Contentious

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda “for acts of armed aggression committed . . . in flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”. In addition to the cessation of the alleged acts, the DRC sought reparation for acts of intentional destruction and looting and the restitution of national property and resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States. In its Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC referred, as bases for the Court’s jurisdiction, to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and, lastly, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. However, the Government of the DRC informed the Court on 15 January 2001 that it intended to discontinue the proceedings instituted against Burundi and Rwanda, stating that it reserved the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the Court. The two cases were therefore removed from the List on 30 January 2001.

In the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the DRC founded the jurisdiction of the Court on the declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court made by the two States. On 19 June 2000, the DRC filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures to put a stop to all military activity and violations of human rights and of the sovereignty of the DRC by Uganda. On 1 July 2000, the Court ordered each of the two Parties to prevent and refrain from any armed action which might prejudice the rights of the other Party or aggravate the dispute, to take all measures necessary to comply with all of their obligations under international law and also to ensure full respect for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law.

Uganda subsequently filed a Counter-Memorial containing three counter-claims. By an Order of 29 November 2001, the Court found that two of the counter-claims (acts of aggression allegedly committed by the DRC against Uganda; and attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa and on Ugandan nationals for which the DRC is alleged to be responsible) were admissible as such and formed part of the proceedings.

Following oral proceedings in April 2005, the Court handed down its Judgment on the merits on 19 December 2005. The Court first dealt with the question of the invasion of the DRC by Uganda. After examining the materials submitted to it by the Parties, the Court found that from August 1998, the DRC had not consented to the presence of Ugandan troops on its territory (save for the limited exception regarding the border region of the Ruwenzori Mountains contained in the Luanda Agreement). The Court also rejected Uganda’s claim that its use of force, where not covered by consent, was an exercise of self-defence, finding that the preconditions for self-defence did not exist. Indeed, the unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such magnitude and duration that the Court considered it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.

The Court also found that, by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces operating on the territory of the DRC, the Republic of Uganda had violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.

The Court then moved to the question of occupation and of the violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Having concluded that Uganda was the occupying power in Ituri at the relevant time, the Court stated that, as such, it was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the DRC. This had not been done. The Court also considered that it had credible evidence sufficient to conclude that UPDF (Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces) troops had committed violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. It found that these violations were attributable to Uganda.

The third issue that the Court was called upon to examine concerned the alleged exploitation of Congolese natural resources by Uganda. In this regard, the Court considered that it had credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the UPDF, including the most high-ranking officers, had been involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources and that the military authorities had not taken any measures to put an end to these acts. Uganda was responsible both for the conduct of the UPDF as a whole and for the conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the UPDF in the DRC. This was so even when UPDF officers and soldiers had acted contrary to instructions given or had exceeded their authority. The Court found, on the other hand, that it did not have at its disposal credible evidence to prove that there was a governmental policy on the part of Uganda directed at the exploitation of natural resources of the DRC or that Uganda’s military intervention was carried out in order to obtain access to Congolese resources.

In respect of the first counter-claim of Uganda (see above concerning the Order of 29 November 2011), the Court found that Uganda had not produced sufficient evidence to show that the DRC had provided political and military support to anti-Ugandan rebel groups operating in its territory, or even to prove that the DRC had breached its duty of vigilance by tolerating anti-Ugandan rebels on its territory. The Court thus rejected the first counter-claim submitted by Uganda in its entirety.

As for the second counter-claim of Uganda (see above concerning the Order of 29 November 2011), the Court first declared inadmissible the part of that claim relating to the alleged maltreatment of Ugandan nationals not enjoying diplomatic status at Ndjili International Airport. Regarding the merits of the claim, it found, on the other hand, that there was sufficient evidence to prove that there were attacks against the Embassy and acts of maltreatment against Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport. Consequently, it found that the DRC had breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The removal of property and archives from the Ugandan Embassy was also in violation of the rules of international law on diplomatic relations.

The Court noted in its Judgment that the nature, form and amount of compensation owed by each Party had been reserved and would only be submitted to the Court should the Parties be unable to reach agreement on the basis of the Judgment just rendered by the Court. Following the delivery of the Judgment, the Parties have regularly informed the Court on the progress of negotiations.

On 13 May 2015, noting that the negotiations with Uganda on this question had failed, the DRC asked the Court to determine the amount of reparation owed by Uganda. While Uganda maintained that this request was premature, the Court, in an Order of 1 July 2015, observed that although the Parties had tried to settle the question directly, they had clearly been unable to reach an agreement. The Parties have subsequently filed written pleadings on the question of reparations.

By an Order of 8 September 2020, the Court decided to arrange for an expert opinion, in accordance with Article 67, paragraph 1, of its Rules, on some heads of damage claimed by the DRC, namely the loss of human life, the loss of natural resources and property damage. By an Order of 12 October 2020, the Court appointed four independent experts for that purpose, who submitted a report on reparations on 19 December 2020.

After holding oral proceedings in April 2021, the Court delivered its Judgment on the question of reparations on 9 February 2022, awarding US$225,000,000 for damage to persons, US$40,000,000 for damage to property and US$60,000,000 for damage related to natural resources. It decided that the total amount due should be paid in five annual instalments of US$65,000,000 starting on 1 September 2022, and that, should payment be delayed, post‑judgment interest of 6 per cent would accrue on any overdue amount as from the day after the day on which the instalment was due.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Annexes to the Application instituting proceedings, Livre blanc (Volumes I and II) (French version only)

23 June 1999

Available in:

French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures (French version only)

19 June 2000

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

French

Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French version only)

6 July 2000

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Counter-Memorial of Uganda

21 April 2001

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Volume III - Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Volume IV - Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Rejoinder of Uganda

6 December 2002

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English

Volume II - Annexes

English

Volume III - Annexes

English

Volume IV - Annexes

English

Volume V - Annexes

English

Additional Written Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on Counter-Claims submitted by Uganda (French version only)

28 February 2003

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

French

Annexes

(French version only) French

Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the question of reparations

1 September 2016

Volume X - Annexes 6.1 - 7.4

English French

Memorial of Uganda on the question of reparations

28 September 2016

Available in:

English French

Volume II - Annexes

English French

Counter -Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the question of reparations

1 February 2018

Available in:

English French

Counter-Memorial of Uganda on the question of reparations

6 February 2018

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Order of 21 October 1999

Decision regarding content of written proceedings; fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 1 July 2000

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Koroma

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 November 2001

Finding on Counter-claims; fixing of time-limits: Reply and Rejoinder

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge ad hoc Verhoeven (translation)

English French Bilingual

Order of 7 November 2002

Extension of time-limit: Rejoinder

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 January 2003

Decision regarding submission of additional pleading on Counter-claims; fixing of time-limit

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 1 July 2015

Fixing of time-limit: Memorials on the question of reparations

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Order of 10 December 2015

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Sebutinde

English French Bilingual

Order of 12 October 2020

Appointment of experts

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 19 December 2005

Merits

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Kateka

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 9 February 2022

Reparations

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 26 November 2013, Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against Colombia relating to a “dispute concern[ing] the violations of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and maritime zones declared by the Court’s Judgment of 19 November 2012 [in the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)] and the threat of the use of force by Colombia in order to implement these violations”.

In its Application, Nicaragua requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Colombia was in breach of several of its international obligations, and that it was obliged to make full reparation for the harm caused by its internationally wrongful acts.

Nicaragua based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. It further contended, “[m]oreover and alternatively, [that] the jurisdiction of the Court [lay] in its inherent power to pronounce on the actions required by its Judgments”.

On 19 December 2014, Colombia raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. On 17 March 2016, the Court rendered its Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by Colombia. The Court found that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, to adjudicate upon the dispute regarding the alleged violations by Colombia of Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime zones which, according to Nicaragua, the Court declared in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 appertain to Nicaragua.

In its Counter-Memorial filed on 17 November 2016, Colombia submitted four counter-claims. The first was based on Nicaragua’s alleged breach of its duty of due diligence to protect and preserve the marine environment of the south‑western Caribbean Sea; the second related to Nicaragua’s alleged breach of its duty of due diligence to protect the right of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago to benefit from a healthy, sound and sustainable environment; the third concerned Nicaragua’s alleged infringement of the artisanal fishing rights of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago to access and exploit their traditional fishing grounds; the fourth related to Nicaragua’s adoption of Decree No. 33-2013 of 19 August 2013, which, according to Colombia, established straight baselines and had the effect of extending Nicaragua’s internal waters and maritime zones beyond what international law permits.

In an Order on the said counter‑claims handed down on 15 November 2017, the Court found that the first and second counter‑claims submitted by Colombia were inadmissible as such and did not form part of the ongoing proceedings, and that the third and fourth counter‑claims submitted by Colombia were admissible as such and did form part of the ongoing proceedings.

Public hearings on the merits of the case were held in a hybrid format from 20 September to 1 October 2021.

On 21 April 2022, the Court rendered its Judgment on the merits, in which it found that Colombia had violated Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the latter’s exclusive economic zone.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

English French

English French

Written Observations of Colombia on the admissibility of its Counter-Claims

English French

Annexes

English French

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 December 2018

Fixing of time-limit: additional pleading relating to the counter-claims

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Caron

English French Bilingual

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 17 October 2000, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed an Application instituting proceedings against Belgium concerning a dispute over an international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian examining judge against the acting Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, seeking his detention and subsequent extradition to Belgium for alleged crimes constituting “grave violations of international humanitarian law”. The arrest warrant was transmitted to all States, including the DRC, which received it on 12 July 2000.

The DRC also filed a request for the indication of a provisional measure seeking “an order for the immediate discharge of the disputed arrest warrant”. Belgium, for its part, called for that request to be rejected and for the case to be removed from the List. In its Order made on 8 December 2000, the Court, rejecting Belgium’s request for the case to be removed from the List, stated that “the circumstances, as they [then] presented themselves to the Court, [were] not such as to require the exercise of its power, under Article 41 of the Statute, to indicate provisional measures”.

The Memorial of the DRC was filed within the prescribed time-limits. For its part, Belgium filed, within the prescribed time-limits, a Counter-Memorial addressing both issues of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits.

In its submissions presented at the public hearings, the DRC requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Belgium had violated the rule of customary international law concerning the inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers and that it should be required to recall and cancel that arrest warrant and provide reparation for the moral injury to the DRC. Belgium raised objections relating to jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility.

In its Judgment of 14 February 2002, the Court rejected the objections raised by Belgium and declared that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application of the DRC. With respect to the merits, the Court observed that, in the case, it was only questions of immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that it had to consider, on the basis, moreover, of customary international law.

The Court then observed that, in customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. The Court held that the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs were such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs when abroad enjoyed full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. Inasmuch as the purpose of that immunity and inviolability was to prevent another State from hindering the Minister in the performance of his or her duties, no distinction could be drawn between acts performed by the latter in an “official” capacity and those claimed to have been performed in a “private capacity” or, for that matter, between acts performed before assuming office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. The Court then observed that, contrary to Belgium’s arguments, it had been unable to deduce from its examination of State practice that there existed under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs when they were suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The Court further observed that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities. The immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, remained opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercised an extended criminal jurisdiction on the basis of various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes.

However, the Court emphasized that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs did not mean that they enjoyed impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. While jurisdictional immunity was procedural in nature, criminal responsibility was a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity might well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences ; it could not exonerate the person to whom it applied from all criminal responsibility. The Court then spelled out the circumstances in which the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs did not represent a bar to criminal prosecution.

After examining the terms of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, the Court noted that the issuance, as such, of the disputed arrest warrant represented an act by the Belgian judicial authorities intended to enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It found that, given the nature and purpose of the warrant, its mere issuance constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the DRC, in that it had failed to respect the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed as incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court also declared that the international circulation of the disputed arrest warrant from June 2000 by the Belgian authorities constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the DRC, in that it had failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. Finally, the Court considered that its findings constituted a form of satisfaction which would make good the moral injury complained of by the DRC. However, the Court also held that, in order to re-establish “the situation which would, in all probability have existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed”, Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it had been circulated.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

17 October 2000

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

English French

Judgments

Judgment of 14 February 2002

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

English French

Summary 2002/1

Summary of the Judgment of 14 February 2002

Available in:

English French

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 January 2003, Mexico brought a case against the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged violations of Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 with respect to 54 Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death in certain states of the United States. At the same time as its Application, Mexico also submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures, among other things so that the United States would take all measures necessary to ensure that no Mexican national was executed and no action was taken that might prejudice the rights of Mexico or its nationals with regard to any decision the Court might render on the merits of the case. After hearing the Parties at public hearings on the provisional measures held on 21 January 2003, the Court, on 5 February 2003, made an Order, by which it decided that the :

“United States of America sh[ould] take all measures necessary to ensure that Mr. Cesar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera [three Mexican nationals] [we]re not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings”,

that the “United States of America sh[ould] inform the Court of all measures taken in implementation of [that] Order”, and that the Court would remain seised of the matters which formed the subject of that Order until the Court had rendered its final judgment. The same day, it issued another Order fixing 6 June 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial by Mexico and 6 October 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial by the United States of America. The President of the Court subsequently extended those dates respectively to 20 June 2003 and 3 November 2003. Those pleadings were filed within the time-limits thus extended.

After holding public hearings in December 2004, the Court rendered its Judgment on 31 March 2004. Mexico had amended its claims during the written phase of the proceedings and again at the oral proceedings, so that the Court ultimately ruled on the cases of 52 (rather than 54) Mexican nationals.

The Court first considered four objections by the United States to its jurisdiction and five objections to admissibility. Mexico had argued that all of these objections were inadmissible because they had been submitted outside the time-limit prescribed by the Rules of Court, but the Court did not accept this. The Court then dismissed the United States objections, whilst reserving certain of them for consideration at the merits stage.

Ruling on the merits of the case, the Court began by considering whether the 52 individuals concerned were solely of Mexican nationality. Finding that the United States had failed to show that certain of them were also United States nationals, the Court held that the United States was under an obligation to provide consular information pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention in respect of all 52 Mexican nationals. Regarding the meaning to be given to the phrase “without delay” in Article 36 (1) (b), the Court further held that there is an obligation to provide consular information as soon as it is realized that the arrested person is a foreign national, or that there are grounds for thinking that he is probably a foreign national. The Court found that, in all of the cases except one, the United States had violated its obligation to provide the required consular information. Taking note of the interrelated nature of the three subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Court then went on to find that the United States had, in 49 cases, also violated the obligation to enable Mexican consular officers to communicate with, have access to and visit their nationals and, in 34 cases, to arrange for their legal representation.

In relation to Mexico’s arguments concerning paragraph 2 of Article 36 and the right of its nationals to effective review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (1), the Court found that, in view of its failure to revise the procedural default rule since the Court’s decision in the LaGrand case, the United States had in three cases violated paragraph 2 of Article 36, although the possibility of judicial re-examination was still open in the 49 other cases.

In regard to the legal consequences of the proven violations of Article 36 and to Mexico’s requests for restitutio in integrum, through the partial or total annulment of convictions and sentences, the Court pointed out that what international law required was reparation in an adequate form, which in this case meant review and reconsideration by United States courts of the Mexican nationals’ convictions and sentences. The Court considered that the choice of means for review and reconsideration should be left to the United States, but that it was to be carried out by taking account of the violation of rights under the Vienna Convention. After recalling that the process of review and reconsideration should occur in the context of judicial proceedings, the Court stated that the executive clemency process was not sufficient in itself to serve that purpose, although appropriate clemency procedures could supplement judicial review and reconsideration. Contrary to Mexico’s claims, the Court found no evidence of a regular and continuing pattern of breaches of Article 36 by the United States. The Court moreover recognized the efforts of the United States to encourage compliance with the Vienna Convention, and took the view that that commitment provided a sufficient guarantee and assurance of non-repetition as requested by Mexico.

The Court further observed that, while the present case concerned only Mexican nationals, that should not be taken to imply that its conclusions did not apply to other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United States. Finally, the Court recalled that the United States had violated paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 36 in the case of the three Mexican nationals concerned by the Order of 5 February 2003 indicating provisional measures, and that no review and reconsideration of conviction and sentence had been carried out in those cases. The Court considered that it was therefore for the United States to find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideration according to the criteria indicated in the Judgment.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

9 January 2003

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 2003/1 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2003/3 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2003/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 11.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Public sitting held on Friday 19 December 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 31 March 2004

Merits

Summary of the Order of 5 February 2003

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/1

Summary of the Judgment of 31 March 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 24 April 2013, the Plurinational State of Bolivia instituted proceedings against the Republic of Chile before the Court, concerning a dispute in relation to “Chile’s obligation to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”. In its Application, Bolivia asserted that “beyond its general obligations under international law, Chile has committed itself, more specifically through agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of declarations attributable to its highest-level representatives, to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia”. According to Bolivia, “Chile has not complied with this obligation and . . . denies the existence of its obligation”. In its Application, as the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Bolivia invoked Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) of 30 April 1948.

On 15 July 2014, Chile filed a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the proceedings on the merits were then suspended. After Bolivia filed its written statement on the preliminary objection, public hearings were held in May 2015. In its Judgment rendered on 24 September 2015, the Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by Chile and found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by Bolivia.

Following the submission of Chile’s Counter-Memorial, the Court authorized the submission of a Reply by Bolivia and a Rejoinder by Chile and fixed 21 March and 21 September 2017 as the respective time-limits for those pleadings. Public hearings were held in March 2018, and the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits on 1 October 2018.

In its Judgment, the Court considered the various legal bases invoked by Bolivia in support of Chile’s alleged obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

The Court concluded that none of those bases established an obligation for Chile to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. It added that its finding should not be understood “as precluding the Parties from continuing their dialogue and exchanges, in a spirit of good neighbourliness, to address the issues relating to the landlocked situation of Bolivia, the solution to which both had recognized to be a matter of mutual interest. With willingness on the part of the Parties, meaningful negotiations could be undertaken”.

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Volume I

English French

Volume II

English French

Volume III

English French

Written Statement of Bolivia on the Preliminary Objection of Chile

7 November 2014

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Counter-Memorial of Chile

13 July 2016

Volume 6

English French

Reply of Bolivia

21 March 2017

Rejoinder of Chile

15 September 2017

Verbatim record 2015/19 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Wednesday 6 May 2015, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) - Preliminary Objection

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2015/20 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Thursday 7 May 2015, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) - Preliminary Objection

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Summary of the Judgment of 24 September 2015

Available in:

English French

Summary 2018/5

Summary of the Judgment of 1 October 2018

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 July 1999, Croatia filed an Application against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) “for violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”. As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Croatia invoked Article IX of that Convention to which, according to it, both Croatia and Yugoslavia were parties. On 11 September 2002, Yugoslavia filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the claims made by Croatia.

The Court delivered its Judgment on the preliminary objections on 18 November 2008. It rejected the first and third objections raised by the Respondent and found that the second objection was not exclusively preliminary in character.

On 4 January 2010, the Republic of Serbia filed its Counter-Memorial containing counter-claims.

The Court held public hearings from 3 March to 1 April 2014, at which time it also heard witnesses and witness-experts. The Court delivered its Judgment on 3 February 2015.

The Court first considered the scope of its jurisdiction, which, it recalled, was founded only on Article IX of the Genocide Convention. It noted that the Court thus had no power to rule on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not amounting to genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in armed conflict. That was so even if the alleged breaches were of obligations under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect essential humanitarian values, and which might be owed erga omnes. The Court further noted that the jurisdiction provided for under Article IX did not extend to allegations of violations of the customary international law on genocide, even if it was well established that the Convention enshrines principles that also form part of customary international law. Referring to statements contained in its jurisprudence, the Court recalled that the Genocide Convention contains obligations erga omnes and that the prohibition of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm (jus cogens).

The Court recalled that, in its 2008 Judgment, it had found that it had jurisdiction over events which had taken place after 27 April 1992 (the date on which the FRY became party, by succession, to the Genocide Convention), but had at the time reserved its decision on its jurisdiction with regard to violations of the Convention allegedly committed before that date. After examining the Parties’ arguments on this second aspect, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to rule upon the entirety of Croatia’s claim, including in respect of acts prior to 27 April 1992. In this regard, the Court first considered that the FRY could not be bound by the Genocide Convention before 27 April 1992. It took note, however, of Croatia’s alternative argument that the FRY (and later Serbia) could have succeeded to the responsibility of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for violations of the Convention prior to that date. The Court stated in this respect that, in order to determine whether Serbia was responsible for violations of the Convention, the Court would need to decide: (1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia had taken place and, if they had, whether they were contrary to the Convention; (2) if so, whether those acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time that they occurred and engaged its responsibility; and (3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been engaged, whether the FRY succeeded to that responsibility. Noting that the Parties disagreed on these questions, the Court considered that there existed between them a dispute falling within the scope of Article IX of the Convention (“[d]isputes . . . relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III”) and that it therefore had jurisdiction to entertain it. The Court further noted that, in reaching that conclusion, it was not necessary for it to decide the aforementioned questions, which were matters for the merits.

The Court also took the view that it was not necessary to determine the admissibility questions raised by Serbia before examining Croatia’s claim on the merits. With regard to Serbia’s argument that Croatia’s claim was inadmissible in so far as events said to have occurred before the FRY came into existence as a State on 27 April 1992 could not be attributed to it, the Court considered that this involved questions of attribution which the Court did not need to determine before considering on the merits the acts alleged by Croatia. With regard to Serbia’s alternative argument that the claim was inadmissible in so far as it concerned events prior to 8 October 1991, the date on which Croatia came into existence as a State and became a party to the Convention, the Court observed that the Applicant had not made discrete claims in respect of the events before and after 8 October 1991; rather, it had advanced a single claim alleging a pattern of conduct increasing in intensity throughout the course of 1991. In this context, the Court considered that what had happened prior to 8 October 1991 was, in any event, pertinent to an evaluation of whether what took place after that date involved violations of the Genocide Convention. It therefore was not necessary for the Court to rule on Serbia’s argument before it had examined and assessed the totality of the evidence advanced by Croatia.

The Court then turned to the merits of the Parties’ claims. It recalled that, under the terms of the 1948 Convention, the crime of genocide contains two constituent elements. The first is the physical element, namely the acts perpetrated (which are set out in Article II and include, in particular, killing members of the group (subparagraph (a)) and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (subparagraph (b)). The second is the mental element, namely the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. The Court noted that this mental element is the essential characteristic of genocide and distinguishes it from other serious crimes. It is a specific intent (dolus specialis), which, in order for genocide to be established, must be present in addition to the intent required for each of the individual acts involved. The Court explained that the aim must be the physical or biological destruction of the protected group, or a substantial part of that group. Evidence of this intent is to be sought, first, in the State’s policy (while at the same time accepting that such intent will seldom be expressly stated), but it can also be inferred from a pattern of conduct, when this intent is the only inference that can reasonably be drawn from the acts in question.

Regarding Croatia’s claim, the Court considered that, in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia, the JNA (the army of the SFRY) and Serb forces had committed killings of and caused serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Croat national or ethnic group. In the view of the Court, these acts constituted the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention.

The actus reus of genocide having been established, the Court turned to the question whether the acts that had been perpetrated reflected a genocidal intent. In the absence of direct proof of such intent (for example, the expression of a policy to that effect), the Court examined whether it had been demonstrated that there existed a pattern of conduct from which the only reasonable inference to be drawn was an intent on the part of the perpetrators of the acts to destroy a substantial part of the group of ethnic Croats. The Court considered that this was not the case. It observed, in particular, that the aim of the crimes committed against ethnic Croats appeared to have been the forced displacement of the majority of the Croat population in the regions concerned, not its physical or biological destruction. In the absence of evidence of the required intent, the Court found that Croatia had not proved its allegations that genocide or other violations of the Convention had been committed. It thus dismissed Croatia’s claim in its entirety and did not consider it necessary to rule on other questions, such as the attribution of the acts committed or succession to responsibility.

Regarding Serbia’s counter-claim, which was found to be admissible, the Court concluded that, during and after Operation Storm, carried out in August 1995, Croatian forces had committed acts falling within Article II (a) and (b): (i) killings of members of the national or ethnical group of Serbs who were fleeing or had remained in the areas of which the Croatian army had taken control; and (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to Serbs.

However, the Court considered that the existence of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the national or ethnical group of Croatian Serbs had not been established in this case. In particular, although acts constituting the physical element of genocide had been committed, they had not been committed on a scale such that they could only point to the existence of a genocidal intent. The Court found that neither genocide nor other violations of the Convention had been proved. Accordingly, it rejected Serbia’s counter-claim in its entirety.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

2 July 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of Croatia

1 March 2001

volume II, part 3

English

Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1 September 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Written statement of the Republic of Croatia

29 April 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Counter-Memorial of Serbia

1 December 2009

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Reply of Croatia

20 December 2010

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Rejoinder of Serbia

1 November 2011

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English

volume I

English

volume II

English

volume III

English

Additional Pleading Croatia

30 August 2012

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Verbatim record 2014/8 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Wednesday 5 March 2014, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2014/9 (bilingual version)

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 18 November 2008

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreća

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 3 February 2015

Merits

Summary of the Judgment of 18 November 2008

Available in:

English French

Summary 2015/1

Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2015

Available in:

English French

Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 10 September 2002, El Salvador filed a request for revision of the Judgment delivered on 11 September 1992 by a Chamber of the Court in the case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening). El Salvador indicated that “the sole purpose of the Application [was] to seek revision of the course of the boundary decided by the Court for the sixth disputed sector of the land boundary between El Salvador and Honduras”. It was the first time that an Application had been made seeking a revision of a judgment rendered by one of the Court’s Chambers.

By an Order of 27 November 2002, the Court unanimously decided to accede to the request of the two Parties for it to form a special Chamber of five judges to deal with the case. It formed a Chamber composed as follows : President Guillaume ; Judges Rezek and Buergenthal ; Judges ad hoc Torres Bernárdez (chosen by Honduras) and Paolillo (chosen by El Salvador). In its Order, the Court also fixed 1 April 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of written observations by Honduras on the admissibility of the request for revision. That pleading having been filed within the time-limit so prescribed, the Chamber held public hearings on the admissibility of the Application from 8 to 12 September 2003.

The Chamber rendered its Judgment on 18 December 2003. In the earlier proceedings which had resulted in the 1992 Judgment, Honduras had contended that in the sixth sector the boundary followed the present course of the River Goascorán. El Salvador, however, had claimed that the boundary was defined by a previous course of the river, which it had abandoned as a result of an “avulsion” — an abrupt change in the riverbed. The Chamber began by recalling that at this stage of the proceedings it must determine whether the Application for revision was admissible in that it satisfied the requirements laid down by Article 61 of the Court’s Statute ; that is to say, the application must, inter alia, be based on the “discovery” of a fact “of such a nature as to be a decisive factor” which, “when the judgment was given”, was “unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision”.

In support of its Application, El Salvador claimed, inter alia, to possess scientific, technical and historical evidence showing the existence of a previous bed of the Goascorán and of its avulsion in the mid-eighteenth century. El Salvador contended that this evidence constituted “new facts” within the meaning of Article 61, and that these were “decisive”, since in the 1992 Judgment, in the absence of proof of any avulsion, the boundary had been declared to follow the course of the Goascorán as it was in 1821 and not the course prior to avulsion. After examining the reasoning followed by the Chamber in 1992, the present Chamber found that the boundary had been determined by application of the principle of uti possidetis juris, whereby the boundaries of States resulting from decolonization in Spanish America are to follow the colonial administrative boundaries. However, the 1992 Judgment had indicated that the situation resulting from uti possidetis was susceptible of modification as a result of the conduct of the Parties after independence in 1821. The Chamber found that the 1992 Chamber had rejected El Salvador’s claims precisely because of that State’s conduct subsequent to 1821. The Chamber accordingly held that it did not matter whether or not there had been an avulsion of the Goascorán, since, even if avulsion were now proved, findings to that effect would provide no basis for calling into question the decision taken by the Chamber in 1992 on different grounds. The facts asserted by El Salvador were accordingly not “decisive factors” in respect of the Judgment which it sought to have revised.

In regard to the second new fact relied on by El Salvador, namely the discovery of further copies of the “Carta Esférica” (a maritime chart of the Gulf of Fonseca prepared in or about 1796 by officers of the brigantine El Activo) and of the report of that vessel’s expedition, which differed from those produced by Honduras in the original proceedings, El Salvador contended that the fact that these documents existed in a number of versions and contained discrepancies and anachronisms compromised the evidentiary value that the Chamber had attached to them in 1992. The Chamber accordingly considered whether the 1992 Chamber might have reached different conclusions if it had had before it the new versions of these documents produced by El Salvador. It concluded that this was not the case. The new versions in fact confirmed the conclusions reached by the Chamber in 1992 and were thus not “decisive factors”.

Having found that none of the new facts alleged by El Salvador were “decisive factors” in relation to the Judgment of 11 September 1992, the Chamber held that it was unnecessary for it to ascertain whether the other conditions laid down by Article 61 of the Statute were satisfied.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

10 September 2002

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Written Observations of the Government of Honduras (French version only)

1 April 2003

Available in:

French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 27 November 2002

Formation of Chamber; fixing of time-limit: written observations on admissibility

Summary of the Judgment of 18 December 2003

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 October 2009, the Ambassador of Honduras to the Netherlands filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Brazil in respect of a

“dispute between [the two States] relat[ing] to legal questions concerning diplomatic relations and associated with the principle of non‑intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, a principle incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations”.

It was alleged therein that Brazil had “breached its obligations under Article 2 (7) of the Charter and those under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”.

At the end of the Application the Court was requested

“to adjudge and declare that Brazil does not have the right to allow the premises of its Mission in Tegucigalpa to be used to promote manifestly illegal activities by Honduran citizens who have been staying within it for some time now and that it shall cease to do so”.

To found the Court’s jurisdiction, Honduras invoked Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed on 30 April 1948 and, under the terms of Article LX thereof, officially called the “Pact of Bogotá”, ratified without reservation by Honduras on 13 January 1950 and by Brazil on 9 November 1965.

An original copy of the Application was sent to the Government of Brazil on 28 October 2009. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was also informed about the filing of that Application.

By a letter dated 28 October 2009, received in the Registry on 30 October 2009 under the cover of a letter dated 29 October 2009 from Mr. Jorge Arturo Reina, Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations, Ms Patricia Isabel Rodas Baca, Minister for External Relations in the Government headed by Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, informed the Court, inter alia, that the Ambassador of Honduras to the Netherlands was not the legitimate representative of Honduras before the Court and that “Ambassador Eduardo Enrique Reina is being appointed as the sole legitimate representative of the Government of Honduras to the International Court of Justice”. A copy of the communication, with annexes, from the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations was sent on 3 November 2009 to Brazil, as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Court decided that, given the circumstances, no other action would be taken in the case until further notice.

By a letter dated 30 April 2010, received in the Registry on 3 May 2010, Mr. Mario Miguel Canahuati, Minister for External Relations of Honduras, informed the Court that the Honduran Government was “not going on with the proceedings initiated by the application” and that it “accordingly withdraws this application from the Registry”. Consequently, the President of the Court made an Order on 12 May 2010 in which, after noting that Brazil had not taken any step in the proceedings in the case, he recorded the discontinuance by Honduras of the proceedings and ordered that the case be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

28 October 2009

Available in:

English French

Orders

Order of 12 May 2010

Removal from list

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

Press release 2009/30

29 October 2009

Filing in the Registry of the Court of an “Application instituting proceedings by the Republic of Honduras against the Federative Republic of Brazil”

Available in:

English French

Press release 2010/15

19 May 2010

Certain Questions concerning Diplomatic Relations (Honduras v. Brazil) - Case removed from the Court's List at the request of Honduras

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In its Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC referred, as bases for the Court’s jurisdiction, to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and, lastly, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. However, the Government of the DRC informed the Court on 15 January 2001 that it intended to discontinue the proceedings instituted against Burundi and Rwanda, stating that it reserved the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the Court. The two cases were therefore removed from the List on 30 January 2001.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Annexes to the Application instituting proceedings, Livre blanc (Volumes I and II)

23 June 1999

English French Bilingual

Order of 19 October 2000

Extension of time-limit: Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 30 January 2001

Removal from List

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 12 August 2008, the Republic of Georgia instituted proceedings before the Court against the Russian Federation relating to “its actions on and around the territory of Georgia in breach of CERD [the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]”. Georgia claimed that

“the Russian Federation, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising governmental authority, and through the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist forces and other agents acting on the instructions of, and under the direction and control of the Russian Federation, is responsible for serious violations of its fundamental obligations under CERD, including Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6”.

As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Georgia relied on Article 22 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Georgia’s Application was accompanied by a Request for the indication of provisional measures in order “to preserve [its] rights under CERD to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries”.

On 15 August 2008, having considered the gravity of the situation, the President of the Court, acting under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, urgently called upon the Parties “to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may take on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects”.

Following public hearings that were held from 8 to 10 October 2008, the Court issued an Order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Georgia. The Court found that it had prima facie jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD to deal with the case and it ordered the Parties,

“within South Ossetia and Abkhazia and adjacent areas in Georgia, [to] refrain from any act of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions; [to] abstain from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial discrimination by any persons or organizations; [to] do all in their power . . . to ensure, without distinction as to national or ethnic origin, (i) security of persons ; (ii) the right of persons to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State; (iii) the protection of the property of displaced persons and of refugees . . . [and to] do all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions”.

The Court also indicated that “[e]ach Party shall refrain from any action which might prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in the case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve”. Finally, the Court ordered each Party to “inform [it] as to its compliance with the . . . provisional measures”.

On 1 December 2009, the Russian Federation filed four preliminary objections in respect of jurisdiction.

In its Judgment of 1 April 2011, the Court began by considering the Russian Federation’s first preliminary objection, according to which there had been no dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of CERD at the date Georgia filed its Application. It concluded that none of the documents or statements provided any basis for a finding that there had been a dispute about racial discrimination by July 1999. However, the Court concluded that the exchanges between the Georgian and Russian representatives in the Security Council on 10 August 2008, the claims made by the Georgian President on 9 and 11 August and the response on 12 August by the Russian Foreign Minister established that by that day, the day on which Georgia submitted its Application, there had been a dispute between Georgia and the Russian Federation about the latter’s compliance with its obligations under CERD as invoked by Georgia in the case. The first preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was accordingly dismissed.

In its second preliminary objection, the Russian Federation had argued that the procedural requirements of Article 22 of CERD for recourse to the Court had not been fulfilled. According to this provision,

“[a]ny dispute between two or more States parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement”.

First of all, the Court noted that Georgia did not claim that, prior to seising the Court, it had used or attempted to use the procedures expressly provided for in CERD. The Court therefore limited its examination to the question of whether the precondition of negotiations had been fulfilled.

In determining what constitutes negotiations, the Court observed that negoti-ations are distinct from mere protests or disputations.

The Court observed that negotiations had taken place between Georgia and the Russian Federation before the start of the relevant dispute. However, in the absence of a dispute relating to matters falling under CERD prior to 9 August 2008, those negotiations could not be said to have covered such matters, and were thus of no relevance to the Court’s examination of the Russian Federation’s second preliminary objection. The Court accordingly concluded that neither requirement contained in Article 22 had been satisfied. Article 22 of CERD thus could not serve to found the Court’s jurisdiction in the case. The second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was therefore upheld.

Having upheld the second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation, the Court found that it was required neither to consider nor to rule on the other objections to its jurisdiction raised by the Respondent and that the case could not proceed to the merits phase. Accordingly, the Order of 15 October 2008 indicating provisional measures ceased to be operative upon the delivery of the Judgment of the Court.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

12 August 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of Georgia

14 August 2008

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French

Amended Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of Georgia

25 August 2008

Written Statement of Georgia

1 April 2010

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

Fixing of time-limit

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 11 December 2009

Fixing of time-limits

English French

Summary 2011/2

Summary of the Judgment of 1 April 2011

Available in:

English French

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OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

23 June 1999

Available in:

Written proceedings

19 June 2000

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

6 July 2000

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

Volume III - Annexes

Volume IV - Annexes

Volume V - Annexes

Volume VI - Annexes

21 April 2001

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

Volume III - Annexes

25 June 2001

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

15 August 2001

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

29 May 2002

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

Volume III - Annexes

Volume IV - Annexes

6 December 2002

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

Volume III - Annexes

Volume IV - Annexes

Volume V - Annexes

28 February 2003

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Annexes

1 September 2016

Available in:

Volume I - Annexes 0.1 - 1.11

Volume II - Annexes 2.1-2.20

Volume III - Annexes 3.1 - 3.8

Volume IV-V - Annexes 4.1 - 4.6

Volume V - Annexe 4.7

Volume VI - Annexes 4.8 - 4.14

Volume VII - Annexes 4.15 - 4.28

Volume VIII - Annexes 5.1 - 5.14

Volume IX - Annexes 5.15 - 5.20

Volume X - Annexes 6.1 - 7.4

28 September 2016

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

1 February 2018

Available in:

6 February 2018

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes 1 - 49

Volume III - Annexes 50 - 110

Oral proceedings

Public hearing held on Monday 26 June 2000, at 6 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 28 June 2000, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 28 June 2000, at 6 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Contentious