Culminated

Code

See also

Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 10 September 2002, El Salvador filed a request for revision of the Judgment delivered on 11 September 1992 by a Chamber of the Court in the case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening). El Salvador indicated that “the sole purpose of the Application [was] to seek revision of the course of the boundary decided by the Court for the sixth disputed sector of the land boundary between El Salvador and Honduras”. It was the first time that an Application had been made seeking a revision of a judgment rendered by one of the Court’s Chambers.

By an Order of 27 November 2002, the Court unanimously decided to accede to the request of the two Parties for it to form a special Chamber of five judges to deal with the case. It formed a Chamber composed as follows : President Guillaume ; Judges Rezek and Buergenthal ; Judges ad hoc Torres Bernárdez (chosen by Honduras) and Paolillo (chosen by El Salvador). In its Order, the Court also fixed 1 April 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of written observations by Honduras on the admissibility of the request for revision. That pleading having been filed within the time-limit so prescribed, the Chamber held public hearings on the admissibility of the Application from 8 to 12 September 2003.

The Chamber rendered its Judgment on 18 December 2003. In the earlier proceedings which had resulted in the 1992 Judgment, Honduras had contended that in the sixth sector the boundary followed the present course of the River Goascorán. El Salvador, however, had claimed that the boundary was defined by a previous course of the river, which it had abandoned as a result of an “avulsion” — an abrupt change in the riverbed. The Chamber began by recalling that at this stage of the proceedings it must determine whether the Application for revision was admissible in that it satisfied the requirements laid down by Article 61 of the Court’s Statute ; that is to say, the application must, inter alia, be based on the “discovery” of a fact “of such a nature as to be a decisive factor” which, “when the judgment was given”, was “unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision”.

In support of its Application, El Salvador claimed, inter alia, to possess scientific, technical and historical evidence showing the existence of a previous bed of the Goascorán and of its avulsion in the mid-eighteenth century. El Salvador contended that this evidence constituted “new facts” within the meaning of Article 61, and that these were “decisive”, since in the 1992 Judgment, in the absence of proof of any avulsion, the boundary had been declared to follow the course of the Goascorán as it was in 1821 and not the course prior to avulsion. After examining the reasoning followed by the Chamber in 1992, the present Chamber found that the boundary had been determined by application of the principle of uti possidetis juris, whereby the boundaries of States resulting from decolonization in Spanish America are to follow the colonial administrative boundaries. However, the 1992 Judgment had indicated that the situation resulting from uti possidetis was susceptible of modification as a result of the conduct of the Parties after independence in 1821. The Chamber found that the 1992 Chamber had rejected El Salvador’s claims precisely because of that State’s conduct subsequent to 1821. The Chamber accordingly held that it did not matter whether or not there had been an avulsion of the Goascorán, since, even if avulsion were now proved, findings to that effect would provide no basis for calling into question the decision taken by the Chamber in 1992 on different grounds. The facts asserted by El Salvador were accordingly not “decisive factors” in respect of the Judgment which it sought to have revised.

In regard to the second new fact relied on by El Salvador, namely the discovery of further copies of the “Carta Esférica” (a maritime chart of the Gulf of Fonseca prepared in or about 1796 by officers of the brigantine El Activo) and of the report of that vessel’s expedition, which differed from those produced by Honduras in the original proceedings, El Salvador contended that the fact that these documents existed in a number of versions and contained discrepancies and anachronisms compromised the evidentiary value that the Chamber had attached to them in 1992. The Chamber accordingly considered whether the 1992 Chamber might have reached different conclusions if it had had before it the new versions of these documents produced by El Salvador. It concluded that this was not the case. The new versions in fact confirmed the conclusions reached by the Chamber in 1992 and were thus not “decisive factors”.

Having found that none of the new facts alleged by El Salvador were “decisive factors” in relation to the Judgment of 11 September 1992, the Chamber held that it was unnecessary for it to ascertain whether the other conditions laid down by Article 61 of the Statute were satisfied.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

10 September 2002

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Written Observations of the Government of Honduras (French version only)

1 April 2003

Available in:

French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 27 November 2002

Formation of Chamber; fixing of time-limit: written observations on admissibility

Summary of the Judgment of 18 December 2003

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 October 2009, the Ambassador of Honduras to the Netherlands filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Brazil in respect of a

“dispute between [the two States] relat[ing] to legal questions concerning diplomatic relations and associated with the principle of non‑intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, a principle incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations”.

It was alleged therein that Brazil had “breached its obligations under Article 2 (7) of the Charter and those under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”.

At the end of the Application the Court was requested

“to adjudge and declare that Brazil does not have the right to allow the premises of its Mission in Tegucigalpa to be used to promote manifestly illegal activities by Honduran citizens who have been staying within it for some time now and that it shall cease to do so”.

To found the Court’s jurisdiction, Honduras invoked Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed on 30 April 1948 and, under the terms of Article LX thereof, officially called the “Pact of Bogotá”, ratified without reservation by Honduras on 13 January 1950 and by Brazil on 9 November 1965.

An original copy of the Application was sent to the Government of Brazil on 28 October 2009. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was also informed about the filing of that Application.

By a letter dated 28 October 2009, received in the Registry on 30 October 2009 under the cover of a letter dated 29 October 2009 from Mr. Jorge Arturo Reina, Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations, Ms Patricia Isabel Rodas Baca, Minister for External Relations in the Government headed by Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, informed the Court, inter alia, that the Ambassador of Honduras to the Netherlands was not the legitimate representative of Honduras before the Court and that “Ambassador Eduardo Enrique Reina is being appointed as the sole legitimate representative of the Government of Honduras to the International Court of Justice”. A copy of the communication, with annexes, from the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations was sent on 3 November 2009 to Brazil, as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Court decided that, given the circumstances, no other action would be taken in the case until further notice.

By a letter dated 30 April 2010, received in the Registry on 3 May 2010, Mr. Mario Miguel Canahuati, Minister for External Relations of Honduras, informed the Court that the Honduran Government was “not going on with the proceedings initiated by the application” and that it “accordingly withdraws this application from the Registry”. Consequently, the President of the Court made an Order on 12 May 2010 in which, after noting that Brazil had not taken any step in the proceedings in the case, he recorded the discontinuance by Honduras of the proceedings and ordered that the case be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

28 October 2009

Available in:

English French

Orders

Order of 12 May 2010

Removal from list

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

Press release 2009/30

29 October 2009

Filing in the Registry of the Court of an “Application instituting proceedings by the Republic of Honduras against the Federative Republic of Brazil”

Available in:

English French

Press release 2010/15

19 May 2010

Certain Questions concerning Diplomatic Relations (Honduras v. Brazil) - Case removed from the Court's List at the request of Honduras

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda “for acts of armed aggression committed . . . in flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”. In addition to the cessation of the alleged acts, Congo sought reparation for acts of intentional destruction and looting and the restitution of national property and resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States.

In its Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC referred, as bases for the Court’s jurisdiction, to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and, lastly, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. However, the Government of the DRC informed the Court on 15 January 2001 that it intended to discontinue the proceedings instituted against Burundi and Rwanda, stating that it reserved the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the Court. The two cases were therefore removed from the List on 30 January 2001.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Annexes to the Application instituting proceedings, Livre blanc (Volumes I and II)

23 June 1999

English French Bilingual

Order of 19 October 2000

Extension of time-limit: Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 30 January 2001

Removal from List

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 12 August 2008, the Republic of Georgia instituted proceedings before the Court against the Russian Federation relating to “its actions on and around the territory of Georgia in breach of CERD [the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]”. Georgia claimed that

“the Russian Federation, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising governmental authority, and through the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist forces and other agents acting on the instructions of, and under the direction and control of the Russian Federation, is responsible for serious violations of its fundamental obligations under CERD, including Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6”.

As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Georgia relied on Article 22 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Georgia’s Application was accompanied by a Request for the indication of provisional measures in order “to preserve [its] rights under CERD to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries”.

On 15 August 2008, having considered the gravity of the situation, the President of the Court, acting under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, urgently called upon the Parties “to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may take on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects”.

Following public hearings that were held from 8 to 10 October 2008, the Court issued an Order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Georgia. The Court found that it had prima facie jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD to deal with the case and it ordered the Parties,

“within South Ossetia and Abkhazia and adjacent areas in Georgia, [to] refrain from any act of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions; [to] abstain from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial discrimination by any persons or organizations; [to] do all in their power . . . to ensure, without distinction as to national or ethnic origin, (i) security of persons ; (ii) the right of persons to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State; (iii) the protection of the property of displaced persons and of refugees . . . [and to] do all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions”.

The Court also indicated that “[e]ach Party shall refrain from any action which might prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in the case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve”. Finally, the Court ordered each Party to “inform [it] as to its compliance with the . . . provisional measures”.

On 1 December 2009, the Russian Federation filed four preliminary objections in respect of jurisdiction.

In its Judgment of 1 April 2011, the Court began by considering the Russian Federation’s first preliminary objection, according to which there had been no dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of CERD at the date Georgia filed its Application. It concluded that none of the documents or statements provided any basis for a finding that there had been a dispute about racial discrimination by July 1999. However, the Court concluded that the exchanges between the Georgian and Russian representatives in the Security Council on 10 August 2008, the claims made by the Georgian President on 9 and 11 August and the response on 12 August by the Russian Foreign Minister established that by that day, the day on which Georgia submitted its Application, there had been a dispute between Georgia and the Russian Federation about the latter’s compliance with its obligations under CERD as invoked by Georgia in the case. The first preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was accordingly dismissed.

In its second preliminary objection, the Russian Federation had argued that the procedural requirements of Article 22 of CERD for recourse to the Court had not been fulfilled. According to this provision,

“[a]ny dispute between two or more States parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement”.

First of all, the Court noted that Georgia did not claim that, prior to seising the Court, it had used or attempted to use the procedures expressly provided for in CERD. The Court therefore limited its examination to the question of whether the precondition of negotiations had been fulfilled.

In determining what constitutes negotiations, the Court observed that negoti-ations are distinct from mere protests or disputations.

The Court observed that negotiations had taken place between Georgia and the Russian Federation before the start of the relevant dispute. However, in the absence of a dispute relating to matters falling under CERD prior to 9 August 2008, those negotiations could not be said to have covered such matters, and were thus of no relevance to the Court’s examination of the Russian Federation’s second preliminary objection. The Court accordingly concluded that neither requirement contained in Article 22 had been satisfied. Article 22 of CERD thus could not serve to found the Court’s jurisdiction in the case. The second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was therefore upheld.

Having upheld the second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation, the Court found that it was required neither to consider nor to rule on the other objections to its jurisdiction raised by the Respondent and that the case could not proceed to the merits phase. Accordingly, the Order of 15 October 2008 indicating provisional measures ceased to be operative upon the delivery of the Judgment of the Court.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

12 August 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of Georgia

14 August 2008

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French

Amended Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of Georgia

25 August 2008

Written Statement of Georgia

1 April 2010

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

Fixing of time-limit

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 11 December 2009

Fixing of time-limits

English French

Summary 2011/2

Summary of the Judgment of 1 April 2011

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Colombia in respect of a dispute concerning “a group of related legal issues subsisting” between the two States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimitation”. On 28 April 2003, Nicaragua filed its Memorial within the time-limit laid down by the Court. On 21 July 2003, Colombia filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction, leading to the suspension of the proceedings on the merits.

In its Judgment on the preliminary objections, rendered on 13 December 2007, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime features claimed by the Parties, other than the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. The Court held that the treaty signed in 1928 between Colombia and Nicaragua (in which Colombia recognized Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Corn Islands, while Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, and the maritime features forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago) had settled the issue of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, that there was no extant legal dispute between the Parties on that question and that, therefore, the Court could not have jurisdiction over it under the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (also known as the Pact of Bogotá and invoked by Nicaragua as basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the case). On the other hand, as regards the question of the scope and composition of the rest of the San Andrés Archipelago, the Court considered that the 1928 Treaty failed to provide answers as to which other maritime features formed part of the Archipelago and thus that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute regarding sovereignty over those other maritime features. As for its jurisdiction with respect to the maritime delimitation issue, the Court concluded that the 1928 Treaty had not effected a general delimitation of the maritime areas between Colombia and Nicaragua and that, as the dispute had not been settled within the meaning of the Pact of Bogotá, the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

On 25 February 2010, Costa Rica filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. In its Application it contended, among other things, that “[b]oth Nicaragua and Colombia, in their boundary claims against each other, claim maritime area to which Costa Rica is entitled” and indicated that it wished to intervene in the proceedings as a non-party State. On 10 June 2010, the Republic of Honduras also filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case, asserting that Nicaragua, in its dispute with Colombia, had put forward maritime claims that lay in an area of the Caribbean Sea in which Honduras had rights and interests. Honduras stated in its Application that it was seeking primarily to intervene in the proceedings as a party. The Court rendered two Judgments on 4 May 2011, in which it ruled that the Applications for permission to intervene filed by Costa Rica and Honduras could not be granted. The Court noted that the interest of a legal nature invoked by Costa Rica could only be affected if the maritime boundary that the Court had been asked to draw between Nicaragua and Colombia were to be extended beyond a certain latitude southwards. However, following its jurisprudence, the Court, when drawing a line delimiting the maritime areas between the two Parties to the main proceedings, would, if necessary, end that line before it reached an area in which the interests of a legal nature of third States might be involved. The Court concluded that Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature could not be affected by the decision in the proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. With respect to Honduras’s Application for permission to intervene, the Court found that Honduras had failed to satisfy the Court that it had an interest of a legal nature that might be affected by the decision of the Court in the main proceedings. It ruled on the one hand that, since the entire maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea had been settled by the Judgment of the Court rendered between those two States in 2007, there were no extant rights or legal interests that Honduras might seek to protect in the settlement of the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. On the other hand, the Court held that Honduras could invoke an interest of a legal nature, in the main proceedings, on the basis of the 1986 bilateral treaty concluded between Honduras and Colombia, but clarified that it would not be relying on that treaty to determine the maritime boundary between Colombia and Nicaragua.

In its Judgment rendered on the merits of the case on 19 November 2012, the Court found that the territorial dispute between the Parties concerned sovereignty over the features situated in the Caribbean Sea — the Alburquerque Cays, the East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo — which were all above water at high tide and which were therefore islands capable of appropriation. The Court noted, however, that Quitasueño comprised only a single, tiny island, known as QS 32, and a number of low-tide elevations (features above water at low tide but submerged at high tide). The Court then observed that, under the terms of the 1928 Treaty concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia not only had sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but also over other islands, islets and reefs “forming part” of the San Andrés Archipelago. Thus, in order to address the question of sovereignty, the Court first needed to ascertain what constituted the San Andrés Archipelago. It concluded, however, that neither the 1928 Treaty nor the historical documents conclusively established the composition of that Archipelago. The Court therefore examined the arguments and evidence not based on the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty. It found that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia had established that it had title to the disputed maritime features by virtue of uti possidetis juris (the principle that, upon independence, new States inherit the territories and boundaries of the former colonial provinces), because nothing clearly indicated whether these features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Colombia. The Court then considered whether sovereignty could be established on the basis of State acts manifesting a display of authority on a given territory (effectivités). It regarded it as having been established that for many decades Colombia had continuously and consistently acted à titre de souverain in respect of the maritime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority had been public and there was no evidence that it had met with any protest from Nicaragua prior to 1969, when the dispute had crystallized. Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s acts of administration with respect to the islands was in contrast to the absence of any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua. The Court also noted that, while not being evidence of sovereignty, Nicaragua’s conduct with regard to the maritime features in dispute, the practice of third States and maps afforded some support to Colombia’s claim. The Court concluded that Colombia, and not Nicaragua, had sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.

With respect to Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles, the Court observed that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia was not a party thereto did not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention. The Court observed that Nicaragua had submitted to the Commission only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, fell short of meeting the requirements for the Commission to be able to make its recommendations. As the Court was not presented with any further information, it found that, in this case, Nicaragua had not established that it had a continental margin that extended far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast. The Court was therefore not in a position to delimit the maritime boundary between the extended continental shelf as claimed by Nicaragua and the continental shelf of Colombia. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court noted that it was still called upon to effect the delimitation of the zone situated within 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast, where the entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua overlapped.

In order to effect the delimitation of the maritime boundary, the Court first determined what the relevant coasts of the Parties were, namely those coasts the projections of which overlapped. It found that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was its whole coast, with the exception of the short stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas, and that Colombia’s relevant coast was the entire coastline of the islands under Colombian sovereignty, except for Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. The Court next noted that the relevant maritime area, i.e., the area in which the potential entitlements of the Parties overlapped, extended 200 nautical miles east of the Nicaraguan coast. The boundaries to the north and to the south were determined by the Court in such a way as not to overlap with any existing boundaries or to extend into areas where the rights of third States might be affected.

To effect the delimitation, the Court followed the three-stage procedure previously laid down by and employed in its jurisprudence.

First, it selected the base points and constructed a provisional median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the relevant Colombian islands opposite the Nicaraguan coast.

Second, the Court considered any relevant circumstances which might have called for an adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line so as to achieve an equitable result. It observed that the substantial disparity between the relevant Colombian coast and that of Nicaragua (approximately 1:8.2), and the need to avoid a situation whereby the line of delimitation cut off one or other of the Parties ties from maritime areas into which its coasts projected, constituted relevant circumstances. The Court noted that, while legitimate security concerns had to be borne in mind in determining what adjustment should be made to the provisional median line or in what way that line should be shifted, the conduct of the Parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already effected in the area were not relevant circumstances in this case. In the relevant area between the Nicaraguan mainland and the western coasts of the Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the relationship was one of opposite coasts, the relevant circumstances called for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. To that end, the Court determined that different weightings should be given to the base points situated on Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, namely a weighting of one to each of the Colombian base points and a weighting of three to each of the Nicaraguan base points. The Court considered, however, that extending the line thus constructed to the north or the south would not lead to an equitable result, since it would leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was more than eight times the length of Colombia’s relevant coast. Moreover, it would cut off Nicaragua from the areas to the east of the principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projected. In the view of the Court, an equitable result was to be achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast. To the north, that line would follow the parallel passing through the most northern point of the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Roncador. To the south, the maritime boundary would first follow the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of the Alburquerque and East-Southeast Cays, then the parallel from the most eastern point of the territorial sea of the East-Southeast Cays. In order to prevent Quitasueño and Serrana from falling, under those circumstances, on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the maritime boundary around each of those features would follow the outer limit of their 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.

Third, and finally, the Court checked that, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the delimitation thus obtained did not create a disproportionality that would render the result inequitable. The Court observed that the boundary line had the effect of dividing the relevant area between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour, while the ratio of relevant coasts was approximately 1:8.2. It concluded that that line did not entail such disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

6 December 2001

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Preliminary Objections of Colombia

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Memorial of Nicaragua

28 April 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Written Statement of Nicaragua

26 January 2004

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Volume I Written Statement

English French

Volume II Annexes

English French

Counter-Memorial of Colombia

11 November 2008

Available in:

English French

Volume I Counter-Memorial

Rejoinder of Colombia

18 June 2010

Available in:

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 13 December 2007

Preliminary objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Judgment of 4 May 2011

Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Judgment of 4 May 2011

Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Gaja

English French Bilingual

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 31 March 2008, Ecuador filed an Application instituting proceedings against Colombia in respect of a dispute concerning the alleged “aerial spraying [by Colombia] of toxic herbicides at locations near, at and across its border with Ecuador”. Ecuador maintained that “the spraying has already caused serious damage to people, to crops, to animals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier, and poses a grave risk of further damage over time”. It further contended that it had made “repeated and sustained efforts to negotiate an end to the fumigations” but that “these negotiations have proved unsuccessful”. As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Ecuador invoked Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá of 30 April 1948, to which both States were parties. Ecuador also relied on Article 32 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

By a letter dated 12 September 2013, the Agent of Ecuador, referring to Article 89 of the Rules of Court and to an Agreement between the Parties dated 9 September 2013 “that fully and finally resolves all of Ecuador’s claims against Colombia” in the case, notified the Court that his Government wished to discontinue the proceedings in the case. By a letter of the same date, the Agent of Colombia informed the Court, pursuant to Article 89, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, that it made no objection to the discontinuance of the case as requested by Ecuador.

According to the letters received from the Parties, the Agreement of 9 September 2013 established, inter alia, an exclusion zone, in which Colombia would not conduct aerial spraying operations, created a Joint Commission to ensure that spraying operations outside that zone had not caused herbicides to drift into Ecuador and, so long as they had not, provided a mechanism for the gradual reduction in the width of the said zone; according to the letters, the Agreement set out operational parameters for Colombia’s spraying programme, recorded the agreement of the two Governments to ongoing exchanges of information in that regard, and established a dispute settlement mechanism.

In consequence, the President of the Court, on 13 September 2013, made an Order recording the discontinuance by Ecuador of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

31 March 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of Ecuador

28 April 2009

Available in:

English

volume I

English

Reply of Ecuador

31 January 2011

Rejoinder of Colombia

1 February 2012

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 January 2006, the Republic of Djibouti filed an Application against the French Republic in respect of a dispute:

“concern[ing] the refusal by the French governmental and judicial authorities to execute an international letter rogatory regarding the transmission to the judicial authorities in Djibouti of the record relating to the investigation in the Case against X for the murder of Bernard Borrel, in violation of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the [Djiboutian] Government and the [French] Government, of 27 September 1986, and in breach of other international obligations borne by [France] to . . . Djibouti”.

In its Application, Djibouti also alleged that these acts constituted a violation of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation concluded between France and Djibouti on 27 June 1977. Djibouti indicated that it sought to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. This provision applies when a State submits a dispute to the Court, proposing to found the Court’s jurisdiction upon a consent yet to be given or manifested by the State against which the Application is made. This was the second occasion that the Court had been called upon to pronounce on a dispute brought before it by an Application based on Article 38, paragraph 5, of its Rules (forum prorogatum). France consented to the jurisdiction of the Court by a letter, dated 25 July 2006 in which it specified that this consent was “valid only for the purposes of the case, within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 5, i.e., in respect of the dispute forming the subject of the Application and strictly within the limits of the claims formulated therein” by Djibouti. However, the Parties disagreed as to the exact extent of the consent given by France.

The Court rendered its Judgment on 4 June 2008.

Having established the precise scope of its jurisdiction in the case, the Court turned first to the alleged violation by France of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between France and Djibouti of 27 June 1977. While pointing out that the provisions of the said Treaty constituted relevant rules of international law having “a certain bearing” on relations between the Parties, the Court concluded that “the fields of co-operation envisaged in th[at] Treaty do not include co-operation in the judicial field” and thus that the above-mentioned relevant rules imposed no concrete obligations in this case.

The Court then turned to the allegation that France had violated its obligations under the 1986 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Under that Convention, judicial co-operation is envisaged, including the requesting and granting of “letters rogatory” (usually the passing, for judicial purposes, of information held by a party). The Convention also provides for exceptions to this envisaged co-operation. Since the French judicial authorities refused to transmit the requested case file, a key question in the case was whether that refusal fell within the permitted exceptions. Also at issue was whether France had complied with the provisions of the 1986 Convention in other respects. The Court held that the reasons given by the French investigating judge for refusing the request for mutual assistance fell within the scope of Article 2 (c) of the Convention, which entitles the requested State to refuse to execute a letter rogatory if it considers that that execution is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, its security, its ordre public or other of its essential interests. The Court did, however, conclude that, as no reasons were given in the letter dated 6 June 2005, whereby France informed Djibouti of its refusal to execute the letter rogatory presented by the latter on 3 November 2004, France had failed to comply with its international obligations under Article 17 of the 1986 Convention.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

9 August 2006

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Republic of Djibouti (French version only)

15 March 2007

Available in:

French

Counter-Memorial of the French Republic (French version only)

13 July 2007

Available in:

French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 15 November 2006

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

By an Application filed in the Registry on 1 June 2001, Liechtenstein instituted proceedings against Germany relating to a dispute concerning

“decisions of Germany, in and after 1998, to treat certain property of Liechtenstein nationals as German assets having been ‘seized for the purposes of reparation or restitution, or as a result of the state of war’ — i.e., as a consequence of World War II —, without ensuring any compensation for the loss of that property to its owners, and to the detriment of Liechtenstein itself”.

The historical context of the dispute was as follows. In 1945, Czechoslovakia confiscated certain property belonging to Liechtenstein nationals, including Prince Franz Josef II of Liechtenstein, pursuant to the “Beneš Decrees”, which authorized the confiscation of “agricultural property” (including buildings, installations and movable property) of “all persons belonging to the German and Hungarian people, regardless of their nationality”. A special régime with regard to German external assets and other property seized in connection with the Second World War was created under the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (Chapter Six), signed in 1952 at Bonn. In 1991, a painting by the Dutch master Pieter van Laer was lent by a museum in Brno (Czechoslovakia) to a museum in Cologne (Germany) for inclusion in an exhibition. This painting had been the property of the family of the Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein since the eighteenth century; it was confiscated in 1945 by Czechoslovakia under the Beneš Decrees. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein, acting in his personal capacity, then filed a lawsuit in the German courts to have the painting returned to him as his property, but that action was dismissed on the ground that, under Article 3, Chapter Six, of the Settlement Convention (paragraphs 1 and 3 of which are still in force), no claim or action in connection with measures taken against German external assets in the aftermath of the Second World War was admissible in German courts. A claim brought by Prince Hans-Adam II before the European Court of Human Rights regarding the decisions of the German courts was also dismissed.

As a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Liechtenstein invoked Article I of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, signed at Strasbourg on 29 April 1957.

Following public hearings on the preliminary objections of Germany in June 2004, the Court delivered its Judgment on 10 February 2005. The Court began by rejecting Germany’s first preliminary objection, which argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no dispute between the Parties.

The Court then considered Germany’s second objection, which required it to decide, in the light of the provisions of Article 27 (a) of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, whether the dispute related to facts or situations that arose before or after 18 February 1980, the date on which that Convention entered into force between Germany and Liechtenstein. The Court concluded that, although these proceedings had been instituted by Liechtenstein as a result of decisions by German courts concerning a painting by Pieter van Laer, the events in question had their source in specific measures taken by Czechoslovakia in 1945, which had led to the confiscation of property owned by some Liechtenstein nationals, including Prince Franz Jozef II of Liechtenstein, as well as in the special régime created by the Settlement Convention, and that the source or real cause of the dispute was accordingly to be found in the Settlement Convention and the Beneš Decrees. The Court therefore upheld Germany’s second preliminary objection, finding that it could not rule on Liechtenstein’s claims on the merits.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

1 June 2001

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Principality of Liechtenstein

28 March 2002

Available in:

English

Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Germany

27 June 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

Observations of the Principality of Liechtenstein

15 November 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 28 June 2001

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French

Order of 12 July 2002

Fixing of time-limit: Written Statement of observations and submissions on Preliminary Objections

Summary of the Judgment of 10 February 2005

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by Canada

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/5

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/4

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 September 2005, Costa Rica filed an Application instituting proceedings against Nicaragua in a dispute concerning the navigational and related rights of Costa Rica on a section of the San Juan River, the southern bank of which forms the boundary between the two States provided for by an 1858 bilateral treaty. In its Application, Costa Rica affirmed that “Nicaragua has — in particular since the late 1990s — imposed a number of restrictions on the navigation of Costa Rican boats and their passengers on the San Juan River”, in violation of Article VI of the 1858 Treaty, which “granted to Nicaragua sovereignty over the waters of the San Juan River, recognizing at the same time important rights to Costa Rica”.

Following public hearings held in March 2009, the Court rendered its Judgment on 13 July 2009.

As regards Costa Rica’s navigational rights on the San Juan River under the 1858 Treaty, in that part where navigation is common, the Court ruled that Costa Rica had the right of free navigation on the San Juan River for purposes of commerce; that the right of navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica included the transport of passengers; that the right of navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica included the transport of tourists; that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation were not required to obtain Nicaraguan visas; that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation were not required to purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards; that the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River had the right to navigate on the river between the riparian communities for the purposes of fulfilling essential needs of everyday life; that Costa Rica had the right of navigation on the San Juan River with official vessels used solely, in specific situations, to provide essential services for the inhabitants of the riparian areas where expeditious transportation is a condition for meeting the inhabitants’ requirements; that Costa Rica did not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River with vessels carrying out police functions; that Costa Rica did not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River for the purposes of the exchange of personnel among the police border posts along the right bank of the river or for the re-supply of these posts with official equipment, including service arms and ammunition.

As regards Nicaragua’s right to regulate navigation on the San Juan River, in that part where navigation is common, the Court found that Nicaragua had the right to require Costa Rican vessels and their passengers to stop at the first and last Nicaraguan post on their route along the San Juan River; that Nicaragua had the right to require persons travelling on the San Juan River to carry a passport or an identity document; that Nicaragua had the right to issue departure clearance certificates to Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation but did not have the right to request the payment of a charge for the issuance of such certificates; that Nicaragua had the right to impose timetables for navigation on vessels navigating on the San Juan River; and that Nicaragua had the right to require Costa Rican vessels fitted with masts or turrets to display the Nicaraguan flag.

As regards subsistence fishing, the Court found that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River for subsistence purposes from that bank must be respected by Nicaragua as a customary right.

As regards Nicaragua’s compliance with its international obligations under the 1858 Treaty, the Court found that Nicaragua was not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it required persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to obtain Nicaraguan visas; that Nicaragua was not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it required persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards; and that Nicaragua was not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it required the operators of vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to pay charges for departure clearance certificates.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

Reply of Costa Rica

15 January 2008

Available in:

English

volume I

English

volume II

English

Rejoinder of Nicaragua

15 July 2008

Available in:

English

volume I

English

volume II

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 29 November 2005

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 9 October 2007

Fixing of time-limits: reply and rejoinder

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 13 July 2009

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 2009/4

Summary of the Judgment of 13 July 2009

Available in:

English French

Press releases

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Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

10 September 2002

Available in:

Written proceedings

1 April 2003

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting of the Chamber held on Monday 8 September 2003, at 10 a.m.

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting of the Chamber held on Monday 8 September 2003, at 10.25 a.m.

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting of the Chamber held on Tuesday 9 September 2003, at 10 a.m

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting of the Chamber held on Wednesday 10 September 2003, at 3 p.m.

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting of the Chamber held on Friday 12 September 2003, at 10 a.m.

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

23 June 1993

Available in:

19 August 2003

Available in:

Orders

Formation of Chamber; fixing of time-limit: written observations on admissibility

Available in:

Declaration of Judge Oda

Judgments

Available in:

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Paolillo

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary of the Judgment of 18 December 2003

Available in:

Press releases

10 September 2002

El Salvador requests a revision of the Judgment delivered on 11 September 1992 by the Chamber of the Court in the case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)

Available in:

20 December 2002

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening)(El Salvador v. Honduras) - The Court forms a special Chamber to deal with the case

Available in:

25 July 2003

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening)(El Salvador v. Honduras) - The Court will hold public hearings from 8 to 12 September 2003

Available in:

1 September 2003

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening)(El Salvador v. Honduras) - Programme of the hearings to be held from 8 to 12 September 2003

Available in:

12 September 2003

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening)(El Salvador v. Honduras) - Conclusion of the public hearings - Chamber ready to begin its deliberation

Available in:

2 December 2003

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening)(El Salvador v. Honduras) - Chamber to deliver its Judgment on Thursday 18 December 2003

Available in:

18 December 2003

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening)(El Salvador v. Honduras) - The Chamber rejects the Application for revision submitted by El Salvador

Available in:

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

28 October 2009

Available in:

Orders

Removal from list

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

Press releases

29 October 2009

Filing in the Registry of the Court of an “Application instituting proceedings by the Republic of Honduras against the Federative Republic of Brazil”

Available in:

19 May 2010

Certain Questions concerning Diplomatic Relations (Honduras v. Brazil) - Case removed from the Court's List at the request of Honduras

Available in:

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

23 June 1999