Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Wellington Koo

DISSENTING OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT

WELLINGTON KOO

1 regret to be unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court which
"finds that the Applicants cannot be considered to have established any
substantive right or legalinterest appertaining to them in the subject-
matter of the present claims". Nor am 1 able to agree with the reasons
upon which it is based. Pursuant to Article 57 of the Statute 1propose
to state the grounds for my dissent.

Declaration of President Sir Percy Spender (as appended immediately after the judgment)

can indeed be very considerable,-but this is a differentthing. It operates
on the political not the legal level: it does not make these resolutions
binding in law. If the "necessity" argument were valid therefore, it
would be applicable as much to trusteeships as it is said to be to man-
dates, because in neither case could the administering authority be
coerced by means of the ordinary procedures of the organization.
Theconclusion to be drawn is obvious.

Separate Opinion of Vice-President Alfaro

SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT ALFARO

The decision rendered by the Court in the present case sets forth
considerations of law and fact in which 1 fully concur, especially
for the reason that its essential basis is a principle of law to
which 1 attribute great weight and which has been frequently
applied by international tribunals, both of justice and arbitration.

This principle, as 1 understand it, is that a State party to an

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