Intervention

Code

Declaration of intervention of Sweden

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN filed in the Registry of the Court on 9 September 2022 in the case of ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION) COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE DECLARATION D'INTERVENTION DU GOUVERNEMENT DE SUEDE enregistree au Greffe de la Cour le 9 septembre 2022 dans le cas de ALLEGATIONS DE GENOCIDE AU TITRE DE LA CONVENTION POUR LA PREVENTION ET LA REPRESSION DU CRIME DE GENOCIDE (UKRAINE c. FEDERATION DE RUSSIE) I.

Declaration of intervention of the United States of America

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION) DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE ST A TUTE SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SEPTEMBER 7, 2022 Embassy of the United States of America LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I.

Declaration of intervention of the United Kingdom

Before the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND l August 2022 In the case of ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (UKRAINE v.

Declaration of intervention of New Zealand

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DISPUTE RELATING TO ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE (Ukraine v Russian Federation) DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND To the Registrar, International Court of Justice. The undersigned being duly authorized by the Government of New Zealand. 1.

Declaration of intervention of Lithuania

DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA INTERVENTION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 19 JULY 2022 To the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, the undersigned being duly authorized by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania: 1.

Declaration of intervention of Latvia

3 DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA Riga, 19 July 2022. A. INTERVENTION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 63, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE To the Registrar of the International Court of Justice (“the Court”), the undersigned being duly authorized by the Government of the Republic of Latvia (“Latvia”): 1.

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 December 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against the Italian Republic, requesting the Court to declare that Italy had failed to respect the jurisdictional immunity which Germany enjoys under international law by allowing civil claims to be brought against it in the Italian courts seeking reparation for injuries caused by violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Third Reich during the Second World War. In addition, Germany asked the Court to find that Italy had also violated Germany’s immunity by taking measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni, German State property situated in Italian territory. Finally, Germany requested the Court to declare that Italy had breached Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek civil courts rendered against Germany on the basis of acts similar to those which had given rise to the claims brought before Italian courts. Germany referred in particular to the judgment rendered against it in respect of the massacre committed by German armed forces during their withdrawal in 1944, in the Greek village of Distomo in the Distomo case.

As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Germany invoked Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, ratified by Italy on 29 January 1960 and by Germany on 18 April 1961.

The Memorial of Germany and the Counter-Memorial of Italy were filed within the time-limits fixed by the Order of the Court of 29 April 2009. In its Counter-Memorial, Italy, referring to Article 80 of the Rules of Court, made a counter-claim “with respect to the question of the reparation owed to Italian victims of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed by forces of the German Reich”. The Court found that the counter-claim presented by Italy was inadmissible, because the dispute that Italy intended to bring before the Court by way of its counter-claim related to facts and situations existing prior to the entry into force as between the parties of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, which formed the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in the case (Order of 6 July 2010).

On 13 January 2011, Greece filed an Application requesting permission to intervene in the case. In its Application, Greece stated that it wished to intervene in the aspect of the procedure relating to judgments rendered by its own courts on the Distomo massacre and enforced (exequatur) by the Italian courts. The Court, in an Order of 4 July 2011, considered that it might find it necessary to consider the decisions of Greek courts in the Distomo case, in light of the principle of State immunity, for the purposes of making findings with regard to Germany’s submission that Italy had breached its jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek courts founded on violations of international humanitarian law committed by the German Reich during the Second World War. This permitted the conclusion that Greece had an interest of a legal nature which might have been affected by the judgment in the case and, consequently, that Greece could be permitted to intervene as a non-party “in so far as this intervention is limited to the decisions of Greek courts [in the Distomo case]”.

In its Judgment rendered on 3 February 2012, the Court first examined the question whether Italy had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by allowing civil claims to be brought against that State in the Italian courts. The Court noted in this respect that the question which it was called upon to decide was not whether the acts committed by the Third Reich during the Second World War were illegal, but whether, in civil proceedings against Germany relating to those acts, the Italian courts were obliged to accord Germany immunity. The Court held that the action of the Italian courts in denying Germany immunity constituted a breach of Italy’s international obligations. It stated in this connection that, under customary international law as it presently stood, a State was not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it was accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict. The Court further observed that, assuming that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibited murder, deportation and slave labour were rules of jus cogens, there was no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity. The two sets of rules addressed different matters. The rules of State immunity were confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State could exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They did not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings were brought was lawful or unlawful. Finally, the Court examined Italy’s argument that the Italian courts were justified in denying Germany immunity, because all other attempts to secure compensation for the various groups of victims involved in the Italian proceedings had failed. The Court found no basis in the relevant domestic or international practice that international law made the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress.

The Court then addressed the question whether a measure of constraint taken against property belonging to Germany located on Italian territory constituted a breach by Italy of Germany’s immunity. It noted that Villa Vigoni was being used for governmental purposes that were entirely non-commercial; that Germany had in no way consented to the registration of the legal charge in question, nor allocated Villa Vigoni for the satisfaction of the judicial claims against it. Since the conditions permitting a measure of constraint to be taken against property belonging to a foreign State had not been met in this case, the Court concluded that Italy had violated its obligation to respect Germany’s immunity from enforcement.

Finally, the Court examined the question whether Italy had violated Germany’s immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy civil judgments rendered by Greek courts against Germany in proceedings arising out of the massacre committed in the Greek village of Distomo by the armed forces of the Third Reich in 1944. It found that the relevant decisions of the Italian courts constituted a violation by Italy of its obligation to respect the jurisdictional immunity of Germany.

English

Counter-Memorial of Italy

22 December 2009

5 October 2010

Available in:

English French

Annexes

Annexes

English

Letter from the Agent of Italy

5 September 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 29 April 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 6 July 2010

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint declaration of Judges Keith and Greenwood

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Gaja

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 July 2011

Application by the Hellenic Republic for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2012

Available in:

English French

Latest Developments

Order of 2 February 2024

Fixing of time-limit: Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French

Press release 2024/10

2 February 2024

Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Daudet

(French version only) French

Press release 2024/7

29 January 2024

Available in:

English French

Summary 2023/5

Summary of the Order of 5 June 2023

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

Order of 5 June 2023

Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

Declaration of Vice-President Gevorgian

English French

Declaration of Judge Abraham

English French

Dissenting opinion of Judge Xue

English French

Declaration of Judge Bhandari

English French

Written Observations of the Russian Federation on the admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention

27 March 2023

Procedure(s):Intervention

English French

Volume of Annexes

English

Written Observations of the Russian Federation on the Declarations of Intervention filed by Bulgaria, Malta, Norway, Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Liechtenstein

30 January 2023

Procedure(s):Intervention

16 December 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

16 December 2022

Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) - The Principality of Liechtenstein files a declaration of intervention in the proceedings under Article 63 of the Statute

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

Declaration of intervention of Liechtenstein

15 December 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

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Press release 2022/66

24 November 2022

Declaration of intervention of Bulgaria

18 November 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

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English French

Written Observations of the Russian Federation on the Declarations of Intervention filed by Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Spain, Australia, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg and Greece

15 November 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

1 November 2022

Declaration of intervention of Croatia

19 October 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

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English French

Written Observations of the Russian Federation on the Declarations of Intervention filed by Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States of America, Sweden, Romania, France, Poland and Italy

17 October 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

13 October 2022

Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) - The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg files a declaration of intervention in the proceedings under Article 63 of the Statute

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

Press release 2022/52

13 October 2022

English French

Declaration of intervention of Portugal

7 October 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

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English French

Preliminary objections of the Russian Federation

3 October 2022

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Volume II - Annexes 1-60

English French

Volume III - Annexes 61 - 135

English

Press release 2022/46

30 September 2022

Press release 2022/43

22 September 2022

Declaration of intervention of Germany

5 September 2022

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

1 July 2022

Available in:

English French

Volume of Annexes

English

Order of 23 March 2022

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 16 March 2022

Request for the indication of provisional measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

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English French Bilingual

Declaration of Vice-President Gevorgian

16 March 2022

English French

Press release 2022/6

1 March 2022

Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) - Request for the indication of provisional measures - The Court to hold public hearings on Monday 7 and Tuesday 8 March 2022

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French

Press release 2022/7

1 March 2022

Request for the indication of provisional measures

27 February 2022

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 31 May 2010, Australia instituted proceedings against Japan in respect of “Japan’s continued pursuit of a large‑scale program of whaling under the Second Phase of its Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (‘JARPA II’), in breach of obligations assumed by Japan under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (‘ICRW’), as well as its other international obligations for the preservation of marine mammals and the marine environment”.

As basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Australia invoked the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute, referring to the declarations recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory made by Australia and Japan on 22 March 2002 and 9 July 2007, respectively.

On 20 November 2012, New Zealand filed in the Registry a declaration of intervention in the case. Relying on Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute, it contended that, as a party to the ICRW, it had a direct interest in the construction that might be placed upon the Convention by the Court in its decision in the proceedings.

In an Order of 13 February 2013, having noted that New Zealand met the requirements set out in the Statute and the Rules of Court, the Court found that the declaration of intervention was admissible. Public hearings were held from 26 June to 16 July 2013, during which oral arguments were presented by Australia and Japan, and the experts that each Party had asked to be called were heard by the Court. New Zealand presented oral observations on the subject‑matter of its intervention.

In its Judgment rendered on 31 March 2014, the Court first found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the case, rejecting Japan’s argument that the dispute fell within the scope of a reservation contained in Australia’s declaration recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory. It then turned to the question of the interpretation and application of Article VIII of the 1946 Convention, paragraph 1 of which states that the parties “may grant to any of [their] nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research”.

With respect to the interpretation of this provision, the Court noted that even if a whaling programme involves scientific research, the killing, taking and treating of whales pursuant to such a programme does not fall within Article VIII unless these activities are “for purposes of” scientific research. To determine this point and, in particular, to ascertain whether a programme’s use of lethal methods is for purposes of scientific research, the Court considered whether the elements of a programme’s design and implementation were reasonable in relation to its stated scientific objectives.

Regarding the application of Article VIII, paragraph 1, the Court noted that JARPA II could broadly be characterized as “scientific research”. However, it considered that the evidence before it did not establish that the programme’s design and implementation were reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives. The Court concluded that the special permits granted by Japan for the killing, taking and treating of whales in connection with JARPA II were not “for purposes of scientific research”, pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the 1946 Convention.

The Court then turned to the implications of that conclusion, in light of Australia’s contention that Japan had breached several provisions of the Schedule annexed to the Convention. Having found that Japan had indeed breached some of the provisions invoked (namely the moratoriums on commercial whaling and factory ships, and the prohibition on commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary), it considered the question of remedies. Since JARPA II was an ongoing programme, it ordered Japan to revoke any extant authorization, permit or licence to kill, or take or treat whales in relation to it, and to refrain from granting any further permits under Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in pursuance of that programme.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

31 May 2010

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 13 July 2010

Fixing of time-limits for the filing of the initial pleadings

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 6 February 2013

Declaration of Intervention by New Zealand

Procedure(s):Intervention

Summary 2014/3

Summary of the Judgment of 31 March 2014

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Colombia in respect of a dispute concerning “a group of related legal issues subsisting” between the two States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimitation”. On 28 April 2003, Nicaragua filed its Memorial within the time-limit laid down by the Court. On 21 July 2003, Colombia filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction, leading to the suspension of the proceedings on the merits.

In its Judgment on the preliminary objections, rendered on 13 December 2007, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime features claimed by the Parties, other than the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. The Court held that the treaty signed in 1928 between Colombia and Nicaragua (in which Colombia recognized Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Corn Islands, while Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, and the maritime features forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago) had settled the issue of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, that there was no extant legal dispute between the Parties on that question and that, therefore, the Court could not have jurisdiction over it under the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (also known as the Pact of Bogotá and invoked by Nicaragua as basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the case). On the other hand, as regards the question of the scope and composition of the rest of the San Andrés Archipelago, the Court considered that the 1928 Treaty failed to provide answers as to which other maritime features formed part of the Archipelago and thus that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute regarding sovereignty over those other maritime features. As for its jurisdiction with respect to the maritime delimitation issue, the Court concluded that the 1928 Treaty had not effected a general delimitation of the maritime areas between Colombia and Nicaragua and that, as the dispute had not been settled within the meaning of the Pact of Bogotá, the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

On 25 February 2010, Costa Rica filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. In its Application it contended, among other things, that “[b]oth Nicaragua and Colombia, in their boundary claims against each other, claim maritime area to which Costa Rica is entitled” and indicated that it wished to intervene in the proceedings as a non-party State. On 10 June 2010, the Republic of Honduras also filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case, asserting that Nicaragua, in its dispute with Colombia, had put forward maritime claims that lay in an area of the Caribbean Sea in which Honduras had rights and interests. Honduras stated in its Application that it was seeking primarily to intervene in the proceedings as a party. The Court rendered two Judgments on 4 May 2011, in which it ruled that the Applications for permission to intervene filed by Costa Rica and Honduras could not be granted. The Court noted that the interest of a legal nature invoked by Costa Rica could only be affected if the maritime boundary that the Court had been asked to draw between Nicaragua and Colombia were to be extended beyond a certain latitude southwards. However, following its jurisprudence, the Court, when drawing a line delimiting the maritime areas between the two Parties to the main proceedings, would, if necessary, end that line before it reached an area in which the interests of a legal nature of third States might be involved. The Court concluded that Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature could not be affected by the decision in the proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. With respect to Honduras’s Application for permission to intervene, the Court found that Honduras had failed to satisfy the Court that it had an interest of a legal nature that might be affected by the decision of the Court in the main proceedings. It ruled on the one hand that, since the entire maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea had been settled by the Judgment of the Court rendered between those two States in 2007, there were no extant rights or legal interests that Honduras might seek to protect in the settlement of the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. On the other hand, the Court held that Honduras could invoke an interest of a legal nature, in the main proceedings, on the basis of the 1986 bilateral treaty concluded between Honduras and Colombia, but clarified that it would not be relying on that treaty to determine the maritime boundary between Colombia and Nicaragua.

In its Judgment rendered on the merits of the case on 19 November 2012, the Court found that the territorial dispute between the Parties concerned sovereignty over the features situated in the Caribbean Sea — the Alburquerque Cays, the East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo — which were all above water at high tide and which were therefore islands capable of appropriation. The Court noted, however, that Quitasueño comprised only a single, tiny island, known as QS 32, and a number of low-tide elevations (features above water at low tide but submerged at high tide). The Court then observed that, under the terms of the 1928 Treaty concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia not only had sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but also over other islands, islets and reefs “forming part” of the San Andrés Archipelago. Thus, in order to address the question of sovereignty, the Court first needed to ascertain what constituted the San Andrés Archipelago. It concluded, however, that neither the 1928 Treaty nor the historical documents conclusively established the composition of that Archipelago. The Court therefore examined the arguments and evidence not based on the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty. It found that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia had established that it had title to the disputed maritime features by virtue of uti possidetis juris (the principle that, upon independence, new States inherit the territories and boundaries of the former colonial provinces), because nothing clearly indicated whether these features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Colombia. The Court then considered whether sovereignty could be established on the basis of State acts manifesting a display of authority on a given territory (effectivités). It regarded it as having been established that for many decades Colombia had continuously and consistently acted à titre de souverain in respect of the maritime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority had been public and there was no evidence that it had met with any protest from Nicaragua prior to 1969, when the dispute had crystallized. Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s acts of administration with respect to the islands was in contrast to the absence of any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua. The Court also noted that, while not being evidence of sovereignty, Nicaragua’s conduct with regard to the maritime features in dispute, the practice of third States and maps afforded some support to Colombia’s claim. The Court concluded that Colombia, and not Nicaragua, had sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.

With respect to Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles, the Court observed that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia was not a party thereto did not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention. The Court observed that Nicaragua had submitted to the Commission only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, fell short of meeting the requirements for the Commission to be able to make its recommendations. As the Court was not presented with any further information, it found that, in this case, Nicaragua had not established that it had a continental margin that extended far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast. The Court was therefore not in a position to delimit the maritime boundary between the extended continental shelf as claimed by Nicaragua and the continental shelf of Colombia. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court noted that it was still called upon to effect the delimitation of the zone situated within 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast, where the entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua overlapped.

In order to effect the delimitation of the maritime boundary, the Court first determined what the relevant coasts of the Parties were, namely those coasts the projections of which overlapped. It found that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was its whole coast, with the exception of the short stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas, and that Colombia’s relevant coast was the entire coastline of the islands under Colombian sovereignty, except for Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. The Court next noted that the relevant maritime area, i.e., the area in which the potential entitlements of the Parties overlapped, extended 200 nautical miles east of the Nicaraguan coast. The boundaries to the north and to the south were determined by the Court in such a way as not to overlap with any existing boundaries or to extend into areas where the rights of third States might be affected.

To effect the delimitation, the Court followed the three-stage procedure previously laid down by and employed in its jurisprudence.

First, it selected the base points and constructed a provisional median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the relevant Colombian islands opposite the Nicaraguan coast.

Second, the Court considered any relevant circumstances which might have called for an adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line so as to achieve an equitable result. It observed that the substantial disparity between the relevant Colombian coast and that of Nicaragua (approximately 1:8.2), and the need to avoid a situation whereby the line of delimitation cut off one or other of the Parties ties from maritime areas into which its coasts projected, constituted relevant circumstances. The Court noted that, while legitimate security concerns had to be borne in mind in determining what adjustment should be made to the provisional median line or in what way that line should be shifted, the conduct of the Parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already effected in the area were not relevant circumstances in this case. In the relevant area between the Nicaraguan mainland and the western coasts of the Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the relationship was one of opposite coasts, the relevant circumstances called for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. To that end, the Court determined that different weightings should be given to the base points situated on Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, namely a weighting of one to each of the Colombian base points and a weighting of three to each of the Nicaraguan base points. The Court considered, however, that extending the line thus constructed to the north or the south would not lead to an equitable result, since it would leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was more than eight times the length of Colombia’s relevant coast. Moreover, it would cut off Nicaragua from the areas to the east of the principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projected. In the view of the Court, an equitable result was to be achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast. To the north, that line would follow the parallel passing through the most northern point of the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Roncador. To the south, the maritime boundary would first follow the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of the Alburquerque and East-Southeast Cays, then the parallel from the most eastern point of the territorial sea of the East-Southeast Cays. In order to prevent Quitasueño and Serrana from falling, under those circumstances, on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the maritime boundary around each of those features would follow the outer limit of their 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.

Third, and finally, the Court checked that, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the delimitation thus obtained did not create a disproportionality that would render the result inequitable. The Court observed that the boundary line had the effect of dividing the relevant area between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour, while the ratio of relevant coasts was approximately 1:8.2. It concluded that that line did not entail such disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

6 December 2001

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Preliminary Objections of Colombia

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Memorial of Nicaragua

28 April 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Written Statement of Nicaragua

26 January 2004

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Volume I Written Statement

English French

Volume II Annexes

English French

Counter-Memorial of Colombia

11 November 2008

Available in:

English French

18 September 2009

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Rejoinder of Colombia

18 June 2010

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(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

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OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

23 December 2008

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Written proceedings

12 June 2009

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Annexes - volume I

Annexes - volume II

22 December 2009

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

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22 December 2009

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Annexes

24 March 2010

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

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25 May 2010

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

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5 October 2010

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Annexes

10 January 2011

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13 January 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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23 March 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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28 March 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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6 May 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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26 May 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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27 May 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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3 August 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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26 August 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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Annexes

5 September 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

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Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Monday 12 September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)

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Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 13 September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)

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Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 14 September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)

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Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 15 September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)

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Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 16 September 2011, at 2.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)

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Translation

Other documents

21 September 2011

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23 September 2011

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23 September 2011

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29 September 2011

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