Requête introductive d'instance

2. APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE UXION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

THE AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF t\XlERICA TO THE
REGISTRAR OF THE ISTERXATIOXAL COURT OF JUSTICE

DEPARTXEXT OF STATE,
\~'ASHINGTON.
February 16, 1954.
Sir:

I. This is a writteii application, in accordance with the Statute
and Rules of the Court, submitted by the Government of the
United States of America instituting proceedings against the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist liepublics on account
of certain actions of the latter Government, in concert with
the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic. A separate
ivritten application is being submitted by the Goveniment of the
United States of America simultaneously herewith instituting
proceedings against the Govemment of the Hungarian People's
Republic on account of the same matter. The Government of
the United States of Amenca requests that so far as it may be
convenient and proper to do so the two applications and the
proceedings thereon be considered and dealt with together.
The subject of the dispute and a succinct statement of the facts

and grounds oii wliich the claim of the Government of the United
States of America is baçed are set forth in two notes, one delivered
to the Soviet Government on March 17, 1953, and one delivered to
the Hungarian Government on the same day ; the note to the Hun-
garian Government mas incorporated by reference in the note to
the Soviet Goveminent, the note to the Soviet Government was
incorporated by reference in the note to the Hunganan Govern-
ment, and each of the two Governments received from the United
States Government a copy of the note addressed by the United
States Governmeiit to the other Govemment. Copies of both notes
are attached to this application as an annex '.

z. The Utiited States Government notes that the present dispute
concems matters of the character specified in Article 36 (2) of 2. REQUETE IXTRODUCTIVE D'INSTAKCE CONTRE
L'UXION DES REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTES SOVIÉTIQUES

L'AGEXTDU GOUVERXEAIEXTDES ETATS-UNS D'AAIÉRIQUE
AU GREFFIER DE LA COUR IXTERXATIOXALE DE JUSTICE

[Trrrduction]
I)ÉPARTEMHND T'ÉTAT,
\VASHINC.TON.
16 février 1954.
?donsieur le Greffier,

1.Conformément aux dispositions du Statut et du Règlement
de la Cour, j'ai l'honneur de vous remettre !a présente requête
introduisant, au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Améri-
que, une instance coiitre le Gouveriicment de l'Union des Républi-
ques socialistes soviétiques en raison de certains actes accomplis
par ce dernier Gouvemement de concert avec le Gouvernement de
la République populaire de Hongrie. En mêmetemps que la pré-
sente requète, le Gouvemement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique en
présente une autre introduisaiit uiie instance contre le Gouveme-
ment de la République populaire de Hongrie, pour la mêmeques-
tion. Le Gouvernemeiit des États-Unis d'Amérique deinande que
ces deus requêteset la procédure qui s'ensuivra soient examinées
en mêmetemps, dans la mesure où cela sera commode et approprié.
L'objet du différend et l'exposé succinct desfaits et des motifs
par lesquels la demande du Gouvernement des li.ats-Unis d'limé-
rique est prétendue justifiéesont énoncésdans deus notes remises
l'une au Gouvernement soviétique, le 17 mars 1953. et l'autre au
Gouvernement hongrois le même jour ;la note au Gouvernement
hongrois est incorporée par référeiicedans la note au Gouverne-

ment soviétique, la note au Gouvernement soviétique est incor-
porée par référencedans la note au Gouvernement hongrois, et
chacun des deux Gouvernements a reçu du Gouvernement des
États-Unis une copie de la note adresàél'autre par ce Gouverne-
ment. Copies des deux notes sont jointesà laprésente requête1.

2. Le Gouvernement des États-Unis constate que le différend
actuel a traià des questions relevant des catégories spécifiàes REQUET ENTRODUCTIVE D'INSTANCE (16II 54) 43

l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour. y conipris les
subdivisions a) à d). Comme on le verra par l'annexe, le différend
d'ordre juridique entre le Gouvernement des États-Unis et le
Gouvernement soviétique met en jeu l'interprétation du traité de
paix, signéà Paris le IO février1947, auquel le Gouvernement des
États-Unis, le Gouvernement soviétique et le Gouvernement hon-
grois sont parties; le traité d'amitié, de commerce et consulaire,
signéà Washington le 24 juin 1925, qui était en vi eur à l'époque
du différend et auque1 le Gouvernement des ?tats-.nis et le
Gouvernement hongrois sont parties; de nombreuses questions de
droit international, indiquées dans la deuxième partie de chacune
des notes en annexe; de nombreux points de fait qui, s'ils étaient
établis, constitueraient la violation d'un engagement international
par le Gouvernement soviétique; et des points relatifs à la nature
et à I'étendiiede la réparation due par le Gouvernement soviétique
au Gouvernement des États-Unis en raison de ces violations.
Le Gouvernement des États-unis, en présentant à la Cour la
présente requête, déclareaccepter la juridiction de la Cour dans
la présente affaire. II ne semble pas qu'à ce jour, le Gouvernement
soviétique ait remis une déclaration à la Cour, et bien qu'il ait été
invité à le faire par le Gouvernement des États-Unis dans la note
jointe en annexe l,il n'a fait aucune réponseutile à cette invitation.
Le Gouvernement soviétique est cependant qualifié pour recon-
naître la juridiction de la Cour en la matière et il lui est loisible,
lorsque cette requêtelui sera notifiéepar le Greffier, conformément
au Règlement de la Cour, de prendre les mesures nécessairespour
aue soit confirmée la iuridiction de la Cour à l'-aard des deux
parties au di.fférend. *
Ainsi, le Gouvernement des États-Unis fonde la juridiction de la
Cour sur les considérations . . précèdentet sur l'article-.6. para-
graphe I, du Statut.
3. La thèse du Gouvernement des États-unis d'Amériquepeut
se résumer comme suit: le Gouvernement de l'Union des Répu-
bliques socialistes soviétiques, de concert avec le Gouvernement
de la Réputilique populaire de Hongrie et avec la complicitéde ce
dernier, a volontairement et illégalement fait saisir, le 19 novem-
bre 1951, un avion du type C-47 de la uUnited States Air Force I,
avec son équipage de quatre citoyens américains et son contenu,
l'avion ayant étépousséau-dessus du territoire de la Hongrie par
des vents inconnus de l'équipage;par la suite, les deux Gouverne-
ments ont pris des mesures illicites à l'occasion de l'incident, tant
contre l'équipage que contre les États-Unis, mesures qui consti-
tuent à la fois des violations graves de traités en vigueur, des
dénisde justice manifestes et autres délitsinternationaux. En raison
de ces violations d'obligations internationales, les États-Unis ont
réclaméet réclament au Gouvernement soviétique des réparations

'Annexe r, voir pp45-60.
444 APPLICATION ISSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS (16 1154)

of the Treaty of Peace to which reference has been made, a conten-
tion which the United States Government denies.

As the United States Government, in further pleadings herein,
will more fully set forth, the United States Government proposes
that the issues of law and fact in this dispute be heard and decided
by the Court in accordance uith its Statute and Rules; that the
Court decide that the accused Govemments are jointly and sever-
ally liable ta the United States for the damage caused; that the
Court award damages in favor of the United States Government
against the Soviet Government in the sum of $637,894.11, with
interest, as demanded in the annexed notes; that the Court
determine the nature and extent of other reparation and redress,
which the Court may deem fit and proper; and that the Court
make the necessary orders and awards, including an award of
costs, to effectuate its determinations.

4. The undersigned has been appointed by the Government of
the United States of Amenca as its Agent for the purpose of this
application and al1 proceedings thereon.
Very truly yours,

(Signed) Herman PHLEGER,
The Legal Adviser of the
Department of State. REQUETE INTRODUCTIVE D'INSTANCE (16 II54) 44

monétaires et autres. Le Gouvernement soviétique a tenté de
justifier en partie sa conduite en invoquant l'articl22 du traité
de paix auquel on s'est déjà référét,hèse que le Gouvernement
des États-Unis conteste.
Comme le Gouvernement des États-Unis l'exposera plus en
détaildans la suite des écritures, il propose de soumettre les points
de droit et de fait du présentdifférendà la Cour pour êtreexaminés
et tranchéspar elle, conformément àson Statut et àson Règlement.

II demande à la Cour de dire que les Gouvernements accuséssont
conjointement et solidairement responsables envers les États-Unis
des dommages causés. 11 demande à la Cour de condamner le
Gouvernement sovjétique à payer au Gouvernement des États-
Unis une indemnité de $637.894,11 avec intérêts,comme il est
dit dans les notes jointes. 11 demande à la Cour de déterminer
la nature et l'étendue des autres réparations et satisfactions que
la Cour jugera convenables et de rendre les ordonnances et sen-
tences nécessaires,y compris en matière de dépens, pour donner
effet à ses décisions.

4. Le soussignéa éténommé par le Gouvernement des États-
Unis d'Amérique comme sonagent aux fins de la présente requête
et de la procédure qui s'ensuivra.
Veuillez agréer, etc.

(Signé) Herman PHLEGER,
Conseiller juridique du
Département d'État. ANNEXES

Annex I

NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
OF MARCH 17, 1953

Xo. 682.
Excellency :

1 have the honor to present to you, upon the instruction of my
Government, the foilowing communication:
The Government of the United States of America transmitted
to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on

December IO,1952, a diplomatic note concerning the case of the
four American Air Force personnel, Captain Dave H. Henderson,
Captain John J. Swift, Sergeant Jess A. Duff and Sergeant James A.
Elam, al1 nationals of the United States of America, who were
brought down in Hungary by Soviet authorities on November 19,
1951.On December II, 1952, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Soviet Government retumed the United States note to the
American Chargé d'Affairesad interim in Moscow, asserting that
the note was "incorrectly addressed". The text of the United States
note clearly called for a response from the Soviet Government and

therefore could not possibly be considered "incorrectly addressed".
To avoid any possibility that the Soviet Government by inadvertence
had not coiisidered the full contents of the note, the United States
on December 17, 1952, again transmitted the December IO note to
the Soviet Government, pointing out by specific reference that the
note clearly referred "to the instrumentalities of the Soviet Govern-
ment wrhichwere involved in the detention of the United States
plane and crew and concerns actions, material and information
\\!hich only the Soviet Government can explain or provide". It
asked that "due consideration be given to the note and an appro-
priate reply be transmitted as requested. The Soviet Government

howcver on December 20, 1952, again returned the December IO
note "for reasons set forth in the letter .... of DecemberII,1952".
The United States Government forbears at this time to comment
upon or characterize the behavior of the Soviet Government in
regard to the note of December IO. If the Soviet Government enter-
tains any notion that by this conduct it can successfully relieve
itself of liability for its actions in this matter or induce the United
States Governrnent to place upon the Hungarian Government alone
a liability to the United States which in law and morals is borne
by both the Soviet and Hungarian Governments, the Soviet
Government is laboring under error.

The Soviet Government is informed that the United States
Government has determined to proceed henceforth in this matter
upon the factual and legal bases which were indicated in the notes SOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17 III53) 47
John J. Swift (U.S. Air Force Serial No. AO-7-42-797).the airbome
radio operator, Sergeant James A. Elam (US. Air Force Serial
No. AF-18-349-150), and the crew chief or engineer, Sergeant Jess

A. Duff (U.S. Air Force Serial No. AF-39-450-853) The sole purpose
and mission of the flight was to carry to the American Air Attaché
attached to the American Embassy at Belgrade, Yugoslavia,
various items of freight which that Air Attaché had from time to
time ordered through normal channels to he supplied to him for the
needs of his establishmeiit in Belgrade. The United States Air
Depot at Erding, Germany, was then and is now a supply and
aircraft maintenance depot attending to the needs of American
Air Attachés stationed at various Amencan Embassies in Europe,
Asia, and Africa, including the Embassy at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
The plane at no time had on board, nor was it at any time intended

that there should be on board, any other perçons than those above
named. The aircraft and the crew were at al1 times, from their
departure ahove noted until their landing, under circumstances
to be described, at an air base situated near Papa in Hungary and
controlled bj. the Soviet Government, unarmed, and the plane
carried only its normal equipmeut, and the cargo to which reference
has been niade ;when the sole mission, the delivery of the cargo,
as stated above, was completed, the plane and crew were required
to return to Erding as promptly as possible, expected to be the
next day, November 20, 1951.
These facts were fully described in the usual air flight documents

and officia1orders on board the plane from its departure and after
its arriva1 at the Soviet-controlled base mentioned above. These
documents and officia1orders came into the possession of the Soviet
Govemment on November 19,1951 ;their production was requested
in the United States note of December IO, 1952, and \vas t~ice
refused by the Soviet Government's replies of December II and
December zo, 1952, They included the maiiifests of the cargo, the
Aight plan, the pilot's navigation log, the crew'sofficia1travel orders
and other routine documents which the United States Government
has described in the note of December IO, 195%
As those documents show, the crew were instructed,and attemp-

ted, to follow a course from Erding to Rlunich, to Iniisbruck, to
Bolzano, to Venice, to Udine, to Ljubljana, to Zagreb, to Sela, to
Sisak, thence to Belgrade. The course was a normal route for Kight
to Belgrade; it was determined by routine flying factors and, insofar
as the Yugoslav portion was concemed, by the regulations of the
Yugoslav Govemment \\rith respect to international flights to
Belgrade from the West.

2.The airplane and crew attempted at al1 times to follow the
course so given for Belgrade, but while the crew, and in particular
the pilots, believed that the plane was flying that course, it was

actually blown by winds the existence and direction of which48 NOTE IO THE SO\'IET GOVERNAIENT (17 III53)

the pilots did not then know or have any waming of, aiid the
velocity of these winds accelerated the speed of the plane consid-
erably beyond the speed which the piiots believed the plane was
flying. The plane, therefore, flew somewhat north of the expected
course and covered a distance considerably greater thau the pilots
then thought or had reason to believe they were covering. In
consequence of the effect of these unknown winds, the plane
flew heyond Belgrade to the north and the east and the crew
were unable to find or descend at Belgrade ; and at approximately
4 p.m. local time the pilots reversed the plane's course and fle~v
wstward with the intention on the part of the pilots-of returning
to Udine or Venice.

Practically the entire retum trip \vas made in darkness. The
crew realized that they were lost, and finding that the plane's
fuel supply was mnning dangerously lom, they made every reason-
able effort to find a landing place on the ground, to alert al1persons
on the ground who might be seeing the plane in flight, or listening
to its radio communications, to the fact that the plane was lost,
that it was in distress, and that it \\.as seeking a safe landing
place. The pilots for this purpose put on al1 the plane's lights
and sent distress signals with its landing lights, cailed for assist-
ance on the international emergency frequencies by voice and
in international hlorse Code communication by liaison radio;
and the pilots caused the plane to descend to lower altitudes at
various points in order to ascertain whether air fields were on
the ground beloiv at which they could land. Al1this was without
success. Shortly before 6 p.m. local time, after the crew had
prepared themselves to abandon the plane, the plane was inter-
cepted by an aircraft and shoxvnto a landing place at an airfield

considerably to the north of the course which 6026 was then
flying. It transpired later that the interception aircraft \vas a
Soviet aircraft, that the airfield was Soviet-controlled and Soviet-
operated and that it was situated near the town of Papa iii
Hungary.
3. The crew selected for the flight were competent for the
piirpose. Captain Henderson and Captain Swift were competent
and experienced pilots. Sergeant Elam was a competent and
experienced airborne radio operator, and Sergeant Duff was a
competent and experienced flight engineer. The aircraft and its

equipment, so far as investigation has disclosed, were in sound
flying condition.
4. At al1 times beginning at the crossing of the Yugoslav
frontier between Udine and Ljubljana uutil after the landing of
the plane at the Soviet airfield near Papa in Hungary, as
mentioned above, the crew thought and believed that the plane
\vas flying solely within the territorial limits of Yugoslavia. Neither
the crew nor any of the persons concemed in any respect with NOTE TO THE SOVIET GO\~ERX\'.\IENT(17 III53) 49

the origination, planning or expediting of the flight had any
intention that the plane should at any time fly, or any knowledge
that it was at any point during the trip flying, within the territory
of any country adjacent to Yugoslavia other than Italy, through
which the plane had necessarily to fly after leaving Erding, Ger-
many, and before returning ta Erding, Germany.
At no time during the flight did any person aboard the plane
entertain any intention or make any attempt, and at no time

did he have any instruction, to engage in any act of sabotage,
espionage or other illegal activity, to deviate in any way from
the flight plan, as shown in the documents aboard the plane,
or to attempt'in any way to cross any frontier into any country,
after leaving Italy, other than Yugoslavia as ahove noted ; specifi-
cally, no member of the crew nor of the United States personnel
concemed with the flight had any knowledge that the plane \vas
over or would cross into Hungary or Rumania. In view of the
assertions made subsequently by the Soviet and Hungarian Gov-
emments, the United States Gaveniment declares categorically
that the aircraft carried no equipment intended for any illegal
purpose whether with respect to Hungary, the Soviet Union
or any other country.

5.During the flight and thereafter bath the Soviet Government
and the Hungarian Government were fully aware, and neither
the United States Government nor the crew in the airplane nor
any other person associated \\?th the United States Government
then knew, that the airplane flew north of its fixed course in
Yugoslavia on its trip eastward, had o\rerîlomn Yugoslavia and
entered Rumania, and had while attempting to return westward
crossed the Hungarian frontier. The airplane was observed and
monitored in its entire westward flight by Soviet and other Soviet-
allied ground authorities from a~>proximately 4 p.m. to 6 p.m.
local time, first in Kumania and then in Hungary; and when

the plane was brought down at 6 p.m. by the Soviet aircraft it
had almost reached the British occupied zone of Austria. More-
over the Hungarian authoritiesnear the eastern border of Hungary
had notified Soviet authorities in Hungary of the westward
course of the plane and the Soviet and Hungarian Governments
thereupon agreed that the plane should be permitted to overlly
Hungary, be observed in its flight and then be brought down by
the Soviet aircraft stationed near thewestern border of Hungary.

6. Thus the Soviet authorities. stationed in Rumania and in
Hungary, watched the plane's flight, knew that it \vas lost and
in distress and \vas seeking a landing place, but refused to come
to the aid of the plane or the crew, either to aid them in finding
their true course, or to show them a landing field at any place
by lights or signals from the ground or in the air, or to respond
to their radioed calls for assistance. The Soviet authorities and50 ~OTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMEXT (17 III53)

their allies deliberately permitted the plane to cross the Hungarian
frontier and to overfly Hungarian territory, and then brought
it down, lest, continuing in its flight. it would ina feus minutes
arrive safely in the British zone of Austria, or in other territory
not controlled by the Soviet Government or its allies. The Soviet
Govemment, and the Hungarian Government, were at al1 times
aware, therefore, that neither the airplane nor the crew had any
intention to cross into or to overfly Hungarian territory, or Soviet
territory, or to engage in any improper activity during such flight.

7. From November 19, 1951, at approximately 6 p.m., until
December 3, the four American airmen above named were held
under arrest and incornmunicado by the Soviet authorities and

continuously interrogated with respect to their flight. In this
interrogation attcmpts were made by the Soviet authorities both
to induce the airmen to desert the United States Government
and to indoctrinate them with anti-American propaganda, and
the Soviet authorities asked the airmen questions for the purpose
of obtaining from them military intelligence with respect to the
United States which the men wcre unauthorized to divulge, al1
outside the scope of any lawful interrogation in the circumstances.

8. Al1 proper questions by Soviet authoritics concerning the
flight and the matters relevant to the arriva1 of the plane in Hun-
garian territory, and into the custody of the Soviet authorities,
were fully, truthfully and adequately answered by the airmen.
It therefore \\.as definitely then, as it had theretofore been, the
duty of the Soviet Government to permit the plane and crew to
depart for their base in Germany or to notify the appropriate
American authorities of al1 the facts. The Soviet Government,
however, \vilfully aiid knowingly failed to do so. It also denied
the repeated requests of each of the creur members for permission
or opportunity to communicate with Amencan consular officials
in Hungary, or with their superiors elsewhere, or to have access

to such persons.
9. The Soviet Government, and the Hungarian Government,
were at al1 times aware tliat the United States Goveriiment,
following the disappearance of the plane on November 19, had
made public inquiries and announcements with respect. to the
loss of the plane and had engaged in an elaborate and notorious

search for the missing plane and the crew ; but during this time
the Soviet Government gave no indication that it was holding
either the plane or the crew or possessed any information on the
subject. Late in the evening of December z, 1951, for publication
in the Soviet press of December 3, 1951, the Soviet Government
for the first time publicly revealed that it had had custody of
the men and the plane and that it was tuming the men over to
Hungarian authorities. KOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17III53) . 51

IO. The Soviet authorities interrogatingthe men announced
to them oii or about December z,1951, that the investigation
had been satisfactorily concluded and that the men would he
returned to their bas;but instead, deceiving the men, and without
any notification to American authorities, the Soviet Government
turned the men over on December 3, 1951, to the Hunganan
authorities,with the purpose and intention of further depriving
them of their libertyand the exercise of other legal rights, and
othenvise denying justice to them and the United States.

II. The United States Govemment asserts that the Soviet
Govemment had no legal right, title, or interest with respect to the
plane or aiiy color of legal authority to tnrn the plane, or the
airmen, over to the Hunganan Government, for the Soviet conduct
in this respect was without authorization,proval or coudonation
of the United States Government which was the only government
from \vhich the Soviet authorities could obtain lawful authority
for their action. As above described, the United States Government
in its note of Decemher IO, 1952 ,ormally requested the Soviet
Government to return to the United States Government the air-
plane, its equipment, cargo and other contents or, in the event
that for some valid reason the retum was not possible, to pay the
United States Government the value thereof. The United States

Government asserts that the condnct of the Soviet Government in
failing to respond to the note of December IO1952 ,onstitutes a
further and definitive refusa1 giving rise to a clear liability for
damages to the United States Government and other remedial
action as herein set forth. Furthermore, as has been stated above,
the Soviet Govemment cannot discharge that liability by referring
the United States Government to the Hungarian Govemment
which was an accomplice of the Soviet Govemment in the conver-
sion of the airplane, its equipment, cargo and other contents.
IZ.The investigation conducted by the United States Govern-

ment compels the conclusion, which the United States Government
herewith asserts, that the Soviet and Hungariaii Governments
aided and abetted each other in the interception and seizure of
the plane, its contents and the crew, in the detention and interroga-
tion of the crew while in Soviet custody, and in the actions which
took place thereafter with respect to the matter and until the
release of the airmen to American authonties on December 21951.
The Soviet Govemment is fully and equally guilty with the
Hungarian Govemment of the latter govemment's violations of
international law and responsible for theamages suffered hy the
United States and hy each of the airmen above named on account
of al1 actions after these persons came into Hungarian custody
heginning with December 3, 1951 as on account of those beginning
with November 19,1951 .he unlawful actions since December23,
1951 ,f which the Soviet Govemment is guilty, include the deten-52 . NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17 III53)

tion of the men, their interrogation and denial of access to American
consular or other authonties, the denial by the Hungarian Govem-
ment to the American diplomatic authorities in Hungary of the
nght of access to the men, the trial and conviction of the men, the
imposition of sentence and the exaction from the United States
Government of the sum of $123,605.15 and al1 actions and dam-
ages to the men and to the United States related thereto. These
actions are more fully described in the note of the United States
Government to the Hungarian Govemment of even date which is
made parbof the.present note, with the same force and effect as if
fully repeated herein.

13.The Soviet Govemment knowingly and wilfully made untrue
public statements with respect to the matter before and since
December 28, 1951, intending to cause, and causing, injury to the
four airmen, Americau nationals, and to the United States. These
statements include those above mentioned made by the Soviet
Government on December z and December 3, 1951, and those
contained in the various speeches delivered by the Soviet Foreign
Minister, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, in the course of the meeting of the
General Assembly in Paris in December 1951 and January 1952.
The untrue statements by the Hungarian authorities in the same
regard were made in pursuance of an agreement with the Soviet
Govemment and with the same intention and effect.
In particular, the United States Govemment specifies the follow-
ing to have been such untrue statements :

(a) The statements made in the name of TASS, the official news
agency of the Soviet Government, through the Soviet radio and
press on December 2 and 3, 1951, that Soviet patrol fighters had
forced the plane to land in an airport near Papa, Hungary, and
that the plane had come into a zone "where, in accordance with
.4rticle22 of the Peace Treaty, Soviet aviation in Hungary is
located". This mas false and \vas known by the Soviet Government
to be false when it uras made. On the contrary, the place at which
the airplane was intercepted by Soviet aircraft was not within any
known zone in which the Soviet Government maintained aviation
under Article 22 of the Peace Treaty ;nor did that Article grant
to the Soviet Government any authority to engage in the actions
which it took against the airplane and its crew. Insofar as the pilots
were concemed, they were led by Soviet authorities to believe when
intercepted that they were being shown a landing place, as they
had requested, and no indication was given to them by these Soviet
authorities that they were being forced down.

(b) Allegations in the same statement that an examination of
the flight plan of the plane showed that the crossing of the Hun-
garian border was premeditated by the crew. These allegations
were false and were known by the Soviet Government to be false
when made, since the flight plan in fact showed no purpose of NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNLIENT (17 III53) 53

entering or overflying Hungary ; the flight plan and the navigation
log, of which the Soviet Government had the original copies, on
the contrary-showed clearly that the plane was to fly to Belgrade
and return homé, never touching Hungary.

(c) Allegations in the sarne statement that the situation of the
cargo and the equipment found on board the plane proved "pre-
meditated violation of the Hungarian border". These allegations
were false and were known by the Soviet Government to be false
when made.
(i) As to the charts on board the plane, taken and examined by

the Soviet authorities: Contrary to the Soviet Government's
assertion, and as could be seen from their face, those which covered
portions of the USSR were not "operational military charts", and
they could not be used for navigation, while those which showed
portions of Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were on the
same charts as those covering the route from Germany to Belgrade ;
al1these charts were standard aeronautical charts such as any air-
man, military or civilian, would have for the purpose of the trip
to and from Belgrade in any innocent flight.

(ii) Contrary to the statement of the Soviet Government, the
plane did not carry "a portable radio station" but only an emer-
gency SOS signal radio transmitter, a part of the standard equip-
ment of every C-47.
(iii) Contrary to the statement of the Soviet Governrnent, the
parachutes were not kept in a peculiar place ; they were for per-
sonnel and not for baggage ;the two parachutes in excess of the
number of crew were carried in accordance with the safety regula-

tions of the United States Government against the contingency of
a parachute being rendered useless by an inadvertent opening in
the plane. This explanation had been fully made by the airmen to
the Soviet interrogatois and the Soviet authorities had themselves
fonnd out by actual tests that by inadvertently touching the handle
of the parachute it may open in the plane and become unusable.
(iv) Contrary to the statement of the Soviet Government, the
"twenty-one warm blankets" found on board were not part of the
equipmentof the plane or of the crew but solely one item in appro-

ximately 4,000 pounds of securely packed cargo, plainly appearing
in the manifests as part of the cargo ordered by and directed to
the Air Attaché in Belgrade ;it was false and there was no evidence
to support a conclusion that such blankets were intended to be
dropped from the airplane to the ground or that they were so
packed as to be prepared for dropping to the ground.
(v) Finally, as the Soviet Government well knew, there was no
evidence whatever to support the conclusion stated by it that the
visit of the airplane to Yugoslavia had as its aim to take aboard

!'Yugoslav spies and diversionists in order later to drop them for54 NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17III53)

subversive work on the temtory of the Soviet Union and the
countries of the People's Democracies". As the Soviet Govemment
well knew, the plane had never landed in Yngoslavia, the plane
was openly seeking assistance on a westward trip toward Udine
and Venice or Germany when intercepted. Furthermore, the
charge that the plane intended to overAy Hungary was inconsistent
with the charge of intention to land in Yugoslavia. Al1of this the
Soviet authorities well knew, since they had conducted detailed

and thorough investigation of the plane, the cargo and the crew
during the entire penod from November 19 to December z, 1951.
(d) The statements of M. Andrei Y. Vishinsky in the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1951. December
19, 1951, December 21,1951, and January IZ, 1952. were false in
many respects and were known by the Soviet Govemment to be
false when made. The following are examples of such statements :

(i) That the plane was carrying out "its intelligence spy mission"
when it went over Huugary. On the contrary, the plane was being
monitored at the time by the Soviet and Hungarian authorities,
and no such activity was going on.
(ii) That the plane was made to land on "the ground of the

Soviet regime of the Soviet State".
(iii) That "there was no question of an accidental landing or an
accidental deviation in the normal course of fiight". On the contrary
by that time both the Soviet and Hungarian authorities had a
full account from each of the airmen showing that the plane was
blown off course by unknown winds.

(iv) That the plane had radio facilities and the statement that
there was on board "radio direction finding equipment", except
insofar as the plane had the normal radio communication facilities.
(v) The reference to maps, blankets and radio equipment on
board, and other references repeated above.

(e) Mr. Vishinsky on December 21, 1951, said in the General
Assembly : "1 venture to assure you that the reason why these
flyers were arrested, why the proper attention was given them by
Ourmilitary border authoritiecand 1 hope that due attention will
be given by Ourmilitary judicial organs-was becanse these flyers
flew there with reconnaissance aims in the interest of your Atlantic
Bloc, in the execution of its plan." The American representative
in Moscow called on the Soviet Foreign Officefor an explanation.
The Soviet Foreign Office, through its representative, Mr. Zorin,
then falsely stated that the allegations of the United States Govern-
ment that the aircraft was lost were "not in accordance ,with the
evidence revealed in interrogations by Hungarian and Soviet
authorities". The fact is that these statements corresponded
entirely with the evidence revealed in these interrogations, as the

Soviet and Hungarian authorities well knew, and while the United YOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17III53) 55

States Government had heen denied access to the airmen during
and after such interrogations.
The Soviet Govemment is reminded that upon that occasion the
American representative stated to the Soviet Government through
its representative, hlr. Zorin, referring to the detention and treat-
ment of the airplane and the crew, "The Soviet Government cannot
escape responsihility therefor."

14. The actions of the Soviet and Hungarian Govemments with
reference to this matter coincided in time with the meeting of the
General Assemhly of the United Nations in Paris. The Soviet
Government. in prearranged concert with its allies (including the
Hungarian Government), in and out of the United Nations, was

engaged in a campaign of propaganda and vilification against the
United States, seeking to make it appear that the United States
Government had emharked on a program of suhversion of the
Soviet and allied governments under the authority of the Mutual
Security Act enacted by the United States Congress. The United
States Government helieves, and asserts, that this campaigu was
intended hy the Soviet Government to divert the min& of the
international puhlic and the memher governments of the United
Nations, then meeting in Pans, from the systematic operations of
international suhversion of estahlished governments and social
institutions throughout the world, and other misconduct, carried
on by the Soviet Government and its allies, overtly and secretly.
Largely unsuccessful in this campaign, the Soviet and Hungarian
Governments in concert seized upon the fortuitous and wholly
innocent presence, within their physical power, of four Amencan
airmen whom they had caused to come down in Hungary and be

detained there, in order to provide so-called evidence to prove the
Soviet and Soviet-allied propaganda charges against the United
States. Knowing at al1times that the charges against the airmen,
as against the United States, were false and unfounded and
that a free and open hearing or investigation according to
the practice of civilized and honorable governments would
demonstrate the faisity of these charges, the Soviet and Hungarian
Govemments in concert deliberately denied the aumen access
to American consular or diplomatic authonties, denied the airmen
representation by independent legai counsel, suhjected the aimen
to a triai hy a military court whose judgment was predetermined,
held the trial in camerawhere no member of the puhlic was present,
kept the airmen continuously incommunicado, denied them and
the United States Government access to judicial records and
dossiers in the case, and in other ways attempted to conceal from
the airmen, the United States Government, and the international

puhlic the manifest injustices deliherately perpetrated hy the
Soviet and Hungarian Governments upon these American nationals
as upon the United States Government.56 NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERSMENT (17 III53)

The statements issued by the Soviet and Hungarian authonties
in concert with respect to this matter were deliberately and wil-
fully broadcast to the world by these governments, or were uttered
so as to be so broadcast in the usual dissemination of news of
international interest, with the purpose and intention of causing
damage to the United States and to the airmen themselves.

~j. As has been indicated, the four airmen with whom this
claim is concerned have at al1 times been and now are citizens
and nationals of the United States of America. Dave H. Hender-
son was born September 20, 1919, at Dale, Oklahoma, in the
United States of America ; John J.Swift was born July 31, 1917.
at Syracuse, New York, in the United States of America ; Jess
A. Duff was born October 12, 1919, at Scotia, Nebraska, in the
United States of America ; and James A. Elam was bom Novem-
ber 3, i931, at Kingsland, Arkansas. in the United States of
America. Al1four airmen were members of the United States Air

Force on the dates relevant to this claim, Dave H. Henderson
and John J. Swift being captains and Jess A. Duff and James A.
Elam being sergeants.
16. The United States Government is compelled to conclude,
and it charges, that the foregoing actions, whether committed
separately by the Soviet Govemment or in conjunction or' in
concert with the Hungarian Government. were deliberately and
unlawfully committed with ulterior intent ta serve a propaganda
purpose of the Soviet Government, ta cause unlawful damage

to the four American airmen above named, and to the United
States, to convert unlawfully to the use and profit of the Soviet
Govemment and the Hungarian Govemment the United States
Air Force plane 6026, its equipment, cargo, and other contents,
and to obtab unlawfully from the United States the sum of
$123.60j.15.
II

- The United States Govemment, as a result of its investigation
above mentioned, believes and asserts that the Soviet Govern-
ment, aided and abettedby and inconcert with the Hungarian
Government. has by committing the foregoing acts in the circum-
stances set forth violated international law and unlawfully caused
the violation by the Hungarian Govemment of the Treaty of
Peace, signed Febmary IO, 1947, between Hungary and the
United States. to which the Soviet Government is also a party,
particularly the provisions in Article 2 thereof relating to human
rights; and unlawfully caused the violation by the Hungarian
Govemment of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular

Rights between Hungary and the United States, proclaimed
October 24, 1926, and then in effect, particularly Articles 1, 14,
18 and 19 thereof. . . NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17III53) 57

Specifically, and without limiting itself by the enumeration, the
United States Government asserts that in the circumstances set
forth above the Soviet Government is guilty of the wilful and inten-
tional violation of its international legal obligations, and of the
wilful and intentional commission of internationally unlawful
acts, as follows :,
(1) It \vas the legal duty of the Soviet Government, in the respect
that it had the opportunity and authority to do sowithin the terri-
tory of Rumania and Hungary, ta have shown the airplane 6026

to a safe landing place as soon as possible.
(2) Having belatedly intercepted the plane and shown it ta a
landing place, it was unlawful for the Soviet Government ta arrest
or detain the men or seize the plane. The Soviet Government was
not justified hy any provision of law in intercepting the plane for
the purposes of arrest and detention of the crew or the plane, or
in thereafter maintaining the men under arrest and detention,
and specifically no provision of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary
or any other valid treaty gave the Soviet Government such power
or authority.

. (3) Having hrought the plane down, it was the legal duty of the
Soviet Government to notify the United States Government repre-
sentatives in Hungary, or the superior officers of the crew in Ger-
many, or other appropriate American authorities, that the airplane
and the crew were being held by the Soviet Government.
(4) It was the legal duty of the Soviet Government ta have
permitted the airmen access to American consular reprcscntatives

when requested.
(5) Knowing that the United States Government was engaged in
an expensive search for the plane, it was the legal duty of the Soviet
Government, as of the Hungarian Government, by truthful and
affirmative statements to inform the United States Government
that the plane and the men were safe and that search was unne-
cessary.

(6) The Soviet interrogation of the men was excessive in length
and in scope, and in those respects unlawful. Upon discovering the
innocence of the flight, and at the latest upon termination of the
interrogation, it was the legal duty of the Soviet Government to
assist the plane and the crew to return promptly to their base in
Germany. Specifically, it was iinlawful to have delivered the crew
into the custody of the Hungarian Government in the circum-
stances of the case.
(7) The Soviet Government's detention of the airmen for the
secret purpose, undisclosed to them or to the United States

Government. of a trial by Hungarian authorities, while pretending
and representing to the men that they were being detained for
another purpose, \vas improper and unlawful.
558 XOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (17III 53)

(8) The Soviet Govemment was under a legal duty to return the
airplane., its equipment, its cargo and its other contents, including
the documents therein, to the American authorities at the earliest
opportunity and in any event was under a legal duty to turn that
property over to the United States Government in response to the
United States Government's request contained in the note of
December IO, 1952, above described, or, upon a showing of a
valid inability to do so, it should have made payment to the United
States qf the monetary value of the property as requested.

(9) The Soviet Government was under a legal duty to furnish
to theUnitedStates Government the documents and other evidence
belonging to the United States taken from the airmen and the
airplane by the Soviet Govemment, and to provide access to the
various dossiers, reports and other documents of the Soviet Govern-
ment described in the United States Government's note of Decem-
ber IO, 1952.

(IO) The actions and statements of the Soviet authorities and
of the Hungarian authorities in the premises constituted legal and.
actionable wrongs to the United Statesfor which the Soviet Govern-
ment and the Hungarian Government are jointly and separately
responsible. These, as has been stated above, include al1 the
violations of law and the denials of justice set forth in the note of
the United States Govemmerit which is simultaneously being
delivered to the Hungarian Government, a copy ofwhich is attached.
hereto and which is made a part hereof with the same force and
effect as if fully repeated herein.
The United States Government believes thatit has on account of

the violations by the Soviet Government of the foregoing legal
duties, and it hereby asserts and prefers against the Soviet Govern-~
ment, a valid international claim for damages as specified below..

III

In consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of
duty, for al1 of which the Soviet Govemment is responsible, the
United States has suffered the following items of damage, and the^
United States Government demands that the Soviet Government.
pay to it on account thereof, the followingsums :

I. The United States Air Force airplane C-47 type known as.
6026 and its equipment, and the cargo thereof as sbown in the-
mnnifests on board the plane when seized, valued in total at.
$98,779.29. with interest at 6 percent from November 19, 1951.
2. The amount paid by the United States Government to the
Hungarian Government, under protest, to obtain the release of'
the four airmen, $123,605.15, with interest at 6 per cent from
December 28, 1951. NOTE TO THE SOVIET COVERNhlENT (17 III53)
59
3. Damages to the four airmen, American nationals, in conse-
quence of their unlawful detention and mistreatment and manifest
denials of justice to them, $zoo,ooo.oo.

4. Damages to the United States by the wilful and unlawful
conduct of the Soviet Govemment in concert with the Hungarian
Govemment. $215,jo9.67.

Total $637,894.11,with interest at 6 percent as indicated.

The United States Government declares that the figure of
$215,509.67, contained in paragraph 4 above, does not iiiclude
any sum on account of the items of intangible injury deliherately
and intentionally caused the United States Govemment and the
American people by the wrongful actions of the Soviet and Hun-
garian Govemments. Such injiiry is not easily calculable in money
and money could not compensate for it. TheUnited States Govcrn-
ment has determined therefore, for thc present, to defer thc formu-
lation of the kind and measure of redress or other action the Soviet

Government and the Hungarian Goverument should take which
would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm
the illegality of the actions directed by them against the United
States Government and the American people.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Government
of the Union of Socialist Soviet Rcpublics promptly to make its
detailed answer to the allegations and demands made in this com-

muiiication. Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowl-
edge its indebtedness to the United States on account of the fore-
going and agree to pay the damages suffered, the United States
Government is prepared, if requested, to present detailed evidence
in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged.
In the event that the Soviet Government contests liability, it is
requested so to state in its answer. In the latter event, the Soviet
Government is hereby iiotified, the United States Governmcnt
proposes that the dispute be presented for Iiearing and decision in
the International Court of Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet
Governmcnt has thus far not filed with that Court any declaration
of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the
United States Government invites the Soviet Government to

file an appropriate declaration with the Court, or to enter into a
Special Agreement, by which the Court may be empowered in
accordance with its Statute and IXulesto determine the issues of
fact and law which have been set forth herein ; and the Soviet
Govemment is requested to inform the United States Governmentin the reply to the present note of its intentions with respect to
such a declaration or Special Agreement.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my Iiigh considera-
tion.

(Signed) Jacob D. Rom,
Chargé d'Affairesad interiln

American Embassy
Moscow, March 17, 1953

His Excellency
V. M. nlolotov,
Jfinister for Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Republics,
hfoscow.

Enclosure to the note to the Soviet GovernmO/Mnrch 17, 19-73

NOTE TO THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNJlENT
01: hfARCH 17, Igj3

[Ses pp.11-59] Annex 2

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
OF JUNE 19. 1953

(Tra+~slatio?z)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
30. r6/SH.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, refemng to the Embassy's Note of blarch 17, 1953,
concerning the American military transport plane C-47No. 316026,
which violated the Hungarian state frontier on November 19, 1951,
has the honor to state :

I.The Government of the USA in its note alleged that the vio-
lation of the State frontier of the Hungarian People's Republic by
the American military transport plane on November 19, 1951, was
accidental. The Government of the USA explains this allegedly
accidental violation of the Hungarian frontier by the American
military plane by the fact that the plane in question, in trying to
follow a course from Erding to Belgrade, via Innsbruck, Udine,
Ljubljana and Zagreb, was "blown by winds the existence and
directions of which the pilots did not then know or have any waming
of", and also that "in consequence of the effect of these unknown
winds, the plane flew beyond Belgrade to the north and east and
the crew \vas unable to find or descend at Belgrade".

The Government of the USA also finds it possible to assert that
the plane crew Iiad no iilegal motives and that on board the plane
allegedly "there \vas no equipment of any sort, intended for any
kiiid of illegal use against Hungary, the Soviet Union or any other
country".
However, this kind of attempt to justify the actions of the
American military transport plane which violated the frontier of
Hungary is artificial and groundless since it is in contradiction
with the facts.
These are the facts disproving the version presented in the Ameri-
can note on the violation of the Hungarian frontier bythe American
military plane :

(a) The assertion that the plane violated the Hungarian frontier
"accidentally", "was blown off its course" and "lost its way",62 NOTE FROS THE SOVIET GOVERXA~ENT (19 VI 53)

being camed by winds behind the Hungarian frontier, are clearly
groundless. This is evident from the fact that the American mili-
tary plane was forced to land not close to the border but at a
point about 200-212 kilometers from the Udine-Belgrade route
mentioned in the U.S. note.

(b) The groundlessness of the above version is also confirmed by
the fact that,as is evident from the U.S. note, special U.S. personnel
followed the plane's flight, who, keeping in communication with
the plane al1along its route, certainly could have helped the plane
crew aiid assisted it in selecting the proper direction, if this was
actually necessary.
(c) The reference in the U.S. note to the effect that the plane's
fuel reserve was "running dangerously low" aiid the plane "was in

distress" is also devoid of any foundation. Actiially, the plane had
enough fuel and the plane was not "in distress". In the document
of transfer of plane and crew by the Soviet authorities to the
Hungarian authorities, drawn up on Uecember 3, 1951, it is set
forth that the plane had 1000 liters of gasoline, and ~ookilograms
of oil, which could have taken care of the plane's normal flight
needs for several hours.
(d) It is also necessary to draw attention to the fact that the

plane crew-the pilot, Captain Henderson, the second pilot,
Captain John Swift, the radio operator, Sergeant James A. Elam,
the plane mechaiiic, James (sic) A. Duff-as stated in the U.S.
note of March 17, were al1 experienced and competent airmeii ;
that this was also completely confirmed by an examination in this
regard of the plane's crew after its landing; and that this excludes
any kind of assurnption that the violation of the frontier by the
above-mentioned airplaiie could have beeii the result of the inex-
perience of its crew.

(e) As to the plane and its equipment, as noted in the U.S. note,
the plane and its equipment were in suitable condition for the
flight. In this circumstance, when the plane's means of communi-
cation and apparatus permitted the plane to fly under difficult
weather conditions, although according to verified meteorological
data, on November 19, 1951. the weather was completely satis-
factory with a visibility o15 to20 kilometers and a wind speed of
20-zj kilometers per hour, and there could not have been any
difficulties for a competent and experienced plane crew.

(f) From the above-meiitioned document of transfer of the plaiie
it is also evident that the plane carried military operations maps,
a portable radio transmitter, six parachutes and two bales of warm
blankets. From the inspection, it was established that these were
military operations maps of the most important areas of the USSR
including the Ukrainian SSR and the Volga Area, and also maps of
Czechoslovakia and Hungary ; but the portable radio transmitterwas not part of the airplane's equipment and it was adapted for
dropping by parachute and for use in field conditions. The number
of parachutes and blankets that were discovered are evidence of
the fact that they were intended not for the plane crew's use, but
for other purpo<es.
Al1 of these circumstances testifv to the fact that the version
put forth in the U.S. note is incoisistent with, and contradicted
by the above-mentioned facts which confirm that the American
military transport plane C-47 No. 316026iutentionally violated the

Hungarian frontier for illegal purposes.

2. In trying to shield those who bear the responsibility for the
actions which took the form of a premeditated violation of the
Hungarian State frontier by an American military transport plane,
the Government of the U.S. also resorts to other equally groundless
arguments.
The U.S. note asserts that the American plane allegedly was
incorrectly stopped by the Soviet planes and that the place where
the plane was stopped is not in the zone in which Soviet aircraft
should be based according to Article 22 of the peace treaty with
Hungary.

Such an assertion is groundless because the Soviet fighters in this
case acted in strict accordance with the duty of protecting the
regular supporting communication lines with the Soviet occupation
Zone in Austria on the strength of Article 22 of the peace treaty
with Hungary.
Thc Soviet flyers, in this case, acted in full accord with the
standards of international law.
As to the statement in the U.S. note that allegedly the "Soviet
authorities and their allies intentionally alloxvedthe plane to cross
the Hungarian frontier and fly over Hungarian territory", this,
at the very least, is a strange argument, clearly withoiit foundation
and needing no rebuttal.
The observations in the U.S. note which allege that it nas the
"judicial obligation" of the Soviet Govemment to direct the violat-

ing aircraft to a safe place for landing are also without foundation.

3. In the U.S. note it is alleged that there were no legal bases
for turuing over of the plane andits crew to the Hungarian Govern-
ment bythe Soviet authonties and that this transfer was a violation
of international law.
However, this argument is also without foundation, since the
Soviet military authorities, in this case, only carried out their
duty, acting in accordance with the principle of respect for the
sovereignty of the Hungarian People's Republic. The transfer of
the above-mentioned plane and its crew to the American military
authorities would have been a clear violation of the sovereign
rights of Hungary in the protection of its borders and thus a SOTE FR011 THE SOVIET GOVERMENT (19 VI 53)
64
violation of generally recognized principles and standards of
international la\z,.
As to the statement in the U.S. note concerning the duration
and illegality of the interrogation of the American plane's crew,
this statemeiit does not correspond with the actual facts and is
tendentious.

4. Al1the facts brought forth above prove the complete baseless-
ness of the attempt to present the matter in such a way as to
allege the U.S.A. is the injured party in the giveii case. If the
Government of the U.S. had taken into consideration the established
facts and had actually been guided by generally recognized precepts
of iiiternatioiial law, it could not have failed to recognize that
the actions taken by the Soviet planes vis-à-vis the American
plane and its crew which violated the state boundary of Hungary
\\.ere legal and could not have failed on its part to take a position
on this question corresponding to the elementary requirements
of correctness and normal relations between States.

j. In vie\\, of the foregoing, the Soviet Government considers
the proposal of the U.S. Government concerning the submission
of this question to the consideration of the International Court
to be without foundation since there exists no subject for such
consideration and equally since there exists no basis for bringing
any claims whatsoever against the Soviet Union.

JIoscow, June 19, 1953. [The two cases brought by the United States of America against the
Hungarian People'sRepublic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
respectivcly, with regard to the Treatment in Hungary of an Aircraft
and Crew of thc United States of America, were removed from the list
by Orders of July rztli, 1954 (I.C.J. Reports 19.54. pp 99 and 103)
before the stage had been reactied for the written and oral procediire.
The present volume accordingly does not include the following
headings: Part I, Sectio;~B. IJleadings; I'nrt II, Oral Proceedings;
proceedittgs.]onentssrrbmitledto the Courtafter the closrrreof thewritten

[Les deux affaires introduites par les États-unis d'Amériquecontre la
République popiilaire de Hongrie et l'union des Républiques socialistes
soviétiques au sujet du traitemeiit en Hongrie d'un avion des États-
Unis d'Amériqueet de son équipage ont étérayéesdu rôle par ordon-
nances du 12 juillet 1954(C.1. J. Reciieilrgjq,pp. 99 et IO^),sansqu'il
y ait eu de procédureécriteni orale.
En conséquerice, le présent volume ne comporte pas les rubriques
suivantes: Première partie, SectionB, Mémoires; Deuxième partie,
Procédnreornle; et Troisième partie, Documentsprésentés à !a Cour
aprèsla fin de la procédureécrite.]