INTIZRNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY
OVER PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN
APPLICATION BY THE PHILIPPINES
FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
JUDGMENT OF 23 OCTOBER 2001
COIJR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
.AVISCC)NSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA SOUVERAINETÉ
SUR PULACr LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN
KEQUÊTE DES PHILIPPINES
À FIN D'INTERVENTION
A.RRÊTDU 23 OCTOBRE 2001 Official citatio:
Sovereignty over Puluu Ligitun und Puluu Sipudan (IndonesiulMuluysia),
Application ,for.Permission to Intervene, Judgment,
IC.J. Reports 2001, p. 575
Mode officiel de citation:
Souveraineté sur Puluu Ligitun et Pulau Sipadun (IndonC.sielMuluisie).
requete à,fin d'intervention, ur.r.L;t,
C.I.J.Rec~ieil200I, p. 575
Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441
NOde vente: 828
ISBN 92-1-070928-4 23 OCTOBER 2001
JUDGMENT
SOVER.EIGNTY OVER PULAU LIGITAN
AND PULAU SIPADAN
APPL.ICATION BY THE PHILIPPINES
FOR.PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
SOUVIZRAINETÉSUR PULAU LIGITAN
ET PULAU SIPADAN
REQUÊTE DES PHILIPPINES
À FIN D'INTERVENTION
23 OCTOBRE 2001
ARRET INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2001
2001
23 October
General List
No. 102 23 October 2001
CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER
PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN
APPLICATION BY THE PHILIPPINES
FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
Intcrilention under Article 62 offlie Siritute.
Article.81, purugrupli 1. ?/'the Ru1e.s(?/'Court - Ohligution to-file tlzeAppli-
c~.~tioor pertnission to irrtervenc "us .soonas po.s.rib/e.und no/ luter tliun the
clo.surrc?f'tli~c3rittepleudings" - Applicution subinitted ufter the,fi/ing qf the
Replies oj'the Purtics but hc</brethe Parties Iiad informed tlie Court of'their
ugreetnrnt not tojÏlc>Rr;joinders.notivith.stunding thepo.s.sibilitjqfso doing pro-
vided,for in the Speciul Agrernient - CVhetherApplicutiot~J0r pern?i.s.sionto
interverzciras submittrd "as soori US possiblc~"und "not luter tllun thc closure qf
the ivrittcn procredings".
Article 81, parugruph 3, of the Rules uf Court - Absencc of clocuments
anne.\-cdin support of the Applicatioti ,for pernik.sion to ititervene.
Article. 62 (v 'IILSJtutute und Article 81, purugruph 2 (c), of the Rules of
Court - Juri.sdirtionu1 link hetivecn thc Stutc .seckirig to Nztervene und the
Parties to tlicCU.SE - Whether unclin irlrut circ~utnstuticessuch a jurisdictioncil
link is rccluircd,/Orintervcwtion untfer Article 62.
Articlc~62 of' the Stritutr utid Articlc~81, purugruph 2 (a), qf rhe Rules of
Court - E.\-i.sfencof'crninterest <?f'ulegul nature ivhiclzmuy he qffkcferl bj a
dc>cisionoj'the Court - Cuse cancerning sovereignty ovcr trc~i.sl(~ri-,~ Stntc
seeking to intcrvene not c.luirningsovrreignty over thoscli.slanci.s but contending
tliut certuin reusonitlg in the Judg~ncnt of the Court rnuy uj'fict that State's
clcrin1to otlzrprferriforj- Whetlier the intcrest of u legai nature (?f'thc> Statc~
seeking tu intervenr islitnitrd to the dispositif cilorle of' tliejudgtnent thut the
Court ivillgive in the case or ivhcthrr it includ~.~ ul.sotlir rcwsoningin thrjudg-
rnent - Proof of the c~si.stence of'un interest of'u lcgul nrlturc3:burdeti und
extent - Wliethrr &nicil (?fcic~c.r.tso.sthe docutnent.~in tlie (.u.seto Stut~ .seetking
to infervene prcventctl it frorn icientifj'ingifs Icgul interr~-t Legal instruiizcwts
relier/ upon bj, the Purties to tlic tnuiti procec,r/ing-s Legul ~~S~~UIII~~IIrcliedupon hy the State seeking tu interi,e-e Efict on thr cluim (!/'the Stute seek-
ing to interime of'fhes~ in.strument.sheinR tukcn into account hy the Cour-
Whether in the circurn.stunc.csthe Stute seeking to intervene disc,lrurgcdits hur-
clenqf detnonstrating the e.l-istenceof ut?interoftu legul nuture thut muy he
uff&c.tedin relation to thcse instrurncnt.~.
Artici~ 81, puragraph 2 (b). c!f'the Rul(ofsCourt - "Preci.rcobjclctuf'the
intervention"- SrureJ object uf'intrrventio(1) to pre.cerveund .suf&guizrdthe
hi.storicu1und legal rights (!/'the Strrte sccking to interilene thut n2u.yhc ujfi'ctcd
hj the ilec~i.sofothe Court. (2) to infi~r~ntl~eCourtofthe nature irnrlr.utent
c?fthose rights, and (3) to clpprec,iutcniore ,fulij3the irit~i.sl~cnsah/rcole of'the
Court in cotnprelien.sii~cconfiict pri~i~rntion.
JUDGMENT
Present: President GUILLAUME V:~L.C-Pr(~.sidc>tzIt; Jt~dgc'.sODA, RANJEVA,
FLEISCHHAUK EO,ROMA V,LRESHCHET HIIC,GINSP,ARKA-ARANGURFN,
KOOIJMANR S,EZEK.AL-KHASAWNEB HU.ERGENTHA JL;~1gesd hoc
WEEKAMANTR FRYA, NCK;RcgistrcrrC~I.VRI.C'K.
In the case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan,
the Republic of Indonesia,
represented by
H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Director General for Political Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Abdul Irsan, Ambassador of lndonesia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent ;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University ofParis X-Nanterre, Member of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Member of the
New York Bar, Frere CholmeleylEversheds. Paris
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Alfred H. A. Soons, Professor of Public International Law, Utrecht Uni-
versity,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Member of the
Rome Bar, Frere CholnieleyIEversheds, Paris,
Mr. Charles Claypoole, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and
Wales, Frere CholmeleylEversheds, Paris,
as Counsel: Mr. Hasyim Saleh, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia in the Netherlands,
Mr. DonniloAnwar, Director for Treaties and Legal Affairs, Department of
Foreign Affairs,
Major-General Djokomulono, Territorial Assistant to Chief of Staff for Ter-
ritorial Affairs, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Rear-Admiral Yoos F. Menko, Intelligence Assistant to Chief of Staff for
General Affairs, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Mr. Kria Fahmi Pasaribu, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia in the Netherlands,
Mr. Eddy Pratomo, Head of Sub-Directorate forTerritorial Treaties, Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Abdul Kadir Jaelani, Officer, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in
the Netherlands.
as Advisers,
Malaysia,
represented by
H.E. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad. Secretary General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Ms Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International
Law, University of Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit interna-
tional,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot, Emeritus Professor, Universitéde Paris 1, Advocate,
Paris and Brussels Bars,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law,
University of Cambridge, Member of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Nico Schrijver,Professor of International Law, Free University Amster-
dam and Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Datuk Heliliah Yusof, Solicitor General of Malaysia,
Mrs. Halima Hj. Nawab Khan, Acting State Attorney-General of Sabah,
Mr. Athmat Hassan, Legal Officer, Sabah State Attorney-General's
Chambers,
as Counsel;
H.E. Ambassador Hussin Nayan. Under-Secretary, Territorial and Maritime
Affairs Division. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Muhamad bin Mustafa, Deputy Director-General, National Security
Division, Prime Minister's Department,
as Advisers ;
Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Principal Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime
Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Raja Aznam Nazrin, Counsellor of the Embassy of Malaysia in the
Netherlands,
Mr. Nik Aziz Nik Yahya, First Secretary of the Embassy of Malaysia in the
Philippines,
Mr. Tan Ah Bah, Principal Assistant Director of Survey. Boundary Divi-
sion, Department of Survey and Mapping,
Ms Haznah Md. Hashim, Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime
Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Shaharuddin Onn, Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime Affairs
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as administrative staff;
on the Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of the Philip-
pines,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Eloy R. Bello Ill, Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. Merlin M. Magallona, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;
Mr. W. Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International
Law of Yale Law School. associéde l'Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Peter Payoyo, University of the Philippines,
as Counsel;
Mr. Alberto A. Encomienda, Secretary-General, Maritime and Ocean Affairs
Center, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Alejandro B. Mosquera, Assistant Secretary, Office of Legal Affairs,
Department of Foreign Affàirs,
Mr. George A. Eduvala, Attaché. Embassy of the Republic of the Philip-
pines in the Netherlands,
Mr. Eduardo M. R. Menez, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of
the Philippines in the Netherlands,
Mr. lgor G. Bailen, Acting Director, Office of Legal Affairs, Department of
Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers,
composed as above,
after deliberation. delivrrs the,following Judgmrnt :
1. Byjoint letter dated 30 September 1998,filed in the Registry of the Court
on 2 November 1998,the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indo-
nesia (hereinafter "lndonesia") and of Malaysia informed the Registrar of a
Special Agreement between the two States. which was signed in Kuala Lumpur
on 31 May 1997 and entered into force on 14 May 1998, the date of the
exchange of instruments of ratification.
In accordance with theaforementioned SpecialAgreement, the Parties request
the Court to
"determine on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any other evidence
furnished by the Parties, whether sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan belongs to the Republic of Indonesia or to Malaysia";
in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Special Agreement, the Parties agreed that
the written pleadings should consist of the following documents:
"(a) a Memorial presented simultaneously by each of the Parties not
later than 12months after the notification of this Special Agreement
to the Registry of the Court;
(h) a Counter-Memorial presented by each of the Parties not later than
4 months after the dateon which each has received the certifiedcopy
of the Memorial of the other Party;
(c) a Reply presented by each of the Parties not later than 4 months
after the date on which each has received the certified copy of the
Counter-Memorial of the other Party; and
(d) a Rejoinder, if the Parties so agree or if the Court decides ex officio
or at the request of one of the Parties that this part of the proceed-
ings is necessary and the Court authorizes or prescribes the presen-
tation of a Rejoinder".
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, copies of
the joint notification and of the Special Agreement were transmitted by the
Registrar to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Members of the
United Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court.
3. By an Order dated 10 November 1998, the Court, having regard to the
provisions of the Special Agreement concerning the written pleadings, fixed
2 November 1999and 2 March 2000 as the respective time-limits for the filing
by each of the Parties of a Memorial and then a Counter-Memorial. The
Memorials were filed within the prescribed time-limit. By joint letter of
18August 1999,the Parties asked the Court to extend to 2 July 2000 the time-
limit for the filing of their Counter-Memorials. By an Order dated 14Septem-
ber 1999,the Court agreed to that request. Byjoint letter of 8 May 2000, the
Parties requested the Court for a further extension of one month to the time-
limit for the filing of their Counter-Memorials. By Order of 11May 2000, the
President of the Court also agreed to that request. The Parties' Counter-
Memorials were filed within the time-limit as thus extended.
4. Under the terms of the Special Agreement, the two Parties were to file a
Reply not later than four months after the date on which each had received the
certified copy of theCounter-Menlorial of the other Party. Byjoint letter dated
14October 2000, the Parties asked the Court to extend this time-limit by three
months. By an Order dated 19October 2000, the President of the Court fixed2 March 2001 as the time-limit for the filing byeach of the Parties of a Reply.
The Replies were filed within the prescribed time-limit. In view of the fact that
the Special Agreement provided for the possible filing of a fourth pleading by
each ofthe Parties, the latter informed the Court byjoint letter of 28 March 2001
that they did not wish to produce any further pleadings. Nor did the Court
itself ask forsuch pleadings.
5. Since the Court did not include upon the Bench a judge of Indonesian or
Malaysian nationality, both Parties exercised their right under Article 31,
paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: Indo-
nesia chose Mr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen and Malaysia Mr. Christopher
Gregory Weeramantry.
6. By letter of 22 February 2001, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (hereinafter "the Philippines"), invoking Article 53, paragraph 1,of
the Rules of Court, asked the Court to furnish it with copies of the pleadings
and documents annexed which had been filed by the Parties. Pursuant to that
provision, the Court, having ascertained the viewsof the Parties, decided that it
was not appropriate, in the circumstances, to grant the Philippine request. The
Registrar communicated that decision to the Philippines, Indonesia and Malay-
sia by letters dated 15 March 2001.
7. On 13 March 2001, the Philippines filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application for permission to intervene in the case, invoking Article 62 of the
Statute of the Court. In that Application, the Philippines explained that it con-
sidered its "request for copies of the pleadings and documents annexed as an
act separate and distinct from [that] Application" and that the latter "does not
affect, and is independent from, the earlier submissions made by the Philippine
Government". According to the Application, the Philippine interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by a decision in the present case "is solely and
exclusively addressed to the treaties, agreements and other evidence furnished
by Parties and appreciated by the Court which have a direct or indirect bearing
on the matter of the legal status of North Borneo". The Philippines also indi-
cated that the object of the intervention requested was,
"(LI) First, to preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines arising from its claim
to dominion and sovereignty over the territory of North Borneo, to
the extent that these rights are affected, or may be affected, by a
determination of the Court of the question of sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
(b) Second, to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Honourable Court of the nature and extent of the historical and
legal rights of the Republic of the Philippines which may be affected
by the Court's decision.
(c) Third, to appreciate more fully the indispensable role of the
Honourable Court in comprehensive conflict prevention and not
merely for the resolution of legal disputes."
The Philippines further stated in its Application that it did not seek to become
a party to the dispute before the Court concerning sovereignty over Pulau Ligi-
tan and Pulau Sipadan, and that the Application "is based solely on Article 62581 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (J~JDGMENT)
of the Statute, which does not require a separate title of jurisdiction as a
requirement for this Application to prosper".
8. On 14 March 2001, pursuant to Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of
Court, the Registrar transmitted copies of the Application for permission to
intervene to the two Parties in the case, Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as to
the United Nations Secretary-General, the Members of the United Nations and
other States entitled to appear before the Court. At thesame time, both Parties
to the case were invited to furnish, by 2 May 2001 at the latest, their written
observations on the Application for permission to intervene; each of them sub-
mitted such observations within the time-limit fixed for that purpose. Those
observations were exchanged between the Parties and transmitted to the
Philippines. In their written observations, both Indonesia and Malaysia objected
to the Application for permission to intervene submitted by the Philippines.
Accordingly, by letters of 11May 2001 the Parties and the Philippine Govern-
ment were notified that the Court would hold public sittings pursuant to
Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court to hear the views of the Philip-
pines, the State seeking to intervene, and those of the Parties in the case.
9. Mr. Shahabuddeen, judge ad hoc, having resigned his duties on
20 March 2001, Indonesia informed the Court, by letter received in the Regis-
try on 17 May 2001, that its Government had chosen Mr. Thomas Franck to
replace him.
10. The Court, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that the
written observations of both Parties on the Application for permission to inter-
vene, and the documents annexed thereto, would be made accessible to the
public on the opening of the oral proceedings.
11. At the public sittings held on 25, 26, 28 and 29 June 2001, the Court
heard oral statements and replies from the following in regard to the question
whether the Philippine Application for permission to intervene should be
granted :
For the Philippines: H.E. Mr. Eloy R. Bello III,
Mr. Michael Reisman,
Mr. Merlin M. Magallona.
For Indonesiu: H.E. Mr. Hassan Wirajuda.
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy.
For Muluysia : H.E. Mr. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,
Mr. James Crawford.
12. In its Application for permission to intervene, the Government of the
Philippines stated in conclusion that it
"requests the Honourable Court to recognize the propriety and validity of
thisApplication for permission to intervene in the proceedings between the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malay-
sia, to grant the same, and to participate in those proceedings in accord-
ance with Article 85 of the Rules of Court" (para. 8).582 PULAU LlGlTAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
In its written observations on the Applicationby the Philippines for permis-
sion to intervene, Indonesia concludedthat "the Philippines ha[d] not demon-
strated that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by a
decision in the case and that the Application should, accordingly, be denied"
(para. 17).
In its written observations on the Application by the Philippines for permis-
sion to intervene, Malaysia concluded as follows: "not merely has the Philip-
pines no right to intervene, it has no claim to make. Malaysia urges theCourt
to reject the request." (Para. 50.)
13. At the oral proceedings, it was stated by way of conclusion that:
On heliuy of'the Governrnrnt ofthe Philippines.
at the hearing of 28 June 2001
"The Government of the Republic of the Philippines seeksthe remedies
provided for in Article 85 of the Rules of Court, namely,
- paragraph 1 : 'the interveningState shall be supplied with copiesof the
pleadings and documents annexed and shall be entitled to submit a
written statement within a time-limit to be fixed by the Court'; and
- paragraph 3: 'the intervening State shall be entitled, in the course of
the oral proceedings, to submit its observationswith respectto the sub-
ject-matter of the intervention'."
On bellalfof the Government of Indonesiu,
at the hearing of 29 June 2001 :
"The Republic of Indonesia respectfully submits that the Republic
of the Philippines should not be granted the right to intervene in the case
concerning Sovereignty over PulauLigitan and PulaziSipadan (Indonesial
Mula,vsiu) ."
On hehalfof the Government of Malaysiu,
at the hearing of 29 June 2001: "[Malaysia requests] that the Court should
reject the Philippines Application".
14. The Philippine Application for permission to intervene relates to
the case, brought to the Court by notification of the Special Agreement
concluded on 31 May 1997 between Indonesia and Malaysia, concerning
sovereignty over two islands, Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (see para-
graph 1 above). The intervention which the Philippines seeks to make is
linked to its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo (see paragraph 7
above).
15. In its Application, the Philippines invokesArticle 62 of the Statute
of the Court, which provides:
"1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request."
16. Paragraph 1of Article 81 of the Rules of Court provides that the583 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
application for permission to intervene shall "be filedas soon as possible,
and not later than the closure of the written proceedings" and that "[iln
exceptional circumstances, an application submitted at a later stage may
however be admitted".
Article 81, paragraph 2, also provides that the State seeking to inter-
vene must specify the case to which its application relates, and set out:
"(a) the interest of a legal nature which the State applying to inter-
vene considers may be affected by the decision in that case;
(h) the precise object of the intervention;
(c) any basis of jurisdiction which is claimed to exist as between
the State applying to intervene and the parties to the case".
Paragraph 3 of Article 81further provides that an application for per-
mission to intervene "shall contain a list of the documents in support,
which documeiits shall be attached".
17. The Philippines maintains that its Application to intervene satisfies
both the requirements of Article 62 of the Statute of the Court and those
of Article 81 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, both Indonesia
and Malaysia oppose the Application by the Philippines on the grounds
that the various requirements have not been met.
18. The Court will initially consider the contention that the Applica-
tion to intervene should not be granted, first, because of its late sub-
mission by the Philippines, and secondly, because of the failure of the
Philippines to annex documentary or other evidence in support of
the Application.
19. Both lndonesia and Malaysia argue that the Philippine Applica-
tion should not be granted because of its "untimely riature".
Indonesia maintains that :
"[iln view of the fact that the Parties do not consider that there is
any need for further written submissions on the merits of the case
and that the Philippines'Application was filedafter the final submis-
sions of the Parties, the Application should be dismissed as untimely
pursuant to Article 81 (1) of the Rules of Court".
It considers that the Philippines "has failed to demonstrate that any .. .
exceptional circiimstances exist justifying the filing of its Application at
such a late stage of the proceedings", and concludes that:
"[tlo admit the Application at this stage of the proceedings would
inevitably entai1 a significant delay in the case being heard by the584 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
Court to the prejudice of the Parties. In these circumstances, Indo-
nesia submits that the Philippines' Application should be dismissed
as untimely."
At the hearings, Malaysia associated itself in the following terms with
the objection in regard to the alleged procedural delay raised by Indo-
nesia: "That issue has been fully dealt with by Indonesia. We agree with
what they have said; we simply feel no need to add to it."
For its part, the Philippines argues that "the fact is that not onlys the
Philippines within al1the time-limits, it could not, as a logical and prac-
tical matter, have submitted its request any sooner". The Philippines
emphasizes that :
"[iln the nature of the case, the Philippines could hardly have
requested permission to intervene under Article 62 before it tried to
secure the documents. And it was only when it became apparent that
the request for the documents was not going to be granted, that the
Philippines requested permission to intervene."
20. The Court will consider this objection ratione temporis by apply-
ing the relevant requirements of its Rules dealing with the intervention
procedure to the factual circumstances of the case.
Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, referred to above (see
paragraph 16), stipulates that:
"[aln application for permission to intervene under the terms of
Article 62 of the Statute, . .. shall be filed as soon as possible,
and not later than the closure of the written proceedings. ln excep-
tional circumstances, an application submitted at a later stage may
however be admitted."
The Court recalls that the Special Agreement between Indonesia and
Malaysia was registered with the United Nations on 29 July 1998 and
notified to the Court on 2 November 1998.Pursuant to Article 40, para-
graph 3, of the Statute of the Court and Article 42 of the Rules of
Court, copies of the notification and of the Special Agreement were
transmitted to al1the Members of the United Nations and other States
entitled to appear before the Court (see paragraph 2 above). Thus, the
Philippines had been aware that the Court had been seised of the dis-
pute between Indonesia and Malaysia for more than two years before it
filed its Application to intervene in the proceedings under Article 62 of
the Statute. Bythe time of the filing of the Application, 13March 2001,
the Parties had already completed three rounds of written pleadings as
provided for as mandatory in the Special Agreement - Memorials,
Counter-Memorials and Replies - their time-limits being a matter of
public knowledge. Moreover, the Agent for the Philippines stated dur-
ing the hearings that his Government "was conscious of the fact that
after 2 March 2001, Indonesia and Malaysia might no longer considerthe need to submit a final round of pleadings as contemplated in their
Special Agreement".
21. Given these circumstances, the time chosen for the filing of the
Application by the Philippines can hardly be seen as meeting the require-
ment that it be filed "as soon as possible" as contemplated in Article 81,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court. This requirement which, although
when taken on its own might be regarded as not sufficiently specific,is
nevertheless essential for an orderly and expeditious progress of the pro-
cedure before the Court. In view of the incidental character of interven-
tion proceedings, it emphasizes the need to intervene before the principal
proceedings have reached too advanced a stage. In one of the recent
cases, dealing with another type of incidental proceeding the Court
observed that: "the sound administration of justice requires that a request
for the indication of provisional measures . . be submitted in good time"
(LaGrund (Germuny v. United Stutes of America), Provi.~ionu Meus-
ures, Order ($3 March 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 19%) (I), p. 14,para. 19).
The same applies to an application for permission to intervene, and
indeed even more so, given that an express provision to that effect is
included in Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
22. As to the argument of the Philippines that the delay in the filingof
its Application for permission to intervene was caused by its wish firstto
secure accessto the pleadings of the Parties, the Court does not find any-
thing in its Rules or practice to support the view that there exists an
inextricable link between the two procedures or, for that matter, that the
requirement of the timeliness of the Application for permission to inter-
vene may be made conditional on whether or not the State seeking to
intervene is granted access to the pleadings. Furthermore, the Philippine
argument is undermined by the fact that the Philippines asked the Court
to furnish it with copies of the pleadings and other documents of the
Parties only on 22 February 2001, that is less than ten days before the
completion of the last compulsory round of written pleadings. It is not
unusual in the practice of the Court that in reliance on Article 53, para-
graph 1,of its Rules, States entitled to appear before the Court ask to be
furnished with copies of the pleadings of the Parties atan early stage of
the written proceedings (see, for example, case concerning the Continen-
tal Sheij'(TunisialLibyatz Arab Jamuhiriyu), Application for Permission
to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 5, para. 4; case concern-
ing Conrinentul Shelf' (Libyun Arab JutnrzhiriyalMaltu), Application jor
Permission to 1r7tervene,Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 5, para. 4).
23. The Court notes, however, that despite the filing of the Applica-
tion at a late stage in the proceedings, which does not accord with the
stipulation of a general character contained in Article 81, paragraph 1,of
the Rules requiring that "[aln application for permission to intervene . ..
shall be filed as soon as possible", the Philippines cannot be held to be
in violation of the requirement of the same Article, which establishes a586 PULAU LlGlTAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
specific deadline for an application for permission to intervene, namely
'hot later than the closure of the written proceedings".
24. It will be recalled that the Special Agreement provided for the pos-
sibility of one more round of written pleadings - the exchange of
Rejoinders - "if the Parties so agree or if the Court decides so ex officio
or at the request of one of the Parties". It was only on 28 March 2001
that the Parties notified the Court by joint letter "that [their] Govern-
ments . . ha[d] agreed that it is not necessary to exchange Rejoinders".
Thus, although the third round of written pleadings terminated on
2 March 2001, neither the Court nor third States could know on the date
of the filing of the Philippine Application whether the written proceed-
ings had indeed come to an end. In any case, the Court could not have
"closed" them before it had been notified of the views of the Parties con-
cerning a fourth round of pleadings contemplated by Article 3, para-
graph 2 (d), of the Special Agreement. Even after 28 March 2001, in
conformity with the same provision of the Special Agreement, the Court
itself could ex officio "authoriz[e] or prescrib[e] the presentation of a
Rejoinder", which the Court did not do.
25. For these reasons, the filing of the Philippine Application on
13March 2001 cannot be viewed as made after the closure of the written
proceedings and remained within the specific time-limit prescribed by
Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
In somewhat similar circumstances,dealing with the Nicaraguan Appli-
cation for permission to intervene in the case concerning the Lund, Islund
und Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sulv~tdorlHonduras),a Chamber of
the Court Sound that, since the Special Agreement included a provision
for a possible further exchange of pleadings, even when the Replies of the
Parties had been filed, "the date of the closure of the written proceedings,
within the meaning of Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
would remain still to be finally determined" (1.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 98,
para. 12). The Court had pronounced itself in similar terms some ten
years earlier in the case concerning the ContinentulShrlj" (TunisiulLibyun
Arub Jumahiriya), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment
(I.C.J. Reports 1981, p.6, para. 5), although in the latter proceedings the
question of timeliness was not in issue.
26. The Court therefore concludes that it cannot uphold the objection
raised by Indonesia and Malaysia based on the alleged untimely filing of
the Philippine Application.
27. Article 81, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court provides that an
application for permission to intervene "shall contain a list of documents
in support, which documents shall be attached". In relation to this
requirement, Indonesia argues in its written observations that "[iln so far as it is claimed that the Philippines' request is directed to
safeguarding its historical andlegal rights over the territory of North
Borneo, such an alleged interest is unsupported by any documentary
or other evidence contrary to the requirements of Article 81 (3) of
the Rules of Court".
For its part, Malaysia submitted no argument on this point.
28. The Philippines states that the fact that it has not annexed a list of
documents in support of its Application does not concern the question of
the admissibility of the Application, but rather that of evidence. It main-
tains that it was left with only two options: either "to try to document
and argue [its] entire case for North Borneo, which would be impermis-
sible and would be an affront to the Court, and would, [it] believe[s],
properly be rejected by the Court" or "to decide not to attach documents,
since [it] could not know which ones would be relevant to the pending
case", with the risk that, in the latter case, one of the Parties would then
complain about the failure to annex documents.
29. The Court confines itself to observing in this regard that, while
Article 81, paragraph 3,of the Rules of Court indeed provides that the
application shall contain a list of any documents in support, there is no
requirement that the State seeking to intervene necessarily attach any
documents to its application in support. It is only where such documents
have in fact been attached to the said application that a list thereof must
be included. A Chamber of the Court took care to emphasize, "it is for a
State seeking to intervene to demonstrate convincingly what it asserts,
and thus to bear the burden of proof' (Land Islunciand Marititne Fron-
tirr Di.spute (El Sali~arlorlHondurus), Application to Interverze, Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports lYYO,p. 117, para. 61). The Court considers, how-
ever, that the choice of the means whereby the State wishing to intervene
seeks to prove its assertions lies in the latter's sole discretion. In the
Court's view, paragraph 3 of Article 81 of its Rules has the same pur-
pose, tnututis tnufaizdi~,as paragraph 3 of Article 50 of the said Rules,
which provides that "[a] list of al1documents annexed to a pleading shall
be furnished at the time the pleading is filed". It follows that the Philip-
pine Application for permission to intervene cannot be rejected on the
basis of Article 81, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.
30. The Court therefore concludes that the Philippine Application was
not filed out of time and contains no formal defect which would prevent
it from being granted. 31. The Court will now consider the objections based on the absence
of a jurisdictional link.
32. In this regard, Malaysia contends that:
"in the present case the jurisdictional link is . . twice lacking.
First, there is no conventional instrument or unilateral declaration
giving the Court jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the territorial dis-
pute between the Philippines and either one of the Parties to thecase;
Second, both Parties in the present case oppose a request for inter-
vention by the Philippines."
Accordingly, it argues that the Philippine Application cannot be
accepted by the Court.
Indonesia presented no argument in this respect.
33. For its part, the Philippines has made it clear that it does not seek
to become a party to the dispute submitted to the Court by Indonesia
and Malaysia. It further States that its Application for permission to
intervene "is based solely on Article 62 of the Statute, which does not
require a separate title of jurisdiction as a requirement for this Applica-
tion to prosper", and that accordingly it should be granted.
34. TheCourt recalls that, under the terms of Article 62 of the Statute:
"1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request."
35. As a Chamber of the Court has already had occasion to observe:
"Intervention under Article 62 of the Statute is for the purpose of
protecting a State's 'interest of a legal nature' that might be affected
by a decision in an existing case already established between other
States, namely the parties to the case. It is not intended to enable a
third State to tack on a new case . . . An incidental proceeding can-
not be one which transforms [a] case into a different case with dif-
ferent parties." (Lund, Islund und Marititne Frontirr Dispute (El Sal-
vudorlHorzdurtrs),Application to Interi~ene,Judgnient, 1.C.J. Reports
1990. pp. 133-134,paras. 97-98.)
Moreover, as that same Chamber pointed out, and as the Court itself
has recalled :
"lt . . . follow... from the juridical natureand from the purposes
of intervention that the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction
between the would-be intervener and the parties is not a requirement
for the success of the application. On the contrary, the procedure of
intervention is to ensure that a State with possibly affected interests
may be permitted to intervene even though there is no jurisdictional
link and it therefore cannot become a party." (Ihid, p. 135,para. 100;
Lund trnd Muritirlle Bountluy*hctii.c.crzCrir~~croo rzztlNig~riu,Appli- cation to Intervenc, Order of 21 Octobrr 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999
(II), pp. 1034-1035, para. 15.)
Thus, such a jurisdictional link between the intervening State and the
Parties to the case is required only if the State seeking to intervene is
desirous of "itself becoming a party to the case" (Land, Islanciund Mari-
time Frontier Dispute (El SalvadorlHondurus), Application to Interilene.
Judgmrnt, 1. C. J. Reports 1990, p. 135, para. 99).
36. That is not the situation here. The Philippines is seeking to inter-
vene in the case as a non-party. Hence the absence of a jurisdictional link
between the Philippines and the Parties to the main proceedings does not
present a bar to the Philippine intervention.
37. The Court will now consider the arguments that the Application to
intervene cannot be granted for the reasons, first, that the Philippines has
not established the existence of an "interest of a legal nature" justifying
the intervention sought, and, secondly, that the object of the intervention
would be inappropriate.
38. In relation to the existence of an "interest of a legal nature" justi-
fying the intervention, the Philippines contends that:
"Under Article 2 of the Special Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of lndonesia and the Government of Malaysia,
the Court has been requested to determine the issue of sovereignty
over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 'on the basis of treaties,
agreements and any other evidence' to be furnished by the Parties.
The interest of the Republic of the Philippines is solely and exclu-
sively addressed to the treaties, agreements and other evidence fur-
nished by Parties and appreciated by the Court which have a direct
or indirect bearing on the matter of the legal status of North Borneo.
The legal status of North Borneo is a matter that the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines considers as its legitimate concern."
The Philippines adds that
"[a] decision by the Court, or that incidental part of a decision by
the Court, which lays down an appreciation of specific treaties,
agreements and other evidence bearing on the legal status of North
Borneo will inevitably and most assuredly affect the outstanding ter-
ritorial claim of the Republic of the Philippines to North Borneo, as
well as the direct legal right and interest of the Philippines to settle
that claim by peaceful means". In outlining its claim, the Philippines has referred interuliu to Sec-
tion 3 of the Republic Act 5446 (which makes an implicit allusion to a
claim to title in North Borneo) and to the Manila Accord of 31 July 1963,
between Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya and the Philippines, in
which specific reference is made to the Philippine claim to North Borneo
and "cognizance of the position regarding the Philippine claim to Sabah
(North Borneo)" is taken by the Heads of Government of these three
States.
39. The Philippines refers to the fact that access to the pleadings and to
the annexed documents filed by the Parties was denied to it by the Court
and indicates that it thereby suffered from a handicap not encountered by
intervening States in previous cases of intervention brought before the
Court; it contends that it therefore could not "say with any certainty
whether and which treaties, agreements and facts are in issue". The Phil-
ippines argues that "[flor some cases, the publication of [a] special agree-
ment, in and of itself, is enough to convince the third State that its interest
may be affected" and offers as an example a special agreement between
two States requesting the Court to delimit a comprehensive maritime
boundary; in such a case a third State can easily determine on the basis of
the special agreement whether the prospective delimitation may poten-
tially affect an interest of a legal nature of that third State. The Philip-
pines argues that, on the other hand, "when the possibility of a decision
affecting an interest of a third State is not certain and not graphic and is
contingent on further information and specifications, the mere publication
of the special agreement may not provide sufficient information". Accord-
ing to the Philippines, a procedure whereby an intervening State must
define and establish the interest of a legal nature in question without being
authorized to have notice of the written briefs submitted by the parties to
the case would be equivalent to a denial of justice.
The Philippines asserts that as long as it does not have access to the
documents filed by the Parties and does not know their content, it will
not be able to explain really what its interest is.
40. The Philippines emphasizes that "Article 62 does not say that
the intervening State must have a 'legal interest' or 'lawful interest' or
'substantial interest"', and that the "threshold for the invocation of
Article 62 is, as a result. a subjective standard: the State requesting
permission to intervene must 'consider' that it has an interest". The
Philippines asserts that "[tlhe criteria are not to prove a legal or lawful
interest, but to 'identify the interest of a legal nature' and 'to show in
what way [it] may be affected"'. In this regard, the Philippines maintains
that
"In so far as any treaty or agreement that Malaysia is relying on
in the present case to sustain its claim to Ligitan and Sipadan
depends on the interpretation that lodges international title to North
Borneo in the British North Borneo Company, that interpretation adversely affects an interest of a legal nature which the Philippines
considers that it has."
The Philippines states that it agrees
"entirely with the jurisprudence of the Court in Tuni.siulLihya and
Nicuruguu that a concern about rules and general principles of law
does not constitute sufficient interest under Article 62",
but argues that, in the case in hand, it is not a question of general prin-
ciples of law but of specific treaties relating to a territory, which have an
effect on the Philippines.
41. The Philippines further indicates that the statements made by lndo-
nesia and Malaysia during the public hearing "provide evidence that the
Court will be presented with many of the treaties and agreements upon
which the Philippines claim is based and will be pressed to adopt
interpretations that will certainly affect the Philippine interest". It states
that it
"find[s] nothing in the precedents about the permissible scope of an
intervention being determined by the language of the submission,
but rather by the possible consequence of the Court's decision. The
test is not connective, but <~ons~~quentiu nlo;t whether there is a 'con-
nection' to the submission - whatever that means - but whether
the decision of the Court could affect the interest of a legal nature of
a third State."
The Philippines submits that, on the basis of that part of the record to
which it has been allowed access, "the probability of consequences for the
interests of the Philippines meets the 'may' requirements of Article 62
and justifies Philippine intervention". It adds that
"Evidently, the chain of title which Malaysia asserts to defend its
territorial claim to Sipadan and Ligitan, based as it is on its own
interpretations of, and representations on, specific treaties, agree-
ments and other documents, is linked to the chain of title which the
Philippines relies on to defend its territorial claim to North Borneo."
The Philippines also argues that it has cited three of the four legal
instruments, which have been relied upon by one or both of the Parties to
prove their case, in the context of the overall argument that it wanted to
make.
The Philippines points out that it "has a direct legal interest in the
interpretation of the 1930 United States-United Kingdom boundary,
being the successor-in-interest of one party to that agreement, the United
States", that "the 1930 Agreement cannot be construed in any way as aninstrument of cession", and that "Britain could not have acquired
sovereignty over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan by virtue of the inter-
pretation placed by Malaysia on the 1930 United States-United King-
dom Agreement"; it follows from this that "the two islands in question
were acquired by the United Kingdom in 1930 for and on behalf of the
Sultan of Sulu".
The Philippines further states that "the territory ceded by the Sultan to
the Philippines in 1962covered only those territories which were included
and described in the 1878 Sulu-Overbeck lease agreement", that its
"Application for permission to intervene is based solely on the rights of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines transferred by and
acquired from the Sulu Sultanate", and that "If at al1there are other ter-
ritories appertaining to the Sultanate not covered by the Sulu-Overbeck
lease of 1878, the Philippines, as agent and attorney for the Sultanate,
has reserved its position on these territories".
The Philippines concludes that :
"anv claim or title to territorv in or islands near North Borneo that
assumes or posits or purports to rest a critical link on the legitimate
sovereign title of Great Britain from 1878 up to the present is un-
founded. Similarly, the interpretation of any treaty, agreement or
document concerning the legal status of North Borneo as well as
islands off the coast of North Borneo which would presume or take
for granted the existence of British sovereignty and dominion over
these territories has no basis at al1in history as well as in law and, if
upheld by the Court. it would adversely affect an interest of a legal
nature on the part of the Republic of the Philippines."
42. For its part, Indonesia denies that the Philippines has an "interest
of a legal nature". It states that
"the subject-matter of the dispute currently pending before the Court
is limited to the question whether sovereignty over the islands of
Ligitan and Sipadan belongs to Indonesia or Malaysia. In its Appli-
cation for permission to intervene, the Philippines expressly states
that it is not its intention to change the scope of the dispute sub-
mitted by Indonesia and Malaysia to the Court."
It recalls that on 5April 2001, the Government of the Philippines sent a
diplomatic Note to the Government of Indonesia in which, referring to
the ongoing case between Indonesia and Malaysia, it wished to reassure
the Government of Indonesia that the Philippines does not have "any ter-
ritorial interest on Sipadan and Ligitan islands".
Indonesia then contends that
"It is evident from this [note] that the Philippines raises no claim
with respect to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. It therefore fol- lows that the Philippines has expressly disavowed any interest of a
legal nature in the actual subject-matter of the dispute currently
pending between lndonesia and Malaysia. In its Application, the
Philippines asserts instead that its interest 'is solely and exclusively
addressed to the treaties, agreements and other evidence furnished
by the Parties and appreciated by the Court which have a direct or
indirect bearing on the matter of the legal status of North Borneo'."
It maintains that
"The legal status of North Borneo is not a matter on which the
Court has been asked to rule. Moreover, the desire of the Philippines
to submit its view on various unspecified 'treaties, agreements and
other evidence furnished by the Parties' is abstract and vague."
Indonesia adds that:
"The reply to the question subinitted to the Court in the Special
Agreement will rest entirely 'on the interpretation of the Convention
of 20 June 1891, concluded by Great Britain and the Netherlands.
Spain was not a party to the Convention. The Convention is rcs
inter ulios uctu as far as the Philippines is concerned' . . .The Phil-
ippines is therefore doubly 'protected' . . . by Article59 of the Stat-
ute of the Court, on the one hand, and by the fundamental principle
that treaties bind the contracting States only, on the other. It may
even be triply protected, since the interpretation of the Convention
which . . . Meinbers of the Court are called upon to give concerns
only its application to Ligitan and Sipadan - there is no dispute
between Indonesia and Malaysia with regard to its application to the
island of Borneo. Since the Philippines limits its interest to the island
of Borneo, expressly excluding Ligitan and Sipadan, it is in a sense
also protected by the petitum as defined in the Special Agreement.
In any event, it is apparent from the clear, amply founded juris-
prudence of the Court that the 'interest' claimed by the Philippines
in the treaties, agreements and other evidence furnished by the
Parties is not such as might justify an intervention pursuant to
Article 62 of the Statute."
43. With reference to the question of the Philippine interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, Malaysia argues
that
"[tlhat legal interest must be precisely identified, then compared with
[the Court's] mandate as it appears from the document of seisin. in
the present instance the Special Agreement" PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
594
and that
"[ilt is thus not a matter of citing some general legal interest, but of
proving it in relation to 'each of the different issues which might fall
to be determined', to quote the words used by [the]Chamber [in the
case concerning the Lund, Islund and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Suli~udorlHondurasj , Application to Inter~lene]".
Malaysia then contends that :
"the Philippines does not indicate how the u'rcision . . . that the
Court is asked to take on the issue of sovereignty over Ligitan and
Sipadan might ulffrct any specific legal interest. It is content to refer
vaguely to the 'treaties, agreements and other evidence' on which the
Court might 'lay down an appreciation'. But . . . the interest of a
legal nature must, if affected, be so affected by the decision of the
Court and not just by its reasoning. Such appreciation as the Court
may be led to make of the effect of a particular legal instrument, or
of the consequences of a particular material fact, as grounds for its
decision cannot, in itself, serve to establish an interest of a legal
nature in its decision in the case.
It is another provision of the Statute, Article 59, that protects the
general legal interests of non-party States by specifying the limits on
the authority of the Court's decision. By stating that 'the decision of
the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case', Article 59 ensures full legal protec-
tion of third parties, including in regard to any appreciation of trea-
ties, agreements or evidence relied upon by the parties to the case."
(Emphasis in the original.)
Malaysia further contends that "the issue of sovereignty over Ligitan
and Sipadan is completely independent of that of the status of North Bor-
neo", and that "[tlhe territorial titles are different in the two cases".
Malaysia therefore "does not accept that the Philippines possess any
'historical and legal rights' of a kind that could be affected by any deci-
sion of the Court relating to sovereignty over the disputed islands".
Malaysia finally emphasizes that, in its view, "the Government of the
Philippines itself agrees that it has no legal interest"; it refers in this
regard to the diplomatic note of 5 April 2001 sent by the Embassy of the
Philippines in Jakarta to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Indonesia, in which the Government of the Philippines stated that it
did not have "any territorial interest on Sipadan and Ligitan islands". It
concludes from this that
"[The Court] must therefore dismiss this request for intervention
in limine litis, since [its] decision can address only the issue of sov-
ereignty over Ligitan and Sipadan and affect only legal interests with
respect to these two islands. To grant this request for intervention by the Philippines would be to allow extension of the judicial debate to
another issue altogether, namely that of sovereignty over Northern
Borneo."
In this regard, Malaysia also contends that in the previous practice of the
Court, States have been allowed to intervene where they claimed part of
the area which was in dispute in the case, but that, by contrast, when a
State does not claim particular territory it has not been allowed to inter-
vene, even though it said that the Court's decision on the territory might
impact on it in some way.
44. The Philippines has informed the Court that it has a claim of sov-
ereignty in North Borneo. It stated that, prior to the arriva1in Borneo of
the European Powers, title, at least to part of Sabah lay with the Sultan-
ate of Sulu. A grant was made by the Sultan to Messrs. Overbeck and
Dent on 22 January 1878 in that part (which grant the Philippines
acknowledges not to have included Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan).
The Philippines has described this instrument as the "primary source" of
itshistoric title and takes the viewthat it provided for a lease of territory
but not a cession. The Philippines claims the Sultanate and its heirs
retained title to that part of North Borneo throughout the period 1878to
1962,notwithstanding the assignment of powers of administration to the
British North Borneo Company (hereinafter "BNBC"). In 1962, accord-
ing to the Philippines, it acquired title to this territory through cession by
the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu.
45. The Court recalls that, on 5 April 2001, the Philippines sought, iri
a Diplomatic Note sent to Indonesia, "to reassure the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia that it does not have any territorial interest on
Sipadan and Ligitan islands" (seeparagraphs 42-43 above). This position
was confirmed by the Philippines before this Court. The Philippines
States that its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo is not affected
by whether the Court affirms sovereignty over the islands as lying with
Indonesia, or alternatively with Malaysia. However, the Philippines has
informed the Court that its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo might
be affected by any reasoning of the Court, whether in interpreting treaties
in issue between Indonesia and Malaysia or otherwise, that would affirm
that the BNBC had had sovereignty in North Borneo.
46. Indonesia and Malaysia contend that the existence of an interest
of a legal nature in the very subject-matter of the case is a condition
precedent for the Court to allow an intervention under Article 62.
In that regard, the Court will at the outset consider whether a third
State may intervene under Article 62 of the Statute in a dispute brought596 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
to the Court under a special agreement, when the State seeking to inter-
vene has no interest in the subject-matter of that dispute as such, but
rather asserts an interest of a legal nature in such findings and reasonings
that the Court might make on certain specifictreaties that the State seek-
ing to intervene claims to be in issuein a different dispute between itself
and one of the two Parties to the pending case before the Court.
47. The Court must first consider whether the terms of Article 62 of
the Statute preclude, in any event, an "interest of a legal nature" of the
State seeking to intervene in anything other than the operative decision
of the Court in the existing case in which the intervention is sought. The
English text of Article 62 refers in paragraph 1to "an interest of a legal
nature which mav be affected bv the decision in the case". The French
text for its part refers toun inthr^t d'ordrejuridique. . .en cause" for the
State seeking to intervene. The word "decision" in the English version of
this provisi6n could be read in a narrower or a broader sense. However,
the French version clearly has a broader meaning. Given that a broader
reading is the one which would be consistent with both language versions
and bearing in mind that this Article of the Statute of the Court was
originally drafted in French, the Court concludes that this is the inter-
pretation to be given to this provision. Accordingly, the interest of a legal
nature to be shown by a State seeking to intervene under Article 62 isnot
limited to the dispositifalone of a judgment. It may also relate to the
reasons which constitute the necessary steps to the dispositif
48. Having reached this conclusion, the Court must now consider the
nature of the interest capable of justifying an intervention. In particular,
it must consider whether the interest of the State seeking to intervene
must be in the subject-matter of the existing case itself, or whether it may
be different and, if so, within what limits.
49. In the majority of the applications for permission to intervene that
have come before the Court, the applicant has claimed to have an interest
in the very subject-matter of the dispute or the territory in which a
delimitation is to be effected. Further, in the two cases where a request
for intervention under Article 62 has been authorized by the Court, that
authorization was in respect of an interest related to the subject-matter of
the dispute (Land, Island and Maririme Frontier Dispute (El Srrlvacdorl
Honduras), Applicution to Intervene, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1990,
p. 121, para. 72: Nicaragua's rights in the Gulf of Fonseca necessarily
being affected by the definition of a condominium; Land and Maritime
Boundary betit9eenCameroon und Nigeria, Applicution to Intervene, Order
of' 21 Octoher 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1029: Equatorial
Guinea's maritime rights could be affected by the determination by the
Court of the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria).
50. In 1981 Malta, seeking to intervene, invoked an interest of a legal
nature which :597 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
"does not relate to any legal interest of its own directly in issue as
between Tunisia and Libya in the present proceedings or as between
itself and either one of those countries. It concerns rather the poten-
tial implications of reasons which the Court may give in its deci-
sion in the present case on matters in issue as between Tunisia and
Libya . . ." (Continrntul Shelf' (TunisiuILibyan Arub Jumuhiriyu),
Applicution to Intcrvenr, Judgnient, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 12,
para. 19.)
51. The Court specified that Malta thought that any pronouncements
on special circumstances or on equitable principles in that particular
region would be certain, or very likely, to affect Malta's own rights on
the continental shelf:
"what Malta fears is that in its decision in the present case the
reasoning of the Court . . . may afterwards have a prejudicial effect
on Malta's own legal interests in future settlement of its own conti-
nental shelf boundaries with Libya and Tunisia" (Continc~ntalSlzelf
(TirnisiulLihyan Aruh Jumahirij-a). Application to Intevvene, Judg-
ment, 1.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 17, para. 29).
52. The Court did not, however, find this a pertinent factor in deciding
whether or not to allow Malta to intervene. The Court noted that a State
could not hope to intervene "simply on an interest in the Court's pro-
nouncements in the case regarding the applicable general principles and
rules of international law" (Continental Sheij (TunisiulLibyan Arub
Jumuhiriya), Applicution to Intrrvenc, Judgrnent, I.C.J. Reports 1981,
p. 17, para. 30). But the interest in the Court's findings and pronounce-
ments was not in that case such a generalized interest. The Court thus
turned to an examination of the interests that Malta had specified, not-
withstanding that they did not lie in the very outcome of the case.
53. Malta's Application was rejected, but not on the grounds that its
expressed intention did not faIl within the scope of the dispute as defined
in the Special Agreement. Malta's Application to intervene was not
granted because the Court felt it was in effect being asked to prejudge the
merits of Malta's claim against Tunisia in a different dispute, which
Malta had nonetheless not put before the Court.
54. The situation is different in the present case. Indeed, the Court
considers that the request of the Philippines to intervene does not require
the Court to prejudge the merits of any dispute that may exist between
the Philippines and Malaysia, and which is not before the Court.
55. Whether a stated interest in the reasoning of the Court and any
interpretations it might give is an interest of a legal nature for purposes
of Article 62 of the Statute can only be examined by testing whether the
legal claims which the State seeking to intervene has outlined might be
thus affected. Whatever the nature of the claimed "interest of a legal
nature" that a State seeking to interveneconsiders itself to have (and pro-vided that it is not simply general in nature) the Court can only judge it
"in concreto and in relation to al1the circumstances of a particular case"
(Chamber of the Court in Lund Isluild und Maritime Frorztier Dispute
(El SulvudorlHondurm), Application to I~fterivne, Judgnlent. 1.C.J.
Reports 1990, p. 118, para. 61).
56. Thus, the Court will now proceed to examine whether the Philip-
pine claim of sovereignty in North Borneo could or could not be affected
by the Court's reasoning or interpretation of treaties in the case concern-
ing Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
57. It is recalled that the Philippines contended that "[tlhe threshold
for the invocation of Article 62 is. . .a subiective standard: the State
requesting permission to intervene must 'consider'that it has an interest"
of a legal nature (seeparagraph 40 above). The Philippines acknowledged
that, having thus invoked Article 62, "the State requesting permission to
intervene must identify the interest in question and relate it to the case at
Bar".
58. As the Chamber said in the case concerning the Lund, Island and
Muritime Frontier Dispute (El SulvudorlHondurus), "it is for a State
seeking to intervene to demonstrate convincingly what it asserts".
Further, "[ilt is for the State seeking to intervene to identify the interest
of a legal nature which it considers may be affected by the decision
in the case, and to show in what way that interest may be affected"
(1.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 117-118,para. 61).
59. The Court would add that a State which, as in this case, relies on
an interest of a legal nature other than in the subject-matter of the case
itself necessarilybears the burden of showing with a particular clarity the
existence of the interest of a legal nature which it claims to have.
60. In order to make concrete its submission that it has an interest of
a legal nature which might be harmed by the reasoning of the Court in
the forthcoming Judgment as to sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan, the Philippines may not introduce a new case before the
Court nor make comprehensive pleadings thereon, but must explain with
sufficient clarity its own claim of sovereignty in North Borneo and the
legal instruments on which it is said to rest, and must show with adequate
specificityhow particular reasoning or interpretation of identified treaties
by the Court might affect its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo.
61. Basing itself on Article53, paragraph 1,of the Rules of the Court,
the Philippines submitted to the Court on 22 February 2001 a request to
be provided with the pleadings and documents annexed by Indonesia and
Malaysia in their written pleadings. After ascertaining the views of the599 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JLIDC~MENT)
Parties, the Court decided that it was not appropriate to accede to the
Philippine request. This decision was communicated to the Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia by letters dated 15 March 2001 (seeparagraph 6
above).
62. The Philippines has strongly protested that it is severely and
unfairly hampered in "identifying" and "showing" its legal interest in the
absence of access to the documents in the case between Indonesia and
Malaysia (see paragraph 39 above). Indeed, it has stated to the Court
that "as long as we do not have access to the subrnissions of the Parties
and don't know their contents, we can not really explain what our inter-
est is". The Philippines observes that since the written pleadings in the
case between Indonesia and Malaysia have not yet been made accessible
to the public, it was not until the oral phase of the present proceedings
that the two Parties publicly stated which treaties they considered to be in
issue in their respective claims to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. Its
request for access to the pleadings not having been granted by the Court,
the Philippines maintains that it does not know (save in so far as it has
emerged through theseproceedings) the precisereliance that either Malay-
sia or Indonesia places on any one of these instruments. The Philippines
also observed, during the oral phase of these proceedings, that not only
do Malaysia and Indonesia seem to have different views on certain of
these treaties, but that they do not have identical views as to whether
some treaties that the Philippines regards as relevant to its own different
claim do indeed have legal significance for the disposition of Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
63. The Court observes, however, that the Philippines mus1have full
knowledge of the documentary sources relevant to its claim of sover-
eignty in North Borneo. While the Court acknowledges that the Philip-
pines did not have access to the detailed arguments of the Parties as
contained in their written pleadings, this did not prevent the Philippines
from explaining its own claim, and from explaining in what respect any
interpretation of particular instruments might affect that claim.
64. In outlining that claim, for purposes of showing an interest of a
legal nature that might be affected by the reasoning or interpretation
of the Court in the dispute over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the
Philippines has emphasized the importance of the instrument entitled,
in English translation, "Grant by Sultan of Sulu of territories and lands
on the mainland of the island of Borneo", dated 22 January 1878(here-
inafter the "Sulu-Overbeck grant of 1878").
65. This instrument which bears the official seal of the Sultan of Sulu
is said by the Philippines to be its "prima1 source" of title in NorthBorneo. The Philippines interprets the instrument as a lease and not as a
cession of sovereign title. It also acknowledges that the territorial scope
of the instrument described in its first paragraph ("together with al1the
islands which liewithin nine miles from the coast") did not include Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
66. The Court observes, however, that the Philippine claims of sover-
eignty, as shown on the map presented by the Philippines during the oral
proceedings, do not coincide with the territorial limits of the grant by the
Sultan of Sulu in 1878.Moreover, the grant of 1878 is not in issue as
between Indonesia and Malaysia in the case, both agreeing that Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan were not included in its reach. Also, the ques-
tion whether the 1878grant is to be characterized as a lease or a cession
does not form part of the claim to title of either Party to the islands in
issue. Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia relieson the 1878grant as a source
of title, each basing its claimed title upon other instruments and events.
67. The burden which the Philippines carries under Article 62, to show
the Court that an interest of a legal nature may be affected by any inter-
pretation it might give or reasoning it might adduce as to its "prima1
source" of title, is thus not discharged.
68. The Philippines supplements its contention that sovereignty in
North Borneo was retained by the Sultanate of Sulu by means of cited
extracts from British State Papers of the late nineteenth century and the
first part of the twentieth century.
69. The 7 March 1885Protocol between Great Britain, Germany and
Spain, recognizing the sovereignty of Spain over the Archipelago of Sulu
(Jolo), and by which Spain renounced "as far as regards the British Gov-
ernment, al1claims of sovereignty over the territories of the continent of
Borneo, which belong, or which have belonged in the past, to the Sultan
of Sulu", is said by the Philippines to have great importance for its claim.
This is because - in the Philippine view - this Protocol too made clear
that sovereignty in North Borneo lay with Sultans and not with the Brit-
ish Crown. However, neither Malaysia nor Indonesia base their claims to
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan on the Protocol. It is not to be envis-
aged that either through its reasoning or through interpretation any legal
interests as articulated by the Philippines may be affected.
70. The Philippines has also explained to the Court its view that the
Royal Charter of 1 November 1881, incorporating the BNBC, clearly
shows that the BNBC was not itself invested with a sovereign character.
The Philippines also finds support for its claim of sovereignty in North
Borneo in the Agreement of 12 May 1888 between the British Govern-ment and the BNBC, and especially Article III thereof, which provided
that "The relations between the State of North Borneo and al1 foreign
States . . shall be conducted by Her Majesty's Government." The Phil-
ippines advances comparable views as to the Confirmation by the Sultan
of Sulu of the Cession of Certain Islands, dated 22 April 1903,asserting
that this instrument shows a continuing and uninterrupted sovereignty of
the Sultan of Sulu over the mainland of North Borneo as well as islands
lying off thatCoast.
Neither of these agreements is regarded by the Parties to the main pro-
ceedings as founding title to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. Their
claims do not implicate the precise status of rule in North Borneo at this
period. Accordingly, the Philippines has not demonstrated any interest of
a legal nature that could be affected in relation to these agreements, and
which might warrant intervention under Article 62 of the Statute.
71. Certain other instruments to which the Court was referred by the
Philippines do appear to have a certain relevance not only to the Philip-
pine claims of sovereignty in North Borneo, but also to the question of
title to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. The Philippine interest in the
20 June 1891 Convention, concluded between Great Britain and the
Netherlands for the purpose of defining boundaries in Borneo, lies in
noting that while the Convention set boundaries defining "Netherlands
possessions" and "British Protected States", the "State of North Borneo"
was indeed one of the British Protected States.
72. Indonesia does claim Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan under the
same Convention. In particular, it contends that, for various reasons,
Article 4 of that Convention should be read as extending into the sea on
the latitude 4" 10' north mentioned therein. Thus, in Indonesia's view,
islands to the south of that parallel, such as Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan, did not belong after 1891 to the State of North Borneo, but to
the Netherlands. Malaysia offers various grounds for rejecting that inter-
pretation of Article 4.
73. In resolving the disputed interpretation of Article 4,the Court has
no need to pronounce upon the precise nature of the British interests
lying to the north of latitude 4" 10'.Notwithstanding that the 1891Con-
vention may be said to have a certain relevance for Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines, the Philippines has demonstrated no legal interest
that could be affected by the outcome or reasoning in the case between
Indonesia and Malaysia.
74. The Philippines has also explained to the Court its view that the
Exchange of Notes on 3 July and 10July 1907between Great Britain and
the United States, relating to the administration of certain islands on the
east cost of Borneo by the BNBC, again shows that Great Britain was
acting in a capacity other than as sovereign over North Borneo. Whilethis Exchange of Notes is also of a certain interest for Malaysia, it relies
on the exchange as evidence that the two islands it disputes with Indo-
nesia were at that time historically and administratively tied to North
Borneo. The precise status of the legal ties in 1907 is not central to
Malaysia's claims. Accordingly, no interest of a legal naturethat requires
an intervention under Article 62, to present their interpretation of the
1907 Exchange of Notes, has been shown by the Philippines.
75. The 2 January 1930 Convention between Great Britain and the
United States regarding the boundary between the Philippine Archi-
pelago and North Borneo may assume a somewhat greater significance
for these proceedings.
76. One of Malaysia's arguments appears to be that the BNBC's right
of administration of the islands was, by the terms of the 1930 Conven-
tion, converted into a full right of sovereignty.
77. It is recalled that the Philippines, commenting on this Convention,
stated that it follows from the sovereignty held by the Sultan of Sulu over
North Borneo that the attribution of islands to the south and Westof the
described line was on behalf of the Sultan of Sulu (see paragraph 41
above); and that this is supported by the text.
78. The Court notes that the 1930 Convention, which delimits the
boundary between the Philippine Archipelago (under United States sov-
ereignty) and the State of North Borneo (under British protection), has
as its particular object the determination of which of the islands in the
region "belong" to the United States on the one hand and to the State of
North Borneo on the other. This Convention does not appear to the
Court at this stage of the proceedings to concern the legal status of the
principal territory of North Borneo. As the Court has already had occa-
sion to emphasize above (see paragraph 59), the interest of a legal nature
invoked by the Philippines in order to be permitted to intervene in the
case must be shown with a particular clarity, since it does not relate to
the actual subject-matter of the case. It appears, however, in light of the
object of the 1930 Convention and of the rights claimed by the Philip-
pines in North Borneo, that the Philippines has not shown how any inter-
pretation of that Convention which the Court might make for purposes
of the case between Indonesia and Malaysia could affect an interest of a
legal nature of the Philippines which would justify its intervention under
Article 62 of the Statute.
79. The North Borneo Cession Order in Council, adopted on
10July 1946,which provided in its sixth paragraph that "with effect from
the fifteenth day of July, 1946, ... the Crown should . . . have full sov-
ereign rights over, and title to, the territory of the State of North Bor-
neo", is saidby the Philippines to demonstrate that only on that date did
the British Crown purport for the very first time to acquire full sovereign
rights over North Borneo. The Philippines couples that position with thecontention that any such purported order of cession is without legal
effect.
80. Indonesia does not contest the status of the 1946Order or British
competence to act thereunder; rather, its views diverge from those of
Malaysia as to the bearing it has on Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
Any interest that the Philippines claims to have as to references that the
Court might make in the case between Indonesia and Malaysia to the
1946 Order is too remote for purposes of intervention under Article 62.
81. The Philippines needs to show to the Court not only "a certain
interest in . . . legal considerations" (Continc~ntnlSlirlf' (Lihjwn Aruh
Jarnuhirij~~IMultuj, Appliccitioti to Intcrilrnr, Judgt~~rnt,I.C:J. Rc~ports
1981, p. 19, para. 33) relevant to the dispute between Indonesia and
Malaysia, but to specify an interest of a legal nature which may be
affected by reasoning or interpretations of the Court. The Court has
stated that a State seeking to intervene should be able to do this on the
basis of its documentary evidence upon which it relies to explain its own
claim.
82. Some of the instruments which the Philippines has invoked, and
the submissions it has madeas to them, may indeed have shown a certain
interest in legal considerations before the Court in the dispute between
Indonesia and Malaysia; but as regards none of them has the Philippines
been able to discharge its burden of demonstrating that it has an interest
of a legal nature that may be affected. within the sense of Article 62. The
Philippines has shown in these instruments no legal interest on its part
that might be affected by reasoning or interpretations of the Court in the
main proceedings, either because they form no part of the arguments of
Indonesia and Malaysia or because their respective reliance on them does
not bear on the issue of retention of sovereignty by the Sultanate of Sulu
as described by the Philippines in respect of its claim in North Borneo.
83. Furthermore, the Court notes that the prime basis which the Phil-
ippines cites in support of its claim is the Sulu-Overbeck grant of 1878
and the historical facts which preceded it. It is notable that a number of
the documents to which it drew the Court's attention do not appear in
the officia1publication of the Philippines of 1963,presented to the Court
by Malaysia, explaining the legal basis of the Philippine claim of sover-
eignty in North Borneo (Pl~ilippinr Cluinl /O North Bornro, Volume 1,
Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1963). All instruments to which the Philip-
pines has drawn the Court's attention. save the Sulu-Overbeck grant of1878, are instruments said to be confirmatory of title, or treaties in
respect of which the Philippines wishes to advance interpretations that
preclude them being read as entailing a Ioss of any previous title that may
have existed in the Sultan of Sulu. Not only are they not, for the most
part, at the centre of the Court's attention in the case between Indonesia
and Malaysia, but they are not themselves sources of title for the Philip-
pines. The wish of a State to forestall interpretations by the Court that
might be inconsistent with responses it might wish to make, in another
claim, to instrumentsthat are not themselves sources of the title it claims,
is simply too remote for purposes of Article 62.
84. In respect of the "the precise object of the intervention"
(Article 81, paragraph 2 (h), of the Rules of Court), the Philippines
States that its Application has the following objects:
"(u) First, to preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines arising
from its claim to dominion and sovereignty over the territory
of North Borneo, to the extent that these rights are affected,
or may be affected, by a determination of the Court of the
question of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
(b) Second, to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Honourable Court of the nature and extent of the historical
and legal rights of the Republic of the Philippines which may
be affected by the Court's decision.
(ci Third, to appreciate more fully the indispensable role of the
Honourable Court in comprehensive conflict prevention and
not merely for the resolution of legal disputes."
The Philippines submitted during the oral proceedings "that the
objects (LI)and (h) in the Application make clear the objectives of the
Philippines in applying to the Court for permission to intervene under
Article 62, are consistent with the Court's jurisprudence; and amply
fulfil the requirements of the Statute".
85. For its part, Indonesia argues that
"the objective of the Philippines is not to inform [the] Court of its
interests in the case before [it], but to draw the Court's attention to
another dispute, speculating that this might, perhaps, be of interest.
At best, the Philippines might appear as timic~uscuritrr."Indonesia further argues that
.............................
(5) the information that the Philippines is seeking, by this means, to
give to the Court therefore does not constitute, in the circum-
stances of the case, a legitimate object of the intervention
requested ;
(6) this equally applies u ji~rtiorito the avowed aim of the Philip-
pines of thus securing communication of the pleadings and
documents refused by the Court's decision of 15 March [2001];
(7) more generally, intervention by the Philippines would create a
dangerous and unwelcome precedent, which would seriously
jeopardize the confidentiality of proceedings which States
appearing before the Court are legitimately entitled to expect -
and indeed the very system of intervention . . ."
86. As for Malaysia, it maintains that:
"the Philippines assertion that it has historical and legal rights to the
territory of Borneo which it wishes 'to preserve and safeguard' is a
fiction which is quite unsustainable. It must, therefore, be regarded
as a claim evidently lacking in precision. The pursuit of so manifestly
defective a claim is not a proper object for an intervention
application."
As to the "second stated object" of the Philippine Application (see para-
graph 84 above), Malaysia contends that "the assertion of such [histori-
cal and legal] rights is manifestly iinsustainable", and that "[tlhe giving of
information to the Court about unsustainable rights is not a proper
object for intervention".
Malaysia also maintains that
"by reference to published sources and even without access to the
pleadings, the Philippines could readily have ascertained for itself
some of the fundamental elements in the dispute between Malaysia
and Indonesia; and it could more specifically have related its con-
cerns to those issues".
In this respect, Malaysia concludes that:
"[The Philippines] has not attempted to grapple with the signifi-
cance of actual British and later Malaysian possession and adminis-
tration of the territory for a century and a quarter.
But that does not entitle the Philippines to be given a second
chance by being allowed now to intervene further in this case. A fail-
ure specifically to define the object of the Application cannot be con-
verted into a statement of ail object. The Philippines has not met the requirements that the Court has laid down for a successful applica-
tion."
As to the third stated object of the Philippine Application (see para-
graph 84 above), Malaysia considers that "[tlhis is a purely abstract
and general matter, on which the Court needs no instruction from the
Philippines or anyone else" and that "[ilt is a gratuitous and imper-
missible object for an intervention".
87. As regards the first of the threeobjects stated in the Application of
the Philippines (see paragraph 84 above), the Court notes that similar
formulations have been employed in other applications for permission to
intervene. and have not been found by the Court to present a legalobstacle
to intervention (Continental Shelf' (Lihyan Ara5 JumuhiriyulMaltu),
Applicution fOr Permission to Inter i~etzcJ,udgnzetzt,L C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 11-12, para. 17; Land, Island und Muritirne Frontier Dispute (El Sal-
vau'orlHondurus), Application to Intervene, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1990, pp. 108-109, para. 38, and pp. 130-131,para. 90; Land und Mari-
time Boundary betiveen Carneroon und Nigeria, Application to Intervene,
Order of 21 October 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999 (Il), p. 1032,para. 4).
88. So far as the second listed object of the Philippines is concerned,
the Court, in its Order of 21 October 1999 in the case concerning the
Land and Muritime Boundury between Cumeroon und Nigeria, Applica-
tion to Intervene, recently reaffirmed a statement of a Chamber that:
"[s]o far as the object of [a State's] intervention is 'to inform the
Court of the nature of the legal rights [of that State] which are in
issue in the dispute', it cannote said that this object is not a proper
one: it seems indeed to accord with the function of intervention"
(1.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1034,para. 14).
89. That the rights claimed by the Philippines lie in North Borneo
rather than in Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan makes the second stated
object of the Philippines rio less a proper one.
90. As to the third object listed in its Application, very occasional
mention was made of it during the oral pleadings. But the Philippines did
not develop it nor did itcontend that it could sufficealone as an "object"
within the meaning of Article 81 of the Rules. The Court rejects the
relevance under the Statute and Rules of the third listed object.
91. Indonesia also suggested that the Philippines has another object in
seeking intervention, and it stated that "although the Philippines denies
this . . .it has indeed progressively transformed its Application for per-mission to intervene into an appeal against the decision not to allow it to
have access to the pleadings".
92. During the oral proceedings, the Agent of the Philippines, on
behalf of his Government, presented by way of conclusion the desire of
that State to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents as
a first "remedy" under Article 85 of the Rules (see paragraph 13 above).
The Court notes however that Article 85 does not provide for "remedies"
as such, but rather deals with the procedural consequences of a decision
to accede to an application for permission to intervene under Article 62.
93. Notwithstanding that the first two of the objects indicated by the
Philippines for its intervention are appropriate, the Court finds that the
Philippines has not discharged its obligation to convince the Court that
specified legal interests may be affected in the particular circumstances of
this case.
94. The Court nevertheless observes that, notwithstanding its finding
that the Philippines has not demonstrated an entitlement to intervene in
the pending case between lndonesia and Malaysia, it remains cognizant
of the positions stated before it by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philip-
pines in the present proceedings.
95. For these reasons,
By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the Application of the Republic of the Philippines, filed in
the Registry of the Court on 13 March 2001, for permission to intervene
in the proceedings under Article 62 of the Statute of the Court, cannot be
granted.
IN FAVOUR : Pre.cide~irGuillaume ; Vice-Presirkerlt Sh; Jur/g<,.sRanjeva,
Fleischhauer, Koroma. Vereshchetin. Higgins, Parra-Aranguren.
Kooijmans, Rezek. Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Jutlgcs ad hoc
Weeramantry, Franck ;
AGAINST: Judge Oda.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-third day of October, two
thousand and one, in four copies, one of which will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government ofthe Republic of Indonesia, the Government of Malaysia, and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines, respectively.
(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.
(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.
Judge ODAappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge KOROMAappends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judges PARRA-ARANGURa End KOOIJMANaS ppend declarations
to the Judgment of the Court; Judges udlzoc WEERAMANTR aYd FRANCK
append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initiulled) G.G.
(Initiullrd) Ph.C.
INTIZRNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY
OVER PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN
APPLICATION BY THE PHILIPPINES
FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
JUDGMENT OF 23 OCTOBER 2001
COIJR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
.AVISCC)NSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA SOUVERAINETÉ
SUR PULACr LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN
KEQUÊTE DES PHILIPPINES
À FIN D'INTERVENTION
A.RRÊTDU 23 OCTOBRE 2001 Official citatio:
Sovereignty over Puluu Ligitun und Puluu Sipudan (IndonesiulMuluysia),
Application ,for.Permission to Intervene, Judgment,
IC.J. Reports 2001, p. 575
Mode officiel de citation:
Souveraineté sur Puluu Ligitun et Pulau Sipadun (IndonC.sielMuluisie).
requete à,fin d'intervention, ur.r.L;t,
C.I.J.Rec~ieil200I, p. 575
Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441
NOde vente: 828
ISBN 92-1-070928-4 23 OCTOBER 2001
JUDGMENT
SOVER.EIGNTY OVER PULAU LIGITAN
AND PULAU SIPADAN
APPL.ICATION BY THE PHILIPPINES
FOR.PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
SOUVIZRAINETÉSUR PULAU LIGITAN
ET PULAU SIPADAN
REQUÊTE DES PHILIPPINES
À FIN D'INTERVENTION
23 OCTOBRE 2001
ARRET INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2001
2001
23 October
General List
No. 102 23 October 2001
CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER
PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN
APPLICATION BY THE PHILIPPINES
FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
Intcrilention under Article 62 offlie Siritute.
Article.81, purugrupli 1. ?/'the Ru1e.s(?/'Court - Ohligution to-file tlzeAppli-
c~.~tioor pertnission to irrtervenc "us .soonas po.s.rib/e.und no/ luter tliun the
clo.surrc?f'tli~c3rittepleudings" - Applicution subinitted ufter the,fi/ing qf the
Replies oj'the Purtics but hc</brethe Parties Iiad informed tlie Court of'their
ugreetnrnt not tojÏlc>Rr;joinders.notivith.stunding thepo.s.sibilitjqfso doing pro-
vided,for in the Speciul Agrernient - CVhetherApplicutiot~J0r pern?i.s.sionto
interverzciras submittrd "as soori US possiblc~"und "not luter tllun thc closure qf
the ivrittcn procredings".
Article 81, parugruph 3, of the Rules uf Court - Absencc of clocuments
anne.\-cdin support of the Applicatioti ,for pernik.sion to ititervene.
Article. 62 (v 'IILSJtutute und Article 81, purugruph 2 (c), of the Rules of
Court - Juri.sdirtionu1 link hetivecn thc Stutc .seckirig to Nztervene und the
Parties to tlicCU.SE - Whether unclin irlrut circ~utnstuticessuch a jurisdictioncil
link is rccluircd,/Orintervcwtion untfer Article 62.
Articlc~62 of' the Stritutr utid Articlc~81, purugruph 2 (a), qf rhe Rules of
Court - E.\-i.sfencof'crninterest <?f'ulegul nature ivhiclzmuy he qffkcferl bj a
dc>cisionoj'the Court - Cuse cancerning sovereignty ovcr trc~i.sl(~ri-,~ Stntc
seeking to intcrvene not c.luirningsovrreignty over thoscli.slanci.s but contending
tliut certuin reusonitlg in the Judg~ncnt of the Court rnuy uj'fict that State's
clcrin1to otlzrprferriforj- Whetlier the intcrest of u legai nature (?f'thc> Statc~
seeking tu intervenr islitnitrd to the dispositif cilorle of' tliejudgtnent thut the
Court ivillgive in the case or ivhcthrr it includ~.~ ul.sotlir rcwsoningin thrjudg-
rnent - Proof of the c~si.stence of'un interest of'u lcgul nrlturc3:burdeti und
extent - Wliethrr &nicil (?fcic~c.r.tso.sthe docutnent.~in tlie (.u.seto Stut~ .seetking
to infervene prcventctl it frorn icientifj'ingifs Icgul interr~-t Legal instruiizcwts
relier/ upon bj, the Purties to tlic tnuiti procec,r/ing-s Legul ~~S~~UIII~~IIrclied COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
ANNÉE 2001 2001
23 octobre
Rôle général
23 octobre2001 no 102
AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA SOUVERAINETÉ
SUR PULAIJ LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN
REQUÊTE DES PHILIPPINES
À FIN D'INTERVENTION
Intervention ciutitre de l'article 62 du Statut.
Parugraphc 1 de l'article 81 du RRL.glernert la Cour - Obligation de dépo-
ser la requt;tcù fin d'intervention «le plus tôt possible avant lu clôture de Irr
procédure ic.rite))- Requêtesournise uprRL.l.es dGp(itdes rép1ique.sdes Parties
tnuis avant que c~e1le.s-ci'aient infortnélu Cour de ce qu'elles Gtaientconvenues
de>nepcisdkj~oscrdl?~lujilique.ulur~qu'ellesen auraient eu lapo.ssibilitéen irrtu
rlirc.ompronlis- Qur~stionde savoir si la requête W jïn d'intervention a éttpré-
.sentéc~le plus tôt pu.s.sihle»et«avant lu ck?ture de luprocédureécrite ».
Parugraphc 3 de 1'artic.lc81L/LR2glement de la Cour - Absence de clocu-
ments annr.ués ù l'appui de la requêteàjïn d'intervention.
Article 62 (/LStrrtut 1.purugrcrphe2 c) de l'article 81 du Rt?glement clt,la
Co~rr - Lien juridicrionnrl entre I'Etat chercllunù infervenir et /es Partieù
1'in.stunce-- Questio~r ci(savoir si et sous quelles conditions l'article 62 suhor-
rlonne I'intcriw~tionirI'c~.~i.rtc~/'c~erntel lienjuridictionnel.
Article 6.2du Stut,!it et ~iuragrcrphe2 a) de l'article 81 du R6glen1entu'c k.
Cour - E.\.istence d'un intéretd'ordrejuridique qui pourrait Ctren7i.sen crruse
pur UIIL~dic.i.sionde ICICo~r- A,ffrir(, con(.ernunIcisourerainetc;sur deux îles
- L'Errrtc.licre~han2 intervenir nc rc~vendiquepas lu .souvercrinetsur ces iles,
nlais soutient que certains n1otiJsU'LI'(rrrGtù rendr~par la Cour sont suse.ep-
rihles rl'ufji~ctersci rc~i~entlictn 1'c;gartld'autres territoire- Question dc~
.sui~)irsi I'«intérêt'ordrejuridique» de II'Etatc,herchant ù intervenir est IitnitG
cru.sc~irtllispositif tlo i'rtue IrrCozrrest appelc;eù rendre en I'ufluire ou s'il
peut tgalet~?entconcccrncjrles nlot$s dc celui-ci - Preuve (le I'e.ui.stenc.cd,'un
intFrc;td'orclrrjuririique: clrtirgcet étendu-- Question de savoir si 1'irnpo.s.si-
hilitc;rl'rr>.oirrrcc.2.srrrrspi2c.c.srelus I'uJ!firirec.on.stipour I'Etat cher-
c.11crnt intcrv<~nirun ohsttrcle Ir trlctrcint tltr1'inipo.s.sihild:e dtfinir .sonupon hy the State seeking tu interi,e-e Efict on thr cluim (!/'the Stute seek-
ing to interime of'fhes~ in.strument.sheinR tukcn into account hy the Cour-
Whether in the circurn.stunc.csthe Stute seeking to intervene disc,lrurgcdits hur-
clenqf detnonstrating the e.l-istenceof ut?interoftu legul nuture thut muy he
uff&c.tedin relation to thcse instrurncnt.~.
Artici~ 81, puragraph 2 (b). c!f'the Rul(ofsCourt - "Preci.rcobjclctuf'the
intervention"- SrureJ object uf'intrrventio(1) to pre.cerveund .suf&guizrdthe
hi.storicu1und legal rights (!/'the Strrte sccking to interilene thut n2u.yhc ujfi'ctcd
hj the ilec~i.sofothe Court. (2) to infi~r~ntl~eCourtofthe nature irnrlr.utent
c?fthose rights, and (3) to clpprec,iutcniore ,fulij3the irit~i.sl~cnsah/rcole of'the
Court in cotnprelien.sii~cconfiict pri~i~rntion.
JUDGMENT
Present: President GUILLAUME V:~L.C-Pr(~.sidc>tzIt; Jt~dgc'.sODA, RANJEVA,
FLEISCHHAUK EO,ROMA V,LRESHCHET HIIC,GINSP,ARKA-ARANGURFN,
KOOIJMANR S,EZEK.AL-KHASAWNEB HU.ERGENTHA JL;~1gesd hoc
WEEKAMANTR FRYA, NCK;RcgistrcrrC~I.VRI.C'K.
In the case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan,
the Republic of Indonesia,
represented by
H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Director General for Political Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Abdul Irsan, Ambassador of lndonesia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent ;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University ofParis X-Nanterre, Member of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Member of the
New York Bar, Frere CholmeleylEversheds. Paris
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Alfred H. A. Soons, Professor of Public International Law, Utrecht Uni-
versity,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Member of the
Rome Bar, Frere CholnieleyIEversheds, Paris,
Mr. Charles Claypoole, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and
Wales, Frere CholmeleylEversheds, Paris,
as Counsel:intérêdt'ordre,juridiqu- Instruments juridiques invoquéspar les Purtieù /u
proc.édureprincipale- Instruments juridiques invoquéspur I'Erat cherchan1ù
intervenir-- Incidence de lu prise cn considération de ces instruments pur lu
Cour sur /u revendicution de I'Etut <,herchùninrervcizi- Question rlr savoir
si, en I'r.spèce,I'Etut cherchaàtintervenir s'est ucquitté de son ohligution de
dkniontrcr qu'un intérd d'ordrejuridique pourrait êtremis en cuuse en relation
avec ces in.stru~nent.s.
Purugruphe 2 b) (le I'urticle 81 du RPglernentde la Co-r « Objet précis de
l'interi~cnrion- Objet del'intervention présentécomme étant 1) depréserver
et de.sauve~~urtlelres droits d'ordrc~hi.\toriqu etjuridiq1'Etutcherchunt ù
intervetlir dans lu rnc:iureoù ceux-ci pourruicnt êtren1i.yen cause pur une déci-
sion de lu Cour, 2) tl'irzformercette dc>rnii.rede lu nature et de lu portée des
droits et7question et 3) de prendre plus lurgement en conzpte le rôle indispen-
suhle quejoue lu Cour en rnatièrede prc;l)cntiongénéraliskede.sconflits.
Pré.rents: M. GUILLAUME p.re;sidct M. SHI, vice-président ; MM. ODA,
RANJEVA F,LEISCHHAUER, KOROMAV , ERESHCHETIM N," HIGGINS,
MM. PARRA-ARANGUR KENO, IJMANRSE,ZEKA,L-KHASAWNEB HU,ER-
GENTHAL ju,gc~s; MM. WEERAMANTRF YR,ANCKj,uges ad hoc;
M. COUVREUg Rr,effier.
En l'affaire relatiàla souverainetésur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan,
entre
la Républiqued'Indonésie,
représentéepar
S. Exc. M. Hassan,Wirajuda, directeur généraldes affaires politiques.
comme agent;
S. Exc.M. Abdul Irsan, ambassadeur d'Indonésieaux Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'universitéde Paris X-Nanterre, membre de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Rodinan R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, membre du bar-
reau de New York, cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Alfred A. H. Soons, professeur de droit international public à l'univer-
sitéd'Utrecht,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat àla cour d'appel de Paris, membre du bar-
reau de Rome, (cabinetFrere CholmeleylEversheds, Paris,
M. Charles Claypoole, Soliritor à la Cour suprêmed'Angleterre et du pays
de Galles,cabinet Frere CholmeleyIEversheds, Paris,
comme conseils ; Mr. Hasyim Saleh, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia in the Netherlands,
Mr. DonniloAnwar, Director for Treaties and Legal Affairs, Department of
Foreign Affairs,
Major-General Djokomulono, Territorial Assistant to Chief of Staff for Ter-
ritorial Affairs, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Rear-Admiral Yoos F. Menko, Intelligence Assistant to Chief of Staff for
General Affairs, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Mr. Kria Fahmi Pasaribu, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia in the Netherlands,
Mr. Eddy Pratomo, Head of Sub-Directorate forTerritorial Treaties, Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Abdul Kadir Jaelani, Officer, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in
the Netherlands.
as Advisers,
Malaysia,
represented by
H.E. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad. Secretary General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Ms Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International
Law, University of Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit interna-
tional,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot, Emeritus Professor, Universitéde Paris 1, Advocate,
Paris and Brussels Bars,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law,
University of Cambridge, Member of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Nico Schrijver,Professor of International Law, Free University Amster-
dam and Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Datuk Heliliah Yusof, Solicitor General of Malaysia,
Mrs. Halima Hj. Nawab Khan, Acting State Attorney-General of Sabah,
Mr. Athmat Hassan, Legal Officer, Sabah State Attorney-General's
Chambers,
as Counsel;
H.E. Ambassador Hussin Nayan. Under-Secretary, Territorial and Maritime
Affairs Division. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PULAU LIGITAN ET PULALISIPADAN (ARRET) 577
M. Hasyim Saleh, chef de mission adjoint à l'ambassade d'Indonésie aux
Pays-Bas,
M. Donnilo Anwar, directeur des traitéset des affaires juridiques au mini-
stèredes affaires étrangères,
le généralde division Djokomulono, assistant pour les questions de territoire
auprèsdu chef d'état-major chargé desaffaires territoriales, quartier géné-
ral des forces armées indonésiennes,
le contre-amiral Yoos F. Menko. assistant auprès du chef d'état-majorpour
les affairesgént~rales(service de renseignements), quartier général des
forces arméesindonésiennes.
M. Kria Fahmi Paisaribu, ministre conseiller à l'ambassade d'lndonésie aux
Pays-Bas,
M. Eddy Pratomo, chef de la sous-direction des traités territoriaux au mi-
nistèredes affaires étrangères,
M. Abdul Kadir Jaelani, fonctionnaireà l'ambassade d'lndonésie auxPays-
Bas,
comme conseillers.
et
la Malaisie.
représentéepar
S. Exc. M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, secrétaire générad lu ministère
des affaires étrangères,
comme agent:
S. Exc. Mn'"Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeurde la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honoraire de droit interna-
tionalà l'université de Cambridge, membre de l'Institut de droit interna-
tional,
M. Jean-Pierre Cot, professeur émérite à l'universitéde Paris 1, avocat aux
barreaux de Paris et de Bruxelles,
M. James Crawfoird, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit internationàll'Uni-
versitéde Cambridge. titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de la Com-
mission du droit international,
M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l'université libre
d'Amsterdam eià l'Institut d'étudessociales de La Haye, membre de la
Cour permanente d'arbitrage,
comme conseils et avocats;
Datuk Heliliah Yusof, Soliciror General de la Malaisie,
Mm' Halima Hj. Nawab Khan, Attorne~3-Generalpar intérim de I'Etat du
Sabah.
M. Athinat Hassan, juriste au cabinet de I'Artorne~,-Cenemlde I'Etat du
Sabah,
comme conseils;
S. Exc. M. Hussiri Nayan, ambassadeur, sous-secrétaireau département des
affaires territoriales et maritimes du ministèredes affairesangères, Mr. Muhamad bin Mustafa, Deputy Director-General, National Security
Division, Prime Minister's Department,
as Advisers ;
Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Principal Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime
Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Raja Aznam Nazrin, Counsellor of the Embassy of Malaysia in the
Netherlands,
Mr. Nik Aziz Nik Yahya, First Secretary of the Embassy of Malaysia in the
Philippines,
Mr. Tan Ah Bah, Principal Assistant Director of Survey. Boundary Divi-
sion, Department of Survey and Mapping,
Ms Haznah Md. Hashim, Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime
Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Shaharuddin Onn, Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime Affairs
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as administrative staff;
on the Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of the Philip-
pines,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Eloy R. Bello Ill, Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. Merlin M. Magallona, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;
Mr. W. Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International
Law of Yale Law School. associéde l'Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Peter Payoyo, University of the Philippines,
as Counsel;
Mr. Alberto A. Encomienda, Secretary-General, Maritime and Ocean Affairs
Center, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Alejandro B. Mosquera, Assistant Secretary, Office of Legal Affairs,
Department of Foreign Affàirs,
Mr. George A. Eduvala, Attaché. Embassy of the Republic of the Philip-
pines in the Netherlands,
Mr. Eduardo M. R. Menez, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of
the Philippines in the Netherlands,
Mr. lgor G. Bailen, Acting Director, Office of Legal Affairs, Department of
Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers,
composed as above,
after deliberation. PUL.AULIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRÊT) 578
M. Muhamad bin Mustafa, directeur généraladjoint du département de la
sécurité nationale.cabinet du premier ministre,
comme conseillers ;
M. Zulkifli Adnari, secrétaireadjoint principal au département des affaires
territoriales et maritimes du ministèredes affaires étrangères,
M. Raja Aznam Nazrin, conseiller de l'ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-
Bas,
M. Nik Aziz Nik Yahya, premier secrétairede l'ambassade de la Malaisie
aux Philippines,
M. Tan Ah Bah, sous-directeur principal de la topographie du service des
frontières, département de la topographie et de la cartographie de la
Malaisie,
Mln'Haznah Md. Hashim, secrétaireadjoint au département desaffaires ter-
ritoriales et maritimes du ministèredes affaires étrangères,
M. Shaharuddin Onn, secrétaireadjoint au départementdes affaires territo-
riales et maritimes du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme personnel administratif;
sur la requête à fin d'intervention déposéepar la République des Philippines,
représentée par
S. Exc. M. Eloy R. Bello III, ambassadeur de la République desPhilippines
aux Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
M. Merlin M. Ma,gallona, sous-secrétaireaux affaires étrangères,
comme coagent et conseil ;
M. W. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit international à l'universitéde
Yale, titulaire de la chaire Myres S. McDougal, associéde l'Institut de
droit international,
comme conseil et avocat ;
M. Peter Payoyo, de l'université des Philippines,
comme conseil ;
M. Alberto A. Encomienda, secrétairegénéraldu centre des affaires océa-
niques et maritirnes du ministèredes affaires étrangères,
M. Alejandro B. ï'vlosquera,secrétaireadjoint au bureau des affaires juri-
diques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. George A. Edliivala,attaché à I'ambassade de la République des Philip-
pines aux Pays-Bas,
M. Eduardo M. R. Menez, deuxième secrétaire à I'ambassade de la Répu-
blique des Philippines aux Pays-Bas.
M. lgor G. Bailen, directeur par intérimdu bureau des affairesjuridiques du
ministère des affairesétrangéres,
comme conseillers.
ainsi composée,
après délibéré en clhambredu conseil, delivrrs the,following Judgmrnt :
1. Byjoint letter dated 30 September 1998,filed in the Registry of the Court
on 2 November 1998,the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indo-
nesia (hereinafter "lndonesia") and of Malaysia informed the Registrar of a
Special Agreement between the two States. which was signed in Kuala Lumpur
on 31 May 1997 and entered into force on 14 May 1998, the date of the
exchange of instruments of ratification.
In accordance with theaforementioned SpecialAgreement, the Parties request
the Court to
"determine on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any other evidence
furnished by the Parties, whether sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan belongs to the Republic of Indonesia or to Malaysia";
in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Special Agreement, the Parties agreed that
the written pleadings should consist of the following documents:
"(a) a Memorial presented simultaneously by each of the Parties not
later than 12months after the notification of this Special Agreement
to the Registry of the Court;
(h) a Counter-Memorial presented by each of the Parties not later than
4 months after the dateon which each has received the certifiedcopy
of the Memorial of the other Party;
(c) a Reply presented by each of the Parties not later than 4 months
after the date on which each has received the certified copy of the
Counter-Memorial of the other Party; and
(d) a Rejoinder, if the Parties so agree or if the Court decides ex officio
or at the request of one of the Parties that this part of the proceed-
ings is necessary and the Court authorizes or prescribes the presen-
tation of a Rejoinder".
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, copies of
the joint notification and of the Special Agreement were transmitted by the
Registrar to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Members of the
United Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court.
3. By an Order dated 10 November 1998, the Court, having regard to the
provisions of the Special Agreement concerning the written pleadings, fixed
2 November 1999and 2 March 2000 as the respective time-limits for the filing
by each of the Parties of a Memorial and then a Counter-Memorial. The
Memorials were filed within the prescribed time-limit. By joint letter of
18August 1999,the Parties asked the Court to extend to 2 July 2000 the time-
limit for the filing of their Counter-Memorials. By an Order dated 14Septem-
ber 1999,the Court agreed to that request. Byjoint letter of 8 May 2000, the
Parties requested the Court for a further extension of one month to the time-
limit for the filing of their Counter-Memorials. By Order of 11May 2000, the
President of the Court also agreed to that request. The Parties' Counter-
Memorials were filed within the time-limit as thus extended.
4. Under the terms of the Special Agreement, the two Parties were to file a
Reply not later than four months after the date on which each had received the
certified copy of theCounter-Menlorial of the other Party. Byjoint letter dated
14October 2000, the Parties asked the Court to extend this time-limit by three
months. By an Order dated 19October 2000, the President of the Court fixed rend I'arrétsuivari:
1. Par lettre conjointe en date du 30 septembre 1998,déposéeau Greffe de la
Cour le 2 novembre 1998, lesministres des affaires étrangèresde la République
d'Indonésie(dénomméeci-après «Indonésie») et de la Malaisie ont notifiéau
greffierun compromis entre lesdeux Etats, signéàKuala Lumpur le31mai 1997
et entré envigueur li: 14mai 1998,date de l'échangedes instruments de ratifica-
tion.
Aux termes dudit compromis, les Parties prient la Cour de
((déterminer,sur la base des traités,accords et de tout autre élémentde
preuve produit par les Parties, si la souverainetésur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau
Sipadan appartient à la République d'Indonésieou à la Malaisien;
au paragraphe 2 de l'article 3 du compromis. les Parties sont convenues que la
procédureécritese composerait des documents suivants:
«a) un mémoire qui doit être soumis simultanémentpar chacune des
Parties au plus tard douze mois après la date de la notification du
présentcompromis au Greffe de la Cour;
b) un contre-mémoire présentépar chacune des Parties au plus tard
quatre mois après la date à laquelle chacune aura reçu la copie cer-
tifiéeconforme du mémoirede l'autre Partie;
ç) une réplique présentée par chacune des Parties au plus tard quatre
mois après la date à laquelle chacune aura reçu la copie certifiée
conforme du contre-mémoirede l'autre Partie;
d) une dupliclue,si les Parties en décident ainsid'un commun accord ou
si la Cour décided'office ou à la demande de l'une des Parties que
cette piècede procédureest nécessaire etautorise ou prescrit la pré-
sentation d'une duplique».
2. Conformément au paragraphe 3 de l'article 40 du Statut de la Cour,
le greffier a transmis copie de la notification conjointe et du compromis au
Secrétaire généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies, aux Membres
des Nations Unies et aux autres Etats admis à ester devant la Cour.
3. Par ordonnance en date du 10novembre 1998,la Cour,eu égardaux dis-
positions du compromis concernant les piècesde la procédureécrite,a fixéau
2 novembre 1999et au 2 mars 2000, respectivement, les dates d'expiration des
délaispour le dépôtd'un mémoire.puis d'un contre-mémoirepar chacune des
Parties. Les mémoiresdes Parties ont été déposédsans le délai ainsifixé.Par
lettre conjointe du18août 1999. lesParties ont demandé à la Cour de reporter
au 2 juillet 2000 la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôt de leurs contre-
mémoires.Par ordonnance en date du 14 septembre 1999, la Cour a accédé à
cette demande. Par lettreconjointe du 8 mai 2000, lesParties ont demandé à la
Cour un nouveau report d'un mois de la date d'expiration du délaipour le
dépôt de leurs c0ntr.e-mémoires.Par ordonnance du 11mai 2000, leprésident
de la Cour a également accédé à cette demande. Les contre-mémoires des
Parties ont été déposédsans le délaiainsi prorogé.
4. Aux termes di1 compromis, les deux Parties devaient présenter une ré-
plique au plus tard quatre mois après la date à laquelle chacune aurait reçu
la copie certifiéeconforme du contre-mémoirede I'autre. Par lettre conjointe
datéedu 14 octobre 2000, lesParties ont priéla Cour de proroger ce délaide
trois mois. Par ordonnance en date du 19octobre 2000. leprésidentde la Cour2 March 2001 as the time-limit for the filing byeach of the Parties of a Reply.
The Replies were filed within the prescribed time-limit. In view of the fact that
the Special Agreement provided for the possible filing of a fourth pleading by
each ofthe Parties, the latter informed the Court byjoint letter of 28 March 2001
that they did not wish to produce any further pleadings. Nor did the Court
itself ask forsuch pleadings.
5. Since the Court did not include upon the Bench a judge of Indonesian or
Malaysian nationality, both Parties exercised their right under Article 31,
paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: Indo-
nesia chose Mr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen and Malaysia Mr. Christopher
Gregory Weeramantry.
6. By letter of 22 February 2001, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (hereinafter "the Philippines"), invoking Article 53, paragraph 1,of
the Rules of Court, asked the Court to furnish it with copies of the pleadings
and documents annexed which had been filed by the Parties. Pursuant to that
provision, the Court, having ascertained the viewsof the Parties, decided that it
was not appropriate, in the circumstances, to grant the Philippine request. The
Registrar communicated that decision to the Philippines, Indonesia and Malay-
sia by letters dated 15 March 2001.
7. On 13 March 2001, the Philippines filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application for permission to intervene in the case, invoking Article 62 of the
Statute of the Court. In that Application, the Philippines explained that it con-
sidered its "request for copies of the pleadings and documents annexed as an
act separate and distinct from [that] Application" and that the latter "does not
affect, and is independent from, the earlier submissions made by the Philippine
Government". According to the Application, the Philippine interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by a decision in the present case "is solely and
exclusively addressed to the treaties, agreements and other evidence furnished
by Parties and appreciated by the Court which have a direct or indirect bearing
on the matter of the legal status of North Borneo". The Philippines also indi-
cated that the object of the intervention requested was,
"(LI) First, to preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines arising from its claim
to dominion and sovereignty over the territory of North Borneo, to
the extent that these rights are affected, or may be affected, by a
determination of the Court of the question of sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
(b) Second, to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Honourable Court of the nature and extent of the historical and
legal rights of the Republic of the Philippines which may be affected
by the Court's decision.
(c) Third, to appreciate more fully the indispensable role of the
Honourable Court in comprehensive conflict prevention and not
merely for the resolution of legal disputes."
The Philippines further stated in its Application that it did not seek to become
a party to the dispute before the Court concerning sovereignty over Pulau Ligi-
tan and Pulau Sipadan, and that the Application "is based solely on Article 62 PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 580
a fixéau 2 mars 2001 la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôtd'une réplique
par chacune des Parties. Les répliquesdes Parties ont étédéposéesdans le délai
ainsi prescrit. Le compromis prévoyant la possibilitédu dépôtd'une quatrième
piècede procédurepar chacune des Parties, celles-ciont, par lettreconjointe du
28 mars 2001, informéla Cour qu'elles nesouhaitaient pas produire de pièce
supplémentaire. La Cour elle-même n'apas prescrit une telle production.
5. La Cour ne comptant sur le siègeaucun juge de la nationalité des Parties,
chacune d'elles a procédé,dans l'exercice du droit que lui confère le para-
graphe 3 de l'article 31 du Statut. la désignation d'unjuge ad hoc pour siéger
en l'affaire: l'Indonésiea désignéM. Mohamed Shahabuddeen, et la Malaisie
M. Christopher Gregory Weeramantry.
6. Par lettre du 22 février 2001,le Gouvernement de la République desPhi-
lippines (ci-après«les Philippines))), invoquant le paragraphe 1 de l'article 53
du Règlement. a adressé à la Cour une demande tendant a ce que lui soient
communiquésdesexemplaires des piècesde procédureetdes documents annexés
déposéspar les Parties. Conformément à la disposition susmentionnée du
Règlement, la Cour s'est renseignéeauprès des Parties et a décidé qu'il n'était
pas approprié, dans les circonstances qui prévalaient alors, d'accéder à la
demande des Philippines. Le greffier a communiquécette décisionaux Philip-
pines. à I'lndonésieetà la Malaisie par lettres en date du 15mars 2001.
7. Le 13 mars 2001, les Philippines ont déposéau Greffe de la Cour une
requête à fin d'intervention dans l'affaire, en invoquant l'article 62 du Statut de
la Cour.Dans cette requête,les Philippines précisaient qu'ellesconsidèrent que
leur ((demandede communication d'exemplairesdes piècesde procédureet des
documents annexés est unedémarche à part, distincte de [ladite] requête)) et
que cette dernière <.:neremet pas en cause les précédentesdemandes du Gou-
vernement des Philippines et en est indépendante)). Selon la requête à fin
d'intervention,I'int~érêd'tordre juridique en cause pour les Philippines dans la
présenteespèce ((porte uniquement et exclusivement sur les traités.les accords
et autres éléments idepreuve fournis par les Parties et pris en compte par la
Cour qui ont une iincidencedirecte ou indirecte sur la question du statut juri-
dique du Nord-Bornéo)).Les Philippines ont par ailleurs indiquéque l'objet de
l'intervention solliciitéeét:it
«ci) Premièrement, de préserveret sauvegarder les droits d'ordre histo-
rique etjuridique du Gouvernement de la Républiquedes Philippines
qui décoiilentde la revendication de possession et de souveraineté
que ce gouvernement forme sur le territoire du Nord-Bornéo dans la
mesure où ces droits sont ou pourraient ètre mis en cause par une
décision (de la Cour relative à la question de la souveraineté sur
Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan.
h) Deuxièmement, d'intervenirdans l'instance pour informer la Cour de
la nature et de la portée des droits d'ordre historique et juridique de
la République desPhilippines qui pourraient êtremis en cause par la
décisionde la Cour.
c) Troisièmement, de prendre plus largement en compte le rôle indis-
pensable que joue la Cour en matière de prévention généraliséd ees
conflits el.non pas simplement aux fins de la résolutiondes différends
d'ordre juridique.»
Dans leur requête à fin d'intervention, les Philippines ont en outre spécifié
qu'elles ne souhaiiraient pas devenir partie au différend soumis à la Cour
concernant la souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan et que leur581 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (J~JDGMENT)
of the Statute, which does not require a separate title of jurisdiction as a
requirement for this Application to prosper".
8. On 14 March 2001, pursuant to Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of
Court, the Registrar transmitted copies of the Application for permission to
intervene to the two Parties in the case, Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as to
the United Nations Secretary-General, the Members of the United Nations and
other States entitled to appear before the Court. At thesame time, both Parties
to the case were invited to furnish, by 2 May 2001 at the latest, their written
observations on the Application for permission to intervene; each of them sub-
mitted such observations within the time-limit fixed for that purpose. Those
observations were exchanged between the Parties and transmitted to the
Philippines. In their written observations, both Indonesia and Malaysia objected
to the Application for permission to intervene submitted by the Philippines.
Accordingly, by letters of 11May 2001 the Parties and the Philippine Govern-
ment were notified that the Court would hold public sittings pursuant to
Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court to hear the views of the Philip-
pines, the State seeking to intervene, and those of the Parties in the case.
9. Mr. Shahabuddeen, judge ad hoc, having resigned his duties on
20 March 2001, Indonesia informed the Court, by letter received in the Regis-
try on 17 May 2001, that its Government had chosen Mr. Thomas Franck to
replace him.
10. The Court, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that the
written observations of both Parties on the Application for permission to inter-
vene, and the documents annexed thereto, would be made accessible to the
public on the opening of the oral proceedings.
11. At the public sittings held on 25, 26, 28 and 29 June 2001, the Court
heard oral statements and replies from the following in regard to the question
whether the Philippine Application for permission to intervene should be
granted :
For the Philippines: H.E. Mr. Eloy R. Bello III,
Mr. Michael Reisman,
Mr. Merlin M. Magallona.
For Indonesiu: H.E. Mr. Hassan Wirajuda.
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy.
For Muluysia : H.E. Mr. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,
Mr. James Crawford.
12. In its Application for permission to intervene, the Government of the
Philippines stated in conclusion that it
"requests the Honourable Court to recognize the propriety and validity of
thisApplication for permission to intervene in the proceedings between the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malay-
sia, to grant the same, and to participate in those proceedings in accord-
ance with Article 85 of the Rules of Court" (para. 8). PULAU LlGlTAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRÊT) 581
requête«se fonde exclusivement sur l'article 62 du Statut, qui n'exige pas un
titre de compétencedistinct pour donner suite à cette requête».
8. Le 14 mars 2001, le greffier a. conformément au paragraphe 1 de I'ar-
ticle 83 du Règlementde la Cour, transmis copie de la requêteà fin d'interven-
tion aux deux Parties à l'affaire, l'Indonésieet la Malaisie, ainsi qu'au Secré-
taire généralde l'Organisation des Nations Unies, aux Membres des Nations
Unies et aux autres Etats admis àester devant la Cour. Les deux Parties ont
par la même occasion été invitéesà présenter,le 2 mai 2001 au plus tard, des
observations écritessur la requèteà fin d'intervention; chacune d'elles a pré-
sentéde telles observations dans le délaifixéà cet effet. Ces observations ont
étééchangéesentre les Parties et transmises aux Philippines. Dans leurs obser-
vations écrites,tantI'llndonésieque la Malaisie ont fait objectàola requêteà
fin d'intervention introduite par les Philippines. En conséquence,par lettres du
I1mai 2001, les Parties et le Gouvernement philippin ont étavisésque la Cour
tiendrait audience, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 84 du Regle-
ment, pour entendre les observations des Philippines, Etat quidemandeà inter-
venir, et celles des PartiàsI'affaire.
9. M. Shahabuddeen, juge ud hoc, ayant démissionnéde ses fonctions à la
date du 20 mars 2001, l'Indonésie,par lettre reçue au Greffe le 17mai 2001. a
informéla Cour que :songouvernement avait désignéM. Thomas Franck pour
le remplacer.
10. La Cour. aprè,ss'ètre renseignéeauprès des Parties, a décidéque les
observations écritesdes deux Parties sur la requêteà fin d'intervention, ainsi
que les documents annexés auxdites observations, seraient rendus accessiblesau
public à l'ouverture de la procédureorale.
11. Au cours d'audiences publiques tenues les 25,26, 28 et 29juin 2001, la
Cour a entendu, sur la question de l'admission de la requête desPhilippinesà
fin d'intervention, les.plaidoiries et réponses desreprésentants suivants:
Pour les Philippines: S. Exc. M. Eloy R. Bello III,
M. Michael Reisman,
M. Merlin M. Magallona.
Pour 1'Indonë.sie: S. Exc. M. Hassan Wirajuda,
M. Alain Pellet,
M. Rodman R. Bundy.
Pour la Maluisir: S. Exc. M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad,
M. Jean-Pierre Cot,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,
M. James Crawford.
12. Dans sa requiiteà fin d'intervention, le Gouvernement des Philippines a
déclaréen conclusion qu'il
«prie la Cour de bien vouloir constater que la présente requête à fin
d'interventiondans l'instance entre le Gouvernement de la République
d'Indonésieet le Gouvernement de la Malaisie est présentéedans les règles
et est fondée.clebien vouloir faire droità ladite requêteet l'autoriseà
participeràla procédure conformément auxdispositions de l'article 85 du
Règlementde la Cour)) (par. 8).582 PULAU LlGlTAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
In its written observations on the Applicationby the Philippines for permis-
sion to intervene, Indonesia concludedthat "the Philippines ha[d] not demon-
strated that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by a
decision in the case and that the Application should, accordingly, be denied"
(para. 17).
In its written observations on the Application by the Philippines for permis-
sion to intervene, Malaysia concluded as follows: "not merely has the Philip-
pines no right to intervene, it has no claim to make. Malaysia urges theCourt
to reject the request." (Para. 50.)
13. At the oral proceedings, it was stated by way of conclusion that:
On heliuy of'the Governrnrnt ofthe Philippines.
at the hearing of 28 June 2001
"The Government of the Republic of the Philippines seeksthe remedies
provided for in Article 85 of the Rules of Court, namely,
- paragraph 1 : 'the interveningState shall be supplied with copiesof the
pleadings and documents annexed and shall be entitled to submit a
written statement within a time-limit to be fixed by the Court'; and
- paragraph 3: 'the intervening State shall be entitled, in the course of
the oral proceedings, to submit its observationswith respectto the sub-
ject-matter of the intervention'."
On bellalfof the Government of Indonesiu,
at the hearing of 29 June 2001 :
"The Republic of Indonesia respectfully submits that the Republic
of the Philippines should not be granted the right to intervene in the case
concerning Sovereignty over PulauLigitan and PulaziSipadan (Indonesial
Mula,vsiu) ."
On hehalfof the Government of Malaysiu,
at the hearing of 29 June 2001: "[Malaysia requests] that the Court should
reject the Philippines Application".
14. The Philippine Application for permission to intervene relates to
the case, brought to the Court by notification of the Special Agreement
concluded on 31 May 1997 between Indonesia and Malaysia, concerning
sovereignty over two islands, Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (see para-
graph 1 above). The intervention which the Philippines seeks to make is
linked to its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo (see paragraph 7
above).
15. In its Application, the Philippines invokesArticle 62 of the Statute
of the Court, which provides:
"1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request."
16. Paragraph 1of Article 81 of the Rules of Court provides that the PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRÊT) 582
Dans ses observations écrites sur lademande à fin d'intervention des Philip-
pines, l'Indonésiea conclu que «les Philippines n'ayant pas démontréqu'un
intérêdt'ordre juridique étaiten cause pour elles, la requêtedoit êtrerejetée)}
(par. 17).
Dans ses observations écritessur la demande àfin d'intervention des Philip-
pines, la Malaisie a conclu comme suit: «non seulement les Philippines n'ont
pas le droit d'intervenir, maiselles n'ont pas non plusde demande à formulei-.
La Malaisie prie instamment la Cour de rejeter la requête. »(Par. 50.)
13. Dans la procédure orale,il a été conclu comme suit:
Au nom du Gouvrrtzeinerztdes P1zilippine.r.
à I'audiencedu 28juin 2001 :
«Le Gouvernement de la Républiquedes Philippinesdemande I'applica-
tion des remèdes prévus à l'article 85 du Règlement de laCour, à savoir:
- paragraphe 1: «I'Etat intervenant reçoit copie des piècesde procédure
et des documents annexés eta le droit de présenter unedéclaration
écritedans unidélaifixépar la Cour»;
- paragraphe 3: «I'Etat intervenant a ledroit de présenterau cours de la
procédure orale des observations sur l'objetde l'intervention)).»
Au nonz du Gouverne~vlentde l'Indon6sir~,
à l'audiencedu 29juin 2001 :
«La Républiqued'Indonésieprie respectueusementla Cour de dire qu'il
n'y a pas lieu d'autoriser la République des Philippinesà intervenir dans
l'affaire relativà la Souveraineti sur Pulau Ligitun et Pulau Sipadrin
(Indon6sielMala1siej.))
Au non?rluGouvernetnetlt dc~la Maluisie,
à l'audiencedu 29juin 2001 :«[La Malaisieprie] la Cour de bien vouloir rejeter
la requête desPhilippl'ines.»
14. La requête a fin d'intervention des Philippines concerne l'affaire
portée devant la Cour par la notification du compromis conclu le
31 mai 1997 entre l'Indonésie et la Malaisie et relative à la question de la
souveraineté sur deux îles, Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (voir para-
graphe 1ci-dessus). L'intervention que les Philippines cherchent a effec-
tuer est liée a leur revendication de souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo (voir
paragraphe 7 ci-dessus).
15. Les Philippir~es, dans leur requête,font état de l'article 62 du Sta-
tut de la Cour, qui prévoit que:
c1. Lorsqu'un Etat estime que, dans un différend, un intérêt
d'ordre juridique est pour lui en cause, il peut adresser à la Cour une
requête,à fin d'intervention.
2. La Cour décide.»
16. Le paragraphe 1 de l'article81 du Règlement de la Cour dispose583 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
application for permission to intervene shall "be filedas soon as possible,
and not later than the closure of the written proceedings" and that "[iln
exceptional circumstances, an application submitted at a later stage may
however be admitted".
Article 81, paragraph 2, also provides that the State seeking to inter-
vene must specify the case to which its application relates, and set out:
"(a) the interest of a legal nature which the State applying to inter-
vene considers may be affected by the decision in that case;
(h) the precise object of the intervention;
(c) any basis of jurisdiction which is claimed to exist as between
the State applying to intervene and the parties to the case".
Paragraph 3 of Article 81further provides that an application for per-
mission to intervene "shall contain a list of the documents in support,
which documeiits shall be attached".
17. The Philippines maintains that its Application to intervene satisfies
both the requirements of Article 62 of the Statute of the Court and those
of Article 81 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, both Indonesia
and Malaysia oppose the Application by the Philippines on the grounds
that the various requirements have not been met.
18. The Court will initially consider the contention that the Applica-
tion to intervene should not be granted, first, because of its late sub-
mission by the Philippines, and secondly, because of the failure of the
Philippines to annex documentary or other evidence in support of
the Application.
19. Both lndonesia and Malaysia argue that the Philippine Applica-
tion should not be granted because of its "untimely riature".
Indonesia maintains that :
"[iln view of the fact that the Parties do not consider that there is
any need for further written submissions on the merits of the case
and that the Philippines'Application was filedafter the final submis-
sions of the Parties, the Application should be dismissed as untimely
pursuant to Article 81 (1) of the Rules of Court".
It considers that the Philippines "has failed to demonstrate that any .. .
exceptional circiimstances exist justifying the filing of its Application at
such a late stage of the proceedings", and concludes that:
"[tlo admit the Application at this stage of the proceedings would
inevitably entai1 a significant delay in the case being heard by the PULALI LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 583
que la requêteà fin d"intera1entionest ((déposle plus tôt possible avant
la clôture de laproctdure écrite))et que «[t]outefois, dans des circons-
tances exceptionnelles, la Cour peut connaître d'une requêteprésentée
ultérieurementn.
Le paragraphe 2 de l'article 81 dispose égalementque I'Etat cherchant
à intervenir doit préciserl'affaire que sa requête concerne etspécifier:
«u) l'intérêdt'ordre juridique qui, selon I'Etat demandantà inter-
venir, est pour lui en cause;
6) l'objet précisde l'intervention;
L.) toute base de compétencequi, selon 1'Etatdemandant à inter-
venir, existerait entre lui et les parties)).
Le paragraphe 3 cle I'article 81 prévoit enoutre qu'une requêtà fin
d'intervention contient<<unbordereau des documents à l'appui, qui sont
annexés D.
17. Les Philippines soutiennent que leur requêteà fin d'intervention
répond à la fois aux exigences de I'article 62 du Statut de la Cour àt
cellesde I'article1de son Règlement.A l'inverse,tant l'Indonésieque la
Malaisie s'opposent à la requête desPhilippines au motif que ces diffé-
rentes exigences nesont pas satisfaites.
18. La Cour se penchera en premier lieu sur l'argument selon lequel la
requête à fin d'intervention des Philippines ne devrait pas être admiseen
raison, d'une part, de son caractèretardif et, d'autre part, de l'absencede
documents ou autres élémentsde preuve annexés à l'appui de cette
requête.
19. L'Indonésie et la Malaisie ont l'une et l'autre soutenu que la
requête des Philippinesne peut êtreadmise, au motif qu'elle«n'a pas été
présentéeen temps voulu)).
L'Indonésie souti~rntque:
«[l]es Parties n'estimant pas nécessaire de fournir d'autres pièces
écritessur le fond de l'affaire et la requête des Philippinesayant été
déposéeaprès les conclusions écritesfinales des Parties, elle devrait
êtrerejetéecoirimen'ayant pas étéprésentéeen temps voulu, confor-
ménientaux dispositions du paragraphe 1 de l'article 81 du Règle-
ment de la Coiir)).
Elleestime que lesF'hilippines((n'ont pas démontréque des circonstances
exceptionnelles justifient le dépôtde leur requête un stade aussi tardif
de la procédure))et conclut que:
«[a]ccueillir la requêàece stade de la procédureprovoquerait iné-
vitablement un retard considérabledans l'examen de l'affaire par la584 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
Court to the prejudice of the Parties. In these circumstances, Indo-
nesia submits that the Philippines' Application should be dismissed
as untimely."
At the hearings, Malaysia associated itself in the following terms with
the objection in regard to the alleged procedural delay raised by Indo-
nesia: "That issue has been fully dealt with by Indonesia. We agree with
what they have said; we simply feel no need to add to it."
For its part, the Philippines argues that "the fact is that not onlys the
Philippines within al1the time-limits, it could not, as a logical and prac-
tical matter, have submitted its request any sooner". The Philippines
emphasizes that :
"[iln the nature of the case, the Philippines could hardly have
requested permission to intervene under Article 62 before it tried to
secure the documents. And it was only when it became apparent that
the request for the documents was not going to be granted, that the
Philippines requested permission to intervene."
20. The Court will consider this objection ratione temporis by apply-
ing the relevant requirements of its Rules dealing with the intervention
procedure to the factual circumstances of the case.
Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, referred to above (see
paragraph 16), stipulates that:
"[aln application for permission to intervene under the terms of
Article 62 of the Statute, . .. shall be filed as soon as possible,
and not later than the closure of the written proceedings. ln excep-
tional circumstances, an application submitted at a later stage may
however be admitted."
The Court recalls that the Special Agreement between Indonesia and
Malaysia was registered with the United Nations on 29 July 1998 and
notified to the Court on 2 November 1998.Pursuant to Article 40, para-
graph 3, of the Statute of the Court and Article 42 of the Rules of
Court, copies of the notification and of the Special Agreement were
transmitted to al1the Members of the United Nations and other States
entitled to appear before the Court (see paragraph 2 above). Thus, the
Philippines had been aware that the Court had been seised of the dis-
pute between Indonesia and Malaysia for more than two years before it
filed its Application to intervene in the proceedings under Article 62 of
the Statute. Bythe time of the filing of the Application, 13March 2001,
the Parties had already completed three rounds of written pleadings as
provided for as mandatory in the Special Agreement - Memorials,
Counter-Memorials and Replies - their time-limits being a matter of
public knowledge. Moreover, the Agent for the Philippines stated dur-
ing the hearings that his Government "was conscious of the fact that
after 2 March 2001, Indonesia and Malaysia might no longer consider Cour, au préjudice desParties. Dans cesconditions, l'Indonésiesou-
tient que la requêtedes Philippines devrait être rejetéeau motif
qu'elle n'a pas étéprésentéeen temps voulu.))
A l'audience, la Malaisie s'est associée,dans les termes suivants, à
l'objection concernarit le retard procédural alléguépar l'Indonésie:«Ce
point a ététraitéde façon très complète par l'Indonésie.Nous approu-
vons les arguments avancéspar celle-ci; nous ne voyons tout simplement
aucune raison d'y ajouter d'autres considérations. ))
Pour leur part, les Philippines soutiennent que ((non seulement les Phi-
lippines ont respectétous les délais prévus, maiselles n'auraient pas pu,
d'un point de vue logique et pratique, déposer leur requêteplus tôt)). Les
Philippines soulignent ce qui suit:
«[e]n raison de la nature de la présente affaire, les Philippines
auraient difficilement pu présenter leurrequête à fin d'intervention
au titre de I'artiicle62 du Statut avant d'avoir essayéd'obtenir les
documents. C'est seulementlorsqu'il est devenu évidentque la com-
munication des documents ne leur serait pas accordée que les Phi-
lippines ont formuléleur requête à fin d'intervention.)>
20. La Cour examinera cette objection ratione temporis,en appliquant
aux circonstances de fait de l'espèce lesconditions fixéespar son Règle-
ment en ce qui concerne la procédure d'intervention.
Le paragraphe 1 de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour déjà men-
tionné (voirparagraphe 16ci-dessus) stipule ce qui suit:
«[u]ne requête à fin d'intervention fondéesur l'article 62 du Statut ...
est déposéele plus tôt possible avant la clôture de la procédure
écrite. Toutefois, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, la Cour
peut connaître d'une requête présentéu eltérieurement.))
La Cour rappellera que le compromis conclu entre l'Indonésieet la
Malaisie a été enregistré auprès de l'organisation des Nations Unies le
29juillet 1998et notifiéa la Cour le 2 novembre 1998. En application du
paragraphe 3 de I'article 40 du Statut de la Cour et de l'article 42 de son
Règlement, copie de la notification et du compromis a été transmise a
tous les Membres des Nations Unies et aux autres Etats admis à ester
devant la Cour (voir paragraphe 2 ci-dessus). Ainsi, les Philippines, lors
du dépôtde leur requête à fin d'intervention en vertu des dispositions de
l'article 62 du Statut, savaient déjà depuisplus de deux ans que la Cour
étaitsaisie du différendopposant l'Indonésieet la Malaisie. A la date du
dépôtde cette requête,le 13mars 2001, les Parties avaient déjà procédé à
l'échange destrois sériesde piècesde procédure écriteque prescrivait le
compromis - à savoir les mémoires,contre-mémoireset répliques-, les
dates d'expiration des délaispour le dépôtde ces piècesétant publiques.
De plus, l'agent des Philippinesa déclaré,au cours des audiences, que son
gouvernement «était conscient du fait que, uprés le 2 mars 2001, I'Indo-
nésieet la Malaisie pourraient estimer qu'un nouveau tour de procédurethe need to submit a final round of pleadings as contemplated in their
Special Agreement".
21. Given these circumstances, the time chosen for the filing of the
Application by the Philippines can hardly be seen as meeting the require-
ment that it be filed "as soon as possible" as contemplated in Article 81,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court. This requirement which, although
when taken on its own might be regarded as not sufficiently specific,is
nevertheless essential for an orderly and expeditious progress of the pro-
cedure before the Court. In view of the incidental character of interven-
tion proceedings, it emphasizes the need to intervene before the principal
proceedings have reached too advanced a stage. In one of the recent
cases, dealing with another type of incidental proceeding the Court
observed that: "the sound administration of justice requires that a request
for the indication of provisional measures . . be submitted in good time"
(LaGrund (Germuny v. United Stutes of America), Provi.~ionu Meus-
ures, Order ($3 March 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 19%) (I), p. 14,para. 19).
The same applies to an application for permission to intervene, and
indeed even more so, given that an express provision to that effect is
included in Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
22. As to the argument of the Philippines that the delay in the filingof
its Application for permission to intervene was caused by its wish firstto
secure accessto the pleadings of the Parties, the Court does not find any-
thing in its Rules or practice to support the view that there exists an
inextricable link between the two procedures or, for that matter, that the
requirement of the timeliness of the Application for permission to inter-
vene may be made conditional on whether or not the State seeking to
intervene is granted access to the pleadings. Furthermore, the Philippine
argument is undermined by the fact that the Philippines asked the Court
to furnish it with copies of the pleadings and other documents of the
Parties only on 22 February 2001, that is less than ten days before the
completion of the last compulsory round of written pleadings. It is not
unusual in the practice of the Court that in reliance on Article 53, para-
graph 1,of its Rules, States entitled to appear before the Court ask to be
furnished with copies of the pleadings of the Parties atan early stage of
the written proceedings (see, for example, case concerning the Continen-
tal Sheij'(TunisialLibyatz Arab Jamuhiriyu), Application for Permission
to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 5, para. 4; case concern-
ing Conrinentul Shelf' (Libyun Arab JutnrzhiriyalMaltu), Application jor
Permission to 1r7tervene,Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 5, para. 4).
23. The Court notes, however, that despite the filing of the Applica-
tion at a late stage in the proceedings, which does not accord with the
stipulation of a general character contained in Article 81, paragraph 1,of
the Rules requiring that "[aln application for permission to intervene . ..
shall be filed as soon as possible", the Philippines cannot be held to be
in violation of the requirement of the same Article, which establishes aécrite, qu'ellesavaient envisagédans leur compromis, n'était plus néces-
saire».
21. Compte tenu de ces circonstances, le moment que les Philippines
ont choisi pour introduire leur requête ne peut guère êtreconsidéré
comme remplissant l;-icondition d'un dépôt effectué «le plus tôt pos-
sible))comme le prévoitle paragraphe 1 de l'article 81 du Règlement de la
Cour. Cette conditiori qui, bien que prise isolément, pourrait être consi-
déréecomme n'étant pas suffisamment précise,n'en est pas moins essen-
tielle pour que la procédure puisse se dérouler devant la Cour de façon
ordonnée et avec la c~ilérité voulue. Eu égard au caractère incident de la
procédure d'intervention, cette disposition souligne la nécessitéd'interve-
nir avant que la procédure principale ait atteint un stade trop avancé.
Dans l'une des affaires dont elle a récemmenteu à connaître, et qui trai-
tait d'un autre type de procédure incidente, la Cour a observé qu'<<une
bonne administration de la justice exige qu'une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires ..soit présentée entemps utilen (affaire LuCrutid
(Allenîugne c. Etats-Unis rl'An~c;riqrre)m , esures conservatoires, ordon-
nance du 3 nnzars1999. C.I.J. Recucil 1999 (I),p. 14, par. 19).Ilen est de
mêmepour ce qui est d'une requêteà fin d'intervention, et ce d'autant
plus qu'une dispositi,on expresse à cet effet figure au paragraphe 1 de
I'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour.
22. Quant à l'argument des Philippines selon lequel le dépôt tardif de
leur requêteà fin d'intervention était motivépar leur désird'avoir d'abord
accès aux écritures des Parties. la Cour ne voit. dans son Réelemunt ou
dans la pratique, rien qui permette de soutenir qu'il existerait un lien
indissociable entre les deux procédures ou, en l'occurrence, que l'exigence
selon laquelle une requete à fin d'intervention doit êtredéposéeen temps
voulu pourrait dépendre du point de savoir si l'accèsau dossier est ou
non accordé a 1'Etatcherchant à intervenir. En outre, l'argument des Phi-
lippines souffre du fait que cet Etat n'a demandé à la Cour communica-
tion des piècesde des Parties et des documents annexésque le
22 février 2001, c'est-à-dire moins de dix jours avant le dépôt des der-
nières piècesde procédure prescrites. Or. dans la pratique de la Cour, il
n'est pas rare que, s'appuyant sur les dispositions du paragraphe 1de I'ar-
ticle53 du Règlemeni:,des Etats admis i ester devant la Cour demandent
à avoir communication des piècesde procédure au début de la procédure
écrite(voir Dar exem~le l'affaire du Plriteuu c'ontinentul (TunisielJumu-
liiriya arabe lihyeizne), requête r'r d'interventioiz, arrêt, C. 1.J.
Recucil 1981. p. 5, par. 4; affaire du Plateau continrntul (Juinuhiriyu
uruhc libj~enn~~/Multe), requCte a jïn d'intervention, rrrrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 5, par. 4).
23. La Cour relèvetoutefois que, bien que la requête ait été déposé ae
un stade tardif de la procédure, ce qui n'est pas conforme à laprescrip-
tion de caractère généralénoncéeau paragraphe 1 de l'article 81 du
Règlement, selon laquelle «[u]ne requêteà fin d'intervention ... est dépo-
séele plus tôt possible)), les Philippines n'ont pas contrevenu à la condi-
tion énoncéedans le mêmearticle, qui établit un délai préfixépour le586 PULAU LlGlTAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
specific deadline for an application for permission to intervene, namely
'hot later than the closure of the written proceedings".
24. It will be recalled that the Special Agreement provided for the pos-
sibility of one more round of written pleadings - the exchange of
Rejoinders - "if the Parties so agree or if the Court decides so ex officio
or at the request of one of the Parties". It was only on 28 March 2001
that the Parties notified the Court by joint letter "that [their] Govern-
ments . . ha[d] agreed that it is not necessary to exchange Rejoinders".
Thus, although the third round of written pleadings terminated on
2 March 2001, neither the Court nor third States could know on the date
of the filing of the Philippine Application whether the written proceed-
ings had indeed come to an end. In any case, the Court could not have
"closed" them before it had been notified of the views of the Parties con-
cerning a fourth round of pleadings contemplated by Article 3, para-
graph 2 (d), of the Special Agreement. Even after 28 March 2001, in
conformity with the same provision of the Special Agreement, the Court
itself could ex officio "authoriz[e] or prescrib[e] the presentation of a
Rejoinder", which the Court did not do.
25. For these reasons, the filing of the Philippine Application on
13March 2001 cannot be viewed as made after the closure of the written
proceedings and remained within the specific time-limit prescribed by
Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
In somewhat similar circumstances,dealing with the Nicaraguan Appli-
cation for permission to intervene in the case concerning the Lund, Islund
und Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sulv~tdorlHonduras),a Chamber of
the Court Sound that, since the Special Agreement included a provision
for a possible further exchange of pleadings, even when the Replies of the
Parties had been filed, "the date of the closure of the written proceedings,
within the meaning of Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
would remain still to be finally determined" (1.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 98,
para. 12). The Court had pronounced itself in similar terms some ten
years earlier in the case concerning the ContinentulShrlj" (TunisiulLibyun
Arub Jumahiriya), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment
(I.C.J. Reports 1981, p.6, para. 5), although in the latter proceedings the
question of timeliness was not in issue.
26. The Court therefore concludes that it cannot uphold the objection
raised by Indonesia and Malaysia based on the alleged untimely filing of
the Philippine Application.
27. Article 81, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court provides that an
application for permission to intervene "shall contain a list of documents
in support, which documents shall be attached". In relation to this
requirement, Indonesia argues in its written observations that dépôt d'une requêteà.fin d'intervention, à savoir ((avant la clôture de la
procédure écrite ».
24. La Cour rappellera que le compromis prévoyait le dépôt éventuel
d'une sériesupplémeritairede piècesécrites - l'échangede dupliques -,
«si les Parties en décitl[aient]ainsi d'un commun accord ou si la Cour [le]
décid[ait]d'office ou ii la demande de l'une des Parties)). Or, ce n'est que
le 28 mars 2001 que les Parties, par une lettre conjointe, ont aviséla Cour
«que leurs gouvernements ... [avaient] décidéd'un commun accord qu'il
n'étaitpas nécessaired'échangerdes dupliques».
Ainsi, bien que le dépôt de la troisième sériede pièces de procédure
écriteait étéeffectuéle 2 mars 2001, ni la Cour ni les Etats tiers ne pou-
vaient savoir, iila date à laquelle les Philippines ont déposé leur requête,
si la procédure écriteétait effectivement parvenue à son terme. En tout
état de cause, la Cour n'aurait pas pu «clore» la procédure écriteavant
d'avoir étéaviséedes vues des Parties quant au dépôt d'une quatrième
sériede piècesde procédure, tel qu'envisagéà l'alinéad) du paragraphe 2
de l'article3 du compromis. Même après le 28 mars 2001, conformément
à la disposition précitkedu compromis, la Cour pouvait, elle-même, déci-
der d'office d'«autorise[r] ou [de prescrire] la présentation d'une du-
plique)), ce qu'elle n'a pas fait.
25. Pour ces motifs, le dépôt,le 13mars 2001, de la requêtedes Philip-
pines ne peut pas êtreregardécommeayant étéeffectuéaprèsla clôture de
la procédureécriteet n'est pas intervenu après l'expiration du délaipréfixé
prescrit par le paragraphe 1de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour.
Dans des circonstances quelque peu similaires, lorsqu'elle a eu à con-
naître de la requêteà fin d'intervention du Nicaragua en l'affaire du Dif-
fi;uen~j/iontnlier teurclstt.c,insuluirc~et muritirne (El S(llvu~lorlHor7durrrs),
une chambre de la Cour a conclu que, du fait que le compromis contenait
une disposition prévoyant la possibilitéd'un échangede piècesaddition-
nelles. mêmeaprès le dépôt,par les Parties. de leurs répliques, <<la date de
clôture de la procédure écrite au sens de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du
Règlement rest[ait] iifixer définitivement)) (C.I.J. Recueil 1990. p. 98,
par. 12). La Cour s'étaitprononcée dans des termes analogues quelque
dix ans plus tôt, dans l'affaire du Plut~rruc~ontinentul(Tuni.si~~lJamul~i-
rijw rruahclihj)ennc~),rryui;tr ùJin d'intc~r~~entior (l,rr.tC. I.J. Recuril
1981, p. 6, par. 5), quoique, dans cette dernière affaire. la question du
respect des délais ne se fût pas posée.
26. La Cour conclut en conséquence qu'elle ne peut accueillir l'objec-
tion de l'Indonésie et de la Malaisie, tirée du dépôt tardif alléguéde la
requêtedes Philippines.
27. Le paragraphe 3 de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour dispose
qu'une requêteà fin d'intervention ((contient un bordereau des docu-
ments à l'appui, qui sont annexés)).Dans ses observations écrites,I'lndo-
nésiesoutient à cet égard que: "[iln so far as it is claimed that the Philippines' request is directed to
safeguarding its historical andlegal rights over the territory of North
Borneo, such an alleged interest is unsupported by any documentary
or other evidence contrary to the requirements of Article 81 (3) of
the Rules of Court".
For its part, Malaysia submitted no argument on this point.
28. The Philippines states that the fact that it has not annexed a list of
documents in support of its Application does not concern the question of
the admissibility of the Application, but rather that of evidence. It main-
tains that it was left with only two options: either "to try to document
and argue [its] entire case for North Borneo, which would be impermis-
sible and would be an affront to the Court, and would, [it] believe[s],
properly be rejected by the Court" or "to decide not to attach documents,
since [it] could not know which ones would be relevant to the pending
case", with the risk that, in the latter case, one of the Parties would then
complain about the failure to annex documents.
29. The Court confines itself to observing in this regard that, while
Article 81, paragraph 3,of the Rules of Court indeed provides that the
application shall contain a list of any documents in support, there is no
requirement that the State seeking to intervene necessarily attach any
documents to its application in support. It is only where such documents
have in fact been attached to the said application that a list thereof must
be included. A Chamber of the Court took care to emphasize, "it is for a
State seeking to intervene to demonstrate convincingly what it asserts,
and thus to bear the burden of proof' (Land Islunciand Marititne Fron-
tirr Di.spute (El Sali~arlorlHondurus), Application to Interverze, Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports lYYO,p. 117, para. 61). The Court considers, how-
ever, that the choice of the means whereby the State wishing to intervene
seeks to prove its assertions lies in the latter's sole discretion. In the
Court's view, paragraph 3 of Article 81 of its Rules has the same pur-
pose, tnututis tnufaizdi~,as paragraph 3 of Article 50 of the said Rules,
which provides that "[a] list of al1documents annexed to a pleading shall
be furnished at the time the pleading is filed". It follows that the Philip-
pine Application for permission to intervene cannot be rejected on the
basis of Article 81, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.
30. The Court therefore concludes that the Philippine Application was
not filed out of time and contains no formal defect which would prevent
it from being granted. PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 587
(([dlans la mesure où il est alléguéque la demande des Philippines a
pour ob,jetde sauvegarder leurs droits d'ordre historique et juridique
sur le territoire du Nord-Bornéo, [elle]constate qu'aucun document
ou autre élémentde preuve n'est produit, contrairement aux pres-
criptions du paragraphe 3 de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour, à
l'appui de ce prétendu intérê» t.
La Malaisie. pour sa part, n'a présentéaucun argument sur cette ques-
tion.
28. Les Philippines indiquent que le fait qu'elles n'aient pas joint de
liste de documents à l'appui de leur requête ne concerne pas la question
de la recevabilité de cette dernière. mais plutôt la question des éléments
de preuve. Elles soutiennent que seules deux solutions se présentaient à
elles:soit((essayerd'étayer et d'argumenter pleinement [leur]thèse concer-
nant le Nord-Bornéo, ce qui n'aurait pas étéautorisé, aurait constitué un
affront à la Cour et aiurait d'ailleurs, à [leur] avis, étéà juste titre rejeté
par la Cour)), soit «décider de n'annexer aucun document, puisqu'[elles]
ne pouv[aient] pas savoir lesquels seraient pertinents en l'espèce)),avec le
risque, si cette seconde solution était retenue, que l'une des Parties se
1laiun nde l'absence dl'annexes.
29. La Cour se contentera d'observer à cet égard que, si le para-
graphe 3 de I'article 1de son Règlement prévoitbien que la requête doit
contenir un bordereau des documents a l'appui, il n'exige pas que 1'Etat
aui demande à intervenir annexe nécessairement à sa reauêtedes docu-
ments àl'appui. Ce n'est que dans lecas où de tels documents ont effective-
ment été annexésà la requêteque celle-ci doit contenir ledit bordereau.
Comme n'a pas manqué de le souligner une chambrede la Cour, ((c'està
1'Etat qui demande à intervenir d'établir de façon convaincante ce qu'il
allègueet donc de supporter la charge de la preuve))(Dqfi5rend,fvontulierter-
restre, insuluire et rnuritir(El Salvudor/Hondura.r), reyut;teujn d'intc~r-
vention. urrr^t,C.1.J. Recueil 1990, p. 1 17, par. 61). La Cour considère
toutefois que 1'Etatqui cherche à intervenir a seul le choix des moyens de
preuve qu'il invoquera à l'appui de ses allégations. De l'avis de la Cour,
le paragraphe 3 de l'article 81 de son Règlement a le même objetrnututis
mut un di.que le paragraphe 3 de I'article 50 dudit Règlement qui prévoit
que, c<[a]~mi oment du dépôt d'une pièce de procédure, ilest fourni un
bordereau de tous les documents annexésà cette pièce)).La requêteà fin
d'intervention des Philippines ne saurait en conséquence êtrerejetéesur
la base du paragraphe 3 de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour.
30. La Cour conclut donc que la requête desPhilippines n'a pas été
déposéehors délai e.t ne comporte aucun vice de forme qui pourrait
l'empêcherd'être admise. 31. The Court will now consider the objections based on the absence
of a jurisdictional link.
32. In this regard, Malaysia contends that:
"in the present case the jurisdictional link is . . twice lacking.
First, there is no conventional instrument or unilateral declaration
giving the Court jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the territorial dis-
pute between the Philippines and either one of the Parties to thecase;
Second, both Parties in the present case oppose a request for inter-
vention by the Philippines."
Accordingly, it argues that the Philippine Application cannot be
accepted by the Court.
Indonesia presented no argument in this respect.
33. For its part, the Philippines has made it clear that it does not seek
to become a party to the dispute submitted to the Court by Indonesia
and Malaysia. It further States that its Application for permission to
intervene "is based solely on Article 62 of the Statute, which does not
require a separate title of jurisdiction as a requirement for this Applica-
tion to prosper", and that accordingly it should be granted.
34. TheCourt recalls that, under the terms of Article 62 of the Statute:
"1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request."
35. As a Chamber of the Court has already had occasion to observe:
"Intervention under Article 62 of the Statute is for the purpose of
protecting a State's 'interest of a legal nature' that might be affected
by a decision in an existing case already established between other
States, namely the parties to the case. It is not intended to enable a
third State to tack on a new case . . . An incidental proceeding can-
not be one which transforms [a] case into a different case with dif-
ferent parties." (Lund, Islund und Marititne Frontirr Dispute (El Sal-
vudorlHorzdurtrs),Application to Interi~ene,Judgnient, 1.C.J. Reports
1990. pp. 133-134,paras. 97-98.)
Moreover, as that same Chamber pointed out, and as the Court itself
has recalled :
"lt . . . follow... from the juridical natureand from the purposes
of intervention that the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction
between the would-be intervener and the parties is not a requirement
for the success of the application. On the contrary, the procedure of
intervention is to ensure that a State with possibly affected interests
may be permitted to intervene even though there is no jurisdictional
link and it therefore cannot become a party." (Ihid, p. 135,para. 100;
Lund trnd Muritirlle Bountluy*hctii.c.crzCrir~~croo rzztlNig~riu,Appli- PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 588
31. La Cour passera maintenant à l'examen des objections tirées du
défaut de lien juridictionnel.
32. A cet égard, la Malaisie allègue que :
((dans le cas présent ...le lien juridictionnel manque par deux fois.
Premièrement, il n'y a pas d'instrument conventionnel ou de décla-
ration unilatérale conférant à la Cour compétence pour connaître
d'un litige territorial entre les Philippines et une des Parties en cause;
Deuxièmement, les deux Parties à l'instance s'opposent à la
demande d'intervention des Philippines. ))
Elle soutient que la requête des Philippines ne peut en conséquenceêtre
accueillie par la Cour.
L'Indonésie n'a prisenté aucun argument sur ce point.
33. Les Philippines ont spécifiéq , uant à elles, qu'elles ne souhaitaient
pas devenir partie au différend soumis à la Cour par l'Indonésie et la
Malaisie. Elles ajoutent que leur requête à fin d'intervention «se fonde
exclusivement sur l'article 62 du Statut qui n'exige pas un titre de com-
pétence distinct pour donner suite à cette requête)).Celle-ci devrait dès
lors êtreadmise.
34. La Cour rappellera que, selon l'article 62 du Statut :
<1. Lorsqu'un Etat estime que, dans un différend, un intérêt
d'ordre juridique est pour lui en cause, ilpeut adresser à la Cour une
requête, à fin d'intervention.
2. La Cour décide. »
35. Ainsi qu'une chambre de la Cour a déjà eul'occasion de l'observer:
«Le but d'une intervention fondée sur l'article 62 du Statut est de
protéger un ((intérêtd'ordre juridique)) d'un Etat susceptible d'être
affecté par une tlécision, dans une affaire pendante entre d'autres
Etats, à savoir les parties à cette affaire. Son but n'est pas de mettre
1'Etat intervenant en mesure de greffer une nouvelle affaire sur la
précédente ... Unr: procédure incidente ne saurait être une procédure
qui transforme [iine]affaire en une affaire différente avec des parties
différentes.)) (D~férendjrontalier terrestre, insulaire et rnuritime
(El Sali~adorlHondurasj, reyuete Li $n d'intervention, orret,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 133-134, par. 97-98.)
Par ailleurs, comme cette mêmechambre l'a soulignéet comme la Cour
elle-mêmel'a rappelé :
((11découle ...de la nature juridique et des buts de l'intervention
que l'existence d'un lien juridictionnel entre I'Etat qui demande à
intervenir et les parties en cause n'est pas une condition du succèsde
sa requête. Au contraire, la procédure de l'intervention doit per-
mettre que 1'Eta~tdont les intérêts risquent d'êtreaffectés puisse
être autoriséà intervenir, alors même qu'iln'existe pas de lien juri-
dictionnel et qu'il ne peut par conséquent pas devenir partie à I'ins-
tance. » (Ihid, p. 135, par. 100; FrorltiCrrterre.ytreet rnuritinie entre cation to Intervenc, Order of 21 Octobrr 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999
(II), pp. 1034-1035, para. 15.)
Thus, such a jurisdictional link between the intervening State and the
Parties to the case is required only if the State seeking to intervene is
desirous of "itself becoming a party to the case" (Land, Islanciund Mari-
time Frontier Dispute (El SalvadorlHondurus), Application to Interilene.
Judgmrnt, 1. C. J. Reports 1990, p. 135, para. 99).
36. That is not the situation here. The Philippines is seeking to inter-
vene in the case as a non-party. Hence the absence of a jurisdictional link
between the Philippines and the Parties to the main proceedings does not
present a bar to the Philippine intervention.
37. The Court will now consider the arguments that the Application to
intervene cannot be granted for the reasons, first, that the Philippines has
not established the existence of an "interest of a legal nature" justifying
the intervention sought, and, secondly, that the object of the intervention
would be inappropriate.
38. In relation to the existence of an "interest of a legal nature" justi-
fying the intervention, the Philippines contends that:
"Under Article 2 of the Special Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of lndonesia and the Government of Malaysia,
the Court has been requested to determine the issue of sovereignty
over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 'on the basis of treaties,
agreements and any other evidence' to be furnished by the Parties.
The interest of the Republic of the Philippines is solely and exclu-
sively addressed to the treaties, agreements and other evidence fur-
nished by Parties and appreciated by the Court which have a direct
or indirect bearing on the matter of the legal status of North Borneo.
The legal status of North Borneo is a matter that the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines considers as its legitimate concern."
The Philippines adds that
"[a] decision by the Court, or that incidental part of a decision by
the Court, which lays down an appreciation of specific treaties,
agreements and other evidence bearing on the legal status of North
Borneo will inevitably and most assuredly affect the outstanding ter-
ritorial claim of the Republic of the Philippines to North Borneo, as
well as the direct legal right and interest of the Philippines to settle
that claim by peaceful means". PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 589
le Cumcroun et 1é NigPria, requêtcù,fin d'intervention, ordonnuncc
du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J.Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1034-1035,par. 1S.)
Ainsi, un lien juridictionnel entre les Parties à l'instance et 1'Etat qui
cherche à intervenir n'est requis que si ce dernier entend «devenir lui-
mêmepartie au procès)) (DifJZrend fi.ont~11ierterrrstrc,insuluire rf muri-
tirnr (El Sul~~udorl~Yondurus). recluêtr (i Jin ~l'irzteri-entionurrêt,
C. 1.J.Recueil 1990, p. 135, par. 99).
36. Telle n'est pas la situation en l'espèce. LesPhilippines cherchent a
intervenir à l'instance en tant que non-partie. Dès lors, le défaut de lien
juridictionnel entre lei3Philippines et les Partiei la procédure principale
ne constitue pas un obstacle à l'intervention des Philippines.
37. La Cour passeira maintenant à l'examen de l'argumentation selon
laquelle la requêteà fin d'intervention ne saurait être admise au motif,
d'une part, que les Philippines n'auraient pas établil'existence d'un «inté-
rêtd'ordre juridique)) justifiant l'intervention demandée et, d'autre part,
que l'objet de celle-ci ne serait pas approprié.
38. Au sujet de l'existence d'un ((intérêtd'ordre juridique))justifiant
l'intervention. les Philippines avancent que:
«en vertu de l'article2 du compromis conclu entre le Gouvernement
de la République d'Indonésie et le Gouvernement de la Malaisie, la
Cour a été priée de trancher la question de la souveraineté sur
Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan «sur la base des traités, accords et de
tout autre élémentde preuve)) que produiront les Parties. L'intérêt
de la République des Philippines porte uniquement et exclusivement
sur les traités,les accords et autres élémentsde preuve fournis par les
Parties et pris eri compte par la Cour qui ont une incidence directe
ou indirecte sur la question du statut juridique du Bornéo septen-
trional. Le Gouvernement de la République des Philippines consi-
dère que la question du statut juridique du Nord-Bornéo relève de
ses préoccupations légitimes. ))
Les Philippines ajoutent que:
«[u]ne décisionclela Cour ou bien le volet d'une décisionde la Cour
qui consisterait à prendre en compte certains traités, accords et
autres éléments de preuve ayant une incidence sur le statut juridique
du Bornéoseptentrional mettra inévitablement et sans aucun doute
possible en cause la revendication territoriale toujours en suspens de
la République des Philippines sur le Bornéo septentrional ainsi que
le droit et 1'intér.jutridique direct consistant pour les Philippines à
réglercette revendication par des moyens pacifiques)). In outlining its claim, the Philippines has referred interuliu to Sec-
tion 3 of the Republic Act 5446 (which makes an implicit allusion to a
claim to title in North Borneo) and to the Manila Accord of 31 July 1963,
between Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya and the Philippines, in
which specific reference is made to the Philippine claim to North Borneo
and "cognizance of the position regarding the Philippine claim to Sabah
(North Borneo)" is taken by the Heads of Government of these three
States.
39. The Philippines refers to the fact that access to the pleadings and to
the annexed documents filed by the Parties was denied to it by the Court
and indicates that it thereby suffered from a handicap not encountered by
intervening States in previous cases of intervention brought before the
Court; it contends that it therefore could not "say with any certainty
whether and which treaties, agreements and facts are in issue". The Phil-
ippines argues that "[flor some cases, the publication of [a] special agree-
ment, in and of itself, is enough to convince the third State that its interest
may be affected" and offers as an example a special agreement between
two States requesting the Court to delimit a comprehensive maritime
boundary; in such a case a third State can easily determine on the basis of
the special agreement whether the prospective delimitation may poten-
tially affect an interest of a legal nature of that third State. The Philip-
pines argues that, on the other hand, "when the possibility of a decision
affecting an interest of a third State is not certain and not graphic and is
contingent on further information and specifications, the mere publication
of the special agreement may not provide sufficient information". Accord-
ing to the Philippines, a procedure whereby an intervening State must
define and establish the interest of a legal nature in question without being
authorized to have notice of the written briefs submitted by the parties to
the case would be equivalent to a denial of justice.
The Philippines asserts that as long as it does not have access to the
documents filed by the Parties and does not know their content, it will
not be able to explain really what its interest is.
40. The Philippines emphasizes that "Article 62 does not say that
the intervening State must have a 'legal interest' or 'lawful interest' or
'substantial interest"', and that the "threshold for the invocation of
Article 62 is, as a result. a subjective standard: the State requesting
permission to intervene must 'consider' that it has an interest". The
Philippines asserts that "[tlhe criteria are not to prove a legal or lawful
interest, but to 'identify the interest of a legal nature' and 'to show in
what way [it] may be affected"'. In this regard, the Philippines maintains
that
"In so far as any treaty or agreement that Malaysia is relying on
in the present case to sustain its claim to Ligitan and Sipadan
depends on the interpretation that lodges international title to North
Borneo in the British North Borneo Company, that interpretation PULAIJLIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 590
Dans l'exposéde leur revendication, les Philippines se sont notamment
référées à la section 3 de la loi no 5446 de la République (qui fait impli-
citement allusion à une revendication du titre sur le Nord-Bornéo) ainsi
qu'à l'accord de Manille du 31 juillet 1963 entre l'Indonésie, la Fédéra-
tion de Malaisie et les Philippines, qui fait spécifiquement référenceà la
prétention des Philiplpines sur le Nord-Bornéo et dans lequel les chefs de
gouvernement de ces trois Etats ((prennentacte de la situation en ce qui
concerne la revendication sur le Sabah (Nord-Bornéo) par les Philip-
pines n.
39. Les Philippines constatent que l'accès aux pièces et documents
annexés déposéspar les Parties leur-aétérefusépar la Cour et observent
qu'elles sesont en coinséquencetrouvées désavantagées,ce qui n'a pas été
le casdes Etats qui, par le passé,ont cherché à intervenir devant la Cour;
elles soutiennent qu't:lles ne pouvaient donc pas «dire avec un minimum
de certitude si des traités, des accords et des faits [étaient] en jeun. Les
Philippines argumentent que «[d]ans certaines affaires, la publication
[d'un] compromis suffit. en soi, à convaincre 1'Etat tiers que son intérêt
peut êtreen cause)) et donnent en exemple un compromis par lequel
deux Etats demandent à la Courde délimitercomplètement une frontière
maritime; en pareil cas, un Etat tiers peut, sur la base du compromis,
aisément déterminersi la délimitation envisagéeest susce~tible de mettre
u
en cause un intérêtd'ordre juridique qui lui soit propre. Les Philippines
font valoir que, en revanche, «lorsque la possibilitéqu'une décisionmet-
tant en cause un intérêtd'un Etat tiers n'est pas certaine, n'est pas mani-
feste et est subordonnée à d'autres informations et précisions, la simple
publication du compromis ne fournit pas nécessairement des renseigne-
ments suffisants)). Selon ce même Etat, une procédure dans laquelle
1'Etat intervenant doit identifier et démontrer l'existence de l'intérêt
d'ordre juridique en causesansêtre autorisé à avoir accèsaux documents
écrits déposéspar les Parties à l'instance équivaut à un dénide justice.
Les Philippines affirment que tant qu'elles n'auront pas accès aux
pièces déposéespar les Parties et qu'elles n'en connaîtront pas le con-
tenu, elles ne pourront pas vraiment expliquer quel est leur intérêt.
40. Les Philippines insistent sur le fait que <<[l]'article62 du Statut ne
dit pas que I'Etat intervenant doit avoir un «intérêjturidique)), un «inté-
rêtlégitime))ou un ((intérêstubstantiel)))),et que «[l]e critère requis pour
que l'article 62 puisse êtreinvoqué est en conséquence un critère suhjec-
tifiI'Etat qui demande à intervenir doit <<estimer»qu'il a un intérê 1).Les
Philippines affirment que <<[l]ecritère n'est pas de prouver. l'existence d'un
intérêt juridique ou légitime, mais d'«identifier l'intérêtd'ordre juri-
dique» et de «montrer en quoi cet intérêt risque d'être mis en cause)).
A cet égard. elles soutiennent que:
«Dans la mesure ou tout traité ou accord que la Malaisie invoque
en l'espècepour étayer sa revendication sur Ligitan et Sipadan est
tributaire d'une interprétation qui revient à conférer à la British
North Borneo Company un titre international sur le Nord-Bornéo, adversely affects an interest of a legal nature which the Philippines
considers that it has."
The Philippines states that it agrees
"entirely with the jurisprudence of the Court in Tuni.siulLihya and
Nicuruguu that a concern about rules and general principles of law
does not constitute sufficient interest under Article 62",
but argues that, in the case in hand, it is not a question of general prin-
ciples of law but of specific treaties relating to a territory, which have an
effect on the Philippines.
41. The Philippines further indicates that the statements made by lndo-
nesia and Malaysia during the public hearing "provide evidence that the
Court will be presented with many of the treaties and agreements upon
which the Philippines claim is based and will be pressed to adopt
interpretations that will certainly affect the Philippine interest". It states
that it
"find[s] nothing in the precedents about the permissible scope of an
intervention being determined by the language of the submission,
but rather by the possible consequence of the Court's decision. The
test is not connective, but <~ons~~quentiu nlo;t whether there is a 'con-
nection' to the submission - whatever that means - but whether
the decision of the Court could affect the interest of a legal nature of
a third State."
The Philippines submits that, on the basis of that part of the record to
which it has been allowed access, "the probability of consequences for the
interests of the Philippines meets the 'may' requirements of Article 62
and justifies Philippine intervention". It adds that
"Evidently, the chain of title which Malaysia asserts to defend its
territorial claim to Sipadan and Ligitan, based as it is on its own
interpretations of, and representations on, specific treaties, agree-
ments and other documents, is linked to the chain of title which the
Philippines relies on to defend its territorial claim to North Borneo."
The Philippines also argues that it has cited three of the four legal
instruments, which have been relied upon by one or both of the Parties to
prove their case, in the context of the overall argument that it wanted to
make.
The Philippines points out that it "has a direct legal interest in the
interpretation of the 1930 United States-United Kingdom boundary,
being the successor-in-interest of one party to that agreement, the United
States", that "the 1930 Agreement cannot be construed in any way as an PULAIJ LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 591
cette interprétation porte atteinte a un intérêtd'ordre juridique que
les Philippines estiment avoir. )>
Les Philippines déclarent
«adhér[er] entièrement à la jurisprudence énoncéepar la Cour dans
les affaires T~nzisirlLihj~et El Sril~~cltlorlHondurasN ;icuruguu (inter-
I'C~LIII~s)e,lon laquelle une préoccupation portant sur des règles et
des principes généraux de droit ne constitue pas un intérètsuffisant
au regard de l'ai-ticle62»,
mais observent qu'en l'espèce il ne s'agit pas de principes générauxde
droit, mais de traités précisrelatifs à un territoire, qui ont un effet sur les
Philippines.
41. Les Philippines avancent en outre que les déclarations faites par
l'Indonésie et la Malaisie au cours des audiences publiques ((prouvent
que de nombreux traités et accords sur lesquels la revendication des Phi-
lippines se fonde seront invoquésdevant la Cour, et que celle-ci sera inci-
téeà en donner des interprétations qui mettront certainement en cause
l'intérêdt es Philippines )).Elles indiquent
((ne trouv[er] rien dans la jurisprudence qui dise que la portéeaccep-
table d'une intervention est définiepar les termes des conclusions,
mais plutôt qu'elle l'est par les conséquences que pourrait entraîner
la décisionde la Cour. Le critéren'est pas la c.onne'tifé,mais le lien
de criuse i1~ffi21;il ne s'agit pas de savoir s'il existe un «lien de
connexité)) avec les conclusions - encore faudrait-il savoir ce que
cela veut dire -- mais si la décision de la Cour pourrait mettre en
cause l'intérêt d"ordre juridique d'un Etat tiers. »
Les Philippines en concluent que, sur la base de la partie du dossier à
laquelle elles ont eu accès,((la probabilité que la décisionde la Cour ait
des incidences sur les intérêts des Philippines répond au critère du ((rnuj»
de l'article 62 et justifie l'intervention des Philippines)). Elles ajoutent que
((De toute évidence,la chaîne de succession du titre que la Malai-
sie considère cornme venant a l'appui de sa prétention territoriale sur
Ligitan et Sipadan. fondée comme elle l'est sur ses propres interpré-
tations de traités, accords et autres documents précis, en même
temps que sur 1;représentation qu'elle s'en fait, est liéeà la chaîne
de succession du titre sur lequel les Philippines se fondent pour faire
valoir leur revendication territoriale sur le Nord-Bornéo.))
Les Philippines affirment en outre avoir citétrois des quatre instru-
ments juridiques invoqués par l'une des Parties ou par les deux à l'appui
de leurs prétentions, et ce dans le cadre de la thèse générale qu'ellessou-
haitaient exposer.
Les Philippines soulignent qu'elles ((ont un intérêtd'ordre juridique
direct dans l'interprétation de la délimitation de la frontière convenue en
1930entre les Etats-]Unis et le Royaume-Uni, dans la mesure ou elles ont
succédédans ses intérêts à l'une des parties à cet accord, les Etats-Unis)),instrument of cession", and that "Britain could not have acquired
sovereignty over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan by virtue of the inter-
pretation placed by Malaysia on the 1930 United States-United King-
dom Agreement"; it follows from this that "the two islands in question
were acquired by the United Kingdom in 1930 for and on behalf of the
Sultan of Sulu".
The Philippines further states that "the territory ceded by the Sultan to
the Philippines in 1962covered only those territories which were included
and described in the 1878 Sulu-Overbeck lease agreement", that its
"Application for permission to intervene is based solely on the rights of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines transferred by and
acquired from the Sulu Sultanate", and that "If at al1there are other ter-
ritories appertaining to the Sultanate not covered by the Sulu-Overbeck
lease of 1878, the Philippines, as agent and attorney for the Sultanate,
has reserved its position on these territories".
The Philippines concludes that :
"anv claim or title to territorv in or islands near North Borneo that
assumes or posits or purports to rest a critical link on the legitimate
sovereign title of Great Britain from 1878 up to the present is un-
founded. Similarly, the interpretation of any treaty, agreement or
document concerning the legal status of North Borneo as well as
islands off the coast of North Borneo which would presume or take
for granted the existence of British sovereignty and dominion over
these territories has no basis at al1in history as well as in law and, if
upheld by the Court. it would adversely affect an interest of a legal
nature on the part of the Republic of the Philippines."
42. For its part, Indonesia denies that the Philippines has an "interest
of a legal nature". It states that
"the subject-matter of the dispute currently pending before the Court
is limited to the question whether sovereignty over the islands of
Ligitan and Sipadan belongs to Indonesia or Malaysia. In its Appli-
cation for permission to intervene, the Philippines expressly states
that it is not its intention to change the scope of the dispute sub-
mitted by Indonesia and Malaysia to the Court."
It recalls that on 5April 2001, the Government of the Philippines sent a
diplomatic Note to the Government of Indonesia in which, referring to
the ongoing case between Indonesia and Malaysia, it wished to reassure
the Government of Indonesia that the Philippines does not have "any ter-
ritorial interest on Sipadan and Ligitan islands".
Indonesia then contends that
"It is evident from this [note] that the Philippines raises no claim
with respect to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. It therefore fol- PULALI LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRÊT) 592
que «la convention di: 1930ne saurait en aucune manière être interprétée
comme un instrument de cession))et que «la Grande-Bretagne ne peut
avoir acquis de souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan par la
grâce d'une interprétation que la Malaisie donne de la convention anglo-
américaine de 1930)); il s'ensuit que ((les deux îles en question ont été
acquises par le Royailme-Uni en 1930 pour le compte du sultan de Sulu
et au nom de celui-ci».
Les Philippines ont en outre préciséque ((lesterritoires cédéspar le sul-
tan aux Philippines en 1962 se limitaient à ceux qui sont mentionnés et
décritsdans le contrat de bail Sulu-Overbeck de 1878», que leur ((requête
à fin d'intervention st:fonde uniquement sur les droits du Gouvernement
de la République des Philippines cédéspar le Sultanat de Sulu et acquis
auprès de celui-ci >et que, s'(<ilexiste d'autres territoires qui, relevant du
Sultanat, n'auraient toutefois pas été couvertspar le contrat de bail Sulu-
Overbeck de 1878, les Philippines. en tant qu'agent et représentant du
Sultanat, ont réservéleur position à l'égarddesdits territoires)).
Les Philippines coricluent que:
((toute revendication ou tout titre concernant un territoire du Nord-
Bornéo ou des îllesproches qui prétendrait ou serait censéereposer
sur un titre souverain légitimement détenu par la Grande-Bretagne
de 1878 à aujourd'hui ne reposerait sur rien. De même, une inter-
prétation de tout traité, accord ou document relatif au statut juri-
dique du Nord-Elornéo ainsique des îles au large de la côte du Nord-
Bornéo qui présumerait ou considérerait comme acquise l'existence
d'une souveraineté britannique sur ces territoires ou leur possession
par la Grande-Bretagne serait dénuéede tout fondement aussi bien
d'un point de vue historique que d'un point de vue juridique et por-
terait atteinte, si elle était retenue par la Cour, à un intérêtd'ordre
juridique de la FLépubliquedes Philippines.
42. L'Indonésie, pour sa part, conteste que les Philippines aient un
((intérêdte nature juridique)). Elle affirme que:
((l'objet du différendactuellement pendant devant la Cour se limite à
la question de savoir si la souveraineté sur les îles de Ligitan et de
Sipadari appartient à l'Indonésieou à la Malaisie. Dans leur requête
à fin d'intervention, les Philippines déclarent expressémentqu'elles
n'ont pas l'intention de modifier la portée du différend soumis à la
Cour par l'Indonésieet la Malaisie. ))
Elle rappelle que, le 5 avril 2001, le Gouvernement des Philippines a
adressé une note diplomatique au Gouvernement de l'Indonésie, dans
laquelle, se référantàil'affaire en cours entre l'Indonésieet la Malaisie, il
a tenu à assurer à nouveau à ce dernier que les Philippines n'avaient
((aucun intérêt territorialrelatif aux îles de Sipadan et de Ligitan)).
L'Indonésieaffirme ensuite que:
«Il ressort à l'évidencede cette [note] que les Philippines ne for-
mulent aucune revendication concernant Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipa- lows that the Philippines has expressly disavowed any interest of a
legal nature in the actual subject-matter of the dispute currently
pending between lndonesia and Malaysia. In its Application, the
Philippines asserts instead that its interest 'is solely and exclusively
addressed to the treaties, agreements and other evidence furnished
by the Parties and appreciated by the Court which have a direct or
indirect bearing on the matter of the legal status of North Borneo'."
It maintains that
"The legal status of North Borneo is not a matter on which the
Court has been asked to rule. Moreover, the desire of the Philippines
to submit its view on various unspecified 'treaties, agreements and
other evidence furnished by the Parties' is abstract and vague."
Indonesia adds that:
"The reply to the question subinitted to the Court in the Special
Agreement will rest entirely 'on the interpretation of the Convention
of 20 June 1891, concluded by Great Britain and the Netherlands.
Spain was not a party to the Convention. The Convention is rcs
inter ulios uctu as far as the Philippines is concerned' . . .The Phil-
ippines is therefore doubly 'protected' . . . by Article59 of the Stat-
ute of the Court, on the one hand, and by the fundamental principle
that treaties bind the contracting States only, on the other. It may
even be triply protected, since the interpretation of the Convention
which . . . Meinbers of the Court are called upon to give concerns
only its application to Ligitan and Sipadan - there is no dispute
between Indonesia and Malaysia with regard to its application to the
island of Borneo. Since the Philippines limits its interest to the island
of Borneo, expressly excluding Ligitan and Sipadan, it is in a sense
also protected by the petitum as defined in the Special Agreement.
In any event, it is apparent from the clear, amply founded juris-
prudence of the Court that the 'interest' claimed by the Philippines
in the treaties, agreements and other evidence furnished by the
Parties is not such as might justify an intervention pursuant to
Article 62 of the Statute."
43. With reference to the question of the Philippine interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, Malaysia argues
that
"[tlhat legal interest must be precisely identified, then compared with
[the Court's] mandate as it appears from the document of seisin. in
the present instance the Special Agreement" PULAü LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 593
dan. II en découle qu'elles ont expressément reconnu l'absence de
tout intérêdt 'ordre juridique dans ce qui est effectivement l'objet du
différend actuel entre l'Indonésie et la Malaisie. Les Philippines
affirment au lieu de cela dans leur requête que leur intérêt((porte
uniquement et exclusivement sur les traités,les accords et autres élé-
ments de preuve fournis par les Parties et pris en compte par la Cour
qui ont une incidence directe ou indirecte sur la question du statut
juridique du Nord-Bornéo)). )>
Elle soutient que:
((11n'est pas demandé à la Cour de se prononcer sur le statut juri-
dique du Nord-Bornéo. En outre, le souhait des Philippines de sou-
mettre leur point de vue sur divers ((traités, ... accords et autres
élémentsde preuve fournis par les Parties))qui ne sont pas spécifiés,
est abstrait et vague.»
L'Indonésie ajoute que:
«la réponse à la question poséeà la Cour par le compromis repose
entièrement «on tlzeinterpretution of the Convention qf20 June 1891.
c.onc~luciedy (Yreut Britain und tlzr Nether1und.s.Spain icus no/ a
part]>to ille Convention. The Conilc.ntionis res inter alios actaas/ar
us tllc Pl~ilippiricsi.sconcerned)[sur l'interprétation de la convention
du 20 juin 1891, conclue entre la Grande-Bretagne et les Pays-Bas.
L'Espagne n'était pas partie à cette convention. La convention est
rcJsinter ulios uctu dans la mesure oii les Philippines sont con-
cernées))]...Le:j Philippines sont donc doublement «protégées» ... :
par l'article 59 du Statut de la Cour d'une part; par le principe
fondamental dt: l'effet relatif des traités d'autre Dart. Peut-êtremême
triplement puisque l'interprétation que ... [les membres] de la Cour
[sont appelésà donner] ne concerne que son application à Ligitan et
Sipadan - il n'existe pas de différendentre l'Indonésieet la Malaisie
quant à son alpplication à I'île de Bornéo. Comme les Philippines
limitent leur intérêtà I'île de Bornéo et en excluent expressément
Ligitan et Sipadan, elles sont, en quelquesorte, protégéesaussi par le
prtitur?~tel qu'il est définipar le compromis.
En tout état de cause, ilressort de la jurisprudence claire et forte-
ment fondéede la Couraue l'«intérêt»dont font étatles Phiiiv..nes
pour les traités, accords et autres élémentsde preuve fournis par les
Parties n'est pas de ceux qui pourraient justifier une intervention en
vertu de I'artic'le62 du Statut.))
43. Concernant l'intérêtd'ordre juridique qui pourrait être encause
pour les Philippines, la Malaisie soutient que:
«[clet intérêtd'ordre juridique doit êtreidentifié avec précision, puis
comparéaux termes [du] mandat [de la Cour], tel que celui-ci résulte
du texte de saisine, ici lecompromis» PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
594
and that
"[ilt is thus not a matter of citing some general legal interest, but of
proving it in relation to 'each of the different issues which might fall
to be determined', to quote the words used by [the]Chamber [in the
case concerning the Lund, Islund and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Suli~udorlHondurasj , Application to Inter~lene]".
Malaysia then contends that :
"the Philippines does not indicate how the u'rcision . . . that the
Court is asked to take on the issue of sovereignty over Ligitan and
Sipadan might ulffrct any specific legal interest. It is content to refer
vaguely to the 'treaties, agreements and other evidence' on which the
Court might 'lay down an appreciation'. But . . . the interest of a
legal nature must, if affected, be so affected by the decision of the
Court and not just by its reasoning. Such appreciation as the Court
may be led to make of the effect of a particular legal instrument, or
of the consequences of a particular material fact, as grounds for its
decision cannot, in itself, serve to establish an interest of a legal
nature in its decision in the case.
It is another provision of the Statute, Article 59, that protects the
general legal interests of non-party States by specifying the limits on
the authority of the Court's decision. By stating that 'the decision of
the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case', Article 59 ensures full legal protec-
tion of third parties, including in regard to any appreciation of trea-
ties, agreements or evidence relied upon by the parties to the case."
(Emphasis in the original.)
Malaysia further contends that "the issue of sovereignty over Ligitan
and Sipadan is completely independent of that of the status of North Bor-
neo", and that "[tlhe territorial titles are different in the two cases".
Malaysia therefore "does not accept that the Philippines possess any
'historical and legal rights' of a kind that could be affected by any deci-
sion of the Court relating to sovereignty over the disputed islands".
Malaysia finally emphasizes that, in its view, "the Government of the
Philippines itself agrees that it has no legal interest"; it refers in this
regard to the diplomatic note of 5 April 2001 sent by the Embassy of the
Philippines in Jakarta to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Indonesia, in which the Government of the Philippines stated that it
did not have "any territorial interest on Sipadan and Ligitan islands". It
concludes from this that
"[The Court] must therefore dismiss this request for intervention
in limine litis, since [its] decision can address only the issue of sov-
ereignty over Ligitan and Sipadan and affect only legal interests with
respect to these two islands. To grant this request for intervention by PUL4U LlGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 594
et que:
<<[ilne s'agit donc pas d'invoquer un quelconque intérêt juridique
général, maisde l'établir en relation avec chacun des ((différents
points susceptibles d'êtretranchés)), pour reprendre l'expression de
[la]Chambre [dlansl'affaire du Di~~krendfrontalic~trerrestre, insulaire
et nîuritime (El SulvadorlHonduru.s), requête r,fin d'interilenti».]
La Malaisie affirme ensuite que:
«la Républiquedes Philippines n'indique pas en quoi la dkcision ...
que la Cour est appelée à prendre au sujet de la souveraineté sur
Ligitan et Sipadan peut ujffcterun intérêtd'ordre juridique spéci-
fique. Elle se contente de faire une vague référenceaux ((traités,
accords et autres élémentsde preuve)) qui pourraient être«pris en
compte))par la décisionde la Cour. Or l'intérêd t'ordre juridique en
cause, ..doit êtreaffecté,lecaséchéant,par la &;cision de la Cour et
non par la seule motiiution. L'appréciation que la Cour peut être
amenéea formuler sur la portée detel ou tel instrument juridique,
ou les conséquencesde tel ou tel fait matériel,pour motiver sa déci-
sion, cette appréciation n'est pas, en soi, de nature fonder un inté-
rêtd'ordre juridique en la cause.
C'est une autre disposition, l'article 59, qui assure la protection
des intérêts juridiquesgénéraux desEtats tiers en précisant l'effet
relatif de la décisionde la Cour. En affirmant que «la décisionde la
Cour n'est oblig;atoireque pour les parties en litigeet dans le cas qui
a étédécidé)),l'article 59 assure une protection juridique complète
aux Etats tiers. notamment quant à toute appréciation au sujet de
trait&, d'accords ou d'éléments depreuve avancéspar les parties a
l'instance» (Les italiques figurent dans l'original.)
La Malaisie expoiseen outre que «la question de la souveraineté sur
Ligitan et Sipadan est une question indépendante de celle du statut du
Bornéoseptentrional)) et qu'(<[il1ne s'agit pas du mêmetitre territorial
dans un cas et dans l'autre)). La Malaisie, des lors, ((ne reconnaît aux
Philippines aucun ((droit d'ordre historique ou juridique)) qui puisse être
mis en cause par une décisionde la Cour concernant la souverainetésur
les îlesqui font l'objet du litige)).
La Malaisie soulugne enfin que «le Gouvernement des Philippines
convient lui-mêmedi: cette absence d'intérêjturidique)); elle évoque, 2 ce
propos, la note diplcomatiquedu 5 avril 2001 adresséepar l'ambassade
des Philippines à Djakarta au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République d'Indonésie,dans laquelle le Gouvernement des Philippines
précise n'avoir«aucun intérêt territorialrelatif aux îles Ligitan et Sipa-
dan P. Elle en déduitque:
«[La Cour écartera]donc in limine liticette demande d'interven-
tion, puisque [sa.]décision nesaurait concerner que la seule question
de la souveraineté sur Ligitan et Sipadan et ne saurait affecter que
les intérêts juridiquesrelatifsà ces deux îles. Accepter la demande the Philippines would be to allow extension of the judicial debate to
another issue altogether, namely that of sovereignty over Northern
Borneo."
In this regard, Malaysia also contends that in the previous practice of the
Court, States have been allowed to intervene where they claimed part of
the area which was in dispute in the case, but that, by contrast, when a
State does not claim particular territory it has not been allowed to inter-
vene, even though it said that the Court's decision on the territory might
impact on it in some way.
44. The Philippines has informed the Court that it has a claim of sov-
ereignty in North Borneo. It stated that, prior to the arriva1in Borneo of
the European Powers, title, at least to part of Sabah lay with the Sultan-
ate of Sulu. A grant was made by the Sultan to Messrs. Overbeck and
Dent on 22 January 1878 in that part (which grant the Philippines
acknowledges not to have included Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan).
The Philippines has described this instrument as the "primary source" of
itshistoric title and takes the viewthat it provided for a lease of territory
but not a cession. The Philippines claims the Sultanate and its heirs
retained title to that part of North Borneo throughout the period 1878to
1962,notwithstanding the assignment of powers of administration to the
British North Borneo Company (hereinafter "BNBC"). In 1962, accord-
ing to the Philippines, it acquired title to this territory through cession by
the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu.
45. The Court recalls that, on 5 April 2001, the Philippines sought, iri
a Diplomatic Note sent to Indonesia, "to reassure the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia that it does not have any territorial interest on
Sipadan and Ligitan islands" (seeparagraphs 42-43 above). This position
was confirmed by the Philippines before this Court. The Philippines
States that its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo is not affected
by whether the Court affirms sovereignty over the islands as lying with
Indonesia, or alternatively with Malaysia. However, the Philippines has
informed the Court that its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo might
be affected by any reasoning of the Court, whether in interpreting treaties
in issue between Indonesia and Malaysia or otherwise, that would affirm
that the BNBC had had sovereignty in North Borneo.
46. Indonesia and Malaysia contend that the existence of an interest
of a legal nature in the very subject-matter of the case is a condition
precedent for the Court to allow an intervention under Article 62.
In that regard, the Court will at the outset consider whether a third
State may intervene under Article 62 of the Statute in a dispute brought PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRÉT) 595
d'intervention des Philippines serait accepter d'ouvrir le débatjudi-
ciaire sur une tout autre question, celle relativea souverainetésur
le Bornéo septentrional.i)
A cet égard, la Malaisie affirme égalementque, dans la pratique anté-
rieure de la Cour, des Etats ont été autorisésintervenir quand ils reven-
diquaient l'un et 1"autre une partie du territoire qui faisait l'objet du
différend, maisque. inversement, un Etat qui ne revendique pas de terri-
toire particulier n'a pas étéautoriséintervenir, quand bien mêmeil sou-
tenait qu'une décisionde la Cour concernant le territoire en question
pourrait avoir des conséquencespour lui.
44. Les Philippines ont expliqué à la Cour qu'elles ont une revendica-
tion de souverainetk au Nord-Bornéo. Elles ont indiquéque, avant I'arri-
vée à Bornéodes puissances européennes,le titre sur une partie au moins
du Sabah appartenait au Sultanat de Sulu. Le 22 janvier 1878, une
concession sur cette partie fut accordée par le sultan à MM. Dent et
Overbeck (concession dont les Philippines reconnaissent qu'elle necom-
prenait pas Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan). Les Philippines ont décrit
cet instrument comme l'«origine» de leur titre historique et ellesestiment
qu'il constituait un contrat de bail du territoire et non une cession. Elles
font valoir que le Sultanat et ses héritiersont conservéleur titre sur cette
partie du Nord-Bornéo tout au long de la période allant de 1878 à 1962,
nonobstant l'octroi de pouvoirs d'administration à la ((British North
Borneo Company)) (ci-aprèsla «BNBC»). En 1962,les Philippines ont,
affirment-elles,acquis un titre sur ce territoire au moyen d'une cession
effectuéepar les héritiersdu sultan de Sulu.
45. La Cour rap;pellera que, le 5 avril 2001, dans une note diploma-
tique adresséeà l'Indonésie,les Philippines ont ten((àassurer à nouveau
au Gouvernement de la République d'Indonésiequ'[elles] n'ont aucun
intérêt territorialrelatif aux îles deipadan et de Ligitann (voir para-
graphes 42-43 ci-dessus). Les Philippines ont confirmé cette position
devant la Cour. Selon elles, que la Cour décideque la souverainetésur
ces îles appartient21l'Indonésieou à la Malaisie, leur revendication de
souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo n'en est pas affectée. Néanmoins, les
Philippines ont informéla Cour que leur revendication de souverainetéau
Nord-Bornéo pourrait être affectée par tout raisonnement - que
ce soit dans l'interprétation de traités en cause entre l'Indonésieet la
Malaisie, ou autrement - par lequel la Cour affirmerait que la BNBC a
possédé à une certaine époquela souverainetésur le Nord-Bornéo.
46. L'Indonésieet la Malaisie soutiennent que l'existenced'un intérêt
d'ordre juridique portant sur l'objet mêmede l'affaire constitue une
condition préalable pourque la Cour autorise une intervention au titre de
l'article 62 du Statut.
A cet égard,la Cour examinera d'embléesi un Etat tiers peut interve-
nir, en vertu de l'article 62du Statut, dans un différendqui lui a étéu-596 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
to the Court under a special agreement, when the State seeking to inter-
vene has no interest in the subject-matter of that dispute as such, but
rather asserts an interest of a legal nature in such findings and reasonings
that the Court might make on certain specifictreaties that the State seek-
ing to intervene claims to be in issuein a different dispute between itself
and one of the two Parties to the pending case before the Court.
47. The Court must first consider whether the terms of Article 62 of
the Statute preclude, in any event, an "interest of a legal nature" of the
State seeking to intervene in anything other than the operative decision
of the Court in the existing case in which the intervention is sought. The
English text of Article 62 refers in paragraph 1to "an interest of a legal
nature which mav be affected bv the decision in the case". The French
text for its part refers toun inthr^t d'ordrejuridique. . .en cause" for the
State seeking to intervene. The word "decision" in the English version of
this provisi6n could be read in a narrower or a broader sense. However,
the French version clearly has a broader meaning. Given that a broader
reading is the one which would be consistent with both language versions
and bearing in mind that this Article of the Statute of the Court was
originally drafted in French, the Court concludes that this is the inter-
pretation to be given to this provision. Accordingly, the interest of a legal
nature to be shown by a State seeking to intervene under Article 62 isnot
limited to the dispositifalone of a judgment. It may also relate to the
reasons which constitute the necessary steps to the dispositif
48. Having reached this conclusion, the Court must now consider the
nature of the interest capable of justifying an intervention. In particular,
it must consider whether the interest of the State seeking to intervene
must be in the subject-matter of the existing case itself, or whether it may
be different and, if so, within what limits.
49. In the majority of the applications for permission to intervene that
have come before the Court, the applicant has claimed to have an interest
in the very subject-matter of the dispute or the territory in which a
delimitation is to be effected. Further, in the two cases where a request
for intervention under Article 62 has been authorized by the Court, that
authorization was in respect of an interest related to the subject-matter of
the dispute (Land, Island and Maririme Frontier Dispute (El Srrlvacdorl
Honduras), Applicution to Intervene, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1990,
p. 121, para. 72: Nicaragua's rights in the Gulf of Fonseca necessarily
being affected by the definition of a condominium; Land and Maritime
Boundary betit9eenCameroon und Nigeria, Applicution to Intervene, Order
of' 21 Octoher 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1029: Equatorial
Guinea's maritime rights could be affected by the determination by the
Court of the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria).
50. In 1981 Malta, seeking to intervene, invoked an interest of a legal
nature which : PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 596
mis par la voie d'un compromis, lorsque 1'Etatcherchant à intervenir n'a
pas d'intérêtdans l',objetdudit différenden tant que tel, mais invoque un
intérêtd'ordre juridique dans les constatations et raisonnements que la
Cour pourrait adopter à propos de certains traités particuliers qui, selon
I'Etat cherchant à intervenir, seraient en jeu dans le cadre d'un autre dif-
férend qui l'oppose à l'une desdeux Parties à l'affaire pendante devant la
Cour.
47. La Cour doit d'abord se demander si les termes de I'article 62 du
Statut excluent, en tout état de cause, un ((intérêd t 'ordre juridique)) de
1'Etat cherchant à intervenir dans une partie autre que le dispositif de
l'arrêtaue rendra la Cour en l'affaire dans laauelle l'intervention est
demandée. Le texte anglais du paragraphe 1 de I'article 62vise«un inter-
est of u Iegul nutur,%~lzichnîuy he ufjcc~cted bj*tlzedecision in the case)).
Dans sa version frilnçaise, ce paragraphe se réfèrepour sa part à «un
intérêtd'ordre juridique ..en cause)) pour 1'Etat cherchant à intervenir.
Le terme « &cision)) dans la version anglaise de cette disposition pourrait
être interprété dans un sens étroit ou dans un sens large. Toutefois, ilest
clair que la version française a un sens plus large. Etant donné que I'inter-
prétation la plus large est celle qui est compatible avec les deux versions
linguistiques et comipte tenu du fait que le texte original de cet article du
Statut de la Cour a étérédigéen français, la Cour conclut que c'est cette
interprétation qu'il y a lieu de retenir pour cette disposition. En consé-
quence. l'intérêtd'ordre juridique qu'un Etat cherchant à intervenir en
vertu de I'article 62doit démontrer n'est uas limitéau seul disuositif d'un
arrêt. II peut également concerner les motifs qui constituent le support
nécessairedu disnoisitif.
48. Ayant abouti à cette conclusion, la Cour doit maintenant s'inter-
roger sur la nature de l'intérêt susceptiblede justifier une intervention.
Elle doit en particulier se demander si I'intérêdte 1'Etatcherchant à inter-
venir doit porter sur l'objet mêmede l'affaire soumise à la Cour ou s'il
peut êtredifférent et, dans l'affirmative, dans quelles limites.
49. Dans la majorité des requêtes a fin d'intervention dont la Cour a
eu à connaître, le demandeur a soutenu qu'il avait un intérêtconcernant
I'objet mêmedu différend ou le territoire devant faire I'objet d'une déli-
mitation. En outre, dans les deux affaires où la Cour a autorisé une inter-
vention en vertu de I'article 62, l'autorisation concernait un intérêtliéà
l'objet du différend (Dif'i.rend,fiontalier terrestre, insuluire et rnuvitime
(El SulvudorlHond~rra.~)r ,equêteÙjn d'intervention, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil
1990, p. 121, par. 72: les droits du Nicaragua dans le golfe de Fonseca
étaient nécessairement mis en cause par la définitiond'un condominium;
FrontiPreterrestre et muritime entre le Canzerounet le Nigeria, requcte Ù
fin d'intervention, ordonnunce du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999
(Il), p. 1029: les droits de la Guinée équatorialeconcernant les questions
maritimes pourraierit êtreaffectéspar la délimitation entre le Cameroun
et le Nigéria à laquelle la Cour doit procéder).
50. En 1981, Malte, cherchant à intervenir, invoqua un intérêd t 'ordre
juridique qui :597 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JUDGMENT)
"does not relate to any legal interest of its own directly in issue as
between Tunisia and Libya in the present proceedings or as between
itself and either one of those countries. It concerns rather the poten-
tial implications of reasons which the Court may give in its deci-
sion in the present case on matters in issue as between Tunisia and
Libya . . ." (Continrntul Shelf' (TunisiuILibyan Arub Jumuhiriyu),
Applicution to Intcrvenr, Judgnient, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 12,
para. 19.)
51. The Court specified that Malta thought that any pronouncements
on special circumstances or on equitable principles in that particular
region would be certain, or very likely, to affect Malta's own rights on
the continental shelf:
"what Malta fears is that in its decision in the present case the
reasoning of the Court . . . may afterwards have a prejudicial effect
on Malta's own legal interests in future settlement of its own conti-
nental shelf boundaries with Libya and Tunisia" (Continc~ntalSlzelf
(TirnisiulLihyan Aruh Jumahirij-a). Application to Intevvene, Judg-
ment, 1.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 17, para. 29).
52. The Court did not, however, find this a pertinent factor in deciding
whether or not to allow Malta to intervene. The Court noted that a State
could not hope to intervene "simply on an interest in the Court's pro-
nouncements in the case regarding the applicable general principles and
rules of international law" (Continental Sheij (TunisiulLibyan Arub
Jumuhiriya), Applicution to Intrrvenc, Judgrnent, I.C.J. Reports 1981,
p. 17, para. 30). But the interest in the Court's findings and pronounce-
ments was not in that case such a generalized interest. The Court thus
turned to an examination of the interests that Malta had specified, not-
withstanding that they did not lie in the very outcome of the case.
53. Malta's Application was rejected, but not on the grounds that its
expressed intention did not faIl within the scope of the dispute as defined
in the Special Agreement. Malta's Application to intervene was not
granted because the Court felt it was in effect being asked to prejudge the
merits of Malta's claim against Tunisia in a different dispute, which
Malta had nonetheless not put before the Court.
54. The situation is different in the present case. Indeed, the Court
considers that the request of the Philippines to intervene does not require
the Court to prejudge the merits of any dispute that may exist between
the Philippines and Malaysia, and which is not before the Court.
55. Whether a stated interest in the reasoning of the Court and any
interpretations it might give is an interest of a legal nature for purposes
of Article 62 of the Statute can only be examined by testing whether the
legal claims which the State seeking to intervene has outlined might be
thus affected. Whatever the nature of the claimed "interest of a legal
nature" that a State seeking to interveneconsiders itself to have (and pro- «ne se rattache a aucun intérêt juridiquelui appartenant en propre
qui serait directement en cause dans la présente instance entre la
Tunisie et la Libye, ou entre Malte et l'un ou l'autre de ces Etats. 11
concerne en réalitél'effet au'auraient éventuellement ...des considé-
rations que la Cour pourrait formuler dans sa décision à propos de
points en litige entre la Tunisie et la Libye...)) (Pluteuu c~ontinentul
( Tuni.sielJumahiri~,rlurube libyenne), rcquc'te ci,fin d'interi~~ntion,
urrc't,C.1.J. Recueil 1951, p. 12, par. 19.)
51. La Cour a remarqué que, selon Malte, tout prononcé concernant
les circonstances spéciales ou les principes équitables dans cette région
particulière mettrait certainement, ou très probablement, en cause les
droits propres de Malte sur le plateau continental:
«la crainte de Malte est que, dans la décisionque rendra la Cour en
l'espèce, lesmotifs ... puissent par la suite avoir un effet préjudiciable
sur ses intérêts juridiquesdans un règlement futur relatif aux limites
de son propre plateau continental avec la Libye et la Tunisien (Plu-
tcuu continent~~l (T~lnisielJan~uhiriy urube libyenne), rc.qut?teci,fin
(/'interilention, arrc'C.1.J. Rccuril 1981, p. 17, par. 29).
52. La Cour n'a cependant pas considéréce facteur comme pertinent
pour déciderd'autoriser ou non Malte à intervenir. Elle a indiquéqu'un
Etat ne peut espérer intervenir «sur un simple intérêtà l'égarddes pro-
noncésde la Cour concernant les principes et règlesde droit international
applicables a titre général))(Pluteuu continentul (TunisielJ~nzuhiri~v~~
urube libyc~ne), rrquc'te cifin tl'intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1981,
p. 17, par. 30).Mai:; l'intérêdte l'intervenant à l'égarddes conclusions et
des prononcés de la Cour ne constituait pas, en l'espèce,un intérêtgéné-
ral de ce genre. La Cour a donc procédé a l'examen des intérêtsque
Malte avait spécifiésb ,ien que ces intérêtsne fussent pas liés à la solution
mêmede l'affaire.
53. La requêtede Malte fut rejetée,mais non au motif que l'intention
expriméepar cet Et.at ne correspondait pas à l'objet du différend tel que
définidans le compromis. Elle ne fut pas admise parce que la Cour eut le
sentiment qu'en réalité illui étaitdemandéde préjugerau fond les reven-
dications de Malte contre la Tunisie dans un différend distinct, que Malte
n'avait cependant p,asporté devant la Cour.
54. La situation est différenteen l'espèce.En effet, la Cour estime que
la demande d'intervention des Philippines ne requiert pas qu'elle préjuge
au fond d'un différend qui peut exister entre elles et la Malaisie, et qui
n'est pas soumis à 1;iCour.
55. A la question de savoir si un intérêt exprimé à l'égarddes raison-
nements ou des interprétations éventuels adoptés par la Cour constitue
un intérêtd'ordre juridique au sens de l'article 62 du Statut, on ne peut
répondre qu'en examinant si les droits invoquéspar I'Etat quidemande à
intervenir sont susceptibles d'y êtremis en cause. Quelle que soit la
nature de l'«intérêtd'ordre juridique)) alléguépar 1'Etat cherchant àvided that it is not simply general in nature) the Court can only judge it
"in concreto and in relation to al1the circumstances of a particular case"
(Chamber of the Court in Lund Isluild und Maritime Frorztier Dispute
(El SulvudorlHondurm), Application to I~fterivne, Judgnlent. 1.C.J.
Reports 1990, p. 118, para. 61).
56. Thus, the Court will now proceed to examine whether the Philip-
pine claim of sovereignty in North Borneo could or could not be affected
by the Court's reasoning or interpretation of treaties in the case concern-
ing Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
57. It is recalled that the Philippines contended that "[tlhe threshold
for the invocation of Article 62 is. . .a subiective standard: the State
requesting permission to intervene must 'consider'that it has an interest"
of a legal nature (seeparagraph 40 above). The Philippines acknowledged
that, having thus invoked Article 62, "the State requesting permission to
intervene must identify the interest in question and relate it to the case at
Bar".
58. As the Chamber said in the case concerning the Lund, Island and
Muritime Frontier Dispute (El SulvudorlHondurus), "it is for a State
seeking to intervene to demonstrate convincingly what it asserts".
Further, "[ilt is for the State seeking to intervene to identify the interest
of a legal nature which it considers may be affected by the decision
in the case, and to show in what way that interest may be affected"
(1.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 117-118,para. 61).
59. The Court would add that a State which, as in this case, relies on
an interest of a legal nature other than in the subject-matter of the case
itself necessarilybears the burden of showing with a particular clarity the
existence of the interest of a legal nature which it claims to have.
60. In order to make concrete its submission that it has an interest of
a legal nature which might be harmed by the reasoning of the Court in
the forthcoming Judgment as to sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan, the Philippines may not introduce a new case before the
Court nor make comprehensive pleadings thereon, but must explain with
sufficient clarity its own claim of sovereignty in North Borneo and the
legal instruments on which it is said to rest, and must show with adequate
specificityhow particular reasoning or interpretation of identified treaties
by the Court might affect its claim of sovereignty in North Borneo.
61. Basing itself on Article53, paragraph 1,of the Rules of the Court,
the Philippines submitted to the Court on 22 February 2001 a request to
be provided with the pleadings and documents annexed by Indonesia and
Malaysia in their written pleadings. After ascertaining the views of the PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 598
intervenir (et pourvu qu'ilne soit pas simplement de caractère général)l,a
Cour ne peut l'apprécier«que concrètement et que par rapport à toutes
les circonstances de l'espèce))(Chambre constituée par la Cour pour
connaître du DifJZrt~~dfrontalierterrestre, insulaireet n~aritinw(El Sul-
vadorlHondz~ru.s),rtrquctcafin d'intervention,arrct,C.1.J. Recueil 1990,
p. 118,par. 61).
56. La Cour examinera donc à présentsi la revendication de souverai-
netédes Philippines au Nord-Bornéo pourrait ou non êtreaffectéepar le
raisonnement de la Cour ou par l'interprétation qu'elle ferait de traités
dans I'affaire relative Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan.
57. La Cour rappellera que les Philippines ont soutenu que «[l]ecritère
requis pour que l'article 62 puisse être invoquéest...un critèresubjectif:
1'Etatqui demande h intervenir doit «estimer» qu'il a un intérêt))d'ordre
juridique (voir paragraphe 40 ci-dessus). Les Philippines ont reconnu
que, ayant ainsi invoqué l'article 62, ((I'Etat qui demande à intervenir
doit identifier l'intérêt encause et établir son lien avec I'affaire pen-
dante)).
58. Ainsi que l'a indiquéla Chambre en l'affaire du Dq'6rend fronta-
lier terrestre.in.su/~fireet rnuritime (El SalvudorlHondurus~. ((c'est à
I'Etat qui demande à intervenir d'établir de façon convaincante ce qu'il
allègue)).En outre, ~[cl'està 1'Etatdésireuxd'intervenir qu'il appartient
d'identifier l'intért'ordre juridique considérépar lui comme susceptible
d'êtreaffectépar la décision àrendre en l'espèceet de montrer en quoi cet
intérêr tisque d'être affecté)).I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 117-118, par. 61).
59. La Cour ajoutera que 1'Etat qui, comme en l'espèce,se prévaut
d'un intérêdt'ordre juridique ne portant pas sur l'objet mêmede I'affaire
doit nécessairement itablir avec une clartétoute particulièrel'existencede
l'intérêdtont il se réclame.
60. Afin d'étayerl'affirmation selon laquelleelles auraient un intérêt
d'ordre juridique susceptible d'êtremis en cause par le raisonnement de la
Cour dans l'arrêtque celle-ci est appelée à rendre concernant la souve-
rainetésur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan, les Philippines ne sauraient
introduire une nouvelle affaire ni développer une argumentation com-
plète àce sujet; mais ellesdoivent exposer avec suffisamment de précision
leurs propres prétentions de souverainetéau Nord-Bornéo ainsi qu'indi-
quer les instruments juridiques supposésfonder ces prétentions,en même
temps qu'elles doivent démontrer, avec toute la clarté nécessaire,dans
quelle mesure tel ou tel raisonnement ou interprétation de la Cour
concernant certains traités pourrait affecter leurs prétentions de souve-
rainetéau Nord-Bornéo.
61. Le 22 février2001, les Philippines, invoquant le paragraphe 1 de
l'article53 du Règlement de la Cour, ont soumis a cette dernière une
demande visant à ce que soient mis à leur disposition les piècesde pro-
cédure et documentis annexés remis par l'Indonésie et la Malaisie au599 PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (JLIDC~MENT)
Parties, the Court decided that it was not appropriate to accede to the
Philippine request. This decision was communicated to the Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia by letters dated 15 March 2001 (seeparagraph 6
above).
62. The Philippines has strongly protested that it is severely and
unfairly hampered in "identifying" and "showing" its legal interest in the
absence of access to the documents in the case between Indonesia and
Malaysia (see paragraph 39 above). Indeed, it has stated to the Court
that "as long as we do not have access to the subrnissions of the Parties
and don't know their contents, we can not really explain what our inter-
est is". The Philippines observes that since the written pleadings in the
case between Indonesia and Malaysia have not yet been made accessible
to the public, it was not until the oral phase of the present proceedings
that the two Parties publicly stated which treaties they considered to be in
issue in their respective claims to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. Its
request for access to the pleadings not having been granted by the Court,
the Philippines maintains that it does not know (save in so far as it has
emerged through theseproceedings) the precisereliance that either Malay-
sia or Indonesia places on any one of these instruments. The Philippines
also observed, during the oral phase of these proceedings, that not only
do Malaysia and Indonesia seem to have different views on certain of
these treaties, but that they do not have identical views as to whether
some treaties that the Philippines regards as relevant to its own different
claim do indeed have legal significance for the disposition of Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
63. The Court observes, however, that the Philippines mus1have full
knowledge of the documentary sources relevant to its claim of sover-
eignty in North Borneo. While the Court acknowledges that the Philip-
pines did not have access to the detailed arguments of the Parties as
contained in their written pleadings, this did not prevent the Philippines
from explaining its own claim, and from explaining in what respect any
interpretation of particular instruments might affect that claim.
64. In outlining that claim, for purposes of showing an interest of a
legal nature that might be affected by the reasoning or interpretation
of the Court in the dispute over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the
Philippines has emphasized the importance of the instrument entitled,
in English translation, "Grant by Sultan of Sulu of territories and lands
on the mainland of the island of Borneo", dated 22 January 1878(here-
inafter the "Sulu-Overbeck grant of 1878").
65. This instrument which bears the official seal of the Sultan of Sulu
is said by the Philippines to be its "prima1 source" of title in North PUL/\U LIGITAN ET PULAlJ SIPADAN (ARRÊT) 599
cours de la procédui-eécrite.Après s'être renseignéa euprès des Parties, la
Cour a décidéqu'il ne convenait pas d'accéder à la demande des Philip-
pines. Cette décision aétécommuniquée aux Philippines, à l'Indonésieet
à la Malaisie par des lettres en date du 15 mars 2001 (voir paragraphe 6
ci-dessus).
62. Les Philippines ont souligné avecvigueur que l'impossibilitéd'avoir
accèsaux piècesrelatives a l'affaire entre l'Indonésieet la Malaisie consti-
tuait un obstacle considérable et injuste au regard de leur obligation de
((définir))et d'«établir» leur intérêt 'ordre juridique (voir paragraphe 39
ci-dessus). Elles ont en effet indiqué à la Cour que, «tant qu'[elles
n'auraient] pas accèsaux piècesdéposéespar les Parties et ...n'en connaî-
tr[aient] pas le contenu, [elles]ne pourr[aient] pas vraiment expliquer quel
est [leur] intérêt). es Philippines ont fait observer que, dans la mesure où
les uièces de urocétlure relatives à l'affaire ouvosant l'Indonésie et la
..
Malaisie n'ont pas encore étérendues publiques, ce n'est qu'au cours de la
procédure orale de la présente instanceque les deux Parties ont publique-
ment fait savoir quels étaient les traitésqu'elles considéraient comme pré-
sentant un intérêtau reg"rd de leurs revendications res~ectives sur Pulau
Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. La Cour n'ayant pas donnéune suite favorable
a leur demande de mise a disposition des piècesde procédure, les Philip-
pines affirment qu'ell!esignorent (a l'exception de ce qui a étédit lors de la
présenteprocédure)l'importance relative qu'attachent la Malaisie et I'Indo-
nésie iichacun de ces divers instruments. Les Philippines ont également
relevé,au cours des audiences publiques, que non seulement la Malaisie et
l'Indonésie semblaiententretenir une vision différentede plusieurs de ces
traités, mais qu'elles n'étaient enoutre pas d'accord sur la question de
savoir si certains des traités que les Philippines estiment pertinents au
regard de leur propre revendication, de caractère distinct, revêtenteffective-
ment une portée juridique pour le sort de Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan.
63. La Cour observera toutefois que les Philippines ne peuvent qu'avoir
pleine connaissance des sources documentaires touchant à leur propre
revendication de souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo. Bien que la Cour recon-
naisse que les Philiplpines n'ont pas eu accès a l'argumentation dévelop-
péepar les Parties dans leurs piècesécrites, cela ne les a pas empêchées
d'exposer leur propre revendication et d'expliquer dans quelle mesure
l'interprétation faite de certains instruments serait susceptible d'affecter
cette revendication.
64. Dans l'exposéde cette revendication, et afin de démontrer l'intérêt
d'ordre juridique qu:ipourrait être mis en cause par le raisonnement ou
l'interprétation de la Cour dans le différendconcernant Pulau Ligitan et
Pulau Sipadan. les Philippines ont insistésurl'importance de l'instrument
intitulé,dans sa traduction anglaise, «Grar~tby the Sultan ~J'Suluof'tw-
ritorirs und Iunds oonthe n~uinlan(i qf'the islrnd of'Borneo)) et daté du
22 janvier 1878(Concession, par le sultan de Sulu, de territoires et terres
sur l'île de Bornéo) (ci-après«la concession Sulu-Overbeck de 1878 O).
65. Cet instrument, qui est revêtudu sceau officiel du sultan de Sulu,
est présentépar les Philippines comme l'«origine>)de leur titre au Nord-Borneo. The Philippines interprets the instrument as a lease and not as a
cession of sovereign title. It also acknowledges that the territorial scope
of the instrument described in its first paragraph ("together with al1the
islands which liewithin nine miles from the coast") did not include Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
66. The Court observes, however, that the Philippine claims of sover-
eignty, as shown on the map presented by the Philippines during the oral
proceedings, do not coincide with the territorial limits of the grant by the
Sultan of Sulu in 1878.Moreover, the grant of 1878 is not in issue as
between Indonesia and Malaysia in the case, both agreeing that Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan were not included in its reach. Also, the ques-
tion whether the 1878grant is to be characterized as a lease or a cession
does not form part of the claim to title of either Party to the islands in
issue. Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia relieson the 1878grant as a source
of title, each basing its claimed title upon other instruments and events.
67. The burden which the Philippines carries under Article 62, to show
the Court that an interest of a legal nature may be affected by any inter-
pretation it might give or reasoning it might adduce as to its "prima1
source" of title, is thus not discharged.
68. The Philippines supplements its contention that sovereignty in
North Borneo was retained by the Sultanate of Sulu by means of cited
extracts from British State Papers of the late nineteenth century and the
first part of the twentieth century.
69. The 7 March 1885Protocol between Great Britain, Germany and
Spain, recognizing the sovereignty of Spain over the Archipelago of Sulu
(Jolo), and by which Spain renounced "as far as regards the British Gov-
ernment, al1claims of sovereignty over the territories of the continent of
Borneo, which belong, or which have belonged in the past, to the Sultan
of Sulu", is said by the Philippines to have great importance for its claim.
This is because - in the Philippine view - this Protocol too made clear
that sovereignty in North Borneo lay with Sultans and not with the Brit-
ish Crown. However, neither Malaysia nor Indonesia base their claims to
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan on the Protocol. It is not to be envis-
aged that either through its reasoning or through interpretation any legal
interests as articulated by the Philippines may be affected.
70. The Philippines has also explained to the Court its view that the
Royal Charter of 1 November 1881, incorporating the BNBC, clearly
shows that the BNBC was not itself invested with a sovereign character.
The Philippines also finds support for its claim of sovereignty in North
Borneo in the Agreement of 12 May 1888 between the British Govern- PULAU LIGITAN ET PULALI SIPADAN (ARRÊT) 600
Bornéo. Les Philippines interprètent cet instrument comme un bail, et
non comme la cession d'un titre souverain. Elles reconnaissent également
que l'instrument, clont la portée territoriale est décrite à son premier
paragraphe («y cornpris toutes les îles qui se trouvent dans une zone de
9 milles de la côte)),),ne couvrait pas Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan.
66. La Cour relévera cependant que les prétentions de souveraineté
des Philippines, telles que figuréessur la carte que les Philippines ont pré-
sentée à l'audience, ne coïncident pas avec l'étendue territoriale de la
concession octroyée par le sultan de Sulu en 1878. En outre, I'acte de
concession de 1878 ne fait l'objet d'aucune contestation par l'Indonésie
ou la Malaisie dans l'affaire les opposant, puisque l'une et l'autre s'ac-
cordent à reconnaîi.re que Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan n'étaient pas
couvertes par cet instrument. Aussi bien, la question de savoir si la con-
cession de 1878 doit êtreconsidéréecomme un bail ou une cession est
étrangèreii la revendication du titre sur ces îles par l'une et l'autre Partie.
Ni l'Indonésie.ni la Malaisie n'invoauent I'acte de 1878comme source de
titre: chacune fonde en effet sa revendication de titre sur d'autres instru-
ments et événemenl:~.
67. Les Philippiries ne se sont ainsi pas acquittées de l'obligation qui
leur est faite par l'article 62 de démontrerla Cour qu'elles ont un intérêt
d'ordre juridique qui risque d'êtremis en cause par toute interprétation
que la Cour pourrait donner de l'«origine» du titre, ou tout raisonne-
ment qu'elle pourrait adopter à cet égard.
68. Les Philippiries, à l'appui de leur prétention selon laquelle le Sul-
tanat de Sulu aurait conservé la souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo, citent
aussi un certain nombre d'extraits de documents officiels britanniques de
la fin du XIX" siècleet de la première partie du XXe siècle.
69. Le protocole du 7 mars 1885 entre la Grande-Bretagne, 1'Alle-
magne et l'Espagne reconnaissant la souveraineté de l'Espagne sur l'archi-
pel de Sulu (Jolo), et par lequel l'Espagne renonçait, «en ce qui concerne
le Gouvernement britanniaue. à toute revendication de souverainetésur les
territoires du continent dé Bornéo qui appartiennent ou ont appartenu
dans le passéau sultan de Sulu)), a étéprésentépar les Philippines comme
revêtantune grande importance pour leur revendication. La raison avan-
céeen est que, de leur point de vue, ce protocole montrait lui aussi clai-
rement que la souveraineté sur le Nord-Bornéo était dévolueaux sultans
et non à la Couronne britannique. Toutefois, ni la Malaisie, ni 1'Indoné-
sie n'invoquent ce protocole comme fondement de leur revendication sur
Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. Iln'y a pas lieu de supposer qu'un rai-
sonnemenl ou une interprétation concernant cet instrument pourrait
mettre en cause un quelconque intérêtd'ordre juridique invoqué par les
Philippines.
70. Les Philippines ont en outre exposéà la Cour le point de vue selon
lequel la charte royale du 1"'novembre 1881, qui constitua la BNBC en
personne morale, montre clairement que cette dernière n'était pasinvestie
d'un pouvoir souverain. Elles invoquent également, à l'appui de
leur revendication de souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo, l'accord conclu lement and the BNBC, and especially Article III thereof, which provided
that "The relations between the State of North Borneo and al1 foreign
States . . shall be conducted by Her Majesty's Government." The Phil-
ippines advances comparable views as to the Confirmation by the Sultan
of Sulu of the Cession of Certain Islands, dated 22 April 1903,asserting
that this instrument shows a continuing and uninterrupted sovereignty of
the Sultan of Sulu over the mainland of North Borneo as well as islands
lying off thatCoast.
Neither of these agreements is regarded by the Parties to the main pro-
ceedings as founding title to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. Their
claims do not implicate the precise status of rule in North Borneo at this
period. Accordingly, the Philippines has not demonstrated any interest of
a legal nature that could be affected in relation to these agreements, and
which might warrant intervention under Article 62 of the Statute.
71. Certain other instruments to which the Court was referred by the
Philippines do appear to have a certain relevance not only to the Philip-
pine claims of sovereignty in North Borneo, but also to the question of
title to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. The Philippine interest in the
20 June 1891 Convention, concluded between Great Britain and the
Netherlands for the purpose of defining boundaries in Borneo, lies in
noting that while the Convention set boundaries defining "Netherlands
possessions" and "British Protected States", the "State of North Borneo"
was indeed one of the British Protected States.
72. Indonesia does claim Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan under the
same Convention. In particular, it contends that, for various reasons,
Article 4 of that Convention should be read as extending into the sea on
the latitude 4" 10' north mentioned therein. Thus, in Indonesia's view,
islands to the south of that parallel, such as Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan, did not belong after 1891 to the State of North Borneo, but to
the Netherlands. Malaysia offers various grounds for rejecting that inter-
pretation of Article 4.
73. In resolving the disputed interpretation of Article 4,the Court has
no need to pronounce upon the precise nature of the British interests
lying to the north of latitude 4" 10'.Notwithstanding that the 1891Con-
vention may be said to have a certain relevance for Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines, the Philippines has demonstrated no legal interest
that could be affected by the outcome or reasoning in the case between
Indonesia and Malaysia.
74. The Philippines has also explained to the Court its view that the
Exchange of Notes on 3 July and 10July 1907between Great Britain and
the United States, relating to the administration of certain islands on the
east cost of Borneo by the BNBC, again shows that Great Britain was
acting in a capacity other than as sovereign over North Borneo. While 12 mai 1888entre le Gouvernement britannique et la BNBC, et en parti-
culier son article 111qui dispose notamment que «[Ilesrelations entre I'Etat
du Nord-Bornéo et i:ousles Etats étrangers ...seront conduites par le gou-
vernement de Sa klajesté)). Les Philippines avancent un point de vue
comparable concernant la confirmation par le sultan de Sulu de la cession
de certaines îles, en date du 22 avril 1903,affirmant que celle-ci démontre
l'existence d'une souveraineté continue et ininterrompue du sultan de
Sulu sur le Nord-Bcirnéoproprement dit, ainsi que sur des îles situéesau
large de ses côtes.
Or, aucun de ces .accords n'est considérépar les Parties à la procédure
principale comme un titre originel sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. La
question de la nature précisedu pouvoir exercé sur le Nord-Bornéo à
cette époque est sans objet pour leur revendication. En conséquence, les
Philippines n'ont pas démontré l'existence, en rapport avec ces instru-
ments, d'un intérêtd'ordre juridique susceptible d'êtremis en cause et
justifiant leur intervention au titre de I'article 62du Statut.
71. Certains autres instruments invoqués par les Philippines devant la
Cour semblent avoir effectivement une pertinence en ce qui concerne non
seulement leur revendication de souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo, mais aussi
la question du titre sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. L'intérêq tue pré-
sente pour les Philippines la convention du 20 juin 1891entre la Grande-
Bretagne et les Pays-,Bas,délimitant les frontières à Bornéo, résideen ceci
que, si cet accord délimite «les possessions néerlandaises)) et les<<Etats
protégéspar la Grande-Bretagne)), I'«Etat du Nord-Bornéo)) faisait effec-
tivement partie des .Etats protégéspar la Grande-Bretagne.
72. C'est cette même convention que l'Indonésieinvoque pour sa part
A l'appui de sa revendication sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. Elle
soutient en particulier que, pour diverses raisons, l'article 4 de cette
convention doit être entendu comme prolongeant cette ligne de délimita-
tion vers le large le long du parallèle courant à 4" 10'de latitude nord.
Ainsi, du point de vue de l'Indonésie, les îles situéesau sud de ce paral-
lèle, tellesque Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan, n'appartenaient pas. après
1891. à I'Etat du Nord-Bornéo mais aux Pays-Bas. La Malaisie avance
diverses ob-jections à.cette interprétation de l'article 4.
73. S'agissant de trancher le différend d'interprétation de l'article 4,
point n'est besoin pour la Courde se prononcer sur la nature précisedes
intérêts britanniques au nord du parallèle situéà 4' 10'de latitude nord.
Bien que la convention de 1891 puisse êtreconsidérée comn-ie revêtant
une certaine importance pour l'Indonésie, la Malaisie et les Philippines,
ces dernières n'ont pas fait la preuve qu'elles auraient un intérêtd'ordre
juridique susceptible d'êtremis en cause par la solution ou le raisonne-
ment dans l'affaire opposant l'Indonésieet la Malaisie.
74. Les Philippines ont également exposé à la Cour le point de vue
selon lequel l'échangede notes des 3 et 10juillet 1907entre la Grande-
Bretagne et les Etats-Unis concernant l'administration de certaines îles de
la côte orientale de Bornéopar la BNBC démontre une fois de plus que
la première n'agissait pas en qualité de souveraiil sur le Nord-Bornéo.this Exchange of Notes is also of a certain interest for Malaysia, it relies
on the exchange as evidence that the two islands it disputes with Indo-
nesia were at that time historically and administratively tied to North
Borneo. The precise status of the legal ties in 1907 is not central to
Malaysia's claims. Accordingly, no interest of a legal naturethat requires
an intervention under Article 62, to present their interpretation of the
1907 Exchange of Notes, has been shown by the Philippines.
75. The 2 January 1930 Convention between Great Britain and the
United States regarding the boundary between the Philippine Archi-
pelago and North Borneo may assume a somewhat greater significance
for these proceedings.
76. One of Malaysia's arguments appears to be that the BNBC's right
of administration of the islands was, by the terms of the 1930 Conven-
tion, converted into a full right of sovereignty.
77. It is recalled that the Philippines, commenting on this Convention,
stated that it follows from the sovereignty held by the Sultan of Sulu over
North Borneo that the attribution of islands to the south and Westof the
described line was on behalf of the Sultan of Sulu (see paragraph 41
above); and that this is supported by the text.
78. The Court notes that the 1930 Convention, which delimits the
boundary between the Philippine Archipelago (under United States sov-
ereignty) and the State of North Borneo (under British protection), has
as its particular object the determination of which of the islands in the
region "belong" to the United States on the one hand and to the State of
North Borneo on the other. This Convention does not appear to the
Court at this stage of the proceedings to concern the legal status of the
principal territory of North Borneo. As the Court has already had occa-
sion to emphasize above (see paragraph 59), the interest of a legal nature
invoked by the Philippines in order to be permitted to intervene in the
case must be shown with a particular clarity, since it does not relate to
the actual subject-matter of the case. It appears, however, in light of the
object of the 1930 Convention and of the rights claimed by the Philip-
pines in North Borneo, that the Philippines has not shown how any inter-
pretation of that Convention which the Court might make for purposes
of the case between Indonesia and Malaysia could affect an interest of a
legal nature of the Philippines which would justify its intervention under
Article 62 of the Statute.
79. The North Borneo Cession Order in Council, adopted on
10July 1946,which provided in its sixth paragraph that "with effect from
the fifteenth day of July, 1946, ... the Crown should . . . have full sov-
ereign rights over, and title to, the territory of the State of North Bor-
neo", is saidby the Philippines to demonstrate that only on that date did
the British Crown purport for the very first time to acquire full sovereign
rights over North Borneo. The Philippines couples that position with theCet échangede notes présente égalementun certain intérêtpour la Malai-
sie, qui, en revanche, l'invoque pour affirmer que les deux îles dont elle se
dispute la souverairietéavec l'Indonésie entretenaient à cette époque un
lien historiaue et administratif avec le Nord-Bornéo. La nature s ré ci se
des liens juridiques existant en 1907 n'est pas déterminante pour les pré-
tentions de la Malaisie. Par conséquent, les Philippines n'ont démontré
aucun intérêtd'ordre juridique qui nécessiterait leur intervention au titre
de l'article 62 en vue de présenter leur interprétation de l'échange de
notes de 1907.
75. La convention du 2janvier 1930conclue entre la Grande-Bretagne
et les Etats-Unis et relative a la frontière entre l'archipel des Philippines
et le Nord-Bornéo revêtpeut-êtredavantage d'importance pour la pré-
sente procédure.
76. L'un des arguments de la Malaisie paraît êtreque le droit d'admi-
nistration de ces îles dont disposait la BNBC fut, par les termes mêmesde
la convention de 19130,intégralement converti en droit de souveraineté.
77. La Cour rappellera que, dans leur commentaire de cette conven-
tion, les Philippines ont indiquéqu'il découlaitde la souveraineté exercée
par le sultan de Sulu sur le Nord-Bornéo que l'attribution d'îles situées
au sud et à l'ouest de la ligne décritedans cette convention s'étaiteffec-
tuée pour le compte du sultan de Sulu (voir paragraphe 41 ci-dessus).
comme cela se trouvait confirmépar le texte de ladite convention.
78. La Cour note que la convention de 1930,qui porte délimitation de
la frontière entre l'archipel des Philippines (sous souveraineté des Etats-
Unis) et 1'Etatdu Nord-Bornéo (sous protection britannique), a plus par-
ticulièrement pour objet de déterminer celles des îles de la régioncappar-
tenant» aux Etats-Unis d'une part et à 1'Etatdu Nord-Bornéo de l'autre.
Cette convention, au stade actuel de la procédure, n'apparaît pas à la
Cour comme concernant le statut juridique du territoire principal du
Nord-Bornéo. Comme la Cour a déià eu l'occasion de le souligner ci-"
dessus (voirparagraphe 59), l'intérêd t'ordre juridique que les Philippines
invoquent pour êtreadmises à intervenir en l'espècedoit êtreétabli avec
d'autant plus de clartéqu'il ne porte pas sur l'objet mêmede l'affaire. Or
il appert que, compte tenu de l'objet de la convention de 1930 et des
droits que les Philippines revendiquent au Nord-Bornéo, celles-ci n'ont
pas montré en quoi toute interprétation de cette convention que la Cour
pourrait donner dans le cadre de l'affaire opposant l'Indonésie et la
Malaisie serait susceptible de mettre en cause un intérêd t 'ordre juridique
des Philippines qui justifierait leur intervention au titre de I'article 62du
Statut.
79. Selon les Philippines, l'ordonnance portant cession du Nord-
Bornéo,adoptée en conseil le 10juillet 1946, dont le sixièmeparagraphe
dispose qu'«à compter du 15juillet 1946 ...la Couronne ...devra possé-
der tous les droits souverains et tous les titres sur le territoire detat du
Nord-Bornéon, démontrerait que seulement à cette date la Couronne bri-
tannique aurait pour la première fois prétendu acquérir l'intégralitédes
droits souverains sur le Nord-Bornéo. Les Philippines complètent cettecontention that any such purported order of cession is without legal
effect.
80. Indonesia does not contest the status of the 1946Order or British
competence to act thereunder; rather, its views diverge from those of
Malaysia as to the bearing it has on Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
Any interest that the Philippines claims to have as to references that the
Court might make in the case between Indonesia and Malaysia to the
1946 Order is too remote for purposes of intervention under Article 62.
81. The Philippines needs to show to the Court not only "a certain
interest in . . . legal considerations" (Continc~ntnlSlirlf' (Lihjwn Aruh
Jarnuhirij~~IMultuj, Appliccitioti to Intcrilrnr, Judgt~~rnt,I.C:J. Rc~ports
1981, p. 19, para. 33) relevant to the dispute between Indonesia and
Malaysia, but to specify an interest of a legal nature which may be
affected by reasoning or interpretations of the Court. The Court has
stated that a State seeking to intervene should be able to do this on the
basis of its documentary evidence upon which it relies to explain its own
claim.
82. Some of the instruments which the Philippines has invoked, and
the submissions it has madeas to them, may indeed have shown a certain
interest in legal considerations before the Court in the dispute between
Indonesia and Malaysia; but as regards none of them has the Philippines
been able to discharge its burden of demonstrating that it has an interest
of a legal nature that may be affected. within the sense of Article 62. The
Philippines has shown in these instruments no legal interest on its part
that might be affected by reasoning or interpretations of the Court in the
main proceedings, either because they form no part of the arguments of
Indonesia and Malaysia or because their respective reliance on them does
not bear on the issue of retention of sovereignty by the Sultanate of Sulu
as described by the Philippines in respect of its claim in North Borneo.
83. Furthermore, the Court notes that the prime basis which the Phil-
ippines cites in support of its claim is the Sulu-Overbeck grant of 1878
and the historical facts which preceded it. It is notable that a number of
the documents to which it drew the Court's attention do not appear in
the officia1publication of the Philippines of 1963,presented to the Court
by Malaysia, explaining the legal basis of the Philippine claim of sover-
eignty in North Borneo (Pl~ilippinr Cluinl /O North Bornro, Volume 1,
Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1963). All instruments to which the Philip-
pines has drawn the Court's attention. save the Sulu-Overbeck grant ofposition en affirmant que ce qui se voulait être uneordonnance portant
cession est en fait dépourvu d'effets juridiques.
80. L'Indonésierie conteste pas la régularitéde l'ordonnance de 1946,
ni la capacité de la Grande-Bretagne a agir en vertu de celle-ci; son point
de vue s'écarteen revanche de celui de la Malaisie quant à la portéede ce
texte du point de vue de la souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipa-
dan. Tout intérêtque les Philippines prétendent avoir en rapport avec
l'usage que la Cour pourrait faire de l'ordonnance de 1946 en l'affaire
opposant l'Indonésie et la Malaisie apparaît trop éloignépour justifier
une intervention au titre de l'article 62.
81. Les Philippines doivent non seulement montrer A la Cour qu'elles
possèdent, en rapport avec l'affaire opposant l'Indonésieet la Malaisie,
«un certain intérêt))quant aux ((considérations juridiques)) (Pltrtctrzr
c.ontincwtul (Jr~rntrliiri~.tarrrrhc./ibj~cnnr/Mtr/tr), rcyur,fitri'itztc~rvcn-
tion, crrrct, C.I.J. Rlc~czril981, p. 19, par. 33), mais également spécifier
l'intérêdt'ordre juridique qui serait susceptible d'êtremis en cause par le
raisonnement ou les interprétations de la Cour. La Cour a indiquéqu'un
Etat qui demande à intervenir devrait êtreà mêmede le faire ë partir des
élémentssur le~quelijil s'appuie pour exposer sa propre prétention.
82. Plusieurs des instruments invoqués par les Philippines, ainsi que les
conclusions formulées par ces dernières ii leur égard, peuvent certes avoir
témoignéde quelqui: intérêtquant aux considérations juridiques soule-
véesdevant la Cour iil'occasion du différend opposant l'Indonésieet la
Malaisie, mais, pour aucun de ces instruments, les Philippines n'ont été
en mesure de démontrer, comme cela leur incombait, qu'elles possédaient
un intérêtd'ordre juridique susceptible d'êtremis en cause au sens de
l'article 62. Les Philippines n'ont pas établi que le raisonnement ou les
interprétations que 1;iCour pourrait adopter au regard de ces instruments
dans le cadre de la procédure principale pourraient mettre en cause un
intérêdt 'ordre juridique qui leur soit propre, soit parce qu'ils sont étran-
gers aux arguments de l'Indonésieet de la Malaisie, soit parce que I'argu-
mentntion que développent ces dernières est sans incidence sur la ques-
tion de savoir si, comme le prétendent les Philippines en liaison avec leur
revendication au Nord-Bornéo, le Sultanat de Sulu aurait conservé la
souveraineté sur celui-ci.
83. La Cour relève-raen outreque l'essentiel des éléments invoquéspar
les Philippines à l'appui de leurs prétentions est constitué par la conces-
sion Sulu-Overbeck de 1878et son contexte historique. IIest remarquable
que divers documents sur lesquels les Philippines ont attiré l'attention de
la Cour ne figurent pas dans la publication officielle des Philippines
de 1963fournie à la Cour par la Malaisie et exposant la base juridique de
la revendication de souveraineté des Philippines au Nord-Bornéo (Ltr
rc~i~c~~~tlic~dcrstPliilippines concernunt IC Iortl-Bornbo, vol 1.Manille,
Imprimerie nationale, 1963).Tous les instruments sur lesquels les Philip-1878, are instruments said to be confirmatory of title, or treaties in
respect of which the Philippines wishes to advance interpretations that
preclude them being read as entailing a Ioss of any previous title that may
have existed in the Sultan of Sulu. Not only are they not, for the most
part, at the centre of the Court's attention in the case between Indonesia
and Malaysia, but they are not themselves sources of title for the Philip-
pines. The wish of a State to forestall interpretations by the Court that
might be inconsistent with responses it might wish to make, in another
claim, to instrumentsthat are not themselves sources of the title it claims,
is simply too remote for purposes of Article 62.
84. In respect of the "the precise object of the intervention"
(Article 81, paragraph 2 (h), of the Rules of Court), the Philippines
States that its Application has the following objects:
"(u) First, to preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines arising
from its claim to dominion and sovereignty over the territory
of North Borneo, to the extent that these rights are affected,
or may be affected, by a determination of the Court of the
question of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.
(b) Second, to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Honourable Court of the nature and extent of the historical
and legal rights of the Republic of the Philippines which may
be affected by the Court's decision.
(ci Third, to appreciate more fully the indispensable role of the
Honourable Court in comprehensive conflict prevention and
not merely for the resolution of legal disputes."
The Philippines submitted during the oral proceedings "that the
objects (LI)and (h) in the Application make clear the objectives of the
Philippines in applying to the Court for permission to intervene under
Article 62, are consistent with the Court's jurisprudence; and amply
fulfil the requirements of the Statute".
85. For its part, Indonesia argues that
"the objective of the Philippines is not to inform [the] Court of its
interests in the case before [it], but to draw the Court's attention to
another dispute, speculating that this might, perhaps, be of interest.
At best, the Philippines might appear as timic~uscuritrr." PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 604
pines ont attiré I'attention de la Cour, à l'exception de la concession
Sulu-Overbeck de 11878,sont des instruments présentés comme confir-
mant un titre, ou des traités à l'égard desquelsles Philippines souhaitent
avancer des interprktations qui empêcheraient de les lire comme se tra-
duisant par la perte de tout titre qui aurait pu êtreantérieurement détenu
par le sultan de Sulu. Non seulement ces instruments ne figurent-ils pas,
pour la plupart d'entre eux, au centre de I'attention de la Cour dans
l'affaire opposant l'Indonésie et la Malaisie, mais encore ne sont-ils pas
eux-mêmesà l'origine d'un titre pour les Philippines. La volonté mani-
festéepar un Etat d',éviterque la Cour ne formule des interprétations qui
pourraient ne pas concorder avec l'attitude qu'il serait susceptible d'adop-
ter, dans le cadre d'une autre revendication, a l'égardd'instruments qui
ne sont pas eux-mêrnessources du titre qu'il revendique est tout simple-
ment par trop étrangèreà la finalitéde l'article 62.
84. En ce qui concerne ((l'objet précisde l'intervention)) (alinéah) du
paragraphe 2 de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour), les Philippines
indiquent. dans leur requête,que celle-ci a pour objet:
«a) Premièrement, de préserveret sauvegarder les droitsd'ordre his-
torique et juridique du Gouvernement de la République des
Philippine:; qui découlentde la revendication de possession et de
souveraineté que ce gouvernement forme sur le territoire du
Bornéo septentrional dans la mesure où ces droits sont ou pour-
raient êtremis en cause par une décisionde la Cour relative à la
question de la souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan.
b) Deuxièmement. d'intervenir dans l'instance Dour informer la
' Cour de la.nature et de la portée des droits d'ordre historique
et juridique de la République des Philippines qui pourraient
êtremis eri cause par la décisionde la Cour.
c) Troisièmement, de prendre plus largement en compte le rôle
indispensable que joue la Cour en matière de prévention géné-
ralisée des conflitset non pas simplement aux fins de la résolu-
tion des différends d'ordre juridique. ))
Au cours de la procédure orale, les Philippines ont fait valoir «que les
objets énoncésaux alinéasa) et h) de la requête décrivent clairementles
objectifs viséspar 1e.sPhilippines dans leur requêteà fin d'intervention
aux termes de l'article 62, qu'ils sont conformes à la jurisprudence de la
Cour et qu'ils satisfont amplement aux dispositions dudit article)).
85. L'Indonésie soutient pour sa part que:
((l'objectif des Philippines n'est pas d'informer [cette] haute juridic-
tion sur ses intérêtsen cause dans l'instance dont [celle-ciest appelée]
à connaître, mais de [la]sensibiliser à un autre différend enspéculant
que ceci pourrait, peut-être,avoir un intérêt.Au mieux, elles pour-
raient apparaître comme un urnicus cuviae.»Indonesia further argues that
.............................
(5) the information that the Philippines is seeking, by this means, to
give to the Court therefore does not constitute, in the circum-
stances of the case, a legitimate object of the intervention
requested ;
(6) this equally applies u ji~rtiorito the avowed aim of the Philip-
pines of thus securing communication of the pleadings and
documents refused by the Court's decision of 15 March [2001];
(7) more generally, intervention by the Philippines would create a
dangerous and unwelcome precedent, which would seriously
jeopardize the confidentiality of proceedings which States
appearing before the Court are legitimately entitled to expect -
and indeed the very system of intervention . . ."
86. As for Malaysia, it maintains that:
"the Philippines assertion that it has historical and legal rights to the
territory of Borneo which it wishes 'to preserve and safeguard' is a
fiction which is quite unsustainable. It must, therefore, be regarded
as a claim evidently lacking in precision. The pursuit of so manifestly
defective a claim is not a proper object for an intervention
application."
As to the "second stated object" of the Philippine Application (see para-
graph 84 above), Malaysia contends that "the assertion of such [histori-
cal and legal] rights is manifestly iinsustainable", and that "[tlhe giving of
information to the Court about unsustainable rights is not a proper
object for intervention".
Malaysia also maintains that
"by reference to published sources and even without access to the
pleadings, the Philippines could readily have ascertained for itself
some of the fundamental elements in the dispute between Malaysia
and Indonesia; and it could more specifically have related its con-
cerns to those issues".
In this respect, Malaysia concludes that:
"[The Philippines] has not attempted to grapple with the signifi-
cance of actual British and later Malaysian possession and adminis-
tration of the territory for a century and a quarter.
But that does not entitle the Philippines to be given a second
chance by being allowed now to intervene further in this case. A fail-
ure specifically to define the object of the Application cannot be con-
verted into a statement of ail object. The Philippines has not met the PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 605
L'Indonésie avancepar ailleurs que
..............................
5) l'information que [les Philippines] voudraient, par ce biais, don-
ner a la Cour ne constitue donc pas, dans les circonstances de
l'affaire,ri objet légitimede l'intervention demandée;
6) il en va à fortiori de mêmede l'objectif avoué des Philippines
d'obtenir de cette manière communication des ~iéceset docu-
ments, qui leur a étérefusée par la décision de la Cour du
15mars 12ClOll:
L A,
7) plus largement, l'intervention des Philippines constituerait un
précédentdangereux et mal venu, qui ferait peser une menace
grave sur la.confidentialitédes affaires laquelle les Etats qui se
présentent (devant la Cour peuvent légitimementtenir et sur le
systèmemêmede l'intervention...))
86. La Malaisie, quant à elle, affirme en premier lieu que:
«la prétention desPhilippines à des droits historiques et juridiques
sur le territoire de Bornéo,droits qu'elles souhaiteraientpréserver
et sauvegarder)), relèvede la fiction et qu'elle est donc totalement
indéfendable. (lette revendication doit par conséquentêtreconsidé-
rée comme manquant manifestement de précision. La poursuite
d'une revendication si notablement défaillantene saurait constituer
I'objet d'une demande d'intervention recevable.»
En ce qui concerne le «deuxième objet invoqué» à l'appui de la requête
des Philippines(voiirparagraphe 84ci-dessus), la Malaisie soutient qu'«il
est manifestement iinpossible de faire valoir de tels droits [d'ordre histo-
rique et juridique])) et soutient que[l]e fait de communiquer à la Cour
des informations concernant des droits indéfendablesne saurait consti-
tuer I'objet d'une demande d'intervention recevable».
La Malaisie affirme égalementque:
((ens'appuyant sur lessources publiéeset mêmesansavoiraccèsaux
piècesde prockdure, les Philippines pouvaient aisément établirpar
elles-mêmes ceirtains des élémentsfondamentaux du différend qui
oppose la Malaisie et l'Indonésieet les examiner plus particulière-
ment au regard de leurs propres préoccupations».
A cet égard,la Malaisie conclut que:
«[Les Philippines] ne l'ont pas fait. Elles ne se sont pas hasardées
à explorer l'importance de la possession et de l'administration effec-
tives du territoire par la Grande-Bretagne et ensuite par la Malaisie
pendant cent vingt-cinq ans.
Les Philippines n'ont pasdroit pour autant iune seconde chance,
qui leur serait dlonnéesi ellesétaient autoriséesntervenirA présent
dans cette affaire. Le manque de précision dans la définition de
I'objet de laeqjuêtene peut pas se transformer en exposéde I'objet. requirements that the Court has laid down for a successful applica-
tion."
As to the third stated object of the Philippine Application (see para-
graph 84 above), Malaysia considers that "[tlhis is a purely abstract
and general matter, on which the Court needs no instruction from the
Philippines or anyone else" and that "[ilt is a gratuitous and imper-
missible object for an intervention".
87. As regards the first of the threeobjects stated in the Application of
the Philippines (see paragraph 84 above), the Court notes that similar
formulations have been employed in other applications for permission to
intervene. and have not been found by the Court to present a legalobstacle
to intervention (Continental Shelf' (Lihyan Ara5 JumuhiriyulMaltu),
Applicution fOr Permission to Inter i~etzcJ,udgnzetzt,L C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 11-12, para. 17; Land, Island und Muritirne Frontier Dispute (El Sal-
vau'orlHondurus), Application to Intervene, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1990, pp. 108-109, para. 38, and pp. 130-131,para. 90; Land und Mari-
time Boundary betiveen Carneroon und Nigeria, Application to Intervene,
Order of 21 October 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999 (Il), p. 1032,para. 4).
88. So far as the second listed object of the Philippines is concerned,
the Court, in its Order of 21 October 1999 in the case concerning the
Land and Muritime Boundury between Cumeroon und Nigeria, Applica-
tion to Intervene, recently reaffirmed a statement of a Chamber that:
"[s]o far as the object of [a State's] intervention is 'to inform the
Court of the nature of the legal rights [of that State] which are in
issue in the dispute', it cannote said that this object is not a proper
one: it seems indeed to accord with the function of intervention"
(1.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1034,para. 14).
89. That the rights claimed by the Philippines lie in North Borneo
rather than in Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan makes the second stated
object of the Philippines rio less a proper one.
90. As to the third object listed in its Application, very occasional
mention was made of it during the oral pleadings. But the Philippines did
not develop it nor did itcontend that it could sufficealone as an "object"
within the meaning of Article 81 of the Rules. The Court rejects the
relevance under the Statute and Rules of the third listed object.
91. Indonesia also suggested that the Philippines has another object in
seeking intervention, and it stated that "although the Philippines denies
this . . .it has indeed progressively transformed its Application for per- PUI.AU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 606
Les Philippines n'ont pas satisfait aux critères établis par la Cour
pour qu'elle a'ccepteune requête. ))
Quant au troisième objet avancé par les Philippines dans leur requête
(voir paragraphe 84 ci-dessus), la Malaisie estime qu'«[il1s'agit là d'une
question purement abstraite et générale,pour laquelle la Cour n'a pas
besoin d'explication, que ce soit de la part des Philippines ou de qui que
ce soit» et qu'il s"agit d'un ((objet d'intervention injustifié et inaccep-
table)).
87. Pour ce qui lestdu premier des trois objets exposés dans la requête
des Philippines (voir paragraphe 84 ci-dessus), la Cour relèveque des for-
mules similaires ont étéemployéesdans d'autres requêtes Afin d'interven-
tion et qu'elle n'a pas estimé qu'ellesconstituaient un obstaclejuridique a
l'intervention (Plu~euu continental (Jumuhiriya arabe IibyenneIMalte),
requêtcù fin d'intervention, arrrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 11-12, par. 17;
DiflCrendfrorztulie,. tcrrestrc, in.wluire et rnuritime (El SulvudorlHondu-
rus), rcqurte a,fin d'intc~rvention,urret, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 108-109,
par. 38, et p. 130-131, par. 90; Fronti?re terrestre et maritime entre le
Curneroun et le AJigCriu,req~tCteù Jin d'intervcwtion, ordonnance du
21 octohri~1999, CI. J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1032, par. 4).
88. En ce qui concerne le deuxième objet exposépar les Philippines, la
Cour, dans son ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999 en l'affaire de la Fron-
ti?re terrestre et muritinle entre le Curneroun cltle Niglriu, requete &Jin
d'intervention, a récemment réaffirméce qu'avait dit une chambre de la
Cour, à savoir que:
«[dlans la mesure où l'intervention [d'un Etat] a pour objet ((d'infor-
mer la Cour de la nature des droits [de cet Etat] qui sont en cause
dans le litige)), on ne peut pas dire que cet objet n'est pas appro-
prié: il semble d'ailleurs conforme au rôle de l'intervention))
(C.1.J. Recueir'1999 (11). p. 1034, par. 14).
89. Le fait que les droits revendiqués par les Philippines portent sur le
Nord-Bornéo et non sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan n'a pas pour
effet de rendre moins approprié le deuxième objet que les Philippines ont
invoqué.
90. Quant au troisième objet exposé dans la requête, ilen a été ques-
tion de façon très occasionnelle au cours de la procédure orale. Mais les
Philippines n'ont pas davantage développécet aspect et n'ont pas non
plus soutenu qu'il pourrait iilui seul suffire en tant qu'«objet>) au sens de
l'article 81 du Règlement. La Cour rejette ce troisième objet comme étant
dénuéde pertinence au regard de son Statut et de son Règlement.
91. L'Indonésie a aussi laisséentendre que les Philippines, en cher-
chant à intervenir iil'instance, avaient un autre objet en vue; elle a indi-
quéque, ((bien que les Philippines s'en défendent ..., ce n'en est pas moinsmission to intervene into an appeal against the decision not to allow it to
have access to the pleadings".
92. During the oral proceedings, the Agent of the Philippines, on
behalf of his Government, presented by way of conclusion the desire of
that State to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents as
a first "remedy" under Article 85 of the Rules (see paragraph 13 above).
The Court notes however that Article 85 does not provide for "remedies"
as such, but rather deals with the procedural consequences of a decision
to accede to an application for permission to intervene under Article 62.
93. Notwithstanding that the first two of the objects indicated by the
Philippines for its intervention are appropriate, the Court finds that the
Philippines has not discharged its obligation to convince the Court that
specified legal interests may be affected in the particular circumstances of
this case.
94. The Court nevertheless observes that, notwithstanding its finding
that the Philippines has not demonstrated an entitlement to intervene in
the pending case between lndonesia and Malaysia, it remains cognizant
of the positions stated before it by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philip-
pines in the present proceedings.
95. For these reasons,
By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the Application of the Republic of the Philippines, filed in
the Registry of the Court on 13 March 2001, for permission to intervene
in the proceedings under Article 62 of the Statute of the Court, cannot be
granted.
IN FAVOUR : Pre.cide~irGuillaume ; Vice-Presirkerlt Sh; Jur/g<,.sRanjeva,
Fleischhauer, Koroma. Vereshchetin. Higgins, Parra-Aranguren.
Kooijmans, Rezek. Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Jutlgcs ad hoc
Weeramantry, Franck ;
AGAINST: Judge Oda.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-third day of October, two
thousand and one, in four copies, one of which will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government ofen un appel contre la décisionde leur refuser l'accèsaux piècesque, pro-
gressivement, elles ont transformé leur requête a fin d'intervention)).
92. A I'audienci:, concluant au nom de son gouvernement, l'agent des
Philippines a présentéle désirde cet Etat de recevoir communication des
pièces de procédure et des documents annexés comme un premier
«remède>)au titre de l'article 85 du Règlement (voir paragraphe 13 ci-
dessus). La Cour riote toutefois que l'articl85 du Règlement ne prévoit
pas de ctreinèdes))en tant que tels, mais traite plutôt des conséquences
procédurales d'une décisionde faire droit à une requêteà fin d'interven-
tion présentéeen vertu de l'article 62.
93. Bien que les deux premiers objets que les Philippines ont assignésa
leur intervention soient appropriés, la Cour constate que les Philippines
n'ont pas rempli leur obligation de convaincre la Cour que des intérêts
d'ordre juridique spécifiéspourraient être en cause dans les circonstances
de la présente espkce.
94. La Cour n'en relèvepas moins que, bien qu'elle ait conclu que les
Philippines n'avaient pas démontréqu'elles étaient fondées a intervenir
dans l'affaire pendante entre l'Indonésie et la Malaisie, elle demeure
informée des positions exposéesdevant elle dans la présente instance par
l'Indonésie. la Malaisie et les Philippines.
95. Par ces motifs,
Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit que la requêtede la Républiquedes Philippines, déposéeau Greffe
de la Cour le 13mars 2001,a fin d'intervention dans l'instance sur la base
de l'article 62 duStatut de la Cour, ne peut êtreadmise.
POUR: M. Guillaume, prPsidc~nt;M. Shi, vice-prksident; MM. Ranjeva,
Fleischhauer. Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mn" Higgins, MM. Parra-
Aranguren. Kooijmans. Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, ,jugr.s:
MM. Weeramantry, Franck,,juges ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Oda. jlfge.
Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, a La Haye, le vingt-trois octobre deux mille un, en quatre exem-
plaires, dont l'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour et les autres
seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Républiquethe Republic of Indonesia, the Government of Malaysia, and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines, respectively.
(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.
(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.
Judge ODAappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge KOROMAappends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judges PARRA-ARANGURa End KOOIJMANaS ppend declarations
to the Judgment of the Court; Judges udlzoc WEERAMANTR aYd FRANCK
append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initiulled) G.G.
(Initiullrd) Ph.C. PUI~AII LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (ARRET) 608
d'Indonésie,au Gouvernement de la Malaisie et au Gouvernement de la
Républiquedes Pkiilippines.
Le président,
(Signi.) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.
M. ODA,juge, joint a l'arrêtl'exposéde son opinion dissidente;
M. KOROMA j, ge, joinà l'arrêtl'exposéde son opinion individuelle;
MM. PARRA-ARAFIGUR etEKOOIJMANjS u, es, joignent des déclarations
à l'arrêt;MM. WEERAMANTe RtYFRANCK j,gesad hoc,joignenta l'arrêt
les exposésde leur opinion individuelle.
(PuruphC) G.G.
(PuruphC) Ph.C.
Application by the Philippines for Permission to Intervene
Judgment of 23 October 2001