Contentious

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Colombia in respect of a dispute concerning “a group of related legal issues subsisting” between the two States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimitation”. On 28 April 2003, Nicaragua filed its Memorial within the time-limit laid down by the Court. On 21 July 2003, Colombia filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction, leading to the suspension of the proceedings on the merits.

In its Judgment on the preliminary objections, rendered on 13 December 2007, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime features claimed by the Parties, other than the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. The Court held that the treaty signed in 1928 between Colombia and Nicaragua (in which Colombia recognized Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Corn Islands, while Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, and the maritime features forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago) had settled the issue of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, that there was no extant legal dispute between the Parties on that question and that, therefore, the Court could not have jurisdiction over it under the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (also known as the Pact of Bogotá and invoked by Nicaragua as basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the case). On the other hand, as regards the question of the scope and composition of the rest of the San Andrés Archipelago, the Court considered that the 1928 Treaty failed to provide answers as to which other maritime features formed part of the Archipelago and thus that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute regarding sovereignty over those other maritime features. As for its jurisdiction with respect to the maritime delimitation issue, the Court concluded that the 1928 Treaty had not effected a general delimitation of the maritime areas between Colombia and Nicaragua and that, as the dispute had not been settled within the meaning of the Pact of Bogotá, the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

On 25 February 2010, Costa Rica filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. In its Application it contended, among other things, that “[b]oth Nicaragua and Colombia, in their boundary claims against each other, claim maritime area to which Costa Rica is entitled” and indicated that it wished to intervene in the proceedings as a non-party State. On 10 June 2010, the Republic of Honduras also filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case, asserting that Nicaragua, in its dispute with Colombia, had put forward maritime claims that lay in an area of the Caribbean Sea in which Honduras had rights and interests. Honduras stated in its Application that it was seeking primarily to intervene in the proceedings as a party. The Court rendered two Judgments on 4 May 2011, in which it ruled that the Applications for permission to intervene filed by Costa Rica and Honduras could not be granted. The Court noted that the interest of a legal nature invoked by Costa Rica could only be affected if the maritime boundary that the Court had been asked to draw between Nicaragua and Colombia were to be extended beyond a certain latitude southwards. However, following its jurisprudence, the Court, when drawing a line delimiting the maritime areas between the two Parties to the main proceedings, would, if necessary, end that line before it reached an area in which the interests of a legal nature of third States might be involved. The Court concluded that Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature could not be affected by the decision in the proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. With respect to Honduras’s Application for permission to intervene, the Court found that Honduras had failed to satisfy the Court that it had an interest of a legal nature that might be affected by the decision of the Court in the main proceedings. It ruled on the one hand that, since the entire maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea had been settled by the Judgment of the Court rendered between those two States in 2007, there were no extant rights or legal interests that Honduras might seek to protect in the settlement of the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. On the other hand, the Court held that Honduras could invoke an interest of a legal nature, in the main proceedings, on the basis of the 1986 bilateral treaty concluded between Honduras and Colombia, but clarified that it would not be relying on that treaty to determine the maritime boundary between Colombia and Nicaragua.

In its Judgment rendered on the merits of the case on 19 November 2012, the Court found that the territorial dispute between the Parties concerned sovereignty over the features situated in the Caribbean Sea — the Alburquerque Cays, the East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo — which were all above water at high tide and which were therefore islands capable of appropriation. The Court noted, however, that Quitasueño comprised only a single, tiny island, known as QS 32, and a number of low-tide elevations (features above water at low tide but submerged at high tide). The Court then observed that, under the terms of the 1928 Treaty concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia not only had sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but also over other islands, islets and reefs “forming part” of the San Andrés Archipelago. Thus, in order to address the question of sovereignty, the Court first needed to ascertain what constituted the San Andrés Archipelago. It concluded, however, that neither the 1928 Treaty nor the historical documents conclusively established the composition of that Archipelago. The Court therefore examined the arguments and evidence not based on the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty. It found that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia had established that it had title to the disputed maritime features by virtue of uti possidetis juris (the principle that, upon independence, new States inherit the territories and boundaries of the former colonial provinces), because nothing clearly indicated whether these features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Colombia. The Court then considered whether sovereignty could be established on the basis of State acts manifesting a display of authority on a given territory (effectivités). It regarded it as having been established that for many decades Colombia had continuously and consistently acted à titre de souverain in respect of the maritime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority had been public and there was no evidence that it had met with any protest from Nicaragua prior to 1969, when the dispute had crystallized. Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s acts of administration with respect to the islands was in contrast to the absence of any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua. The Court also noted that, while not being evidence of sovereignty, Nicaragua’s conduct with regard to the maritime features in dispute, the practice of third States and maps afforded some support to Colombia’s claim. The Court concluded that Colombia, and not Nicaragua, had sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.

With respect to Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles, the Court observed that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia was not a party thereto did not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention. The Court observed that Nicaragua had submitted to the Commission only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, fell short of meeting the requirements for the Commission to be able to make its recommendations. As the Court was not presented with any further information, it found that, in this case, Nicaragua had not established that it had a continental margin that extended far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast. The Court was therefore not in a position to delimit the maritime boundary between the extended continental shelf as claimed by Nicaragua and the continental shelf of Colombia. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court noted that it was still called upon to effect the delimitation of the zone situated within 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast, where the entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua overlapped.

In order to effect the delimitation of the maritime boundary, the Court first determined what the relevant coasts of the Parties were, namely those coasts the projections of which overlapped. It found that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was its whole coast, with the exception of the short stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas, and that Colombia’s relevant coast was the entire coastline of the islands under Colombian sovereignty, except for Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. The Court next noted that the relevant maritime area, i.e., the area in which the potential entitlements of the Parties overlapped, extended 200 nautical miles east of the Nicaraguan coast. The boundaries to the north and to the south were determined by the Court in such a way as not to overlap with any existing boundaries or to extend into areas where the rights of third States might be affected.

To effect the delimitation, the Court followed the three-stage procedure previously laid down by and employed in its jurisprudence.

First, it selected the base points and constructed a provisional median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the relevant Colombian islands opposite the Nicaraguan coast.

Second, the Court considered any relevant circumstances which might have called for an adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line so as to achieve an equitable result. It observed that the substantial disparity between the relevant Colombian coast and that of Nicaragua (approximately 1:8.2), and the need to avoid a situation whereby the line of delimitation cut off one or other of the Parties ties from maritime areas into which its coasts projected, constituted relevant circumstances. The Court noted that, while legitimate security concerns had to be borne in mind in determining what adjustment should be made to the provisional median line or in what way that line should be shifted, the conduct of the Parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already effected in the area were not relevant circumstances in this case. In the relevant area between the Nicaraguan mainland and the western coasts of the Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the relationship was one of opposite coasts, the relevant circumstances called for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. To that end, the Court determined that different weightings should be given to the base points situated on Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, namely a weighting of one to each of the Colombian base points and a weighting of three to each of the Nicaraguan base points. The Court considered, however, that extending the line thus constructed to the north or the south would not lead to an equitable result, since it would leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was more than eight times the length of Colombia’s relevant coast. Moreover, it would cut off Nicaragua from the areas to the east of the principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projected. In the view of the Court, an equitable result was to be achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast. To the north, that line would follow the parallel passing through the most northern point of the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Roncador. To the south, the maritime boundary would first follow the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of the Alburquerque and East-Southeast Cays, then the parallel from the most eastern point of the territorial sea of the East-Southeast Cays. In order to prevent Quitasueño and Serrana from falling, under those circumstances, on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the maritime boundary around each of those features would follow the outer limit of their 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.

Third, and finally, the Court checked that, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the delimitation thus obtained did not create a disproportionality that would render the result inequitable. The Court observed that the boundary line had the effect of dividing the relevant area between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour, while the ratio of relevant coasts was approximately 1:8.2. It concluded that that line did not entail such disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

6 December 2001

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Preliminary Objections of Colombia

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Memorial of Nicaragua

28 April 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Written Statement of Nicaragua

26 January 2004

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Volume I Written Statement

English French

Volume II Annexes

English French

Counter-Memorial of Colombia

11 November 2008

Available in:

English French

Volume I Counter-Memorial

Rejoinder of Colombia

18 June 2010

Available in:

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 13 December 2007

Preliminary objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Judgment of 4 May 2011

Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Judgment of 4 May 2011

Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Gaja

English French Bilingual

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 31 March 2008, Ecuador filed an Application instituting proceedings against Colombia in respect of a dispute concerning the alleged “aerial spraying [by Colombia] of toxic herbicides at locations near, at and across its border with Ecuador”. Ecuador maintained that “the spraying has already caused serious damage to people, to crops, to animals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier, and poses a grave risk of further damage over time”. It further contended that it had made “repeated and sustained efforts to negotiate an end to the fumigations” but that “these negotiations have proved unsuccessful”. As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Ecuador invoked Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá of 30 April 1948, to which both States were parties. Ecuador also relied on Article 32 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

By a letter dated 12 September 2013, the Agent of Ecuador, referring to Article 89 of the Rules of Court and to an Agreement between the Parties dated 9 September 2013 “that fully and finally resolves all of Ecuador’s claims against Colombia” in the case, notified the Court that his Government wished to discontinue the proceedings in the case. By a letter of the same date, the Agent of Colombia informed the Court, pursuant to Article 89, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, that it made no objection to the discontinuance of the case as requested by Ecuador.

According to the letters received from the Parties, the Agreement of 9 September 2013 established, inter alia, an exclusion zone, in which Colombia would not conduct aerial spraying operations, created a Joint Commission to ensure that spraying operations outside that zone had not caused herbicides to drift into Ecuador and, so long as they had not, provided a mechanism for the gradual reduction in the width of the said zone; according to the letters, the Agreement set out operational parameters for Colombia’s spraying programme, recorded the agreement of the two Governments to ongoing exchanges of information in that regard, and established a dispute settlement mechanism.

In consequence, the President of the Court, on 13 September 2013, made an Order recording the discontinuance by Ecuador of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

31 March 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of Ecuador

28 April 2009

Available in:

English

volume I

English

Reply of Ecuador

31 January 2011

Rejoinder of Colombia

1 February 2012

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 January 2006, the Republic of Djibouti filed an Application against the French Republic in respect of a dispute:

“concern[ing] the refusal by the French governmental and judicial authorities to execute an international letter rogatory regarding the transmission to the judicial authorities in Djibouti of the record relating to the investigation in the Case against X for the murder of Bernard Borrel, in violation of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the [Djiboutian] Government and the [French] Government, of 27 September 1986, and in breach of other international obligations borne by [France] to . . . Djibouti”.

In its Application, Djibouti also alleged that these acts constituted a violation of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation concluded between France and Djibouti on 27 June 1977. Djibouti indicated that it sought to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. This provision applies when a State submits a dispute to the Court, proposing to found the Court’s jurisdiction upon a consent yet to be given or manifested by the State against which the Application is made. This was the second occasion that the Court had been called upon to pronounce on a dispute brought before it by an Application based on Article 38, paragraph 5, of its Rules (forum prorogatum). France consented to the jurisdiction of the Court by a letter, dated 25 July 2006 in which it specified that this consent was “valid only for the purposes of the case, within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 5, i.e., in respect of the dispute forming the subject of the Application and strictly within the limits of the claims formulated therein” by Djibouti. However, the Parties disagreed as to the exact extent of the consent given by France.

The Court rendered its Judgment on 4 June 2008.

Having established the precise scope of its jurisdiction in the case, the Court turned first to the alleged violation by France of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between France and Djibouti of 27 June 1977. While pointing out that the provisions of the said Treaty constituted relevant rules of international law having “a certain bearing” on relations between the Parties, the Court concluded that “the fields of co-operation envisaged in th[at] Treaty do not include co-operation in the judicial field” and thus that the above-mentioned relevant rules imposed no concrete obligations in this case.

The Court then turned to the allegation that France had violated its obligations under the 1986 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Under that Convention, judicial co-operation is envisaged, including the requesting and granting of “letters rogatory” (usually the passing, for judicial purposes, of information held by a party). The Convention also provides for exceptions to this envisaged co-operation. Since the French judicial authorities refused to transmit the requested case file, a key question in the case was whether that refusal fell within the permitted exceptions. Also at issue was whether France had complied with the provisions of the 1986 Convention in other respects. The Court held that the reasons given by the French investigating judge for refusing the request for mutual assistance fell within the scope of Article 2 (c) of the Convention, which entitles the requested State to refuse to execute a letter rogatory if it considers that that execution is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, its security, its ordre public or other of its essential interests. The Court did, however, conclude that, as no reasons were given in the letter dated 6 June 2005, whereby France informed Djibouti of its refusal to execute the letter rogatory presented by the latter on 3 November 2004, France had failed to comply with its international obligations under Article 17 of the 1986 Convention.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

9 August 2006

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Republic of Djibouti (French version only)

15 March 2007

Available in:

French

Counter-Memorial of the French Republic (French version only)

13 July 2007

Available in:

French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 15 November 2006

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

By an Application filed in the Registry on 1 June 2001, Liechtenstein instituted proceedings against Germany relating to a dispute concerning

“decisions of Germany, in and after 1998, to treat certain property of Liechtenstein nationals as German assets having been ‘seized for the purposes of reparation or restitution, or as a result of the state of war’ — i.e., as a consequence of World War II —, without ensuring any compensation for the loss of that property to its owners, and to the detriment of Liechtenstein itself”.

The historical context of the dispute was as follows. In 1945, Czechoslovakia confiscated certain property belonging to Liechtenstein nationals, including Prince Franz Josef II of Liechtenstein, pursuant to the “Beneš Decrees”, which authorized the confiscation of “agricultural property” (including buildings, installations and movable property) of “all persons belonging to the German and Hungarian people, regardless of their nationality”. A special régime with regard to German external assets and other property seized in connection with the Second World War was created under the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (Chapter Six), signed in 1952 at Bonn. In 1991, a painting by the Dutch master Pieter van Laer was lent by a museum in Brno (Czechoslovakia) to a museum in Cologne (Germany) for inclusion in an exhibition. This painting had been the property of the family of the Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein since the eighteenth century; it was confiscated in 1945 by Czechoslovakia under the Beneš Decrees. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein, acting in his personal capacity, then filed a lawsuit in the German courts to have the painting returned to him as his property, but that action was dismissed on the ground that, under Article 3, Chapter Six, of the Settlement Convention (paragraphs 1 and 3 of which are still in force), no claim or action in connection with measures taken against German external assets in the aftermath of the Second World War was admissible in German courts. A claim brought by Prince Hans-Adam II before the European Court of Human Rights regarding the decisions of the German courts was also dismissed.

As a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Liechtenstein invoked Article I of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, signed at Strasbourg on 29 April 1957.

Following public hearings on the preliminary objections of Germany in June 2004, the Court delivered its Judgment on 10 February 2005. The Court began by rejecting Germany’s first preliminary objection, which argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no dispute between the Parties.

The Court then considered Germany’s second objection, which required it to decide, in the light of the provisions of Article 27 (a) of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, whether the dispute related to facts or situations that arose before or after 18 February 1980, the date on which that Convention entered into force between Germany and Liechtenstein. The Court concluded that, although these proceedings had been instituted by Liechtenstein as a result of decisions by German courts concerning a painting by Pieter van Laer, the events in question had their source in specific measures taken by Czechoslovakia in 1945, which had led to the confiscation of property owned by some Liechtenstein nationals, including Prince Franz Jozef II of Liechtenstein, as well as in the special régime created by the Settlement Convention, and that the source or real cause of the dispute was accordingly to be found in the Settlement Convention and the Beneš Decrees. The Court therefore upheld Germany’s second preliminary objection, finding that it could not rule on Liechtenstein’s claims on the merits.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

1 June 2001

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Principality of Liechtenstein

28 March 2002

Available in:

English

Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Germany

27 June 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

Observations of the Principality of Liechtenstein

15 November 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 28 June 2001

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French

Order of 12 July 2002

Fixing of time-limit: Written Statement of observations and submissions on Preliminary Objections

Summary of the Judgment of 10 February 2005

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by Canada

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/5

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/4

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 September 2005, Costa Rica filed an Application instituting proceedings against Nicaragua in a dispute concerning the navigational and related rights of Costa Rica on a section of the San Juan River, the southern bank of which forms the boundary between the two States provided for by an 1858 bilateral treaty. In its Application, Costa Rica affirmed that “Nicaragua has — in particular since the late 1990s — imposed a number of restrictions on the navigation of Costa Rican boats and their passengers on the San Juan River”, in violation of Article VI of the 1858 Treaty, which “granted to Nicaragua sovereignty over the waters of the San Juan River, recognizing at the same time important rights to Costa Rica”.

Following public hearings held in March 2009, the Court rendered its Judgment on 13 July 2009.

As regards Costa Rica’s navigational rights on the San Juan River under the 1858 Treaty, in that part where navigation is common, the Court ruled that Costa Rica had the right of free navigation on the San Juan River for purposes of commerce; that the right of navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica included the transport of passengers; that the right of navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica included the transport of tourists; that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation were not required to obtain Nicaraguan visas; that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation were not required to purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards; that the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River had the right to navigate on the river between the riparian communities for the purposes of fulfilling essential needs of everyday life; that Costa Rica had the right of navigation on the San Juan River with official vessels used solely, in specific situations, to provide essential services for the inhabitants of the riparian areas where expeditious transportation is a condition for meeting the inhabitants’ requirements; that Costa Rica did not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River with vessels carrying out police functions; that Costa Rica did not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River for the purposes of the exchange of personnel among the police border posts along the right bank of the river or for the re-supply of these posts with official equipment, including service arms and ammunition.

As regards Nicaragua’s right to regulate navigation on the San Juan River, in that part where navigation is common, the Court found that Nicaragua had the right to require Costa Rican vessels and their passengers to stop at the first and last Nicaraguan post on their route along the San Juan River; that Nicaragua had the right to require persons travelling on the San Juan River to carry a passport or an identity document; that Nicaragua had the right to issue departure clearance certificates to Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation but did not have the right to request the payment of a charge for the issuance of such certificates; that Nicaragua had the right to impose timetables for navigation on vessels navigating on the San Juan River; and that Nicaragua had the right to require Costa Rican vessels fitted with masts or turrets to display the Nicaraguan flag.

As regards subsistence fishing, the Court found that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River for subsistence purposes from that bank must be respected by Nicaragua as a customary right.

As regards Nicaragua’s compliance with its international obligations under the 1858 Treaty, the Court found that Nicaragua was not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it required persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to obtain Nicaraguan visas; that Nicaragua was not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it required persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards; and that Nicaragua was not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it required the operators of vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to pay charges for departure clearance certificates.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 September 2005

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of Costa Rica

29 August 2006

volume II

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 29 November 2005

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 9 October 2007

Fixing of time-limits: reply and rejoinder

English French

Press releases

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

20 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/12

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/10

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 16 September 2004, Romania filed an Application instituting proceedings against Ukraine in respect of a dispute concerning “the establishment of a single maritime boundary between the two States in the Black Sea, thereby delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones appertaining to them”. The Memorial of Romania and the Counter-Memorial of Ukraine were filed within the time-limits fixed by an Order of 19 November 2004. By an Order of 30 June 2006, the Court authorized the filing of a Reply by Romania and a Rejoinder by Ukraine and fixed 22 December 2006 and 15 June 2007 as the respective time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. Romania filed its Reply within the time-limit thus fixed. By an Order of 8 June 2007, the Court extended to 6 July 2007 the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder by Ukraine. The Rejoinder was filed within the time-limit thus extended.

Following public hearings held in September 2008, the Court rendered its Judgment in the case on 3 February 2009. On the basis of established State practice and of its own jurisprudence, the Court declared itself bound by the three-step approach laid down by maritime delimitation law, which consisted first of establishing a provisional equidistance line, then of considering factors which might call for an adjustment of that line and adjusting it accordingly and, finally, of confirming that the line thus adjusted would not lead to an inequitable result by comparing the ratio of coastal lengths with the ratio of relevant maritime areas.

In keeping with this approach, the Court first established a provisional equidistance line. In order to do so, it was obliged to determine appropriate base points. After examining at length the characteristics of each base point chosen by the Parties for the establishment of the provisional equidistance line, the Court decided to use the Sacalin Peninsula and the landward end of the Sulina dyke on the Romanian coast, and Tsyganka Island, Cape Tarkhankut and Cape Khersones on the Ukrainian coast. It considered it inappropriate to select any base points on Serpents’ Island (belonging to Ukraine). The Court then proceeded to establish the provisional equidistance line as follows :

“In its initial segment the provisional equidistance line between the Romanian and Ukrainian adjacent coasts is controlled by base points located on the landward end of the Sulina dyke on the Romanian coast and south-eastern tip of Tsyganka Island on the Ukrainian coast. It runs in a south-easterly direction, from a point lying midway between these two base points, until Point A (with co-ordinates 44° 46′ 38.7ʺ N and 30°58′ 37.3ʺ E) where it becomes affected by a base point located on the Sacalin Peninsula on the Romanian coast. At Point A the equidistance line slightly changes direction and continues to Point B (with co-ordinates 44°44′ 13.4ʺ N and 31°10′ 27.7ʺ E) where it becomes affected by the base point located on Cape Tarkhankut on Ukraine’s opposite coasts. At Point B the equidistance line turns south-south-east and continues to Point C (with co-ordinates 44°02′ 53.0ʺ N and 31°24′ 35.0ʺ E), calculated with reference to base points on the Sacalin Peninsula on the Romanian coast and Capes Tarkhankut and Khersones on the Ukrainian coast. From Point C the equidistance line, starting at an azimuth of 185°23′ 54.5ʺ, runs in a southerly direction. This line remains governed by the base points on the Sacalin Peninsula on the Romanian coast and Cape Khersones on the Ukrainian coast.”

The Court then turned to the examination of relevant circumstances which might call for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line, considering six potential factors : (1) the possible disproportion between coastal lengths ; (2) the enclosed nature of the Black Sea and the delimitations already effected in the region ; (3) the presence of Serpents’ Island in the area of delimitation ; (4) the conduct of the Parties (oil and gas concessions, fishing activities and naval patrols) ; (5) any potential curtailment of the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone entitlement of one of the Parties ; and (6) certain security considerations of the Parties. The Court did not see in these various factors any reason that would justify the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. In particular with respect to Serpents’ Island, it considered that it should have no effect on the delimitation other than that stemming from the role of the 12-nautical-mile arc of its territorial sea.

Finally, the Court confirmed that the line would not lead to an inequitable result by comparing the ratio of coastal lengths with the ratio of relevant maritime areas. The Court noted that the ratio of the respective coastal lengths for Romania and Ukraine was approximately 1:2.8 and the ratio of the relevant maritime areas was approximately 1:2.1.

In the operative clause of its Judgment, the Court found unanimously that :

“starting from Point 1, as agreed by the Parties in Article 1 of the 2003 State Border Régime Treaty, the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea shall follow the 12-nautical-mile arc of the territorial sea of Ukraine around Serpents’ Island until Point 2 (with co-ordinates 45°03′ 18.5ʺ N and 30°09′ 24.6ʺ E) where the arc intersects with the line equidistant from Romania’s and Ukraine’s adjacent coasts. From Point 2 the boundary line shall follow the equidistance line through Points 3 (with co-ordinates 44°46′ 38.7ʺ N and 30°58′ 37.3ʺ E) and 4 (with co-ordinates 44° 44′ 13.4ʺ N and 31° 10′ 27.7ʺ E) until it reaches Point 5 (with co-ordinates 44° 02′ 53.0ʺ N and 31° 24′ 35.0ʺ E). From Point 5 the maritime boundary line shall continue along the line equidistant from the opposite coasts of Romania and Ukraine in a southerly direction starting at a geodetic azimuth of 185°23′ 54.5ʺ until it reaches the area where the rights of third States may be affected.”

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

16 September 2004

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 3 February 2009

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 December 2002, the Republic of the Congo filed an Application instituting proceedings against France, seeking the annulment of the investigation and prosecution measures taken by the French judicial authorities further to a complaint concerning crimes against humanity and torture allegedly committed in the Congo against individuals of Congolese nationality filed by various human rights associations against the President of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese Minister of the Interior, General Pierre Oba, and other individuals including General Norbert Dabira, Inspector-General of the Congolese armed forces, and General Blaise Adoua, Commander of the Presidential Guard.

In its Application, the Congo indicated that it sought to found the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, “on the consent of the French Republic, which [would] certainly be given”. In accordance with that provision, the Congo’s Application was transmitted to the French Government and no action was taken in the proceedings. By a letter dated 8 April 2003, France indicated that it “consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Application pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 5”, and the case was thus entered in the Court’s List. It was the first time, since the adoption of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court in 1978, that a State thus accepted the invitation of another State to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a case against it.

The Application of the Congo was accompanied by a request for the indication of a provisional measure seeking “an order for the immediate suspension of the proceedings being conducted by the investigating judge of the Meaux Tribunal de grande instance”, and hearings on that request were held on 28 and 29 April 2003. In its Order of 17 June 2003, the Court concluded that no evidence had been placed before it of any irreparable prejudice to the rights in dispute and that, consequently, circumstances were not such as to require the exercise of its power to indicate provisional measures.

Hearings were scheduled to open in the case on 6 December 2010, when, by a letter dated 5 November 2010, the Agent of the Congo, referring to Article 89 of the Rules of Court, informed the Court that his Government was “withdraw[ing] its Application instituting proceedings” and requested the Court “to make an Order officially recording the discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the List”. A copy of that letter was immediately communicated to the French Government, which responded in a letter dated 8 November 2010 that it had no objection to the discontinuance of the proceedings by the Congo. Accordingly, by an Order of 16 November 2010, the Court placed on record the discontinuance of the proceedings by the Congo and ordered that the case be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Annexes

English French

Counter-Memorial of France

11 May 2004

Available in:

English French

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 17 June 2003

Request for the Indication of a Provisional Measure

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint Separate Opinion by Judges Koroma and Vereshchetin

English French Bilingual

Summary 2003/3

Summary of the Order of 17 June 2003

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 3 May 2002, Benin and Niger, by joint notification of a Special Agreement signed on 15 June 2001 at Cotonou and which entered into force on 11 April 2002, seised the Court of a dispute concerning “the definitive delimitation of the whole boundary between them”. Under the terms of Article 1 of that Special Agreement, the Parties agreed to submit their frontier dispute to a Chamber of the Court, formed pursuant to Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and each to choose a judge ad hoc. By an Order of 27 November 2002, the Court unanimously decided to accede to the request of the two Parties for a special Chamber of five judges to be formed to deal with the case.

Following public hearings held in March 2005, the Chamber delivered its Judgment on 12 July 2005. After briefly recalling the geographical and historical context of the dispute between these two former colonies, which had been part of French West Africa (FWA) until their accession to independence in August 1960, the Chamber considered the question of the law applicable to the dispute. It stated that this included the principle of the intangibility of the boundaries inherited from colonization, or the principle of uti possidetis juris, whose “primary aim is . . . securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved”. The Chamber found that, on the basis of this principle, it had to determine in the case the boundary that had been inherited from the French administration. It noted that “the Parties agreed that the dates to be taken into account for this purpose were those of their respective independence, namely 1 and 3 August 1960”.

The Chamber then considered the course of the boundary in the River Niger sector. It first examined the various regulative or administrative acts invoked by the Parties in support of their respective claims and concluded that “neither of the Parties has succeeded in providing evidence of title on the basis of [those] acts during the colonial period”. In accordance with the principle that, where no legal title exists, the effectivités “must invariably be taken into consideration”, the Chamber then proceeded to examine the evidence presented by the Parties regarding the effective exercise of authority on the ground during the colonial period, in order to determine the course of the boundary in the River Niger sector and to indicate to which of the two States each of the islands in the river belonged, in particular the island of Lété.

At the end of that examination, the Chamber concluded that the boundary between Benin and Niger in that sector follows the main navigable channel of the River Niger as it existed at the dates of independence, it being understood that, in the vicinity of the three islands opposite Gaya, the boundary passed to the left of those islands. Consequently, Benin had title to the islands situated between the boundary thus defined and the right bank of the river and Niger had title to the islands between that boundary and the left bank of the river.

In order to determine the precise location of the boundary line in the main navigable channel, namely the line of deepest soundings, as it existed at the dates of independence, the Chamber relied on a report prepared in 1970, at the request of the Governments of Dahomey (the former name of Benin), Mali, Niger and Nigeria, by the firm Netherlands Engineering Consultants (NEDECO). In its Judgment, the Chamber specified the co-ordinates of 154 points through which the boundary between Benin and Niger passes in that sector. It stated, inter alia, that Lété Goungou belongs to Niger. Finally, the Chamber concluded that the Special Agreement also conferred jurisdiction upon it to determine the boundary line on the bridges between Gaya and Malanville. It found that the boundary on those structures follows the course of the boundary in the River Niger.

In the second part of its Judgment, dealing with the western section of the boundary between Benin and Niger, in the sector of the River Mekrou, the Chamber proceeded to examine the various documents invoked by the Parties in support of their respective arguments. It concluded that, notwithstanding the existence of a legal title of 1907 relied on by Niger in support of its claimed boundary, it was clear that,

“at least from 1927 onwards, the competent administrative authorities regarded the course of the Mekrou as the intercolonial boundary separating Dahomey from Niger, that those authorities reflected that boundary in the successive instruments promulgated by them after 1927, some of which expressly indicated that boundary, whilst others necessarily implied it, and that this was the state of the law at the dates of independence in August 1960”.

Available in:

French

Oral proceedings

Orders

Order of 27 November 2002

Formation of Chamber; fixing of time-limit: Memorials

Available in:

English French Bilingual

English French

Press releases

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OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

6 December 2001

Available in:

Written proceedings

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

28 April 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

26 January 2004

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Volume I Written Statement

Volume II Annexes

11 November 2008

Available in:

Volume I Counter-Memorial

Volume II-A Annexes

Volume II-B Appendices

Volume III Maps

18 September 2009

Available in:

Volume I Reply

Volume II Annexes and Figures

25 February 2010

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

26 May 2010

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

26 May 2010

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

10 June 2010

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

18 June 2010

Available in:

Volume I Rejoinder

Volume II Appendices, Annexes and Maps

2 September 2010

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

2 September 2010

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Monday 4 June 2007, at 10.10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 5 June 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 6 June 2007, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 8 June 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 11 October 2010, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 13 October 2010, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 13 October 2010, at 11.20 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) - Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 14 October 2010, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) - Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

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Contentious