Contentious

Code

See also

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 3 March 1992 the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya filed in the Registry of the Court two separate Applications instituting proceedings against the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom, in respect of a dispute over the interpretation and application of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971, a dispute arising from acts resulting in the aerial incident that occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988. In its Applications, Libya referred to the charging and indictment of two Libyan nationals by a Grand Jury of the United States of America and by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, respectively, with having caused a bomb to be placed aboard Pan Am flight 103. The bomb subsequently exploded, causing the aeroplane to crash, all persons aboard being killed. Libya pointed out that the acts alleged constituted an offence within the meaning of Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, which it claimed to be the only appropriate Convention in force between the Parties, and asserted that it had fully complied with its own obligations under that instrument, Article 5 of which required a State to establish its own jurisdiction over alleged offenders present in its territory in the event of their non-extradition ; and that there was no extradition treaty between Libya and the respective other Parties, so that Libya was obliged under Article 7 of the Convention to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Libya contended that the United States of America and the United Kingdom were in breach of the Montreal Convention through rejection of its efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, including the Convention itself, in that they were placing pressure upon Libya to surrender the two Libyan nationals for trial. On 3 March 1992, Libya made two separate requests to the Court to indicate forthwith certain provisional measures, namely : (a) to enjoin the United States and the United Kingdom respectively from taking any action against Libya calculated to coerce or compel it to surrender the accused individuals to any jurisdiction outside Libya ; and (b) to ensure that no steps were taken that would prejudice in any way the rights of Libya with respect to the legal proceedings that were the subject of Libya’s Applications.

On 14 April 1992, the Court read two Orders on those requests for the indication of provisional measures, in which it found that the circumstances of the cases were not such as to require the exercise of its powers to indicate such measures. Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, each of the respondent States filed preliminary objections : the United States of America filed certain preliminary objections requesting the Court to adjudge and declare that it lacked jurisdiction and could not entertain the case ; the United Kingdom filed certain preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Libyan claims. In accordance with the provisions of Article 79 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended in those two cases. By Orders dated 22 September 1995, the Court then fixed 22 December 1995 as the time-limit within which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya might present, in each case, a written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised, which it did within the prescribed time-limit.

On 27 February 1998, the Court delivered two Judgments on the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Court first began by dismissing the Respondents’ respective objections to jurisdiction on the basis of the alleged absence of a dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention. It declared that it had jurisdiction on the basis of Article 14, paragraph 1, of that Convention to hear the disputes between Libya and the respondent States concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The Court then went on to dismiss the objection to admissibility based on Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). Lastly, it found that the objection raised by each of the respondent States on the ground that those resolutions would have rendered the claims of Libya without object did not, in the circumstances of the case, have an exclusively preliminary character.

In June 1999, the Court authorized Libya to submit a Reply, and the United Kingdom and the United States to file Rejoinders. Those pleadings were filed by the Parties within the time-limits laid down by the Court and its President.

By two letters of 9 September 2003, the Governments of Libya and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and of Libya and the United States on the other, jointly notified the Court that they had “agreed to discontinue with prejudice the proceedings”. Following those notifications, the President of the Court, on 10 September 2003, made an Order in each case placing on record the discontinuance of the proceedings with prejudice, by agreement of the Parties, and directing the removal of the case from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

3 March 1992

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

3 March 1992

volume I

English

volume I, basic documents

English

volume II

English

volume III

English

Observations and Submissions of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom (French version only)

22 December 1995

Judgment of 27 February 1998

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

English French

Summary 1998/2

Summary of the Judgment of 27 February 1998

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 14 April and 5 June 1972, respectively, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against Iceland concerning a dispute over the proposed extension by Iceland, as from 1 September 1972, of the limits of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from a distance of 12 to a distance of 50 nautical miles. Iceland declared that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and declined to be represented in the proceedings or file pleadings. At the request of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, the Court in 1972 indicated, and in 1973 confirmed, provisional measures to the effect that Iceland should refrain from implementing, with respect to their vessels, the new regulations regarding the extension of the zone of its exclusive fishing rights, and that the annual catch of those vessels in the disputed area should be limited to certain maxima. In Judgments delivered on 2 February 1973, the Court found that it possessed jurisdiction ; and in Judgments on the merits of 25 July 1974, it found that the Icelandic regulations. constituting a unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 nautical miles were not opposable to either the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, that Iceland was not entitled unilaterally to exclude their fishing vessels from the disputed area, and that the Parties were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

14 April 1972

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Interim Measures submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

19 July 1972

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Order of 18 August 1972

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 25 July 1974

Merits

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings against France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific region. France stated that it considered the Court manifestly to lack jurisdiction and refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings. By two Orders of 22 June 1973, the Court, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, indicated provisional measures to the effect, inter alia , that pending judgment France should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. By two Judgments delivered on 20 December 1974, the Court found that the Applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and that it was therefore not called upon to give any decision thereon. In so doing the Court based itself on the conclusion that the objective of Australia and New Zealand had been achieved inasmuch as France, in various public statements, had announced its intention of carrying out no further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of the 1974 series.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

9 May 1973

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1973 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 21, 22, 23 and 25 May 1973, President Lachs presiding, and on 22 June 1973, Vice-President Ammoun presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1974 (bilingual version)

Oral arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the public sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 July and 20 December 1974, President Lachs presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Order of 12 July 1973

Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Gros (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Petrén (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Onyeama (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

English French

Summary 1974/3

Summary of the Judgment of 20 December 1974

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 31 August 1990, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya filed in the Registry a notification of an Agreement that it had concluded with Chad in Algiers on 31 August 1989, in which it was agreed, inter alia , that in the absence of a political settlement of their territorial dispute, they undertook to submit that dispute to the Court. On 3 September 1990, Chad filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya that was based upon the aforementioned Agreement and, subsidiarily, on the Franco-Libyan Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness of 10 August 1955. The Parties subsequently agreed that the proceedings had in fact been instituted by two successive notifications of the Special Agreement constituted by the Algiers Agreement. The written proceedings occasioned the filing, by each of the Parties, of a Memorial, a Counter-Memorial and a Reply, accompanied by voluminous annexes, and the oral proceedings were held in June and July 1993.

The Court delivered its Judgment on 3 February 1994. It began by observing that Libya considered that there was no existing boundary, and had asked the Court to determine one, while Chad considered that there was an existing boundary, and had asked the Court to declare what that boundary was. The Court then referred to the lines claimed by Chad and by Libya, as illustrated in sketch-map No. 1 reproduced in the Judgment (see below p. 146) ; Libya’s claim was on the basis of a coalescence of rights and titles of the indigenous inhabitants, the Senoussi Order, the Ottoman Empire, Italy and Libya itself ; while that of Chad was on the basis of a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness concluded by France and Libya on 10 August 1955, or, alternatively, on French effectivités, either in relation to, or independently of, the provisions of earlier treaties.

The Court noted that it had been recognized by both Parties that the 1955 Treaty between France and Libya was the logical starting-point for consideration of the issues before the Court. Neither Party questioned the validity of the 1955 Treaty, nor did Libya question Chad’s right to invoke against Libya any such provisions thereof as related to the frontiers of Chad. One of the matters specifically addressed was the question of frontiers, dealt with in Article 3 and Annex I. The Court pointed out that if the 1955 Treaty did result in a boundary, this furnished the answer to the issues raised by the Parties. Article 3 of the Treaty provided that France and Libya recognized that the frontiers between, inter alia, the territories of French Equatorial Africa and the territory of Libya were those that resulted from a number of international instruments in force on the date of the constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya and reproduced in Annex I to the Treaty. In the view of the Court, the terms of the Treaty signified that the Parties thereby recognized complete frontiers between their respective territories as resulting from the combined effect of all the instruments listed in Annex I. By entering into the Treaty, the Parties recognized the frontiers to which the text of the Treaty referred ; the task of the Court was thus to determine the exact content of the undertaking entered into. The Court specified in that regard that there was nothing to prevent the Parties from deciding by mutual agreement to consider a certain line as a frontier, whatever the previous status of that line. If it was already a territorial boundary, it was confirmed purely and simply.

It was clear to the Court that — contrary to what was contended by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya — the Parties had agreed to consider the instruments listed as being in force for the purpose of Article 3, since otherwise they would not have included them in the Annex. Having concluded that the Contracting Parties wished, by the 1955 Treaty, to define their common frontier, the Court considered what that frontier was. Accordingly it proceeded to a detailed study of the instruments relevant to the case, i.e., (a) to the east of the line of 16° longitude, the Anglo-French Declaration of 1899 — which defined a line limiting the French zone (or sphere of influence) to the north-east in the direction of Egypt and the Nile Valley, already under British control — and the Convention of 8 September 1919 signed at Paris between Great Britain and France, which resolved the question of the location of the boundary of the French zone under the 1899 Declaration ; (b) to the west of the line of 16° longitude, the Franco-Italian Agreement (Exchange of Letters) of 1 November 1902, which referred to the map annexed to the Declaration of 21 March 1899. The Court pointed out that that map could only be the map in the Livre jaune published by the French authorities in 1899 and which showed a dotted line indicating the frontier of Tripolitania.

The Court then described the line resulting from those relevant international instruments. Considering the attitudes adopted subsequently by the Parties with regard to their frontiers, it reached the conclusion that the existence of a determined frontier had been accepted and acted upon by the Parties. Lastly, referring to the provision of the 1955 Treaty according to which it had been concluded for a period of 20 years and could be terminated unilaterally, the Court indicated that that Treaty had to be taken to have determined a permanent frontier, and observed that, when a boundary has been the subject of agreement, its continued existence is not dependent upon the continuing life of the Treaty under which that boundary was agreed.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

31 August 1990

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1993/14 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Monday 14 June 1993, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Sir Robert Jennings presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1993/15 (bilingual version)

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 19 May 1989 the Republic of Nauru filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia in respect of a dispute concerning the rehabilitation of certain phosphate lands mined under Australian administration before Nauruan independence. In its Application, Nauru claimed that Australia had breached the trusteeship obligations it had accepted under Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations and under the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru of 1 November 1947. Nauru further claimed that Australia had breached certain obligations towards Nauru under general international law, more particularly with regard to the implementation of the principle of self-determination and of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. Australia was said to have incurred an international legal responsibility and to be bound to make restitution or other appropriate reparation to Nauru for the damage and prejudice suffered. Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, Australia raised certain preliminary objections relating to the admissibility of the Application and the jurisdiction of the Court.

On 26 June 1992, the Court delivered its Judgment on those questions. With regard to the matter of its jurisdiction, the Court noted that Nauru based that jurisdiction on the declarations whereby Australia and Nauru had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. The declaration of Australia specified that it did “not apply to any dispute in regard to which the Parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement”. Referring to the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947 and relying upon the reservation contained in its declaration to assert that the Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with Nauru’s Application, Australia argued that any dispute which arose in the course of the trusteeship between “the Administering Authority and the indigenous inhabitants” should be regarded as having been settled by the very fact of the termination of the trusteeship (provided that that termination had been unconditional) as well as by the effect of the Agreement relating to the Nauru Island Phosphate Industry of 1967, concluded between the Nauru Local Government Council, on the one hand, and Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, on the other, whereby Nauru was said to have waived its claims to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands. As Australia and Nauru did not, after 31 January 1968, when Nauru acceded to independence, conclude any agreement whereby the two States undertook to settle their dispute relating to rehabilitation, the Court rejected that first preliminary objection of Australia. It likewise rejected the second, third, fourth and fifth objections raised by Australia.

The Court then considered the objection by Australia based on the fact that New Zealand and the United Kingdom were not parties to the proceedings. It noted that the three Governments mentioned in the Trusteeship Agreement constituted, in the very terms of that Agreement, “the Administering Authority” for Nauru ; but this Authority did not have an international legal personality distinct from those of the States thus designated ; and that, of those States, Australia played a very special role, established, in particular, by the Trusteeship Agreement. The Court did not consider, to begin with, that any reason had been shown why a claim brought against only one of the three States should be declared inadmissible in limine litis, merely because that claim raised questions regarding the administration of the territory, which was shared with the two other States. It further considered, inter alia, that it was in no way precluded from adjudicating upon the claims submitted to it, provided the legal interests of the third State which might possibly be affected did not form the actual subject-matter of the decision requested. Where the Court was so entitled to act, the interests of the third State which was not a party to the case were protected by Article 59 of the Statute. The Court found that, in the instant case, the interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom did not constitute the actual subject-matter of the Judgment to be rendered on the merits of Nauru’s Application and that, consequently, it could not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction and that the objection argued on that point should be dismissed.

Lastly, the Court upheld the preliminary objection addressed by Australia to the claim by Nauru concerning the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners, according to which it was inadmissible on the ground that it was a completely new claim which appeared for the first time in the Memorial, and that the object of the dispute originally submitted to the Court would have been transformed if it had dealt with that request. A Counter-Memorial of Australia on the merits was subsequently filed and the Court fixed the dates for the filing of a Reply by the Applicant and a Rejoinder by the Respondent. However, before those two pleadings were filed, the two Parties, by a joint notification deposited on 9 September 1993, informed the Court that they had, in consequence of having reached a settlement, agreed to discontinue the proceedings. Accordingly, the case was removed from the General List by an Order of the Court of 13 September 1993.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

19 May 1989

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Republic of Nauru

20 March 1990

Available in:

English

Written Statement of Nauru

8 July 1991

Oral proceedings

Orders

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 August 1989, Guinea-Bissau instituted proceedings against Senegal, on the basis of the declarations made by both States under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. Guinea-Bissau explained that, notwithstanding the negotiations pursued from 1977 onwards, the two States had been unable to reach a settlement of a dispute concerning the maritime delimitation to be effected between them. Consequently they had jointly consented, by an Arbitration Agreement dated 12 March 1985, to submit that dispute to an Arbitration Tribunal composed of three members. Guinea-Bissau indicated that, according to the terms of Article 2 of that Agreement, the Tribunal had been asked to rule on the following twofold question:

“1. Does the Agreement concluded by an exchange of letters [between France and Portugal] on 26 April 1960, and which relates to the maritime boundary, have the force of law in the relations between the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Senegal ?

2. In the event of a negative answer to the first question, what is the course of the line delimiting the maritime territories appertaining to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Senegal respectively ?”

Guinea-Bissau added that it had been specified, in Article 9 of the Agreement, that the Tribunal would inform the two Governments of its decision regarding the questions set forth in Article 2, and that that decision should include the drawing of the frontier line on a map. According to the Application, the Tribunal communicated to the Parties on 31 July 1989 a “text that was supposed to serve as an award” but did not in fact amount to one. Guinea-Bissau asserted that the decision was inexistent as the majority of two arbitrators (against one) that had voted in favour of the text was no more than apparent given that one of the two arbitrators — in fact the President of the Tribunal — was said to have “expressed a view in contradiction with the one apparently adopted by the vote”, in a declaration appended thereto. Subsidiarily, Guinea-Bissau maintained that the Award was null and void, as the Tribunal had failed, in various ways (see explanation below) to accomplish the task assigned to it by the Agreement. By an Order dated 12 February 1990, the Court dismissed a Request for the indication of provisional measures presented by Guinea-Bissau.

It delivered its Judgment on 12 November 1991. The Court first considered its jurisdiction, and, in particular, found that Guinea-Bissau’s declaration contained no reservation, but that the declaration of Senegal, which replaced a previous declaration of 3 May 1985, provided among other things that it was applicable only to “all legal disputes arising after the present declaration . . .”. As the Parties agreed that only the dispute relating to the Award rendered by the Tribunal (which arose after the Senegalese declaration) was the subject of the proceedings before the Court and that it should not be seen as an appeal from the Award, or as an application for revision of it, the Court accordingly regarded its jurisdiction as established. It then rejected, inter alia, Senegal’s contention that Guinea-Bissau’s Application, or the arguments used in support of it, amounted to an abuse of process. With regard to Guinea-Bissau’s contention that the Award was inexistent, the Court considered that the view expressed by the President of the Tribunal in his declaration constituted only an indication of what he considered would have been a better course. His position therefore could not be regarded as standing in contradiction with the position adopted by the Award. The Court accordingly dismissed the contention of Guinea-Bissau that the Award was inexistent for lack of a real majority.

The Court then examined the question of the nullity of the Award, as Guinea-Bissau had observed that the Tribunal had not replied to the second question put in Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement and had not appended to the Award the map provided for in Article 9 of that Agreement. According to Guinea-Bissau, those two omissions constituted an excès de pouvoir. It was further asserted that no reasons had been given by the Tribunal for its decision. With regard to the absence of a reply to the second question, the Court recognized that the structure of the Award was, in that respect, open to criticism, but concluded that the Award was not flawed by any failure to decide. The Court then observed that the Tribunal’s statement of reasoning, while succinct, was clear and precise, and concluded that the second contention of Guinea-Bissau must also be dismissed. With regard to the validity of the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal on the issue of whether it was required to answer the second question, the Court recalled that an international tribunal normally had the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and the power to interpret for that purpose the instruments which governed that jurisdiction. It observed that Guinea-Bissau was in fact criticizing the interpretation in the Award of the provisions of the Arbitration Agreement which determine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and proposing another interpretation. Further to a detailed consideration of Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, it concluded that the Tribunal had not acted in manifest breach of its competence to determine its own jurisdiction by deciding that it was not required to answer the second question except in the event of a negative answer to the first. Then, with respect to the argument of Guinea-Bissau that the answer given by the Tribunal to the first question was a partially negative answer and that this sufficed to satisfy the prescribed condition for entering into the second question, the Court found that the answer given achieved a partial delimitation, and that the Tribunal had thus been able to find, without manifest breach of its competence, that its answer to the first question was not a negative one. The Court concluded that, in this respect also, the contention of Guinea-Bissau that the entire Award was a nullity must be rejected. It considered moreover that the absence of a map could not in this case constitute such an irregularity as would render the Award invalid.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 August 1989

Available in:

English French

Annex to the Application instituting proceedings of the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989)

23 August 1989

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures (French version only)

18 January 1990

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

French

Observations of the Government of Senegal on the Request by the Government of Guinea-Bissau for the indication of Provisional Measures (French version only)

7 February 1990

Verbatim record 1990/1 (bilingual version)

Minute of the public sitting held on Monday 12 February 1990, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Ruda presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1990/2 (bilingual version)

Minute of the public sitting held on Monday 12 February 1990, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Ruda presiding

Order of 1 November 1989

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 2 March 1990

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Summary of the Order of 2 March 1990

Available in:

English French

Summary 1991/2

Summary of the Judgment of 12 November 1991

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In February 1971, following an incident involving the diversion to Pakistan of an Indian aircraft, India suspended overflights of its territory by Pakistan civil aircraft. Pakistan took the view that this action was in breach of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation and the International Air Services Transit Agreement and complained to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization. India raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Council, but these were rejected and India appealed to the Court. During the written and oral proceedings, Pakistan contended, inter alia , that the Court was not competent to hear the appeal. In its Judgment of 18 August 1972, the Court found that it was competent to hear the appeal of India. It further decided that the ICAO Council was competent to deal with both the Application and the Complaint of which it had been seised by Pakistan, and accordingly dismissed the appeal laid before it by the Government of India.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

30 August 1971

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1972 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 19 June to 3 July, and on 18 August 1972, Vice-President Ammoun presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Summary of the Judgment of 18 August 1972

Available in:

English French

Press releases

See also

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

3 March 1992

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

3 March 1992

Observations and Submissions of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the Preliminary Objections of the United States of America (French version only)

22 December 1995

Judgment of 27 February 1998

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

English French

Summary 1998/1

Summary of the Judgment of 27 February 1998

Available in:

English French

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting Proceedings

4 November 1960

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

10 January 1964

Books VII-X

English

Reply of the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia

20 June 1964

Available in:

English

Rejoinder filed by the Government of the Republic of South Africa

22 December 1964

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 21 December 1962

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Judgment of 18 July 1966

Second Phase

Summary of the Judgment of 21 December 1962

Available in:

English French

Summary 1966/2

Summary of the Judgment of 18 July 1966

Available in:

English French

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

6 October 1959

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Verbatim record 1961 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Hearings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 10 to 15 April 1961, and on 26 May 1961, the President, M. Winiarski, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1962 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 1 to 31 March 1962, and on 15 June 1962, the President, M. Winiarski, presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 26 May 1961

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Merits

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 1961/1

Summary of the Judgment of 26 May 1961

Available in:

English French

Summary 1962/1

Summary of the Judgment of 15 June 1962

Available in:

English French

Press release 1961/12

﻿Contentious

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

3 March 1992

Available in:

Written proceedings

3 March 1992

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

20 December 1993

Available in:

20 June 1995

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

volume I

volume I, basic documents

volume II

volume III

22 December 1995

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

31 March 1999

Available in:

29 June 2000

Available in:

1 August 2001

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Thursday 26 March 1992, at 10.20 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Oda presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 26 March 1992, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Oda presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Saturday 28 March 1992, at 9 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Oda presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Saturday 28 March 1992, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Oda presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 13 October 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 14 October 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 17 October 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 17 October 1997, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 20 October 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 22 October 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

2 April 1992

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

4 November 1997

Available in:

6 November 1997

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Orders

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

Contentious