Intervention

Code

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 March 1994, Cameroon filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Nigeria with respect to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula, and requesting the Court to determine the course of the maritime frontier between the two States in so far as that frontier had not been established in 1975. As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Cameroon referred to the declarations made by the two States under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, by which they accepted that jurisdiction as compulsory. In its Application, Cameroon referred to “an aggression by the Federal Republic of Nigeria, whose troops are occupying several Cameroonian localities on the Bakassi Peninsula”, and asked the Court, inter alia, to adjudge and declare that sovereignty over the Peninsula of Bakassi was Cameroonian, by virtue of international law, and that Nigeria had violated and was violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization (uti possidetis juris), as well as other rules of conventional and customary international law, and that Nigeria’s international responsibility was involved. Cameroon also requested the Court to proceed to prolong the course of its maritime boundary with Nigeria up to the limit of the maritime zone which international law placed under their respective jurisdictions.

On 6 June 1994, Cameroon filed in the Registry an Additional Application “for the purpose of extending the subject of the dispute” to a further dispute described as relating essentially “to the question of sovereignty over part of the territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad”, while also requesting the Court to specify definitively the frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria from Lake Chad to the sea. That Application was treated as an amendment to the initial Application. After Nigeria had raised certain preliminary objections, Cameroon presented, on 1 May 1996, a written statement of its observations and submissions relating thereto, in accordance with an Order of the President dated 10 January 1996. Moreover, on 12 February 1996, Cameroon, referring to the “grave incidents which [had] taken place between the . . . forces [of the Parties] in the Bakassi Peninsula since . . . 3 February 1996”, asked the Court to indicate provisional measures. By an Order dated 15 March 1996, the Court indicated a number of provisional measures aimed principally at putting an end to the hostilities.

The Court held hearings from 2 to 11 March 1998 on the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria. In its Judgment of 11 June 1998, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute and that Cameroon’s requests were admissible. The Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria and declared that, as the eighth did not have an exclusively preliminary character, it should be settled during the proceedings on the merits.

Nigeria filed its Counter-Memorial, including counter-claims, within the time-limit extended by the Court. On 30 June 1999, the Court adopted an Order declaring Nigeria’s counter-claims admissible and fixing 4 April 2000 as the time-limit for the filing of the Reply of Cameroon and 4 January 2001 as the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of Nigeria. In its Order, the Court also reserved the right of Cameroon to present its views in writing a second time on the Nigerian counter-claims in an additional pleading which might be the subject of a subsequent Order. The Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed. In January 2001, Cameroon informed the Court that it wished to present its views in writing a second time on Nigeria’s counter-claims. As Nigeria had no objection to that request, the Court authorized the presentation by Cameroon of an additional pleading relating exclusively to the counter-claims submitted by Nigeria. That pleading was duly filed within the time-limit fixed by the Court.

On 30 June 1999, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. Each of the two Parties having filed its written observations on that Application and Equatorial Guinea having informed the Court of its views with respect to them, the Court, by Order of 21 October 1999, authorized Equatorial Guinea to intervene in the case pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute, to the extent, in the manner and for the purposes set out in its Application. Equatorial Guinea filed a written statement and each of the Parties filed written observations on the latter within the time-limits fixed by the Court. Public hearings on the merits were held from 18 February to 21 March 2002.

In its Judgment of 10 October 2002, the Court determined as follows the course of the boundary, from north to south, between Cameroon and Nigeria :

In the Lake Chad area, the Court decided that the boundary was delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (between Great Britain and France) ; it found that the boundary started in the Lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint (whose co-ordinates it defined) and followed a straight line to the mouth of the River Ebeji as it was in 1931 (whose coordinates it also defined) and thence ran in a straight line to the point where the river today divided into two branches.
Between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court confirmed that the boundary was delimited by the following instruments :
- from the point where the River Ebeji bifurcated as far as Tamnyar Peak, by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 (paras. 2-60), as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 ;
- from Tamnyar Peak to pillar 64 referred to in Article XII of the Anglo- German Agreement of 12 April 1913, by the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946 ;
- from pillar 64 to the Bakassi Peninsula, by the Anglo-German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913.
The Court examined point by point seventeen sectors of the land boundary and specified for each one how the above-mentioned instruments were to be interpreted.
In Bakassi, the Court decided that the boundary was delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 (Arts. XVIII-XX) and that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lay with Cameroon. It decided that in that area the boundary followed the thalweg of the River Akpakorum (Akwayafe), dividing the Mangrove Islands near Ikang in the way shown on map TSGS 2240, as far as a straight line joining Bakassi Point and King Point.
As regards the maritime boundary, the Court, having established that it had jurisdiction to address that aspect of the case — which Nigeria had disputed —, fixed the course of the boundary between the two States’ maritime areas.

In its Judgment the Court requested Nigeria, expeditiously and without condition, to withdraw its administration and military or police forces from the area of Lake Chad falling within Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi Peninsula. It also requested Cameroon expeditiously and without condition to withdraw any administration or military or police forces which might be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which, pursuant to the Judgment, fell within the sovereignty of Nigeria. The latter had the same obligation in regard to territories in that area which fell within the sovereignty of Cameroon. The Court took note of Cameroon’s undertaking, given at the hearings, to “continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the [Bakassi] peninsula and in the Lake Chad area”. Finally, the Court rejected Cameroon’s submissions regarding the State responsibility of Nigeria, as well as Nigeria’s counter-claims.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 March 1994

Available in:

English French

Additional Application to the Application Instituting Proceedings brought by the Republic of Cameroon

6 June 1994

Available in:

English French

French

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1996/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 5 March 1996, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1996/3 (bilingual version)

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 21 October 1999

Decision on intervention; fixing of time-limits: Written Statement and Written Observations

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 20 February 2001

Authorizing of submission of pleading relating to Counter-claims and fixing of time-limit therefor

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Judgment of 10 October 2002

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 November 1998, the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia jointly notified the Court of a Special Agreement between the two States, signed at Kuala Lumpur on 31 May 1997 and having entered into force on 14 May 1998. In accordance with that Special Agreement, they requested the Court to determine, on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any other evidence furnished by them, to which of the two States sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belonged.

Shortly after the filing by the Parties of the Memorials, Counter-Memorials and Replies, the Philippines, on 13 March 2001, requested permission to intervene in the case. In its Application, the Philippines indicated that the object of its request was to

“preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights [of its Government] arising from its claim to dominion and sovereignty over the territory of North Borneo, to the extent that those rights [were] affected, or [might] be affected, by a determination of the Court of the question of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan”.

The Philippines specified that it was not seeking to become a party in the case. Further, the Philippines specified that “[its] Constitution . . . as well as its legislation ha[d] laid claim to dominion and sovereignty over North Borneo”. The Application for permission to intervene drew objections from Indonesia and Malaysia. Among other things, Indonesia stated that the Application should be rejected on the ground that it had not been filed in time and that the Philippines had not shown that it had an interest of a legal nature at issue in the case. Meanwhile, Malaysia added that the object of the Application was inadequate. The Court therefore decided to hold public sittings to hear the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, before ruling on whether to grant the Application for permission to intervene. Following those sittings, the Court, on 23 October 2001, delivered a Judgment by which it rejected the Application by the Philippines for permission to intervene.

After the holding of public sittings in June 2002, the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits on 17 December 2002. In that Judgment, it began by recalling the complex historical background of the dispute between the Parties. It then examined the titles invoked by them. Indonesia asserted that its claim to sovereignty over the islands was based primarily on a conventional title, the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands.

After examining the 1891 Convention, the Court found that, when read in the context and in the light of its object and purpose, that instrument could not be interpreted as establishing an allocation line determining sovereignty over the islands out to sea, to the east of the island of Sebatik, and that as a result the Convention did not constitute a title on which Indonesia could found its claim to Ligitan and Sipadan. The Court stated that that conclusion was confirmed both by the travaux préparatoires and by the subsequent conduct of the parties to the Convention. The Court further held that the cartographic material submitted by the Parties in the case did not contradict that conclusion.

Having rejected that argument by Indonesia, the Court turned to consideration of the other titles on which Indonesia and Malaysia claimed to found their sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. The Court sought to determine whether Indonesia or Malaysia obtained a title to the islands by succession. In that connection, it did not accept Indonesia’s contention that it retained title to the islands as successor to the Netherlands, which had allegedly acquired it through contracts concluded with the Sultan of Bulungan, the original title-holder. Nor did the Court accept Malaysia’s contention that it had acquired sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan following a series of alleged transfers of the title originally held by the former sovereign, the Sultan of Sulu, that title having allegedly passed in turn to Spain, to the United States, to Great Britain on behalf of the State of North Borneo, to the United Kingdom and finally to Malaysia.

Having found that neither of the Parties had a treaty-based title to Ligitan and Sipadan, the Court next considered the question whether Indonesia or Malaysia could hold title to the disputed islands by virtue of the effectivités cited by them. In that regard, the Court determined whether the Parties’ claims to sovereignty were based on activities evidencing an actual, continued exercise of authority over the islands, i.e., the intention and will to act as sovereign.

In that connection, Indonesia cited a continuous presence of the Dutch and Indonesian navies in the vicinity of Ligitan and Sipadan. It added that the waters around the islands had traditionally been used by Indonesian fishermen. In respect of the first of those arguments, it was the opinion of the Court that from the facts relied upon in the case “it [could] not be deduced . . . that the naval authorities concerned considered Ligitan and Sipadan and the surrounding waters to be under the sovereignty of the Netherlands or Indonesia”. As for the second argument, the Court considered that “activities by private persons [could] not be seen as effectivités if they [did] not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental authority”.

Having rejected Indonesia’s arguments based on its effectivités, the Court turned to the consideration of the effectivités relied on by Malaysia. As evidence of its effective administration of the islands, Malaysia cited inter alia the measures taken by the North Borneo authorities to regulate and control the collecting of turtle eggs on Ligitan and Sipadan, an activity of some economic significance in the area at the time. It relied on the Turtle Preservation Ordinance of 1917 and maintained that the Ordinance “[had been] applied until the 1950s at least” in the area of the two disputed islands. It further invoked the fact that the authorities of the colony of North Borneo had constructed a lighthouse on Sipadan in 1962 and another on Ligitan in 1963, that those lighthouses still existed and that they had been maintained by Malaysian authorities since its independence. The Court noted that

“the activities relied upon by Malaysia . . . [we]re modest in number but . . . they [we]re diverse in character and include[d] legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial acts. They cover[ed] a considerable period of time and show[ed] a pattern revealing an intention to exercise State functions in respect of the two islands in the context of the administration of a wider range of islands.”

The Court further stated that “at the time when these activities were carried out, neither Indonesia nor its predecessor, the Netherlands, [had] ever expressed its disagreement or protest”.

The Court concluded, on the basis of the above-mentioned effectivités, that sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belonged to Malaysia.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

2 November 1998

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

English French

Observations of the Government of Indonesia on the Philippines's Application for Permission to Intervene

2 May 2001

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English

Observations of the Government of Malaysia on the Philippines's Application for Permission to Intervene

2 May 2001

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 23 October 2001

Application by the Philippines for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Franck

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 17 December 2002

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Franck

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 2001/3

Summary of the Judgment of 23 October 2001

Available in:

English French

Summary 2002/2

Summary of the Judgment of 17 December 2002

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings against France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific region. France stated that it considered the Court manifestly to lack jurisdiction and refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings. By two Orders of 22 June 1973, the Court, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, indicated provisional measures to the effect, inter alia , that pending judgment France should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. By two Judgments delivered on 20 December 1974, the Court found that the Applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and that it was therefore not called upon to give any decision thereon. In so doing the Court based itself on the conclusion that the objective of Australia and New Zealand had been achieved inasmuch as France, in various public statements, had announced its intention of carrying out no further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of the 1974 series.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

9 May 1973

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1973 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 21, 22, 23 and 25 May 1973, President Lachs presiding, and on 22 June 1973, Vice-President Ammoun presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1974 (bilingual version)

Oral arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the public sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 July and 20 December 1974, President Lachs presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Order of 12 July 1973

Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Gros (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Petrén (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Onyeama (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

English French

Summary 1974/3

Summary of the Judgment of 20 December 1974

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 21 August 1995, the New Zealand Government filed in the Registry a document entitled “Request for an Examination of the Situation” in which reference was made to a “proposed action announced by France which will, if carried out, affect the basis of the Judgment rendered by the Court on 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case”, namely “a decision announced by France in a media statement of 13 June 1995” by the President of the French Republic, according to which “France would conduct a final series of eight nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific starting in September 1995”. In that Request, the Court was reminded that, at the end of its 1974 Judgment, it had found that it was not called upon to give a decision on the claim submitted by New Zealand in 1973, that claim no longer having any object, by virtue of the declarations by which France had undertaken not to carry out further atmospheric nuclear tests. That Judgment contained a paragraph 63 worded as follows

“Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court’s function to contemplate that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute . . .”

New Zealand asserted that this paragraph gave it the “right”, in such circumstances, to request “the resumption of the case begun by application on 9 May 1973”, and observed that the operative part of the Judgment concerned could not be construed as showing any intention on the part of the Court definitively to close the case. On the same day, the New Zealand Government also filed in the Registry a “Further Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures” in which reference was made, inter alia, to the Order for the indication of provisional measures made by the Court on 22 June 1973, which was principally aimed at ensuring that France would refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls.

After holding public hearings on 11 and 12 September 1995, the Court made its Order on 22 September 1995. The Court found that, when inserting into paragraph 63 the sentence “the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute”, it had not excluded a special procedure for access to it (unlike those mentioned in the Court’s Statute, such as the filing of a new application, or a request for interpretation or revision, which would have been open to the Applicant in any event) ; however, it found that that special procedure would only be available to the Applicant if circumstances were to arise which affected the basis of the 1974 Judgment. And that, it found, was not the case, as the decision announced by France in 1995 had related to a series of underground tests, whereas the basis of the Judgment of 1974 was France’s undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric nuclear tests. Consequently, New Zealand’s Request for provisional measures and the Applications for permission to intervene submitted by Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia as well as the Declarations of Intervention made by the last four States, all of which were proceedings incidental to New Zealand’s main request, likewise had to be dismissed.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

21 August 1995

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Summary of the Order of 22 September 1995

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El Salvador v. Honduras)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 11 December 1986, El Salvador and Honduras notified to the Court a Special Agreement whereby the Parties requested the Court to form a Chamber — consisting of three Members of the Court and two judges ad hoc — in order to (1) delimit the frontier line in the six sectors not delimited by the 1980 General Treaty of Peace concluded between the two States in 1980 and (2) determine the legal situation of the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca and the maritime spaces within and outside it. That Chamber was constituted by an Order of 8 May 1987. The time-limits for the written proceedings were fixed, but extended several times at the request of the Parties.

In November 1989, Nicaragua addressed to the Court an Application under Article 62 of the Statute for permission to intervene in the case, stating that, while it had no desire to intervene in the dispute concerning the land boundary, it wished to protect its rights in the Gulf of Fonseca (of which the three States are riparians), as well as “in order to inform the Court of the nature of the legal rights of Nicaragua which are in issue in the dispute”. Nicaragua further maintained that its request for permission to intervene was a matter exclusively within the procedural mandate of the full Court. The Court, by an Order adopted on 28 February 1990, found that it was for the Chamber formed to deal with the case to decide whether the Application for permission to intervene should be granted. Having heard the Parties and Nicaragua at a series of public sittings, the Chamber delivered its Judgment on 13 September 1990. It found that Nicaragua had shown that it had an interest of a legal nature which might be affected by part of the Judgment of the Chamber on the merits, with regard to the legal régime of the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca.

The Chamber on the other hand decided that Nicaragua had not shown such an interest which might be affected by any decision it might be required to make concerning the delimitation of those waters, or any decision as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces outside the Gulf or any decision as to the legal situation of the islands in the Gulf. Within the framework thus defined, the Chamber decided that Nicaragua was entitled to intervene in the case. A written statement of Nicaragua and written observations on that statement by El Salvador and Honduras were subsequently filed with the Court. The oral arguments of the Parties and the oral observations of Nicaragua were heard at 50 public sittings, held between April and June 1991. The Chamber delivered its Judgment on 11 September 1992.

The Chamber began by noting the agreement of both Parties that the fundamental principle for determining the land area is the uti possidetis juris, i.e., the principle, generally accepted in Spanish America, that international boundaries follow former colonial administrative boundaries. The Chamber was, moreover, authorized to take into account, where pertinent, a provision of the 1980 Peace Treaty that a basis for delimitation is to be found in documents issued by the Spanish Crown or any other Spanish authority during the colonial period, and indicating the jurisdictions or limits of territories, as well as other evidence and arguments of a legal, historical, human or any other kind. Noting that the Parties had invoked the exercise of government powers in the disputed areas and of other forms of effectivités, the Chamber considered that it might have regard to evidence of action of this kind affording indications of the uti possidetis juris boundary. The Chamber then considered successively, from west to east, each of the six disputed sectors of the land boundary, to which some 152 pages were specifically devoted.

With regard to the legal situation of the islands in the Gulf, the Chamber considered that, although it had jurisdiction to determine the legal situation of all the islands, a judicial determination was required only for those in dispute, which it found to be El Tigre, Meanguera and Meanguerita. It rejected Honduras’s claim that there was no real dispute as to El Tigre. Noting that in legal theory each island appertained to one of the Gulf States by succession from Spain, which precluded acquisition by occupation, the Chamber observed that effective possession by one of the States could constitute a post-colonial effectivité shedding light on the legal situation. Since Honduras had occupied El Tigre since 1849, the Chamber concluded that the conduct of the Parties accorded with the assumption that El Tigre appertained to it. The Chamber found Meanguerita, which is very small, uninhabited and contiguous to Meanguera, to be a “dependency” of Meanguera. It noted that El Salvador had claimed Meanguera in 1854 and that from the late nineteenth century the presence there of El Salvador had intensified, as substantial documentary evidence of the administration of Meanguera by El Salvador showed. A protest in 1991 by Honduras to El Salvador over Meanguera was considered too late to affect the presumption of acquiescence by Honduras. The Chamber thus found that Meanguera and Meanguerita appertained to El Salvador.

With respect to the maritime spaces within the Gulf, El Salvador claimed that they were subject to a condominium of the three coastal States and that delimitation would hence be inappropriate ; Honduras argued that within the Gulf there was a community of interests necessitating a judicial delimitation. Applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation to the Special Agreement and the Peace Treaty, the Chamber found that it had no jurisdiction to effect a delimitation, whether inside or outside the Gulf. As for the legal situation of the waters of the Gulf, the Chamber noted that, given its characteristics, the Gulf was generally acknowledged to be a historic bay. The Chamber examined the history of the Gulf to discover its “régime”, taking into account the 1917 Judgment of the Central American Court of Justice in a case between El Salvador and Nicaragua concerning the Gulf. In its Judgment, the Central American Court had found inter alia that the Gulf was a historic bay possessing the characteristics of a closed sea. Noting that the coastal States continued to claim the Gulf as a historic bay with the character of a closed sea, a position in which other nations acquiesced, the Chamber observed that its views on the régime of the historic waters of the Gulf coincided with those expressed in the 1917 Judgment. It found that the Gulf waters, other than the three-mile maritime belt, were historic waters and subject to the joint sovereignty of the three coastal States. It noted that there had been no attempt to divide the waters according to the principle of uti possidetis juris. A joint succession of the three States to the maritime area thus seemed to be the logical outcome of the uti possidetis principle. The Chamber accordingly found that Honduras had legal rights in the waters up to the bay closing line, which it considered also to be a baseline.

Regarding the waters outside the Gulf, the Chamber observed that entirely new concepts of law, unthought of when the Central American Court gave its Judgment in 1917, were involved, in particular those regarding the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, and found that, excluding a strip at either extremity corresponding to the maritime belts of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the three joint sovereigns were entitled, outside the closing line, to a territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, but must proceed to a division by mutual agreement. Lastly, as regards the effect of the Judgment on the intervening State, the Chamber found that it was not res judicata for Nicaragua.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

11 December 1986

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

English French

Reply of the Republic of El Salvador

15 December 1989

Available in:

English

Observations of the Government of the Republic of El Salvador

8 January 1990

Oral proceedings

Separate opinion Judge Shahabuddeen

English French Bilingual

Order of 28 February 1990

Application for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Oda

Summary of the Judgment of 13 September 1990

Available in:

English French

Summary 1992/4

Summary of the Judgment of 11 September 1992

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 April 1984 Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America, together with a Request for the indication of provisional measures concerning a dispute relating to responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. On 10 May 1984 the Court made an Order indicating provisional measures. One of these measures required the United States immediately to cease and refrain from any action restricting access to Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines. The Court also indicated that the right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed by Nicaragua, like any other State, should be fully respected and should not be jeopardized by activities contrary to the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force and to the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. The Court also decided in the aforementioned Order that the proceedings would first be addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court and of the admissibility of the Nicaraguan Application. Just before the closure of the written proceedings in this phase, El Salvador filed a declaration of intervention in the case under Article 63 of the Statute, requesting permission to claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Nicaragua’s Application. In its Order dated 4 October 1984, the Court decided that El Salvador’s declaration of intervention was inadmissible inasmuch as it related to the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings.

After hearing argument from both Parties in the course of public hearings held from 8 to 18 October 1984, on 26 November 1984 the Court delivered a Judgment stating that it possessed jurisdiction to deal with the case and that Nicaragua’s Application was admissible. In particular, it held that the Nicaraguan declaration of 1929 was valid and that Nicaragua was therefore entitled to invoke the United States declaration of 1946 as a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction (Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute). The subsequent proceedings took place in the absence of the United States, which announced on 18 January 1985 that it “intends not to participate in any further proceedings in connection with this case”. From 12 to 20 September 1985, the Court heard oral argument by Nicaragua and the testimony of the five witnesses it had called. On 27 June 1986, the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits. The findings included a rejection of the justification of collective self‑defence advanced by the United States concerning the military or paramilitary activities in or against Nicaragua, and a statement that the United States had violated the obligations imposed by customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State, not to use force against another State, not to infringe the sovereignty of another State, and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce. The Court also found that the United States had violated certain obligations arising from a bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956, and that it had committed acts such to deprive that treaty of its object and purpose.

It decided that the United States was under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all acts constituting breaches of its legal obligations, and that it must make reparation for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international law and the 1956 Treaty, the amount of that reparation to be fixed in subsequent proceedings if the Parties were unable to reach agreement. The Court subsequently fixed, by an Order, time‑limits for the filing of written pleadings by the Parties on the matter of the form and amount of reparation, and the Memorial of Nicaragua was filed on 29 March 1988, while the United States maintained its refusal to take part in the case. In September 1991, Nicaragua informed the Court, inter alia, that it did not wish to continue the proceedings. The United States told the Court that it welcomed the discontinuance and, by an Order of the President dated 26 September 1991, the case was removed from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

9 April 1984

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

29 March 1988

Available in:

English

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1984 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 25 and 27 April and 10 May 1984, President Elias presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1984 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 8 to 18 October and 26 November 1984, President Elias presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1985/17 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Merits - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 12 to 20 September 1985 and on 27 June 1986, President Nagendra Singh presiding

Order of 14 May 1984

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial (Jurisdiction and Admissibility)

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 October 1984

Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador

Procedure(s):Intervention

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 27 June 1986

Merits

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

This case, which was submitted to the Court in 1982 by Special Agreement between Libya and Malta, related to the delimitation of the areas of continental shelf appertaining to each of these two States. In support of its argument, Libya relied on the principle of natural prolongation and the concept of proportionality. Malta maintained that States’ rights over areas of continental shelf were now governed by the concept of distance from the coast, which was held to confer a primacy on the equidistance method of defining boundaries between areas of continental shelf, particularly when these appertained to States lying directly opposite each other, as in the case of Malta and Libya. The Court found that, in view of developments in the law relating to the rights of States over areas of continental shelf, there was no reason to assign a role to geographical or geophysical factors when the distance between the two States was less than 400 miles (as in the instant case). It also considered that the equidistance method did not have to be used and was not the only appropriate delimitation technique. The Court defined a number of equitable principles and applied them in its Judgment of 3 June 1985, in the light of the relevant circumstances. It took account of the main features of the coasts, the difference in their lengths and the distance between them. It took care to avoid any excessive disproportion between the continental shelf appertaining to a State and the length of its coastline, and adopted the solution of a median line transposed northwards over a certain distance. In the course of the proceedings, Italy applied for permission to intervene, claiming that it had an interest of a legal nature under Article 62 of the Statute. The Court found that the intervention requested by Italy fell, by virtue of its object, into a category which — on Italy’s own showing — was one which could not be accepted, and the Application was accordingly refused.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

26 July 1982

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

French

Counter-Memorial of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

26 October 1983

Available in:

English

Counter-Memorial of Malta

26 October 1983

Available in:

English

Written Observations on the Application for Permission to Intervene (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta)

5 December 1983

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English

Reply of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

12 July 1984

Available in:

English

Reply of the Republic of Malta

12 July 1984

Available in:

English

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1984/10 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 25 to 30 January and 21 March 1984, President Elias presiding

Judgments

Judgment of 21 March 1984

Application by Italy for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Summary 1984/1

Summary of the Judgment of 21 March 1984

Available in:

English French

Summary 1985/1

Summary of the Judgment of 3 June 1985

Available in:

English French

Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

By a Special Agreement notified to the Court in 1978, it was asked to determine what principles and rules of international law were applicable to the delimitation as between Tunisia and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of the respective areas of continental shelf appertaining to each. After considering arguments as well as evidence based on geology, physiography and bathymetry on the basis of which each party sought to support its claims to particular areas of the sea-bed as the natural prolongation of its land territory, the Court concluded, in a Judgment of 24 February 1982, that the two countries abutted on a common continental shelf and that physical criteria were therefore of no assistance for the purpose of delimitation. Hence it had to be guided by “equitable principles” (as to which it emphasized that this term cannot be interpreted in the abstract, but only as referring to the principles and rules which may be appropriate in order to achieve an equitable result) and by certain factors such as the necessity of ensuring a reasonable degree of proportionality between the areas allotted and the lengths of the coastlines concerned.

The Court found that the application of the equidistance method could not, in the particular circumstances of the case, lead to an equitable result. With respect to the course to be taken by the delimitation line, it distinguished two sectors : near the shore, it considered, having taken note of some evidence of historical agreement as to the maritime boundary, that the delimitation (beginning at the boundary point of Ras Adjir) should run in a north-easterly direction at an angle of approximately 26° ; further seawards, it considered that the line of delimitation should veer eastwards at a bearing of 52° to take into account the change of direction of the Tunisian coast to the north of the Gulf of Gabes and the existence of the Kerkennah Islands, to which a “half-effect” was attributed.

During the course of the proceedings, Malta requested permission to intervene, claiming an interest of a legal nature under Article 62 of the Court’s Statute. In view of the very character of the intervention for which permission was sought, the Court considered that the interest of a legal nature which Malta had invoked could not be affected by the decision in the case and that the request was not one to which, under Article 62, the Court might accede. It therefore rejected it.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

1 December 1978

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Available in:

English French

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1981 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Application for Permission to Intervene - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 19 to 23 March and on 14 April 1981, President Sir Humphrey Waldock, presiding

Judgments

Judgment of 14 April 1981

Application by Malta for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Morozov

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Schwebel

English French Bilingual

Summary 1981/1

Summary of the Judgment of 14 April 1981

Available in:

English French

Summary 1982/2

Summary of the Judgment of 24 February 1982

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings against France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific region. France stated that it considered the Court manifestly to lack jurisdiction and refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings. By two Orders of 22 June 1973, the Court, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, indicated provisional measures to the effect, inter alia, that pending judgment France should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. By two Judgments delivered on 20 December 1974, the Court found that the Applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and that it was therefore not called upon to give any decision thereon. In so doing the Court based itself on the conclusion that the objective of Australia and New Zealand had been achieved inasmuch as France, in various public statements, had announced its intention of carrying out no further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of the 1974 series.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

9 May 1973

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1973 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Pease Palace, The Hague, on 24 and 25 May 1973, President Lachs presiding, and on 22 June 1973, Vice-President Ammoun presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1974 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 10 and 11 July and 20 December 1974, President Lachs presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Order of 12 July 1973

Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Gros (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Petrén (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Onyeama (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

English French

Summary 1974/4

Summary of the Judgment of 20 December 1974

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

This case, a sequel to the earlier proceedings, was instituted by Colombia by means of a fresh Application. Immediately after the Judgment of 20 November 1950, Peru had called upon Colombia to surrender Mr. Haya de la Torre. Colombia refused to do so, maintaining that neither the applicable legal provisions nor the Court’s Judgment placed it under an obligation to surrender the refugee to the Peruvian authorities. The Court confirmed this view in its Judgment of 13 June 1951. It declared that the question was a new one, and that although the Havana Convention expressly prescribed the surrender of common criminals to the local authorities, no obligation of the kind existed in regard to political offenders. While confirming that diplomatic asylum had been irregularly granted and that on this ground Peru was entitled to demand its termination, the Court declared that Colombia was not bound to surrender the refugee ; these two conclusions, it stated, were not contradictory because there were other ways in which the asylum could be terminated besides the surrender of the refugee.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

13 December 1950

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Written proceedings

Memorial submitted on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Colombia (French version only)

7 February 1951

Available in:

French

Declaration of intervention by the Government of Cuba

13 March 1951

Letter from the Agent of the Government of Peru to the Registrar of the Court (French version only)

2 April 1951

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

French

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1951 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from May 15th to 17th, and on June 13th, 1951, the President, M. Basdevant, presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1951 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from May 15th May 1951, the President, M. Basdevant, presiding

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Order of 3 January 1951

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

English French

Press releases

Press release 1951/23