention. The
Court denied this argument and found that the conduct of Germany did not create any such estoppel:
"it appears to the Court that only th e existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend substance
to this contention, — that is to say if the Fede ral Republic were now prec luded from denying the
applicability of the conventional régime, by reason of past conduct, declarations etc., which not only
clearly and consiste ntly evinced acceptance of that régime, but also had caused Denmark or the
Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of
this there is no evidence whatever in the present case" (I.C.J. Reports 1969 , p. 26, para. 30).
20. The principles involved were examined by authoritative commentators. Bowett explained:
"the essential elements of estoppel are: (a) the statement of fact must be clear and unambiguous; (b) the
statement of fact must be made voluntarily, unconditionally and must be authorized; (c)there must be
reliance in good faith upon the statement either to the detriment of the party so relying on the statement
or to the advantage of the party maki ng the statement." (See D.W.Bowett , "Estoppel before
International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquiescence" British Year Book of International Law,
Vol. 33 (1957), pp. 176-202, at p. 202.)
21. Brownlie commented upon this (see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law , 1998, p.646 for
enumeration of various author ities and other references) and, more rece ntly, after examining the case-law of the
Court, Sir Ian Sinclair observed that:
"This brief survey of the case law of the presen t Court on estoppel and acqui escence sufficiently bears
out the point that there is a close link between th ese two concepts, and indeed that they must be
considered as part of the wider pattern of state conduct which an in ternational tribunal may find to be
relevant to the determination of an inte r-state dispute. The survey, however, equally demonstrates that the Court will be reluctant to pena lise a state unduly for inconsistency of conduct, and in particular to
find that the conduct relied on has created an estoppel in the strict sense." (SirIanSinclair, "Estoppel
and acquiescence" in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Fifty years of the International Court
of Justice (1996) pp. 104-120, at p. 120.)
22. Mr. President, it is significant that Pakistan does not specify any instance in which it created a situation which is
opposable to India and India remained silent to bring such a conduct wi thin the ambit of the principle o f
acquiescence; nor does it indicate any in stance in which Pakistan relied on a clear and c onsistent affirmation by
India and acted upon it either to its own detriment or to the advantage of India in order for the principle of estoppel
to apply.
Mr. President, and honourable Members of the Court,
23. I respectfully submit that Pakistan has failed to found the jurisdiction of this Court on grounds of either:
(i)the United Nations Charter; or
(ii)rticle 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court; or
(iii)he Simla Agreement; and in this connection, Pakist an cannot rely upon the pr inciples of estoppel,
preclusion and acquiescence.
I thank you for your patience. I thank you once again.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Dr.Rao. Ceci clôt notre session de ce matin. Je remercie chacune des
Parties pour les exposés de qualité qui nous ont été présentés. La Cour se réunira à nouveau demain à 10heures et
jeudi à 10 heures pour les deuxièmes tours de plaidoiries de la République islamique du Pakistan et de la République
de l’Inde. Chacune des Parties dispos era à cet effet d’un maximum de trois heures. J’aimerais cependant rappeler
que conformément à l’article 60, paragraphe 1, du Règlement de la Cour, les présentations orales doivent être aussi
succinctes que possible et j’aj outerais que ce deuxième tour de plaidoiries a pour objet de permettre à chacune des
Parties de répondre aux arguments avancé s oralement par l’autre Partie. Ce second tour ne doit donc pas constituer
une répétition des présentations déjà fa ites par les Parties et celles-ci ne sont évidemment pas tenues de plaider
pendant les trois heures dont elles disposent. Je vous remercie.
L'audience est levé à13 h 5.
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Audience publique tenue le mardi 4 avril 2000, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président