DISSENTING OPINION
OF VICE-PRESIDENT SCHWEBEL

While there is much with which 1agree in the Court's Judgrnent, 1am
unable to accept its dispositive decision that it has jurisdiction to enter-
tain the claims made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights of 1955.
In interpretingthe scope of a compromissory clause of a treaty accord-

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE RIGAUX

[Translation]

1voted with the majority on the two points in the operative part and
1did so without reservation as regards point 1. As far as point 2 is con-
cerned, 1agree with the decision on jurisdiction therein, but regret that it
implicitly limits the jurisdiction of the Court to paragraph 1 of Article X
of the Amity Treaty.

II. OBSERVATIOR NESLATING TO THE GROUNDS

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

1. Notwithstanding my agreement with the operative paragraphs of
the Judgment 1 consider it necessary to explain that, in my opinion, the
Court also has jurisdiction to entertain the claims made by Iran under
Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955,which provides:

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE HIGGINS

1. In thisjurisdictional phase the Court has had to decide whether the
1955Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between
Iran and the United States affords a basis ofjurisdiction in respect of any
of the claims advanced by Iran.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE RANJEVA

[Translation]

1voted in favour of the Judgment for two reasons:

- on the legal basis of the proceedings: the solution adopted by the
Court is the only possible one. It was necessary and sufficient that
one of the grounds relied upon by the Respondent in its preliminary
objection should be dismissed to ensure that the jurisdiction of the

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN

The question before the Court is whether the Applicant has a right to
have its claim adjudicated. The Respondent says there is not such a right.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1 have voted in favour of the Judgment of the Court despite the con-
siderable case made out by Malta in support of its Application for per-
mission to intervene. 1 have done so for one essential and dispositive
reason.
The Court may reasonably interpret the institution of intervention,
whose scopeneither the Statute nor the practice of the Court makes clear,
so as todebar what might be called "non-party intervention", or, perhaps,

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ODA

1. 1 have voted in favour of the Judgment in deference to the compe-
tence conferred upon the Court by thesecond paragraph of Article 62 of its
Statute. That paragraph expressly entrusts the Court with the authority to

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV

1. 1voted for the operative part of the decision because from my point
of view no application to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute can be
entertained by the Court unless jurisdictional links(within the meaning of
Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute) exist between the State presenting the

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VALTICOS

[Tvanslation]

1. While fully recognizing the qualities of the preceding Judgment, to
which 1 shall return later, 1am not able to associate myself with it.

2. For 1 do not consider that the Court is competent to consider the