Written statement of Somalia concerning the preliminary objections of Kenya

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
5 FEBRUARY 2016
CASE CONCERNING
MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
SOMALIA
v.
KENYA
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SOMALIA
CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS OF KENYA
VOLUME I

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................1
Section I. Summary of Somalia’s Response to Kenya’s Preliminary
Objections...............................................................................2
A. A Preliminary Point of Agreement: The Court’s
Jurisdiction to Delimit Beyond 200 M in the Absence of
Recommendations by the CLCS..........................................4
B. The Memorandum of Understanding and Kenya’s
Declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the
Court ....................................................................................5
C. The Consequences of Kenya’s Approach..........................10
D. The Context in which the MOU Was Adopted..................12
Section II. Structure of the Written Statement .......................................16
Chapter 2. Factual Background..............................................................................19
Section I. The Origins of the MOU.......................................................20
Section II. The Parties’ Subsequent Conduct .........................................32
Section III. The Status of the MOU.........................................................53
Chapter 3. The MOU Does Not Fall within the Ambit of Kenya’s Reservation...63
Section I. The Correct Interpretation of the MOU................................66
A. The Object and Purpose of the MOU ................................70
B. The Text of the MOU within the Relevant Context ..........75
C. The Subsequent Practice of the Parties..............................80
D. A Systemic Interpretation of the MOU..............................86
E. The Drafting History of the MOU .....................................90
ii
Section II. The Absence of Any Agreed Exclusive Method of
Settlement within the Meaning of Kenya’s Optional
Declaration..........................................................................101
A. The MOU Does Not Fall within the Scope of Kenya’s
Reservation ......................................................................101
B. Part XV of UNCLOS Poses No Obstacle to the Court’s
Jurisdiction.......................................................................104
Chapter 4. In Any Case, the Parties Have Fulfilled Their Purported Obligation
to Negotiate........................................................................................109
Section I. Unfeasibility of Successful Negotiations............................110
Section II. Kenya’s Artificial Objection Based on the Doctrine of
“Unclean Hands” ................................................................113
Submissions.........................................................................................................117
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia
v. Kenya) was brought before the Court by means of an Application filed by the
Federal Republic of Somalia on 28 August 2014. The Application concerns
“the establishment of the single maritime boundary
between Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean
delimiting the territorial sea, exclusive economic
zone (“EEZ”) and continental shelf, including the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
(‘M’)”.1
1.2. By Order of 18 October 2014, the Court fixed 13 July 2015 and 27 May
2016 as the time limits, respectively, for the Memorial and Counter Memorial of
Somalia and Kenya. Somalia filed its Memorial on the scheduled date and
requested the Court:
“1. To determine the complete course of the
maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya
in the Indian Ocean, including in the continental
shelf beyond 200 M, on the basis of
international law.
2. To determine the maritime boundary between
Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean on the
basis of the following geographical coordinates
… .
3. To adjudge and declare that Kenya, by its
conduct in the disputed area, has violated its
international obligations to respect the

1 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Application Instituting
Proceedings (28 Aug. 2014), para. 2.
2
sovereignty, and sovereign rights and
jurisdiction of Somalia, and is responsible under
international law to make full reparation to
Somalia, including inter alia by making
available to Somalia all seismic data acquired in
the areas that are determined by the Court to be
subject to the sovereignty and/or sovereign
rights and jurisdiction of Somalia, and to repair
in full all damage that has been suffered by
Somalia by the payment of appropriate
compensation”.2
1.3. On 7 October 2015, the Republic of Kenya raised Preliminary Objections
to jurisdiction and admissibility. The Order of the Court dated 9 October 2015
fixed 5 February 2016 as the time limit within which Somalia may present a
written statement of its observations and submissions in response to Kenya’s
Preliminary Objections. Somalia files this Written Statement pursuant to that
Order.
Section I. Summary of Somalia’s Response to Kenya’s Preliminary
Objections
1.4. By its Preliminary Objections, Kenya seeks to persuade the Court not to
engage with any aspect of the merits of Somalia’s Application concerning the
delimitation of the entirety of the Parties’ maritime boundary, including the
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) and continental shelf, both
within and beyond 200 nautical miles (“M”). Kenya argues that the Court has no
jurisdiction, and invites it to consign the Parties to an open-ended and indefinite
process of negotiation—a course that they have already pursued but has failed to
yield any prospect of resolving this long-running dispute.

2 Memorial of Somalia (hereinafter “MS”) (13 July 2015), pp. 147-148.
3
1.5. In challenging the Court’s jurisdiction to hear Somalia’s Application,
Kenya seeks to foreclose any possibility of an independent determination by the
Court of the Parties’ maritime boundary in accordance with international law. It
thereby endeavours to perpetuate a status quo that is characterised by Kenya’s
marked departure from its previous recognition of an equidistant maritime
boundary; its expansive and novel claim to a straight boundary along a parallel of
latitude; and its extensive unilateral activities throughout the disputed area.
1.6. For reasons explained in Somalia’s Memorial, Kenya’s position regarding
the location of the maritime boundary is legally untenable and its unilateral
activities are a violation of Somalia’s sovereign rights. It therefore serves Kenya’s
interests—but not Somalia’s—to prevent the merits of Somalia’s claims from
receiving independent judicial appraisal. This is the true purpose of Kenya’s
Preliminary Objections.
1.7. Kenya contests the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of a single short
excerpt of a two-page Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) concerning the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS” or “Commission”).3
As Somalia will demonstrate, Kenya is seeking to use a document that was
intended solely to facilitate the Commission’s delineation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 M—a process that has no connection with or implications for the
territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf up to 200 M—in order to frustrate the
delimitation of the entire maritime boundary by the Court.

3 As in its Memorial, Somalia uses the term “delineation” to describe the process under Article 76
of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “the Convention”), whereby
States submit information to the CLCS, which then makes recommendations on the location of the
outer-limits of the continental shelf, the point at which national jurisdiction over the continental
shelf ends and the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority begins.
4
1.8. There is no textual, contextual or logical foundation for Kenya’s
argument, which ignores the cardinal distinction between the processes of
delimitation and delineation. For the reasons set out in this Written Statement,
Kenya’s reliance on the MOU in an effort to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is
misconceived and entirely without merit. The Preliminary Objections are a
transparent attempt to insulate Kenya’s unlawful conduct from legal scrutiny. If
acceded to, Kenya’s argument would deprive the Court of a meaningful role in
the resolution not only of this maritime boundary dispute, but of other maritime
boundary disputes, including those that might be brought before it under Part XV
of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “the
Convention”). There is no obstacle to the Court’s ability to hear the merits of
Somalia’s Application in its entirety, and Somalia invites the Court to firmly so
rule.
A. A PRELIMINARY POINT OF AGREEMENT: THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO
DELIMIT BEYOND 200 M IN THE ABSENCE OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE CLCS
1.9. Before providing an overview of Somalia’s submissions in response to
Kenya’s objections, it is appropriate to highlight an important point of common
ground between the Parties. In Chapter 7 of its Memorial, Somalia set out the
basis of the Court’s jurisdiction to delimit maritime boundaries beyond 200 M
before the CLCS has made recommendations in respect of the delineation of the
outer continental shelf of the States concerned.4 Somalia explained why the
Court’s jurisdiction is not affected by the absence of the delineation of the outer
limits of the coastal States’ respective entitlements by the CLCS. Delineation is
an entirely separate scientific process that has no bearing or effect on the legal
question of delimitation, whether as a matter of process or substance.

4 MS, paras. 7.3-7.27.
5
1.10. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections do not dispute any aspect of that analysis.
Accordingly, there is no doubt—and certainly no difference between the
Parties—that as a matter of general principle, the Court is not required to await
the final delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf before delimiting
the Parties’ maritime boundary beyond 200 M. The Court’s competence to
undertake that exercise without reference to the status of proceedings before the
CLCS is thus a matter of agreement between the Parties. Accordingly, in light of
the Parties’ common position, Somalia does not address the issue further in this
Written Statement. Instead, Somalia’s submissions are confined to the single
issue that divides the Parties: the interpretation, status and effect of the MOU.
B. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND KENYA’S DECLARATION
UNDER ARTICLE 36(2) OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT
1.11. The entirety of Kenya’s objection to the Court’s jurisdiction is based on
the alleged effect of the bilateral MOU signed by representatives of the Parties in
Nairobi on 7 April 2009. The MOU was drawn up by the Government of Norway
(which was providing assistance to Somalia and Kenya in connection with their
submissions to the CLCS) in order to facilitate the delineation of the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 M by the CLCS. Specifically, the MOU was
intended to ensure that the CLCS could issue recommendations concerning the
outer limits of the shelf appurtenant to the Parties’ coasts—a process that required
each Party to consent to the CLCS’s review of the other’s submission. Contrary
to the view Kenya now takes, this was the MOU’s exclusive object and purpose.
1.12. The MOU was never ratified in accordance with the requirements of
Somalia’s Transitional Federal Charter. A short while after the instrument was
signed in Nairobi, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Parliament voted to reject it. As
a consequence, the MOU never entered force in accordance with the Constitution
of Somalia.
6
1.13. Notwithstanding the MOU’s questionable status as a binding agreement,
Kenya contends that it brings the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute within the
scope of the first reservation to its Declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statute
of the Court, which excludes: “Disputes in regard to which the Parties to the
dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method or
methods of settlement”. It submits that by signing the MOU, the Parties agreed
that their entire maritime boundary would be delimited “[o]nly after the CLCS
has made its recommendations concerning establishment of the outer limits of the
continental shelf” and “[b]y means of a negotiated agreement, not by recourse to
the Court”.5
1.14. Kenya’s argument faces a number of formidable hurdles. To succeed in its
objection, Kenya has the burden of establishing that the MOU is a valid and
binding agreement which:
(1) Contains a clear statement that the Parties must have
exclusive recourse to some other method of settling the
dispute;
(2) Concerns the entirety of the disputed maritime boundary,
including the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf,
both within and beyond 200 M; and
(3) Provides that recourse to the other method of dispute
settlement may only take place after the CLCS has made
its recommendations on delineation.
1.15. Kenya’s submissions do not come close to succeeding on any of these
three points.

5 Preliminary Objections of the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter “KPO”) (7 Oct. 2015), para. 3.
7
1.16. First, quite apart from the significant doubt concerning the legal status of
the unratified instrument, the text, drafting history and purpose of the MOU do
not provide any support for Kenya’s claim that it was intended to establish a
mechanism for settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute in whole or in any
part. The MOU was concerned exclusively with enabling the delineation of the
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M by the CLCS, as its title makes
clear: “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic
of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to
grant to each other No-Objection in respect of submissions on the Outer Limits of
the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf”.6 This interpretation is reinforced by the text of the
MOU, which contains no reference to a particular method of settlement and has
no exclusionary language capable of preventing judicial determination of the
dispute. This is also confirmed by the preparatory material relating to the drafting
of the MOU.
1.17. Kenya has not provided any evidence to the Court to show a different
intent in the preparatory material. Not a single word in the material cited by
Kenya in its Preliminary Objections suggests that the MOU was concerned with
establishing a mechanism (whether exclusive or otherwise) for resolving the
disputed maritime boundary. Nor has Somalia been able to locate or identify any
material to suggest this was the intention or understanding of the MOU’s drafters.
Had the Parties intended to confine themselves to reaching a negotiated
settlement of their boundary dispute, one would expect to see this clearly

6 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the
Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to Grant to Each Other No-Objection in
Respect of Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2599 U.N.T.S. 35 (hereinafter “2009
MOU”) (7 Apr. 2009) (emphasis added). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III, Annex 6.
8
reflected in the contemporaneous correspondence, drafts and diplomatic
exchanges. Yet, Kenya has put no documentary evidence into the record to show
that the Parties intended to restrict themselves to a particular method of dispute
resolution or to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court. In the absence of any such
clear or express reference or statement—in the text of the MOU or the material
relating to its preparation—Kenya’s objection to jurisdiction is untenable and, in
Somalia’s submission, unarguable.
1.18. The subsequent conduct of the Parties also contradicts Kenya’s
interpretation. As Somalia will demonstrate, in the years following the MOU
Kenya repeatedly described the document as a non-objection agreement. At no
point prior to filing its Preliminary Objections did Kenya ever assert that the
MOU was an agreement for any other purpose, and it never claimed that it was an
agreement to exclude “recourse to some other method or methods of settlement”
of the disputed maritime boundary. Somalia has likewise always maintained that
the MOU was exclusively concerned with the Parties’ CLCS submissions.
1.19. In 2014—at Kenya’s invitation—the Parties engaged in detailed and
ultimately fruitless negotiations concerning their maritime boundary. During
those negotiations it was never suggested that the MOU prescribed a particular
means of resolving the dispute. Indeed, Kenya itself even raised the possibility of
submitting the dispute to binding international arbitration: a suggestion flatly at
odds with the position it now advances before the Court.
1.20. Second, and in any event, on its own terms the MOU is plainly limited to
matters relating to the outer continental shelf beyond 200 M, and only to matters
of delineation. It does not address the continental shelf within 200 M and does not
refer (even in passing) to the territorial sea or EEZ. On any view, therefore, the
MOU cannot affect the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to delimitation of the
9
territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf within 200 M. Kenya’s attempt to use a
document concerning only delineation of the outer continental shelf to bar the
Court from addressing delimitation of any of the disputed maritime zones is thus
fatally flawed.
1.21. Third, on Kenya’s newly imagined approach, by signing the MOU the
Parties intended to enter a binding pact that they would not reach a negotiated
settlement in respect of any part of the maritime boundary until after the CLCS
issued its recommendations on the outer limits of the continental shelf. This is
illogical. There is no reason why the Parties would have deliberately agreed that
the disputed maritime boundary could only be resolved by agreement, while
simultaneously agreeing to exclude the possibility of agreement until some
unknown future date after the CLCS completed its delineation recommendations
(a process that would inevitably take many years and would have no effect on
delimitation).
1.22. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections appear to recognise the contradiction
inherent in its argument. Kenya’s attempt to square the circle in a discreet
footnote to its submissions belies the fundamental flaw in its interpretation of the
MOU. In that footnote, Kenya asserts that
“[t]he MOU did not preclude on-going negotiations
pending completion of the CLCS review, but
provided that the final agreement would only be
reached after the CLCS had made its
recommendations”.7

7 KPO, p. 25, fn. 64.
10
1.23. There is no logical reason why the Parties would simultaneously have
elected to agree that (1) negotiations are the only means of settling the boundary
dispute; but (2) a negotiated settlement is excluded for a potentially indefinite
period of time until the CLCS issues recommendations that have no bearing on
the dispute subject to negotiation. Kenya’s argument treats the MOU both as an
agreement to agree and as an agreement not to agree. That is a patently
nonsensical and self-contradictory proposition, and one that is undermined by the
negotiations that actually took place. As the evidence before the Court indicates,
at no point in those negotiations did Kenya ever indicate that its conduct was
premised on the understanding that negotiations could only take place on the
basis that they would not reach a conclusion. Kenya’s attempt to escape the result
of its interpretation highlights the flaw that runs throughout its case.
C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF KENYA’S APPROACH
1.24. Quite apart from the textual and contextual problems with Kenya’s
reliance on the MOU, the consequences of Kenya’s approach also demonstrate
that its argument cannot be correct.
1.25. On Kenya’s case, the MOU deliberately established bilateral negotiations
as the only mechanism for resolving the Parties’ disputed maritime boundary. On
that basis, any independent judicial determination of the dispute was permanently
ruled out, no matter how intractable or unrealistic the Parties’ negotiating
positions, and regardless of how long they spent unsuccessfully attempting to
reach agreement. Either Party could forestall settlement, forever if so desired,
simply by adhering to a position the other could not accept.
11
1.26. As Somalia has explained in its Memorial,8 there is a fundamental
difference of principle between the Parties concerning the location of the
maritime boundary in the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf (both within
and beyond 200 M). Somalia claims an equidistance line following from the
three-step process in accordance with the established principles under the Court’s
jurisprudence and Articles 15, 74 and 83 of UNCLOS, while Kenya advances a
novel claim to a boundary along a parallel of latitude. The Parties have already
sought to reach a negotiated solution and have had no success. Adjudication by
the Court therefore offers the only realistic prospect of a clear and binding
resolution of the dispute.
1.27. Further, in addition to the consequences in this case, Kenya’s submissions
would have far-reaching implications for other maritime boundary disputes.
Article 74(1) of UNCLOS provides that the delimitation of the EEZ between
adjacent or opposite coasts “shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law”. Article 83 contains an identically worded provision in respect
of the delimitation of the continental shelf. The fifth operative paragraph of the
MOU closely mirrors and is rather obviously drawn from the language of Articles
74 and 83: “The delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute …
shall be agreed between the two coastal States on the basis of international law”.
1.28. If Kenya were correct that this particular language of the MOU is an
agreement “to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement”, it
would follow that the equivalent language in Article 74 and 83 of UNCLOS (on
which that text of the MOU is drawn) would also constitute such an agreement. If
so, and on Kenya’s approach, the language to be found in those Articles would

8 MS, paras. 1.17-1.24.
12
have the effect of automatically depriving the Court of jurisdiction under Article
36(2) of the Statute in respect of any dispute concerning the delimitation of the
EEZ or continental shelf of a State that is a party to UNCLOS and whose
Optional Clause declaration contains a similarly worded reservation.
1.29. As Kenya notes in its Preliminary Objections, the reservation it relies on
is “[t]he most frequent reservation” to the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction.9 Of the 34 other States listed in Kenya’s Preliminary Objections that
have entered the same reservation, 33 have also ratified UNCLOS.10 It would be
remarkable if the mere act of ratifying UNCLOS had the consequence of
triggering those States’ reservations and thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the
Court in respect of any maritime delimitation dispute involving those States. That
outcome—which is the logical consequence of Kenya’s submission—cannot have
been intended by the framers of UNCLOS or its signatories. This provides further
confirmation that Kenya’s reliance on the MOU is misplaced.
D. THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE MOU WAS ADOPTED
1.30. Apparently conscious of the evidentiary weaknesses and logical flaws
inherent in its argument, Kenya attempts to bolster its Preliminary Objections
with a selective and misleading description of the circumstances in which the
MOU was drafted, discussed and signed. A proper understanding of the context
in which the MOU was produced underscores the conclusion that it was only

9 KPO, para. 142 (citing R. Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013),
464).
10 Those States are: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Djibouti, Estonia, the
Gambia, Germany, the Republic of Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ivory Coast, Lesotho,
Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname and the
United Kingdom.
13
concerned with facilitating the delineation of the outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 M and was never intended to enshrine a particular method for
settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute. For this reason, Somalia responds
in this Written Statement to Kenya’s skewed presentation of the facts by
providing an accurate account of the relevant factual background.
1.31. In assessing Kenya’s argument that the MOU excludes the jurisdiction of
the Court in this case, it is appropriate for the Court to have regard to the broader
context in which the MOU came to be drafted and agreed in early 2009.
Consideration of that context reinforces the implausibility of Kenya’s suggestion
that the Parties intended to establish a negotiated agreement as the exclusive
method of resolving the disputed boundary.
1.32. The MOU was drafted over a very brief period in March 2009. This was a
time of considerable flux for Somalia, which was undergoing a delicate transition
from almost two decades of civil war, during which the country had effectively
ceased functioning as a State. As Somalia has explained in its Memorial,11
following the armed overthrow of the government in 1991, law and order
collapsed and the institutions of government disintegrated. Somalia was plunged
into a long period of violence and successive humanitarian disasters, as rival
factions battled for control and the country’s resources were plundered. For many
years there was no effective government in Somalia.
1.33. The grave humanitarian toll of the ongoing conflict, and the increasingly
precarious stability of the wider region, ultimately brought about concerted
intervention by a range of international bodies acting under the direction of the

11 See MS, paras. 1.11–1.12.
14
United Nations. With extensive support and guidance from those bodies, the
fragile process of re-establishing the framework for a functioning State was
begun. As Somalia explains in this Written Statement, that process was very
much a work in progress in 2009. A new transitional government had only
recently come into office. Years of population displacement and the uncontrolled
depletion of Somalia’s assets meant that resources and administrative expertise
were both in short supply. Terrorism, armed militias and severe poverty all
presented existential threats to Somalia’s ability to operate as a functioning State.
The nascent institutions of the Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”) were
therefore heavily reliant on outside assistance from the international community
in order to carry out the basic tasks of establishing security and protecting
Somalia’s national interests.
1.34. It was against this background that in early 2009 the U.N. Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia (“SRSG”) presented to the
then newly established TFG drafts of Somalia’s preliminary information
indicative of the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 M, together with
a draft of the MOU, both of which had been prepared with Norway’s technical
assistance. The documents had been prepared by Norway at the SRSG’s
initiative, without the TFG’s prior knowledge, in order to help Somalia meet the
rapidly approaching 13 May 2009 deadline for the filing of preliminary
information with the CLCS.
1.35. The TFG was anxious to ensure that Somalia did not suffer further losses
of its resources (in this case, those of its continental shelf beyond 200 M) by
failing to meet the CLCS deadline. It thus welcomed Norway’s assistance. Given
its lack of expertise in such matters, the tight time frame and the many other
pressing concerns facing the TFG at this time, it naturally deferred to Norway’s
superior technical expertise and knowledge of CLCS procedure.
15
1.36. The impending deadline for filing submissions with the CLCS did not
have any bearing on the status of the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute.
Norway’s assistance was confined to matters relating to the CLCS. Contrary to
the presentation in Kenya’s Preliminary Objections, Somalia had virtually no
input in negotiating and drafting of the MOU.
1.37. Kenya’s suggestion that the Parties intended to restrict themselves to an
exclusive method of resolving the disputed maritime boundary is impossible to
reconcile with this broader context. At that precarious juncture in its
development, Somalia had no interest in binding itself to reach a negotiated
settlement, still less a settlement that could not be concluded until after the CLCS
made its recommendations on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond
200 M many years later. On the contrary, Somalia had every reason for keeping
all options open, particularly those that would result in a fair, independent and
expeditious appraisal of the merits of its claim, and which would not leave it
vulnerable to further denudation of its natural resources nor entrench instability in
relation to its borders. Having relied heavily on the assistance of the international
community, Somalia had no reason to exclude the Court from resolving this issue
of immense national importance.
1.38. It follows that Kenya’s Preliminary Objections do not merely seek to rewrite
the MOU, they also seek to re-write the Parties’ recent history and to
capitalise on Somalia’s vulnerability during a delicate transitional moment after
years of upheaval.
1.39. After many years of conflict and exploitation, Somalia is proud to be in a
position to stand on its own feet, and claim its lawful sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in the waters and seabed adjacent to its coast. By making its
Application to the Court, Somalia seeks nothing more—and nothing less—than a
16
fair hearing of the legal merits of the Parties’ respective claims concerning their
maritime boundary. For the reasons developed in this Written Statement, Kenya’s
attempt to prevent that from happening is factually and legally without merit.
Section II. Structure of the Written Statement
1.40. Somalia’s Written Statement consists of two volumes. Volume I contains
the main text. Volume II contains supporting materials.
1.41. The main text of this Written Statement, Volume I, consists of four
chapters followed by Somalia’s Submissions in response to Kenya’s Preliminary
Objections.
1.42. After this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an account of the relevant
facts. The chapter responds to Kenya’s selective presentation of the facts in its
Preliminary Objections. Section I describes the origins of the MOU. Somalia
provides a detailed explanation of the circumstances in which the MOU was
drafted and signed in 2009. The contemporaneous evidence unequivocally
establishes that the Parties never intended the MOU to create a binding
mechanism for resolving the disputed maritime boundary. Section II then
describes the Parties’ subsequent conduct following the conclusion of the MOU.
This reinforces the conclusion that the MOU was intended and understood solely
as a non-objection agreement in relation to the Parties’ CLCS submissions.
Section III concludes with an explanation of the significant doubts regarding the
legal status of the MOU. It then describes the conduct by Kenya that caused
Somalia to file an objection to the consideration of Kenya’s submission by the
CLCS, and the reasons why that objection was subsequently withdrawn following
Somalia’s Application to the Court.
17
1.43. Chapter 3 explains why the MOU does not fall within the ambit of
Kenya’s reservation to its Optional Clause Declaration. Section I begins by
addressing the correct interpretation of the MOU. It analyses (1) the object and
purpose of the MOU; (2) the text of the instrument; (3) the subsequent practice of
the Parties; (4) the wider international legal framework, including UNCLOS; and
(5) the circumstances in which it was drafted, discussed and signed. These
considerations all point to the same conclusion: that the MOU was concerned
exclusively with delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M and had
nothing to do with establishing a method for resolving any part of the disputed
maritime boundary, or any issues of delimitation. After establishing the correct
interpretation of the MOU, Section II then explains why the MOU does not fall
within the scope of Kenya’s reservation to its Optional Clause Declaration.
1.44. Finally, Chapter 4 explains why, even if the MOU had established a
binding agreement concerning the procedure for delimitating the disputed
boundary—which Somalia emphatically disputes—it was, in any event, nothing
more than an agreement to negotiate (pactum de negociando), not an obligation to
reach agreement (pactum de contrahendo). As will be shown, notwithstanding the
difficulties presented by Kenya’s conduct, the Parties did in fact engage in
detailed negotiations in relation to the disputed maritime boundary, and they did
so at Kenya’s invitation. However, those negotiations ended in deadlock as a
result of Kenya’s stubborn adherence to a boundary following a parallel of
latitude, its intransigent refusal to consider equidistance or the three-step process
established in the Court’s jurisprudence, and the failure of its representatives to
show up at a scheduled final round of negotiations. In these circumstances, the
Parties exhausted any purported obligation to negotiate. Based on the
diametrically opposed positions of the Parties, there is no prospect of further
negotiations yielding a final agreement. It follows that the MOU cannot deprive
the Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute.
18
19
CHAPTER 2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2.1. This Chapter presents the facts relating to the origins and signing of the
MOU, as well as the conduct of the Parties subsequent to its execution. In setting
out these facts, Somalia will address and correct the errors and
mischaracterizations set forth in Kenya’s Preliminary Objections.
2.2. The Chapter is organised as follows. Section I addresses the origins of the
MOU; in particular, it addresses the circumstances in which it was proposed,
drafted and executed in April 2009. The contemporaneous evidence—including
from Norway (which drafted and promoted the idea of the MOU), Kenya and
Somalia—shows that the Parties’ intent was exclusively to facilitate the
consideration of their respective CLCS submissions by committing each not to
object to the Commission’s consideration of the other’s submission. There is no
evidence that Norway, Somalia or Kenya ever intended the MOU to do anything
else, let alone create a binding agreement on the method for settling the Parties’
maritime boundary dispute, as Kenya now claims.
2.3. Section II presents the evidence concerning the Parties’ subsequent
conduct. The evidence shows that at no time following the execution of the MOU
did either Party act in a manner consistent with Kenya’s newly minted claim that
the MOU was intended to constitute an agreed means of settling their boundary
dispute. Indeed, the Parties’ conduct is entirely inconsistent with Kenya’s claim.
2.4. Finally, Section III reviews the facts relating to the Parties’ differing
views on the status of the MOU. Given the circumstances of its adoption and the
subsequent conduct of the Parties, Somalia has repeatedly expressed doubts about
the legal effect of the MOU. This section presents the relevant facts and shows
that even if the MOU were an agreement in force (quod non), Somalia is in full
20
compliance with the only obligation it was intended to impose: that it not object
to the Commission’s consideration of Kenya’s Submission.
Section I. The Origins of the MOU
2.5. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections assert that the timing of the April 2009
MOU “was prompted by the 13 May 2009 deadline fixed by the CLCS for the
submissions on the outer limits of the continental shelf, and the need for an
agreed procedure for the full and final delimitation of the maritime boundary”.12
Kenya is correct about the importance of the 13 May 2009 CLCS deadline. It is
incorrect, however, about the MOU being prompted by a “need” for “an agreed
procedure” for the delimitation of the maritime boundary. There is no evidence
before the Court to support that contention, or that the MOU was intended to have
anything to do with resolving the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute.
2.6. Under Article 4 of Annex II to UNCLOS, coastal States were initially
obligated to make submissions to the CLCS on the limits of their continental shelf
beyond 200 M within 10 years of UNCLOS entering into force for them. Many
coastal States, particularly developing States like Somalia and Kenya, faced
challenges in meeting this deadline. Accordingly, the Eleventh Meeting of States
Parties to the Convention in 2001 decided that for States for which the
Convention had entered into force prior to 13 May 1999 (which included Somalia
and Kenya), the 10-year period would be extended to 13 May 2009.13

12 KPO, para. 12 (emphasis added).
13 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Meeting of States Parties, Eighteenth Meeting,
Decision regarding the workload of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the
ability of States, particularly developing States, to fulfill the requirements of article 4 of annex II
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the decision contained in
21
2.7. By the middle of 2008, it had become evident that many developing
nations lacked the requisite technical and financial resources to meet even this
extended deadline. On 20 June 2008, the CLCS decided that the filing obligation
could be satisfied by the submission of “preliminary information” indicative of
the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M.14 Full and final
submissions could follow thereafter.
2.8. Somalia was among the States that encountered difficulty meeting the
extended 13 May 2009 deadline. Its problems were exacerbated by the prevailing
domestic situation. As noted in Chapter 1 of this Written Statement and in the
Memorial,
15 Somalia entered a long period of civil war following a 1991 armed
rebellion against the government. For many years thereafter, there was no
effective national governing authority.
16

SPLOS/72, paragraph (a), U.N. Doc. SPLOS/183 (20 June 2008), p. 2. MS, Vol. III, Annex 58;
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Meeting of States Parties, Eleventh Meeting, Decision
regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for making submissions to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in article 4 of Annex II to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001), para. (a)
(stating: “In the case of a State Party for which the Convention entered into force before 13 May
1999, it is understood that the ten-year time period referred to in article 4 of Annex II to the
Convention shall be taken to have commenced on 13 May 1999”.). MS, Vol. III, Annex 55.
14 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Meeting of States Parties, Eighteenth Meeting,
Decision regarding the workload of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the
ability of States, particularly developing States, to fulfill the requirements of article 4 of annex II
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the decision contained in
SPLOS/72, paragraph (a), U.N. Doc. SPLOS/183 (20 June 2008), p. 2. MS, Vol. III, Annex 58
(stating: “It is understood that the time period referred to in article 4 of annex II to the Convention
and the decision contained in SPLOS/72, paragraph (a), may be satisfied by submitting to the
Secretary General preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles and a description of the status of preparation and intended date of
making a submission in accordance with the requirements of article 76 of the Convention and
with the Rules of Procedure and the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf”.); KPO, paras. 26-30.
15 See, e.g., MS, para. 1.11.
16 See, e.g., U.N. Environment Programme, The State of the Environment in Somalia: A Desk
Study (Dec. 2005), p. 13. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 88; U.N. Peacekeeping, “U.N. Operation in
22
2.9. After a number of failed attempts to establish a stable government, the
TFG was set up in 2004, initially for a five-year term. The Transitional Federal
Institutions included a Transitional Federal Charter and a Transitional Federal
Parliament, the purposes of which were to begin to help reconstitute Somalia as
functioning State.17
2.10. By early 2007, the domestic situation had stabilised enough that then-TFG
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was able to establish a presence in Mogadishu
for the first time since 2004.18 At approximately the same time, the U.N. Security
Council approved the creation of AMISOM, an African Union peacekeeping
mission to help promote peace and security in the country, and assist in the
reconstruction process.19 Nevertheless, fighting between forces aligned with the
TFG and Al-Shabaab militants continued throughout much of 2007 and 2008.
2.11. It was in this context that a new TFG came to power in early 2009 with
the appointment of a President and a cabinet, known as the Council of
Ministers.20 The new President and Council of Ministers were sworn in on 22

Somalia I (UNOSOM I)”, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unosomi.htm (last accessed 11 Jan. 2016). Written Statement of Somalia (hereinafter “WSS”) (5
Feb. 2016), Vol. II, Annex 15; U.N. Peacekeeping, “U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM
II)”, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm (last accessed
11 Jan. 2016). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 16; U.N. Peace Operations, “UNSOM United Nations
Assistance Mission in Somalia”, available at https://unsom.unmissions.org/ (last accessed 11 Jan.
2016). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 18.
17 A. C. Beier and E. Stephansson, Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief: Somalia (28
Oct. 2012), p. 16. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 92. The Transitional Federal Institutions expired in August
2012; it was at this time that the Federal Government of Somalia was established. Ibid.
18 C. Majtenyi, “Somali President in Capital for Consultations”, VOA (8 Jan. 2007). WSS, Vol. II,
Annex 29.
19 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1744 (2007): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5633rd
meeting, on 20 February 2007, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (21 Feb. 2007). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 8.
20 See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Somalia, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (last visited 3 Apr.
2015), p. 1. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 96.
23
February 2009,21 less than three months before the 13 May 2009 deadline for the
submission of preliminary information to the CLCS. That submission was one of
the first tasks that demanded the new government’s attention.
2.12. When it took office, the new TFG was unaware that the SRSG, Mr.
Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, had initiated preparation of Somalia’s preliminary
information in October 2008 on Somalia’s behalf. The SRSG had been assisted in
this effort by the Government of Norway.22 Kenya’s Preliminary Objections
correctly observe: “Norway came to the assistance of Somalia in preparing its
submission to the CLCS. The key figure in this process was a senior Norwegian
diplomat and jurist, Mr. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Ambassadeur en Mission
Spéciale of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.23 Mr. Harald Brekke,
Norway’s CLCS member at the time, also provided assistance to Somalia with
the submission to the CLCS.24

21 Federal Republic of Somalia, Preliminary Information Indicative of the outer limits of the
continental shelf and Description of the status of preparation of making a submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for Somalia (hereinafter “Somalia, Preliminary
Information to the CLCS”) (14 Apr. 2009), p. 4. MS, Vol. III, Annex 66.
22 See Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations to the
Secretariat of the United Nations (17 Aug. 2011), para. 7 (stating: “In October 2008 the SRSG for
Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, initiated the preparation on behalf of Somalia of
preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, in accordance
with the decision contained in documents SPLOS/183 from the eighteenth Meeting of States
Parties to UNCLOS. In the preparation of this material the SRSG accepted an offer of assistance
from the Norwegian Government”.). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 4.
23 KPO, para. 28.
24 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to the Secretariat of the United Nations
(17 Aug. 2011), para. 7. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 4. See also Somalia, Preliminary Information to the
CLCS (14 Apr. 2009), p. 5. MS, Vol. III, Annex 66 (“The SRSG and the Transitional Federal
Government of the Somali Republic were moreover assisted in the preparation of the present
submission by Mr. Harald Brekke, member of the Commission (1997 - present). No advice was
provided by any other member of the Commission”.); Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental
Shelf Submission of the Federal Republic of Somalia: Executive Summary (21 July 2014), p. 4.
24
2.13. Norway’s help with Somalia’s preliminary information was in keeping
with its actions throughout the region. In co-operation with the Economic
Community of West African States, it had a similar assistance programme in
place for West African countries.25 Among the other countries that received
Norway’s assistance was Kenya, which also received advice from Mr. Brekke in
the preparation of its CLCS submission.26
2.14. The TFG became aware of the SRSG’s initiative and Norway’s assistance
only a little more than two weeks after it had come into office. As recounted in
Somalia’s Preliminary Information, transmitted to the CLCS on 8 April 2009:
“The new Transitional Federal Government of the
Somali Republic was sworn in on 22 February
2009. At a meeting in Nairobi on 10 March 2009
between the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Fisheries and Marine Resources of the Transitional
Federal Government of the Somali Republic,
Professor Abdirahman Adan Ibrahim Ibbi, the
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary
General for Somalia, Mr Charles Petrie, and
Ambassador Hans Wilhelm Longva from the Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Transitional Federal Government of the Somali

MS, Vol. IV, Annex 70. Mr. Brekke departed the CLCS in 2012. U.N. Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf “Membership of the Commission”, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members_1997_2012.htm (last accessed 11
Jan. 2016). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 18.
25 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release: Somalia submits preliminary
information indicative of the outer limits of its continental shelf with Norwegian assistance (17
Apr. 2009), p. 3. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 5.
26 Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf Submission beyond 200 nautical miles
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary (Apr. 2009), p. 10.
MS, Vol. III, Annex 59.
25
Republic was informed about the initiative of the
SRSG and of the Norwegian assistance”.27
2.15. At this same meeting, Norway’s Ambassador Longva simultaneously
presented the Somalis with a draft of the preliminary information and a draft of
the MOU. According to an undated email from Ambassador Longva to Ms. Juster
Nkoroi, the Chairperson of Kenya’s Task Force on the Delineation of Kenya’s
Outer Continental Shelf:
“At the meetings [on 10 March] I presented to the
Deputy Prime Minister the draft submission of
preliminary information indicative of the outer
limits of the continental shelf of Somalia beyond
200 nautical miles which has been prepared at the
initiative of the Special Representative of the
Secretary General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould
Abdallah, with the assistance of the Government of
Norway. Furthermore, I presented to the Deputy
Prime Minister the Draft Memorandum of
Understanding which we discussed when we met in
Nairobi”.28
2.16. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections are thus incorrect when they assert that
“[t]he MOU was proposed by Somalia to Kenya”.29 The proposal originated from
Norway, which was then providing technical assistance to both countries. Indeed,
the TFG was only made aware of the MOU at the same time it was made aware

27 Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009). MS, Vol. III, Annex 66; Note
Verbale from H.E. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal
Government of the Somali Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United
Nations, No. XRW/0065/06/09 (8 Apr. 2009). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 22.
28 Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms. Juster Nkoroi (Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 6. See also Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009), p. 5. MS, Vol.
III, Annex 66; Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental Shelf Submission of the Federal Republic
of Somalia: Executive Summary (21 July 2014). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 70; KPO, para. 26.
29 KPO, para. 44(a).
26
that the SRSG had taken the initiative to prepare preliminary information on
Somalia’s behalf (with Norway’s help).
2.17. The drafts of the preliminary information to be submitted to the CLCS
and the MOU to be signed with Kenya were presented to Somalia as a package
deal, which the TFG understood to be necessary to avoid “los[ing] the continental
shelf”.30 According to the transcript of an October 2009 meeting of the Somali
Diaspora in London with the then-Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister
(included as Annex 15 to Kenya’s Preliminary Objections), the Prime Minister
described the TFG’s initial meetings with the SRSG and Ambassador Longva as
follows:
“The issue, the way it begun, on its outset, the man
in charge of the UN, Weled Abdallah [the SRSG],
accompanied by another man, a maritime expert,
paid us a visit. He told us: are you aware that in
May 12th [sic] you have a deadline? A deadline of
which if we don’t ask for its extension, due to this
so-called ‘continental shelf’ that our ocean is likely
to be taken over by an organisation by the name:
International Sea[bed Authority]”.31
2.18. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections also incorrectly assert that “[t]he draft
MOU was accepted, first by Somalia, and then by Kenya”.32 In fact, the

30 Network Al Shahid, Press Release issued by former Somali Minister of National Planning and
International Cooperation, Dr. Abdirahman Abdishakur (7 July 2012), in which he recounts that
“[a]fter the decision by the TFG cabinet and minister [to approve the MOU], I was called by the
then Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid who told me to sign the MoU with Kenya adding that there
was a deadline to beat (07.04.2009) [sic] which if Somalia misses, it can lose the continental
shelf”. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 13.
31 Transcript of a Meeting of the Somali Diaspora in London with Somali Prime Minister Omar
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and Dr. Abdirahman Adishakur Warsame. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 15.
32 KPO, para. 34.
27
contemporaneous evidence shows that Kenya had been made aware of—and then
accepted—the proposal for an MOU before the matter had ever been brought to
Somalia’s attention. Indeed, this was before the TFG had even been made aware
of the impending CLCS deadline.
2.19. The undated email from Ambassador Longva to Ms. Nkoroi quoted above
at paragraph 2.15 makes this clear. When Ambassador Longva reports to Ms.
Nkoroi that he “presented to the Deputy Prime Minister the Draft Memorandum
of Understanding which we discussed when we met in Nairobi”,33 it is clear that
he is referring to an earlier conversation about the MOU between himself and Ms.
Nkoroi.
2.20. It is also clear that Somalia had very little input on Norway’s draft of the
MOU. In fact, the record reflects only a single, purely stylistic change to the title
(not even the body) of the document requested by Somalia.34 The evidence
submitted with Kenya’s Preliminary Objections reflects a larger number of
changes requested by Kenya.35 Because Somalia was frequently not copied on
emails between Ambassador Longva and Ms. Nkoroi and the other members of
the Kenyan government with whom he was communicating,36 it is not in a

33 Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms. Juster Nkoroi (Mar. 2009) (emphasis added).
KPO, Vol. II, Annex 6; See also Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009), p.
5. MS, Vol. III, Annex 66; Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental Shelf Submission of the
Federal Republic of Somalia: Executive Summary (21 July 2014). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 70; KPO,
para. 26.
34 Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga KPO, Vol. II, Annex 14.
35 See Email exchange between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar.
2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 9; Email exchange between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Mr. Hans
Wilhelm Longva (30–31 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 10.
36 See, e.g., ibid.
28
position to know whether Kenya did or did not also make other changes to the
draft.
2.21. Norway’s draft, amended to reflect what Kenya characterises as the
“purely technical and formalistic” changes requested by the Parties,37 was signed
by Somalia and Kenya in Nairobi on 7 April 2009, less than a month after it had
first been presented to the TFG. The Minister for National Planning and
International Cooperation, Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, signed on behalf
of Somalia; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moses Wetang’ula, signed on behalf
of Kenya.38 The signed original of the MOU bears only Kenya’s coat of arms, not
Somalia’s.39 This reflects the fact that it was finalised and prepared for signature
at Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.40
2.22. The contemporaneous evidence shows that the MOU was intended solely
to facilitate the consideration of the Parties’ respective CLCS submissions by
granting the mutual consent required, while at the same time making clear that
those submissions were without prejudice to the delimitation of the Parties’
maritime boundary. The document’s title itself reflects this limited goal:
“Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of
Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to grant
to each other No-Objection in respect of submissions on the Outer Limits of the

37 KPO, para. 34.
38 2009 MOU. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III, Annex 6.
39 See ibid.
40 See Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 14
(asking Kenyan representative to make necessary edits); 2009 MOU. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS,
Vol. III, Annex 6 (showing Kenyan government seal on the executed document).
29
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission of the Limits of
the Continental Shelf”.41
2.23. Annex 25 to Kenya’s Preliminary Objections is a copy of Ambassador
Longva’s prepared remarks at the Pan African Conference on Maritime Boundary
Delimitation and the Continental Shelf that took place on 9-10 November 2009
(just seven months after the MOU was signed). Ambassador Longva discussed
the MOU in some detail. He stated:
“On 7 April 2009 Kenya and Somalia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding where they agree
that each of them will make separate submissions to
the CLCS, that may include areas under dispute,
without regard to the delimitation of maritime
boundaries between them, and where they give their
prior consent to the consideration by the CLCS of
these submissions in the areas under dispute.
Furthermore, it is stipulated that the submissions
made before the CLCS and the recommendations
approved by the CLCS thereon shall not prejudice
the positions of the two coastal States with respect
to the maritime dispute between them and shall be
without prejudice to the future delimitation of
maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute,
including the delimitation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles”.42
2.24. There is no indication in Ambassador Longva’s statement that Norway
intended the MOU to do anything other than facilitate the consideration of the
Parties’ respective submissions to the CLCS on the outer limits of their

41 2009 MOU (emphasis added). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III, Annex 6.
42 Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Prepared Remarks at Pan African Conference on Maritime
Boundary Delimitation and the Continental Shelf, Accra (9–10 Nov. 2009) (emphasis added), p.
114. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 25.
30
continental shelves. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Norway
intended to create for the Parties an agreement on the method—let alone the
exclusive method—for resolving their maritime boundary dispute. The only goal
stated was to give the necessary consent for the Commission’s consideration of
each of their submissions, while at the same time making clear that this was
without prejudice to their different positions on delimitation of the maritime
boundary.
2.25. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections point to no evidence—and there is none
in the record before the Court—that either Somalia or Kenya understood the
MOU differently than Norway. There is no suggestion in any of the exchanges
leading to the signing of the MOU that anyone involved in the process ever
believed that the MOU created an agreed procedure for settling the Parties’
maritime boundary dispute.43
2.26. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Minister Warsame was authorised
to sign the MOU on Somalia’s behalf by means of a 7 April 2009 letter from the
then-Prime Minister.44 That letter—which itself was drafted by Norway, not

43 See generally Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms. Juster Nkoroi (Mar. 2009). KPO,
Vol. II, Annex 6; Email exchange between Ms. Rina Kristmoen, Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji
Adan Ibbi, Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 7; Email exchange between Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji
Adan Ibbi and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 8; Email exchange
between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 9; Email exchange between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Mr. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30–31
Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 10; Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James
Kihwaga. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 14.
44 See Email from Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi to Hon. Abdirahman Abdishakur
Warsame, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of Somalia (7 Apr. 2009). WSS,
Vol. II, Annex 21.
31
Somalia45—states that the Minister had authorization to “[s]ign a memorandum
of understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the
Transitional Government of the Somali Republic to grant no-objection to each
other in respect of submission on the outer limits of the Continental Shelf beyond
200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”.46
Minister Warsame’s authorization extended no further than that narrow and
limited purpose.
2.27. In keeping with the fact that it understood the MOU and its preliminary
information to be a package deal, Somalia transmitted its preliminary information
indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M to the CLCS
on 8 April 2009, the day after signing the MOU.47 Kenya’s full submission
followed shortly afterwards, on 6 May 2009.48
2.28. The Executive Summary to Kenya’s submission refers to the MOU in the
section captioned “Maritime Delimitations”. With respect to the delimitation with
Somalia, the Executive Summary states:

45 Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Somalia (3 Apr. 2009). WSS,
Vol. II, Annex 20.
46 See Email from Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi to Hon. Abdirahman Abdishakur
Warsame, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of Somalia (7 Apr. 2009) (emphasis
added). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 21. On 7 April, Minister Warsame and Ambassador Longva
received a letter of authorization, and the MOU was signed that day. Id.; 2009 MOU. KPO, Vol.
II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III, Annex 6.
47 Note Verbale from H.E. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Prime Minister of the Transitional
Federal Government of the Somali Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the
United Nations, No. XRW/0065/06/09 (8 Apr. 2009). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 22. See also Somalia,
Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009). MS, Vol. III, Annex 66.
48 Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf Submission beyond 200 nautical miles
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary (Apr. 2009). MS,
Vol. III, Annex 59; United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Receipt of
the submission made by the Republic of Kenya to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, U.N. Doc. CLCS.35.2009.LOS (11 May 2009). MS, Vol. III, Annex 60.
32
“Section 4(4) of the Maritime Zones Act, 1989
provides that the exclusive economic zone
boundary between Kenya and Somalia shall be
delimited by notice in the Gazette by the Minister
pursuant to an agreement between Kenya and
Somalia on the basis of international law.
Subsequently, the two countries have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 7
April 2009 granting each other no objection in
respect of submissions on the outer limits of the
continental shelf to the Commission on Limits of
the Continental Shelf”.49
2.29. Kenya claims no other effect for the MOU beyond the mutual grant of noobjection.
There is no suggestion that Kenya considered the MOU to constitute an
agreement on means of dispute settlement.
2.30. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this Written Statement, the plain text of the
MOU is consistent with this understanding of the MOU. An analysis of the text
confirms that the Parties intended only to consent to the Commission’s
consideration of each other’s submissions on the outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 M, not to create an agreed method of settling their maritime
boundary dispute. Because the interpretation of that text is a question of law,
Somalia addresses it in Chapter 3.
Section II. The Parties’ Subsequent Conduct
2.31. The evidence of the Parties’ subsequent conduct is consistent with the
contemporaneous material surrounding the preparation and adoption of the MOU.

49 Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf Submission beyond 200 nautical miles
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary (Apr. 2009)
(emphasis added). MS, Vol. III, Annex 59.
33
That conduct—including Kenya’s own actions—disproves Kenya’s argument that
the MOU was intended to be anything more than a non-objection agreement.
2.32. Kenya submitted the MOU for registration with the U.N. Secretariat
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter in June 2009, two months after it was
signed.50 Kenya’s Preliminary Objections contain an internal memorandum from
Ms. Jacqueline Moseti of Kenya’s Permanent Mission to the U.N. to the Head of
the Legal Division of Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirming the MOU’s
registration. After noting the fact of registration, Ms. Moseti reminded the Head
of the Legal Division: “The MOU is in respect of submissions on the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf”.51 No other purpose is ascribed to the MOU.
2.33. Kenya made its oral presentation to the CLCS on 3 September 2009.52
According to the official CLCS records of the session, Ms. Nkoroi (the same Ms.
Nkoroi who was involved in the conclusion of the MOU) stated that
“pending negotiations with the Transitional Federal
Government of the Republic of Somalia,
provisional arrangements of a practical nature had
been entered into, in accordance with article 83,
paragraph 3, of the Convention. These
arrangements are contained in a memorandum of
understanding signed on 7 April 2009, whereby the

50 Message from Jacqueline K. Moseti to the Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
regarding “Registration of Memorandum of Understanding between GOK and the Transitional
Federal Government of the Somali Republic” (20 Aug. 2009) attaching Note Verbale from the UN
Secretariat (14 Aug. 2009), p. 75. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 17.
51 Ibid., p. 74 (emphasis added).
52 United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work of the
Commission, U.N. Doc. CLCS/64 (1 Oct. 2009), para. 93, MS, Vol. III, Annex 61.
34
parties undertake not to object to the examination
of their respective submissions. In this connection,
Ms. Nkoroi pointed out that one of the notes
verbales from Somalia dated 19 August 2009 was
consistent with the memorandum of understanding
and confirmed that, at an appropriate time, a
mechanism will be established to finalize the
maritime boundary negotiations with Somalia”.53
2.34. Here too, there is no suggestion that the MOU was seen by Kenya as
anything more than an “undertak[ing] not to object to the examination of the[]
respective submissions” of Somalia and Kenya. Moreover, Kenya’s statement
that “at the appropriate time a mechanism will be established to finalize the
maritime boundary negotiations” means that it did not then consider that any such
mechanism yet existed. This stands in stark contrast with the argument in
Kenya’s Preliminary Objections that the MOU not only did establish such a
mechanism, but that it did so to the preclusion of all other mechanisms, including
recourse to the Court.
2.35. Kenya’s new argument also contrasts with its 24 October 2014 Note
Verbale to the Secretary General of the U.N. protesting Somalia’s February 2014
objection to the CLCS’s consideration of Kenya’s Submission. (The reasons for
Somalia’s objection are discussed in Section III below.) That Note demonstrates
that, even as late as two months after Somalia instituted proceedings in this case,
Kenya did not regard the MOU as constituting an agreement on a means of
settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, or precluding dispute settlement
before the CLCS had acted. The Note states, inter alia:

53 Ibid. (emphasis added).
35
“Kenya confirms that prior to the filing of her
Submission to the Commission on 6 April [sic] …
Kenya had, in the spirit of understanding and
cooperation, negotiated arrangements of a practical
nature with the Transitional Federal Government of
the Republic of Somalia in accordance with Article
83, paragraph 3, of the Convention. These
arrangements were contained in a Memorandum of
Understanding (hereinafter MOU) signed on 7th
April 2009, where by both parties, undertook not to
object to the examination of their respective
submissions, At the time, Kenya indicated to the
Commission that pending further negotiations, a
mechanism will be established to finalise the
maritime boundary negotiations with Somalia”.54
2.36. Two points emerge from this. First, the effect of the MOU was limited to
mutual non-objection to the CLCS’s consideration of the Parties’ respective
submissions on the outer limits of the continental shelf. Second, and relatedly, no
mechanism “to finalise the maritime boundary negotiations with Somalia” had
yet been agreed.
2.37. The Parties’ initiation and conduct of negotiations on boundary
delimitation long before the CLCS acted on either submission constitutes further
proof that the MOU was not intended or understood as an agreement on a
mechanism for resolving the boundary dispute.
2.38. In its Preliminary Objections, Kenya states:
“On 31 May 2013, the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary
for Foreign Affairs (Hon. Amina Mohamed) and

54 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 586/14 (24 Oct. 2014), p. 2
(emphasis added). MS, Vol. III, Annex 50.
36
the Somali Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hon.
Fauzia Yusuf Adam) issued a Joint Statement in
which ‘the two ministers underlined the need to
work on a framework of modalities for embarking
on maritime demarcation’”.55
2.39. If in May 2013 there was a “need to work on a framework for embarking
on maritime demarcation”, it means that no such framework had yet been
agreed—in the MOU or otherwise. Moreover, documents annexed to Kenya’s
Preliminary Objections show that the 2013 initiative to “embark[] on maritime
delimitation” came from Kenya.56 A contemporaneous newspaper article supplied
by Kenya refers, for example, to a “request from Kenya to re-open talks to
demarcate maritime boundaries”.57
2.40. Somalia did not initially consider it opportune to enter into maritime
delimitation negotiations. As of May 2013, the new President of what by then had
become the Federal Republic of Somalia, H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, had
been in power for just a few months and was not yet prepared to take the issue up
with Kenya. Somalia therefore declined Kenya’s first invitation.58
2.41. Kenya renewed its initiative early in 2014. As recounted in Somalia’s
Memorial,59 the Somali Prime Minister, H.E. Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, met the
Deputy President of Kenya, H.E. Wilham Ruto, and other senior Kenyan

55 KPO, para. 88.
56 See, e.g., “Somalia Cabinet rejects appeal for talks on border dispute with Kenya”, Hiiraan (10
June 2013), p. 1. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 32.
57 Ibid.
58 See KPO, para. 90 (quoting Somali Council of Ministers): “The Federal Government of
Somalia does not consider it appropriate to open new discussions on maritime demarcation or
limitations on the continental shelf with any parties”.
59 MS, para 3.43.
37
Officials in Nairobi on 19 February 2014.60 During the meeting, Kenya’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade reiterated “the willingness of
the Government of Kenya to engage the Somali Government in regards to the
existing dispute relating to the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the
two countries”.61 Kenya followed up with a Note Verbale dated 7 March 2014
inviting Somalia’s Minster of Foreign Affairs to meet with his counterpart in
Nairobi.62
2.42. This time, Somalia accepted Kenya’s invitation by means of a diplomatic
note dated 13 March 2014.63 Somalia confirmed that the time was right to “meet
with an official delegation representing the Government of Kenya,” and
underscored its “commitment to a speedy resolution of the dispute between our
sisterly countries regarding the maritime boundary”.64
2.43. The Parties’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in Nairobi on 21 March and
concluded that a technical meeting between the two States should be held

60 Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms. Amina Mohamed, Minister of
Foreign Affairs & International Trade of the Republic of Kenya, No. MOFA/SER/MO/ /2014 (13
Mar. 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 43.
61 Ibid. (emphasis added).
62 Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Republic of
Kenya to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia in Nairobi, No. MFA. PROT/7/8/1 (7
Mar. 2014). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 23.
63 Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms. Amina Mohamed, Minister of
Foreign Affairs & International Trade of the Republic of Kenya, No. MOFA/SER/MO/ /2014 (13
Mar. 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 43.
64 Ibid.
38
“immediately”.65 A first round of bilateral negotiations was therefore held in
Nairobi on 26-27 March 2014.66 Neither Party considered the MOU an
obstacle—whether legal or otherwise—to the conduct of meetings aimed at
resolving the dispute.
2.44. Kenya argues in its Preliminary Objections that “the primary purpose of
the March 2014 meetings was to secure Somalia’s consent to CLCS review, in
order to resume and eventually conclude the method of settlement agreed under
the MOU”.67 There is no evidence to support that assertion. Indeed, all the
evidence is to the contrary.
2.45. As Somalia explained in its Memorial,68 the Kenyan delegation prepared a
draft agenda in advance of the meeting, which contained a line item referring to
the MOU.69 Upon reviewing the draft agenda, the Somali delegation stated its
view that the MOU was without effect.70 It therefore insisted that all references to
the MOU be deleted from the agenda.71 Kenya agreed to the deletion and
amended the agenda accordingly. Tellingly, the title of the agreed agenda is

65 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somali
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (hereinafter “Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014”) (1 Apr. 2014), p. 1. MS, Vol. III, Annex 31.
66 Ibid.
67 KPO, para. 99.
68 MS, para. 3.46.
69 Federal Republic of Somalia, Report on the Meeting between The Federal Republic of Somalia
and The Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-27 March 2014
(hereinafter “Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27 March 2014”) (1 Apr.
2014), p. 1. MS, Vol. III, Annex 24.
70 Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr.
2014), pp. 1-2. MS, Vol. III, Annex 31; Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27
March 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 1. MS, Vol. III, Annex 24.
71 Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27 March 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 1. MS,
Vol. III, Annex 24.
39
“Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Meeting on Wednesday 26th March, 2014
at 10:00 A.M, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4th Floor Boardroom”.72
2.46. According to a contemporaneous internal record of the meeting, the
Somali team suggested
“that both delegations should commit themselves to
moving forward with beginning negotiations on the
existing disputes including the Somali
Government’s refusal to consent to the
consideration by the Commission on the Limitation
of Continental Shelf (the “Commission”) of the
Kenyan submission for an extended continental
shelf. The Somali delegation stated that they are
willing to discuss all issues relating to maritime
delimitation, including the failure to consent to the
Commission’s review of Kenya’s submission, as a
comprehensive package with the aim of resolving
the existing dispute in a speedy manner.
The Kenyan delegation agreed to proceed on that
basis … ”.73
2.47. The two delegations thus proceeded to engage in an exchange of views
over delimitation of their maritime boundary. Somalia, for its part, expressed the
view that the boundary should be delimited based on the “principle of
equidistance”, which was well-established in international law and
jurisprudence.74 It also emphasised that no country could unilaterally establish a

72 Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr.
2014), pp. 1-2, Annex 2 to the Report (emphasis added). MS, Vol. III, Annex 31.
73 Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27 March 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 2. MS,
Vol. III, Annex 24.
74 Ibid.; Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1
Apr. 2014), p. 5. MS, Vol. III, Annex 31.
40
boundary in the absence of an agreement with its neighbouring country, as Kenya
had purported to do.75 Kenya, for its part, rejected equidistance in favour of
considerations of “equity and fairness” which, it maintained, yielded the “parallel
of latitude” claimed in its 2005 Presidential Proclamation.76
2.48. Kenya’s current contention that the primary purpose of the March 2014
meeting was “to secure Somalia’s consent to CLCS review” is inconsistent with
the evidence showing that its purpose in inviting Somalia to talk was, as stated,
“to engage the Somali Government in regards to the existing dispute relating to
the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two countries”.77
2.49. Kenya’s contention is also undermined by the fact that its own negotiating
team came to the meeting with a 13-slide PowerPoint presentation detailing
Kenya’s arguments in favour of its parallel of latitude claim that it duly presented
to the Somali team. A copy of that presentation is included in Annex 31 to
Somalia’s Memorial. As the Court will appreciate, the slides were highly detailed
and included, among other things, a map of the east African coastline depicting
what Kenya considers the concavity of the coast giving rise to “special
circumstances”; detailed models and calculations of the relevant coasts and

75 Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr.
2014), p. 5. MS, Vol. III, Annex 31; Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27
March 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 2. MS, Vol. III, Annex 24.
76 Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27 March 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 2. MS,
Vol. III, Annex 24; Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar.
2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 2. MS, Vol. III, Annex 31.
77 Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms. Amina Mohamed, Minister of
Foreign Affairs & International Trade of the Republic of Kenya, No. MOFA/SER/MO/ /2014 (13
Mar. 2014) (emphasis added). MS, Vol. III, Annex 43.
41
relevant area; and maps depicting what Kenya considered the “gross inequity”
that an equidistance-based solution would work on it.78
2.50. The details of the Parties’ March 2014 negotiations are reflected in a 27
March “Joint Report of the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal
Republic of Somali [sic] on the Kenya-Somali Maritime Boundary Meeting” duly
signed by Ms. Mona Al-Sharmani on behalf of Somalia and Ms. Nkoroi on behalf
of Kenya.79 As in the case of the agreed agenda, the title of the Joint Report is
itself indicative of the purpose of the meeting.
2.51. Under the heading “DISCUSSIONS ON THE MARITIME
BOUNDARY”, four topics are listed in the Joint Report:
“a) Kenya’s departure from the ‘equidistance’
methodology adopted by the Kenyan
Government in the 1972 Territorial Waters
Act [as revised in 1977] and the 1989
Maritime Zones Act to the 2005 Presidential
Proclamation;
b) Starting point for the determination of the
maritime boundary;
c) Baseline and base points;
d) Potential maritime boundary line”.80

78 Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr.
2014), Annex 3 to the Report. MS, Vol. III, Annex 31.
79 Ibid., p. 6 (emphasis added).
80 Ibid., p. 2.
42
2.52. The Joint Report contains a detailed record of the Parties’ exchanges on
each of these subjects. Somalia respectfully refers the Court to Annex 31 of its
Memorial for this information.
2.53. The two delegations continued their negotiations for a full two days but,
in the end, could not even agree on the applicable principles of international
law.81 Somalia remained insistent on the methods and principles reflected in
UNCLOS and the relevant jurisprudence, which it interpreted to favour an
equidistance line, while Kenya remained equally insistent on general
considerations of equity, which, in its view, justified a parallel of latitude.82
2.54. The Joint Report concludes:
“The delegations after considering several options
and methods including bisector, perpendicular,
median and parallel of latitude could not reach a
consensus on the potential maritime boundary line
acceptable to both countries to be adopted.
Consequently the two delegations resolved to refer
the matter to the principals for further guidance”.83
2.55. There is no suggestion in the Joint Report, or in any other evidence, that
either State treated the MOU in the manner that Kenya now claims in its
Preliminary Objections. The MOU was not seen to have the effect of precluding
negotiations to resolve the maritime boundary dispute until after CLCS

81 Somalia, Report on the Somalia-Kenya Meeting, 26-27 March 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 2. MS,
Vol. III, Annex 24.
82 See ibid.
83 Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr.
2014), p. 6 (emphasis added). MS, Vol. III, Annex 31.
43
recommendations were issued. To the contrary, negotiations proceeded without
delay, the Parties fully exchanged their views, and went into a notable degree of
detail in doing so before reaching an impasse.
2.56. As discussed in Somalia’s Memorial,84 the Parties subsequently agreed to
meet again to continue their negotiations concerning the location of their
maritime boundary. A second round of talks was held in Nairobi on 28-29 July
2014.85 Reflecting the importance the Parties gave to the matter, the Foreign
Ministers of both States attended these talks. In its 24 October 2014 Note Verbale
to the U.N. cited above, Kenya itself characterised these talks as taking place “at
the highest levels possible”.86
2.57. The two delegations presented PowerPoint presentations reflecting their
views on the delimitation issue.87 Somalia gave its presentation on the first day,
Kenya on the second.88 As was the case during their March negotiations,
Somalia’s position emphasised the law as reflected in the Convention and
international jurisprudence, which, in its view, favoured a solution based on
equidistance.89 Kenya continued to insist on the centrality of general

84 MS, para. 3.52.
85 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 32.
86 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 586/14 (24 Oct. 2014), p. 2.
MS, Vol. III, Annex 50.
87 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 32.
88 Ibid.
89 M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of
Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July
2014 (5 Aug. 2014), p. 1. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 4.
44
considerations of fairness, and maintained its position that the boundary should
follow a parallel of latitude.90 Once again, the discussions were not seen as being
precluded by the MOU in any way.
2.58. The July 2014 talks were “intense” but fruitless.91 The Parties’ positions
remained the same as they had been during the first round of negotiations in
March. No progress was made in narrowing the differences between them.
However, the Parties agreed to reconvene for one more effort “to continue
working on these issues in an attempt to bridge the gaps between the two parties’
positions”.92
2.59. At the conclusion of the July negotiations, the Parties produced another
Joint Report (the “Second Joint Report”).93 The title of the Second Joint Report
echoed the title of the first Joint Report94 and reflects the purpose of the meeting:

90 Ibid., p. 2.
91 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 32.
92 Ibid. See Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment
Promotion of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms. Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, No. 2231 (26 Aug. 2014), p. 1. MS, Vol. III, Annex 47. See
also M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of
Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July
2014 (5 Aug. 2014), pp. 3-4. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 4.
93 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 32.
94 See, supra, para. 2.50.
45
“Joint Report of the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal
Republic of Somalia on the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Meeting …”.95
2.60. As Somalia detailed in its Memorial,96 the head of the Somali technical
team, Ms. Al-Sharmani, signed the Second Joint Report and transmitted it to Ms.
Nkoroi by email on 5 August 2014.97 Ms. Nkoroi replied on 6 August 2014
confirming that she would sign the Second Joint Report upon her return to the
office on 11 August 2014.98 When that date came and went, Somalia made
further inquiries into the status of the report.99 This time, however, Kenya did not
respond; nor did it sign the Second Joint Report. Kenya gave no reason for its
failure to sign.
2.61. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections contend that at the second round of
negotiations
“Kenya expected finally to discuss the MOU.
However, Somalia once again refused to discuss the
withdrawal of its objection. Instead, Somalia used
the meeting to advance a detailed argument on
equidistance as the only possible solution to the
maritime boundary dispute. Kenya responded by

95 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014) (emphasis added). MS, Vol. III, Annex
32.
96 MS, para. 3.53-3.54.
97 Exchange of Emails between Ms. Mona Al-Sharmani, Special Adviser to the President of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, and Ms. Juster Nkoroi, Republic of Kenya (6-16 Aug. 2014), p. 4,
Email of 5 Aug. 2014. MS, Vol. III, Annex 46.
98 Ibid., p. 2, Email of 6 Aug. 2014.
99 Ibid., pp. 1-2, Emails of 11, 15, and 16 Aug. 2014.
46
presenting its preliminary views in order to
establish a framework for further discussions”.100
2.62. Once again the evidence does not support any of these assertions. The
only document Kenya cites is the Second Joint Report, which Kenya invokes for
the proposition that Somalia presented its views on the merits of equidistance.101
That is true, but the Second Joint Report makes it equally clear that Kenya too
presented its position on the delimitation issue and rejected Somalia’s position.102
2.63. There is, moreover, no evidence that these were mere “preliminary
views”, as Kenya now claims. What the Second Joint Report actually states is:
“The Kenyan technical team made a presentation on the 29th July 2014 that
reflected the position of the Government of the Republic of Kenya on the
maritime boundary between Kenya and Somalia”.103 Given the considerable
detail with which Kenya had already addressed the issue at the first round of talks
in March, Kenya’s assertion that this second presentation (in the presence of its
Foreign Minister) was only “preliminary” in nature is not credible.
2.64. The considerable care with which Kenya presented its position is reflected
in a contemporaneous Somali record of the second round of negotiations.
According to that report:
“On the morning of 29 July 2014, the Somali and
Kenyan delegations met again at the Ministry of

100 KPO, para. 109.
101 Ibid., para. 109 fn. 135.
102 Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 32.
103 Ibid.
47
Foreign Affairs of Kenya. The meeting was again
attended by both Ministers. The Kenyan delegation
proceeded to make its presentation as agreed. The
Kenyan team argued that the principles of equity
and fairness demanded the application of the
parallel of latitude methodology in delimiting the
maritime boundary between both countries. The
Kenyan delegation reviewed certain cases
particularly the India/Bangladesh case and the
Bangladesh/Myanmar case and noted the
importance of identifying the correct relevant
coastlines for both countries for purposes of
determining the fairness of the delimitation
exercise. It stated that in the case between Somalia
and Kenya, the relevant coastline for Kenya is its
entire coastline and for Somalia the coastline
starting from the tip of Horn of Africa and going in
the southern direction all the way to the landboundary
terminal between both countries. The
Kenyan delegation further argued that due to the
concavity of the Kenyan coastline, the parallel of
latitude method would result in a more equitable
and fair solution.
The Somali and the Kenyan delegation engaged in
a heated discussion following the completion of the
presentation made by the Kenyan delegation. The
Somali delegation requested the Kenyan delegating
[sic] to cite one case that a court or a tribunal
applied the parallel of latitude as a legally accepted
and widely applied principle in international
jurisprudence. The Kenyan delegation mentioned
bilateral agreements between certain African
countries such as Kenya/Tanzania and
Tanzania/Mozambique as examples of the
applicability of this principle, particularly in Africa.
The Somali delegation responded that the existing
agreements between Kenya/Tanzania and
Tanzania/Mozambique are bilateral agreements that
each country voluntarily agreed to. It further stated
that no case law exists where a court or a tribunal
adopted the parallel of latitude as an internationally
48
accepted method in the delimitation of maritime
disputes unless the disputing parties voluntarily
agree to this method in a separate agreement as in
the case of Kenya and Tanzania”.104
2.65. Kenya’s attempt to make it seem as if these negotiations were focused on
the MOU is refuted by its own documents. In advance of the second round of
negotiations, Kenya sent Somalia a Note Verbale dated 24 July 2014 inviting it to
the talks in Nairobi.
105 The Note states:
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade of the Republic of Kenya presents its
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Investment Promotion of the Federal Government
of Somalia and has the honour to refer to the
negotiations between the Government of the
Republic of Kenya and the Federal Republic of
Somalia on the delimitation of our overlapping
maritime boundary.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade of the Republic of Kenya further informs that
Amb. Amina C. Mohamed, Cabinet Secretary,
Foreign Affairs and International Trade has the
honour to invite H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Dualeh
Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Somalia to Nairobi, on Monday 28th
July 2014, to discuss the issue on the delimitation

104 M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of
Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July
2014 (5 Aug. 2014). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 4.
105 Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Republic of
Kenya to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Investment Cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, No. MFA/REL/13/21A (24 July 2014) (bold in original, other emphasis added). WSS,
Vol. II, Annex 24.
49
of the two countries overlapping maritime
boundary”.106
2.66. The words could hardly be clearer: on Kenya’s own account the purpose
of the discussions was precisely “to discuss the issue on the delimitation of the
two countries overlapping maritime boundary”. The MOU was not even
mentioned in Kenya’s Note.
2.67. In addition, Kenya’s 24 October 2014 Note Verbale to the U.N. (which, as
stated, reported to the U.N. that the maritime boundary talks with Somalia were
taking place “at the highest levels possible”) still further undermines Kenya’s
attempt to portray these talks as being focused on the MOU. It states, inter alia:
“Kenya remains committed and continues to pursue
more legitimate avenues to have the delimitation of
the maritime boundary amicably resolved, most
preferably through a bilateral agreement with the
Somali Federal Republic and in this regard wishes
to inform that notwithstanding the aforementioned
actions by Somalia [i.e., its objection to Kenya’s
submission], bilateral diplomatic negotiations, at
the highest levels possible, are ongoing with a view
to resolving this matter expeditiously …”.107
2.68. Again according to Kenya, the goal of the negotiations was “to have the
delimitation of the maritime boundary amicably resolved”. And by indicating that
a bilateral agreement was the “most preferable” avenue for resolving the
delimitation, Kenya also made clear that it did not consider a bilateral agreement

106 Ibid.
107 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 586/14 (24 Oct. 2014), p. 2.
MS, Vol. II, Annex 50.
50
the only “legitimate avenue” for doing so, or that the MOU stood in the way of
any other lawful means for resolving the dispute.
2.69. Indeed, the evidence shows that Kenya itself proposed the idea of
referring the dispute to third-party dispute settlement. According to Somalia’s
contemporaneous internal account of the second round meetings:
“Minister Beileh [of Somalia] asked Minister
Mohamed [of Kenya] as to how long would both
countries continue to have their delegations
entangled in these heated discussions without any
possible solution. Minister Mohamed stated that
although both delegations are far apart, she would
like both teams to meet again and to attempt one
final time to find an amicable solution. Minister
Mohamed further stated that if no agreement could
be reached between both countries, both countries
might resort to international arbitration”.108
2.70. Kenya cannot reconcile its current interpretation of the MOU—as
precluding any form of settlement other than by direct negotiation—with its own
Foreign Minister’s statement that “if no agreement could be reached between
both countries, both countries might resort to international arbitration”.109

108 M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of
Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July
2014 (5 Aug. 2014), p. 2 (emphasis added). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 4.
109 Ibid. There is also nothing in the Second Joint Report, or any other document in the record, to
support Kenya’s contention that Somalia refused to discuss the withdrawal of its objection to the
CLCS’s consideration of Kenya’s submission. Kenya’s own documents prove the opposite. See
KPO, para. 109. Annex 41 to Kenya’s Preliminary Objections is an internal Kenyan document
dated 4 August 2014 concerning the proposal to hold a third round of talks in Mogadishu. It
states: “Somalia delegation did not discuss the MOU during the first meeting but we have
witnessed a friendlier attitude towards the MOU during the second meeting”. Confidential Note
from Dr. Karanja Kibicho to the Director General of the National Intelligence Service, “Proposal
51
2.71. In short, the evidence shows that Kenya did not adopt the position that the
delimitation negotiations (or any other lawful means for resolving the dispute)
might be untimely in the absence of CLCS recommendations. To the contrary,
Kenya’s negotiating team pressed ahead with exchanges concerning the substance
of the maritime boundary dispute with Somalia, and did so in a process of
negotiation with Somalia that represented an effort to resolve that dispute. It is
striking that Kenya itself raised the possibility of third-party dispute settlement in
the event that the negotiations did not succeed.
2.72. As stated, the Parties agreed to a final round of negotiations in Mogadishu
in late August 2014.110 However, Kenya’s delegation never arrived for the
scheduled talks, and failed to notify Somalia in advance that it would not attend.
Kenya’s Preliminary Objections attribute the failure of its team to appear to
security concerns.111 Even if that were true, it was never communicated to
Somalia. The Kenyan delegation simply failed to appear on the agreed date.
2.73. There is, moreover, reason to doubt the sincerity of Kenya’s professed
security concerns. High-level delegations from international bodies and Kenya
regularly visited Mogadishu. These included visits by a United Nations Security

for the Cabinet Secretary MFA and Other Senior Government Official to Visit Mogadishu to
Discuss Maritime Boundary Including Lifting of Objection by Somalia on MOU Granting No
Objection to Consideration of Kenya’s Submission”, MFA.INT.8/15A (4 Aug. 2014) (emphasis
added). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 41.
110 See, supra, para. 2.58.
111 KPO, para. 110.
52
Council delegation,112 Kenya’s Minster of Foreign Affairs113 and the Speaker of
its Parliament.114
2.74. In any event, if the agreed venue was a problem for Kenya, it might have
been expected to say so, or to propose an alternative location. It did neither. Thus,
the Somali Foreign Minister wrote to his Kenyan counterpart on 26 August 2014
expressing dismay that the August meetings had not taken place as planned.115
2.75. As Somalia explained in its Memorial,116 it was disappointed by Kenya’s
unexplained non-appearance at the planned third meeting, and its nonresponsiveness
to Somalia’s efforts to reschedule the meeting, as well as the
complete lack of progress during the two rounds of negotiations that the Parties
had already held. It was also increasingly troubled by Kenya’s continued
unilateral actions in the disputed area. In these circumstances, Somalia concluded
that further negotiation would be fruitless and decided to initiate these
proceedings to seek resolution of its dispute with Kenya in accordance with
international law. It did so without violating the MOU, the limited purpose of
which did not preclude such judicial recourse.

112 See “U.N. Secretary Council makes historic visit to Somalia”, Dhanaanmedia.com (13 Aug.
2014). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 31 (recording a UN Security Council delegation visited to Mogadishu
on 13 August 2014).
113 “IGAD Foreign Affairs Ministers Arrive in Mogadishu”, AMISOM (10 Jan. 2015). WSS, Vol.
II, Annex 32.
114 “Speaker of the Somali Parliament receives parliamentary delegation from Kenya”, Radio
Muqdisho (3 Feb. 2015). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 33.
115 Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment
Promotion of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to Ms. Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, No. 2231 (26 Aug. 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 47.
116 MS, paras. 3.55-3.56.
53
2.76. Kenya continued to behave in a manner inconsistent with its recently
adopted understanding of the MOU even after Somalia submitted its Application
initiating these proceedings. Kenya’s October 2014 Note Verbale to the U.N. has
already been discussed.117 In addition, on 4 May 2015, Kenya submitted another
Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary General, this one objecting to the CLCS’s
consideration of Somalia’s submission.118 (Somalia made its full submission to
the Commission on 21 July 2014.119) Kenya’s Note did not state that the MOU
created any binding obligations, let alone the specific obligations Kenya now
contends, precluding this Court from exercising jurisdiction. The Note simply
took issue with Somalia’s objection to the Commission’s consideration of
Kenya’s submission, and proceeded to lodge Kenya’s own objection to the
Somali submission.120
Section III. The Status of the MOU
2.77. It is a matter of public record that Somalia has repeatedly expressed
doubts as to the effectiveness of the MOU, based on the circumstances of its
adoption, its rejection by the Somali Parliament and Kenya’s continued unilateral
actions in the contested area which have steadily increased its de facto control
over that area.

117 See, supra, para. 2.35.
118 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 141/15 (4 May 2015). MS, Vol.
III, Annex 51.
119 Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental Shelf Submission of the Federal Republic of
Somalia: Executive Summary (21 July 2014), MS, Vol. IV, Annex 70.
120 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 141/15 (4 May 2015). MS, Vol.
III, Annex 51.
54
2.78. Also on the public record are Somalia’s views that, whether or not the
MOU is, or ever was, legally effective, it does not, and was never intended to,
establish an exclusive means for settlement of the boundary dispute, let alone one
that ousts the clear jurisdiction of this Court. The Court therefore has no need, in
Somalia’s view, to determine the legal validity vel non of the MOU. Even if it
were effective (quod non), it does not constitute an agreement on a method for
settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, let alone one that could preclude
this Court from resolving it on the basis of the Parties’ matching Optional Clause
declarations.
2.79. The issue of Somalia’s compliance with the MOU is, therefore, beside the
point of these proceedings. Nevertheless, Kenya goes on at some length about
Somalia’s alleged non-compliance with the MOU, perhaps in an effort to make it
appear that Somalia has not acted in good faith. This calls for Somalia to set the
record straight with regard to its statements and actions pertaining to that
instrument.
2.80. First, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Charter (“TFC”)—which was in
effect between 2004 and 2012, and drafted in Nairobi with Kenya’s
assistance121—required international agreements to be ratified by Parliament.122
Article 33(j) of the TFC included “ratification of international agreements and
treaties” as a function of Parliament; and Article 44(4)(a) expressly made the

121 See A. C. Beier and E. Stephansson, Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief: Somalia
(28 Oct. 2012), p. 16. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 92; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Factbook: Somalia, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/so.html
(last accessed 3 Apr. 2015), p. 1. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 96.
122 See Letter from Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the Somali Federal Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the
United Nations, No. MOFA/SFR/MO/259/2014 (4 Feb. 2014). MS, Vol. III, Annex 41 (repeating
that Somalia had informed Kenya of the ratification requirement at the time of the signing of the
MOU).
55
President’s authority to sign binding international agreements conditional upon
subsequent ratification by Parliament.123 Kenya does not appear to dispute this.
2.81. The MOU itself states that it enters into force immediately upon signature,
and does not expressly require ratification. However, Minister Warsame’s
authorization to sign the MOU did not constitute, and could not have constituted,
authorization under Somali law for him to dispense with the ratification
requirement. The view of the Parliament, and many in the Executive, was that
ratification was still required for the MOU to enter into force.
2.82. Accordingly, on 1 August 2009, the Somali Parliament took up the MOU
and debated whether or not to ratify it.124 The debate was intense; some members
viewed the MOU as without legal basis.125 Exercising the powers accorded it
under the TFC, the Somali Parliament voted overwhelmingly to reject the
MOU.126
2.83. By means of a Note Verbale dated 10 October 2009, Somalia reported the
Parliament’s rejection of the MOU to the United Nations. In light of the
ratification requirement under domestic law, Somalia asked the U.N. to treat the

123 Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali
Republic (Feb. 2004), Article 44(4)(a) (“The President shall have authority to […] sign
international treaties on the proposal of the Council of Ministers and upon ratification by
Parliament”). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 3.
124 See MS, para. 3.40; Letter from H.E. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Prime Minister of the
Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary
General of the United Nations, No. OPM/IC/00./016/11/09 (10 Oct. 2009). MS, Vol. III, Annex
38.
125 Parliamentary Session of Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia, Report and Transcript on
Vote on a Motion in connection with the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 2009), p.
103. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 23.
126 Ibid.
56
MOU as “non-actionable”.127 The Note Verbale was posted to the website of the
U.N. Division on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea no later than March
2010.128 There is no record of any response from Kenya in any forum prior to
2014.129
2.84. In any event, Kenya’s conduct following execution of the MOU gave
Somalia other grounds for questioning the instrument itself, as well as Kenya’s
intentions. As noted above, the Executive Summary to Kenya’s 6 May 2009
CLCS Submission contains a section entitled “Maritime Delimitations”.130 That
Section makes no reference to the dispute with Somalia but mentions only the
MOU (which it characterises as a non-objection agreement).
2.85. More troubling to Somalia, the Executive Summary expressly claims that
Kenya “exercises sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the
maritime areas extending up to the parallel boundary Kenya claimed in the 2005

127 Letter from H.E. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal
Government of the Somali Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United
Nations, No. OPM/IC/00./016/11/09 (10 Oct. 2009), p. 1. MS, Vol. III, Annex 38; see also Letter
from Dr. Elmi Ahmed Duale, Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Somali
Republic to the United Nations, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations,
No. SOM/MSS/09/10 (2 Mar. 2010), p. 1. MS, Vol. III, Annex 39 (“In this connection H.E. the
Prime Minister of Somalia is kindly requesting your Excellency and the relevant offices of the
U.N. to take note of the rejection of the (MOU) by the (T.F.G.) Parliament and hence treat the
MOU as non-actionable”.).
128 See Letter from Dr. Elmi Ahmed Duale, Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission
of the Somali Republic to the United Nations, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the
United Nations, No. SOM/MSS/09/10 (2 Mar. 2010). MS, Vol. III, Annex 39.
129 See Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations to the U.N.
Secretary General (24 Oct. 2014). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 24.
130 See, supra, para. 2.28.
57
Presidential Proclamation described in Somalia’s Memorial.131 It also includes
two maps which portray what is labelled as the “maritime boundary” with
Somalia shown as running due east along a parallel of latitude from the land
boundary terminus.132 Kenya’s Executive Summary therefore suggests that the
boundary is settled along the line claimed by Kenya.
2.86. Additionally, Kenya had, before the MOU, begun offering a number of
off-shore oil blocks that extended north of the equidistance line up to the
1°39’34” parallel it claimed as the boundary in 2005. This unilateral conduct
continued after the signing of the MOU. Relevant activities are discussed in
Somalia’s Memorial.133 Two examples will suffice for present purposes:
• Kenya’s Block L-22 straddles the equidistance line in areas
between approximately 52 and 104 M from the coast.134 Kenya
awarded it to the French oil company Total S.A. in 2012.135 In
2013, Total carried out a “2D seismic survey and sea core
drilling operations” in the area.136
• Also in 2012, Kenya awarded Blocks L-21, L-23 and L-24—
which lie in deeper water entirely (in the case of L-21 and L-
23) or predominantly (in the case of L-24) on the Somali side

131 Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf Submission beyond 200 nautical miles
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary (Apr. 2009), paras.
1-3. MS, Vol. III, Annex 59.
132 Ibid., pp. 9 and 15.
133 MS, paras. 8.19-8.28.
134 MS, Vol. II, Figure 8.1.
135 Total S.A., Press Release: Total Steps Up Exploration Activities in Kenya with the Award of
the Offshore L22 License in the Lamu Basin (27 June 2012). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 105; K.
Senelwa, “Kenya ministry signs contracts for oil drilling”, The East African (7 July 2012). MS,
Vol. IV, Annex 108.
136 Total S.A., Factbook 2013 (2013), p. 85. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 111.
58
of the equidistance line137—to the Italian company Eni
S.p.A.138 In 2013-2014, 2D seismic surveys were carried out in
all of these blocks by Schlumberger,139 working pursuant to a
non-exclusive exploration licence.140
2.87. Confronted with Kenya’s persistent and active assertion of its parallel
boundary claim despite (1) its recognition of the existence of a dispute, and (2) its
obligations under UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3) not to do anything “to
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of [a] final agreement”, Somalia responded by
objecting to the CLCS’s consideration of Kenya’s submission.
2.88. Somalia made its objection by means of a 4 February 2014 Note Verbale
to the U.N. Secretary General: “Based on the exaggerated nature of Kenya’s
claim, its lack of legal foundation, and its severe prejudice to Somalia both within
and beyond 200 M, Somalia formally objects to the consideration of Kenya’s
submission by the [CLCS]”.141 In Somalia’s view, this was the only means at its

137 MS, Vol. II, Figure 8.1.
138 Eni S.p.A., Press Release: Eni enters Kenya with the acquisition of three exploration blocks (2
July 2012). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 106. See also IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block
L21 (2015). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 135; IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L23
(2015). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 136; IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L24 (2015).
MS, Vol. IV, Annex 123.
139 See Schlumberger, “Multiclient Latest Projects: Kenya Deepwater 2D 2013 Multiclient
Seismic Survey”, available at http://www.multiclient.slb.com/en/latestprojects/africa/kenya_2d.aspx
(last accessed 9 June 2015). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 130;
Schlumberger, “Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys: 2D offshore data”, available at
http://www.multiclient.slb.com/africa/east-africa/kenya.aspx (last accessed 9 June 2015). MS,
Vol. IV, Annex 131; Schlumberger, “Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys Map”, available at
http://www.multiclient.slb.com/africa/east-africa/kenya.aspx (last accessed 9 June 2015). MS,
Vol. IV, Annex 132.
140 See Hon. Davis Chirchir, Minister of Energy & Petroleum, Republic of Kenya, Speech:
Official Opening of the 5th East Africa, Oil, Gas and Energy Conference (29 Apr. 2014), p. 2.
MS, Vol. III, Annex 28.
141 Letter from Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
of the Somali Federal Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations,
No. MOFA/SFR/MO/259/2014 (4 Feb. 2014), para. 4. MS, Vol. III, Annex 41. See also ibid.,
59
disposal that might cause Kenya to cease and desist from its unilateral efforts to
assume control over the disputed maritime area.
2.89. Somalia also hoped that its March 2014 agreement to Kenya’s proposal to
commence negotiations on delimitation of the disputed maritime boundary might
cause Kenya to consider refraining from further unilateral actions in the disputed
area, at least pending the conclusion of negotiations. However, as discussed in
Somalia’s Memorial,142 Kenya’s conduct in the disputed area continued without
interruption. Indeed, it has persisted even since July 2015, when the Memorial
(which includes a claim challenging the unlawfulness of Kenya’s activities143)
was filed.
2.90. Thus, for example, in September 2015 the National Oil Corporation of
Kenya (a company wholly owned by the Kenyan Government) published an
“Expression of Interest For Provision of a 3D multi-client broadband seismic
offshore survey in the Shallow waters of the Lamu offshore basin”.144 The tender
document officially announced that the company and Kenya’s Ministry of Energy
and Petroleum were preparing for “an open licensing round tentatively scheduled
for the year 2017”, and that “[a] formal announcement on the date from the
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum is expected soon”. The document included a
map which shows the shallow offshore area to be surveyed extending all the way

para. 10 (stating: “The Somali Republic protests the continuing activities of oil companies under
licence to Kenya in maritime zones claimed by the Somali Republic, and in dispute between the
two States, which are in contravention of Article 74(3), Article 83(3) and Article 300 of
UNCLOS. The Somali Republic condemns these activities and urges all parties involved in such
activities to immediately cease and desist from them”.).
142 See MS, paras. 3.20-3.24, 8.19-8.28.
143 See, e.g., MS, paras. 8.28, 8.35, p. 148.
144 National Oil Corporation of Kenya, “Expression of Interest for Provision of a 3D Multi-Client
Broadband Seismic Offshore Survey in the Shallow Waters of the Lamu Offshore Basin”,
NOCK/PRC/03(1057) (25 Sept. 2015). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 5.
60
up to the parallel boundary illegally claimed by Kenya.145 The document added
that block L-26 (which covers a large area far offshore on both sides of the
equidistance line) might also be included.146
2.91. It was only after filing its Application instituting proceedings in this case,
and preparing to submit its Memorial to the Court, that Somalia considered it was
in a position to safely withdraw its objection to Kenya’s submission to the CLCS.
On 7 July 2015, it sent a Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary General stating, inter
alia:
“In view of Somalia’s request to the ICJ to delimit
the maritime boundary with Kenya (including in the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles),
Somalia deems it no longer necessary to maintain
its objection to the Commission’s consideration of
Kenya’s submission to the Commission, and hereby
extends its consent to the Commission’s
consideration of the Kenyan submission”.147
Even assuming that the MOU is in force (quod non), Somalia is fully in
compliance with the only obligation the instrument purports to impose upon it:
not to object to Kenya’s submission to the CLCS.
2.92. On the basis of Somalia’s July 2015 Note, the CLCS proceeded to form a
subcommission to consider Kenya’s submission on the merits.148 The

145 Ibid., p. 6.
146 Ibid., p. 1.
147 Letter from H.E. Abdulsalam H. Omer, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion
of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United
Nations (7 July 2015), p. 2. MS, Vol. III, Annex 52.
148 U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Progress of work in the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Statement by the Chair, U.N. Doc. CLCS/90 (1 Oct. 2015),
61
subcommission met to begin consideration of Kenya’s submission during the
Commission’s thirty-ninth session in New York in October and November
2015.149 Kenya has presented no evidence that it was materially harmed by the
brief delay in consideration of its CLCS submission as a consequence of
Somalia’s February 2014 objection to consideration of that submission.

para. 17 (stating that “the Commission took note of a communication received since the thirtyfifth
session, namely, the communication from Somalia dated 7 July 2015. In the light of that
communication, the Commission determined that it was in a position to proceed with the
establishment of a subcommission”). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 14.
149 Ibid.
62
63
CHAPTER 3. THE MOU DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF
KENYA’S RESERVATION
3.1. Both Somalia and Kenya have accepted the Optional Clause and recognise
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. They made their respective declarations
in accordance with Article 36(2) of the Statute soon after their independence.150
These declarations have remained unchanged ever since, a fact which bears
witness to the two States’ enduring commitment to the judicial settlement of
disputes.151
3.2. Both declarations contain reservations excluding the Court’s jurisdiction
in respect of certain categories of disputes. Contrary to what Kenya argues,
however, none of those exclusions is relevant to the present case. According to
Kenya’s Preliminary Objections: “Kenya and Somalia have expressly agreed on a
method of settlement other than the Court for delimitation of their maritime
boundary”.152 In Kenya’s view, this purported agreement triggers the first
reservation to its Article 36(2) declaration, which excludes
“[d]isputes in regard to which the Parties to the
dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse
to some other method or methods of settlement”.

150 Somalia made its declaration on 11 April 1963; Kenya made its on 19 April 1965.
(Declarations recognising as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, are available at: https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I-4&chapter=1&lang=en).
151 Kenya’s representative to the U.N. General Assembly confirmed his country’s commitment to
judicial settlement in 2009 when he called for a wider acceptance of the Optional Clause. U.N.
General Assembly, Sixty-Fourth Session, Thirtieth Plenary Meeting, Agenda Item 72: Report of
the International Court of Justice, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.30 (29 Oct. 2009), p. 15 (Mr. Muita
(Kenya). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 10.
152 KPO, para. 2.
64
3.3. As Kenya itself notes, reservations that exclude the Court’s jurisdiction
when the disputing States have agreed to a different method for settling their
disputes are present in the Optional Clause declarations of many States.153 What
Kenya fails to mention, however, is that the Court has never found that it lacks
jurisdiction on the basis of a reservation of this kind. The President of the Court
noted in a 2010 speech at the United Nations: “[Forty] States have limited their
optional clause declarations by stipulating that any other mechanisms of dispute
settlement as agreed between the parties will prevail over the general jurisdiction
of the Court. In the few cases where this condition has been at issue, the Court
found that it did not exclude recourse to ICJ adjudication”.154
3.4. Each case must, of course, be assessed in light of its particular
circumstances. Nevertheless, the fact that this common reservation has never once
been found to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction at the very least shows that in order
to deprive the Court of its compulsory jurisdiction, an agreement to that effect
must be clear and unambiguous. This is all the more so given that, as this Court
has held:
“[A] declaration by which a State recognizes the
compulsory jurisdiction … constitute[s] a certain
progress towards extending to the world in general
the system of compulsory judicial settlement of
international disputes”.155

153 See KPO, para. 142.
154 H. Owada, Introductory Remarks at the Seminar on the Contentious Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (26 Oct. 2010), p. 7. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 26; See, e.g., ibid., fn. 18:
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 77, p. 76; Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v.
Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, paras. 22-24.
155 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984 (hereinafter “Nicaragua v. United States of America”), para. 34.
65
3.5. An instrument that might deprive matching Optional Clause declarations
of their effet utile should therefore be interpreted with caution. The Court has
explained in a related vein:
“[T]he clauses of a special agreement by which a
dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not
involve doing violence to their terms, be construed
in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to
have appropriate effects”.156
3.6. Kenya thus bears the burden of persuading the Court that it and Somalia
have entered into a clear and unambiguous agreement to have exclusive recourse
to some other method of settling the entirety of their maritime boundary dispute,
including in the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf, both within and
beyond 200 M. For Kenya to succeed, at least four cumulative conditions would
have to be met: (1) there is a binding agreement between Somalia and Kenya; (2)
that provides for a method of settling their maritime boundary dispute; (3) and
excludes the jurisdiction of the Court; (4) for the entirety of the dispute Somalia
has submitted to the Court.
3.7. Kenya’s Preliminary Objections argue that the MOU, signed on 7 April
2009 by Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Somalia’s Minister of National
Planning and International Cooperation, meets these conditions. More precisely,
Kenya claims that the MOU established a “two-step procedure for dispute
settlement, namely that the Parties (a) ‘shall agree’ on delimitation, and (b) only

156 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Judgment, 1929, P.C.I.J. Series A- No. 22,
p. 13; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom/Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports (1949), p. 24.
See also Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 1939,
P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 77, p. 76.
66
after CLCS review”.157 However, Kenya does not even come close to showing
that the MOU meets the four criteria stated above.
3.8. As explained in the previous Chapter, the MOU’s status as a binding
agreement is highly questionable.158 In any event, quite apart from its legal status,
Kenya has wholly misinterpreted the nature and content of the MOU. Section I of
this Chapter shows that far from establishing a method of settling the Parties’
maritime boundary dispute, the MOU deals only with the delineation of the outer
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M. The issue of the delimitation of the
maritime boundary is set to the side; the MOU expressly states that the issue of
delineation is without prejudice to the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute.
Section II shows that because the MOU is not an agreement on a method of
settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, Kenya’s reservation does not
apply in this case.
Section I. The Correct Interpretation of the MOU
3.9. The context in which the MOU was adopted is important to its correct
interpretation. When Norway drafted the MOU for the Parties there was—and,
indeed, still is—a widespread misperception that proceedings before the CLCS
might prejudice the positions of States with respect to the delimitation of their
maritime boundaries. Despite express assurances that the work of the
Commission is without prejudice to their boundary positions,159 “States appear

157 KPO, para. 146.
158 See, supra, paras. 2.77-2.92.
159 See UNCLOS, Annex II, Art. 9 (“The actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters
relating to delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”.). See also,
infra, paras. 3.15-3.17.
67
wary of depending on this protection to safeguard their interests”.160 The
Commission therefore refrains from examining submissions which cover
maritime areas that are disputed, unless all States concerned have given their
prior consent.161 This point is important to a proper understanding of the MOU’s
text in light of its object and purpose, which was to enable both Somalia and
Kenya to make their respective submissions to the CLCS concerning the
continental shelf beyond 200 M and to receive the Commission’s
recommendations without prejudicing their positions on the disputed maritime
boundary.
3.10. It must also be recalled that a number of developing States, including
Somalia, had to prepare their preliminary information under conditions of
extreme urgency in order to meet the Commission’s 13 May 2009 deadline.162
Failure to meet that deadline would have meant losing their potential entitlement
to a continental shelf beyond 200 M. As Somalia underlined in its April 2009
Preliminary Information: “Somalia is among the developing States that faces
particular challenges in fulfilling the requirements of article 4 of Annex II to the

160 C. Lathrop, “Continental Shelf Delimitation Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Approaches Taken by
Coastal States before the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” in INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES (D.A. Colson & R.W. Smith eds., 2011), p. 4144. WSS, Vol. II, Annex
28.
161 See, infra, paras. 3.15-3.17.
162 Annex II, Article 4 of the Convention calls upon coastal States to make submissions “within 10
years of the entry into force of [the] Convention for that State”. Recognizing that the Commission
did not begin its work until mid-1997 and had not adopted Scientific and Technical Guidelines
until 13 May 1999, the States Parties to the Convention decided to push the commencement date
for the ten-year period back to 13 May 1999, thus creating a deadline of 13 May 2009 for any
State Party for which the Convention had entered into force by 13 May 1999. U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Decision regarding the date of
commencement of the ten-year period for making submissions to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf set out in article 4 of Annex II to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 7. Somalia and Kenya (and many
other developing States) had to meet this deadline.
68
Convention due to lack of financial and technical resources and relevant capacity
and expertise. Moreover, Somalia continues to experience a number of …
constraints relating to the political and security situation in the country,
substantially hindering the fulfilment of these requirements”.163 As explained in
Chapter 2,164 and discussed further below, this political context also played an
important role in the drafting history of the MOU.
3.11. Assuming (quod non) that the MOU were a binding agreement, it would
be subject to the “General Rule of Interpretation” embodied in Article 31 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”):
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation
of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty
which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one
or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with
the context:

163 Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009). MS, Vol. III, Annex 66.
164 See, supra, 2.5-2.30.
69
(a) any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties so intended”.
3.12. In the commentary to its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, which
formed the basis for the VCLT, the ILC made clear that
“by heading the article ‘General rule of
interpretation’ in the singular and by underlining
the connexion between paragraphs 1 and 2 and
again between paragraph 3 and the two previous
paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application
of the means of interpretation in the article would
be a single combined operation. All the various
elements, as they were present in any given case,
would be thrown into the crucible, and their
interaction would give the legally relevant
interpretation. Thus, article 27 is entitled ‘General
rule of interpretation’ in the singular, not ‘General
rules’ in the plural, because the Commission
desired to emphasize that the process of
interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of
the article form a single, closely integrated rule”.165

165 U.N. International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties” in YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1966, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 219-220 (emphasis added).
WSS, Vol. II, Annex 6. See also WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, 21 December 2009, China -
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, AB-2009-3, para. 268.
70
3.13. Taken both individually and as “a single combined operation”, all the
elements referred to in Article 31 of the VCLT yield the same result: the MOU
does not fall within the ambit of Kenya’s reservation. It therefore creates no
obstacle to the Court’s jurisdiction.
3.14. Given Kenya’s newly-espoused view of the object and purpose of the
MOU, Somalia will start its analysis by addressing Kenya’s errors in this respect;
it will next turn to a textual and contextual analysis of the language on which
Kenya bases its argument. Somalia will then show that the errors in Kenya’s
interpretation are further exposed by the subsequent practice of the Parties and by
reading the MOU in light of the other rules of international law applicable
between the Parties, in particular UNCLOS. Finally, Somalia will examine the
drafting history of the MOU for purposes of confirming its proper interpretation.
A. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE MOU
3.15. The CLCS’s Rules of Procedure expressly provide that the Commission
will refrain from making recommendations regarding the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 M when a submission implicates a dispute
concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite or adjacent
States. Rule 46(1) provides:
“In case there is a dispute in the delimitation of the
continental shelf between opposite or adjacent
States or in other cases of unresolved land or
maritime disputes, submissions may be made and
shall be considered in accordance with Annex I to
these Rules”.
3.16. Article 5(a) of Annex I of the Rules provides further:
71
“In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists,
the Commission shall not consider and qualify a
submission made by any of the States concerned in
the dispute. However, the Commission may
consider one or more submissions in the areas
under dispute with prior consent given by all States
that are parties to such a dispute”.
3.17. Consistent with its Rules, it is the Commission’s practice to defer
consideration of submissions concerning disputed maritime areas unless and until
all interested States give their consent. This is true notwithstanding the fact that
Article 9 of Annex II to UNCLOS expressly states that the “actions of the
Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”.166
3.18. The object and purpose of the MOU between Somalia and Kenya was
precisely to provide the requisite mutual consent—and no more than that. At the
same time, it underscored that neither their consent nor any action by the CLCS
would prejudice either State’s claim with respect to the delimitation of the
maritime boundary, including beyond 200 M.
3.19. This is made abundantly clear by the MOU’s title, a key indicator of its
purpose:167 “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the
Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali
Republic to grant to each other no-objection in respect of submissions on the

166 See also UNCLOS, Art. 76(10) (stating that “[t]he provisions of this article [concerning the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 20 M] are without prejudice to the
question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts”.).
167 See Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1957 (6 July 1957), p. 24 (using the title of a treaty to determine its purpose).
72
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”.168
3.20. Other elements of the MOU lead equally to the conclusion that its object
and purpose was exclusively to permit the CLCS to examine Somalia’s and
Kenya’s submissions, without prejudice to their respective delimitation claims.
This is readily demonstrated by applying to the MOU the indicia the ILC and the
Court have identified as relevant to determining a treaty’s object and purpose,
including its introductory paragraphs, its overall structure and the circumstances
of its conclusion:
169
• Although the MOU does not contain a formal preamble, its
first paragraph emphasises the “spirit of cooperation and
mutual understanding” which animated Somalia and Kenya;
• Paragraph two of the MOU acknowledges the existence of an
“unresolved delimitation issue between the two coastal States”,
and paragraph three underscores that, despite their diverging
interests as to delimitation, “the two coastal States are
determined to work together to safeguard and promote their
common interest with respect to the establishment of the outer
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.170
These statements are significant because the Court has held
that articles that appear at the beginning of a treaty “must be

168 2009 MOU (emphasis added). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III Annex 6.
169 See U.N. General Assembly, Sixty-Sixth Session, Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its sixty-third session (26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011), U.N. Doc.
A/66/10/Add.1 (2011), p. 18. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 12 (commentary of guideline 3.1.5.1 of the
ILC’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (Determination of the object and purpose of
the treaty): “The object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith, taking account
of the terms of the treaty in their context, in particular the title and the preamble of the treaty.
Recourse may also be had to the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion and, where appropriate, the subsequent practice of the parties”.).
170 2009 MOU (emphasis added). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III Annex 6.
73
regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the other
treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied”.171
• In accordance with this clearly stated purpose, the essential
terms of the MOU, as reflected in its operative paragraphs,
refer only to the Parties’ submissions to the CLCS. In those
paragraphs, the Parties give their consent to each other’s
submissions to enable the Commission to consider them and
render its recommendations on delineation of the outer limits
of the shelf. To that end, paragraph four states that Somalia’s
forthcoming preliminary information is without prejudice to
the delimitation of the boundary and, on that basis, Kenya
indicates that it has no objection to the inclusion of the
disputed maritime areas in the preliminary information.
Paragraph five then states that at the appropriate time both
States will make full submissions which will include the areas
in dispute. The same paragraph further states: “The two coastal
States hereby give their prior consent to the consideration by
the Commission of these submissions in the area under
dispute”, and concludes that “the recommendations approved
by the Commission … shall be without prejudice to the future
delimitation”.
• The same object and purpose is further confirmed by the
evidence contemporaneous to the drafting of the MOU that
was detailed in Chapter 2.172 In this respect, it must be stressed
that the MOU was prepared in parallel with Somalia’s
Preliminary Information, which was prepared in light of the
rapidly approaching 13 May 2009 CLCS deadline to protect
Somalia from losing its potential entitlement in the continental
shelf beyond 200 M. Kenya itself admits that “the conclusion
of the 2009 MOU was most immediately precipitated by the 13

171 Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 28 (determining that Article I of the
1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of
American and Iran “must be regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the other Treaty
provisions are to be interpreted and applied”).
172 See, supra, paras. 2.5-2.30.
74
May 2009 time limit imposed on both Parties for making their
respective submissions to the CLCS”.173
3.21. These circumstances all undermine Kenya’s newly invented argument that
the MOU’s object and purpose was “to agree on a method for the final settlement
of the maritime boundary between Kenya and Somalia”.174 That interpretation
does not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, a number of statements in its Preliminary
Objections contradict Kenya’s current interpretation of the MOU. The
Preliminary Objections acknowledge, for example:
(1) that the rationale behind the MOU was to avoid
the waste of time, effort and resources involved in
preparing submissions to the CLCS only to have
them set aside based on the other Party’s
objections:
“It was apparent that an objection by either
Party would waste the considerable costs of
gathering and analysing data for the
submissions and create a situation of
perpetual limbo”;175 and
(2) the absence of any relationship between the
MOU and the delimitation process:
“The second operative paragraph emphasizes that
the MOU is without prejudice to the final
delimitation of the maritime boundary”.176

173 KPO, para. 22.
174 Ibid., para. 46. See also ibid., paras. 12, 17.
175 Ibid., para. 46.
176 Ibid., para. 50.
75
3.22. Other objective elements point to the same inescapable conclusion: the
Parties’ only intent was to give mutual consent to the Commission’s
consideration of their respective submissions.
B. THE TEXT OF THE MOU WITHIN THE RELEVANT CONTEXT
3.23. Kenya bases its entire case on the penultimate paragraph (paragraph six)
of the MOU, which reads in full:
“The delimitation of maritime boundaries in the
areas under dispute, including the delimitation of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles,
shall be agreed between the two coastal States on
the basis of international law after the Commission
has concluded its examination of the separate
submissions made by each of the two coastal States
and made its recommendations to two coastal States
concerning the establishment of the outer limits of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.
Kenya now claims to interpret this paragraph to mean:
“The Parties also agreed that following CLCS
review, after which the outer limits of the
continental shelf could be definitively established,
the method of settlement for delimitation of the full
extent of the maritime boundary would be a
negotiated agreement rather than recourse to any
compulsory procedures”.177
3.24. Kenya thus reads into the spare language of paragraph six two expansive
conclusions: (1) that the establishment of the entire maritime boundary, not just
the boundary beyond 200 M, is subject to the condition precedent that the CLCS

177 Ibid., para. 46; See also íbid., para. 73 and Kenya’s conclusions, paras. 152-153.
76
has issued recommendations on both Kenya’s and Somalia’s submissions; and (2)
that the full maritime boundary will be established by negotiations—and by
negotiations alone—only after those recommendations have been issued. Kenya
would thus have the MOU condition the delimitation of the entire maritime
boundary, within and beyond 200 M, on the prior delineation of the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 M. Such an approach would not only be
entirely unprecedented but it would also lead to a manifestly absurd result:
Somalia and Kenya would have to wait many years until the CLCS issues its
recommendations on both of their submissions before they could even attempt to
delimit any part of their maritime boundary.
3.25. Kenya’s current interpretation of the MOU is also entirely illogical. There
is no principled reason why the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 M
would be subordinated to the recommendations of the CLCS concerning the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M. The former
is in no way conditioned on the latter.
3.26. In addition to being illogical, Kenya’s argument is incompatible with the
plain text of the MOU read on its own and in context. In contrast to the other
paragraphs of the MOU, paragraph six does not have any dispositive scope. Its
wording is wholly unremarkable and largely echoes the language of Articles
74(1) and 83(1) of the Convention (which provide that the delimitation of
maritime boundaries in the EEZ and continental shelf, respectively, “shall be
effected by agreement on the basis of international law”). It therefore does
nothing more than reiterate the Parties’ standing obligation to attempt to agree on
the delimitation of their maritime boundary.
3.27. Moreover, the use of the passive voice (“the delimitation of maritime
boundaries … shall be agreed on the basis of international law”) in paragraph six
77
contrasts with the more active formulation characteristic of the operative
paragraphs. The heart of the MOU is paragraph five pursuant to which Somalia
and Kenya consent to each other’s submissions. The first sentence of that
paragraph states: “The two coastal States agree that at an appropriate time” they
may make submissions that may include the area in dispute.178 The second
sentence then states: “The two States hereby give their prior consent to the
consideration by the Commission of these submissions in the area under
dispute”.179 The contrast between the affirmative nature with which these
obligations are expressed, on the one hand, and the wording of paragraph six, on
the other, is plain.
3.28. Paragraph six of the MOU is thus merely descriptive, not prescriptive.180
Far from establishing a binding agreement to negotiate—and only negotiate—
their maritime boundary, and then only after the CLCS has made its
recommendations, it merely acknowledges the Parties’ existing obligations under
the Convention.
3.29. Moreover, a single provision cannot be—and must not be—read in
isolation from the text as a whole.181 The overall object and purpose of the

178 2009 MOU (emphasis added). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 1; MS, Vol. III Annex 6.
179 Ibid.
180 It is not alone in the respect. Large portions of the MOU contain similarly descriptive
statements. Paragraph four, for example, states that Somalia’s Preliminary Information “shall not
prejudice the positions of the two coastal States with respect to the maritime dispute between
them and shall be without prejudice to the future delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area
under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M”. Ibid. This, of
course, would be true regardless of whether or not it was stated in the MOU.
181 See, e.g., Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 27 (“The Court considers
that such a general formulation cannot be interpreted in isolation from the object and purpose of
the Treaty in which it is inserted”); WTO, Appellate Body, Report, 12 September 2005, European
Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R;
78
document concerns non-objection. It would be wholly inappropriate to seize on a
single clause of the sixth paragraph read in isolation to make the MOU mean
what Kenya now attempts to make it mean without clear and convincing evidence
of the Parties’ intent to achieve that result. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2,182 there
is no such evidence. Indeed, all the evidence is to the contrary.
3.30. This evidence includes Kenya’s 6 May 2009 submission to the CLCS,
which was made one month after the MOU was signed.183 That submission was
facilitated by the MOU and it constitutes an “instrument which was made by one
or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty”184 within the meaning of
Article 31 of the VCLT. It is thus part of the context relevant for the
interpretation of the MOU.

WT/DS286/AB/R, para. 239 (“[W]e caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the
purported ‘object and purpose’ of specific provisions, paragraphs or subparagraphs of the WTO
agreements, or tariff headings in Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty
on the whole. Even if, arguendo, one could rely on the specific ‘object and purpose’ of heading
02.10 of the EC Schedule in isolation, we would share the Panel’s view that ‘one Member’s
unilateral object and purpose for the conclusion of a tariff commitment cannot form the basis’ for
an interpretation of that commitment, because interpretation in the light of Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention must focus on ascertaining the common intentions of the parties”.).
182 See, supra, paras. 2.5-2.30.
183 This is the date of transmission of the Executive Summary to the UN. See United Nations,
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Receipt of the submission made by the
Republic of Kenya to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc.
CLCS.35.2009.LOS (11 May 2009). MS, Vol. III, Annex 60. The Executive Summary itself has
“April 2009” on its cover-page.
184 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 (23 May, 1969), entered into
force 27 Jan. 1980. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 1.
79
3.31. As discussed in Chapter 2,185 the Executive Summary to Kenya’s May
2009 submission describes the MOU only by its title, indicating that its object is
the one described in the title; namely, the mutual grant of non-objection:
“[T]he two countries have signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) dated 7 April 2009
granting each other no objection in respect of
submissions on the outer limits of the continental
shelf to the Commission on Limits of the
Continental Shelf”.186
Kenya’s Executive Summary says nothing more about the MOU. There is
nothing that even suggests that Kenya considered the MOU to establish an agreed
method of dispute settlement.
3.32. To succeed on its Preliminary Objections, Kenya must persuade the Court
that the MOU is a binding agreement to have exclusive recourse to some other
method of settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute. It also must persuade
the Court that this method is negotiations alone and that these negotiations shall
be undertaken only after the CLCS has made its recommendations in respect to
the submissions of both States. Kenya does not meet any of these challenges.
3.33. Not only does the text of the MOU interpreted in the light of its object and
purpose refute Kenya’s position, so too does the Parties’ subsequent conduct.
Indeed, as detailed in Chapter 2,187 Kenya has not put before the Court any
evidence prior to the filing of its Preliminary Objections showing that it

185 See, supra, para. 2.28.
186 Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf Submission beyond 200 nautical miles
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary (Apr. 2009), para.
7-3. MS, Vol. III, Annex 59.
187 See, supra, paras. 2.5-2.76.
80
considered the MOU to be an instrument whose purpose was to establish a
method for settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute. To the contrary, the
evidence it has tendered makes clear that the Parties considered that they could
and should conduct delimitation negotiations long before the CLCS issued any
recommendations on their submissions.
C. THE SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE OF THE PARTIES
3.34. Article 31(3) of the VCLT provides that the subsequent practice in the
application of a treaty is also to be taken into account in interpreting its meaning.
In this case, the practice of the Parties, including Kenya, after they signed the
MOU confirms that they did not understand it to make the issuance of
recommendations by the CLCS a pre-requisite to negotiations to settle their
maritime boundary dispute. To the contrary, as described in Chapter 2,188 they
entered into such negotiations without waiting for the CLCS’s recommendations,
and they did so at Kenya’s initiative.
3.35. It must be recalled in this regard that, as soon as the Government of the
new Federal Republic of Somalia was firmly in place, Somalia accepted Kenya’s
invitation to engage in maritime boundary negotiations. The Parties subsequently
held two rounds of talks (and scheduled a third) in 2014, all before the CLCS had
even considered Somalia’s submission or issued recommendations to either
State.189 (In fact, Somalia’s full submission to the Commission was made only on
21 July 2014,190 four months after the first round of negotiations and one week

188 See, supra, paras. 2.37-2.75.
189 MS, paras. 3.43-3.56. See also, supra, paras. 2.41-2.72.
190 Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental Shelf Submission of the Federal Republic of
Somalia: Executive Summary (21 July 2014). MS, Vol. IV, Annex 70.
81
before the second round.) The negotiations were serious and substantive, but they
failed.191
3.36. This leads to two conclusions: (1) it confirms that neither Party believed
the MOU to subordinate delimitation negotiations to the prior recommendations
of the CLCS; and (2) to the extent that the MOU would have obliged the Parties
to endeavour to solve their dispute by direct negotiations, that obligation (which
is an obligation of conduct, not of result) was fulfilled by the negotiations that
were held in 2014 but that ultimately proved to have no prospect of success.
3.37. Concerning the first point,192 it must again be underscored that before
lodging its Preliminary Objections, Kenya never took the view that the MOU
prevented the Parties from attempting to resolve their delimitation dispute before
the CLCS had issued its recommendations. Indeed, a considerable number of
documents emanating from Kenya itself clearly show that it shared Somalia’s
understanding of the MOU as an instrument that did no more than grant mutual
non-objection.
3.38. The Executive Summary to Kenya’s May 2009 submission to the CLCS
already has been discussed above.193 As recounted in Chapter 2,194 Kenya’s 3
September 2009 oral presentation to the CLCS was to a similar effect. The Head
of Kenya’s Task Force on the Delineation of the Outer Continental Shelf, Ms.
Juster Nkoroi (who was also involved in the discussions leading to the adoption
of the MOU), characterised the MOU as an instrument pursuant to which “the

191 See, supra, para. 2.75.
192 As for the second point, see Chapter 4 below.
193 See, supra, para. 2.28.
194 See, supra, para. 2.33.
82
parties undertake not to object to the examination of their respective
submissions”.195 She did not suggest any other purpose for the MOU. According
to the official CLCS records, she also “confirmed that, at an appropriate time, a
mechanism will be established to finalize the maritime boundary negotiations
with Somalia”.196 In so doing, she made clear that Kenya did not consider the
MOU to be an agreement on a method of settling the Parties’ delimitation
dispute.
3.39. The same points are equally clear in Kenya’s 24 October 2014 Note
Verbale to the Secretary General of the U.N. protesting Somalia’s February 2014
objection to the CLCS’s consideration of Kenya’s Submission.197 The timing of
Kenya’s October 2014 Note Verbale is particularly significant, as it was
submitted two months after Somalia filed its Application instituting proceedings
in this case. It was thus written not just in the context of an active dispute but in
the context of ongoing litigation.
3.40. Kenya’s October 2014 Note demonstrates that even at that late date it did
not regard the MOU as constituting an agreement on a method for settling the
Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, nor as precluding dispute settlement before
the CLCS had acted. The Note states, inter alia:
“Kenya confirms that prior to the filing of her
Submission to the Commission on 6 April [sic]

195 U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work of the Commission,
U.N. Doc. CLCS/64 (1 Oct. 2009) (emphasis added), para. 95. MS, Vol. II, Annex 61.
196 Ibid.
197 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 586/14 (24 Oct. 2014). MS,
Vol. III, Annex 50.
83
2009 … Kenya had, in the spirit of understanding
and cooperation, negotiated arrangements of a
practical nature with the Transitional Federal
Government of the Republic of Somalia in
accordance with Article 83, paragraph 3, of the
Convention. These arrangements were contained in
a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter
MOU) signed on 7th April 2009, whereby both
parties, undertook not to object to the examination
of their respective submission. At the time, Kenya
indicated to the Commission that pending further
negotiations, a mechanism will be established to
finalise the maritime boundary negotiations with
Somalia”.198
3.41. Here again, the only effect Kenya ascribed to the MOU was mutual nonobjection.
And by stating that “a mechanism will be established to finalise the
maritime boundary negotiations with Somalia”, Kenya had also made clear that
no such mechanism had yet been agreed. The argument put forward by Kenya in
its Preliminary Objection is thus plainly a recent invention, devised well after
Somalia had filed its Application initiating these proceedings.
3.42. Notably, Kenya’s October 2014 Note Verbale also contains the following
statement:
“Kenya remains committed and continues to pursue
more legitimate avenues to have the delimitation of
the maritime boundary amicably resolved, most
preferably through a bilateral agreement with the
Somali Federal Republic and in this regard wishes
to inform that notwithstanding the aforementioned
actions by Somalia [i.e., its objection to Kenya’s
submission], bilateral diplomatic negotiations, at

198 Ibid., para. 2 (emphasis added).
84
the highest levels possible, are ongoing with a view
to resolving this matter expeditiously …”.199
3.43. In indicating that it considered a bilateral agreement to be the “most
preferable” avenue for resolving the delimitation dispute with Somalia, Kenya
also clearly indicated that it did not consider such agreement the only “legitimate
avenue” for doing so. The significance of this last point is underscored by the
timing of the Note. As stated, it was submitted to the U.N. two months after
Somalia filed its Application in this case. Yet, even then, Kenya did not (as it
does now) take the view that a bilateral agreement was the exclusive “legitimate
avenue” for resolving the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute such that Somalia’s
earlier recourse to the Court should be deemed invalid. Indeed, as discussed in
Chapter 2,200 it was Kenya itself that first raised the possibility of referring the
matter to third-party dispute settlement at the end of the second round of
negotiations in July 2014.
3.44. The above leads to two clear conclusions: (1) Kenya may have preferred
bilateral negotiations but it did not exclude (which means that, in its view, the
MOU does not exclude) other means of settling the dispute; and (2) negotiations
were not a remote prospect which could take place only after the CLCS had made
its recommendations on the delineation of the outer limits of the shelf. They were,
in Kenya’s words, “ongoing”.
3.45. Kenya’s conduct proving that it did not consider the MOU to constitute an
agreement on a method for settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, or
precluding dispute settlement before the CLCS had acted, continued even well

199 Ibid., para. 7.
200 See, supra, para. 2.69.
85
beyond October 2014. As stated in Chapter 2,201 Kenya objected to the
Commission’s consideration of Somalia’s submission by means of a Note
Verbale to the U.N. Secretary General dated 4 May 2015. After lodging its
objection, Kenya’s Note reiterated that it
“remains committed and continues to pursue more
legitimate avenues to have the delimitation of the
maritime boundary amicably resolved, most
preferably through bilateral agreement with the
Federal Republic of Somalia. The objection to
consideration of Somalia’s submission, therefore, is
without prejudice to such endeavours”.202
3.46. Here, more than eight months after Somalia filed its Application
instituting these proceedings and just five months before submitting its
Preliminary Objections, Kenya still did not take the view that a bilateral
agreement was the exclusive “legitimate avenue” for resolving the Parties’
maritime boundary dispute. To the contrary, by continuing to insist that a bilateral
agreement was the “most preferable” method for resolving the dispute, and by
failing to invoke the MOU, Kenya clearly proceeded on the basis that the MOU
did not make a “bilateral agreement” the exclusive method for doing so. This, of
course, is consistent with the fact that Kenya itself had raised the possibility of
having recourse to compulsory dispute settlement in the event negotiations
failed.203

201 See, supra, para. 2.76.
202 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, No. 141/15 (4 May 2015). MS, Vol.
III, Annex 51.
203 See, supra, paras. 2.69-2.70.
86
3.47. The conduct of negotiations on the disputed maritime boundary (at
Kenya’s request) between March and July 2014, Kenya’s oral statements before
the CLCS, and its Notes Verbales to the U.N. all confirm that:
• The MOU related only to the examination of the Parties’
respective submissions to the CLCS; it was meant merely to
ensure their mutual consent to those submissions;
• Kenya never conditioned negotiations on the prior adoption of
recommendations by the Commission;
• Thus, negotiations on the boundary could be—and were—held
in parallel with the examination of the two States’ submissions
to the CLCS; and
• Finally, as Kenya’s own conduct attests, the MOU by no
means precluded recourse to the Court to settle their dispute
concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary between
the two States.
D. A SYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE MOU
3.48. According to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT: “There shall be taken into
account, together with the context … any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the Parties”. In the case of the MOU, the
“relevant rules of international law” include UNCLOS, to which both Somalia
and Kenya are parties. Kenya ratified the Convention on 2 March 1989 and
Somalia on 24 July 1989.204 Interpreting the MOU in the light of UNCLOS is
particularly appropriate given that: (1) the text was adopted with a view to
facilitating the smooth implementation of the Convention’s provisions relating to

204 U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Table
recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements (10 Oct. 2014),
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf. MS, Vol. IV, Annex 72.
87
the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M; and (2)
the language of the sixth paragraph of the MOU echoes the wording of Articles
74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS.
3.49. The Convention’s compulsory dispute resolution system provides further
support for Somalia’s interpretation of the MOU. As Judge P.C. Rao noted in the
entry of the Max Planck Encyclopedia concerning the settlement of disputes in
the law of the sea:
“More than 100 of [UNCLOS’s] articles deal with
dispute settlement in a comprehensive manner. The
dispute settlement provisions constitute an integral
part of the Convention. It establishes both voluntary
and compulsory procedures for dispute settlement.
The drafters of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea considered that effective dispute settlement
was essential to balance the delicate compromises
incorporated in the Convention and to guarantee
that it would be interpreted both consistently and
equitably”.205
3.50. Part XV of UNCLOS sets out the principles and the procedures applicable
to dispute settlement under the Convention. Two basic principles govern its
interpretation. First, the Parties to UNCLOS are under an obligation to settle
disputes by peaceful means;206 undue prolongation of disputes is

205 P. Chandrasekhara Rao, “Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes”, Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (last updated Mar. 2011). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 27.
206 UNCLOS, Art. 279.
88
impermissible.207 Second, the resolution of disputes by means of binding
decisions is “the default rule”.208
3.51. It is true that Article 281 permits States to agree to opt out of procedures
entailing a binding decision. That is only true, however, if the agreement excludes
any further procedure beyond that agreed by the parties.209 Moreover, an
agreement opting out of procedures entailing a binding decision must contain a
clear statement to that effect. As aptly explained in a recent arbitral award, an
express exclusion of judicial or arbitral settlement is indispensable:
“Article 281 requires some clear statement of
exclusion of further procedures. This is supported
by the text and context of Article 281 and by the
structure and overall purpose of the Convention.
The Tribunal thus shares the views of ITLOS in its
provisional measures orders in the Southern Bluefin
Tuna and MOX Plant cases, as well as the separate
opinion of Judge Keith in Southern Bluefin Tuna

207 Articles 74(2) and 83(2) of UNCLOS specifically provide that “[i]f no agreement can be
reached within a reasonable time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for
in Part XV”.
208 The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Award, 2015, PCA Case Nº 2013-19 (hereinafter “Philippines v. China), para. 224 (referring to
“the overall design of the Convention as a system whereby compulsory dispute resolution is the
default rule …”.). See also UNCLOS Art. 287 (providing that States may choose among ITLOS,
the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention for the
settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS (Art. 287(1)). In
the event a State does not choose any of the stated means of settling disputes under the
Convention, it shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII (Art.
287(3)).
209 UNCLOS, Art. 281(1) (“If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no
settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties
does not exclude any further procedure”.). Art. 282 allows States to opt out of the procedures
provided for in Part XV of the Convention, but only if they have agreed to a procedure that
“entails a binding decision”. Art. 282(1). See, infra, paras. 3.82-3.86 for a discussion of the
interaction between Articles 282 and 287 in the case of matching Optional Clause declarations.
89
that the majority’s statement in that matter that ‘the
absence of an express exclusion of any procedure ...
is not decisive’ is not in line with the intended
meaning of Article 281”.210
3.52. In this respect it is notable that ITLOS and arbitral tribunals constituted
pursuant to Annex VII have consistently rejected objections to their jurisdiction
based on arguments concerning the existence of an alternative method of dispute
settlement.211
3.53. Kenya’s recently adopted reading of the MOU pursuant to which it
excludes any method of dispute settlement other than negotiations is therefore
incompatible with scheme of the Convention, which favours the speedy
resolution of disputes, through binding decisions when necessary, and only
permits exclusion of judicial or arbitral recourse when the States concerned
clearly and unambiguously so agree. The MOU does not meet these conditions.
The only reasonable construction of paragraph six of the MOU is that it is a
reaffirmation of the obligations of the Parties under UNCLOS, in particular those
providing for delimitation by agreement in accordance with international law
(Articles 74(1) and 83(1)). That obligation has never been interpreted by States,
or by international courts or tribunals, as preventing States from submitting their
delimitation disputes to judicial or arbitral settlement. The same can be said for
the MOU; it no more constitutes a pactum de contrahendo than do Articles 74
and 83 of UNCLOS. Any other interpretation would pave the way to indefinite

210 Philippines v. China, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Award, 2015, PCA Case Nº 2013-19
(internal citations omitted, emphasis added), para. 223.
211 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional
Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 2011, paras. 53-55; MOX Plant Case
(Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports
2001, paras. 40-53; see also Philippines v. China, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Award, 2015,
PCA Case Nº 2013-19.
90
stalemates in the resolution of disputes and uncertainty in the delimitation of
maritime boundaries between States.
E. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE MOU
3.54. Interpreting the MOU in accordance with Article 31 of VCLT does not
leave its meaning ambiguous or obscure, nor does it lead to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Recourse may therefore be had to its
preparatory works and the circumstances of its conclusion as a supplementary
means of interpretation only “to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31”.212 In this case, an examination of the preparatory works
and the circumstances in which the MOU was concluded does, in fact, confirm
the interpretation set out above.
3.55. In the first place, the unique circumstances surrounding the conclusion of
the MOU bear reiterating. As shown in Chapter 2,213 the MOU was concluded
with no substantive input from Somalia. The drafters of the MOU were Norway
and Kenya—a truly anomalous situation for a bilateral treaty.
3.56. Several reasons explain why Somalia signed it despite these unusual
circumstances. Somalia’s new Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”) was
under considerable pressure to submit preliminary information indicative of the
outer limits of its continental shelf to the CLCS by 13 May 2009. Failure to do so

212 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 (23 May, 1969), entered into
force 27 Jan. 1980, Art. 32 (“Supplementary Means of Interpretation”). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 1.
See also Case Concerning Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1994, para. 55; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports 1995, para.
40; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2002, para. 53.
213 See, supra, para. 2.16.
91
would have meant losing Somalia’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond
200 M. The preparation of the preliminary information required time, expertise
and funding, all of which Somalia lacked at the critical moment. It was for that
reason that, as described in Chapter 2,214 “in October 2008 the Special
Representative of the [UN] Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia, Mr Ahmedou
Ould Abdallah, initiated the preparation of preliminary information indicative of
the outer limits of the continental shelf of Somalia beyond 200 nautical miles ….
In the preparation of this material the SRSG accepted an offer of assistance from
the Government of Norway”.215
3.57. In the case of Somalia, Norway’s involvement went beyond the mere
technical assistance it had provided to other States, including Kenya. Norway’s
help included not just drafting the Preliminary Information but also the MOU and
even the letter from Somalia’s Prime Minister authorizing the Minister of
National Planning and International Cooperation to sign it on Somalia’s behalf.216
By contrast, Kenya’s representatives were more actively involved in the drafting
of the MOU and proposed several changes to it.217 The MOU was effectively
presented to the TFG as a done deal, part of a package that included the

214 See, supra, para. 2.12.
215 Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009), pp. 3-4. MS, Vol. III, Annex
66.
216 See, supra, para. 2.26. Norway also drafted the cover letter to Somalia’s Preliminary
Information submission. See Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Hon. Prof. Abdirahman
Haji Adan Ibbi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources of
Somalia (27 Mar. 2009). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 19.
217 See, e.g., Email exchange between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30
Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 9; Email exchange between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Mr. Hans
Wilhelm Longva (30–31 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 10.
92
preliminary information, without which Somalia would “lose the continental
shelf”.218
3.58. When the draft preliminary information and MOU were presented to it,
the new TFG had been in place for less than a month.219 Somalia’s April 2009
Preliminary Information recalls:
“The new Transitional Federal Government of the
Somali Republic was sworn in on 22 February
2009. At a meeting in Nairobi on 10 March 2009 …
the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali
Republic was informed about the initiative of the
SRSG and of the Norwegian assistance”.220
3.59. Considering the extreme time pressure, the TFG could hardly have
opposed the initiative or requested more time to consider it. Thus, the Minister of
National Planning and International Cooperation, Professor Ibbi—the person
from the TFG with whom Ambassador Longva exchanged e-mails—limited
himself to expressing his gratitude to Norway:
“Dear Ambassador, I am very pleased to see you
again what I would like to inform you is that The
Council of Minister of [S]omalia have approved the
Re-Submission of the preliminary information

218 See Network Al Shahid, Press Release issued by former Somali Minister of National Planning
and International Cooperation, Dr. Abdirahman Abdishakur (7 July 2012). KPO, Vol. II, Annex
13; Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms. Juster Nkoroi (Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 6; Email exchange between Ms. Rina Kristmoen, Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi,
Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 7;
Email exchange between Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi
and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 8; Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm
Longva to Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi (2 Apr. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 12.
219 See, supra, paras. 2.14-2.15.
220 Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS (14 Apr. 2009), p. 4. MS, Vol. III, Annex 66.
93
indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles, which we suppose [sic]
to submit to the Secretary General of the United
Nations before 13 May 2009.
As we have agreed yes I am ready to meet with you
again but My Prime [M]inister would like to invite
you and H.E Rina to come to Mogadishu one day
trip that you will also see our Prime Minister who
would li[k]e to thank you and your Government for
their unreserved endeavours towards this issue. The
Cabinet became ve[r]y happy to know that The
Norw[e]gian Government has done all the work
that we supposed [sic] to do without any interest
than wanting only to help the newly born Somali
Government and as well wants to see Somalia to
stand again its fee[t].
Third Po[i]nt, if you remember The parag[]raph
that you asked me to mention what to be written we
agreed to let you know these points:-
1- Yem[e]n and Kenya we must have the
mem[o]randum of understanding that you have
prepared.
2. mentioning that the Council of Minister have
approved with many thanks to the Norwegian
Government and SRSG whom have been doing.
3. Somalia wants to submit its submission before
any[]one else.
and so on”.221
There is no mention of the maritime boundary or any “agreed” procedure for
resolving the Parties’ dispute. The entire focus is on the submission to the CLCS.

221 Email exchange between Ms. Rina Kristmoen, Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi, Amb.
Hans Wilhelm Longva, and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009), p. 34. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 7.
94
3.60. The e-mail exchanges submitted with Kenya’s Preliminary Objections are
to the same effect. None of them presents the MOU as anything other than a
mutual commitment not to object to each other’s CLCS submission. None of the
persons involved in its drafting stated, or even hinted, that the MOU had anything
to do with establishing a method for resolving the Parties’ maritime delimitation
dispute. Still less is there anything to suggest that the MOU was intended to
establish a very peculiar two-step procedure for settling that dispute, pursuant to
which negotiations were both exclusive and dependent upon the CLCS’s prior
issuance of recommendations.
3.61. Considering Ambassador Longva’s critical role in drafting the MOU, it is
useful to examine the views he expressed, both contemporaneously222 and in
subsequent declarations. They confirm beyond any doubt that the purpose of the
document was not to condition the delimitation of the maritime boundary
between Somalia and Kenya on the prior adoption of recommendations by the
CLCS. The sole purpose of the instrument was, as its title attests, the mutual grant
of no objection so the Commission could proceed to exam their respective
submissions notwithstanding their unresolved delimitation dispute.
3.62. Ambassador Longva’s presentation concerning the MOU at the November
2009 Pan African Conference on Maritime Boundary Delimitation and the
Continental Shelf was discussed in Chapter 2 and is conclusive on this point. As

222 See, e.g., Email exchange between Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji
Adan Ibbi and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II, Annex 8; Email exchange
between Ms. Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar. 2009). KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 9; or Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga. KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 14. In all these exchanges Ambassador Longva stresses the need to include clarifications
concerning the “beyond 200 nautical miles purpose” of the MOU.
95
recounted there,223 Ambassador Longva characterised the MOU strictly as a nonobjection
agreement. He stated:
“On 7 April 2009 Kenya and Somalia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding where they agree
that each of them will make separate submissions to
the CLCS, that may include areas under dispute,
without regard to the delimitation of maritime
boundaries between them, and where they give
their prior consent to the consideration by the
CLCS of these submissions in the areas under
dispute”.224
He said nothing about any agreement on dispute settlement, whether generally or
in relation to the area beyond 200 M. Nowhere in his summary does he hint that
the MOU is an agreement on the means of settlement of the boundary dispute, or
that the Commission’s delineation of the outer limits in the area beyond 200 M is
a pre-condition for negotiations on the delimitation of the boundary.
3.63. Also enlightening is the more general explanation concerning the purpose
and utility of such non-objection agreements Ambassador Longva gave during
the same presentation:
“Both the joint submission made by Mauritius and
the Seychelles, and the Memorandum of
Understanding signed by Kenya and Somalia, as
well as the understandings reached at the
subregional meetings of West African coastal
States in Accra and Praia represent important
breakthroughs in the handling of unresolved issues

223 See, supra, paras. 2.23-2.24.
224 Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Prepared Remarks at Pan African Conference on Maritime
Boundary Delimitation and the Continental Shelf, Accra (9–10 Nov. 2009), p. 114. KPO, Vol. II,
Annex 25.
96
of maritime delimitation between neighbouring
States in the context of the establishment of the
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles. … The regional or sub-regional
approach and cooperation chosen by most of the
West African coastal States with respect to the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles should also provide
an example to other coastal States both in Africa
and elsewhere. We have already seen that
unresolved issues of maritime delimitation and the
possibility of overlap between the areas beyond 200
nautical miles claimed by neighbouring States,
provide strong arguments in favour of a regional or
sub-regional approach and cooperation”.
225
3.64. Norway subsequently reconfirmed this interpretation of the MOU in a
2011 Note Verbale from its Permanent Mission to U.N. to the U.N. Secretariat, in
which the MOU is discussed in some detail. The Note closely parallels
Ambassador Longva’s comments on the object and purpose of the document:
“With the good offices of Norway, and after
consultations between the two sides, on 7 April
2009 Somalia and Kenya signed in Nairobi a
‘Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of Kenya and the Transitional Federal
Government of the Somali Republic granting each
other No-objection in respect of submissions on the
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200
nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf’. In the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) the Parties agree that at an
appropriate time each of them will make separate
submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) that may include areas
under dispute between the two countries, without

225 Ibid. (emphasis added).
97
prejudice to the delimitation of maritime
boundaries between them. In this MoU the two
coastal States grant their prior consent to the
consideration by the CLCS of these submissions in
the areas under dispute. Furthermore it is stipulated
that the submissions made before the CLCS and the
recommendations approved by the CLCS thereon
shall not prejudice the positions of the two coastal
States with respect to the maritime dispute between
them and shall be without prejudice to the future
delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas
under dispute, including the delimitation of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.
226
3.65. The conclusions to be drawn from the above are obvious. On the basis
that the general rule of interpretation enunciated in Article 31 (and, secondarily,
Article 32) of the VCLT is applicable, the 2009 MOU between Somalia and
Kenya:
(1) Creates a neat distinction between the delimitation of the
Parties’ maritime boundary and the delineation of the
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M, and
applies only to the latter;
(2) Does not establish, or even imply, any prohibition of
negotiations between the two States pending the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 M; and
(3) Does not establish negotiations as the exclusive method of
settling the maritime boundary dispute between them.
3.66. To require the Parties to wait for the CLCS’s recommendations before
engaging in efforts to resolve the boundary dispute would only cause
considerable and pointless delay. In addition to being inconsistent with

226 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations to the Secretariat
of the United Nations (17 Aug. 2011) (emphasis added), p. 25. KPO, Vol. II, Annex 4.
98
UNCLOS, it is also flatly incompatible with the general policy of the African
Union.227 In April 2014, at a time when the negotiations with Somalia were ongoing,
Kenya’s President himself stated before Parliament that, as a member of
the African Union, Kenya was under an obligation to delimit its boundaries in a
timely manner.228
3.67. While it is conceivable that the CLCS could issue recommendations
concerning Kenya’s submission in late 2016 or during 2017, many more years
will be needed before the Commission will be able to consider Somalia’s
submission (which, as stated, was submitted in July 2014). Indeed, Somalia’s
submission is fourth to last in the queue for consideration by the CLCS, and the
Commission’s backlog is already considerable. According to Kenya’s untenable
interpretation of the MOU, the Parties (and the Court) could not address any
aspect of their maritime delimitation dispute for at least a decade. The MOU

227 Memorandum of Understanding between the Members of the African Union on Security,
Stability, Development and Cooperation in Durban, South Africa (July 2002), reprinted in
AFRICA, FROM BARRIERS TO BRIDGES: COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL TEXTS ON AFRICAN BORDERS
FROM 1963 TO 2012 (2013), p. 53. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 2 (Point 10 of the Memorandum is thus
drafted: “African borders: In conformity with the Cairo Summit Decision on borders, conclude
[sic] by 2012, with the assistance of the UN cartographic unit where required, the delineation and
demarcation of borders between African states, where it has not been done, to strengthen peaceful
inter-state relations. The outcome of such exercises should be deposited with the African Union
and the United Nations. Prior to 2012 when the process should be completed, there should be biannual
review of the state of implementation”.). See also African Union Border Programme, Third
Declaration on the African Union Border Programme Adopted by the Third Conference of
African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, Niamey, Niger, AUBP/EXP-MIN/7 (17 May 2012),
reprinted in AFRICA, FROM BARRIERS TO BRIDGES: COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL TEXTS ON AFRICAN
BORDERS FROM 1963 TO 2012 (2013). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 13. See also African Union Border
Programme, Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation
Modalities as Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues held in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (7 June 2007). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 9. See also African Union, Second
Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, Preparatory Meeting of
Governmental Experts, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, AUBP/EXP‐MIN/2 Concept Note (22-25 Mar.
2010). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 11.
228 E. Mutai, “Kenya, Somalia border row targeted in Sh5.6bn mapping plan”, Business Daily (20
Apr. 2014). WSS, Vol. II, Annex 30.
99
cannot and should not be interpreted to frustrate any prospect of resolving the
Parties’ delimitation dispute in a timely manner, or via judicial determination.
3.68. Further, in the alternative and as a strictly subsidiary argument, Somalia
notes that under any view of the MOU, Kenya’s Preliminary Objections are
entirely irrelevant concerning the delimitation of any maritime area other than the
continental shelf:
• The title of the MOU refers only to the “Continental Shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles”, showing that it has no application
to any other zone;
• The second paragraph defines the “maritime dispute” as
concerning “[t]he delimitation of the continental shelf between
the Republic of Kenya and the Somali Republic”;229
• The same paragraph also states that “the claims of the two
coastal States cover an overlapping area of the continental
shelf which constitutes the ‘area under dispute’”;230
• The sixth paragraph (the provision on which Kenya would
rely) applies only to “[t]he delimitation maritime boundaries in
the areas under dispute”;231 and
• The expressions “territorial sea” and “exclusive economic
zone” are entirely absent from the MOU.
3.69. That said, Somalia wishes to make absolutely clear that it does not
consider that the MOU applies even to the Parties’ dispute concerning the
delimitation of the continental shelf, whether within or beyond 200 M. As shown,

229 2009 MOU (emphasis added). KPO, Annex 1; MS Annex 6.
230 Ibid. (emphasis added).
231 Ibid. (emphasis added).
100
the MOU’s object and purpose is limited to the mutual grant of non-objection in
relation to their respective CLCS submissions. Its scope is therefore limited to the
delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M; it has nothing to do with the
delimitation of any aspect of the Parties’ maritime boundary. To the extent that
the MOU addressed the delimitation dispute, it was solely to confirm that the no
objection agreement had no effect on, and was without prejudice to, the Parties’
positions on delimitation. The MOU was not, even remotely, an attempt to
resolve that dispute; rather, it did no more than confirm the separateness of that
dispute from the agreement on submissions to the CLCS.
3.70. The fact that the Somali and Kenyan submissions are pending before the
Commission232 does not prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction to
delimit the maritime boundary between the Parties in its entirety, including in the
continental shelf beyond 200 M. Indeed, it would not be in line with the principle
of sound administration of justice to expect States to return to the Court (or any
other judicial or arbitral organ) years later to settle the remaining part of their
maritime boundary dispute.233 As made clear by the chapeau of Article 38 of its
Statute, the Court’s “function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it”. It would not be consistent with this mandate
if the Court were, without good reason, to allow a significant part of a dispute to

232 See, supra, paras. 2.92, 3.67.
233 As President Basdevant recalled, “to ensure a good administration of justice, it is necessary not
to delay the settlement of this dispute”. Asylum (Colombia/Peru), Extension of Time-Limits,
Order, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 267. See also The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, Preliminary
Objections, Order, 1938, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 67, pp. 55-56; Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 42; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Counter-Claims, Order, I.C.J. Reports 1997, para. 30. See also Case Concerning Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, para. 85.
101
lie unresolved for many years, and remain a source of tension and instability in
the relations between the two Parties.
Section II. The Absence of Any Agreed Exclusive Method of Settlement
within the Meaning of Kenya’s Optional Declaration
3.71. It follows from the above that the MOU does not fall within the scope of
the first reservation to Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration. Nor is Part XV of
the UNCLOS an obstacle to the Court’s Jurisdiction, as Kenya obliquely seems to
suggest.
A. THE MOU DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF KENYA’S RESERVATION
3.72. The language of the MOU providing that the “delimitation of maritime
boundaries in the areas under dispute, including the delimitation of the
continental shelf beyond 200 M, shall be agreed between the two coastal States”
merely restates the basic principle articulated in Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of
UNCLOS, according to which the delimitation of maritime boundaries shall be
effected by agreement. Even if negotiations are the most natural way for States to
settle their maritime boundary disputes, that does not mean they are the only way.
Negotiations are one among other possible methods. The MOU does not render
them exclusive.
3.73. As shown above,234 correctly interpreted, the MOU does not set out an
agreed method for settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, or any part of
it. The object and purpose of the MOU is neither the delimitation of Somalia’s
and Kenya’s respective maritime areas nor the establishment of a procedure for

234 See Section I above.
102
that purpose. Despite Kenya’s extraordinary claim to the contrary, there is
nothing in the MOU to suggest that the Parties undertook a binding commitment
to settle their dispute through negotiations, and then only after the CLCS had
made its recommendations. The MOU therefore does not constitute an
“agreement” for that purpose within the meaning of Kenya’s reservation.
3.74. There is, moreover, nothing in the MOU to support Kenya’s assertion that
negotiations would be exclusive and prevent the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over this dispute. For Kenya’s objection to succeed, it would have to
demonstrate that the Parties intended the MOU to displace the effect of their
Optional Clause declarations under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute for the
entirety of the dispute Somalia has submitted. Kenya cannot do so.
3.75. It is well established that the system of convergent Optional Clause
declarations creates a series of binding obligations based on reciprocity. The
Court has underscored the contractual nature of the relationship that results from
such matching declarations:
“The Court considers that, by the deposit of its
Declaration of Acceptance with the Secretary
General, the accepting State becomes a Party to the
system of the Optional Clause in relation to the
other declarant States, with al1 the rights and
obligations deriving from Article 36. The
contractual relation between the Parties and the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court resulting
therefrom are established, ‘ipso facto and without
special agreement’ by the fact of the making of the
Declaration. … A State accepting the jurisdiction of
the Court must expect that an Application may be
filed against it before the Court by a new declarant
State on the same day on which that State deposits
with the Secretary General its Declaration of
Acceptance. For it is on that very day that the
103
consensual bond, which is the basis of the Optional
Clause, comes into being between the States
concerned”.235
3.76. The Court also highlighted the bilateral nature of the engagements
resulting from convergent Optional Clause declarations in its judgment in the
Military and Paramilitary Activities case:
“In fact, the declarations, even though they are
unilateral acts, establish a series of bilateral
engagements with other States accepting the same
obligation of compulsory jurisdiction, in which the
conditions, reservations and time-limit clauses are
taken into consideration”.236
3.77. Given the bilateral nature of the commitments assumed under Article
36(2) of the Statute, the legal effects stemming from them can only be nullified
by a clear and unambiguous exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction. There is no
such exclusion in the MOU.
3.78. In the present case, it is apparent that at no point did Kenya seek to
exclude—or actually exclude—the right of recourse to the ICJ (or any other
judicial or arbitral mechanism) for the delimitation of the maritime boundary with
Somalia:
• There is no express exclusion to that effect in Kenya’s
Optional Clause declaration;

235 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections, Judgement,
I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 146 (emphasis added). See also Electricity Company of Sofia and
Bulgaria, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 77, p. 81.
236 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1984, para. 60.
104
• During two rounds of negotiations with Somalia, no such
exclusion was ever claimed;
• The MOU itself makes no mention of “negotiations” in regard
to the maritime boundary within 200 M, and certainly makes
no reference to them as exclusive of other peaceful means of
dispute settlement; and
• Prior to the filing of its Preliminary Objections on 7 October
2015, Kenya never expressed the view that the MOU
constituted an agreement to settle the maritime boundary
dispute by negotiation only, to the exclusion of all other means
of peaceful dispute settlement. Nor did Kenya assert that such
negotiations could only be held after the CLCS had issued its
recommendations to both States. To the contrary, it was Kenya
that invited Somalia to join in negotiations to resolve the
boundary dispute in 2013 and 2014. As a result of Kenya’s
initiative, the Parties engaged in detailed substantive
negotiations during two rounds of talks in 2014.
B. PART XV OF UNCLOS POSES NO OBSTACLE TO THE COURT’S
JURISDICTION
3.79. In a terse, subsidiary argument, Kenya’s Preliminary Objections also
claim that
“quite apart from the 2009 MOU, the UNCLOS
Part XV methods of settlement would also trigger
Kenya’s reservation and exclude the Court’s
jurisdiction”.237
3.80. Kenya does not elaborate on this point. Presumably, it means to suggest
that UNCLOS itself constitutes another agreement to have recourse to some other

237 KPO, para. 147.
105
method of dispute settlement within the meaning of the first reservation to its
Optional Clause declaration. Kenya is mistaken about this too.
3.81. Part XV of the Convention has no effect on the prior agreement between
Somalia and Kenya to confer jurisdiction on this Court resulting from their
matching Optional Clause declarations. In an analogous context, the Permanent
Court of International Justice stressed:
“[T]he multiplicity of agreements concluded
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction is evidence
that the contracting Parties intended to open up new
ways of access to the Court rather than to close old
ways or to allow them to cancel each other out with
the ultimate result that no jurisdiction would
remain. In concluding the Treaty of conciliation,
arbitration and judicial settlement, the object of
Belgium and Bulgaria was to institute a very
complete system of mutual obligations with a view
to the pacific settlement of any disputes which
might arise between them. There is, however, no
justification for holding that in so doing they
intended to weaken the obligations which they had
previously entered into with a similar purpose, and
especially where such obligations were more
extensive than those ensuing from the Treaty”.238
3.82. In fact, the agreement to submit disputes to the Court that results from the
Parties’ matching declarations under Article 36(2) of the Statute has priority over
the procedures established in Part XV of UNCLOS. Article 282 of the
Convention provides:

238 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J.
Series A/B, No. 77, p. 76.
106
“If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention have agreed, through a general,
regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that
such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the
dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a
binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu
of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless
the parties to the dispute otherwise agree”.
239
3.83. The conditions stated in Article 282 are met in this case. The agreement
between Somalia and Kenya to submit their dispute to this Court that results from
their convergent Optional Clause declarations constitutes an agreement under
UNCLOS “to a procedure that entails a binding decision” within the meaning of
Article 282. This form of agreement is covered by the words “or otherwise” in
Article 282. As noted in an authoritative commentary:
“Article 282 mentions that an agreement to submit
a dispute to a specified procedure may be reached
‘otherwise.’ This reference was meant to include, in
particular, the acceptances of the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice by declarations made
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of that
Court”.240
3.84. The first condition established by Article 282 of the UNCLOS—namely
that the Parties have agreed to submit their dispute to a procedure that entails a
binding decision—is therefore met.

239 UNCLOS, Art. 282 (emphasis added).
240 M. H. Nordquist, S. Nandan, & S. Rosenne (eds.), UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA 1982, A COMMENTARY, VOL. V (1989), pp. 26-27. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 25. See also
ibid., p. 26, fn. 7 (“Earlier drafts also contained a reference to the possibility of the acceptance of
a procedure through ‘some other instrument or instruments.’ This phrase was changed to
‘otherwise’ on recommendation of the Drafting Committee”. (citing A/CONF.62/L.75/Add.l and
A/CONF.62/L.82)); Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand-Japan, Australia-Japan), Decision of 4
August 2000, RIAA, Vol. XXIII, p. 27 (summarizing an argument made by Japan).
107
3.85. The second condition is that the jurisdictional body chosen by the Parties
(here the ICJ) must have the power to interpret and apply UNCLOS in order to
resolve the dispute submitted to it. This condition is implicit in the use of the
phrase “a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention”
in Article 282.241
3.86. In the present case, the Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to interpret and
apply UNCLOS. Both Parties have ratified it and Somalia has explicitly
requested the Court to decide its claims on this basis.242 Therefore, not only is the
Court’s jurisdiction established on the basis of Article 36(2) of the Statute, it also
has priority over the procedures established in Article 287 of UNCLOS. The
UNCLOS Part XV procedures are therefore no obstacle to the Court’s
jurisdiction, as Kenya wrongly claims.
*
3.87. Kenya’s and Somalia’s adherence to the system of Optional Clause
declarations provided by Article 36(2) of the Statute for over 50 years bears
witness to their commitment to “the object and purpose of the Statute [which] is
to enable the Court to fulfil the functions provided for therein, and, in particular,
the basic function of judicial settlement of international disputes by binding
decisions in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute”.243

241 See also MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3
December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, paras. 38, 48-52.
242 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Application Instituting
Proceedings (28 Aug. 2014), para. 33.
243 LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 102.
108
3.88. Whether by virtue of the combined effect of the Optional Clause
declarations and the MOU, or by virtue of UNCLOS, negotiations and judicial
settlement are considered as alternative methods to reach a solution to the dispute
on maritime delimitation, neither of which is preclusive of the other:
“The Court’s judgment will thus substitute for the
non-existent agreement between the Parties on the
delimitation of the continental shelf and the
exclusive economic zones and shall resolve all such
matters which have not been settled by the
Parties”.244
3.89. Consequently, the MOU cannot be interpreted as making negotiations the
only permissible method of dispute settlement, to the exclusion of third-party
settlement. And even in the exceedingly unlikely event the Court agrees with
Kenya’s newly adopted interpretation of the MOU, it still cannot depart from its
constant jurisprudence, which makes clear that negotiations are not to continue
indefinitely. If deadlock has been reached, the Parties can seize the Court. In the
present case, Somalia and Kenya have—at Kenya’s invitation—made such efforts
and, as discussed in the next Chapter, they have proven futile.

244 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
para. 29.
109
CHAPTER 4. IN ANY CASE, THE PARTIES HAVE FULFILLED
THEIR PURPORTED OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
4.1. The first reservation included with Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration
concerns “[d]isputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or
shall agree to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement”. As
shown in the previous Chapter, the MOU does not constitute such an agreement.
4.2. It is therefore only in the alternative that Somalia will show that even if
(quod non) the MOU fell within the ambit of Kenya’s reservation and implicitly
made negotiations a required method of settlement, there would still be no bar to
the Court’s jurisdiction. In that case, the obligation would be only a pactum de
negociando not a pactum de contrahendo; that is, it would not be an obligation to
actually conclude an agreement:
“[E]vidence of such an attempt to negotiate – or of
the conduct of negotiations – does not require the
reaching of an actual agreement between the
disputing parties. In this regard, in its Advisory
Opinion on Railway Traffic between Lithuania and
Poland, the Permanent Court of International
Justice characterized the obligation to negotiate as
an obligation ‘not only to enter into negotiations,
but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a
view to concluding agreements [even if] an
obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation
to reach agreement ...’”.245

245 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 158 (quoting Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory
Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 42, p. 116). See also North Sea Continental Shelf
(Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 87; Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
110
4.3. Therefore:
“Negotiations do not of necessity always
presuppose a more or less lengthy series of notes
and despatches; it may suffice that a discussion
should have been commenced, and this discussion
may have been very short; this will be the case if a
dead lock is reached, or if finally a point is reached
at which one of the Parties definitely declares
himself unable, or refuses, to give way, and there
can therefore be no doubt that the dispute cannot be
settled by diplomatic negotiation”.
246
In the view of the Court,
“[i]t is sufficient if, at the date on which a new
procedure is commenced, the initial procedure has
come to a standstill in such circumstances that there
appears to be no prospect of its being continued or
resumed”.247
Section I. Unfeasibility of Successful Negotiations
4.4. As discussed, Somalia and Kenya entered into negotiations without
considering themselves bound to wait for the CLCS’s recommendations.
Negotiations took place between March and July 2014 but proved fruitless.248
Despite “intense” and sometimes “heated” exchanges, the Parties made no
progress in narrowing the sizable gap between them. Somalia’s position remained

intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 424, par. 244; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 68, para. 150.
246 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece/United Kingdom), Jurisdiction, Judgment,
1994, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 2, p. 13 (emphasis added). See also Border and Transborder Armed
Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, para. 80.
247 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1988, para. 80.
248 See, supra, paras. 2.41-2.75.
111
constant in emphasizing equidistance and the three-step method established in the
Court’s jurisprudence, while Kenya remained equally committed to a generalised
conception of equity that, in its view, dictated the parallel of latitude it claimed as
the boundary by Presidential Proclamation in 2005.249
4.5. The lack of progress caused the Somali Foreign Minister to ask in
frustration at the end of the second round of talks “how long would both countries
continue to have their delegations entangled in these heated discussions without
any possible solution”.250 The Parties had, in short, reached a deadlock.
Nevertheless, a last chance was to be given at achieving a negotiated settlement at
talks scheduled in Mogadishu in August 2014.251 On the agreed date, the Kenyan
delegation simply did not appear. No advance notification was provided and no
explanation was given.252
4.6. As discussed in Chapter 2,253 even as the negotiations were ongoing—
and, indeed, even now—Kenya has persisted in its unilateral activities in the
disputed area. Kenya thus seeks to have the best of all worlds: it (1) has refused
even to consider modifying its position with respect to its parallel boundary claim
in negotiations with Somalia; (2) persists in its unilateral activities in the disputed
area that are plainly designed to exert de facto control over it; and (3) now seeks
simultaneously to preclude Somalia from seeking judicial settlement of the

249 See, supra, paras. 2.53, 2.57.
250 M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of
Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July
2014 (5 Aug. 2014), p. 2. WSS, Vol. II, Annex 4.
251 See, supra, para. 2.72.
252 See, supra, para. 2.72-2.74.
253 See, supra, para. 2.86.
112
dispute. These actions are part and parcel of the same transparent strategy: to
impose upon Somalia a boundary following a parallel of latitude by unilateral
action, by foreclosing any possibility of a negotiated settlement (except on
Kenya’s terms) or a judicially-determined one.
4.7. It is customary for international courts to defer to a State’s appreciation
that negotiations have reached a deadlock. Indeed, “the States concerned ... are in
the best position to judge as to political reasons which may prevent the settlement
of a given dispute by diplomatic negotiation”.254 In light of Kenya’s intransigent
attitude during the bilateral exchanges,255 its extensive unilateral activities in the
disputed area,256 its lack of explanation for its failure to appear during the
scheduled third round of negotiations,257 Somalia was clearly correct in
concluding that negotiations had reached a deadlock and that it was pointless to
continue trying. Indeed, Kenya’s attitude was (and is) incompatible with the
principle of bona fide negotiations. Somalia has therefore more than fulfilled any
pactum de negociando the MOU may have created.
4.8. The recently adopted interpretation of the MOU Kenya now offers in its
Preliminary Objections is just another tactic for delaying the settlement of the
dispute while continuing to exert its control over the disputed area. Somalia does
not share this conception of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Recourse to the
Court is justified on several grounds:

254 Philippines v. China, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Award, 2015, PCA Case Nº 2013-19,
para. 350 (quoting Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Jurisdiction, Judgment, 1924, P.C.I.J.
Series A, No. 2, p 15).
255 See, supra, paras. 2.72-2.75.
256 See, supra, para. 2.86. See also MS, paras. 8.19-8.28.
257 See, supra, paras. 2.72-2.75.
113
• The Court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute;
• Its solution will be a fair, binding and final decision based on
international law;
• It will solve the whole dispute through a binding decision,
reached within a reasonable time; and
• An international judicial decision is more likely to be respected
by government and civil society in both countries.
Section II. Kenya’s Artificial Objection Based on the Doctrine of
“Unclean Hands”
4.9. In these circumstances, Somalia is fully justified to have seized the Court.
It remains only to address what appears to be Kenya’s second preliminary
objection, based on the uncertain doctrine of “unclean hands”.258 According to
Kenya, Somalia’s Application should be deemed inadmissible because:
“First, [Somalia] has consented, then objected, then
consented again (immediately before filing its
Memorial), to Kenya’s CLCS submission, causing
significant costs and delay. Second, it has
disregarded the requirement of CLCS review prior
to delimitation that was specifically stipulated in
the MOU. Third, it has attempted to circumvent its
obligation to negotiate an agreement on
delimitation after CLCS review, by opting
unilaterally to bring the dispute before the
Court”.259

258 KPO, paras. 148-150.
259 Ibid., para. 149.
114
4.10. These spurious allegations are irrelevant to the Court’s jurisdiction. All of
them relate to matters that go to the delineation of the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 M, not to the delimitation of the maritime boundary
up to and beyond 200 M. More to the point, this is not a case in which Somalia
seeks to enforce an agreement that it is alleged to have breached. Somalia does
not invoke the MOU as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. It argues merely that
the MOU, even if it is enforceable (quod non), does not bar the Court’s
jurisdiction resulting from the Parties’ convergent Optional Clause declarations.
4.11. Finally, Kenya’s allegations are unfounded in fact. The CLCS is currently
reviewing Kenya’s submission,260 and the alleged “costs and delay” are highly
exaggerated. The CLCS proceeded to form a subcommission to consider Kenya’s
submission only a year after the initially planned date. This hardly a “significant”
delay, particularly given that Kenya cannot lawfully begin to exploit the shelf
beyond 200 M until the boundary with Somalia has been settled.
4.12. In that sense, the interests of both Parties, including Kenya, are furthered
by the submission of this dispute to the Court. There is no question that, given the
CLCS’s lengthy backlog, combined with the large number of States ahead of
Somalia in the queue, the boundary will be determined much sooner by the Court
than by any negotiations, even if fruitful, that might take place after the CLCS
eventually makes its recommendations to both States.
4.13. Moreover, it must be recalled that the unclean hands doctrine has never
been recognised in inter-State proceedings. On the contrary, the Court has always

260 See, supra, para. 2.92.
115
rejected it, whether expressly or implicitly, in every case when it has been
raised.261
4.14. In any event, whatever the status of the doctrine in inter-state relations, it
is clearly not a bar to the admissibility of an Application. The Court held in the
Avena case:
“Even if it were shown … that Mexico’s practice as
regards the application of Article 36 was not
beyond reproach, this would not constitute a ground
of objection to the admissibility of Mexico’s
claim”.
262
The same conclusion applies with respect to Kenya’s objection to the
admissibility of Somalia’s Application: the objection is itself inadmissible.
*
4.15. It follows from the above that even if (quod non) the MOU could be
interpreted as providing for negotiations as an exclusive means of settlement of
the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf between Somalia and
Kenya, it would have been superseded by the subsequent conduct of the Parties
who had engaged in detailed negotiations (at Kenya’s invitation) over the

261 See Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 134,
para. 268; Judgment, 25 September 1997, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, para. 133; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, para. 35; Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, paras. 28-30; Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, para. 63.
262 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2004, para. 47.
116
maritime boundary and had reached a deadlock long before the CLCS could make
its recommendations.
117
SUBMISSIONS
For these reasons, Somalia respectfully requests the Court:
1. To reject the Preliminary Objections raised by the Republic of Kenya; and
2. To find that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the
Federal Republic of Somalia.
118
119
120
121

VOLUME II
EXHIBITS
TREATIES & AGREEMENTS
Annex 1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332
(23 May, 1969), entered into force 27 Jan. 1980
Annex 2 Memorandum of Understanding between the Members of
the African Union on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Durban, South Africa (July 2002), reprinted
in Africa, From Barriers to Bridges: Collection of
Official Texts on African Borders from 1963 to 2012
(2013)
SOMALI GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 3 Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, The Transitional
Federal Charter of the Somali Republic (Feb. 2004)
Annex 4 M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Report
to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of
Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary
Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014)
KENYAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 5 National Oil Corporation of Kenya, “Expression of Interest for
Provision of a 3D Multi-Client Broadband Seismic Offshore
Survey in the Shallow Waters of the Lamu Offshore Basin”,
NOCK/PRC/03(1057) (25 Sept. 2015)
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION DOCUMENTS
Annex 6 U.N. International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on the
Law of Treaties” in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission 1966, Vol. II, Part II
Annex 7 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Eleventh Meeting of
States Parties, Decision regarding the date of commencement
of the ten-year period for making submissions to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in
article 4 of Annex II to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001)
Annex 8 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1744 (2007): Adopted by
the Security Council at its 5633rd meeting, on 20 February
2007, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (21 Feb. 2007)
Annex 9 African Union Border Programme, Declaration on the African
Union Border Programme and its Implementation Modalities
as Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge
of Border Issues held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (7 June 2007)
Annex 10 U.N. General Assembly, Sixty-Fourth Session, Thirtieth
Plenary Meeting, Agenda Item 72: Report of the International
Court of Justice, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.30 (29 Oct. 2009)
Annex 11 African Union, Second Conference of African Ministers
in Charge of Border Issues, Preparatory Meeting of
Governmental Experts, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, AUBP/EXP_
MIN/2 Concept Note (22-25 Mar. 2010)
Annex 12 U.N. General Assembly, Sixty-Sixth Session, Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third
session (26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011), U.N.
Doc. A/66/10/Add.1 (2011)
Annex 13 African Union Border Programme, Third Declaration on
the African Union Border Programme Adopted by the Third
Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues,
Niamey, Niger, AUBP/EXP-MIN/7 (17 May 2012), reprinted
in Africa, From Barriers to Bridges: Collection of
Official Texts on African Borders from 1963 to 2012
(2013)
Annex 14 U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf: Statement by the Chair, U.N. Doc. CLCS/90
(1 Oct. 2015)
Annex 15 U.N. Peacekeeping, “U.N. Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM
I)”, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unosomi.htm (last accessed 11 Jan. 2016)
Annex 16 U.N. Peacekeeping, “U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM
II)”, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unosom2.htm (last accessed 11 Jan. 2016)
Annex 17 U.N. Peace Operations, “UNSOM United Nations Assistance
Mission in Somalia”, available at https://unsom.unmissions.
org/ (last accessed 11 Jan. 2016)
Annex 18 U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
“Membership of the Commission”, available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members_1997_2012.
htm (last accessed 11 Jan. 2016)
DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER GOVERNMENT
CORRESPONDENCE
Annex 19 Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Hon. Prof.
Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Somalia (27
Mar. 2009)
Annex 20 Email from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Hon. Prof.
Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Somalia (3 Apr.
2009)
Annex 21 Email from Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi to Hon.
Abdurahman Abdishakur Warsame, Minister of Planning and
International Cooperation of Somalia (7 Apr. 2009)
Annex 22 Note Verbale from H.E. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke,
Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of the
Somali Republic, to H.E. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of
the United Nations, No. XRW/0065/06/09 (8 Apr. 2009)
Annex 23 Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade of the Republic of Kenya to the Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Somalia in Nairobi, No. MFA.
PROT/7/8/1 (7 Mar. 2014)
Annex 24 Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade of the Republic of Kenya to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs & Investment Cooperation of the Federal
Republic of Somalia, No. MFA/REL/13/21A (24 July 2014)
ACADEMIC ARTICLES, BOOKS, AND SPEECHES
Annex 25 M. H. Nordquist, S. Nandan, & S. Rosenne (eds.), United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A
Commentary, Vol. V (1989)
Annex 26 H. Owada, Introductory Remarks at the Seminar on the
Contentious Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(26 Oct. 2010)
Annex 27 P. Chandrasekhara Rao, “Law of the Sea, Settlement of
Disputes”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (last updated Mar. 2011)
Annex 28 C. Lathrop, “Continental Shelf Delimitation Beyond 200
Nautical Miles: Approaches Taken by Coastal States before
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” in
International Maritime Boundaries (D.A. Colson & R.W.
Smith eds., 2011)
NEWSPAPER & MEDIA REPORTS
Annex 29 C. Majtenyi, “Somali President in Capital for Consultations”,
VOA (8 Jan. 2007)
Annex 30 E. Mutai, “Kenya, Somalia border row targeted in Sh5.6bn
mapping plan”, Business Daily (20 Apr. 2014)
Annex 31 “U.N. Secretary Council makes historic visit to Somalia”,
Dhanaanmedia.com (13 Aug. 2014)
Annex 32 “IGAD Foreign Affairs Ministers Arrive in Mogadishu”,
AMISOM (10 Jan. 2015)
Annex 33 “Speaker of the Somali Parliament receives parliamentary
delegation from Kenya”, Radio Muqdisho (3 Feb. 2015)