Contentious

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 17 November 2008, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Hellenic Republic in respect of a dispute concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995. In particular, the Applicant sought to establish that, by objecting to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, the Respondent had breached Article 11, paragraph 1, of the said Accord, which provides that:

“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”

In paragraph 2 of resolution 817, the Security Council recommended that the Applicant be admitted to membership in the United Nations, being “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State”. In the period following the adoption of the Interim Accord, the Applicant was granted membership in a number of international organizations of which the Respondent was already a member. The Applicant’s NATO candidacy was considered in a meeting of NATO member States in Bucharest (hereinafter the “Bucharest Summit”) on 2 and 3 April 2008 but the Applicant was not invited to begin talks on accession to the organization. The communiqué issued at the end of the Bucharest Summit stated that an invitation would be extended to the Applicant “as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached”.

In its Judgment of 5 December 2011, the Court first addressed the Respondent’s claim that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and that the Application was inadmissible for several reasons. The Court upheld none of those objections and concluded that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and that the Application was admissible. Turning to the merits of the case, the Court considered whether the Respondent objected to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, within the meaning of the first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord. In the view of the Court, the evidence submitted to it demonstrated that through formal diplomatic correspondence and through statements of its senior officials, the Respondent had made clear before, during and after the Bucharest Summit that the resolution of the difference over the name was the “decisive criterion” for the Respondent to accept the Applicant’s admission to NATO. The Court therefore concluded that the Respondent had objected to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, within the meaning of the first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.

The Court then considered whether the Respondent’s objection to the Applicant’s admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit fell within the exception contained in the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord, finding that it did not.

The Court thus concluded that the Respondent had failed to comply with its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord by objecting to the Applicant’s admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit. It also rejected the Respondent’s alternative arguments that its objection had been made in response to the Applicant’s breaches of the Interim Accord.

As to possible remedies for the violation by the Respondent of its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord, the Court found that a declaration that the Respondent had violated its obligation not to object to the Applicant’s admission to or membership in NATO was warranted and that such finding constituted appropriate satisfaction. The Court did not consider it necessary, however, to order the Respondent, as the Applicant requested, to refrain from any future conduct that violated its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

17 November 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 20 January 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 12 March 2010

Fixing of time-limits

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 December 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against the Italian Republic, requesting the Court to declare that Italy had failed to respect the jurisdictional immunity which Germany enjoys under international law by allowing civil claims to be brought against it in the Italian courts seeking reparation for injuries caused by violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Third Reich during the Second World War. In addition, Germany asked the Court to find that Italy had also violated Germany’s immunity by taking measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni, German State property situated in Italian territory. Finally, Germany requested the Court to declare that Italy had breached Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek civil courts rendered against Germany on the basis of acts similar to those which had given rise to the claims brought before Italian courts. Germany referred in particular to the judgment rendered against it in respect of the massacre committed by German armed forces during their withdrawal in 1944, in the Greek village of Distomo in the Distomo case.

As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Germany invoked Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, ratified by Italy on 29 January 1960 and by Germany on 18 April 1961.

The Memorial of Germany and the Counter-Memorial of Italy were filed within the time-limits fixed by the Order of the Court of 29 April 2009. In its Counter-Memorial, Italy, referring to Article 80 of the Rules of Court, made a counter-claim “with respect to the question of the reparation owed to Italian victims of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed by forces of the German Reich”. The Court found that the counter-claim presented by Italy was inadmissible, because the dispute that Italy intended to bring before the Court by way of its counter-claim related to facts and situations existing prior to the entry into force as between the parties of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, which formed the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in the case (Order of 6 July 2010).

On 13 January 2011, Greece filed an Application requesting permission to intervene in the case. In its Application, Greece stated that it wished to intervene in the aspect of the procedure relating to judgments rendered by its own courts on the Distomo massacre and enforced (exequatur) by the Italian courts. The Court, in an Order of 4 July 2011, considered that it might find it necessary to consider the decisions of Greek courts in the Distomo case, in light of the principle of State immunity, for the purposes of making findings with regard to Germany’s submission that Italy had breached its jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek courts founded on violations of international humanitarian law committed by the German Reich during the Second World War. This permitted the conclusion that Greece had an interest of a legal nature which might have been affected by the judgment in the case and, consequently, that Greece could be permitted to intervene as a non-party “in so far as this intervention is limited to the decisions of Greek courts [in the Distomo case]”.

In its Judgment rendered on 3 February 2012, the Court first examined the question whether Italy had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by allowing civil claims to be brought against that State in the Italian courts. The Court noted in this respect that the question which it was called upon to decide was not whether the acts committed by the Third Reich during the Second World War were illegal, but whether, in civil proceedings against Germany relating to those acts, the Italian courts were obliged to accord Germany immunity. The Court held that the action of the Italian courts in denying Germany immunity constituted a breach of Italy’s international obligations. It stated in this connection that, under customary international law as it presently stood, a State was not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it was accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict. The Court further observed that, assuming that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibited murder, deportation and slave labour were rules of jus cogens, there was no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity. The two sets of rules addressed different matters. The rules of State immunity were confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State could exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They did not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings were brought was lawful or unlawful. Finally, the Court examined Italy’s argument that the Italian courts were justified in denying Germany immunity, because all other attempts to secure compensation for the various groups of victims involved in the Italian proceedings had failed. The Court found no basis in the relevant domestic or international practice that international law made the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress.

The Court then addressed the question whether a measure of constraint taken against property belonging to Germany located on Italian territory constituted a breach by Italy of Germany’s immunity. It noted that Villa Vigoni was being used for governmental purposes that were entirely non-commercial; that Germany had in no way consented to the registration of the legal charge in question, nor allocated Villa Vigoni for the satisfaction of the judicial claims against it. Since the conditions permitting a measure of constraint to be taken against property belonging to a foreign State had not been met in this case, the Court concluded that Italy had violated its obligation to respect Germany’s immunity from enforcement.

Finally, the Court examined the question whether Italy had violated Germany’s immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy civil judgments rendered by Greek courts against Germany in proceedings arising out of the massacre committed in the Greek village of Distomo by the armed forces of the Third Reich in 1944. It found that the relevant decisions of the Italian courts constituted a violation by Italy of its obligation to respect the jurisdictional immunity of Germany.

English

Counter-Memorial of Italy

22 December 2009

5 October 2010

Available in:

English French

Annexes

Annexes

English

Letter from the Agent of Italy

5 September 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 29 April 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 6 July 2010

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint declaration of Judges Keith and Greenwood

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Gaja

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 July 2011

Application by the Hellenic Republic for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2012

Available in:

English French

“(a) The United States of America shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Messrs. José Ernesto Medellín Rojas, César Roberto Fierro Reyna, Rubén Ramírez Cárdenas, Humberto Leal García, and Roberto Moreno Ramos are not executed pending judgment on the Request for interpretation submitted by the United Mexican States, unless and until these five Mexican nationals receive review and reconsideration consistent with paragraphs 138 to 141 of the Court’s Judgment delivered on 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America);

(b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Court of the measures taken in implementation of this Order.”

Following the submission of written observations by the United States and of further written explanations by both Parties, the Court delivered its Judgment on Mexico’s Request for interpretation on 19 January 2009.

The Court found that Mexico’s Request for interpretation dealt not with the “meaning or scope” of the Avena Judgment as Article 60 required, but rather with “the general question of the effects of a judgment of the Court in the domestic legal order of the States parties to the case in which the judgment was delivered”. Thus, the Court considered that, “[b]y virtue of its general nature, the question underlying Mexico’s Request for interpretation is outside the jurisdiction specifically conferred upon the Court by Article 60” and that “[w]hether or not there is a dispute, it does not bear on the interpretation of the Avena Judgment, in particular of paragraph 153 (9).” The Court therefore concluded that it could not accede to Mexico’s Request for interpretation.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

5 June 2008

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

5 June 2008

English French

Summary 2009/1

Summary of the Judgment of 19 January 2009

Available in:

English French

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Portuguese Republic

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/10

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/9

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 19 February 2009, Belgium filed an Application instituting proceedings against Senegal relating to Mr. Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad and resident in Senegal since being granted political asylum by the Senegalese Government in 1990. In particular, Belgium submitted that, by failing to prosecute Mr. Habré for certain acts he was alleged to have committed during his presidency, including acts of torture and crimes against humanity, or to extradite him to Belgium, Senegal had violated the so‑called obligation aut dedere aut judicare (that is to say, “to prosecute or extradite”) provided for in Article 7 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and in customary international law.

On the same day, Belgium filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures, asking the Court to order “Senegal to take all the steps within its power to keep Mr. H. Habré under the control and surveillance of the judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly applied”.

In its Order of 28 May 2009, referring to the assurances given by Senegal during the oral proceedings that it would not allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory while the case was pending, the Court concluded that there was no risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Belgium and that there did not exist any urgency to justify the indication of provisional measures.

In its Judgment dated 20 July 2012, the Court began by examining the questions raised by Senegal relating to its jurisdiction and to the admissibility of Belgium’s claims. It found that it did have jurisdiction to entertain Belgium’s claims based on the interpretation and application of Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture. The Court further determined that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the issue whether there existed an obligation for a State to prosecute crimes under customary international law allegedly committed by a foreign national abroad.

With respect to the admissibility of Belgium’s claims, the Court ruled that once any State party to the Convention against Torture was able to invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, i.e., obligations owed toward all States parties, Belgium, as a party to the said Convention, had standing to invoke the responsibility of Senegal for the alleged breaches of its obligations under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of that Convention. The Court thus found that Belgium’s claims based on those provisions were admissible.

As regards the alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention against Torture, which provides that a State party in whose territory a person alleged to have committed acts of torture is present must “immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts”, the Court noted that Senegal had not included in the case file any material demonstrating that it had carried out such an inquiry. In the present case, the establishment of the facts had become imperative at least since the year 2000, when a complaint was filed in Senegal against Mr. Habré. Nor had an investigation been initiated in 2008, when a further complaint against Mr. Habré was filed in Dakar, after the legislative and constitutional amendments made in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The Court concluded from the foregoing that Senegal had breached its obligation under the above‑mentioned provision.

With respect to the alleged violation of Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture, the Court first examined the nature and meaning of the obligation laid down in that provision.

It concluded from the foregoing that Senegal’s obligation to prosecute pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention did not apply to acts alleged to have been committed before the Convention entered into force for Senegal on 26 June 1987, although there was nothing in that instrument to prevent it from instituting proceedings concerning acts that were committed before that date. The Court found that Belgium, for its part, was entitled, with effect from 25 July 1999, the date when it became party to the Convention, to request the Court to rule on Senegal’s compliance with its obligation under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

Finally, the Court examined the question of the implementation of the obligation to prosecute. It concluded that the obligation laid down in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention required Senegal to take all measures necessary for its implementation as soon as possible, in particular once the first complaint had been filed against Mr. Habré in 2000. Having failed to do so, Senegal had breached and remained in breach of its obligations under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

The Court found that, by failing to comply with its obligations under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, Senegal had engaged its international responsibility. Therefore, it was required to cease that continuing wrongful act and to take, without further delay, the necessary measures to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it did not extradite Mr. Habré.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

19 February 2009

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures (translation) -
filed on 19 February 2009

19 February 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 11 July 2011

Extension of a time-limit

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 20 July 2012

Merits

English French

Summary 2012/4

Summary of the Judgment of 20 July 2012

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 4 May 2006, Argentina filed an Application instituting proceedings against Uruguay concerning alleged breaches by Uruguay of obligations incumbent upon it under the Statute of the River Uruguay, a treaty signed by the two States on 26 February 1975 (hereinafter “the 1975 Statute”) for the purpose of establishing the joint machinery necessary for the optimum and rational utilization of that part of the river which constitutes their joint boundary. In its Application, Argentina charged Uruguay with having unilaterally authorized the construction of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay without complying with the obligatory prior notification and consultation procedures under the 1975 Statute. Argentina claimed that those mills posed a threat to the river and its environment and were likely to impair the quality of the river’s waters and to cause significant transboundary damage to Argentina. As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Argentina invoked the first paragraph of Article 60 of the 1975 Statute, which provides that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of that Statute which cannot be settled by direct negotiations may be submitted by either party to the Court.

Argentina’s Application was accompanied by a Request for the indication of provisional measures, whereby Argentina asked that Uruguay be ordered to suspend the authorizations for construction of the mills and all building works pending a final decision by the Court; to co-operate with Argentina with a view to protecting and conserving the aquatic environment of the River Uruguay; and to refrain from taking any further unilateral action with respect to the construction of the two mills incompatible with the 1975 Statute, and from any other action which might aggravate the dispute or render its settlement more difficult. Public hearings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures were held on 8 and 9 June 2006. By an Order of 13 July 2006, the Court found that the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to it, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.

On 29 November 2006, Uruguay in turn submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures on the grounds that, from 20 November 2006, organized groups of Argentine citizens had blockaded a “vital international bridge” over the River Uruguay, that that action was causing it considerable economic prejudice and that Argentina had made no effort to end the blockade. At the end of its Request, Uruguay asked the Court to order Argentina to take “all reasonable and appropriate steps . . . to prevent or end the interruption of transit between Uruguay and Argentina, including the blockading of bridges or roads between the two States”; to abstain “from any measure that might aggravate, extend or make more difficult the settlement of this dispute”; and to abstain “from any other measure which might prejudice the rights of Uruguay in dispute before the Court”. Public hearings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures were held on 18 and 19 December 2006. By an Order of 23 January 2007, the Court found that the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to it, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute.

Following public hearings held between 14 September 2009 and 2 October 2009, the Court delivered its Judgment on 20 April 2010. With respect to Argentina’s argument that projects had been authorized by Uruguay in violation of the mechanism for prior notification and consultation laid down by Articles 7 to 13 of the 1975 Statute (the procedural violations), the Court noted that Uruguay had not informed the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) of the projects as prescribed in the Statute. The Court concluded that, by not informing CARU of the planned works before the issuing of the initial environmental authorizations for each of the mills and for the port terminal adjacent to the Orion (Botnia) mill, and by failing to notify the plans to Argentina through CARU, Uruguay had violated the 1975 Statute.

With respect to Argentina’s contention that the industrial activities authorized by Uruguay had had, or would have, an adverse impact on the quality of the waters of the river and the area affected by it, and had caused significant damage to the quality of the waters of the river and significant transboundary damage to Argentina (the substantive violations), the Court found, based on a detailed examination of the Parties’ arguments, that there was

“no conclusive evidence in the record to show that Uruguay has not acted with the requisite degree of due diligence or that the discharges of effluent from the Orion (Botnia) mill have had deleterious effects or caused harm to living resources or to the quality of the water or the ecological balance of the river since it started its operations in November 2007”.

Consequently, the Court concluded that Uruguay had not breached substantive obligations under the Statute. In addition to this finding, however, the Court emphasized that, under the 1975 Statute, “[t]he Parties have a legal obligation . . . to continue their co-operation through CARU and to enable it to devise the necessary means to promote the equitable utilization of the river, while protecting its environment”.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

4 May 2006

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures submitted by Argentina (French version only)

4 May 2006

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 13 July 2006

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 13 July 2006

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Ranjeva

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Abraham

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Bennouna

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa

English French Bilingual

Order of 23 January 2007

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 24 April 2014, the Republic of the Marshall Islands filed Applications against nine States (in alphabetical order : China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), accusing them of not fulfilling their obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

While these nine Applications all related to the same matter, the Marshall Islands distinguished between those three States (India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom) which had recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, and the six others, in respect of which the Marshall Islands proposed to found the jurisdiction of the Court on consent yet to be given. In accordance with Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the Applications filed against these six States were transmitted to them but not entered in the General List, and no action was taken in the proceedings in the absence of their consent.

With regard to the cases entered in the General List, the Marshall Islands alleged, more specifically, that the United Kingdom had violated Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which they were both party. According to that Article, each party “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. Although India and Pakistan were not parties to the NPT, the Marshall Islands contended that certain obligations enshrined in that instrument applied to all States as a matter of customary international law, and such was the case of the obligations provided for in Article VI of the NPT.

India and Pakistan having informed the Court that they considered that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute alleged by the Marshall Islands, and that the latter’s Application was inadmissible, the Court decided that these questions needed to be resolved first and that they would be determined separately, before any proceedings on the merits, pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. The Parties subsequently filed their written pleadings on these questions within the time-limits fixed.

In the proceedings instituted against the United Kingdom, the Court fixed the time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by the Marshall Islands and a Counter-Memorial by the United Kingdom. However, within the time-limit of three months following the filing of the Applicant’s Memorial, the United Kingdom raised certain preliminary objections in the case. Consequently, pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, and the Marshall Islands presented a written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom.

Public hearings were held in all three cases in March 2016, and the Court delivered its Judgment in each case on 5 October 2016.

In each of the three Judgments, the Court considered that the respondent States’ preliminary objection based on the absence of a dispute between the Parties at the time the Applications were filed should be upheld. The Court noted that, in order for a dispute to exist, the two sides must hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain international obligations. It further noted that a dispute exists when the evidence demonstrates that the respondent was aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were positively opposed by the applicant. Lastly, it observed that, in principle, the existence of a dispute is to be determined as of the date the application is submitted to the Court. Having examined the statements and conduct of the Parties in each of the cases, the Court considered that they did not provide a basis for finding a dispute between the two States in each case before the Court. Since the Court did not have jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, it could not proceed to the merits of these cases.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

24 April 2014

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Marshall Islands

16 March 2015

Available in:

English French

Memorial

English French

Annexes volume I

English French

Annexes volume II

English French

Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom

15 June 2015

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Statement of observations of the Marshall Islands

15 October 2015

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2016/9 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Wednesday 16 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 16 June 2014

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 19 June 2015

Fixing of time-limit: written statement of observations and submissions on preliminary objections

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 August 2014, Somalia filed an Application instituting proceedings against Kenya with regard to a dispute concerning the delimitation of maritime spaces claimed by both States in the Indian Ocean. In its Application, Somalia requested the Court “to determine, on the basis of international law, the complete course of the single maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas appertaining to Somalia and to Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including the continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles]”.

As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, the Applicant invoked the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and referred to the declarations recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory made under those provisions by Somalia on 11 April 1963 and by Kenya on 19 April 1965. In addition, Somalia submitted that “the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute [was] underscored by article 282 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, which both parties ratified in 1989.

On 7 October 2015, Kenya raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application.

On 2 February 2017, the Court rendered its Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by Kenya. After it rejected those objections, the Court found that “it ha[d] jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by . . . Somalia on 28 August 2014 and that the application [was] admissible”.

Public hearings on the merits of the case, initially scheduled to be held from 9 to 13 September 2019, were successively postponed to November 2019, June 2020 and March 2021, following requests for postponements made by Kenya. The hearings were held in a hybrid format between 15 and 18 March 2021, with the participation of the delegation of Somalia. Kenya did not participate in those hearings.

The Court delivered its Judgment on the merits of the case on 12 October 2021 by which it determined the maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya. It found that “there is no agreed maritime boundary between . . . Somalia and . . . Kenya that follows the parallel of latitude described in paragraph 35 [of the Judgment]”. The Court decided that “the starting-point of the single maritime boundary delimiting the respective maritime areas between . . . Somalia and . . . Kenya is the intersection of the straight line extending from the final permanent boundary beacon (PB 29) at right angles to the general direction of the coast with the low‑water line, at the point with co‑ordinates 1° 39' 44.0" S and 41° 33' 34.4" E (WGS 84)” and that “from the starting-point, the maritime boundary in the territorial sea follows the median line described at paragraph 117 [of the Judgment] until it reaches the 12‑nautical‑mile limit at the point with co-ordinates 1° 47' 39.1" S and 41° 43' 46.8" E (WGS 84) (Point A)”. It then decided that “from the end of the boundary in the territorial sea (Point A), the single maritime boundary delimiting the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles between . . . Somalia and . . . Kenya follows the geodetic line starting with azimuth 114° until it reaches the 200‑nautical‑mile limit measured from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of . . . Kenya is measured, at the point with co‑ordinates 3° 4' 21.3" S and 44° 35' 30.7" E (WGS 84) (Point B)” and that “from Point B, the maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf continues along the same geodetic line until it reaches the outer limits of the continental shelf or the area where the rights of third States may be affected”. In its Judgment, the Court rejected the claim made by Somalia, alleging that Kenya, by its conduct in the disputed area, had violated its international obligations.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

28 August 2014

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Written proceedings

Memorial of Somalia

13 July 2015

Available in:

Counter-Memorial of Kenya

18 December 2017

Available in:

English French

Rejoinder of Kenya

18 December 2018

Available in:

English French

Volume II - Figures and annexes

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2021/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Monday 15 March 2021, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 2021/3 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 16 March 2021, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 2021/4 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Thursday 18 March 2021, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 2 February 2017

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Summary 2017/1

Summary of the Judgment of 2 February 2017

Available in:

English French

Summary 2021/3

Summary of the Judgment of 12 October 2021

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 26 April 2006, the Commonwealth of Dominica filed an Application instituting proceedings against Switzerland concerning alleged violations by the latter of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as well of other international instruments and rules, with respect to a diplomatic envoy of Dominica to the United Nations in Geneva.

By letter of 15 May 2006, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica informed the Court that his Government “did not wish to go on with the proceedings instituted against Switzerland” and requested the Court to make an Order “officially recording [their] unconditional discontinuance” and “directing the removal of the case from the General List”. By letter of 24 May 2006, the Swiss Ambassador in The Hague advised the Court that he had informed the competent Swiss authorities of the discontinuance as thus notified. Accordingly, on 9 June 2006, the Court made an Order in which, after noting that the Government of the Swiss Confederation had not taken any step in the proceedings in the case, it recorded the discontinuance of the proceedings by the Commonwealth of Dominica and ordered that the case be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

26 April 2006

Available in:

English French

Orders

Order of 9 June 2006

Removal from List

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

Press release 2006/16

26 April 2006

Dominica brings a case against Switzerland to the Court in a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other international instruments and rules with respect to a diplomatic envoy of Dominica to the United Nations in Geneva

Available in:

English French

Press release 2006/23

12 June 2006

Case concerning the Status vis-à-vis the Host State of a Diplomatic Envoy to the United Nations (Dominica v. Switzerland) - Case removed from the Court's List at the request of Dominica

Available in:

English French

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Supplement to the Application submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

13 May 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Kingdom of Belgium

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 2 June 1999

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Judgments

Judgment of 15 December 2004

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 1999/4

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/3

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

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OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

17 November 2008

Available in:

Written proceedings

20 July 2009

Available in:

19 January 2010

Available in:

9 June 2010

Available in:

27 October 2010

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Monday 21 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 22 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 22 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 24 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 25 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 25 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 28 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 30 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

7 April 2011

Available in:

14 April 2013

Available in:

Orders

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

Fixing of time-limits

Available in:

Judgments

Available in:

Separate opinion of Judge Simma

Declaration of Judge Bennouna

Dissenting opinion of Judge Xue

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Roucounas

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Vukas

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary of the Judgment of 5 December 2011

Available in:

Press releases

17 November 2008

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia institutes proceedings against Greece for a violation of Article 11 of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995

Available in:

22 January 2009

Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece) - Fixing of time-limits for the filing of the initial pleadings

Available in:

16 March 2010

Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece) - The Court authorizes the submission of a Reply by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a Rejoinder by Greece, and fixes time-limits for the filing of these pleadings

Available in:

9 February 2011

Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece) - The Court to hold public hearings from Monday 21 to Wednesday 30 March 2011

Available in:

30 March 2011

Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece) - Conclusion of the public hearings - Court to begin its deliberation

Available in:

24 November 2011

Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece) - The Court to deliver its Judgment on Monday 5 December 2011 at 10 a.m.

Available in:

5 December 2011

The Court finds that Greece, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to NATO, has breached its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995

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