Culminated

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 May 2002, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Rwanda for “massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” resulting

“from acts of armed aggression perpetrated by Rwanda on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in flagrant breach of the sovereignty and territorial integrity [of the DRC], as guaranteed by the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”.

The DRC stated in its Application that the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the dispute between it and Rwanda “deriv[ed] from compromissory clauses” in many international legal instruments, such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Constitution of UNESCO, the 1984 New York Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The DRC added that the jurisdiction of the Court also derived from the supremacy of peremptory norms (jus cogens), as reflected in certain international treaties and conventions, in the area of human rights.

On 28 May 2002, the date of the filing of the Application, the DRC also submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures. Public hearings were held on 13 and 14 June 2002 on that request. By an Order of 10 July 2002, the Court rejected that request, holding that it did not, in this case, have the prima facie jurisdiction necessary to indicate the provisional measures requested by the DRC. Further, “in the absence of a manifest lack of jurisdiction”, it also rejected Rwanda’s request for the case to be removed from the List. The Court also found that its findings in no way prejudged the question of its jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application or relating to the merits themselves.

On 18 September 2002, the Court delivered an Order directing that the written pleadings should first be addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application, and fixed 20 January 2003 and 20 May 2003, respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Rwanda and Counter-Memorial of the DRC. Those pleadings were filed within the time-limits thus prescribed.

In its Judgment of 3 February 2006, the Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the DRC. It found that the international instruments invoked by the DRC could not be relied on, either because Rwanda (1) was not a party to them (as in the case of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) or (2) had made reservations to them (as in the case of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination), or because (3) other preconditions for the seisin of the Court had not been satisfied (as in the case of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Constitution of the WHO, the Constitution of UNESCO and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation).

Since the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Application, it was not required to rule on its admissibility. Mindful that the subject-matter of the dispute was very similar in nature to that in the case between the Congo and Uganda, and that the reasons as to why the Court would not proceed to an examination of the merits in the case between Congo and Rwanda needed to be carefully explained, the Court stated that it was precluded by a number of provisions in its Statute from taking any position on the merits of the claims made by the DRC. It recalled, however, “that there is a fundamental distinction between the acceptance by States of the Court’s jurisdiction and the conformity of their acts with international law”. Thus, “[w]hether or not States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, they are required to fulfil their obligations under the United Nations Charter and the other rules of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, and they remain responsible for acts attributable to them which are contrary to international law”.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings (French version only)

28 May 2002

Available in:

French

Written proceedings

Summary 2002/2

Summary of the Order of 10 July 2002

Available in:

English French

Summary 2006/1

Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2006

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 21 December 2009, the Kingdom of Belgium initiated proceedings against the Swiss Confederation in respect of a dispute concerning primarily the interpretation and application of the Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

The Memorial of Belgium was filed on 23 November 2010. On 18 February 2011, Switzerland raised preliminary objections in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application.

By a letter dated 21 March 2011, the Agent of Belgium informed the Court that his Government “in concert with the Commission of the European Union, considers that it can discontinue the proceedings instituted [by Belgium] against Switzerland”.

Since Switzerland did not oppose the said discontinuance, the Court, placing on record the discontinuance by Belgium of the proceedings, ordered that the case be removed from its List (Order of 5 April 2011).

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 8 October 2008 (resolution 63/3), the General Assembly decided to ask the Court to render an advisory opinion on the following question : “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law ?”

Thirty-six Member States of the United Nations filed written statements and the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence filed a written contribution. Fourteen States submitted written comments on the written statements of States and on the written contribution of the authors of the declaration of independence. Twenty-eight States and the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence participated in the oral proceedings, which took place from 1 to 11 December 2009.

In its Advisory Opinion delivered on 22 July 2010, the Court concluded that “the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law”. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court first addressed the question of whether it possessed jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly. Having established that it did have jurisdiction to render the advisory opinion requested, the Court examined the question, raised by a number of participants, as to whether it should nevertheless decline to exercise that jurisdiction as a matter of discretion. It concluded that, in light of its jurisprudence, there were “no compelling reasons for it to decline to exercise its jurisdiction” in respect of the request.

With regard to the scope and meaning of the question, the Court ruled that the reference to the “Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo” in the question put by the General Assembly did not prevent it from deciding for itself whether the declaration of independence had been promulgated by that body or another entity. It also concluded that it was not required by the question posed to decide whether international law conferred a positive entitlement upon Kosovo to declare independence ; rather, it had to determine whether a rule of international law prohibited such a declaration.

The Court first sought to determine whether the declaration of independence was in accordance with general international law. It noted that State practice during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “points clearly to the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of declarations of independence”. In particular, the Court concluded that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”. It also determined that no general prohibition of declarations of independence could be deduced from Security Council resolutions condemning other declarations of independence, because those declarations of independence had been made in the context of an unlawful use of force or a violation of a jus cogens norm. The Court thus concluded that the declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo had not violated general international law.

The Court then considered whether the declaration of independence was in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. It concluded that the object and purpose of that resolution was to establish “a temporary, exceptional legal régime which . . . superseded the Serbian legal order . . . on an interim basis”. It then examined the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence. An analysis of the content and form of the declaration, and of the context in which it was made, led the Court to conclude that its authors were not the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, but rather “persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration”. The Court concluded that the declaration of independence did not violate resolution 1244 for two reasons. First, it emphasized the fact that the two instruments “operate on a different level” : resolution 1244 was silent on the final status of Kosovo, whereas the declaration of independence was an attempt to finally determine that status. Second, it noted that resolution 1244 imposed only very limited obligations on non-State actors, none of which entailed any prohibition of a declaration of independence. Finally, in view of its conclusion that the declaration of independence did not emanate from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, the Court held that its authors were not bound by the Constitutional Framework established under resolution 1244, and thus that the declaration of independence did not violate that framework.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the adoption of the declaration of independence had not violated any applicable rule of international law. On 9 September 2010, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which it acknowledged the content of the advisory opinion of the Court rendered in response to its request (resolution 64/298).

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Request for Advisory Opinion

10 October 2008

Request for Advisory Opinion

Available in:

English French

Introductory Note (including the structure of the dossier)

10 October 2008

Introductory Note (including the structure of the dossier)

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 17 October 2008

Fixing of time-limits: Written Statements and Written Comments

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 17 November 2008, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Hellenic Republic in respect of a dispute concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995. In particular, the Applicant sought to establish that, by objecting to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, the Respondent had breached Article 11, paragraph 1, of the said Accord, which provides that:

“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”

In paragraph 2 of resolution 817, the Security Council recommended that the Applicant be admitted to membership in the United Nations, being “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State”. In the period following the adoption of the Interim Accord, the Applicant was granted membership in a number of international organizations of which the Respondent was already a member. The Applicant’s NATO candidacy was considered in a meeting of NATO member States in Bucharest (hereinafter the “Bucharest Summit”) on 2 and 3 April 2008 but the Applicant was not invited to begin talks on accession to the organization. The communiqué issued at the end of the Bucharest Summit stated that an invitation would be extended to the Applicant “as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached”.

In its Judgment of 5 December 2011, the Court first addressed the Respondent’s claim that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and that the Application was inadmissible for several reasons. The Court upheld none of those objections and concluded that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and that the Application was admissible. Turning to the merits of the case, the Court considered whether the Respondent objected to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, within the meaning of the first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord. In the view of the Court, the evidence submitted to it demonstrated that through formal diplomatic correspondence and through statements of its senior officials, the Respondent had made clear before, during and after the Bucharest Summit that the resolution of the difference over the name was the “decisive criterion” for the Respondent to accept the Applicant’s admission to NATO. The Court therefore concluded that the Respondent had objected to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, within the meaning of the first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.

The Court then considered whether the Respondent’s objection to the Applicant’s admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit fell within the exception contained in the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord, finding that it did not.

The Court thus concluded that the Respondent had failed to comply with its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord by objecting to the Applicant’s admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit. It also rejected the Respondent’s alternative arguments that its objection had been made in response to the Applicant’s breaches of the Interim Accord.

As to possible remedies for the violation by the Respondent of its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord, the Court found that a declaration that the Respondent had violated its obligation not to object to the Applicant’s admission to or membership in NATO was warranted and that such finding constituted appropriate satisfaction. The Court did not consider it necessary, however, to order the Respondent, as the Applicant requested, to refrain from any future conduct that violated its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

17 November 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 20 January 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 12 March 2010

Fixing of time-limits

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 December 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against the Italian Republic, requesting the Court to declare that Italy had failed to respect the jurisdictional immunity which Germany enjoys under international law by allowing civil claims to be brought against it in the Italian courts seeking reparation for injuries caused by violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Third Reich during the Second World War. In addition, Germany asked the Court to find that Italy had also violated Germany’s immunity by taking measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni, German State property situated in Italian territory. Finally, Germany requested the Court to declare that Italy had breached Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek civil courts rendered against Germany on the basis of acts similar to those which had given rise to the claims brought before Italian courts. Germany referred in particular to the judgment rendered against it in respect of the massacre committed by German armed forces during their withdrawal in 1944, in the Greek village of Distomo in the Distomo case.

As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Germany invoked Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, ratified by Italy on 29 January 1960 and by Germany on 18 April 1961.

The Memorial of Germany and the Counter-Memorial of Italy were filed within the time-limits fixed by the Order of the Court of 29 April 2009. In its Counter-Memorial, Italy, referring to Article 80 of the Rules of Court, made a counter-claim “with respect to the question of the reparation owed to Italian victims of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed by forces of the German Reich”. The Court found that the counter-claim presented by Italy was inadmissible, because the dispute that Italy intended to bring before the Court by way of its counter-claim related to facts and situations existing prior to the entry into force as between the parties of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, which formed the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in the case (Order of 6 July 2010).

On 13 January 2011, Greece filed an Application requesting permission to intervene in the case. In its Application, Greece stated that it wished to intervene in the aspect of the procedure relating to judgments rendered by its own courts on the Distomo massacre and enforced (exequatur) by the Italian courts. The Court, in an Order of 4 July 2011, considered that it might find it necessary to consider the decisions of Greek courts in the Distomo case, in light of the principle of State immunity, for the purposes of making findings with regard to Germany’s submission that Italy had breached its jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek courts founded on violations of international humanitarian law committed by the German Reich during the Second World War. This permitted the conclusion that Greece had an interest of a legal nature which might have been affected by the judgment in the case and, consequently, that Greece could be permitted to intervene as a non-party “in so far as this intervention is limited to the decisions of Greek courts [in the Distomo case]”.

In its Judgment rendered on 3 February 2012, the Court first examined the question whether Italy had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by allowing civil claims to be brought against that State in the Italian courts. The Court noted in this respect that the question which it was called upon to decide was not whether the acts committed by the Third Reich during the Second World War were illegal, but whether, in civil proceedings against Germany relating to those acts, the Italian courts were obliged to accord Germany immunity. The Court held that the action of the Italian courts in denying Germany immunity constituted a breach of Italy’s international obligations. It stated in this connection that, under customary international law as it presently stood, a State was not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it was accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict. The Court further observed that, assuming that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibited murder, deportation and slave labour were rules of jus cogens, there was no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity. The two sets of rules addressed different matters. The rules of State immunity were confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State could exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They did not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings were brought was lawful or unlawful. Finally, the Court examined Italy’s argument that the Italian courts were justified in denying Germany immunity, because all other attempts to secure compensation for the various groups of victims involved in the Italian proceedings had failed. The Court found no basis in the relevant domestic or international practice that international law made the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress.

The Court then addressed the question whether a measure of constraint taken against property belonging to Germany located on Italian territory constituted a breach by Italy of Germany’s immunity. It noted that Villa Vigoni was being used for governmental purposes that were entirely non-commercial; that Germany had in no way consented to the registration of the legal charge in question, nor allocated Villa Vigoni for the satisfaction of the judicial claims against it. Since the conditions permitting a measure of constraint to be taken against property belonging to a foreign State had not been met in this case, the Court concluded that Italy had violated its obligation to respect Germany’s immunity from enforcement.

Finally, the Court examined the question whether Italy had violated Germany’s immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy civil judgments rendered by Greek courts against Germany in proceedings arising out of the massacre committed in the Greek village of Distomo by the armed forces of the Third Reich in 1944. It found that the relevant decisions of the Italian courts constituted a violation by Italy of its obligation to respect the jurisdictional immunity of Germany.

English

Counter-Memorial of Italy

22 December 2009

5 October 2010

Available in:

English French

Annexes

Annexes

English

Letter from the Agent of Italy

5 September 2011

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 29 April 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 6 July 2010

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint declaration of Judges Keith and Greenwood

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Gaja

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 July 2011

Application by the Hellenic Republic for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2012

Available in:

English French

“(a) The United States of America shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Messrs. José Ernesto Medellín Rojas, César Roberto Fierro Reyna, Rubén Ramírez Cárdenas, Humberto Leal García, and Roberto Moreno Ramos are not executed pending judgment on the Request for interpretation submitted by the United Mexican States, unless and until these five Mexican nationals receive review and reconsideration consistent with paragraphs 138 to 141 of the Court’s Judgment delivered on 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America);

(b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Court of the measures taken in implementation of this Order.”

Following the submission of written observations by the United States and of further written explanations by both Parties, the Court delivered its Judgment on Mexico’s Request for interpretation on 19 January 2009.

The Court found that Mexico’s Request for interpretation dealt not with the “meaning or scope” of the Avena Judgment as Article 60 required, but rather with “the general question of the effects of a judgment of the Court in the domestic legal order of the States parties to the case in which the judgment was delivered”. Thus, the Court considered that, “[b]y virtue of its general nature, the question underlying Mexico’s Request for interpretation is outside the jurisdiction specifically conferred upon the Court by Article 60” and that “[w]hether or not there is a dispute, it does not bear on the interpretation of the Avena Judgment, in particular of paragraph 153 (9).” The Court therefore concluded that it could not accede to Mexico’s Request for interpretation.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

5 June 2008

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

5 June 2008

English French

Summary 2009/1

Summary of the Judgment of 19 January 2009

Available in:

English French

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Portuguese Republic

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/10

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/9

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 19 February 2009, Belgium filed an Application instituting proceedings against Senegal relating to Mr. Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad and resident in Senegal since being granted political asylum by the Senegalese Government in 1990. In particular, Belgium submitted that, by failing to prosecute Mr. Habré for certain acts he was alleged to have committed during his presidency, including acts of torture and crimes against humanity, or to extradite him to Belgium, Senegal had violated the so‑called obligation aut dedere aut judicare (that is to say, “to prosecute or extradite”) provided for in Article 7 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and in customary international law.

On the same day, Belgium filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures, asking the Court to order “Senegal to take all the steps within its power to keep Mr. H. Habré under the control and surveillance of the judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly applied”.

In its Order of 28 May 2009, referring to the assurances given by Senegal during the oral proceedings that it would not allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory while the case was pending, the Court concluded that there was no risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Belgium and that there did not exist any urgency to justify the indication of provisional measures.

In its Judgment dated 20 July 2012, the Court began by examining the questions raised by Senegal relating to its jurisdiction and to the admissibility of Belgium’s claims. It found that it did have jurisdiction to entertain Belgium’s claims based on the interpretation and application of Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture. The Court further determined that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the issue whether there existed an obligation for a State to prosecute crimes under customary international law allegedly committed by a foreign national abroad.

With respect to the admissibility of Belgium’s claims, the Court ruled that once any State party to the Convention against Torture was able to invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, i.e., obligations owed toward all States parties, Belgium, as a party to the said Convention, had standing to invoke the responsibility of Senegal for the alleged breaches of its obligations under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of that Convention. The Court thus found that Belgium’s claims based on those provisions were admissible.

As regards the alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention against Torture, which provides that a State party in whose territory a person alleged to have committed acts of torture is present must “immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts”, the Court noted that Senegal had not included in the case file any material demonstrating that it had carried out such an inquiry. In the present case, the establishment of the facts had become imperative at least since the year 2000, when a complaint was filed in Senegal against Mr. Habré. Nor had an investigation been initiated in 2008, when a further complaint against Mr. Habré was filed in Dakar, after the legislative and constitutional amendments made in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The Court concluded from the foregoing that Senegal had breached its obligation under the above‑mentioned provision.

With respect to the alleged violation of Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture, the Court first examined the nature and meaning of the obligation laid down in that provision.

It concluded from the foregoing that Senegal’s obligation to prosecute pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention did not apply to acts alleged to have been committed before the Convention entered into force for Senegal on 26 June 1987, although there was nothing in that instrument to prevent it from instituting proceedings concerning acts that were committed before that date. The Court found that Belgium, for its part, was entitled, with effect from 25 July 1999, the date when it became party to the Convention, to request the Court to rule on Senegal’s compliance with its obligation under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

Finally, the Court examined the question of the implementation of the obligation to prosecute. It concluded that the obligation laid down in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention required Senegal to take all measures necessary for its implementation as soon as possible, in particular once the first complaint had been filed against Mr. Habré in 2000. Having failed to do so, Senegal had breached and remained in breach of its obligations under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

The Court found that, by failing to comply with its obligations under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, Senegal had engaged its international responsibility. Therefore, it was required to cease that continuing wrongful act and to take, without further delay, the necessary measures to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it did not extradite Mr. Habré.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

19 February 2009

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures (translation) -
filed on 19 February 2009

19 February 2009

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 11 July 2011

Extension of a time-limit

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 20 July 2012

Merits

English French

Summary 2012/4

Summary of the Judgment of 20 July 2012

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 4 May 2006, Argentina filed an Application instituting proceedings against Uruguay concerning alleged breaches by Uruguay of obligations incumbent upon it under the Statute of the River Uruguay, a treaty signed by the two States on 26 February 1975 (hereinafter “the 1975 Statute”) for the purpose of establishing the joint machinery necessary for the optimum and rational utilization of that part of the river which constitutes their joint boundary. In its Application, Argentina charged Uruguay with having unilaterally authorized the construction of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay without complying with the obligatory prior notification and consultation procedures under the 1975 Statute. Argentina claimed that those mills posed a threat to the river and its environment and were likely to impair the quality of the river’s waters and to cause significant transboundary damage to Argentina. As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Argentina invoked the first paragraph of Article 60 of the 1975 Statute, which provides that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of that Statute which cannot be settled by direct negotiations may be submitted by either party to the Court.

Argentina’s Application was accompanied by a Request for the indication of provisional measures, whereby Argentina asked that Uruguay be ordered to suspend the authorizations for construction of the mills and all building works pending a final decision by the Court; to co-operate with Argentina with a view to protecting and conserving the aquatic environment of the River Uruguay; and to refrain from taking any further unilateral action with respect to the construction of the two mills incompatible with the 1975 Statute, and from any other action which might aggravate the dispute or render its settlement more difficult. Public hearings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures were held on 8 and 9 June 2006. By an Order of 13 July 2006, the Court found that the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to it, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.

On 29 November 2006, Uruguay in turn submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures on the grounds that, from 20 November 2006, organized groups of Argentine citizens had blockaded a “vital international bridge” over the River Uruguay, that that action was causing it considerable economic prejudice and that Argentina had made no effort to end the blockade. At the end of its Request, Uruguay asked the Court to order Argentina to take “all reasonable and appropriate steps . . . to prevent or end the interruption of transit between Uruguay and Argentina, including the blockading of bridges or roads between the two States”; to abstain “from any measure that might aggravate, extend or make more difficult the settlement of this dispute”; and to abstain “from any other measure which might prejudice the rights of Uruguay in dispute before the Court”. Public hearings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures were held on 18 and 19 December 2006. By an Order of 23 January 2007, the Court found that the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to it, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute.

Following public hearings held between 14 September 2009 and 2 October 2009, the Court delivered its Judgment on 20 April 2010. With respect to Argentina’s argument that projects had been authorized by Uruguay in violation of the mechanism for prior notification and consultation laid down by Articles 7 to 13 of the 1975 Statute (the procedural violations), the Court noted that Uruguay had not informed the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) of the projects as prescribed in the Statute. The Court concluded that, by not informing CARU of the planned works before the issuing of the initial environmental authorizations for each of the mills and for the port terminal adjacent to the Orion (Botnia) mill, and by failing to notify the plans to Argentina through CARU, Uruguay had violated the 1975 Statute.

With respect to Argentina’s contention that the industrial activities authorized by Uruguay had had, or would have, an adverse impact on the quality of the waters of the river and the area affected by it, and had caused significant damage to the quality of the waters of the river and significant transboundary damage to Argentina (the substantive violations), the Court found, based on a detailed examination of the Parties’ arguments, that there was

“no conclusive evidence in the record to show that Uruguay has not acted with the requisite degree of due diligence or that the discharges of effluent from the Orion (Botnia) mill have had deleterious effects or caused harm to living resources or to the quality of the water or the ecological balance of the river since it started its operations in November 2007”.

Consequently, the Court concluded that Uruguay had not breached substantive obligations under the Statute. In addition to this finding, however, the Court emphasized that, under the 1975 Statute, “[t]he Parties have a legal obligation . . . to continue their co-operation through CARU and to enable it to devise the necessary means to promote the equitable utilization of the river, while protecting its environment”.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

4 May 2006

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures submitted by Argentina (French version only)

4 May 2006

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 13 July 2006

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 13 July 2006

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Ranjeva

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Abraham

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Bennouna

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa

English French Bilingual

Order of 23 January 2007

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

The Court decided that the WHO and the member States of that organization entitled to appear before the Court were likely to be able to furnish information on the question, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute. Written statements were filed by 35 States, and subsequently written observations on those written statements were presented by nine States. In the course of the oral proceedings, which took place in October and November 1995, the WHO and 20 States presented oral statements. On 8 July 1996, the Court found that it was not able to give the advisory opinion requested by the World Health Assembly.

It considered that three conditions had to be satisfied in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court when a request for advisory opinion was submitted to it by a specialized agency : the agency requesting the opinion had to be duly authorized, under the Charter, to request opinions of the Court ; the opinion requested had to be on a legal question ; and that question had to be one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting agency. The first two conditions had been met. With regard to the third, however, the Court found that although according to its Constitution the WHO is authorized to deal with the health effects of the use of nuclear weapons, or of any other hazardous activity, and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in, the question put to the Court in the present case related not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects.

The Court further pointed out that international organizations did not, like States, possess a general competence, but were governed by the “principle of speciality”, that is to say, they were invested by the States which created them with powers, the limits of which were a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrusted to them. Besides, the WHO was an international organization of a particular kind — a “specialized agency” forming part of a system based on the Charter of the United Nations, which was designed to organize international co-operation in a coherent fashion by bringing the United Nations, invested with powers of general scope, into relationship with various autonomous and complementary organizations, invested with sectorial powers. The Court therefore concluded that the responsibilities of the WHO were necessarily restricted to the sphere of “public health” and could not encroach on the responsibilities of other parts of the United Nations system. There was no doubt that questions concerning the use of force, the regulation of armaments and disarmament were within the competence of the United Nations and lay outside that of the specialized agencies. The Court accordingly found that the request for an advisory opinion submitted by the WHO did not relate to a question arising “within the scope of [the] activities” of that organization.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Request for Advisory Opinion

3 September 1993

Request for Advisory Opinion

Available in:

English French

English

Transmittal Note verbale (in Spanish) dated 4 July 1995 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, together with Written Comments of the Government of Costa Rica

4 July 1995

Available in:

English

Orders

Order of 13 September 1993

Fixing of time-limit: Written Statements

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 20 June 1994

Extension of time-limits: Written Statements; fixing of time-limit: Written Comments

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Advisory opinions

Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 1996/2

Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996

Available in:

English French

Press releases

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OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

28 May 2002

Available in:

Written proceedings

28 May 2002

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

20 January 2003

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

20 May 2003

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Thursday 13 June 2002, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

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Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 13 June 2002, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 14 June 2002, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 14 June 2002, at 12 noon, at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 4 July 2005, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 5 July 2005, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 6 July 2005, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 8 July 2005, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

27 July 2005

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

29 July 2005

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Orders

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Declaration by Judge Koroma

Declaration by Judge Higgins

Declaration by Judge Buergenthal

Declaration by Judge Elaraby

Separate Opinion by Judge ad hoc Dugard

Separate Opinion by Judge ad hoc Mavungu (translation)

Decision regarding content of written pleadings; fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

Judgments

Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma

Joint Separate Opinion by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma

Declaration of Judge Kooijmans

Separate Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh

Declaration of Judge Elaraby

Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard

Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Mavungu

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary of the Order of 10 July 2002