Culminated

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 24 April 2014, the Republic of the Marshall Islands filed Applications against nine States (in alphabetical order : China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), accusing them of not fulfilling their obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

While these nine Applications all related to the same matter, the Marshall Islands distinguished between those three States (India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom) which had recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, and the six others, in respect of which the Marshall Islands proposed to found the jurisdiction of the Court on consent yet to be given. In accordance with Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the Applications filed against these six States were transmitted to them but not entered in the General List, and no action was taken in the proceedings in the absence of their consent.

With regard to the cases entered in the General List, the Marshall Islands alleged, more specifically, that the United Kingdom had violated Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which they were both party. According to that Article, each party “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. Although India and Pakistan were not parties to the NPT, the Marshall Islands contended that certain obligations enshrined in that instrument applied to all States as a matter of customary international law, and such was the case of the obligations provided for in Article VI of the NPT.

India and Pakistan having informed the Court that they considered that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute alleged by the Marshall Islands, and that the latter’s Application was inadmissible, the Court decided that these questions needed to be resolved first and that they would be determined separately, before any proceedings on the merits, pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. The Parties subsequently filed their written pleadings on these questions within the time-limits fixed.

In the proceedings instituted against the United Kingdom, the Court fixed the time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by the Marshall Islands and a Counter-Memorial by the United Kingdom. However, within the time-limit of three months following the filing of the Applicant’s Memorial, the United Kingdom raised certain preliminary objections in the case. Consequently, pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, and the Marshall Islands presented a written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom.

Public hearings were held in all three cases in March 2016, and the Court delivered its Judgment in each case on 5 October 2016.

In each of the three Judgments, the Court considered that the respondent States’ preliminary objection based on the absence of a dispute between the Parties at the time the Applications were filed should be upheld. The Court noted that, in order for a dispute to exist, the two sides must hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain international obligations. It further noted that a dispute exists when the evidence demonstrates that the respondent was aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were positively opposed by the applicant. Lastly, it observed that, in principle, the existence of a dispute is to be determined as of the date the application is submitted to the Court. Having examined the statements and conduct of the Parties in each of the cases, the Court considered that they did not provide a basis for finding a dispute between the two States in each case before the Court. Since the Court did not have jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, it could not proceed to the merits of these cases.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

24 April 2014

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Marshall Islands

16 March 2015

Available in:

English French

Memorial

English French

Annexes volume I

English French

Annexes volume II

English French

Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom

15 June 2015

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Statement of observations of the Marshall Islands

15 October 2015

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2016/9 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Wednesday 16 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 16 June 2014

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 19 June 2015

Fixing of time-limit: written statement of observations and submissions on preliminary objections

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 August 2014, Somalia filed an Application instituting proceedings against Kenya with regard to a dispute concerning the delimitation of maritime spaces claimed by both States in the Indian Ocean. In its Application, Somalia requested the Court “to determine, on the basis of international law, the complete course of the single maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas appertaining to Somalia and to Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including the continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles]”.

As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, the Applicant invoked the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and referred to the declarations recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory made under those provisions by Somalia on 11 April 1963 and by Kenya on 19 April 1965. In addition, Somalia submitted that “the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute [was] underscored by article 282 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, which both parties ratified in 1989.

On 7 October 2015, Kenya raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application.

On 2 February 2017, the Court rendered its Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by Kenya. After it rejected those objections, the Court found that “it ha[d] jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by . . . Somalia on 28 August 2014 and that the application [was] admissible”.

Public hearings on the merits of the case, initially scheduled to be held from 9 to 13 September 2019, were successively postponed to November 2019, June 2020 and March 2021, following requests for postponements made by Kenya. The hearings were held in a hybrid format between 15 and 18 March 2021, with the participation of the delegation of Somalia. Kenya did not participate in those hearings.

The Court delivered its Judgment on the merits of the case on 12 October 2021 by which it determined the maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya. It found that “there is no agreed maritime boundary between . . . Somalia and . . . Kenya that follows the parallel of latitude described in paragraph 35 [of the Judgment]”. The Court decided that “the starting-point of the single maritime boundary delimiting the respective maritime areas between . . . Somalia and . . . Kenya is the intersection of the straight line extending from the final permanent boundary beacon (PB 29) at right angles to the general direction of the coast with the low‑water line, at the point with co‑ordinates 1° 39' 44.0" S and 41° 33' 34.4" E (WGS 84)” and that “from the starting-point, the maritime boundary in the territorial sea follows the median line described at paragraph 117 [of the Judgment] until it reaches the 12‑nautical‑mile limit at the point with co-ordinates 1° 47' 39.1" S and 41° 43' 46.8" E (WGS 84) (Point A)”. It then decided that “from the end of the boundary in the territorial sea (Point A), the single maritime boundary delimiting the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles between . . . Somalia and . . . Kenya follows the geodetic line starting with azimuth 114° until it reaches the 200‑nautical‑mile limit measured from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of . . . Kenya is measured, at the point with co‑ordinates 3° 4' 21.3" S and 44° 35' 30.7" E (WGS 84) (Point B)” and that “from Point B, the maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf continues along the same geodetic line until it reaches the outer limits of the continental shelf or the area where the rights of third States may be affected”. In its Judgment, the Court rejected the claim made by Somalia, alleging that Kenya, by its conduct in the disputed area, had violated its international obligations.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

28 August 2014

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Written proceedings

Memorial of Somalia

13 July 2015

Available in:

Counter-Memorial of Kenya

18 December 2017

Available in:

English French

Rejoinder of Kenya

18 December 2018

Available in:

English French

Volume II - Figures and annexes

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2021/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Monday 15 March 2021, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 2021/3 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 16 March 2021, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 2021/4 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Thursday 18 March 2021, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Donoghue presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 2 February 2017

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Summary 2017/1

Summary of the Judgment of 2 February 2017

Available in:

English French

Summary 2021/3

Summary of the Judgment of 12 October 2021

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 26 April 2006, the Commonwealth of Dominica filed an Application instituting proceedings against Switzerland concerning alleged violations by the latter of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as well of other international instruments and rules, with respect to a diplomatic envoy of Dominica to the United Nations in Geneva.

By letter of 15 May 2006, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica informed the Court that his Government “did not wish to go on with the proceedings instituted against Switzerland” and requested the Court to make an Order “officially recording [their] unconditional discontinuance” and “directing the removal of the case from the General List”. By letter of 24 May 2006, the Swiss Ambassador in The Hague advised the Court that he had informed the competent Swiss authorities of the discontinuance as thus notified. Accordingly, on 9 June 2006, the Court made an Order in which, after noting that the Government of the Swiss Confederation had not taken any step in the proceedings in the case, it recorded the discontinuance of the proceedings by the Commonwealth of Dominica and ordered that the case be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

26 April 2006

Available in:

English French

Orders

Order of 9 June 2006

Removal from List

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

Press release 2006/16

26 April 2006

Dominica brings a case against Switzerland to the Court in a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other international instruments and rules with respect to a diplomatic envoy of Dominica to the United Nations in Geneva

Available in:

English French

Press release 2006/23

12 June 2006

Case concerning the Status vis-à-vis the Host State of a Diplomatic Envoy to the United Nations (Dominica v. Switzerland) - Case removed from the Court's List at the request of Dominica

Available in:

English French

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Supplement to the Application submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

13 May 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Kingdom of Belgium

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/4

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/3

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda “for acts of armed aggression committed . . . in flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”. In addition to the cessation of the alleged acts, the DRC sought reparation for acts of intentional destruction and looting and the restitution of national property and resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States. In its Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC referred, as bases for the Court’s jurisdiction, to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and, lastly, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. However, the Government of the DRC informed the Court on 15 January 2001 that it intended to discontinue the proceedings instituted against Burundi and Rwanda, stating that it reserved the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the Court. The two cases were therefore removed from the List on 30 January 2001.

In the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the DRC founded the jurisdiction of the Court on the declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court made by the two States. On 19 June 2000, the DRC filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures to put a stop to all military activity and violations of human rights and of the sovereignty of the DRC by Uganda. On 1 July 2000, the Court ordered each of the two Parties to prevent and refrain from any armed action which might prejudice the rights of the other Party or aggravate the dispute, to take all measures necessary to comply with all of their obligations under international law and also to ensure full respect for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law.

Uganda subsequently filed a Counter-Memorial containing three counter-claims. By an Order of 29 November 2001, the Court found that two of the counter-claims (acts of aggression allegedly committed by the DRC against Uganda; and attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa and on Ugandan nationals for which the DRC is alleged to be responsible) were admissible as such and formed part of the proceedings.

Following oral proceedings in April 2005, the Court handed down its Judgment on the merits on 19 December 2005. The Court first dealt with the question of the invasion of the DRC by Uganda. After examining the materials submitted to it by the Parties, the Court found that from August 1998, the DRC had not consented to the presence of Ugandan troops on its territory (save for the limited exception regarding the border region of the Ruwenzori Mountains contained in the Luanda Agreement). The Court also rejected Uganda’s claim that its use of force, where not covered by consent, was an exercise of self-defence, finding that the preconditions for self-defence did not exist. Indeed, the unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such magnitude and duration that the Court considered it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.

The Court also found that, by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces operating on the territory of the DRC, the Republic of Uganda had violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.

The Court then moved to the question of occupation and of the violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Having concluded that Uganda was the occupying power in Ituri at the relevant time, the Court stated that, as such, it was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the DRC. This had not been done. The Court also considered that it had credible evidence sufficient to conclude that UPDF (Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces) troops had committed violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. It found that these violations were attributable to Uganda.

The third issue that the Court was called upon to examine concerned the alleged exploitation of Congolese natural resources by Uganda. In this regard, the Court considered that it had credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the UPDF, including the most high-ranking officers, had been involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources and that the military authorities had not taken any measures to put an end to these acts. Uganda was responsible both for the conduct of the UPDF as a whole and for the conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the UPDF in the DRC. This was so even when UPDF officers and soldiers had acted contrary to instructions given or had exceeded their authority. The Court found, on the other hand, that it did not have at its disposal credible evidence to prove that there was a governmental policy on the part of Uganda directed at the exploitation of natural resources of the DRC or that Uganda’s military intervention was carried out in order to obtain access to Congolese resources.

In respect of the first counter-claim of Uganda (see above concerning the Order of 29 November 2011), the Court found that Uganda had not produced sufficient evidence to show that the DRC had provided political and military support to anti-Ugandan rebel groups operating in its territory, or even to prove that the DRC had breached its duty of vigilance by tolerating anti-Ugandan rebels on its territory. The Court thus rejected the first counter-claim submitted by Uganda in its entirety.

As for the second counter-claim of Uganda (see above concerning the Order of 29 November 2011), the Court first declared inadmissible the part of that claim relating to the alleged maltreatment of Ugandan nationals not enjoying diplomatic status at Ndjili International Airport. Regarding the merits of the claim, it found, on the other hand, that there was sufficient evidence to prove that there were attacks against the Embassy and acts of maltreatment against Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport. Consequently, it found that the DRC had breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The removal of property and archives from the Ugandan Embassy was also in violation of the rules of international law on diplomatic relations.

The Court noted in its Judgment that the nature, form and amount of compensation owed by each Party had been reserved and would only be submitted to the Court should the Parties be unable to reach agreement on the basis of the Judgment just rendered by the Court. Following the delivery of the Judgment, the Parties have regularly informed the Court on the progress of negotiations.

On 13 May 2015, noting that the negotiations with Uganda on this question had failed, the DRC asked the Court to determine the amount of reparation owed by Uganda. While Uganda maintained that this request was premature, the Court, in an Order of 1 July 2015, observed that although the Parties had tried to settle the question directly, they had clearly been unable to reach an agreement. The Parties have subsequently filed written pleadings on the question of reparations.

By an Order of 8 September 2020, the Court decided to arrange for an expert opinion, in accordance with Article 67, paragraph 1, of its Rules, on some heads of damage claimed by the DRC, namely the loss of human life, the loss of natural resources and property damage. By an Order of 12 October 2020, the Court appointed four independent experts for that purpose, who submitted a report on reparations on 19 December 2020.

After holding oral proceedings in April 2021, the Court delivered its Judgment on the question of reparations on 9 February 2022, awarding US$225,000,000 for damage to persons, US$40,000,000 for damage to property and US$60,000,000 for damage related to natural resources. It decided that the total amount due should be paid in five annual instalments of US$65,000,000 starting on 1 September 2022, and that, should payment be delayed, post‑judgment interest of 6 per cent would accrue on any overdue amount as from the day after the day on which the instalment was due.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Annexes to the Application instituting proceedings, Livre blanc (Volumes I and II) (French version only)

23 June 1999

Available in:

French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures (French version only)

19 June 2000

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

French

Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French version only)

6 July 2000

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Counter-Memorial of Uganda

21 April 2001

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

Volume II - Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Volume III - Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Volume IV - Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Rejoinder of Uganda

6 December 2002

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English

Volume II - Annexes

English

Volume III - Annexes

English

Volume IV - Annexes

English

Volume V - Annexes

English

Additional Written Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on Counter-Claims submitted by Uganda (French version only)

28 February 2003

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

French

Annexes

(French version only) French

Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the question of reparations

1 September 2016

Volume X - Annexes 6.1 - 7.4

English French

Memorial of Uganda on the question of reparations

28 September 2016

Available in:

English French

Volume II - Annexes

English French

Counter -Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the question of reparations

1 February 2018

Available in:

English French

Counter-Memorial of Uganda on the question of reparations

6 February 2018

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Order of 21 October 1999

Decision regarding content of written proceedings; fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 1 July 2000

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Koroma

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 November 2001

Finding on Counter-claims; fixing of time-limits: Reply and Rejoinder

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge ad hoc Verhoeven (translation)

English French Bilingual

Order of 7 November 2002

Extension of time-limit: Rejoinder

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 January 2003

Decision regarding submission of additional pleading on Counter-claims; fixing of time-limit

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 1 July 2015

Fixing of time-limit: Memorials on the question of reparations

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Order of 10 December 2015

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Sebutinde

English French Bilingual

Order of 12 October 2020

Appointment of experts

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 19 December 2005

Merits

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Kateka

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 9 February 2022

Reparations

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 26 November 2013, Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against Colombia relating to a “dispute concern[ing] the violations of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and maritime zones declared by the Court’s Judgment of 19 November 2012 [in the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)] and the threat of the use of force by Colombia in order to implement these violations”.

In its Application, Nicaragua requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Colombia was in breach of several of its international obligations, and that it was obliged to make full reparation for the harm caused by its internationally wrongful acts.

Nicaragua based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. It further contended, “[m]oreover and alternatively, [that] the jurisdiction of the Court [lay] in its inherent power to pronounce on the actions required by its Judgments”.

On 19 December 2014, Colombia raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. On 17 March 2016, the Court rendered its Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by Colombia. The Court found that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, to adjudicate upon the dispute regarding the alleged violations by Colombia of Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime zones which, according to Nicaragua, the Court declared in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 appertain to Nicaragua.

In its Counter-Memorial filed on 17 November 2016, Colombia submitted four counter-claims. The first was based on Nicaragua’s alleged breach of its duty of due diligence to protect and preserve the marine environment of the south‑western Caribbean Sea; the second related to Nicaragua’s alleged breach of its duty of due diligence to protect the right of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago to benefit from a healthy, sound and sustainable environment; the third concerned Nicaragua’s alleged infringement of the artisanal fishing rights of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago to access and exploit their traditional fishing grounds; the fourth related to Nicaragua’s adoption of Decree No. 33-2013 of 19 August 2013, which, according to Colombia, established straight baselines and had the effect of extending Nicaragua’s internal waters and maritime zones beyond what international law permits.

In an Order on the said counter‑claims handed down on 15 November 2017, the Court found that the first and second counter‑claims submitted by Colombia were inadmissible as such and did not form part of the ongoing proceedings, and that the third and fourth counter‑claims submitted by Colombia were admissible as such and did form part of the ongoing proceedings.

Public hearings on the merits of the case were held in a hybrid format from 20 September to 1 October 2021.

On 21 April 2022, the Court rendered its Judgment on the merits, in which it found that Colombia had violated Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the latter’s exclusive economic zone.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

English French

English French

Written Observations of Colombia on the admissibility of its Counter-Claims

English French

Annexes

English French

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 December 2018

Fixing of time-limit: additional pleading relating to the counter-claims

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Caron

English French Bilingual

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 17 October 2000, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed an Application instituting proceedings against Belgium concerning a dispute over an international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian examining judge against the acting Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, seeking his detention and subsequent extradition to Belgium for alleged crimes constituting “grave violations of international humanitarian law”. The arrest warrant was transmitted to all States, including the DRC, which received it on 12 July 2000.

The DRC also filed a request for the indication of a provisional measure seeking “an order for the immediate discharge of the disputed arrest warrant”. Belgium, for its part, called for that request to be rejected and for the case to be removed from the List. In its Order made on 8 December 2000, the Court, rejecting Belgium’s request for the case to be removed from the List, stated that “the circumstances, as they [then] presented themselves to the Court, [were] not such as to require the exercise of its power, under Article 41 of the Statute, to indicate provisional measures”.

The Memorial of the DRC was filed within the prescribed time-limits. For its part, Belgium filed, within the prescribed time-limits, a Counter-Memorial addressing both issues of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits.

In its submissions presented at the public hearings, the DRC requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Belgium had violated the rule of customary international law concerning the inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers and that it should be required to recall and cancel that arrest warrant and provide reparation for the moral injury to the DRC. Belgium raised objections relating to jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility.

In its Judgment of 14 February 2002, the Court rejected the objections raised by Belgium and declared that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application of the DRC. With respect to the merits, the Court observed that, in the case, it was only questions of immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that it had to consider, on the basis, moreover, of customary international law.

The Court then observed that, in customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. The Court held that the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs were such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs when abroad enjoyed full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. Inasmuch as the purpose of that immunity and inviolability was to prevent another State from hindering the Minister in the performance of his or her duties, no distinction could be drawn between acts performed by the latter in an “official” capacity and those claimed to have been performed in a “private capacity” or, for that matter, between acts performed before assuming office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. The Court then observed that, contrary to Belgium’s arguments, it had been unable to deduce from its examination of State practice that there existed under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs when they were suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The Court further observed that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities. The immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, remained opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercised an extended criminal jurisdiction on the basis of various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes.

However, the Court emphasized that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs did not mean that they enjoyed impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. While jurisdictional immunity was procedural in nature, criminal responsibility was a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity might well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences ; it could not exonerate the person to whom it applied from all criminal responsibility. The Court then spelled out the circumstances in which the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs did not represent a bar to criminal prosecution.

After examining the terms of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, the Court noted that the issuance, as such, of the disputed arrest warrant represented an act by the Belgian judicial authorities intended to enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It found that, given the nature and purpose of the warrant, its mere issuance constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the DRC, in that it had failed to respect the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed as incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court also declared that the international circulation of the disputed arrest warrant from June 2000 by the Belgian authorities constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the DRC, in that it had failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. Finally, the Court considered that its findings constituted a form of satisfaction which would make good the moral injury complained of by the DRC. However, the Court also held that, in order to re-establish “the situation which would, in all probability have existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed”, Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it had been circulated.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

17 October 2000

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

English French

Judgments

Judgment of 14 February 2002

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

English French

Summary 2002/1

Summary of the Judgment of 14 February 2002

Available in:

English French

English French

Press release 2002/4

14 February 2002

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) - The Court finds that the issue and international circulation by Belgium of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo enjoyed under international law; and that Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant

Available in:

English French

See also

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 January 2003, Mexico brought a case against the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged violations of Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 with respect to 54 Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death in certain states of the United States. At the same time as its Application, Mexico also submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures, among other things so that the United States would take all measures necessary to ensure that no Mexican national was executed and no action was taken that might prejudice the rights of Mexico or its nationals with regard to any decision the Court might render on the merits of the case. After hearing the Parties at public hearings on the provisional measures held on 21 January 2003, the Court, on 5 February 2003, made an Order, by which it decided that the :

“United States of America sh[ould] take all measures necessary to ensure that Mr. Cesar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera [three Mexican nationals] [we]re not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings”,

that the “United States of America sh[ould] inform the Court of all measures taken in implementation of [that] Order”, and that the Court would remain seised of the matters which formed the subject of that Order until the Court had rendered its final judgment. The same day, it issued another Order fixing 6 June 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial by Mexico and 6 October 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial by the United States of America. The President of the Court subsequently extended those dates respectively to 20 June 2003 and 3 November 2003. Those pleadings were filed within the time-limits thus extended.

After holding public hearings in December 2004, the Court rendered its Judgment on 31 March 2004. Mexico had amended its claims during the written phase of the proceedings and again at the oral proceedings, so that the Court ultimately ruled on the cases of 52 (rather than 54) Mexican nationals.

The Court first considered four objections by the United States to its jurisdiction and five objections to admissibility. Mexico had argued that all of these objections were inadmissible because they had been submitted outside the time-limit prescribed by the Rules of Court, but the Court did not accept this. The Court then dismissed the United States objections, whilst reserving certain of them for consideration at the merits stage.

Ruling on the merits of the case, the Court began by considering whether the 52 individuals concerned were solely of Mexican nationality. Finding that the United States had failed to show that certain of them were also United States nationals, the Court held that the United States was under an obligation to provide consular information pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention in respect of all 52 Mexican nationals. Regarding the meaning to be given to the phrase “without delay” in Article 36 (1) (b), the Court further held that there is an obligation to provide consular information as soon as it is realized that the arrested person is a foreign national, or that there are grounds for thinking that he is probably a foreign national. The Court found that, in all of the cases except one, the United States had violated its obligation to provide the required consular information. Taking note of the interrelated nature of the three subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Court then went on to find that the United States had, in 49 cases, also violated the obligation to enable Mexican consular officers to communicate with, have access to and visit their nationals and, in 34 cases, to arrange for their legal representation.

In relation to Mexico’s arguments concerning paragraph 2 of Article 36 and the right of its nationals to effective review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (1), the Court found that, in view of its failure to revise the procedural default rule since the Court’s decision in the LaGrand case, the United States had in three cases violated paragraph 2 of Article 36, although the possibility of judicial re-examination was still open in the 49 other cases.

In regard to the legal consequences of the proven violations of Article 36 and to Mexico’s requests for restitutio in integrum, through the partial or total annulment of convictions and sentences, the Court pointed out that what international law required was reparation in an adequate form, which in this case meant review and reconsideration by United States courts of the Mexican nationals’ convictions and sentences. The Court considered that the choice of means for review and reconsideration should be left to the United States, but that it was to be carried out by taking account of the violation of rights under the Vienna Convention. After recalling that the process of review and reconsideration should occur in the context of judicial proceedings, the Court stated that the executive clemency process was not sufficient in itself to serve that purpose, although appropriate clemency procedures could supplement judicial review and reconsideration. Contrary to Mexico’s claims, the Court found no evidence of a regular and continuing pattern of breaches of Article 36 by the United States. The Court moreover recognized the efforts of the United States to encourage compliance with the Vienna Convention, and took the view that that commitment provided a sufficient guarantee and assurance of non-repetition as requested by Mexico.

The Court further observed that, while the present case concerned only Mexican nationals, that should not be taken to imply that its conclusions did not apply to other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United States. Finally, the Court recalled that the United States had violated paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 36 in the case of the three Mexican nationals concerned by the Order of 5 February 2003 indicating provisional measures, and that no review and reconsideration of conviction and sentence had been carried out in those cases. The Court considered that it was therefore for the United States to find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideration according to the criteria indicated in the Judgment.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

9 January 2003

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 2003/1 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2003/3 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2003/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 11.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Public sitting held on Friday 19 December 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 31 March 2004

Merits

Summary of the Order of 5 February 2003

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/1

Summary of the Judgment of 31 March 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 24 April 2013, the Plurinational State of Bolivia instituted proceedings against the Republic of Chile before the Court, concerning a dispute in relation to “Chile’s obligation to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”. In its Application, Bolivia asserted that “beyond its general obligations under international law, Chile has committed itself, more specifically through agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of declarations attributable to its highest-level representatives, to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia”. According to Bolivia, “Chile has not complied with this obligation and . . . denies the existence of its obligation”. In its Application, as the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Bolivia invoked Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) of 30 April 1948.

On 15 July 2014, Chile filed a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the proceedings on the merits were then suspended. After Bolivia filed its written statement on the preliminary objection, public hearings were held in May 2015. In its Judgment rendered on 24 September 2015, the Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by Chile and found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by Bolivia.

Following the submission of Chile’s Counter-Memorial, the Court authorized the submission of a Reply by Bolivia and a Rejoinder by Chile and fixed 21 March and 21 September 2017 as the respective time-limits for those pleadings. Public hearings were held in March 2018, and the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits on 1 October 2018.

In its Judgment, the Court considered the various legal bases invoked by Bolivia in support of Chile’s alleged obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

The Court concluded that none of those bases established an obligation for Chile to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. It added that its finding should not be understood “as precluding the Parties from continuing their dialogue and exchanges, in a spirit of good neighbourliness, to address the issues relating to the landlocked situation of Bolivia, the solution to which both had recognized to be a matter of mutual interest. With willingness on the part of the Parties, meaningful negotiations could be undertaken”.

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Volume I

English French

Volume II

English French

Volume III

English French

Written Statement of Bolivia on the Preliminary Objection of Chile

7 November 2014

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Counter-Memorial of Chile

13 July 2016

Volume 6

English French

Reply of Bolivia

21 March 2017

Rejoinder of Chile

15 September 2017

Verbatim record 2015/19 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Wednesday 6 May 2015, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) - Preliminary Objection

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2015/20 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Thursday 7 May 2015, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) - Preliminary Objection

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Summary of the Judgment of 24 September 2015

Available in:

English French

Summary 2018/5

Summary of the Judgment of 1 October 2018

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 July 1999, Croatia filed an Application against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) “for violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”. As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Croatia invoked Article IX of that Convention to which, according to it, both Croatia and Yugoslavia were parties. On 11 September 2002, Yugoslavia filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the claims made by Croatia.

The Court delivered its Judgment on the preliminary objections on 18 November 2008. It rejected the first and third objections raised by the Respondent and found that the second objection was not exclusively preliminary in character.

On 4 January 2010, the Republic of Serbia filed its Counter-Memorial containing counter-claims.

The Court held public hearings from 3 March to 1 April 2014, at which time it also heard witnesses and witness-experts. The Court delivered its Judgment on 3 February 2015.

The Court first considered the scope of its jurisdiction, which, it recalled, was founded only on Article IX of the Genocide Convention. It noted that the Court thus had no power to rule on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not amounting to genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in armed conflict. That was so even if the alleged breaches were of obligations under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect essential humanitarian values, and which might be owed erga omnes. The Court further noted that the jurisdiction provided for under Article IX did not extend to allegations of violations of the customary international law on genocide, even if it was well established that the Convention enshrines principles that also form part of customary international law. Referring to statements contained in its jurisprudence, the Court recalled that the Genocide Convention contains obligations erga omnes and that the prohibition of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm (jus cogens).

The Court recalled that, in its 2008 Judgment, it had found that it had jurisdiction over events which had taken place after 27 April 1992 (the date on which the FRY became party, by succession, to the Genocide Convention), but had at the time reserved its decision on its jurisdiction with regard to violations of the Convention allegedly committed before that date. After examining the Parties’ arguments on this second aspect, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to rule upon the entirety of Croatia’s claim, including in respect of acts prior to 27 April 1992. In this regard, the Court first considered that the FRY could not be bound by the Genocide Convention before 27 April 1992. It took note, however, of Croatia’s alternative argument that the FRY (and later Serbia) could have succeeded to the responsibility of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for violations of the Convention prior to that date. The Court stated in this respect that, in order to determine whether Serbia was responsible for violations of the Convention, the Court would need to decide: (1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia had taken place and, if they had, whether they were contrary to the Convention; (2) if so, whether those acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time that they occurred and engaged its responsibility; and (3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been engaged, whether the FRY succeeded to that responsibility. Noting that the Parties disagreed on these questions, the Court considered that there existed between them a dispute falling within the scope of Article IX of the Convention (“[d]isputes . . . relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III”) and that it therefore had jurisdiction to entertain it. The Court further noted that, in reaching that conclusion, it was not necessary for it to decide the aforementioned questions, which were matters for the merits.

The Court also took the view that it was not necessary to determine the admissibility questions raised by Serbia before examining Croatia’s claim on the merits. With regard to Serbia’s argument that Croatia’s claim was inadmissible in so far as events said to have occurred before the FRY came into existence as a State on 27 April 1992 could not be attributed to it, the Court considered that this involved questions of attribution which the Court did not need to determine before considering on the merits the acts alleged by Croatia. With regard to Serbia’s alternative argument that the claim was inadmissible in so far as it concerned events prior to 8 October 1991, the date on which Croatia came into existence as a State and became a party to the Convention, the Court observed that the Applicant had not made discrete claims in respect of the events before and after 8 October 1991; rather, it had advanced a single claim alleging a pattern of conduct increasing in intensity throughout the course of 1991. In this context, the Court considered that what had happened prior to 8 October 1991 was, in any event, pertinent to an evaluation of whether what took place after that date involved violations of the Genocide Convention. It therefore was not necessary for the Court to rule on Serbia’s argument before it had examined and assessed the totality of the evidence advanced by Croatia.

The Court then turned to the merits of the Parties’ claims. It recalled that, under the terms of the 1948 Convention, the crime of genocide contains two constituent elements. The first is the physical element, namely the acts perpetrated (which are set out in Article II and include, in particular, killing members of the group (subparagraph (a)) and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (subparagraph (b)). The second is the mental element, namely the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. The Court noted that this mental element is the essential characteristic of genocide and distinguishes it from other serious crimes. It is a specific intent (dolus specialis), which, in order for genocide to be established, must be present in addition to the intent required for each of the individual acts involved. The Court explained that the aim must be the physical or biological destruction of the protected group, or a substantial part of that group. Evidence of this intent is to be sought, first, in the State’s policy (while at the same time accepting that such intent will seldom be expressly stated), but it can also be inferred from a pattern of conduct, when this intent is the only inference that can reasonably be drawn from the acts in question.

Regarding Croatia’s claim, the Court considered that, in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia, the JNA (the army of the SFRY) and Serb forces had committed killings of and caused serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Croat national or ethnic group. In the view of the Court, these acts constituted the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention.

The actus reus of genocide having been established, the Court turned to the question whether the acts that had been perpetrated reflected a genocidal intent. In the absence of direct proof of such intent (for example, the expression of a policy to that effect), the Court examined whether it had been demonstrated that there existed a pattern of conduct from which the only reasonable inference to be drawn was an intent on the part of the perpetrators of the acts to destroy a substantial part of the group of ethnic Croats. The Court considered that this was not the case. It observed, in particular, that the aim of the crimes committed against ethnic Croats appeared to have been the forced displacement of the majority of the Croat population in the regions concerned, not its physical or biological destruction. In the absence of evidence of the required intent, the Court found that Croatia had not proved its allegations that genocide or other violations of the Convention had been committed. It thus dismissed Croatia’s claim in its entirety and did not consider it necessary to rule on other questions, such as the attribution of the acts committed or succession to responsibility.

Regarding Serbia’s counter-claim, which was found to be admissible, the Court concluded that, during and after Operation Storm, carried out in August 1995, Croatian forces had committed acts falling within Article II (a) and (b): (i) killings of members of the national or ethnical group of Serbs who were fleeing or had remained in the areas of which the Croatian army had taken control; and (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to Serbs.

However, the Court considered that the existence of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the national or ethnical group of Croatian Serbs had not been established in this case. In particular, although acts constituting the physical element of genocide had been committed, they had not been committed on a scale such that they could only point to the existence of a genocidal intent. The Court found that neither genocide nor other violations of the Convention had been proved. Accordingly, it rejected Serbia’s counter-claim in its entirety.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

2 July 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Verbatim record 2014/8 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Wednesday 5 March 2014, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2014/9 (bilingual version)

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 18 November 2008

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Merits

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 2008/5

Summary of the Judgment of 18 November 2008

Available in:

English French

Summary 2015/1

Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2015

Available in:

English French

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OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

24 April 2014

Available in:

Written proceedings

16 March 2015

Available in:

Memorial

Annexes volume I

Annexes volume II

15 June 2015

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

15 October 2015

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 11 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 14 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 16 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

23 March 2016

Available in:

23 March 2016

Available in:

30 March 2016

Available in:

30 March 2016

Available in:

Orders

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

Fixing of time-limit: written statement of observations and submissions on preliminary objections

Available in:

Judgments

Preliminary objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Declaration of President Abraham

Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Yusuf

Separate opinion of Judge Owada

Separate opinion of Judge Tomka

Dissenting opinion of Judge Bennouna

Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade

Declaration of Judge Xue

Declaration of Judge Donoghue

Declaration of Judge Gaja

Separate opinion of Judge Sebutinde

Separate opinion of Judge Bhandari

Dissenting opinion of Judge Robinson

Dissenting opinion of Judge Crawford

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Bedjaoui

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary of the Judgment of 5 October 2016

Available in:

Press releases

19 June 2014

Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) - Fixing of time-limits for the filing of initial pleadings

Available in:

23 June 2015

Available in:

29 January 2016

Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) - Preliminary objections - The Court to hold public hearings from Wednesday 9 March to Wednesday 16 March 2016

Available in:

16 March 2016

Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) - Conclusion of public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom

Available in:

5 October 2016