INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING APPLICATIONOF THE CONVENTION ON
THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENTOF THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE
(BOSNIAAND HERZEGOVINA v.YUGOSLAVIA)
PKELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
JUNE1995 I
TABLEOF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS .............................. 1
INTRODUCTION ....................................... 3
FACTS ........................................... 7
1.1. Relevant facts from the past of Bosnia and
Herzegovina ............................. 7
1.2. The creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
11
Slovenes and the statusof Muslimsin that State . .
1.3. Genocide committed against the Serbs in Bosnia
and Herzegovina during the Second World War . . 12
1.4. The stati~s of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
post-war socialistYugoslavia ................ 20
1.5.The first cirisisin inter-ethnic relationsin
post-war socialistYugoslavia ................ 23
1.6. The founding of parties in the Yugoslav Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovinain 1990 ............. 24
1.7. The first multipartyelections in Bosnia-Herzegovi.a 36
1.8. Disagreement betweenthe three leading parties over
the future organization of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-
Herzegovinain 1991 ...................... 38
1.9.The rebellion by membersof the SDAandthe HDZin
the republican government against the SFRY and
pressuresontheSerbpeopleinBosnia-Herzegovina
(1991-1992) ............................. 3": 1.10 .The emergence of newstates in the territory of the
former Yugoslavrepublic of Bosnia-Herzegovina . . 72
1.11 .The establishmentof the BosnianSerb Republic . . 73
1.12. The establishment of the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina ....................... 77
1.13 .The establishmentof Herzeg-Bosnia ........... 82
1.14 .The establishmentof the Autonomous Province
of Western Bosnia ....................... 83
1.15 .The Constitutionof the Muslim-CroatFederation .. 84
1.16. The Armed ConflictBetweenthe Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats ....................... 85
1.17.CONCLUSIONSCONCERNlNGTHE FACTS ......... 86
LAW ............................................... 91
PRELlMlNARY OBJECTION REGARDINGTHE ADMlSSlBlLlTY
OF THE APPLICATION ......................... 91
First PreliminaryObjection ...................... 91
Second preliminaryobjection .................... 92
PRELlMlNARYOBJECTIONSTOTHECOURT'SJURlSDlCTlON
RATIONEPERSONAE .......................... 95
Third preliminary objection...................... 95
Fourth preliminaryobjection ..................... 127
PRELlMlNARY OBJECTION TO THE COURT'SJURlSDlCTlON
RAT IONEMATERIAE .......................... 129
Fifth preliminary objectio....................... 129
PRELlMlNARY OBJECTIONS TOTHECOURT'SJURlSDlCTlON
RATIONETEMPORIS .......................... 131
Sixth preliminaryobjection ...................... 131
Seventh preliminaryobjection .................... 133
E. CONCLUSIONSREGARDINGTHE LAW ................... 139
SUBMISSIONS' ....................................... 141 Abbreviations
B-H Bosniaand Herzegovina
FRY the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia
HDZ the CroatianDemocraticUnion
JNA the YugoslavPeople'sArmy
SDA the MuslimPartyof DemocraticAction
SDS the SerbianDemocraticParty
SFRJ the SocialistFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia PRELlMlNARY OBJECTIONS
By the Application dated 20 March 1993, the
Government of the so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
requested the Court to adjudicate on the application of the
Conventionon the Preventionand Punishmentof the Crime of
Genocideof 1948. Inpursuanceof theOrderissuedby the Court
on 7 October 1993, thatGovernmentfiled on 15April 1994the
Memorialseiting forth the reasonsof law and of fact on which it
seeks to rely in support of its claims.
TheGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia
raises PreliminaryObjectionsagainst these claims and has the
honour to set them out and justify them below, in accordance
with Article 79, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Court, and in
pursuance of the Orcierissued by theCourt on 21 March 1995.
Accordingly, this Governrnentwill for the timebeing refrainft-om
filing, in accordance withArticle 79,paragra3, of the Rulesof
Court, a Counter-Mernorialin replyto the contentionssetorth in
the Memorial of the Governmentof theApplicant State. INTRODUCTION
1. The Applicant requests the Court to base its
jurisdiction on Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the
Preventionand Punishmentofthe Crimeof Genocide (hereafter:
the 1948 GenocideConvention).Bearingthis in mind,the FR of
Yugoslavia is herebysubmitting its preliminaryobjections. The
Applicant cannot make his retentionof this requestconditional
upon the FR of Yugoslavia's renounciationof its right to raise
preliminary objections. In case theFR of Yugoslavia submits
preliminary objections, the Applicant cannot invoke other
possible grounds for thejurisdiction of the Court and proceed
to submit new reqi~ests,as set out in para. 4.1.0.9. of the
Memorial (p. 132) and para. 4.2.4.5 of the Memorial (p. 178).
Thiswould meana revisionof the Mernorialand the formulation
of a new case, which isnot permittedin this procedure. Before
initiatingtherocedi~reand inthe courseof proceedingsthe FR
of Yugoslaviahad notacceptedthejurisdictionof the Court over
this Case.
2. The circurnstances which constitute the
background ofthe C'asearedominatedby elernents ofcivilstrife
and, consequently, no international dispute is involved over
which the Court cari properlyexerciseits cornpetence.
3. By issuing the authorizationfor the institution of
proceedings, Alija Izetbegovichas overstepped his powers as
the President of 13residencyof the Applicant State and,
consequently, the A.pplicationis not admissible.
4. The FrRof Yugoslavia holds that the Applicant
State is not a partyto the 1948Gen~cideConventionforit could
not enter into it by riotificationof succession, for, by declaririgits independence, it violated the duties stemming from the
imperativeruleof internationallaw -the principleof equal rights
and self-determinationof peoples. To prove this violation, we
haveto highlight the relationsbetweenthe threepeoples in the
territoryof the former YugoslavRepublicof Bosnia-Herzegovina
at critical junctures, as well as certain segments of their past
historywhich havebecome pertinentonceagain in the wake of
the latest developments.
5. The FR of Yugoslavia points to the fact that the
Applicant State has been recognized as an independent state
incontraventionof internationallaw,thatithasneverestablished
its authority over a larger part of the territory of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the
Bosnian Serb Republic was formed, as well as that the
established authoritystood no chanceof remaining stablefor a
longer period of time because the new independent
governments of Herceg-Bosniaand the Autonomous Province
of Western Bosniawereformed ontheterritory whichhad briefly
been under the control of the Governmentin Sarajevo.These
are, also,the reasonswhy the Applicant State is not a party to
the 1948 Genocide Convention.
6. In view of the fact that armedconflicts are taking
place in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinain whichthe FRof Yugoslaviais nottaking
part, nor did it do so, and consideringthat the FRof Yugoslavia
did not have any jurisdiction over the contested areas in the
period in question,there are no grounds on which to constitute
a dispute between the two sides under Article IX of the 1948
Genocide Convention.
7. If, however, the Court establishes that the aboveassertionsare not founded eitheron the lawor on facts or that,
even though they are, there are other reasonswhy this Case
falls under the jurisdiction of the Court, FRe of Yugoslavia
holds that a jurisdiction of a Court cannot be definedratione
temporis as claimed bythe Applicantand requeststhe Courtto
determine itsjurisdictirationetemporis inaccordancewiththe
law.
8. Theopinionsofthe BadinterCommissionto which
the Applicant has referreddo not constituteresiudicatain this
Case becausethe Badinter Commissionwas not an arbitration
in the sense of internationallaw but an advisory body at the
service of theChairmanof the Conferenceon Yugoslaviaand
theopinions bythe Badinter Commission arenotlegallybinding.
9. The participation of the FR of Yugoslavia in this
procedure cannot be interpreted as its recognition of the
Republic of Bosnia--Herzegovina. FACTS
1.l. Relevant factsfromthe pastof Bosniaand
Herzegovina
1.1.O.FR:Ydoes not wish to burden this procedure
and this submission with the elaboration of historical facts.
Referencesto certain historicalfacts, however,concerning the
application of the principle of equal rights and self-
determinationof peoplesareindispensableandwillthereforebe
made here. Of relevance here are the historical facts which
testify that Serbs have been living in the space of Bosnia and
Herzegovinaas a people for centuries,and that in certain past
periods they weresi~bjectedto repression,including the acts of
genocide, at the hands of the Ottomanauthoritiesand later on
of the Muslim-Croatianfascistcoalition during World War Two.
1.1.l. Inmid-10thcentury Bosniawasmentionedforthe
first time in Constantine Porphyrogenitus'"De administrando
imperio", as an area within Serbia. At the time Bosniawas the
region around the iupstreamand middle sections of the river
Bosna, in effect a geographical designation within the Serbian
stateratherthana separatestateentity.Thesectionsubtitled "Of
the Serbs and of the Countrythey nowdwell in" clearly shows
that Serbs settled iii Bosnia as early as the ninth century, i.e.
that Bosniahas beena Serbland. (ConstantinePorphyrogenitus,De
administrandoimperio,eG.M .oravcsik,trans.R.J.H.Jenkins,Dumbarton
Oaks, Washington 1967, 160Annex.p.ll)
1.1.2. In the 12th century Pope UrbanIII regards
Serbia and Bosnia as identical and speaks about the politlcal
1Documents annexedto the PreliminaryObjectionsare marked by "Annex.p...''
7and ecclesiastical unity of these lands. The Pope likewise
cofirms the rightsof the DubrovnikChurch by the 1187Charter
in which he says: "regnum Seruilie,quod est Bosna ...-
"Kingdom of Serbia - that is Bosnia". (T. Smiciklas, Codex
diplornaticusregniCroatiae,DalmatiaeetSlavoniae,vol.llZagreb 1904,207)
1.1.3. John Kinnamosrefersin his article"Campaign
on the Tara in 11 50't' the DrinaRiverwhich separates Bosnia
from the rest of Serbia, meaningto Saythat eventhen Serbs
were living in Bosnia, (John Kinnamos,Deeds of John and Manuel
Commenus, ColumbiaUniversity Press,NewYork 1976, Annex.p. 7)
1.1,4. ln the 12th century PriestDukljanin also says
that the Drina RiverseparatesSerbia intotwo regions -Bosnia
and Raska (Priest Dukljanin's Chronicle,H~atska Zagreb, 1950).
1.1.S. Bosnian rulersin the 13thand 14th centuries
exclusively designatedtheir subjects as Serbs and referredto
Serbian as the only language in Bosnia. (S. Cirkovic, I Serbi ne1
Medio Evo, 62., M. Blagojevic, onthe Nationalldentity of the Serbs in the
MiddleAges, Serhsin EuropeanCivilization,Belgrade,1993,25-26,Annex.
p.10)
1.1.6, The charters of the Bosnian Governor Matija
Ninoslavof 1249 usethe term "Serb"to denote an inhabitantof
Bosnia and the Charter of Governor Stjepan II Kotromanic
addressedto Dubrovnikregardingthesaleof RatiinSton,dated
March 1333, notes that "two of the charters are Latin and two
are Serb". (F. Miklosich. Monumenta Serbia,Vie~nae,1858)
1.1.7.TheCyrillics,as the âerbian script,wcisused in
Bssnia from earliest times. The Charter ofKulin Ban issued to
the people of Dubrovriik in '189 was aiss written in it. lt was
used lateron too inthe offices of the Bosnian rulersand feudallords as well as in church books. (G. Cremosnik, Die serbische
diplomatische Minuskel,Studien zur alteren Geschichte Osteuropas II,
Graz-Koln1959, 113-115)
1.1.8. Fromthe beginningofthe 15thcenturyexternal
political circumstanc;esbeganto change and Bosniawas being
increasinglyattacked by Turks.Theirattacksforced King Tvrtko
II to become a vassal both to the Hungarian king and to the
Turkish sultan, to whom he paid regular yearly tributes as of
1415. Bosnia finally fell under Turkish rule in 1463. (C.Jirecek,
Geschichte der Serberi II, Gotha, Friedrich Andreas ParthesA.G., 1918,
168-226.John V.A. Fine, Jr.,The Late MedievalBalkans,Ann Arbor, The
Universityof Michigan Press,577-590)
1.1.9. The Turks abducted Serb boys, took them to
the centers of the Ottoman Empirewhere they wereislamized
and trained for soldiers - notorious janissaries. There was
constant religious iritolerance. As of 1767 the Serbs lost their
autocephalous church and wereofficiallyconsidered "Romaics"
and in 1853 a Turkish regulation was enacted banning the use
of the Serbian name. From 1868the rulewas introduced that in
national terms the entire population had to declare themselves
as being Osmanii. (Milorad Ekmecic, StvaranjeJugoslavije 1790-1918,
II, Beograd, 1989, p.316After the Serb uprising in 1874 which
broke out as a result of terror, 250,000 Serbs, or one fourth of
the total population, crossed the Bosnian border into tne
Habsburg-ruled lands. Later on, another 80,000 Serbs fled
Bosnia and moved into Serbia and Montenegro (B.H. Summer,
Russiaand the Balkans 1870 -1880,Oxford, 1937).
1.1.18. The first officiai population census in 1879
showed that the proportion of the Zhreereligiouâ communities
was: Serbs - 43%, Muslims - 386, Catholics - 18%. (Diurdje
Pejanovic, The Popula1:iof Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade,1955;Ferdo Hauptman,The Economy and Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina
during Austro-HungarianRule(187918), Contributionsfor the Historyof
Bosnia and Herzegovina,II, Sarajevo, 1987;Milena Spasovska, Dragica
Zivkovic, Milomir Stepic:Ethnic Compositionof the Population of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,Belgrade,1992,68 Annex.15,MarkPinson,The Muslim
of Bosnia-Herzegovina,HarvardUniversity Press, 1994,87,102,103,
Annex. 21)
1.1.11. The execution by firing squad of 84 Serbian
peasants at the hands of the MuslimvolunteerSchutzkorps in
Celebici on the river Drina at the outset of the World War
presaged the genocide and large-scalemassacresthat wereto
follow. The violence to which the Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina had been subjected in 191 4 was the reason why
itwasonlytherethatsomepreviousdemocraticinstitutionswere
not restored.Parliamentsthat hadbeendisbanded in 191 4were
renewedin al1countriesof Europe.Thiswas not done in Bosnia
and Herzegovinalestthe Serbsdemanded investigationsof the
crimes committed. Instead, the Governor of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, General Sarkotic, made plans for Bosnia and
Herzegovina to become part of Greater Croatia, for the
establishmentof an allianceof Croatsand Muslimsinwhich way
the unificationofYugoslaviaaroundSerbiawould be precluded.
(Stephan F.Sarkotic,Der BanjaLuka Process,1,Berlin, 1933,p.lX) 1.2. The creationof the Kingdomof Serbs, Croatsand
Slovenes
and the statusof Muslimsinthat State
1.2.0. Inview of the principleof self-determinationof
peoples as a basisfor the creationof an independentstate, it is
necessary to explain the position of Muslims in the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovinafrom theestablishment ofthe Kingdom of
Serbs, Croatsand Slovenesup to 1992.
1.2.1. The national question of Serbs, but also of
other South Slav nations -Croatsand Slovenes -was resolved
with the creationof theKingdomof Serbs,Croats and Slovenes
in 191 8. This Kingidom was formed when the Kingdom of
Montenegro and thle territories which had belonged to the
Austro-Hungarian Fdionarchybefore World War One and
inhabited by Serbs,{Croatsand Slovenesjoined the Kingdomof
Serbia. The unificationwasachievedon the basis of the right of
peoples to self-determinationwhichwasthen valid as a political
principie.(Address by the Diplomatic Legationof the People's Council,
Zagreb,1 December1918 andthe Replyof His RoyalHighnessHeirto the
Throne Alexander, December1918, Annex.p. 26)
1.2.2. The Muslimsin the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Sloveneswere protectedasa religiousminority.Theirstatus
was governed by Article 10 of the Treaty which the principal
allied and associatetJpowersandtheStateof Serbs, Croatsanu
Slovenessigned in St. Germain-en-Laison 10September 1919.
Article 10of thisTrebatreads:
"TheSerb-Croat-SloveneStateagreesto grant to the
Muslimans in the rnatter of family law and personal status
provisions suitable for regulatingthese matters in accordai?cewith Muslirnanusage.
"The Serb-Croat Slovene State shall take
measuresto assurethe nominationof a Reiss-UI-Ulema.
"The Serb-Croat-SloveneState undertakesto
ensure protection to the rnosques, cemeteries and other
Muslimanreligiousestablishments. Fullrecognitionandfacilities
shall be assured to Muslimanpious foundations (Wakfs) and
religious and charitable establishmentsnow existing, and the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Government shall not refuse any of the
necessary facilities for the creation of new religious and
charitable establishments guaranteed to other private
establishmentsof this natureeM(Traitntreles principales puissances
allieeset associeeset 1'etatSerbe-Croate-Slovene,Saint-Germain-en-Laye,
10 septembre'1919,Annex.p. 36)
1.3. Genocidecommittedagainst theSerbs in Bosnia
and Herzegovina duringthe SecondWorldWar
1.3.1. Withthe Nazioccupationof Yugoslavia earlyin
April 1941 Bosniaand Herzegovina wereincorporatedby force
into the lndependentStateof Croatia, a satellite stateled by the
Croatian fascists - the Ustashi, whose head was Dr. Ante
Pavelic. A massivecampaignof conversionto Catholicismand
of genocide was mounted in that state. Certain Catholic
clergymen directly workedon this up to 1943whenthe Vatican
distanced itself from the Croatian ustashi movement. In the
organized genocide against Serbs,Jews and Gypsies,several
hundred thousand people were killed. (Ladislaus Hory, Martin
Broszat,DerKroatische Ustascha-Staat 1-1945,Stutgart,1964;Odone
Talpo, Dalmazia. UnaCronacaper lastoria 1941,Roma,1985, 998.Official
edition of the ltalianGeneral Staff,Edmond Paris,Convertor Die, Catholic
Persecutionin Yugoslaviauring World War II,printed in the USA,Annex.
51, Avro Manhattan, The Vatican Holocaust, printed in the USA, 1986,Annex. p. 58)
1.3.2.By the decision of Nazi Germany and fascist
ltaly at the Vienna Conferenceof April 21 and 22, 1941, Bosnia
and Herzegovina was made part of the lndependent State of
Croatia. By special provisions the Government of the
lndependent State of Croatia designated its commissioners to
quickly institute Ustashi authorities and be in charge of direct
preparations for theterror againstthe Serbs, Jewsand Gypsies
in Bosnia and Herzegovinawhich was to ensue.
1.3.3. Arriong the most notorious of the Ustashi
commissionersdesignated for Bosniaand HerzegovinawereDr.
Viktor Gutic (for the Banja Luka region), Nikola Jurisic (for
Travnik), Prof.HakijciHadzic (forthe Tuzla basin), Don Bozidar
Bralo (for Sarajevo),Dr. DragutinKamber (for Doboj), Dr. Pavle
Canki (for Mostar) and prof. Alija Suljak (for eastern
Herzegovina). Jure Francetis was appointed Chief Ustashi
Commissioner for the entire Bcsnia and Herzegovina.
During World War ilthe Nazi Gerrriânyorganizad a
Moslem SS division - "Hanjar"
1.3.4.Theestablishmentof UstashiaiathorityinBosnia
and Herzegovina met with the overt support of Moslem
politicians from the Yugoslav MoslemOrganization (hereafter:
JMO), the pro-Ustashi Moslem intelligentsia as weii as of
different population strata. Thus Osman Kulencsvic was
Vice-Premier of the Ustashi governrnent unti! November 1941
when he was replaced by Disinfiuenrial brother Jafer. Aincng
the Ustashi were the leaders af JMC Harnid Kurbegovic,
Ismet-begKapetanovicand otl-ielc;.Moslems grnineritUslashi
dignitaries were the! depaty f:eac%of s'raieAdei:-raga ?desic,
Mehmed Alajbegovic;(laterforeign ministerof tka lndependznt
State of Croatia), HâikijaHadzic, AtijaSuijag arid a!fie;i~theGovernment of the lndependent State of Croatia (theCroatian
Parliament) there were as many as11 representatives of the
JMO at the beginning of 1942.
1.3.5.TheUstashiauthoritiesnominatedthe Moslems
Hamdija Beslagic and Ragib Capljic heads of the counties of
Plivaand Ramaand Usoraand Soli.They al1exerted efforts for
Moslems to declare themselves as Croats and support the
establishment and strengtheningof Ustashirule in Bosnia and
Herzeg0vin.a.
1.3.6. Ustashipropaganda portrayedthe Moslemsas
one of the main constituentsin the forming of the lndependent
State of Croatia and proclaimsthem the "flower of Croatdom",
and Bosniaand Herzegovina "theheartand sou1of Croatia".At
the same time, the Serbs are represented asthe centuries-old
enemy which has to be liquidated. All this prompted many
Moslems fo join the Ustashi movement, either through their
participation instashiand Home Guardsmenquisling armed
formations or by joining the state bodies and organizations of
the lndependent State of Croatia.
1.3.7. lntensified propaganda was employed
throughout the war, especially byreligiousfactors (Moslemand
Catholic) to incite to crimes against the Serbian people in
Bosniaand Herzegovina with aviewto carryingout the general
strategy of the lndependent State of Croatia for soiving the
Serbian question: kill a third, expel athird and convert a third to
Catholicism.Bytheir crueltyand massivescale,crimesin Bosnia
and Herzegovina did not differ from those in Croatia itself,
especially in primitive religiouslyfanatic Moslemcommunities.
Thus for example crimes in Herzegovina, where the Chief
ustashi Commissionerwas the Moslem AlijaSuljag, started as
early as on June 1, 1941 and soon reached unheard-ofproportions. In what are known as the three waves of carnage
of the Orthodox population (inJune, on the holiday of St.Vitusl
day (Vidovdan)and on the holidayof St. Elias'sday (Ilinden)in
1941, almost 12.000 men, women and children of Serb
nationality were killed and thrown into pits. In the pit near the
village of Korito near Gacko alone, 160 Serbs were killed and
their property appropriated by Moslems.
1.3.8. At the same time, in several villages near
Ljubinje,the Ustashikilled 143 peasantsandthrewthem in a pit
in the village of Kapavica, and somewhat later, on June 23,
1941, in the fields of Popovo Polje they captured and killed
another 168 personsof Serb nationalityand threw them in the
pit "Rzanido". On 6 August 1941the Ustashithrew about five
hundred women, c:hildrenand old men who were mostly alive
in the pit "Golubinkia"in Surmanci.Horrendous massacresand
carnage rapidly spread through Herzegovina. Of 1020 Serb
inhabitants of the village Prebilovci near Capljina, 824 were
subjected to the crime of genocide by the Ustashi. The pits
"~zani do", "Pandurica", "Golubinka", "Kapavica", "Vidovno",
"Bivoljebrdo","Hutovo","Beninaograda",and manyotherswere
full of massacredSerbs at the time. In the shedsof the military
camp at Nevesinje137men, womenand children were killed in
the carnage on St. Vitus' Dayand the Ustashiplanted potatoes
on their graves. In the eastern part of Staro PetrovoSelo near
Stara Gradiska, 25 Serbs in the 35 - 40 yearsage group were
killed and this, alongsidethe adoption of numerous regulaiions
against the Serbs, kvasone ofthe reasonswhythe Serbs began
t0 put up resistence.(MilitaryHistory institute Belgrade, Military Histo:?
Gazette 1-2/1994, pp.79-104, Strahinja Kurdulija, Atthe lJstasha
Genocide of the Serbç 1941-1945, Belgrade, 1993, Annex. p. 70)
1.3.9.Atthattirne,the Ustashikilled526 men,woi-i?en
and children in Capljina andthe surrounding villages, of which283 persons at the execution site near Opuzen. At the same
time, 450Serbsfrom Mostar wereslaughtered,battered to death
with clubs or thrown into the Neretva river. The mass scale of
these murders is gruesomely attested to by the "request of the
Croatian population" from the Neretva river valley to the highest
authorities of the lndependent Stateof Croatia,"notto throw the
corpses of killed Serbs into the Neretva and other rivers of
Herzegovina because they pollute the water".
1.3.10.The most massivecarnages in the territory of
Bosniatook place during August 1941 in its western regions. It
is estimated that at the end of June over 20,000 Serbs, among
whom a large number of children, were killed in the districts of
Bihac, Bosanska Krupa and Cazin alone. About 6,000 people
were killed in the area of Sanski Most and another 6,000 in the
area of the districts of Prijedor and Bosanski Novi. Only in
Bosanska Krupa, on July 31, 1941 , the Ustashi killed several
hundred Serbs (men,wornenand children) and the day after, in
the general "cleansing"of that district,a further 1,000persons of
Serb nationality.
1.3.11. The daily reports of the Gendarmerie show
that in the area of the commune of Buzin "between 1,000 and
1,300 Serbs were killed" in just one day (August 1 , 1941), 500
Serbs in the surroundings of Kljuc, while the day after, 800
hostages were killed in Sanski Most, and nearly 3,000 men,
women and children of Serb nationality in the territory of the
entire district.
1.3.12. MoslernUstashitook the lead in most of these
campaigns. The Office for Public Order and Security of the
lndependent Stateof Croatia (NDH)was informed on August 22,
1941, that "an Ustashi iinit composed of 200 Bosnians -
Moslems attacked the Serb village of Kotorane in the district ofDvor na Uni"and that theattackers setfireto houses,plundered
the village and slaughtered a large number of its inhabitants.
1.3.13.Ori thefirstdayof September 1941,thevillage
of Srdjevici was raided by a group of Moslemsfrom the nearby
villages of Basici, Kula, Muhovici and from Gacko who, led by
Musa Basicand Avdo Zvizdic,setfire to the housesand looted
Serb property.
1.3.14. The extermination of the Serbs and the
ultimatesolutionto the Serbianquestionwerenot muchdifferent
in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina either. The
Commanderof theV'ojnaKrajina(Military Frontier)Command,in
his report of September 20, 1941,commentson the situation in
the areaof Jajce anclits surroundingsafterthe arrivof Moslem
Ustashifrom Herzegovina and notes that "total anarchy reigns
in Jajce, 117 Ustashiiwho fled Mostarand Herzegovinabefore
the ltalian army, mostly Moslemsfrom Gacko and Mostar, are
committing grave atrocities in Jajce and the vicinity: four days
ago 158 Greek Orthodox Serbs were slai~ghterecf in the
Orthodox Church in Jajce".
1.3.15. Iri numerous actions of this kind, Moslern
Ustashi took the lead in killing the Serbian population and
looting their property. The Serbs, in smalier or iarger groups,
took refuge in the mountains and fled from one territory to
another before such terror. "ln the periûd from August 1-5,
between 4,600 and 5,000 Orthodoxes fled to the area of the
gendarmerie precinct Zirovac in thedistrict of Cazin, fram the
area of the gendarmerieprecinctsVrgorac and Ravnice,fleeing
untold terror at the hiandsof the Moslems",saysthe daily report
of August 15, 1941.
1.3.6. Tt-iereporadthedistrictof Slunjof September24, 1941,to the Ministryof the lnteriorof the lndependent State
of Croatia, states that in the period immediatelypreceding the
Report, "there was large-scale persecution and cleansing of
Serbsatthe handsofthe local Moslems -rambunctiousUstashi"
in the area of the countiesof Krbavaand Psat"especiallyin the
districts of Carin, Bihac,and the stationof Velika KladusaN8
1.3.17. The Serbs were massacred with
unprecedentedbestialityand horrendouslytortured.TheUstashi
killed them everywhere: in the street, in the fields, on their
thresholds, beforetheir parentsand children. They gouged out
theirvictims' eyes, cut off their tongues and ears, slit open the
bellies of women extracting unborn infants, smashed in their
skulls...
Itis a state of fact that in1941 the regular armed
forces of the lndependentStateof Croatia, the Ustashi, offered
as a birthday presentto their leaderAnte Pavelica basketfull of
eyes they had gouged out of dead Serbs. (Curzzio Malaparte,
Kaput; Military History Iristitute Belgrade, photographs)
1.3.18.Eventhe overtenemiesof the Serbian people
were appalled at the use of such horrific meihsds to "solvethe
Serbian question", one very much resorted to by the Moçlem
Ustashi.TheVice-MarshalVladimir Laksa,special representative
of the head of state Ante Pavelic reported, already in the first
days of July, that "no citizen, woman, no child can caunt on
staying alive". At the same time, the German commander of
Sarajevo qualified such crimes as "violenceof the worst kind",
quoting examples of mass murder and massacreof Serbs.
1.3.19. The Ustashi crimes against the Serbs in
Bosniaand Herzeaovina which startecfinthe firsl days afterthe
establishment of the lndependent State of Caaatia,cclntinued
unabated in 1942and untilthe end of the war. InFebruary 1942alone,the Ustashi,led by FatherVjekoslavFilipovicMajstorovic,
as they themselves admifted,killed 2,300 Serbs with pickaxes,
hoes and axes inthe villagesof Sargovac,Draguliciand Motike
near Banja Luka. Somewhat later, in mid-year, under the
command of Germarigeneral FriedrichStahland incooperation
with Germanunits, the Ustashiwiped out 140villagesatthe foot
of Mt. Kozara.Some 70,000inhabitantsof Kozaraout of a total
of 195,000 were deported. 46,642 adults and 23,858 children
were taken to the Ustashicamp Jasenovac. Most ofthem were
killedin the camp, i.~!.33,398civiliansincluding 11,194children.
1.3.20. Inparallelwith massliquidationand terror the
authorities of the lndependent State of Croatiasystematically
moved Serbsoutto Serbiaor forciblyconvertedthemto Roman
Catholicism. According to German data, in 1941 alone some
180,000 Serbs were moved out to Serbia from Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and during the four years ofWorld War II
(1941 -1945),some 400,000Serbsfrom Bosnia werebanished
t0 Serbia. (Miiitary History lnstitute Belgrade, Military History Gazette,
1-2/94,p.103)
1.3.21. Duringthe war, special larger Ustashiarmed
formations were forrned of Moslems,such as for instance, the
13th SS Moslem Division and 369th Legionary Division. The
Hanjar Division, set up in May 1943 by Hitler's Germany and
made up of Moslems (60%) and of Germans, mostly
Volksdeutschers, (4.0%)was the most notorious of them all.
These units killed 352 Serbs at Sremska Raca alone in July
1944. Theyset houseson fire in a numberof villages and killed
over 100personsat Jarmenwhilethey sental1personscapable
of work to Germariy. They slaughtered 35 persons, mostly
women and childreii in the Orthodoxchurch at Brezovo Poije,
a village near Bijelji(MiiitaryHistoryInstituteBelgrade,Archives,box312,reg. No.43)
'1.3.22.Due to massive loss of life in World War II
there was a change in the ethnic composition of the population
in os niaand Herzegovina. According to the 1991 census,
Moslems accounted for 43%,ranking first, whilethe Serbs were
second, accounting for 31 %.
1.4. The status of Muslimsin Bosnia-Herzegovinain
post-war socialistYugoslavia
1.4.1. In post-war socialist Yugoslavia, the status of
Muslims improved from that of a religious minority to that of a
people. Art. 1 of the 1974 Constitutionof the Socialist Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina says:
"The Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a
socialist democratic state and a socialist self-managed
democratic community of the working people and citizens, the
peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Muslims, Serbs and
Croats, persons belonging to other peoples and nationalities
living in it, based on the rule and self-management of the
working class and al1working people and on the sovereignty
and equal rights of the peoples of Bosniaand Herzegovina and
of persons of other peoples and nationalities living in it.
"TheSocialist Republicof Bosniaand Herzegovinais
a part of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia."(Annex ..
104)
This is probably a unique case in the history of the
world that a religious minority has advanced to the status of anation.
1.4.2. Art.2 of the same Constitutionsays:
"Working people and citizens, peoples of
Bosnia-Herzegovina -Serbs, Croatsand Muslimsand persons
belonging to otherpeoplesand nationalities - shallexercisetheir
sovereignrightsinthleSocialistRepublicof Bosnia-Herzegovina,
except those rights which -in the common interest of working
people and citizen~s,peoples and nationalities - shall be
implemented in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
under the Constitution of the SFRY." (Annex.p. 104)
1.4.3. Arl:.3 of the same Constitution sets out as
follows:
"lnthe Socialist Republicof Bosniaand Herzegovina,
the equalityof peopllesand nationalitiesand persons belonging
to them shall be guaranteed.
"Thepeoplesof Bosnia-Herzegovina,Croats, Muslims
and Serbs, and persons belonging to other peoples and
nationalitiesshall be providedwith themeansfor the promotion
of national values, for a free expression of their distinctive
national features in iine with the requirementsof CO-existence,
socialdevelopmentandstrengtheningof brotherhoodand unity,
as well as proportionate representation in the assemblies of
socio-politicai communiiies."(Annex,p. 104)
1.4.4. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had broad constitutional, legal, executive and
judiciary powers. It lhaditsassembly as the constitutional and
legislativebody, itsgovernmentasthe executive,presidency as
a representative boldy and a constitutional court and its awr?Supreme Court.
1.4.5.In post-war Yugoslavia, the Muslims were
proportionally represented in al1agencies of government, both
at local, republican and federallevels. The following perçons
held high-ranking offices in the Federation:Avdo Humo (1953,
1962), Hasan Brkic (1958), Osman Karabegovic (1949,1953-57,
1963), Dr Zaim Sarac (1953-57), Safet Filipovic (1945 - 1960),
Lutvo Ahmetovic (1965),Ahmet Cahovic (1965-1967), Dr Kemal
Kapetanovic (1969), lbrahim Maglajic (1965), lbrahim Liftic
(1969), Mustafa Sabic (1962), Dzemal Bijedic (Prime Minister),
MuhamedHadzic, HakijaPozderac(1969), FehimHalilovic (until
1980), Dr Kemal Tarabar, Mumamed Berberovic (1985), Nijaz
Dizdarevic (1982), Dr Muhamed Kesetovic, Tarik Karavdic
(1978), Kadir Alijagic, lzet Brkic, Smajo Mandzuka, Hamdija
Pozderac, Raif Dizdarevic, Dzevad Mujazinovic (1989), Suada
Muminagic (1990),lbrahimHadzic(1990),lrfanAjanovic, Ibrahim
Tabakovic (198&) ,emalHalilovic(1984),SabrijaPojskic (1990).
1.4.6 F.rom 1945to 1992,the Muslims in Yugoslavia
made remarkable progress and developed freely in economic,
political, cultural and religious fields.
1.4.7. lslamic clergy was educated at the Gaza
Husref-Beg Madrasah in Sarajevo.A number of young Muslims
attended religious schools in lslamic countries. Unfortunately,
they were one of the conduits through which the ideas of
militant Islam were irriported into Yugoslavia.
1.4.8. There were four universities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: in Sara!evo (since 1949), in Banja Luka (since
1975), in Tuzla (976) and in Mostar (1977). 1.4.9. The Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia
and Herzegovinawas founded in 1966.
1.4.10. Inthepost-warperiod,the economyof Bosnia
and Herzegovinadevelopedrapidly.Alargenumberof industrial
facilities were constructed in Bosnia and Herzegovina withthe
Federal Governmentfunds.
1.4.11. All arts were developed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. There were theateres in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja
Luka, Zenica and other. The associationsof authors, painters,
musicians and others were established. Movie industry was
flourished as well.
1.4.12. All three peoples participated equally in al1
spheres of social life. Hence, the Muslimsin Yugoslavia fully
enjoyed their rights as a people on the principle of equality and
self-determination.
1.5. The firstcrisisin inter-ethnic relationsin
post-war socialist Yugoslavia
1.5.1. Thesignsof amajorcrisiswhichcould escalate
into a civil war emergedalso in 1971and 1972whileJosip Broz
Titowasstill alive.Inthe politicalhistoryofYugoslavia,this crlsis
was registered as the "Mass Movement". The crisis was
provoked by the separatist forces within the League of
Communists of Croatia.
1.5.2. Farmersin Serb villages set up vigils, ari-lied
themselves illegally and took other self-defensivemeasures. 1.5.3. A certain number of Serbs left Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovinafor Serbia.
1.5.4. The crisis ended when Josip Brpoz Tito
replacedthe Croatianpolitical leadership.
1.6. The foundingof parties in theYugoslavRepublicof
Bosnla and Herzegovina in 1990
1.6.1. The Parliament of the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinaadopted a Law on Civic Associations in
Bosnia- Herzegovina in the first half of February 1990 (Officiai
Gazetteof the Socialist Republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina, No.nnex.
p. 109).This created a legal basis for the formation of political
parties. The three most important of the many parties formed
had an explicitly nationalcharacter.Theywerethe MuslimParty
of Democratic Action, the Serbian DemocraticParty and the
Croatian Democratic Union (hereafter:HDZ).
1.6.2. The Muslim Party of Democratic Action
(hereafter:SDA)was formed on 26 May 1990in Sarajevo. Alija
lzetbegovic was elected as its leader.
1.6.3.Giventhe earlierbiographyand activitiesof Mr
Izetbegovic,hisappearanceonthe Bosnia-Herzegovina political
scene provoked the concern and mistrustof the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.Mr. lzetbegovic was sentenced twice on
the grounds of subversive activity from thepositions of lslamic
fundamentalism.
1.6.4.Alijalzetbegovicwrotethe"lslamicDeclaration",
a religious politicalogram,in 1970,and itwas illegallyprinted
and distributed among Muslims.Itwas publishedagain in 1990in Sarajevo. It was suùtitled "A program of the lslamization of
Moslems and Moçlen~Peoples". Alija's aimwasthe lslamization
of Muslims and his imottowas "faith and struggle", This was
concisely and explicj!:explained underneaththe subtitle. Since
the whole text of the "lslamic Declaration" is appendecf to the
PreliminaryObjections (Annex.p. VI), weshall mention hereonly
those parts that wis think are the most important for an
understanding of Alija Izetbegovic's political activity.
1.6.5. One of the mosi: important of the ideas
presented by A. lzetbegovic in the "lslamic Declaration" is the
unity of religion and politics. Startingfrom this idea, lzetbegovic
arrives at his "first and most important conclusion", which was
certainly a reason for serious concern among Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lateron in the "lslamic Declaration", in the
third paragraph under the heading "Islamis nof only a religion",
stands the text:
"The firscindthe mostimportantof these conclusions
is definitely the on52about the incompatibility of Istan~and
non-islamic systerns.There ean be no pêace or coexistence
between the 'Ialânnic faith' and 'non-Jsiarnic'soclail and
politicalinstitutions. TheS-âilure of these institutionsto fiinclion
and the instabiiity of'regirnes iïMsslern c~tirttries, msnifested
in frequent chanq .es and coups d'etat are as a ide the
consequence of ttleir a priori opposition to isiarrg: as the
fundamental and guiding feeiing of the peapie irlti?ese
counlries. Claining f~r itselftheright toregt~iaz;rtrowli \?~eiid,
Islam clearly rkjtvso:utany right or possibiiityr'faatir~icf any
foreign ideoioyy on itstuf. Narneiy,ineue isno i~oum ?or Ir;eiay
prineiple and the s:a& should be ari expresslori of' the mcral
coricepts of rciIqior;mi7~~appûi-tivoefijiern."{Eaidty;J-e1sairuj. 1.6.6. A. lzetbegovic does not only advocate the
lslamization of one Muslimcommunity, but a global lslamization
of al1Moslems. Inthe fourth thesis on the lslamic order, entitled
"The unity of Moslems", he says:
"Islam comprises the principle of ummet, Le., the
aspiration for the unification of al1 Moslems into a single
community - religious, cultural and political. lslam is not a
nationality, but it isthesupranationalityofthis community." (Bold
type is ours)
1.6.7. This is what A. lzetbegovic says about the
introduction of lslamic rule:
"Emphasizingas a priority religious and moral revival
does not imply - nor can it be interpretedto imply - that lslamic
order can be achieved without lslamic rule. This stand only
means that Ourroad does not proceed from the conquering of
power, but rather from the conquering of people, and that
lslamic revival is primarily a revolution in the field of education
and only after that in the field of politics.
"Therefore, we must be preachers first and then
soldiers. Our prime means are personal example, books and
words. When wili force be added to these means?
"Thechoice of the right moment is always a specific
question and depends on a number of factors. Nevertheless,
there is a general rule: lslarnic order should and can approach
the overtaking of rule as soon as it is morally and numerically
strong enough not onlyto overthrowthe non-lslamic rule but
to develop new Islamic rule. This differentiation is important,
since destruction and development do not require an equal level
of psychological and material readiness. '70 act prematurelyis equallyas dangerous as to be
late in taking the required action.
"The conquering of power on the basis of a
favourable concurrence of events,without sufficient moraland
psychological preparednessand withoutthe required minimum
of competent and developed personnel implies the realization
of another coup anclnot an lslamic revoiution (and a coup is a
continuation of non-llslamicolitics by othergroups of people or
on behalf of other principles). To be late in the overtaking of
power means to deny oneself a very powerful means for
achieving the aims of lslamicorder and to give non-lslamic rule
an opportunity to strike a blow to the movementand disperse
its activities. For the latter case, recent history gives sufficient
tragic and illustrativeexamples."(Boldtype is ours)
1.6.8. In an attempt to hide his true intentions, as
outlined in the above text of the "lslamic Declaration",and after
forming an anti-Serb coalition betweenthe SDA and the HDZ
with the aim of preserving a single and unitary Bosnia-
Herzegovina, lzetbegovic began to speak about
Bosnia-Herzegovina. as a civil, multi-ethnicstate. However,the
Serb people did not believe in such a sudden change in Mr
Izetbegovic's politicialconvictions.
1.6.9. Howjustified this lack of confidence was can
best be seenfrom the factthat Alijalzetbegovicdid not manage
to hide for long behind this transparent political mask, and the
lslamization of the Muslim population on territory under his
control became quite ciear i1994. This isshown by a series of
reports from territoiry under his control. A campaign began
against mixed marriages, anti-warsongs of Serb singers were
banned, and even "loyal"Christianswerediscriminated agairist.
The Mujaheddinconitributedto this by banningthe consumptionof alcohol, and aemanding women to Wear long hooded
overdresses. (Roger Cohen, Bosnians Fear a Rising lslamic
Authoritarianism,The New York Times,October 10, 1994,Annex. p. 241,
Anthony Loyd, lslamic Teachers Offer Pension in Return for Jihad, The
Times,22 October 1994, Annex.p. 242, Lubor Zink,Throughts on Balkan
Stife, TheToronto Sun,21 July 1993,Annex.. 243, RemyOurdan, La fin
du reve boçniaque, Le Mond, 28 September 1994.Annex. p. 244R. Cia,
L'allarmedel neocardinalePuljic"StannoislamizzanlaBosnia",Corriera
della Sera, 14 November1994,Annex.p. 247)
1.6.10. One of the ways of expressing lslamic
fundamentalism of the leadership of the Party of Democratic
Action (SDA) was their readiness to sacrifice their citizens in
order to achieve foreign political goals: condemnation of Serbs
and foreign military intervention. There are convincing
indications that the Moslemauthoritiesactivatedthe mine in the
line of people waiting for bread on 27 May 1992 in Sarajevo,
when 17 people were killed and a large number wounded. n/
networks broadcast the terrifying pictures al1around the world
and military forces of the Republic of Srpska were condemned
without any proof. (Leonard Doyle, Moslems Slaughter iheir Own
People, TheIndepencient,22 August 1992, Annex.p. 250,Warren Strobel,
Bosnians May Shelled Selves:The Washington Times, 23 August 1992,
Annex.p. 251ColonelMilankoCvijovic,ExpertAnslysisofthe 0-H TVShots
of the Eventin the Vase MiskinStreetarajevo,25 May 1992,Annex. p.
252)
Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie,
Commander-in-Chief of UNPROFOR, wrote down in his diary:
"Disaster inSarajevo.People lined up for bread were
attacked and at least 17 killed. Presidencyciaims it was a Serb
mortar attack, Serbs claim iwas a set-up using explosives. Our
people tell us there were a riumber of things that did not fit. Thestreet had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the
crowd was let in anid lined up, the media appeared but kept
their distance. The attack took place and media were
immediately on the scene. The majority of people killed are
alleged to be "tame Serbs" ..." (Major General LewisMacKenzie,
Peacekeeper,Douglasand Mclntyre,Vancouver -Toronto, 1993pp. 193,
194, Annex.p. 262)
Thereisseriousreasonto believethat Moslemforces
fired a mortargrenade killing 68 people in the Sarajevo market
"Markale"in Februaiy 1993. (Reuters,February 19, 1994,Annex. p.
267,DavidBinder,Anatomyof a Massacre,TheForeignPolicy,Winter 1994
- 1995, Annex. p. 268, Pazit Ravina,Was there a Shell in the Sarajevo
Marketplace, Davap,February 16, 1994,Annex.p. 277)
1.6.11. Another form of expressing the lslamic
fundamentalism was Alija Izetbegovic's relying on the
Mujaheddin,warriorswaging the holywar. They participated in
the fighting, trained BosnianMoslems,and also worked on the
spreading of Islam(andhelped introduce lslamic customs and
similar. From the countries they came from, an enormous
quantity of armswasdeliveredto Moslemforces in B-H.Itwoirld
be wrong to justify the engagement of the Mujaheddin by
military reasons, because Alija Izetbegovic's regime enjoys
NATO'ssupport and rnilitaryprotection. (~ndrew Hogg, Arabs Jain
in Bosnia War, The Sunday Times, 30August 1992, Annex.p. 280, Toni
Post, Joel Brand, Help from Holy Warriors, Newsweek,October 5, 1992,
Annex.p. 281, BillGerti:,lraniansMoveinto Bosniato TerrorizeSerbs, The
Washington Times, Annex.p. 283, Bill Gertz, lranian Weapons Sent Via
Croatia,The WashingtonTimes, Annex.p. 285)
1.6.12. This can perhaps best be seen from ';he
Statement issued by five of the seven members of thePresidencyof theso-called Republicof Bosniaand Herzegovina
in February 1995 against Alija Izetbegovic's attempt to make
Bosnia-Herzegovina into a one-party lslamic state. The
signatories say that army units are exposed to ideological
pressures and the abuse of religious feelings by some of their
members. The protest was signed by Nijaz Durakovic, a
Moslem, Stjepan Kljujic, a Croat, Ivo Komsic, a Croat, Tatjana
Ljujic-Mijatovic and Mirko Pejanovic, Serbs. The other two
members of the Presidency are Alija lzetbegovic and Ejup
Ganic, Moslems. (Robert Fox, lslamic lndoctrination of Army Splits
Bosnian Leadership, Daily Telegra6February 1995, Annexp.288)
1.6.13.A. lzetbegovicsaid atTeheranon 30 October
1992 that his Bosnian Muslim forces had poison-gas weapons
and might be forced to use them as a "defensive" measures
against Serbian forces. (Bosnian Threatens Poison Gas Against Serb
Forces, The New York Times31 October 1992,Annex. p. 289)
1.6.14.On 21 June 1993 in Ankara, A. lzetbegovic
said that he'could not exclude the possibility of using chemical
weapons if 'the United Nations did not lift the arms embargo
against them. In an interviewto Anadolia Agency, he said that
Muslims did not want to use chemicalweapons but that events
could get out of control.(REUTERS,AFP)
Really,on three occasions in August 1993, Bosnian
Muslim army near Zvornik used chlorine gas in artillery
p!'ojectile(Yossef Bodansky, "BosnianMuslimForces' FirstCombat Use
of Chemical Weapons: The Precedentis Set",Defenseand Foreign Affaires
Policy, September 1993)
The LDNPROFOR Situation Reportfor 15-17 October
1993 notified the President of the UN Security Council that
chemical grenades were used by the Bosnian goverrarnet?tarrny
in the Tuzla vicinity.(United Nations: "Note to the Presicient of the
Security Couficil" UNPROFORSituationreport, NewYork, 18Oct1993) 1.6.15. A.lzetbegovic said in Tehran that Bosnian
Muslims would not abandon their original demands and would
step up their struggle until their expectations were fulfHeled.
said that there coulcl be no peace in Bosnia until the demands
of Muslims were met. He invited lslamic countries to support
Muslims more actively and to bring pressureto bear to end the
"Serbaggression". (Nicosia,Reuters,Irna,13September 1993).
1.6.16. The distinguished American expert in
terrorism Yossef Bodansky, who was the Director of the US
House of Republican Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Wairfarefor four years, testifies:
"Beginniriginearly 1992,the Islamists'commitmentto
a Jihad against ttie West came to be tested in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in what was formerly Yugoslavia. A forward
support and coordination center was established in the fall of
1991 in Bulgaria. In early 1992, forces of the Armed Islamic
Movement (AIM)assumed an offensiveand special operations
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most active are the Islarnic
Jihad forces, the elite component of the Movement's
'internationallegion', led 'Afgans'.Tehrânurgedand actively
supported the establishment of 'volunteer forces from ail ovei
the Muslim world who would rushto help their brothers in iaith
in the Balkans'.
"inBosnia-Herzegovina,the AIM forcesareorganized,
very disciplined, cind well equipped, Their commander is
Mahmud Abdul-Aziz, a veteran of sex yecirs of fighting in
Afghanistan under Ahmed Shah Massud and other combat foi
'the sacred cause' in the Philippines and Kashmir, who clso
participateci in clandestins operati~t~sin Africa for Turabi.
"The 'Muslim Forces' include severai hundiedvolunteers, primarily from Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Persian
Gulf Arab states, Pakistan,Afghanistan, Syria, and Turkey..As
of the fall of 1992, there were 200-300volunteer mujahideen in
the Travnik area; 200 in the center of Bosnia;an undertermined
number (in the hundreds) in Sarajevo and in eastern Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Theyfight the Serbs and train the Bosnianforces.
They also teach children the Koran and fundamentalist lslamic
ways. The volunteers also train local Muslims in special
operations. Meanwhile,theflowof volunteers,including Muslims
from the United Kingdom, some of whom are 'Afghan' veterans,
continues. By early 1993, there were over 1,000 mujahideen
from Pakistan, Iran,Sudan and Libya.
"ln addition, Iran maintains a core of highly
professional operatives, mainly lranians from the Pasdaran and
Lebanese from the HizbAllah, who provide expert training and
assistance and conduct the most sensitive covert operations
(intelligence and terrorism). Tehran continues to provide
Sarajevo with weapons and experts. In early November 1992,
more than 50 expert terrorists and instructors of the HizbAllah
and the Tawhid (its Sunni counterpart under Sheikh Sha'ban)
were sent from Baalbak to Bosnia-Herzegovina to train local
cadres and launch operations on their own. These trainers
spearhead on ongoing lranian efforts to deploy a 2.000-strong
brigade of its Al-Quds Forces. All these forces receive
substantial lranian military assistance.
"lndeed, since the summer of 1992,there has been a
marked escalation in provocations by the Muslim forces, the
goal of which is to secure military intervention by the West
against the Serbs (and, to a lesser extent,the Croats). Initially,
these provocations were mainiy senseless attacks on their own
Muslim population. The UN concluded that a special group of
Bosnian Muslim Forces,manyof whom had served with lsiamistterroristorganizations, committedaseriesofatrocities,including
'some of the worst irecentkillings', against Muslim civilians in
Sarajevo 'as s propaganda ploy to win world premeditated
attacks and atrocitiescommitted against Serbiancivilianstrying
to flee contested aireas. It is noteworthy that these Bosnian
detachrnents are following exactlythe principles of 'the war of
the weak' as outlined by the HizbAllah'sAyatollah Fadlallah."
(Yosse f odansky,TargetAmerica,ShapolskyPublisherUSA, 1993,pp.
275- 277, Annex. 2901)
1.6.17. Croatian DemocraticUnionwas foundedon 6
September 1990. Itsprogramstressedthe goal of "transforrning
Bosnia-Herzegovinainto a democratic, parliamentaryand rnulti-
party state", but did not mention Yugoslavia at all. This party
represented the interests of the Croat people in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and worked towards the creation of a separate
state entity of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina,which
would be linked to Croatia and to the Muslim state entity in
Bosnia- Herzegovinato the extentthat was necessary in order
to realize to Croal: interests in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.
1.6.18.TIie Serb Democratic Party (hereafter:SDS)
was formed on 27 July 1990. Itsmain goal was "a dernocratic
Yugoslavia, organizledas a modern federal state". This party
represented the interests of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.lt strove firstto ensurethat territory witha
Serb majority in Bosnia- Herzegovinashould remain part of
Yugoslavia, but if that was not possible, to create a separate
state for the Serbs in Bosnia- Herzegovina.
1.6.19.Vlie formation of this party was hindered by
the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.SDS activists waFe
arrested while they were pasting party posters. The flat of thepresident of the SDS regional committee in Zenica, Slobodanka
Hrvacanin, was broken into. She suspects that the intruders
were members of the state security service under Moslem
control and that their aim wasto frighten members of the SDS.
1.6.20. The leaders of this party are Dr Radovan
Karadzic, Professor Dr Biljana Plavsicand Professor Dr Nikola
Koijevic. Dr Karadzic is a professional psychiatrist, while Dr
Plavsic and Dr Koljevic are university professors. They had not
been involved in politics before the crisis began in Yugoslavia
in 1990.
1.6.21. The Muslim Bosnian Organization was
founded in Sarajevoin earlyOctober 1990 by defectorsfrom the
SDA who were dissatisfied by the fact that the party had fallen
under the influence of its religious fundamentalist wing. The
leader of this party is Adil Zulfikarpasic. Its members felt
threatened by radical Muslims and therefore cancelled
conferences in Mostar, Sarajevo and Zenica.
1.6.22. In the very first public appearances of the
leaders of the new parties different views on the political
organization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(hereafter: SFRY) and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were expressed. During preparations for the
foundation of the SDS, its future leaders stressed as the
essence of its program two aims: that al1parts of the Serb
people living in the SFRYshould remain in Yugoslavia, and the
maintenance and development of friendly relations with
neighbouring peoples, in the first place the Muslims. These
goals were repeated at the Constituent Assembly and later
during theformation of localSDSorganizations. Atthe founding
meeting of the SDS in Gorazde all those present in the town
stadium expressed their wish to continue to live within theborders of the SR\('. Speaking at the founding meeting of the
SOS branch in Stola~c, Mr Velibor Ostojic, chairman of the SOS
Executive Cornmittee,said that a confederal organization of the
SFRYwould mean that the Serb people would be split among
several states and 1:ransformedinto national minorities, which
could not be acceptcsd.Dr Karadzicrepeatedthe same thesis at
the founding meeting of the SDS branch in Mostar. (D. Maric,
Nikada necemo prihvatiti konfederaciju Ne Shall Never Accept a
Confederationt Politi8aOctober 1990,Annex.p. 29617)
1.6.23. 'The Serb National Council in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was formed at the pan-Serb rally in Banja Luka on
12 October 1990. It was said at a press conference that the
Serbs had been forced to organize in this way because at the
end of the 20th century they had been deprived of the state they
had created. By that time, the Serbs had been eliminated from
the Croatian Constitution, which had earlier recognized thern as
a constituent people in Croatia. Because of new threats to the
Serb population, it had beenforced to form the Counçil in order
to prevent a new genocide. Al a public meeting in Bileca,
representatives of the SDS said that, on the Dasis of the
Declaration of the Serb Nationai Gouncil on the situation of the
Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they woüid insist on the
equality of people:: and a federai system. The Declaration
proposed the founaling of a chamber of peoples in the Bosnian
parliament. If an a'ttempt was made to impose a confedera!
system in Yugoslavia or make Bssnia-Herzegovina into an
independent state, the Serb Nationai Council would not accept
any !aw or decisioin made by the parliamerit thaf harmed its
interest (M. Duric, S. Kljakic, Za ravnopravanuiBiH kao federalnoj
jedinici :For L-ifeon an Equal Footing in 5-H as a Federal Unit/ Politika,9
Notlerilbe1990,Annex. p. 298/9) 1.6.24. Before the first multiparty elections, SDA
leaders did not Say much about the future organization of the
SFRY and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
However, Mr lzetbegovic said at one meeting of his party in
BanjaLuka that he would defend Bosnia's unity by force. (Cl.
Kecman,BranicemoBosnuisilom /We ShallDefendBosniawith ForceToo
if Need Be/ Politika,uly 1990, Annex.30112)
1.7. The first multiparty electionsin Bosnia-Herzegovina
1.7.1. The first multiparty elections in the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were held on 18 and 19
November 1990. The results were published in the Official
Gazette of SR Bosnia-Herzegovina, No. 4211 990, dated 19
December 1990.Inaddition to the three leading national parties,
many other partiestook part in the elections. They included the
Democratic socialist Leagueof Bosnia-Herzegovina,the League
of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
Democratic League for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Green
Movement, the League of Communists - Social Democratic
Party, the Muslim Bosnian Organization, the Party of Private
Initiative, the Democratic Party of Mostar and Tuzla and the
Serbian Renewal Movement.
1,.7.2.Theparliamentaryseatsweredivided asfollows
in SR Bosnia-Herzegovina: SDA 86, SDS 72 and HDZ 44. The
distribution cifthe parliamentaryseatswas in line of the national
structure of the population. The three main national parties
together won 202 of the total of 240 parliamentary seats. The
parties whose programs did not stress national issueswon only
38 pariiarnentary seats.(Report on the Results of the Elections of
Deputiesto Chamber of Citizeofthe Assembiyof the SRB-H,Annex.p.
326,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Defenseand ForeignAffairesHandbook,London,1994, p.135, Annep.410)
1.7.3. The electoral results clearly demonstrate the
political mood of the citizensof the former Yugoslavrepublic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear that the ovewhelming majority
of citizensvotedaccording to their national affiliationfor parties
that representedtheir national interests.
1.7.4. At the first multi-party elections on -819
November 1990,thefollowing membersofthe Presidencyof SR
B-H were elected: Fikret Abdic, (1,045,539 votes) and Alija
lzetbegovic (879,266 votes) as Muslims; Dr.Biljana Plavsic
(573,812 votes) arid Dr. Nikola Koljevic (556,218 votes), as
Serbs; Stjepan Kljujic (473,812 votes) and Franjo Boras
(416,629) as Creats; and Ejup Ganic (709, 691 votes) as
Yugoslav. (OfficiaiGazetteof SRB-HlNo.42,19December1990,Annex.
p. 326)
1.7.5. Ttie Assembly of the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinaelected at its sessionon 30 January 1991
the following government: Prime Minister Jure Pelivan (HDZ
candidate), Vice Prime Ministers Muhamed Cengic (SZA
candidate), Dr. Miodrag Simovic (SDS candidate), Dr. Rusmir
Mahmutcehajic (SCIAcandidate), members Jerko Doko (HDZ
candidate), Alija Deiimustafic (SDAcandidate), Ranko Nikoiic
(SDS candidate), FvîomciloPejic (SDS candidate), Dr. Resad
Bergetic (SDA candidate), Dr. Milivoje Nadazdin (SDS
candidate),Tornisla,Krsticevic(HDZcandidate),Dr.MunirJahic
(§DA candidate), Dr. HarisSilajdzic (SDAca~didate), Dr.Isi-net
Lipa (SDA candidate), Dr. lsmet Kusumagic (SDA canaidaie),
David Balaban (SDS candidate), Velibor Ostojic (SDS
candidate), Vitomir- Miro Lasic (HDZ candidate), Dr. Vitomir
Lukic (SDS candidate), Dr. Nihad Hasic (SDA canciicbc:isj.
Ibrahim Colahodzic (SDA candidate), and Dr. Branko Ojeric(SDScandidate). (Official Gazetteof SR B-H, No. 4, 7 February
1991).
1.8. Disagreement between thethree leadingparties
over the future organizationof Yugoslaviaand Bosnia-'
Herzegovinain 1991
1.8.1. After the first multiparty elections, the SDA
made clear its position on the organization of Yugoslavia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. A resolution of Muslim intellectuals on a
sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina was presented at a press
conference held in Sarajevo on 7 January 1991, on Orthodox
Christmas. (M. Duric, Objavljena rezolucija muslimanskihintelektualaca
/Resolution of Muslim IntellectualsMade Public/ Politika,8 January 1991,
Annex. p. 416i7) It was probably no coincidence that this
statement was made precisely on the Orthodox Christmas Day.
It is mentioned because certain acts of genocide against the
Serbs were committed on Orthodox Christian holidays during
World War II. Thesame happened in the civil war that started in
1992. The holding of the press conference at which the
resolution of the Muslim intellectuals was presented on the
Christian Orthodox Christmas Day was prsbably part of a
deliberate strategÿ aimed at further irritating the Serb people.
(See paragrapn 1.3,7.)
1.8.2.The details of this strategy were presented by
SDA leader A. lzetbegovic at a press conference held in
Sarajevo on 30 January 1991, wheri he said: "If Slovenia and
Croatia secede from the present Federation, Iwill consider that
I no longer have any authority toconduct further talks on a new
Yugoslavia. I willpropose that a referendurn be held of al1
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina -not of individual peoples - todecide on the independence and sovereignty of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and that a decision be reached by a
majority of at leasttwo-thirds." A Declarationon the Sovereignty
of Bosnia-Herzegovinawas given to reporters on this occasion.
(Referendum O samostalnostiBiHIReferendumon the lndenpence of 6-Hl
Politika, 31 January 19, nnex. p. 41819)
1.8.3 .nFebruary 1991, the SDA Executive Council
prepared a Draf? Declaration on the Sovereign 9-H and
submitted it to the B-H Parliament.
1.8.4.On 20 February 1991the SDS Council issued
a staternent saying that the SDA Declarationon the Sovereignty
and lndivisibility of Bosnia-Herregovinawasunacceptable to the
Serb people. Thestatementsaid that asovereign and indivisible
was possible only within the framework of the Yugoslav
Federationand that the SDADeclarationdeniedthe Serb people
their right to live in one state(DeklaraciOasuverenosti Bii-i svodi
status srpskog narocla na nacionalnu rnanjinli /C)eclaratioi? on the
Sovereignty of B-H Reducesthe Serbian Peopleto the Status of a Natianai
Minorityl Politika,21 February 1991, Annex.p. 42011)
1A.5. In reactionto the Declarationon the Sovereign
B-H prepared by SIDAfor the €3-HParliament,five parties that
were active in Banja Luka issued a joint statement saying th&
these acts did not respect the results of the first muliiparty
electicns in Bosnia-Herzegovinabecause the SDS had scorecl
a convincing vietory incomrmunes that eovered 64 percent of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory, which rneantthat the people of
these areas had voitedto rerriainvvitkinYugoslavia. (0. Kecrnan.
BiH nij"negde izmedju"/E-HisNot Sûmev\ii~err"ln-betweenr'/Pol26ika.
February 1991,Annex.p. 42213) 1.8.6. The SDS branch in Sarajevo rejected the
Declaration. The regional Committee of SDS for North-Easter
Bosnia said in a public statement of 14 Herzegovinian
municipalities that the Declarationwas unacceptable. (M. Caric,
SDSSarajevaodbija DeklaraciOsuverenostiBiHISDSofSarajevo Rejects
the Declarationon a SovereignB-Hl Politika27 February 1991, Annex. p.
42516)
In a public statement the SDS Committee for
Herzegovina, said, among other things: "We most energetically
condemn the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as an anti-constitutionaland illegal act calculated
to break up Yugoslavia and as an act directed against the
interests of the Serb people and their right to live in a single
state." At the end of this pubiic statement the regional SDS
committee said that representatives of 14 municipalities had
agreed at a meeting in Gacko on concrete measuresto protect
the Serb people and its sovereign right to live in a common
homeland (Politika, 28 February 1991).
1.8.7.At the session of the B-H Parliament on 27
February 1991, the Draft Declaration on the Sovereign B-H
proposed by SDA was reviewed. Marko Simic proposed on
behalf of 20 SDSdeputiesthat Declarationbe excluded from the
Agenda and addressed to the Council for National Equality of
B-H, as envisaged in item 10 of Amendment UO( to the
Constitution ofthe Socialist Republicof Bosniaand Herzegovina
from 1990. Item 10 of Amendment 00( read as follows:
"TheCouncil shall reviewissuesofequalityof peoples
and national rninoritiesatthe initiativeof deputies inthe Socialist
Republic of Bosnia-Hezegovina Parliament. If at least 20
deputies deem that a proposed regulation or any act from the
competence of the Parliament of the Socialist republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinaviolatestheequalityof peoplesand nationalrninorities, theCouncilshalldetermine theproposaldecidedon
by the Parliamentof the SRBosnia-Herzegovina.
"Issuesof interestfor achieving equalityof peoples
andnationalminoritiesof Bosnia-Hezegovinaa ,redecidedonat
the proposal of the Council by SR B-H Parliamentunder a
special procedureestablishedbyTheRulesof Procedureofthe
SR B-HParliament,i.e.a twolthird majorityof the total nurnber
of deputies".
The Parliament Secretary Avdo Campara (SDA
deputy)toldthe Parliament that the Councifor NationalEquality
did not exist. (M. iluric, M. Caric,Deklaraupucenau Savetza
nacionalnuravnopravnosItecleratiRefferetotheCounoiflorNational
Equalityl olit28aFelbruar1991,Annex.p.42718)
1.8.8.Alijalzetbegovicsaidatthissessionof the SR
Bosnia-Herzegovina's Parliament:"1wouldsacrificepeace for e
sovereign Bosnia-tierzegovina,but 1 would not saicriiiceits
sovereigntyfor peat:e."Thisstatementgaeatlyupsetthe Serbluii
people. The Club of Serbian Deputieain the €3-HParliament
addressed a letter to the President of the Presidéncy of the
Socialist Federal Rlepublicof Yugoslavia witha request for
protection,includingthe following:
"We, Serbian deputies in the Parliament of the
SocialistRepublic of Bosnia-Herzegovina a,slegitimateandonly
representativesof 1:heSerbian people in Bosnia-Hertegovina
requestthe federal institutionto protectour sovereignright to
rernainwithin the federalstateofYugosiavia.
We base our right to live in the federal state of
Yugoslavia on the presentConstitutionof osn nia-~erze~ovina,
Article1, para 2,as well as on the still existingConstitutionof
the SocialistFederrilRepublic ofYugoslavia." This statement of Alija lzetbegovic was also
condemned by the Socialist Democratic Party of
Bosnia-Herzegovinagatheringmembersof al1the threepeoples.
(M.Caric,SDA jekonacno obelodanilasvojepravenamereISDAHas Finaly
RevealedIts True Intentions1Politika,1 March 1991, Annex.p. 43012,M.
Caric,Koga lzetbegovicmozedazastupau PredsednistvuSFRJ/Who Can
lzetbegovic Represant in the Presidencyof theRYI Politika, 1 March
1991, Annex.p. 43213,D. Kecman,FrapantnemetamorfozeA. lzetbeovoca
/The Amazing Metamorphosesof A. Izetbegovicl Politika, 1 March 1991,
Annex. p. 43415)
1.8.9. Mass rallieswere held in Banja Luka and on
Mount Kozarainearly March1991insupportof the preservation
of the Yugoslav Federation.About 70 000 people rallied at the
meeting in Banja Luka. (Veliko interesovaza mitingna Kozari/Great
Interestinthe Rallyon Mn,KozaralPolitika,3 March1991,Annex.p. 43617,
Dusan Kecman, Protiv razbijacazemlje IAgainst Those Breaking up the
Country1Politika4March1991, Annex.p. 43819,Dj.Djukic,Odlucnabitka
za Jugoslaviju/The DecisiveBattlefor Yugoslavia/Politika,4 March 1991,
Annex. p. 44011)
1.8.10. TheSDSRegionalCommitteeforthe Bosnian
Krajinaprotested at a press conference held in Banja Luka on
7 June 1991 against the announced referendum on
Bosnia-Herzegovina'ssovereigntyand pledged its support for
living together in Yugoslavia. (D. Kecman, Krajisnici ne priznaju
nikakvusuverenu drzavuBiHIKrajinaPeopleDo Not RecognizeSovereign
State of B-Hl Politika,8 June 1991, Annex.p. 44213)
1.8.11. Addressing a mass rally in Nevesinjeon 23
June 1991, Dr Karadzicsaid that the Serbswould not agree to
be divided by state borders. (D. Maric, Srpski narod nece dati
Jugoslaviju/The Serbian PeopleWill Not GiveYugoslaviaUpi Politika,24
June 1991, Annex.p. 44415) 1.8.12. In a letter to US Secretary of State darnes
Baker, the SDS said that it had won the supp~rt sf
three-quarters of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who
wished to live in afederalYugoslaviain which parts of the Serb
people wouid nOt be national minorities. (Mirko Caric, Miloâevic
umesto lzetbegovicaIMilosevicInsteadIzetbegoviclPolitika,25J!991,
Annex. p. 44617)
1.8.13. Afterit becameevident that the Muslimsand
the Croats in Bosn~ia-Herzegovina did not wish to remain in
Yugoslavia, Dr Karadzic told a press conference held in
Belgrade on 18 July 1991 that each people could kave
Yugoslavia but withioutharming other peoples that wanted to
remain in Yugoslavia. Serbian and Engiish versions of a
pamphlet entitled "VVhat the Serbs Propose"were distributed at
this press conferenice.The purpose of this pamphlet was ?O
precisely present ttie positions of the SDS and thus oppos5
anti-Serbpropagantila. (A.Brkic,Regij-kljuczaresenjejugost~ge:;s.-.
krize /Region- the Keyto the Solutionof the Yi~goslavCrisis1Poi:Yikâ,
July 1991,Annex. p. 44819)
1.8.14. Eventhen SDS was trying to find a solution
equally acceptable for the Serbs and the Muslims in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and ,for that purpose prepared a text of an
agreement with representatives of the Muslim-Bosniac
Organization. However, representativesof the Muslim-Bosniac
Organizationwere exposedto great pressure and open threats
by SDA leaders, which prevented the conclusion of the
agreement. (M. Caric,Propao pokusajSDAda minirasporazum/Attemp~
of the Party of Democratic Action to Underminethe Agreement Failedl
Politika,2 September 1991, Annex.p. 45011,P.Simic,Srpsko-muslimanski
sporazum pod informativnomblokadom /Serbian-Mus!irnAgreemnt under
an InformationBlockacfe/Plotika,11Acigu:991,Annex.p. 453/4) (SF?~
1.8.18.) 1.8.15. In a statement dated 14 October 1991 , the
SDS said that if Croatia seceded from ~u~oslavia the SDS
would propose the holding at local levels (district, commune
and region) and republican level of a referendum of
Bosnia-Herzegovina'sthree constituentpeoples.
1.8.16.Twodays laterDrKaradzictold an SDSpress
conference in Sarajevothat it was evident that the Muslimsand
Croats in Bosnia Herzegovina did not wish to remain in
Yugoslavia. "Forthat reasonwe expect recognitionof our wish
to have strong federal ties with Yugoslavia.In order to avoid a
civil war the Parliamentadopted principles according to which
a solution acceptablefor al1the peopleswill be sought, while no
one will impose their will on others"the SDS leader said. (M.
Pesic,Nemajedinstvenogresenjaza BiHrrhere is No UnifiedSolutionfor
B-Hl Politika, 18 October1991, Annex.p. 45516)
1.8.17. Finally, on 22 December 1991,the SDS
proposed a comprehensive democratic transformation of
Bosnia- Herzegovina into a confederation of three ethnic
communities with three parliaments. During the talks held
betweenthethree partiesSDSproposedthatan integralB-Hbe
preservedas partof the YugoslavFederation. Realizingthat the
two other parties were against this, SDS was prepared to
respect thewishof Muslimand Croatrepresentativesto "loosen"
the ties withYugoslaviaorto completelysecedefrom it."Forthe
sake of peace we are readyto accept B-H as a confederation
with three parliaments of the three ethnic communities,
functioning withoutany mutualdisturbances.Thisconfederation
would also havesome common functions, whichcould make it
possible for for B-H to be a link between Croatia and
Yugoslavia. Thus, in B-H three entities, complementaryor at
least indifferentto each other,would be established"- said Dr.R. Karadzicinformingthe Parliamentof the Serbianpeopleof
negotiationsbetween thethreeethnic communities.(Muharem
Duric,Bosanskoherceyovackakonfederacija/A Bosnia-Herzegovinian
ConfederationPolitik,3December1991,Annex,p. 45718)
1.8.18. Itshouldbesaid,however, thatnotal1Muslim
parties and leaders shared theposition of the SDA and A.
Izebegovic. The Muslim Bosnian Organizationand its leader,
Adil Zulfikarpasic,and the SDS and its leader,Dr Radovan
Karadzic,prepareda draftagreementon Serb-Muslim relations
in Bosnia-Herzegovina,whics haid:
"1. Awareof the problemswe have inheritedand
those produced by politicallife since the elections,we have
decided, inthe spiritof opennessand mutualrespect,to work
fortheachievement ofthehistoricalandpoliticalinterestsfour
two peoples.ThisAgreementis notaimed against anyoneI.tis
for the benefitof all,andas such,opento al1who support the
principleof the cornlmonlifein freedomandfull equality.
"2.Weconsiderthatthe basisfor such lifeis muPuai
recognitionof the sovereigntyof peoplesandthe full territorial
integrity of our Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinaand its
constitutionaland legalequality withthe otherrepublics inthe
commonstateof Y~igoslavia.
"3,In Ourview,thereis full historical justificaforn
Yugoslaviaasacornmonstateofcompletelyequalpeoplesand
we shallwork for thepreservation and developrnentof such a
community.
"4.WeareagreedthatBosnia-Herzegovins ahouldbe
a legallyandpoliticallyunitedandademocraticfederalunit with
appropriatepowersin al1partsof itsterritoron conditionthatthe federal constitution and legislation form the basis of the
country's systemand guaranteetheequalityof citizens,peoples
and republics.
"5. We express our interest in the Croats of
Bosnia-Herzegovinaliving with us in full equality and we cal1
upon them to accede to this Agreement. Regardless of the
position of the Republicof Croatia,inoroutsideYugoslavia,the
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovinaare a completely equal people.
"6.Relationsbetweencitizens,peoplesand republics
in Yugoslavia shall be regulated by a common constitution
embodying Europeanstandards.
"7.Weare awarethatthisAgreementconstitutes only
a political and historical basisfor our durable common life in
peace. However, such a political accord makes it possible to
seekthe most constructive andrationalsolutionsfor the work of
comrnon federal bodies and their functions: monetary system,
single market,single armed force and foreign affairs.
"8. We also consider that the optimal Yugoslav
community is one comprising al1 six republics and al1 the
peoples who originally constituted this cornmunity. Those
peoples and republics who wish to withdraw from this
cornrnunityshould do so by agreementand guarantee the real
interestsof each of the other members." (Focus S119, p. 118-119,
Annex. p. 459)
1.8.19. However, fundamentalist Muslim forces
hindered these effortswith their constantattackson the Muslim
BosnianOrganizations (Muharem Duric,Zajednicki zivotu zajednickoj
drzavi /Joint Life in a Joint Statel Politika,31 July 1991, Annex.p. 46112) 1.8.20.Inadditionto this,a riftoccurredbetweenA.
lzetbegovicand the leaderof the Muslimsin WesternBosnia,
Fikret Abdic, at the SDA Conferenceheld in Sarajevo on 1
December 1991. The lattersaidthat in importantthings itwas
wrong to act against thenterestof not onlythe Muslimpeople
butalsotheotherpeoplesof Bosnia-Herzegovina and opposed
the absolute power of A. Izetbegovic.(MuharemDuric,Abdiceve
zamerkelzetbegovicVVhaDt oesAbdicHold againtetbegoviclolitika,
2 December 1991Annex.46516).F.Abdic had beforethat received
morevotesthanA.lzetbegovicinthe presidentialelections,but
had concededthe Presidencyto the latter.F. Abdic laterbroke
entirely withA. Izetbegovic,particulaftertheformationof the
Muslim Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and the
conclusion of a treaty on peace and cooperation with the
Bosnian Serb Republic. This conflict culminatedwhen A.
Izetbegovic's forces (The Fifth Corps in Bihac) defeated F-.
Abdic'sforces inWestern Bosniaw , hichresultedinterrorby A.
Izetbegovic'sforcesagainsttheciviliaMuslimpopulationinthat
region, particularlythe townof VelikaKladusa,andtheflight of
about 60,000Muslirnsfrom that regionto the Republicof Serb
KrajinaattheendofAugust 1994.Afterconsoiidating hisforces,
Abdic regainedthe lost territoryand Muslimrefugeesreturned
to thearea.
1.9.The rebelllonbymembersofthe SDA andthe HDZ In
the republlcangovernment agalnstthe SFRYand
pressureson the Serb people In Bosnia-Herzegovina
(1991-1992)
l.g..l.The harassrnent of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 withattacks on thSDS leadership
on television and radio, and in newspapersand magaziries
printed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.The magazine "Novi Vox", aMuslimyouth paperled the attacks.(Bosna jeokuplrana-Al'ne
zadugoIBosniaOccuoied -But NoforLong1 NoviVox,Sarajevo,o,3,
October1991 ,nnex.p.469170)
1.9.2.In its third issuein October1991,"NoviVoxu
publishedthefollowing"patriotic"Song:
Dearmother,I'mgoingto plantwillows,
We'llhangSerbsfromthem.
Dearmother,I'mgoingto sharpen knives,
We'llsoonfiIl pitsagain.
Dearmother,chopsomesalad,
And inviteOurCroatbrothers.
When Ourbannersunite,
Allthe Serbswillendin graves.
DuringWorldWarTwotheslogan"SerbsonWillows"
waspopular among theUstashi(fascist armedformationsinthe
IndependentState of Croatiaduring World War II). (Serbs
should behangedfrom the willows a,ndwords"Srbe"and"Vrbe"
rhymeinSerbian.Thementioning of pitswasalsosupposedto
associateto thesufferingofthe SerbsinWorldWarII, sinceat
that timeCroatand Muslimfasciststhrewslaughteredor killed
Serbsinto deep pits itherockyfieldsof B-H).Underthe lyrics
of the Songtheeditorial office stathatit publishedtheSong
becauseallegedlyits styleremindedof IvoAndric'swork.Thus,
chauvinism,religiousand national intolerance, ereattributed
to the literatureof Yugoslavia's oNobelPrizewinner,which
isabsurd.In anyevent,inwhatever contextitwaspublishedthis
Songhadtocause concern oftheSerbsinB-H.(Patriotsk poezija
IPatriotPoetrylNovVox,No.3,October1991,Annexp. 47214)
1.9.3.The same issue of "Novi Vox" published
obituariesof the mostprominent Serb leaders i, cluding DrRadovanKaradzic,Dr BiljanaPlavsicand Dr Nikola Koijevic.
This"newspaperu funeralofthe leaders otfhe Serbianpeople in
B-Hwasagraveattackonthem.("citu~j/ "" bituariNo/voVox,No.
3,October1991,p.47819)
1.9.4. lllegal armed formations were set up in
Bosnia-Herzegovina ,s illustratedby anarticle, alsopublished
inthethirdissueof"Novi Vox" inOctober1991,entitled"Wewill
defendthe borderon the Drina",Thisarticlesaid:
"A two-pagearticle entitled'Fromthe camp of the
Hanjar Division' appearedin the latest issue of the Zagreb
weekly'Globus'withan interview with AlijSiljak,a memberof
the Presidency of the Croatian Party of Rights and its
coordinatorfor EasternBosnia,whoissaidinpoliticalcirclesto
have organized milhtaryactivities on theDrina and recruited
Muslim volunteers for Croatia's patriowar. Thejournalistsf
the popular Zagreb weeklysaw that these stories were rict
without basiswhen Alijatook himto a trainingcamp for new
fighterssomewherein deepforest'betweenthe Drinaand the
Sutla'. Whenthejournalistsaidthathewasseenasthe creator
of the newHanjarDivision,AlijaSiljakreplied:'WhaIamdoing
with my people from theDrina,as I cal1them, really is the
continuationofatradition.MuchhasbeensaidabouttheHanjar
Divisionfrom 1945to 1990,mainlyin a negativecontext.Their
so-calledcrimewasto fightfor their own statanddefendtheir
peoplefrompeoplelikeKalabic,Medenica andMihajlovic. They
were disciplined arid lovedby the people, but one of their
so-calledcrimeswasthatthey worefezeswitha letter'U' or a
crescent andstar,airboth,insteadof the Serb royalistinsignia
or the communist fi\re-pointestar."
The Hanjar Division was a fascist Muslim armed
formationcreated irithe Second World War. (See paragraphs1.3.3.and 1.3.21.) (Branit cemo granice na DriniIWe Will Defend Our
Border on theDrina/ Novi Vox, No. 3, October 1991,p. 48215,OdluOa
formiranju muslimanske narodne garde/Decisionon the Formationof the
Muslim NationalGuard/ Annex.p. 49011,Uvodi se Hajvanvagon ISpecial
Animal CarsTo BeIntroducedlAnnex.p. 49417,Cele-Kulafrower of Skullsl
Annex. p. 49519,lgre /Games/Annex.p. 49619)
1.9.5.Theauthorities ofB-Hdid not reactto the texts
in "Novi Vox"although they were meantto spread religious and
ethnic intolerance.
1.9.6. The Bosnia-Herzegovinaradio and television,
the "Oslobodjenje" newspaper publishing house and al1other
republican mass media remainedin Muslim-Croathands. They
were used to wage a media war against the Serb people.
1.9.7. SDS leader Dr Karadzic spoke at a press
conference held on 23 January 1991 ofthe anxietyof Serbs in
the westernHerzegoviniancommunesborderingon Croatiadue
to which women and children were moving from Metkovici to
eastern Herzègovina.
1.9.8. The arming of the Muslim and Croat civilians
was organized in 1991.Partof the armswereobtained with the
help of the Republicof Slovenia.This wasconfirmed by Hasan
Cengic, a Muslim middleman. Cengic said at a hearing a
Slovenian parliamentary committee that he had been first
approached by Slovenian President Milan Kucan, who then
connected him with lnterior Minister lgor Bavcar. Slovenian
Defence MinisterJanezJansawas the key person in the illegal
arms deals. (M. Jaksic, Kucan prva veza IKucan the First Connectionl
Politik14 July 1994, Annexp.50213) 1.99 The former chief of Slovenia's
Counter-IntelligenceService,Miha Brejc,said on 17 Februaiy
1995 at a hearing beforea Slovenian parliamentarycornmittee
that Sloveniasuppliedthe Bosnian Muslims with armfs rom the
beginningof 1991 to autumn 1994. Althoughthesearmsdeals
weresupposedto besecret,it isquitecertain thatthe armingof
Muslimsin Bosnia-Herzegovina could nothavegone unnoticed
by the Serbs.
1.9.10. Severalthousand Muslimsand Croats from
Bosnia- Herzegovinawere trained at the Croatian lnterior
Ministrytrainingcentreduring 1991.("it'a CrimetoRemain Silent
About aCrime" ,oviSad,1993,pp.372-375)
1.9.11.As earlyas February 1991, the flats oarmy
officersandeminent Serbs weremarked inSarajevoand Bihac.
Inthis waythey weremarkedaspossibletargets.
1.9.12. Attacks by Croatia's armed forces on the
territory of Bosnia-t-ierzegoviinhabitedlby Serbs began in
March 1991, CroatianSpecial Policeseized the "Brotherhood
and Unity"bibge on the SavanearJasenovacand the village
of DonjaGradinaon 5 March 1991 SerbsinBosnia-Herzegovina
wereconcernedbythefailureoftheSDA -and HDZ -controlled
republicanauthoritiesto condemnthese attacks.
, .
1.9.13. The SDA began to organize the Muslim
extremist organization,the Patriotic League, at least a year
before the war. Thiiswas an illegalterrorist organizationthat
mainly comprised Muslim officerçwho had desertedfrom the
Yugoslav People's Army (hereafter: JNA). Sefer Halilovic,
commander of the Muslimarmy of the so called Republicof
Bosnia-Herzegovinadesertedfrom JNA and joined theillegai
and terrorist PatrioticLeague.ThePatriotiLeague grew intoanewterritorialdefence forceof Bosnia-Herzegovinaand came
into the open by attackingthe JNAand breakingup the legal
TerritorialDefenceforce.ThepreviouslyillegalPatrioticLeague
was based in Sarajevoand led by leadersof the SDA.
1.9.14. When asked in an interview on "Bosnia-
HerzegovinianRadioand Television"whether ornot thewar in
Bosnia-Herzegovina could have been avoided, Muslimleader
Alijalzetbegovicadmittedthathehimselfhad notexpectedthat
the war would be so terrible. "lnthe second halof1991, we
establishedthe PatrioticLeagueto preparethe peoplefor the
possibilityof war,"Mr lzetbegovicsai(Tanjug15 Februar1993)
1.9.15.TheSerbpeoplein Bosnia-Herzegovina was
particularlyirritatedbythefactthatA.lzetbegovicpaidanofficial
visitto KurtWaldheim.TheSerbsconsiderthatMrWaldheimis
amongthoseresponsibleforthedeathof 34.000 Serbs fromMt
KozarainWorldWarTwo. A. lzetbegovicsaidthat K.Waldheim
had been only a soldier. This visit and A. Izetbegovic's
explanationdid notcontributeto buildingtrust between Muslims
and Serbs.Onthe contrary.
1.9.16. Residentsof several western Herzegovina
communesblocked roadswithvehiclesand humanshieldsto
prevent the passageof a motorizedJNA column, The road
blockswereplacedontheMostar-Listica-Posusjre oadallegedly
becauseBosnia-Herzegovina'a suthoritieshadnotbeennotified
in advanceof the passageof the armycolumn.A. lzetbegovic
claimedat a press conferencethat hehad not beenconsulted
abouttroop movements.ThiswasaclearcaseofA.lzetbegovic
claiming authorityhe did not have,becausethe JNA wasnot
obligedto consultthe Republican PresidencyI.isclearthat this
too influenced the political mood of the Serbs inBosnia-Herzegovinaand that they saw this as a threat.(Drago
Maric, Uzaludni pokusaji da se omoguCi prolaz vojnorn konvoju
/UnsucessfulEffortsto EnableArmyConvoyto PasslPolitika,9 May 1991,
Annex.p. 50516)
1.9.17. At an SDS press conference, Dr Karadzic
warned that the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia was slowly melting away and that A. lzetbegovic had
given half of Bosnia-Herzegovina'ssovereigntyto F. Tudjman,
the Presidentof the Republicof Croatia.Inthe Croat-populated
parts of B-H the school systemand the massmedia were part
of the Croatiansystem. (GraniceizmedjuBiHiHrvatskepolakosetope
/Border between 6-H and CroatiaSlowlyMeltinglPolitika,16 Ma1991,
Annex.p. 50718)
1.9.18. DrBiljana Plavsic, Presidentf the Councilfor
the Protection of the ConstitutionalOrder and member of the
Bosnia-HerzegovinaPresidency,spokeof the chaos inthe legai
systemof Bosnia-Herzegovinaandsaidthatthis was due ta the
coalition of the SDAand the HDZin the republicangovernmeiit
and the interferenceof the Republicof Croatia. (M.Caric,HrvatSka
se grubo uplice u poçlove suvereneBiH ICroatia's Interferencein the
Interna1Affaires of So\ilerignBosnial Pol14iMay 1991, Annex.p.
510111)
1.9.19. Alijalzetbegovicsaid in Sarajevo on 8 May
1991 that Sarajevo lwasa Muslim city. Shortly afterwards,the
Mayorof Sarajevo,DrMuhamedKresevljakovic,wentfuither and
said that Bosnia-Herzegovinawas a Muslirn country. These
statements naturally did not give the Serbs any reason to
believe in the good intentions of the SDA. (Izetbegovic
demantuje Kljuica/IzetbegoviccontradictsKljuiç/Politika,9 May
1991, Annex.p. 512/513) 1.9.20.DobroslavParaga,aleaderofultraright-wing,
fascist politicalforces,saidthat Croatcompanieswerealready
alliedwith Muslimforces on theDrina. (MirkoCaric,Poglediuprtiu
BiHIEyasTurnedtowards Bosnia-HerzegovinaP l olitika,11 June 1991,
Annex. p. 54/55)
1.9.21.The local police station in Visegrad was
blockaded for several hours on 15 June 1991.A group of
Muslimssoughtthe replacemeno t fSerbpolicemeninthetown.
This was part of an organized actionaimed at changing the
national structure of the police force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
(R.M.BlokiraniputevipreSrbiji/RoadsTowardsSerbiaBlocked/Politika,
16 June 1991,Annex.p. 51617)
1.9.22. In protest against the conduct of Mr
Izetbegovic, the President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Presidency,who madestatementswithoutconsultingthe other
members of the Presidency, the Serb members of the
Presidency,DrPlavsicandDrKoljevic,decidedon 8June 1991
to freeze their membershipof the Presidency.The SDS
leadershipon 10June1991to deny Mrlzetbegovic therightto
represent the Serbs of Bosnia- Herzegovina.This was the
beginningof the departureof Serb representatives from bodies
of the governmentof Bosnia- Herzegovina as a resultof their
isolation andmarginalizationby SDAand HDZ representatives.
1.9.23.Croatia'sarmed forcesshelled the town of
Bosanska Gradiskafrom territoryof the Republic of Croatia.
Againtherewasno reactionfromthe republicangovernmentof
Bosnia-Herzegovina. (DusanKecman,Velikiratniokrsaj na Savi/Big
ArmedClashon the SavalPolitika, August1991, Annex. . 51819)
1.9.24.Duringa visitto Turkey,A. lzetbegovic asked
for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be allowedto attend a MinisterialConference of the Organization of lslamic Countries. This
request only further deepened the mistrustof Serbstowards A.
Izetbegovic's policies. (Zahtev da BiH ucestvuje u radu Islamske
konferencije /Demand for B-H Participation in the Work of the lslamic
Conferencel Politika,18July 1991, Annex.p. 52112)
1.9.25. Alijalzetbegovicsaid inan interviewin"Der
Spieg1":"If Bosnia-Herzegovinais divided there will certainiybe
a civil war which will be impossibleto bringto an end." Healso
said that during visits to T'urkey and Libya he had sought
"politicalsupport, but not assistancein armsfor the time being".
This statement als'o testifies that A. lzetbegovic had been
determined to use force to create an independent, united and
unitary Bosnia-Herzegovinaagainst the will of the Serbian
people. (Jeder kampft gegen jeden IEvryone Fightingagainst Everyone
Else/ Der Spiegel,22 July 1991,Annex.p.52315)
1.9.26. At the end of a visit to the USA, Mr
lzetbegovic said that there could be a conflict between the
Serbs and the Croats, andthat the Muslimswould in that case
support the Croats;.This was indeed what later happened.
Naturally, this statement was not intended to win the trust of
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina,on the contrary. (U siucajusukoba
Muslimani uz Hrvate/Iilnuslimswill Side with Croats in Event of Conflictl
Politika,1 August 1991,Annex.p. 52617)
1.9.27. A Muslimgroup led by MuratSabanovic beat
up a driver of the "Raketa"bus Companyfrom Uzice in Serbia
and several Serbiari passengers.Thenext day the same group
of Muslims beat up MilijaCeba, a Serb shipper from Visegrad.
(R.M. SDA tuce Srbe ISDA Beats Serbsl Politik24 September 1991,
Annex. p.52819)
Murat Sabanovic and a group of Moslems
demolished the monument to Ivo Andrie, the Nobel Literaiure
Prize laureate,at the Liberation Square in Visegrad.Pieces ofthe marblestatuewerethrownintothe Drina,Thedernolitionof
the monument hadbeen precededby a negativearticleon Ivo
Andri in the magazine "NoviVox",as well as a cartoonof the
Nobel Prizelaureatefixed ona pencil as if impaled andthus
punishedinthe mannercharacteristicof the Ottomanperiod, a
punishment describedby the Nobel Prizewinner in his novel
"TheBridgeonthe Drina",whichcertainlslamicfundamentalists
could not forgive him.
In August 1991 lslamic fundamentalistdistributeda
leafletin Visegradcontaining20 instructionson whatto do to
the Serbs in order to drive them out. These instructions
included,amongother, thefollowingrecommendations: "Forbid
your childrento playwith Serbchildren","Throwyourrubbishin
front of theirdoors", "Urinatein their doorways","Mark their
houses and apartments","Write threatening graffiti on their
housesand churches",etc.
1.9.28. Forces of the Croatian Ministry of lnternal
Affairs and the Croatian NationalGuard shelled the town of
Bosanska Kostajnica from Croatianterritory.DraganBorojevic,
aged 30, and Nedeljko Prohic, aged 28, werekilled in the
attack. SDA and HDZ representatives inthe republican
governmentinSarajevodeliberatelyignoredSerbdemandsthat
the Croatian leadership be warned against attacking
Bosnia-Herzegovina. (D.Kecman, Ponovo napadnuta Bosanska
Kostajnica/Bosanska KostajnicaAttacked Againl Politika, 1 September
1991, Annex..53112)
1.9.29. Ala pressconferenceheld in Sarajevoon 5
September 1991, the SDS leaders issued an appeal to the
Ministryof lnternalAffairsof Bosnia-Herzegovina to cease its
activitiesagainsttheJNA.(MuharemDuric,Protivhaosau BiHIAgainst
Chaos in B-Hl Politika,6 September1991, Ap.53314) 1.9.30. Tt-iroughthe Ministryof the lnterior of B- H,
SDA intensively worked on preventing recruitmentin JNA and
forming one-national police forces. JNA officers constantly
received threatening phone calls. (D. Kocic, Prete rusenjem mosta
kod Zvornika IThreats to Destroy Zvornik Bridge1Politka,29 September
1991, Annex.p.53516)
1.9.31. Dir. Biljana Plavsic and Dr. Nikola Koljevic
stated ina letteraddressedto the HaguePeaceConferencethat
Alija lzetbegoviccou~ld not representthe Serbsfrom 6-H.
1.9.32. At an SDApress conferencein Sarajevoof 2
October 1991 ,lrfanAjanovic,Vice Presidentof the Assembly of
SFRY and one of the leaders of this party, and Muhamed
Cengic, B-H Vice Prime Ministerand also one of the SKIA
leadersannounced aterriblewarin B-H.Theyconfirmedthatthe
Moslemsin B-Hweregetting armed. (MirkoCaric,Ajanovici Cengic
grubo vredjaju JNA IAjanovoc and CengicSevereiylnsultJNA/ Pol3.ika,
October 1991,Annex.p. 53718)
1.9.33. The President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, A.
Izetbegovic, proclairned Bosnia-Herzegovina'sneutrality in the
conflicts in Croatia on 7 October 1991. He behaved as if the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinawas an independent
and sovereignstate,althoughitwasnot. Dr.RadovanKaradzic,
Momcilo Krajisnik, Dr. Biljana Plavsic, Dr.Nikola Koljevic and
Vojislav Maksimovic:, issued a statement on behalf of the
Serbian people condemning that act and pointing to its
unconstitutionality. They stressed that B-H was nst an
independent state, and therefore,could not claim neutrality.
Theyalso said that Alija Izetbegovic'sappealto concripts not to
respond to mobilization calls constituted a severe violation of
the iaw. (Predsednik PredsednistvaBiH povredio citav niz ustavnih i
zakonskih normi 1Pres;identof the B-H Presidency Violated SeveralConstitutional and Lagal Provisions/Politika,8 October 1991, Annex.p.
539140)
1.9.34. A session of the republican parliamentwas
held in Sarajevo on 14 October 1991. At the proposa1 ofthe
SDA, the incomplete Parliament of SR Bosnia-Herzegovina
adopted a Memorandum(Letterof Intent)on the sovereigntyof
the republic and a Platform on the Position of
Bosnia-Herzegovinaand the Future Set-up of the Yugoslav
Community proposed by the republican Presidency. These
documents were not supported bythe SDSand SDS members
did not take part inthese decisions. The documents were not
subjected to the procedure envisagedin item 10,Article LXXof
the 1990 Amendment to the Constitution of SR B-H, which
meansthat they were not reviewed orproposed by the Council
for National Equality. Bearingin mind that the three leading
parties could not agree on these documents, and that the
procedure regarding the Councilfor National Equalitywas not
observed, Momcilo Krajisnik, Presidentof the Assembly and
SDS deputy, concluded the Assemblysession afterwhich SDS
deputies withdrew.At the proposal of lrfan Ajanovic, the then
Vice President of the SFRY Assembly and one of the SDA
leaders,theAssemblycontinuedworkingalthoughtherewasnot
a sufficient number of deputies present, and adopted the
mentioned documents. (Memorandum -pismo O namjerma-
IMemorandum -Letter of Intent-/Sluzbenilist SR BiH, br. 32, 16. oktobar
1991, Annex. p. 54216,PlatforOapolozaju BiH i buducem ustrojstvu
jugoslovenskezajednicePlatformon theStatusof B-Handthe FutureSet-
up of the YugoslavCommunity/543/5,MuharemDuric,MirkoCaric, Bosna
se podelila IBosna Dividesl Politika, 16October 1991,Annex. p. 54718,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,Defense and Foreign AffairesHandbook, London,
1994,p.135,Annex.p.410)
1.9.35.At a pressconferenceheld in Sarajevoon 16October 1991, the SDS issued a proclamation to the Serb
people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.The proclamation said that the
parliamentarygroups ofthe SDAandthe HDZattempted acoup
d'etat during the niyht of 14-15 October 1991 by adopting by
means of political terror unconstitutional decisions, thus
destroying the tradition of Serbs, Moslemsand Croats living
together. That endarigeredthe constitutionalorder and opened
the door to lawlessness and chaos. If the parliament of
Bosnia-Herzegovinadid not preservethe constitutional order,
the Serb peoplewould establisha legalorderthatwas inaccord
with the SFRY Coristitution, ensure respect for the federal
constitution and fetleral laws, civil and national rights and
organize its own legislative,executiveandjudicial authorities,to
which it had a right ;asa sovereign people. It also said that the
Serb people would remain in Yugoslavia unless it decided
otherwise in a referendum. (M. Duric, Nezavisnost BiH mimo vuije
srpskog naroda ISovereignty of B-H against Will of Serb People1Politika,
17 October 1991,p.55112)
1..9.36.About 50,000 Serbs attended a meeting in
BanjaLukaon 26 0c;tober1991protesting against theadoption
of the Memorandurriand the Platform. (See para. 1.9.34.) Dr.
Nikola Koljevicsaidthat the Serbswould organizea referendum
on theirstate'status.(Srbi su izabraliplebiscit/The Serbs HaveChosen
a Plebiscitel Politika27 October 1991, Ap. 55314)
1.9.37. DeputyPrimeMinisterof Bosnia-Herzegovina
Muhamed Cengic visited Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman
Demirel in Ankara on 15 November1991 . Yugoslav diplornats
were notallowedto attendthe meeting. (Cengic informisaoDemirela
O Bosni ICengic Informed Demirelon Bosnia/ Poli16 November 1991,
Annex. p. 559160)
1.9.38. JNA pilot, Captsirt Dragos Stojcinovic, waskidnapped in Mostar on 28 November 1991 by a Croat
paramilitary formation.The policeof Bosnia-Herzegovina were
involvedin the kidnapping. CaptainStojcinovicwasfirsttaken
to Listica and then to Split and Zagrebin Croatia. He was
physically torturedand receivedseriousbodilyinjuriesin these
places. He was exchangedat Plesoairporton 10 December
1991, (Statementof DragosStojcinovicto the team of expertsfor
collectingand processingevidenceon crimesagainsthumanityand
internationll w,of May1994,Annex.p. 566,MedicalDocumentation,
Annex. p.574)
1.9.39.Anexplosivedevicewasplacedunderthecar
of the Editorof the Krajina newspaper "Glas",M. Mladjenovic,
Secretaryof InformationoftheAutonomousRegionof Bosanska
Krajina,The car was destroyedand windowsin surrounding
buildings were shattered. Before that event,explosive was
placed under the car of Dr.Radislav Vukic, President of
Bosanska KrajinaSDS, and then in the entrance hall of the
building where PredragRadic,Mayorof Banja Luka,lived. (D.K.
Na meticelniciSDSISDSLeadersAttackedlPolitika1, December1991,
Annex.p. 57718)In Decemberbombswereplantedin restaurants
ownedby Serbs (D.KTridiverziusrpskim lokalirahreeSabotages
inSer-owned Restaurants1Politk5a,December1991,Annex.p.579180)
Thosesabotageswereorganizedin orderto bring pressureto
bear on Serbs in that partof B-H. The mentioned events
significantlyinfluencedthepoliticalpositionsofthe Serbsin0-H.
1.9.40.Afterthedecisionofthe Parliameno tfthe Serb
people in Bosnia-Herzegovinato form the Bosnian Serb
Republic,Alija lzetbegovicthreatened the Serbs in a TV news
broadcastthattheywouldseea repetitionof the exodus which
they had suffered inCroatia, 1.9.41. lzetbegovic thankedTurkey for recognjzing
Bosnia-Herzegovina beforethe Referendumwas held on 29
February1992.lzetbegovicsaidthat he metwith Cetin, Minister
for Foreign Affaires in Davos, and that he promised him the
recognition. Demirel also made the same promise later.
lzetbegovicsaidthat therecognitionwould encourageMoslems
and Croats to vote for independence. In an interview to the
Turkish daily "Miliyet", he described Turkey as a brother.
(Saraybosna,bayramyasiyor, Miliyet,10 February1992,Annex.581/2)
1.9.42"On the dayofthe Muslim-Croatreferendumon
an independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina,1 March 1992,
therewasan armedattackon Serbweddingguestsin Sarajevo.
Nikola Gardovic,the groom's father, was killed, and the priest
Radenko Mirovicwas wounded in front of the Orthodoxchurch
in the Bascarsija in the centre of Sarajevo. They were botR
Serbs. Suad (of fatherHamdija)Sabanovic,a Moslem,Igor (of
father Zvonimir) Dodig, a Croatand Muhamed (of father Emin)
Svrakic,a Moslem carriedout theattac~,The attackers trimltci
seizethe Serbianflag carried by the bride-groomsbsother.It sS
a Serb custom to carry nationalflags at weddings. When the
father tried to protect his son the attackersopened fire. Under
the circumstances (ofthe referendumon independence that
attack symbolizedthe futurefate of the Serbian people in B-H.
This attack started the inter-ethnic armed conflicts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Ubsitvona BascarsijIiKillinginBascarsijalPolitika,
2 March 1992, Annex.p. 58415,Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dand Foreign
AffairesHandbook, Lonclon,1994,p.135,Annex.40)
1.9.43. Barricadeswereerectedin Sarajevoafterthe
murder of Nikola Gardovic. After the agreement between Dr.
Radovan Karadzic,Alija lzetbegovic and JNA General Milutin
Kukanjac, barricadeswere removedaiid crisis areas put ur'ider
the control of mixed imilitaryand police patrols. On the night of3 March 1992armedMoslemserected barricadesin the part of
the town wherethey constitutedmajority.This wasdespite Alija
Izetbegovic's promise that the blockade would not happen
again. There wereseveralmurdersof both Serbsand Moslems.
(M. Caric, M. Duric, NovenapetostiIRenewedTensions1Poli4March
1992, Annex.p.58617,M. Duric, Bosna:Dogovor u poslednji casIBosnia:
LastMinuteAgreement,Annex.p. 589190)
1.9.44. About 50,000SDAand HDZ members were
armed in March 1992.Theirformationswere called the "Green
Berets",the "FlyingPals"and the "HanjarDivision".The Turkish
newspaper "Hurriyet" carried two reports from Sarajevo and
Bosnia- Herzegovinaon lslamiccommandoswhoare preparing
for war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The paper called the
commandos "The lslamic Rambos of Bosnia". The reporter
Muammer Elverenvisited the "Green Berets" Headquarters in
Bosniaand describedtheirarms,clothesandtraining. (Muammer
Elveren,IslamicRambos,Hurriy, 0March1992,Annex.p.597,Muammer
Elveren,Password of Rambos Selamunaleykum,Hurriet,31 March 1992,
Annex. p. 598, RadovanPavlovic,Pod oruzjem50.000clanovaHDZ i SDA
150.000Members of HDZ and SDA Are Armedl Politika 4 March 1992,
Annex. p.600/1)
1.9.45. During March 1992 Moslem-Croatmilitary
formations triedto take over by force dominant positionsin B-H
with ethnicly mixed population.To achieve that they attacked
some JNA units, and a civil war started in B-H.
Croatarmedformationsopened artilleryfire from the
commune of Neum on a JNA unit on 22 March 1992.On that
occasion, sixJNAmemberswerekilled: Slavko Lukovac,Vukan
Joksimovic, Zoran Obradovic, RadenkoFilipovic and Branislav
Mrdak. (D.M. S.D. Poginulosest pripadnika rezervnogsastavaJNA /Six
JNA ReservistsKilledl Politika,24 March 1992, Annex.p.60314) Moslem and Croat armed formations created threg
hotbeds of crisis: BosanskiBrod, Neumand Gorazde. (M.Duric,
Pucnji od mora do Bosanskog Broda IShots from the Sea to Bosansk~
Brod/ Politika25 March 1992,Annex.p. 60516)
In BosanskiBrodCroat ArmedFormations(HOSand
ZNG) and the Moslem"GreenBerets"entered the conflict with
Bosnian Serb territorial defence units.The town was shelled
from Slavonski Brod in Croatia.
The RepublicanMinistryof the lnteriorof B-Hdid not
try to preventinter-ethnicconfiicts(M. Duric,Opetsukobi i barikade,
/Conflicts and BarricadesAgainl Politika,2 April 1992, Annex.p. 60819)
In Bijeljina therewere armed conflicts after Moslem
armed formationshaderected barricadesinthe streets. (p. Sirnic,
Gradske borbe u BijeljiniIFighting in the City in BijeljinalPolitika,2 Aprii
1992,Annex.p. 61112)
On 3 April 1992 in Mostar a terrorist action was
carried out when a cistern loaded with grenades and left in
front of the JNA barracks "Mostarskibataljon"exploded. Great
material damage was caused and a number of soldiers and
civiiians injured.(Cisternaje bila napunjena granatama,/Tank Truck
Filledwith Shellsl Politikia,5 April 1992,Annex.p. 61415)
1.9.46. SerbswerefleeingB-Hto Serbia.InApril1992
tens ofthousands of refugeesfrom B-HarrivedinSerbia. (~irjana
Kuburovic, Ratase svi plase IEverybody Is Afraid of Warl Politika7 April
1992, Annex.p.61819)
1.9.47. TheSDSleaderDr.Karadzic,the SDAleader
Alija lzetbegovic arid the HDZ leader M. Brkic signea a
DeclarationontheHumanitarianTreatmentof DisplacedPersonsin Sarajevoon 1 1 April1992. The Declarationstated:
"Consideringthe particularproblems of displaced
persons inBosnia-Herzegovina,
"Acknowledgingthat they were compelled to leave
their homesasa resultoftheconflict intension which affect the
neighbouringrepublicsandsomeareasof Bosnia-Herzegovina
and which continueto generatenewdisplacement ..,..
I,1111111II<I..I.
To support the initiativeto establish a tripartite commission
between the Republicof Croatia, theRepublicof Bosniaand
Herzegovinaand UNHCR to defineprinciples,guaranteesand
proceduresaimedatfacilitatingthe returnof displaced persons
to the RBpublicof Croatia
..,........."(S/2383 p.12,Annexp . 622)
TheDeclaration bears witnesstothe fact thatthefirst
victimsof ethniccleansingwereSerbs.Theterm"neighbouring
republics"couldreferonlyto Croatia,andthe term"someareas
of Bosnia-Herzegovinac "ouldonlyrefertoWesternHerzegovina
from whereSerb villagershad beenexpelled.
1.9.48.Agreementsonanimmediatecease-firewere
signed on 12 Aprilandagainon23April1992by leadersofthe
threesides(Karadzic,lzetbegovicand Brkic),withthemediation
of the European Community.The Bosnian-Herzegovinian
Cease-fireAgreementof April 12, 1992readsas follows:
"Theleadersof thethreemainpartiesof Bosniaand
Herzegovina -aware ofthe extremelyserious situation now
prevailing inthe territoryof Bosniaand Herzegovina;
Solemnly agree: -To declare an immediateand total cease-fire on aIi
the territory of Bosniaand Herzegovina,starting on Sunday, 12
April at midnight.
- To stop1al1activities that can provoke fear and
instability among the population like the action of snipers and
the bombardment of Sarajevoand other towns and villages. All
house searches, barricades andgeneral arbitrary actio~s of al1
kinds should stop inimediately.
-Allthreateningartilleryshould be removedunderthe
control of the EC Monitorssimultaneously withthe suspension
of al1 mobilization. 'Thesetwo actions should start withjn 24
hours of the cease-fire.
-Todisband al1irregulararmedforces, inaccordance
with an agreed timetable, this will be conducted under the
supervision and control of the EC Monitors.
-Tostart inthe mosturgentwaywork on defining the
areas of the future constituent unitsof Bosnila and
Herzegovina.
- In this context the three main parties reaffirmtheir
opposition to anyterritorialgain by force and agree on the right
of return for the refugees, without adverseconsequences in
respectof employmentor otherwise.Thethreepartiesagreethat
al1partiesshould haveequalaccesstotelevision." (S123836,p.11,
Annex.p. 624)
With this Agreement,the three parties recognized ts
each other the statusof warring parties and confirmed control
over their armed forc:esand combat operations.TheAgreei-~icnt
also points to the main controversialissue among the parties:the future state organization , i.e. "defining the areas of the
future constituent units of Bosnia and Herzegovina". The
Agreementtestifies to the dissatisfactionof the Serb side over
the lack of access to SarajevoTelevision.
.1.9.49. Despite the cease-fire agreements, in April
1992 Ejup Ganic and Stjepan Kljujic as members of the B-H
Presidency,Juka Pusina,asassistantRepublicanMinisterofthe
lnterior ofB-H, Hasan Efendic former JNA Colonel, presently
Commander of the B-H territorial defence, FikretMuslimovic,
former JNA Lieutenant Colonel, and assistant security
command& of the B-Hterritorial defense,Jovan Divjak, Colonel
and member-ofthe Supreme Headquartersofthe B-Hterritorial
defense lzet Bajramovic called "Celo", and Jusuf Prazina, as
commandersof the "GreenBerets"ofthe B-Hterritorialdefence,
Jovica Berovic, investigator in B-H police, agreed to launch
armed attacks on militaryfacilities, unitsand officers and take
over weaponry and ammunition.To this effect, theyissued an
order to al1BLHterritorial defense paramilitformations,and in
late April and early Maystarted armed actions.The competent
militaryauthoritiesofYugoslaviapressedcharges againstthese
persons on the grounds of criminalact of armed rebellionand
war crimes.
1.9.50. Here are some of the actions carried out.
Croat forces and Muslim "Green Berets"attacked the JNA
barracks in Derventa. FiveSerb territorial defense members
were killedand seven otherswerewounded inthe attack.About
100 Serbs were imprisoned in the basementof the JNA Army
Club. (D. Kecman,Napad nakasarnuJNA u DerventiIAttack on the JNA
Barracks in DerventalPolitika, 26 April 1992,.. 62516)
A JNA ambulance vehicle was stolen. From that
vehicle the "Green Berets"in Sarajevoopened fire on the townand passengersat the bus station.The media attributed the
attackto JNA.Firewasalsoopened bothfrom thatvehicleand
from the mosqueat the militaryhospital inSarajevo.
The road to Butmir airport was blocked and two
nearbymosqueswereusedforsurveillanceandfor openingfire
on the airport.
Inthe morningof 30April1992,a terrorist attackwaç
carried out against threeJNA soldiers in a cafe opposite the
Command of the SecondArmy District. Predrag Ninkov and
Sasa Urosevicwere killed. Anothersoldier and a 13-yearold
child were severelyinjured. A memberof the "Green Berets"
called Pavijanopened fire on the mentionedpersonswithout
any reason.
On2 May1992,a directall-outattackon al1the JNA
units started. lzet Bajramoviccalled "Celo"was ordered to
attack with his unit JNAcentreinSarajevo. He did it around
11:30 a.m.supportedby theunitcommanded by JukaPrazina,
a well-knowncriminal.Six personswerewounded in the JNA
centre.
On the same day around 1 p.m. a motor vehicle
transportingfood fromthe "MarsalTito"barracksin Sarajevoto
the barracks of the Second Army District Command was
attacked, on ,which occasion Colonel Goran Belic,who was
sitting next to the driver, was heavily injured, while Goran
Divovic,the driver,was killed.
1.9.51.Inthemorningof 2 May 1992, Moslemarmed
formations attackedthe buildingof the JNAcentrein Sarajevo.
Inthe buildingtherewasa smallnumberof JNAmembers,who
soon found themselves in a difficult situationas they werelargely outnumbered by the enemy. They requested
reinforcement. Reinforcementtroops set off from the Second
Army District Commandbetween12:30and 1 p.m. The troops
consisted of military police units headed by Colonel Milan
Suput. The column was moving along DobrovoljackaStreet -
Skenderija - ObalaVojvode StepeStreet -the Drvenijabridge -
the JNAcentre.WhilemovingalongObalaVojvodeStepeStreet
in the direction of the JNA centre,the JNA unit was blocked at
a point parallelto the "Djuro Djakovic"TechnicalCollege. Near
the MainPostOfficeinfrontofthecolumntherewasa barricade
of containers. The column could not withdraw because behind
it, at the end of ObalaVojvode Stepe Street,there was a public
transport tram around which there were cheval-de-fises. A
missilewas fired from a bazookafrom behind the barricadeon
the first JNA transporter,with SergeantMagazinin it. After that
the B-H territorial defence members opened fire from the
neighboring buildingson the column. Respondingto the attack,
JNA members divided into two groups taking positions in the
neighboring buildings. Onegroup with ColonelSuput, Captain
SrdjanPetrovicandCaptainMiodragMarkovictookthe passage
inthe building of the Technical College, whilethe second group
with Corporals Dragan Stepanovic,BojanJovanovic and Milan
Kontic took a building nearbythe Main PostOffice.
lmmediatelyafterthe attackon ColonelSuput's unit,
another military police unit set off from the military hospital in
two "Pinzgauer"vehicles (registratio'nplate4319,with Captain
Marko Labudovic, Colonels Obrad Gvozdenovic and lvica
Cvetkovic, Soldiers BrankoPopovic,Srdjan Nikolic,Aleksandar
Blagojevic,RadosPajovicand Milan Pejic;and registrationplate
P-3535,with ColonelNihad Kastrati,CorporalDragan Maticand
soldiers Dragan Lazukic, MladenNikolic, Kruno Beslic,Dragan
Glamocanin and Dragoslav Nikolic and two "Citroen"
ambulances.Atthe invitationof ColonelSuputthis unitset off tounblock the surrounded JNA members and to rescue the
wounded. However, as soon as it arrived in Obala Vojvode
Stepe Street,the unit was attacked.Thefront vehicle driven by
Colonel Obrad Gvozdenovicwasshot by an anti-armour missile
because of which it turned to the tram rails and ran into an
electric mine. Colonel Gvozdenovicburned in the vehicle.After
that,fire wasopened from al1directionson JNAmembers.Since
they were in a hopeless situation Captain Labudovic shsuted
that theywere surreridering, butMoslemspaid no attentionto it
and continued opening even more intensefire.
In a three hour fight most soldiers from Captain
Labudovic'sgroup werekilled.Duringthat time,ColonelSuput's
group successfully rejectedthe attackâ until the next morning,
on 3 May 1992, when they were deceived and captured.
Namely, that morning Colonel Suput agreed with the Moslem
Commander that soldiers and officers be enabled to return to
the Command,andwhen theygatheredinthe TechnicalCollege
building, Moslem soldiers disarmed thém and took them to
prison. Moslemforces usedchernicalweaponsinthe attacks gr!
Colonel Suput's unit.
In the fighting on 2 May 1992the following persons
were killed: Captain Marko Labudovic, Colonellvica Cvetkovic,
Colonel Obrad Gvo2!denovic,Colonel Nihad Kastrati, soldiers
RadosPajovic,AleksandarBlagojevic,MladenNikolic,Slobodan
Jelic, Predrag Cerovic, MiodragDjuric,Srecko Jovanovic, lvica
Simic, Dragan Vitkovic, Kruno Beslic, Perica Novic and Branko
Popovic.
1.9.52. A inechanizedJNA column with officers and
soldiers from the garrnison of the Second Army District
Command was attacked in Sarajevo on 3 May 1992. 1-he
evacuation was cariried out on the basis of an agreementbetweenAlijalzetbegovicandJNA. Theagreementwas reached
with the mediation of UNPROFOR and the EC Mission.
UNPROFORparticipated inthe organizationof the evacuation.
Despitethis, paramilitaryformationsofthe Ministryof the lnterior
and the Territorial Defenceof Bosnia-Herzegovinaopened fire
in Dobrovoljacka Streetaround 6 p.m. on the column after the
vehicle carryingAlija lzetbegovic andt.-Gen.Milutin Kukanjac
had passed. Although no one in the column had given any
motive for theattack, theyforcedoldiersand officersto get out
of the vehicles, strippedthemto their underpants,ordered them
to lay on the asphaltwith their faces to the ground and kicked
them, hit them with rifle butts and shot at them as they laid
there. On this occasion they killed Colonels Dr. Budimir
Radulovic,MiroSokic, GradimirPetrovic,Bosko Mihajlovic,and
Lt.Colonel BoskoJovanovic,soldierZdravkoTomovicandSuko
Normel, a civilian employee of the JNA. The attackers
interrogated someof the officerswhile theylaid on the ground
and shot at them with small arms seriouslywounding Colonel
Ratko Katalin. Members of UNPROFORand the EC Mission
watched what was happening. Colonels Hasan Efendic and
Jovan Divjak watched what theirtroops were doing the whole
time but did not intervene.The paramilitaryformations of the
Bosnia-HerzegovinaTerritorial Defence then took about 200
officersand soldiersto the policeheadquarterswheretheywere
mistreated and interrogatedby people commanded by lvica
Berovic, inthe presenceof GoranMilic,TVdirector. Oneof the
captured soldiers was taken out and murdered in the cellar,
while lnspector lvica Berovic interrogated Colonel Slavoljub
Belosevic for 36 hours without interruption, hitting him with
truncheons and a pistol inthe face,the kidneysand other parts
of his body. Groupsof civilianswereallowed intotheprisonand
spat,pushedand kickedColonel Belosevic,causing himto lose
consciousness several times. They then took him to another
room, turnedon a strong light and shoneit in his eyes,bringingit to within two to three centimeters withinhis eyes. Iheÿ heid
him likethis for 11 hourswithouta break, hitting him ail over his
body. Hiseyeswereswollen up and he could not see anything
forseveraidays (Minutesfrom the hearingof SlavoljubBelosevicbefore
the investigativejudge C)ragoslavRakicinthe District Courtin Belgradeon
13 March 1995, Annex. P. 639, Major General Lewis MacKenzie,
Peacekeeper, Douglas & Mclntyre, Vancouver/Toronto 1993, pages
164-171, Annex. p. 649)
1.9.53. Atthe sametime shotswerefired from nearby
mosques and other buildings at the Sarajevomilitary hospital.
The 9th floor of the hospital was damaged. Parallelwith these
attacks,small armsf'irewasopened on the Rajlovacaerodrome
from the mosque in Sokolje, Sarajevo, in which paramiiitary
formations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina TerritorialDefenceforce
had placed a machine-gunnest.
1.9.54. Representatives of the Presidency 9:
Bosnia-Herzegovinaand the JNA,underthe sponsorship of the
personal representaitivesof Lord Carringtonand the headof the
EC Monitoring MissiionB-H, have agreed a cease-fire to taka
effect immediately in Sarajevo and elsewhere in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaon 5thof May1992.All sides inthe conflict
are urged to suppoirtthe cease-fire. (Focus: Documents 92 p. 88,
Annex. p. 658) ln spi'te of the withdrawai decision of the FRY
Presidency and the cease-fire agreement, Muslim armed
formations continued their attacks on JNA units as they
withdrew. (R.K. Borbe posle masakra IFighting after the Massacre1
Politika,5 May 1992, Annex.p. 659160,D. Stevanovic,Napadnuta kasarna
"MarsalTito" /"Marsha1Tito"Army Barracks under Attackl Plotika,31 May
1992, Annex.p. 66213)
1.9.55. At7:00 p.m. on 15 May 1992, in Skojevska
Street in Tuzlathe lastJNA column was attacked as it withdrewfromthebarracks.Inspiteofthe agreementconcludedbetween
Moslem authoritieandJNAon safawithdrawalseveraldozens
of JNA memberswerekilledin the attack.
1.9.56ThebattlefortheMarsalTitobarracksandthe
SecondaryQuartermaster School inSarajevorecommencedon
30 May 1992. The soldiers, surroundedby "Green Beretsu
appealedto UNPROFOR for help.
1.9.57.It was obvious that JNA was attacked by
Moslem and Croat forces controlled by theGovernmentin
Sarajevoandthat thoseattackssloweddown andhindered the
withdrawalof JNAfrom theregion.Theattackscontinuedeven
afterthedecisionoftheYugoslavPresidencyonthe withdrawal
ofJNAmembers,citizensoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,
and after the decision of the Presidencyo4 May 1992 to
acceleratethewithdrawal,aswellasdespiteseveralagreements
on cease fire and agreements on concrete actions of
evacuationof JNAfrom certain facilities.is evident fromthe
abovethat JNAwas notthe attacker,but the attacked.
1.IO The emergenceof new states inthe territoryof the
former Yugoslav republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina
1.10.1.The almost simultaneousemergence of
several ne,wstatesinthe former Yugoslavrepublic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina reflectethe referendumof29 Februaryand
1 March 1992, showing that only majority of Moslems and
Croatsin Bosniaand Herzegovina wanted to çecede from the
SocialistFederal Republiof Yugoslavia,but notto establisha
commonstate. 1.10.2. The Serbianpeople in the former Yugosiav
republic of 6-H, subjected to terror by the Moslem-Croat
coalition in the republican government, remembering the
genocide against it in World War Two, was concerned with
reasonthat thegenocidecouldhappenagain,which eventually
was the case. The Serbian people established its state the
Republicof Srpska.
1.10.3. The Croatianpeople inthe former Yugoslav
republic of Bosniaand Herzegovinawanted to secede from
Yugoslavia, but not to remain in an Islamic state of B-H. It
wanted to have as tight ties as possible with Croatia and
therefore establisheditsstateof Herzeg-Bosnia,which became
economicaly,monetaryand militaryintegral partof Croatia.
1.10.4. Allija lzetbegovic and other SDA leaeers
wantedto transform theformer Yugoslav republicof Bosniaand
Herzegovina into aln integral lslarnic state. This idea was
opposed not only bqy the Serbs and the Croatsin the former
Yugoslav republic of 8-H, but also by part of the Mosio~
populationinWesternBosnia. Thus, asa resultoftheresistarrce
against lslamic fundamentalismas a state ideology, a fourth
state emerged in the region: the Autonomous Provinceof
Western Bosnia,led by FikretAbdic.
1.Il. Tho establishmentof the BosnianSerb Republic
1.11.1. In reaction tothe firstsignals coming from
Muslim and Croat political organizations on the possible
secessionof theSocialistRepublicof Bosnia-Herzegovinafrom
the SFRY,during 1991 the Serbpeople inBosnia-Herzegovina
setup a numberof Serbautonomous regions: Bosnian Krajina,
Romanija,Herzegovina,Semberija and Northern Bosnia.Theyshowed in this way that they would not remain in an
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1.11.2. The SDS and the Serbian Movement of
Renewal(SPO)clubs inthe Bosnia- Herzegovinaparliament, as
the legitimate representatives of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,decided at a meeting held on 24 October
1991 to found a parliament of the Serb people in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, on the basis of the constitutional right to self-
determination. This was done after the session ofthe SR B-H
Assembly withan insufficientnumberof deputies presenton 14
October 1991, when the Memorandumand the Platformwere
adopted which started the legal secession of SR B-H from
Yugoslavia. (Decisionon the Establishmentof the Assemblyof the Serb
People in 6-Hl Annex.p. 667)
1.11.3. At its session on 24 October 1991, the
parliamentof the Serbpeople in Bosnia-Herzegovina,acting on
the constitutional rightto self-determination,adopted acision
that the Serbpeople in Bosnia-Herzegovina would remaininthe
common state of Yugosiavia. (Decisionof the Serb Peopleof B-Hto
Remainin the Common Stateof Yugoslavia,Annex.p671)
1.11.4. The parliament of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaorganizeda plebiscite of the Serb people
in Bosnia-Herzegovinaon9 and 10November1991. 1,162,032
Serbs and 48,895 non-Serbs voted in favour of remaining in
Yugosiavia (MuharemDuric,Bosnaostaje uJugoslaviji/Bosnia Remains
in Yugoslavial Politika, 13 November 1991, Annex,67213,Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Defense and Foreign Affaires Handbook, London, 1994,
Annex. p.410)
1.11.5. The parliament of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaadopted a Declarationon the proclamationof the Republic of the Serb Peoplein Bosnia-Herzegovinaon 9
January 1992. The Declaration said: On the basis of the
plebiscite of 9 and 10 November1991 atwhich Serbsvoted in
favour of remaining in the common state of Yugoslavia, the
Republic of the Serb Peoplein Bosnia-Herzegovinais founded
and proclaimed in the territories of the Serb autonomous
regions and areas and other Serb ethnic territories in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,including those areas in which the Serb
people became a rninority in World War II(Declarationon the
Proclamationof the Republicof the Serb PeopleofAnnex.p. 681)
1.11.6. The parliament of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaadopted the constitution of the Bosnian
Serb Republic on 28 February1992. (Decisionon the Promulgation
of the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Annex. p. 691, The
Constitutionof thepiiblicof Srpska,Annex.p. 692)
1.11.7. The BosnianSerb Republicfounded its army
on 13 May 1992 and appointed General Ratko Mladic its
Commander.. (SI 24049,Annex.p. 695)
1.11.8. The parliament of the Serb people in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaadopted a declaration on the state and
politicalorganization of the Bosnian Serb Republic, which
defined the name of'the state as "Republika Srpska".
1.11.9. Annex II of the Report on the situation of
human rights in the territoryof the formerYugoslaviasubmitted
by Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Speciai Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to para.14 of
Commission resolution 1992JS-111 of 14 August 1992
(ElCN.411992lS-112,8 August 1992,p.18,Annex.p. 7says:
"MO'S?observers agree that the'Serbian Republic ofBosnia-Werregovina': dr-idurrrecognizauguvernmentproclaimed
when Bosriia-,t.ierz ..r_to\/iaei;iared iis iridependence from
Yugoslavia against the wi.îhi;s of the Serbian population,
controls between 50 and 70 percerit of the territory. The
headquarters of the 'Serbian Republicof Bssnia-Herzegovina'
is located in the ciiy uf Pale.a stiodistance from Sarajevo,the
besieged capital of Bosiiia-Herzegovina.it iscornprisedof four
'autonomot~sregions',one of wfiich, BanjaLuka, was visited by
the Special Rapporteur,. ."
1.1 1.1Q.This report cleariy describestheexistenceof
unrecognized but indapendentStates.
1.1 1.11. 7fie Security Çouncil indirectly recognized
the existence of the Bosriiari SeerbRepublic when it applied
against it measairesiinder Cilaptet Vil of the U.N. Charter in
Resolution 942 (1994), clated23 Septer-riber1 994 (Annex.p. 702).
Like many previuijs resslutions, tnisresolution described the
Bosnian Ser u Repiiblrc as "the Bosrii~:?Serb party".Paragraph
14 of the Resortifi~~iisr:xe:;
"Decides il-iasic,:essiiaii preventhe entry into their
territoriesof:
"(a) rlie rneri-!bersof iiie authorities, including
legislative authorities, it~ :hose arc-.asof the Republic of .
Bosnia-Herzegoviriarlnder the coidrol of Bssnian Serb forces
and officers ut the Rosiiian Se1.h rnil~taryand paramilitary
forces...".
The Secilr.i:y Voi~ncil recoyi~izedthe existence of
authorities, includirig legis!aiiveautiloritiesand also military
forces, as weil as Thc iact iiiat i!~ lattecoritrolled territory,
which are precor~ditioi~s f~rthe exi~tei-~c;of aslate. 1.11.12.In concluding many agreements with the
Serb side, startingon 11April 1992,the Applicant recognized
the formeras a partyto the conflict (awarringparty).
TheBosnianSerb Republic is one ofthe participants
in the Conferenceon1 Yugoslavia.
1.12.The establishmeno tfthe80-calledRepubllcof
Bosnla-Herzegovina
1.12.1.On 20 December1991 the governmentof
Bosnia-Herzegovina decidedby a majorityof votesto submitto
the Ministerialounci~olfthe EuropeanCommunity a requestfor
the international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an
independentstate.The SDSmembers ofthe government voted
againstthis decision.(DecisionontherecognitionofstatehOfficiai
GazetteSRB-H, 1991,No. 37,p. 1085, Annep.709)
1.12.2. On 20 December 1991,the Presidencyof
Bosnia-Herzegovina decidedby a majorityof votesto submit a
request to the European Communities for the recognition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina ;asa sovereign state(Decisionon Submitting
a Request for thRecognitionof the SocialistRepublicof Bosnia and
Herzegovinaasan tndependentState,OfficialGazSRt6-H, 1992,No.
4,p. 96, Annexp. 71)
1.12.3.AtanSDSpressconferenceinSarajevoon 20
December1991,Dr.Koljevicand Dr.Plavsicsaidthat theyhad
not agreed with the vote taken in the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Presidencyto seek recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
sovereignstate. (~uharemDuric,ZajednoilideobeITogetheror DividedlPolitika,21 December1991,Annex.p. 713)
1.12.4. At a session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
parliament in Sarajevoon 24 and 25 January 1992,a decision
was taken to organize a referendumasking citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovinawhetheror nottheywanted Bosnia-Herzegovinato
be a sovereign state. This decision was adopted against the
opposition of the Serb deputies. SDS PresidentDr. Karadzic
said atthe parliamentarysession:"WewantBosnia-Herzegovina
to be transformed so that Serbs will have strong links with
Yugoslavia, Croats with Croatia and Muslims with Yugoslavia
and with Croatiaas much as they want.It does not haveto be
Yugoslavia, it can be a Serb federation. What we are offering
can not be more honest: every people to determine itself its
position vis-a-vis any other people, to have a its own
government and maintainits sovereignty. Bosnia-Herzegovina
should be acceptableto al1three peoples.Onlythen should we
hold a referendum. That is the only way to avoid any
undesirable effects,to calm down the peoples and to let them
start living normallyat l..."
The discussion in the Assembly showed that there
was readinessto acceptthedecisionthatfirstthe regionalization
of Bosniaand Herzegovina,acceptableto allthethree peoples,
should be agreed, on and then organizea referendum.When it
seemed that the agreement was at hand, Alija lzetbegovic
refused to agree on a regionaltransformationof B-Hand then
organizea referendum,andproposedinsteadthattheAssembly
should vote immediatelywhetherit accepted the decision on a
referendum. After the deputy Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic said on
behalf of the Serb deputy club that for Serb deputies it was
unacceptable to put the decision on the referendum on the
agenda, and that they would withdraw if it was done, lrfan
Ajanovic, Vice Presidentof the Assembly ofSFRYand one ofthe SDA leaders, threatenedto act in the same way as on 14
October 1991, when the Assembly of SR B-H adopted the
Platform and the Memorandum without the presence of SDS
deputies. This is exactly what happened. The decision on
referendum was iricluded in the agenda, Serb deputies
withdrew, and the Assembly adopted the decision. (Muharem
Duric, Odluka O referendumu bez srpskih poslanika /Decision on
Referendumwithout SêrrDeputiesl Politika26 January 1992,Annex. p.
71516)
1.12.5. The referendum in which
Bosnia-Herzegovina's citizens were asked if they wanted a
sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovinawas held on 29 Februaryand 1
March 1992. The Serb people abstained from voting at the
referendum. The results of the referendumwere not officially
pu blished(Bosnia-Herzegovin, efenseandForeignAffairesHandbook,
London, 1994,.135,Annex.p. 410)
1.12.6. Although the internationalstandards had not
been fulfilled, the tfuropean Community recognized Bosnia-
Herzegovinaas a sovereignstateon 6 April 1992. Othersta8es
followed suit. At the moment of recognition, the republican
government in Sarajevo controlled only a small part of the
territory of Republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina.The Bosnian Serb
Republic was emerging in the sameterritoryand was in armed
conflict with the government in Sarajevo. Those who decided
on the recognitionf Bosnia-Herzegovinamusthaveknownthat
6 April1941 wasthe date onwhich NaziGermanyhad bombed
Belgrade and began its attackon Yugoslavia,without declaring
war. (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Defense and Foreign Affaires Handbook,
London, 1994,p.135,Annex.p. 410)
1.12.7. Lord Carrington, Co-chairman of the
InternationalConferenceon the FormerYugoslavia, said on 26September 1992that the recognition of Croatia, Slovenia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina by European Community and other
countries had been premature. (PriznanjeBosne tragicna greska
/Recognition of Bosni-a Tragic Mistakel Politika,27 September 1992,
Annex.p. 720)
1.12.8. TheFrenchPresident,Mitterrand,pointed out
several times that the recognitionof the so-called Republicof
Bosnia and Herzegovinahad been premature. (Un entretienavec
M. FrancoisMitterrand,Le Mond,9 fevrier 1993, Annex.p. 721)
1.12.9. Presidentof the Foreign PolicyCommitteeof
the RussianParliamentAmbarcumovstated that the premature
recognition particularly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
responsible for the deteriorationof the Yugoslavcrisis and the
outbreak of the war. (Statementto Globus5 March 1993, Annex.p.
722)
1.12.10. Former US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger wrotein an articlepublished intheLosAngeles Times
on 16 May1993:"lt is importantto realizethat Bosniahas never
been a separate nation and that there is no distinct Bosnian
cultural identity.The most irresponsiblemistake ofthe current
tragedy was international recognition of a Bosnian state
governed by Muslims, blindly following the precedent of
Germany's hasty recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. But
whereas CroatiaandSloveniahadtheirown identity,Bosniawas
a Yugoslavia in microcosm.
"lt is a mystery howanyone could even think that
Croats and Serbs, unwilling to stay together in the larger
Yugoslavia, could be induced to create a joint statein Bosnia
together with Moslems they hated for centuries." (Henry A.
Kissinger, LosAngelesTimes,16 May 1993,Annexp. 729) 1.12.11. US Secretaryof State,Christophersaid that
the premature rec:ognition of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovinacaused the civil war.(StatementtUS Today, 17June
1993, Annex.. 734)
1.12.12. Former ltalian ForeignMinisteDe Michelis
has also pointed to the premature recognition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Statementto the "L'Europeo"June 1993,
Annex.p. 741)
1.12.13. FormerFrenchForeignMinisterDumassaid
that the premature recognitionwas a mistake.(Statementto AFP,
20 June 1993, Annex.p. 744)
1.12.14. Annex II of the Report on the situation ~f
human rights in the territoryof the formerYugoslaviasubmitted
by Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 14 of
Commission resolution 1 99215- 11 of 14 August 1 992,
(E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9,28August 1992,p. 18, Annex.psays:)
"Threeseparateregions are underthe control of the
Governmentof Bosnia-Herzegovina,narnely,part of the capital,
Sarajevo; the region known as Bihac, adjacent to the border
with Croatia in northwest Bosnia; and parts of central Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Much of the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not under the control of the recognized
Government."
1.12.15. It is clear that the recognition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred contrary to the rules of
international law. The secessionist governmentcontrolled orilya small part of the territory ofthe former Yugoslavrepublic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.Inaddition, this governmentwas alsovery
unstable, whichcould be seen not only in the fact thatit was in
conflict withthe BosnianSerbRepublic,but also inthe constant
clashesand effortsto resolveproblemsin relationsbetweenthe
Muslim andCroat representatives. As well as the Bosnian Serb
Republic, two other new independent states emerged in this
process: Herzeg-Bosnia under Croat control; and the
Autonomous Provinceof WesternBosniaunder the control of
Muslim leader FikretAbdic, who had brokenwith Izetbegovic.
1.13.Theestablishment of Herzeg-Bosnia
1.13.1. The Croat Communityof Herzeg-Bosniawas
establishedon 19November1991inthe Herzegovinacommune
of Grude. It was conceivedof asa political, economic, cultural
and territorialentitycomprising communespopulatedmostly by
Croats: Kresevo,BusovacaV , itez,NoviTravnik, KiselFojnica,
Skender Vakuf, Kakanj, Vares, Kotor Varos, Tomislavgrad,
Posusje,Mostar,Siroki Breg, Grude, Ljubuski,Citluk, Capljina,
Neum and Stolac, and the commune of Ravno in Trebinje.
Mostar wasproclaimedthe capital of Herzeg-Bosnia.
1.13.2. On July 4, 1992 the independent state
community under the name of Herzeg-Bosniawas formed.
(Hrvati u BiH proglasili svoju posebnu drzavu ICroats in B-H
Proclaim Their Own Separate Statej Politika, July 6, 1992,
Annex. p. 74718, Bosnia-Herzegovina,Defense and Foreign
Affaires Handbook, London, 1994,p. 136,Annex,p. 410)
1.13.3. On Saturday, August27, 1993,the Bosnian
Croats proclaimed their ownstate within the framework ofthe
future Bosnian-Herzegovinian Union, "the Republic ofHerzeg-Bosnia."A decision was brought on the constitution of
the assem bly of the new Republic. (ProglasenaRepublikaHerzeg-
Bosna/Fiepublicof Herzeg-BosnaProclaimedlPolitika,August 28, 1993)
1.14. The establishmentof the AutonomousProvince
of WesternBosnia
1.14.1. At the sessionof the constituent assemblyin
Velika Kladusaon September 27, 1993a decision was brought
on the proclamation of the Autonomous Province of Western
Bosnia. Fikret Abdic, former memberof the B-H Presidency,
was elected President. The majority of the population ir; this
region of Western Bosniais of Muslimnationality.The Province
was constituted due to the discontentof the populationand its
disagreement with A. Izetbegovic's manner of rule as they
believed that he introduced lslamicfundamentalism.
1.14.2. TheauthoritiesoftheAutonomousProvinces of
Western Bosniawere in a state of constant armedconflict with
the forces ofA. lzetbegovic untilthe end of August 1994,when
they were militarily defeated and which resulted in the
withdrawal of approximately 60,000 inhabitants, primarily of
Muslim nationality. The population withdrew because of the
terror andkilling of iciviliansby A. Izetbegovic'sforces. Thefact
that civilians were shot at was confirmed by UNPROFORin
Velika Kladusa.
1.14.3.A,few months later, the armed forces of the
Autonomous Provinceof WesternBosniasucceeded in getting
back the lost territory sothat the Muslimefugeeswere able to
return to their homes. 1.15.TheConstltutlon oftheMusllm-Croa tederatlon
, s
1.15.1.After many months of heavy and bloody
fighting between the Muslim and Croatianforces in Central
Bosnia, in 1993the Muslim governmentin Sarajevo sentan
appealfor an urgentmeetingofthe UNSecurityCouncilasking
the world orgafiization to prevent the open interferenceof
Croatia into the conflict inBosnia-HerzegovinaT , he Security
Council ordered thewithdrawalof the Croatianarmyfrom the
territoryof Bosnia-Herzegovinaandsetadead-line.However,in
mid-February1994whenthe Croatian army wastowithdraw,but
did not, news arrived of the creationof the Muslim-Croatian
federation.
1.15.2.In Washingtonin the State Departmentan
agreement was signed on March 2, 1994 between the
representatives of the Muslims and Croats from
Bosnia-Herzegovina on the unificationof Muslimand Croatian
territoriesin Bosniaand Herzegovinaintoafederationof ethnic
cantonswith a joint centralgovernmentalong with confederal
relationswith Croatia.(FrameworkAgreemnet,Annex.p. 752,Dusan
Pesic,FederacijaMuslimanai Hrvatau BosniIFederationof Muslimsand
Croats inosnial Politi3aMarch 1994Annex. p.77012)
1.5.3A .tanofficialceremonyintheWhiteHousein
Washington theFederationof BosnianCroatsand Muslimswas
formed. A separate declarationwas adopted containing the
principlesof confederationwith Croatia. u us PesicnStvorena
federacijasanskihHrvataiMuslimanIFederationofBosnianCroatsand
MuslimlPolitik19March 1994,Annex.p.77617)
1.15.4. On May 16, 1994 the beginning of the
operationof the joingeneral-staffof the joint Croatian-Muslim
Armywas marked inSarajevo. 1.15.5. Inreality,however,nottoo much was done in
the establishment of the new federation. Therefore, the
Agreementon the completecessationof hostilitiesof December
31, 1994 concludecj between the armed formations of the
Republic of Srpskai and Muslim armed formations at the
beginning of January was also signed by the military
commanders of the forces of Herzeg-Bosniaand the forces of
theAutonomous ProvinceofWesternBosnia. (ianTraynerUS Puts
Pressureon BosnianMuslimsand Croatsto StayTo gether and Keepthe
Serbs at bay, Guardian5 February1995,Annex.p. 782)
1.16. The ArmedConflict Between the BosaianMuslians
and BosnianCroats
1.16.1. During 1993 very severe fighting broke out
between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. These
conflicts took placeiricentralBosnia.TheMuslimmilitiafocliseci
its attacks in the regions of Kakanj,Travnik, Vitez and Mostar
from where it expelled more than 10,000 Croats from Cr~atian
villages.
1.16.2. The Security Council reviewed the conflicts.
The Security Council Presidents referred to them in the
statementsof 21 April 1993 (Sl25646,Annex.p. 78410 May 1993
(S125746A, nnex.p. 78514September 1 993 (S126437, nnex.p. 787),
9 November 1993 (SI26716, Annex.p. 789and 3 February 1994
(S/PRST/1994/6,Annex.p. 791).
1.16.3. Croatian refugeeswere passing through the
territory of the Republic of Srpska at that time on their way to
Croatia.On that occasion they received aid infood. (U centrainoj
Bosni zestoko/Fierce Fi'ghtinCentral Bosnial Polit4kJune 1533,
Annex.p. 79213,Hrvatisesklanjajukod SrbaISerbsGiveShelterto CroatslPolitika, 9 June 1993, Annex.p. 79516,Muslim Forces Plunder Bosnian
CroatVillages,the WashingtonPost,June 17, 1993,Annex.p.799,Bosnian
Muslim'Gains MayHigh Cast,TheWashingtonPost,September12,1993,
Annex. p;801)
1.'17.CONCLUSIONSCONCERNINGTHE FACTS
1.17.1. Serbs have been living as a people in the
territory of Bosniaand Herzegovinafor centuries.
1.17.2. Thestatusof Serbswho lived inthe Ottoman
state was worse than that of colonial peoples. They were
subjected to the acts of genocide, which was legitimate and
known as the tribute in blood: forcible taking away of Serb
children from theirfamiliesto the centresof the Ottomanstate,
conversion of those children into Islamand their training so as
to become Turkish soldiers, notoriousjanissaries.
1.17.3. During World War Two, the Serbs from
Bosnia-Herzegovinaweresubjectedto genocideatthe handsof
the Croato-Muslimfascistcoalitionin Bosnia-Herzegovinawhich
was then an integral part of the collaborationist lndependent
State of Croatia.Several hundred thousand of Serbs perished
at that time, which brought about a change in the ethnic
composition of certain partsof Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1.17.4. At the first multi-party elections in
Bosnia-Herzegovinain 1990,the DemocraticAction Partywon
the support of the overwhelmingmajorityof Muslims.This party
had been founded by Alija lzetbegovic who expounded his
religiousand politicaldeasin his"lslamicDeclaration"which hewroteand distributedillegallyin 1970and officiallypublishedin
Sarajevoin 1990.A.Izetbegovic'spoliticalgoalwastotransform
Bosnia-Herzegovina intoan lslamicstate.
1.17.5. At the first multi-party elections in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaa , n overwhelming majority of roatsvoted
for the CroatianDemocratic Communityw , hich was controlled
by Franjo Tudjman and pursued his policy, aimed at
dismemberingYugoslaviaandcreatinganindependentCroatian
state and, in doing so, theyfelt no qualmsabout usingfascist
symbolsand relyingon Croatianfascist emigres.
1.17.6Aninformalcoalitionofthe Democratic Action
Partyand the Croatian Democratic Communitw yasconstituted
within the government of the Yugoslav federal un@ of
Bosnia-Herzegovina a.ndal1relevantdecisions,includingthose
regardingthe proclamationof independence,were brought by
the majorityvote of the representatives of those two parties,
contrary to the republican constitution and law in force ir,
Bosnia-Herzegovina~
1.17.7. As the political representatives ofthe Serb
people in Bosnia-Herzegovina saidthatthe Serbswereagainst
the breakawayof Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslaviaand as
they refusedto remain withinan independentand autonomous
Bosnia-Herzegovina,they were demonized in the media,
harrassedand physicallymistreated, while there werefrequent
acts of terrorism againstthe YugoslavPeople'sArmy and its
lawful and legitimate operations, whiie the Serb civilian
populationwasattackedbythe Croatian regularandparamilitary
units in theareas borderingon Croatia. At the sametime, the
Muslim authoritiesin Sarajevoprepared illegal organizational
plansandarmedthe PatrioticLeagueunitsto denyby force the
Serbs theirrightto self-determination. 1.17e8eTheafore-mentionedhistoricarleasons,aswell
as the actualpoliticalsituationin Bosnia-Herzegovifollowing
thefirst multi-partyelections, constitddefacto basisforthe
Serb people in Bosnia- Herzegovinato exercise theirlegitimate
rights stemming from the principle of equal rights and
self-determinationof peoples.
1.17,Q.On the other hand,therewere no legitimate
reasonsfor the Muslimsand Croatsin Bosnia-Herzegovina to
make a claim for théforming of an independent stateand to
secede from Yugoslavia.They joined, together with Bosnian
Serbs,the Kingdomof Serbiaoftheir ownfreewill in 1918 and,
byexercisingtheirrighttoself-determination, roclaimedatthat
time by U.S.President Woodrow Wilson ,reatedthe Kingdom
of Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes together with the Kingdomof
Serbiaand the Kingdomof Montenegro.The Muslimsliving in
thatKingdomwereprotectedby statuteas a religiousminority.
1.17.10.AfterWorldWarTwo,the Serbs, Muslims and
Croats in Bosniaand Herzegovinawere constitutedas equal
peopleswithin aseparatefederal uni- Bosnia-Herzegovina T.he
status of Muslimswas thus promoted intothat of a people.
Muslims and Croats were proportionally representedin al1
agenciesof governmentand enjoyedfull freedomof political,
economic, religiousand cultural developmentTherefore, they
had noreasonwhatsoeverto invoketheprincipleofequal rights
andself-determinationof peoplesinorderto demand secession
from Yugoslavia.
1.17.11.Latein 1991and earlyin 1992,the political
representativesof the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina
soughtto reacha democratic and peacefus lettlementso asto
accommodatethe interestsof al1threepeoplesby meansof a
mutual divisionuf territoryand the transformationof Bosnia-Herzegovina into a loose federation or confederation.
Unfortunately, the Muslim leadership did not accept these
proposals, convinceclthat it would establish its authorit- by
force and with the help of the countries that supported i- on
the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, evenin the areas in
which the Serbs were the majority population. lzetbegovic
reiterated on several occasions that a united and indivisible
Bosnia-Herzegovina lwasmoreimportantto himthan peace. He
thus violated the prinlcipleof equal rightsand self-determination
of peoples,the aim of which istomaintainpeacefuland frienclly
relations among peoples.
1.17.12. Shots at a Serb wedding party on 1 March
1992 on the day lof the referendum on an independent
Bosnia-Herzegovina,fired by a numberof Muslims,markedthe
outbreak of fighting between the three peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
1.17.13. Despitethe fact that the international legal
requirements for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an
independent state had not been satisfied, certain countries
proceeded to grant such recognition in contravention of the
rules of internationalllaw,thus inteferingin the interna1affairsof
the Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslavia.
1.17.14. A,lmostat the same time two states were
created in the territory of the former Yugoslav republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina:the Republic of Srpska and the Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegoviria.
1.17.15. As the Muslim-Croatian coalition was
constituted solely ori their common policy against the Serb
peopleand asthe Croatsin Bosnia- Herzegovinaneverwarited
to live in an lslamic state,this coalition soon fell 00,CDCD
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n>o?3ZP LAW
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONREGARDING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OFTHEAPPLICATION
FirstPrellminaryObjection
A.1.The existenceof civilwarat the materlaltlme renders
the Applicationinadmissible
A.1.1.The circumstances which constutute the
background againstwhich the'Submissions'of the Memorial
are formulated, inso far as the 'Submissions'may be said to
relateto th1948GenocideConvention (Which isdeniedbythe
Respondent State),are dominated by elementsof civistrife
and, consequently, no internationaldispute is involved sver
which the Courtcan properlyexeciseits cornpetence.
A.1.2.The protagonists in reality are the four
contending politicalelementswithin theterritoryof the former
Republicof Bosniaand Herzegovina:the Bosnian Serbs, the
BosnianCroats,the Muslimfollowersof Mr.lzetbegovicandthe
Muslim group which opposes Mr. Izetbegovic. Second preliminary objection
A.2. Alljalzetbegovicwas notcompetentto Issue
authorlzationfor the lnitlatlonof proceedingsbefore the
Court
A.2.1.Pursuantto itsConstitution,theApplicantState
is represented in international relations the Presidency as a
collective head of state. The decision on the initiation of
proceedings beforethe InternationalCourtofJusticeandon the
designation of its agents could have been only taken by the
Presidency as a collective organ or by the Government rather
than by the Presidentof the Presidency.
A.2.2. Pursuantto Art. 219 of the Constitutionof the
so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina:
"The Presidency of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinashall:
"1) represent the Republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina;
"2) consider issues regardingthe implementationof
the agreed policies in the field of defence, statesecurity,social
self-defence and internationalcooperation...
. m .
"4)in line with the positions and proposais of the
Assembly consider issues concerning the charting and
implementation of the Republic's foreign policy, the pursuit of
international cooperation and enforcement of international
treaties;
...."(Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 14 March 1993, the textis given in the Annex to
the letter of 22 August 1993,which ProfessorFrancisA. Boyle
addressed to the Courtas the agentfor the Applicant State). A.2.3. The decision to initiate the proceedingwas
taken by the Presidentof the Presidency,thus overstepping his
authority and violating relevantprovision of internalaw.
A.2.4. The letteof authorizationfor the initiation of
proceedings andthe appointmentof agentswassigned byAlija
Izetbegovic,as the Presidentof the Republic.However, atthat
time there was no President of the Republic, but only the
President of the Presidency . Consequently , the letter of
authorizationwas signed by the Applicant State'sorgan which
did not existunder the regulationsof internallaw.
A.2.5. Alija lzetbegovic was not appointed as
President of the Presidencyin a legal manner. At the general
and direct electionsheld inthe Socialist Republicof Bosniand
Herzegovina in 1990, he won 879.266 votes, whereas Fikret
Abdic won 1.045.5319 votes. Havingwori more votes, Fikf~t
Abdic should have becornethe Presidentof the Presidency.
A.2.6.Atthe timeof the issuanceof the authorizatrsi;
for the conduct of proceedings and of the designation of the
agent, Alija lzetbegovic was not perforrningthe duties of the
Presidentof the Presidency legally.His mandatewas contested
by the representativesof the Croat people in former Yugoslav
republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
A.2.7,Alija.Izetbegovic'smandateasthe Presidentof
the Presidency was contested by Serbs as early as 1991.
A.2.8. The fact that certain states recognize Alija
lzetbegovic as the Applicant State's representative cannot
invalidatethe grossviolationsof internallaw and the challenge
of his mandateby the Serband Croatpeoples in the territoryof
the former Yugoslav i'epublicof Bosnia-Herzegovina. PRELIMINARO YBJECTIONT 8OTHECOURT'S
JURlSDlCTlON RATIONE PER6ONAE
Thlrdprellmlnrryobjrctlon
8.1.A8Ithm tlrgrrntlyvlolitrth prlnolplofequrl
rlghtaandaelf~drtrrmlnatloonfproplrr,theApplloint
Strtr oouldnotbynotlflortlonofrucoerriunrnterlntothe
1#48 ainooldeOanventlen
B,l,lAct8wherrby theAppllcan8ttatewar oonatltuted
runcounter tothelntsrnaIlaw
BI11 The Platfsrrn on the statue of
Bosnla-Herzegovli nathe futurs eet=upof the Yugoslav
communlty, the Memorandum (Letteof Intent),whicwçle
adapted bytheAssernbl yftheBocialiaRegublloof Boania-
Herzegovin on 14Octabe r091,thebeclslaAssernb lfthe
SacialistRepublicof Bosniaand Herzegovinaoncalaipublic
referendum on gaining independenceof 24 January 199es
wellasthe Decisioofthe Governmentofthe SocialistRepublic
of Bssnia and Herzegovinaon the recognitofstatehaodof
20 December 1991and the Decisionof the Presidencyof the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ta eubmat
request for the recognition of the Socialist Republic of
Bosnie-Herzegovineasan independentstate o20 December
1891 are incontravention of the federal and republican
statute, i.e. Art5cand 237 of the 1974 Constitutofthe
SFRY,Article 16 of the 1976 CriminCode ofthe SFRY, aswellas ofArticle252ofthe 1974Constitutionof theSR Bosnia
and Herzegovinaand 1990AmendmentsUIX and W( to the
1974Constitutionof theSRBosniaand Herzegovina.
B.l.1.2. By its Platform on the status of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the futureset-up of the Yugoslav
community,aswellasbyitsMemorandum (Letterof Intent),the
illegitimatelyconstituted Assembly of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovina,sittingithout representatiosftheSerbs,
expresseditsintenttoconstituttheSRBosnaandHerzegovina
as an independentstateoutsidetheYugoslavfederation.This
intentwas achievedwith the adoptionof the Decisionof the
Government oftheSRofBosnia-Herzegovino antherecognition
of statehood,as well as that of the Presidencof the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovint osubmitanapplicationfortherecognition
of the SR Bosniaand Herzegovinaas an independentstate
wherebythe recognition oftheSRBosniaand Herzegovina as
an independentstatewasrequested.
Bsls 3. Article5 of theSFRYConstitutionstipulates
as follows:
"Theterritoryofthe Socialist FederaRl epublicof
Yugoslavia is a single unifiedwhole and consists of the
territoriesof the Socialist Republics.
"TheterritoryofaRepublicmaynotbealteredwithout
the consentofthatRepublic,and theterritoryofan Autonomous
province -without the consentf thatAutonomousProvince.
"Thefrontiersof the SocialistFederalRepublicof
Yugoslavia may not be altered withoutthe consentof al1
Republics andAutonomous Provinces. "Boundaries between the Republics may only be
altered on the basis of mutual agreement,and if the bsundary
of an Autonomousprovinceis invoived -alsoon the basisof the
latter's agreement." (1974Constitutionof the SFRY,Article5, Annex.p.
805)
Thetransformationoftheadministrativeboundariesof
a federal unit into internationalfrontiersof an independent state
is an alteration which under Art. 5, para 4, of the SFRY
Constitutioncould not be made withoutan agreementbetween
the Republics,and such an agreementwas not achieved in this
particular case.
8.1.1.4. Article 237 of the SFRYConstitutionsays:
"lt shall be the inviolable and inalienableright and
duty of the peoples and nationalitiesof Yugoslavia, working
people and citizens to protect and defend the independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrityand the social system of "ce
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia establisheci by the
SFRYConstitution." (1974Constitutionof the SFRY,Article237,Annex.
p. 805)
B.1.1.5.Article116of the CriminalCode of the SFRY
stipulates:
"(1) Whoever commits an act aimed at a violent or
unconstitutionalsecessionof a part of the SFRY'sterritory or at
the annexationof a part ofthat territoryto another state,
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at
leastfive years.
......"(CriminalCode of the SFRY,Article 116, Annex.p. 809)
B.1.1.6. Mentionshould also be made of Article 124
97of the CriminalCodeof the SFRYwhich reads:
"(1) Whoever takes part in the preparation of an
armed rebellion, or in an armed rebellion itself, shallbe
punishedby a termof imprisonmentof at leastone year.
"(2)Whoeverorganizespreparationsfor an armed
rebellionortakes partthereinasits organizeor ringleader,shall
be punishedby a term of imprisonmentof atleastfive years."
(CriminalCodeof the SFRY,Arti124,Annex.p.809)
CriminalactionhasbeentakeninYugoslaviaagainst
some officiais of the authoritiesof the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, who are charged with the said criminal
offences,
BI1.1.7. Clearly,the above acts by the Assembly,
Government and the Presidency of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovinawere contrary to the above- mentioned
federal regulations.The fact that therepublicanauthoritiesin
some other federal unitsof the SFRYundertooksimilar illegal
acts cannotjustifynor providelegalityto the mentioned actsof
the authoritiesof Bosnia-Herzegovina.
B1.18 The above acts of the authorities of
Bosnia-Herzegovinawere contrary to Article 252 of the
Constitutionof the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina which readsas
follows:
"lt shall bethe inviolableand inalienableright and
duty of the peoples and nationalities,working people and
citizens of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinato
protect and defend the freedom, independence, sovereignty,
territorialintegrityandthesocialsystemof the SocialistFederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.established by the Constitution ." (1974
Constitutionof SRBosnaand Herzegovina, Article252,Annp.812)
8.1.1.9. The above acts of the authorities of
Bosnia-Herezgovinawere contraryto the provision of item 7 of
1990 Amendment LXIX to the Constitution of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovinawhich readsas follows:
"Political organization and actions designed to:
violently overthrow the systemestablished by the Constitution,
violate the territorial integrity andindependenceof the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslaviashall be prohibited." (The 1990
Amendment LXIX to the 1974 Constitution of SR Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Annex. p. 815)
B.1.1.IO. The Platform on the status of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the future set-up of the Yugoslav
community, the Memorandum(Letterof Intent) ofthe Assembly
of the SRof Bosnia-Herzegovina,as well as the Decisionof th2
SR of Bosnia and Herzegovinato cal1a public referendum on
acquiring independence were brought in contravention of the
procedure required under item 10 of 1990Amendment LXX to
the Constitution of the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the
adoption of acts of such importance (the mentioned provision
stipulates that the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina
shall setup a Counclilto decide upon mattersof equal rights of
the peoplesand nationalitiesin Bosnia-Herzegovina).This item,
among others, says:
"The Couricil shall be duty-bound to review issues
concerning equal rights of peoples and nationalities at the
initiative of deputies to the Assembly of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. If at least 20 deputies hold that theproposed regulationor anyotheract in the competenceof the
Assembly violatesthe equalityof the peoples andnationalities,
the proposal which the Assembly of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovina willdecideuponshallbeformulatedbythe
Council.
"Thequestions regardingthe exerciseof equal rights
bythe peoplesandnationalitiesof Bosnia-Herzegovina shallbe
decideduponby theAssemblyoftheSRof Bosnia-Herzegovina
at the proposa1of the Councilin a separateprocedurespelled
out in the Rulesof Procedureof that Assemblyby a two-third
majorityvote of the total numberof deputies(Annexp..816)
Theabove-mentionedprocedurewas not observed.
Despitethe factthat al1deputiesof the Serb DemocraticParty
opposed theadoptionof the mentioned documentsalong with
other Serb deputies andthattheywalked outof the sessionof
theAssemblyoftheSRof Bosnia-Herzegovina , ePlatformwas
adoptedatthe proposalofthe republicanPresidency,while the
Memorandumwas adoptedat the proposalof the Democratic
Action Party.
B.1.1.11, The adopted documentscontradict one
another. Item 1 of the Platform on the status of
Bosnia-Herzegovina andthe future set-up of the Yugoslav
community,amongothers,readsasfollows:
"An appropriate structure of the Assembly of the
Republicof Bosnia-Herzegovinashae llxcludethe possibilityof
out-voting in the decision-making procesregardingthe most
importantissuesof relevanceto the equalityofl1peoplesand
nationalities livingin the Republic."
However,eventhen,i.e.on 14 October 1991, whenthe Republican Assembly adopted the Platform,there were
outvoting-prevention mechanisms in place in the
decision-makingprocessregarding the mostimportantissuesof
relevance to the equality of nations. The appropriate
proportional national representation in the Assembly of
Bosnia-Herzegovinawas laid down in Articles 19-22 of the
ConstitutionalLaw for the applicationof AmendmentsLIXto
WIX to the Constitutionof the SRof Bosnia-Herzegovina and
was also basedon the authentic interpretatiof Articles9 to
22 of the ConstitutionalLawon the applicationof amendments
LIX to WIX to the Constitution of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.(OfficialGazette of the SR of Bosniaand
Herzegovina1990,No.34) Therewasalsoa Councilfor questions
concerning the exercise of equal rights of nations and
nationalitiesof Bosnia-Herzegovina,s mentionedabove.
All those rriechanismswere grosslyviolated and al1
the decisions regarcling the independence of the SR 0%
Bosnia-Herzegovina vverebroughton the basisof outvoting in
the decision-makingprocess.
8.1.1.12.Olntheverysameday of 14 October1991,
the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted the
Memorandum(Letterof Intent)on the basisof the mentioned
Platformand at the proposalof the DemocraticAction Party.
Item 5 of the Memorandumreadsas follows:
"Thepositianspresentedinthis Memorandumreflect
the will of aajorityof deputiesin this Assemblyand as such
the political will of the majority of the citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovinaa ,ndthusrepresenta bindingbasisfor the
conduct of the government and political authorities of the
Republic." 6.1.1.13. While the Platform on the status of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the future set-up of the Yugoslav
community of 14 October 1991 rejectsany decision based on
the procedure of outvoting, the Memorandum(Letterof Intent)
adopted on the same day on the basis the Platform was
adopted by a majority voteinthe Assemblyinwhich therewere
no Serb representatives.
6.1.1-14. Pursuantto item 3 of the Platformon the
status of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the future set-up of the
Yugoslav community "boundariesof a Republic may only be
altered on the basis of a decision of the Assembly of the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinaand in keeping with thewill of
al1the citizensof that Republic, expressedat their referendum,
provided at least two-thirds of the electoratevote in favour of
such an alteration". As the proclamation of the Yugoslav
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent and
autonomos state implies the alteration of the status of its
boundaries - the boundaries of a federal unit becoming
internationalstate boundaries- the decision at the referendum
was intended to be taken on the basis of a two-third majority
vote of the total number of voters.
The results of the referendum have never been
published in the prescribed manner. The Memorial (para.
4.2.1.19,p.139)saysthat63.4percentofthe electorateshowed
up for the referendumon 29 Februaryand 1 March 1992 and
that reportedly 99.4 per cent ofthose who took part voted in
favour. Even if these figures weretrue, the decision was taken
by a majoritybelowthe two-thirdmajorityof the total numberof
voters required by law. 8.1.2. Acts wherebythe so-calledRepublicof
Bosnia-Herzegovina was constititutedare contraryto
internationallaw
B.1.2.1.TheSocialistRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovina
was a federal unit within theYugoslavfederation at the time of
the adoption of the disputableenactments.Itwas not a state in
terms of internationallaw, however, nordid it haveanyelements
of international leyal personality.
B.1.2.2,,There is no rule of international law on the
basis of which a federal unit, as such, would have the right
unilaterallyto break away from the federation and become an
independent and autonomousstate.
B.1.2.3. The principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples applies as a rule of positive law
but this is not a rule on which a federal unit as such may base
its right unilaterallyto break away from federation.(paragraph
1.9.34. of the Prelimiobjections)."FourteePoints",Address by
the Presidentof thieUnited States,Woodrow Wilson, delivered
at a Joint Session of the two Houses of Congress, 8 January
1918; Declarationof Principles,known as the Atlantic Charter,
bythe President ofthe UnitedStates,FranklinD.Roosevelt,and
the Prime Ministerof the UnitedKingdom,WinstonS. Churchill,
14 August 1941; "Declarationof LiberatedEurope",The Crimes
(Yalta)Conference, 4-11 February 1945; Charterof the United
Nations (Art. 1, para 2, Art. 55, Art. 73 and Art. 76); Draft
International Covenant on Human Rights and measures of
implementation: future work of the Commission of Human
Rights, Resolutiori of the General Assembly 421(V) D, 4
December 1950; Resolutionof the GeneralAssembly, 637(Vll),
16 December 1952; "The right of peoples and nations to self-determination", Resolutionofthe GeneralAssembly738(Vlll), 28
November 1953; "Recommendations concerning international
respect for the right of peoples and nations to
self-determination" Resolutionof the GeneralAssembly 837(1X),
14 December 1954; "Declaration on the granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples", Resolution of
the General Assembly 1514(XV), 14 December 1960;
InternationalCovenanton Economic,Socialand Cultural Rights,
16December 1966;"Declarationof principlesof internationallaw
concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution
of the General Assembly 2625 (XXV),24 October 1970; Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (SouthWest Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276(1970), ICJ Reports 1971, p. 31;
Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Art.
40 of the Covenant, Third periodic reports of States parties due
in 1988, Addendum, Federal Republic of Germany, Human
RightsCommittee,CCRP/C/52/Add.3,7 March 1989,pp. 11-14;
Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Art.
40 of the Covenant, third periodic reports of states parties due
in 1992, Addendum, Mexico, Human Rights Committee,
CCRP/76/ Add.2, 20 January 1993, pp. 4.8; Consideration of
reports submitted by states parties under Article 40 of the
Covenant, fourth periodic reports of states parties due in 1994,
Spain, Human Rights Committee,CCPR/C/95/Add.1, 5 August
1994, pp. 2,3; Consideration of reports submitted by states
partiesunder article 40 of the Covenant, third periodic reports
of states parties due in 1991, Addendum, Sri Lanka, Human
RightsCommittee,CCPR/70/Add.6,27September1994,pp. 1,2;
Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Art.
40 of the Covenant, initial reports of states parties due in 1993,
Addendum, UnitedStatesofAmerica,HumanRightsCommittee,
CCPR/81/ Add.4, pp. 5-20, Annex. pp. 819-856) 8.1.2.4. The subject of powers deriving from the
principle of equal rights and self-determinationof peopies is a
group of personswhich hasthe statusof a peopleas an ethnic
community. A large number of GeneralAssembly resolutions
make simultaneous use of two notions - a "peopleuand a
"nation" - to indicate the ethnic links among the group's
members.
Accordingto a positionof the General Assemblyand
the InternationalCourtofJustice,incertain casesa"population"
does not constitutea "people"which is authorizedto decide on
self-determination.
Inthe Western SaharaCase,the Court stated:
"The validity of the principle of self-determination,
defined asthe needto pay regardto the freelyexpressed will of
peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the
General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement af
consulting the inhabitantsof a given territory.Those instances
were based either on the consideration that a certain
population dld not constitute a 'people' entitied to
self-determination or on the convictionthat a consultationwas
totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances." (iCJ,
Reports 1975, p33.Arinex.p. 873(Boidtype is ours.).
Under the Constitution of the SR of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statusof a people inthat republicwas
enjoyed by Serbs, Moslemsand Croats.
B.1.2.5. It iswrongto interpretthisto meanthat this
rightcould be used inthe casein pointbythe citizensof the SR
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs did not take part in Lhe
referendum held ori 29 Februaryand 1 March 1992,on thetransformationof Bosnia-Herzegovina intoanindependentstate,
Personsbelongingto the Muslimand Croatianpeoplesdid. It
very soon transpired, however,that in realitythe two ethnic
community did not constitutea single stable group which
wantedto live in a singlestateand be represented by a single
government,because,asearlyas 1993,the Croatsbrokeaway
fromtheso-calledRepublicof Bosnia-Herzegovina andfounded
theirseparatestate unit -Herceg-Bosnia.
8.1.2.6Inthefollowingyearof1994,thesetwostates
- the so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Herceg-
Bosnia - started negotiations and reached agreeement in
Washington onthe formingof a common federation.
13.1.2.7Itis questionable,however, whethetrhe use
of the rightto self-determinationi,ncludingthefoundationof an
independentstate, is exclusivelya matterof political will of a
group of peoplehavingthestatusof a peopleor is restrictedby
certain conditions.
13.1.2.. heDeclarationon Principlesof International
Law concerning Friendly Relationsand Cooperation among
States in accordancewith theCharter ofthe United Nations,
adopted by theGeneralAssemblyon 24 October 1970sets out
the principleof equal rightsandself-determinatioof peoples in
the followingway:
"By virtue of the principle of equal rights and
self-determinationof peoples enshrinedin the Charterof the
United Nations,al1peopleshavethe rightfreelyto determine,
without externalinterference, thepoliticalstatusand to pursue
their economic, social and cultural development,and every
Statehasthe duty to respectthis rightin accordancewith the
provisionof the Charter, "Every State has the duty to promote, through joint
and separate action, realizationof the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the
provision of the Charter,and to renderassistanceto the United
Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrustedto it by the
Charter regarding the implementationof the principle, in order:
"(a) To promote friendly relations and cooperation
among States; and
"(b)To bringaspeedyendto colonialism,havingdue
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation
of the principle, asellasa denialoffundamentalhumanrights,
and is contrary to the Charter."
"EveryStatehasthedutyto promotethroughjoint and
separate action univrersalrespectfor and observanceof human
rightsand fundameritalfreedominaccordancewiththe Charter.
"The esta.blishmentof a sovereign and independent
State, the freeasso~ciation or integration with an independent
State or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementingthe
right of self-determination by thatpeople.
"Every Stnte hasthe duty to refrainfrom any forcible
action which deprives peoples referred to above in the
elaboration of the present principle of their right to
self-determination and freedom and independence. In their
actionsagainst,and resistanceto, suchforcible action in pursuit
of the exerciseof their rightto self-determination,such peopies
are entitled to seek and to receivesupport in accordance withthe purpose and principles of the Charter.
"Theterritory of acolonyorotherNon-Self-Governing
Territory has,under the Charter,a statusseparateand distinct
from theterritory of theStateadministeringit;and suchseparate
and distinct status underthe Chartershall exist untilthe people
of the colony or Non-Self-GoverningTerritory have exercised
their right of self-determinationin accordancewith the Charter,
and particularly itsurposesand principles.
"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be
construedasauthorizingorencouraginganyactionwhichwould
dismember or impair,totally or in part,the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independentStatesconducting
themselvesin compliancewiththe principleof equal rightsand
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representingthe whole people
belongingto the territory withoutdistinctionasto race,creed or
color.
"EveryStateshall refrainfromanyaction aimedatthe
partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of any other Stateor country."
8.1.2.9.Bearingin mindthe above mentionedtext of
the Declaration one cannot proceed to invoke formally the
principle of equal rights and self-determinationof peoples. A
proper approach calls for the review of certain political,
economic, cultural and other social circumstances.
B.1.2.10. Itis certainthatthe peoplesundercolonial
rule may invoke the principle of equal rights and
self-determinationof peoples and requestthe establishmentof
their independent states. 8.1.2.11. "The beneficiaries of the right to
self--determinationaire peoples subjected to colonial or racist
regimes or any otlher form of alien domination. Thus the
international status of colonies or non-self-governing territories
as separate and distinct frorn the territory of the administering
State is recognized, and remains so as long as the peoples of
these territories have not exercised their right to
self-determination, iri accordance with the Charter.The principie
does not however extend to the rights of nationalities living in a
sovereign State; for although it is the duty of al1 States ta
promotethe universaland effective respect of human rights, the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples must
not be understood to authorize or encourage any action
whatsoever likely to divide or threaten, wholly or partially, the
territorial integrity or lpoliticalunityof any independentsovereign
State." (R.Daoudi,The Principleof Equal Rightsand Self-Determinationof
Peoples, in International Law: Achievementsand prospects, Mohammed
Bedjaoui. General Editor, Martinus Njihoff, Publishers, UNESCO, 1991,
p.493, Annex. p. 876)
8.1-2.12. The peoples which have joined a state on
a voluntary basis, preciseiy on the basis of the principle of
self-determination, inthe governmentof whichthey arefairly and
proportionally represented and freely pursue economicSsociai
and cultural development may not invokethe principle on eqm!
rights and self-dete~rmiantionof peoples in order to get out
unilaterally and by force of such a community.
B.1.2.13. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes frorn the
territorles of what used to be the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
freely decided, by invoking the principie of self-determinatioiita
join the Kingdom of Serbia and together with the Kingdom of
Montenegro forrri the Kingdom of Serbs. Croats and Çfcivenes.
This is evinced by the Preambleof the Treaty concluded bv theprincipal allied and associated powers and the State of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes and signed in St. Germain-en-Laison 10
September 1919 which, inter alia, reads:
"Consideringthe Serbs,CroatsandSlovenesfromthe
former Austria-Hungary Monarchydecided of their own free will
to unite permanently with Serbia so as to organize an
independent and unified state named the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and,.Slovenes;
C.onsideringthat the Prince-Regentof Serbia and the
Serbian Governmentagreed to achieve that unification and that
consequei-itlythe Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes was
formed which undertook upon itselfto exercisesovereignty over
the territories inhabited by those nations;"...
B.1.2.14. Perhaps no other human group has seen
such promotion of its statusas the MuslimsinYugoslavia. From
a religious minority - the status they had in 1918 - they
advanced to the status of a people. Theyobtained the status of
a constituent people within the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina,side
by side with the Serbs and the Croats. They enjoyed free
economic, political, culturaland everyother social development
on an equal footing with Serbs and Croats. They were
proportionally represented in al1agencies of government in the
SR of Bosnia-Herzegovinaand, through the representatives of
SR Bosnia- Herzegovina, also in the federal administration.
8.1.2.15. A part of the Croatian people in the SFRY
lived in the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina.The Croatian people in
the SRof Bosnia-Herzegovina,accounted for about 17per cent
of its population,enjoyed the status of a people equalto Serbs
and Muslims. Croats had free political, economic and cultural
development. They wereproportionatelyrepresentedatal1levelsof authority.Almostthroughoutthe post-World-War-Twoperiod,
Yugoslavia had Josip Broz Tito, a Croat by nationality, as its
head of state. In 1990 and 1991 Ante Markovic, a Croat by
nationality, was the federal PrimeMinister.
8.1.2.16. Muslimsand Croatsliving within the SR of
Bosnia- Hezegovina enjoyedtheir right to self-determinationby
freely pursuing political, economic, cultural and every other
social development and by being adequately represented in
government. Consequently,the social requirements necessary
for these two peoplesto invokethe principleof equal rightsand
self-deterinationof peoplesandsecedefromYugoslaviahad not
been satisfied.
8.1.2.17. On the contrary, their action along the
above lines, ran counter to the explicit provision set out in the
UN Declarationon the principlesof internationallaw on friendly
relationsand CO-operation amongstatesin accordance with the
UN Charterwhich reiadsa follows:
"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be
construed as authorizingor encouraginganyactionwitch would
dismember or impair, totallyor in part, the territorialintegrity or
political unity of sovereign and independentStates conducting
themselves in compliance withthe principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory withoutdistinction asto race, creed or
color."
8.1.2.1 8.This is why the Respondent Statebelieves
thal the aetswherebythe Applicant Statewas constituted as an
indepent state are in1contraventionof the rules of internatisi~al
law. B.1.2.19. The RespondentStatewishes to point out,
on the other side, that the authorities in Sarajevo have by their
acts violated, also, the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples against the Serbs living in the
territory of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Heizegovina.
B.1.2.20. The relevant historicalfacts, as well as the
political developments in the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovinafrom
1990 to April 1992 form the required basis for the Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovinato invoke the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples.
B.1.2.21. The part in which the relevant facts have
been presented contains a description of the status of the Serb
people in the Ottoman Empire. That status was much worse
than that of any colonial people.
B.1.2.22. The part in which the relevant facts have
been presented contains a description of the status of the Serb
people in the lndependent State of Croatia which was formed
during World War Two and included the terrritory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb people in that state was
subjected to genocide. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs
perished in the concentration camp at Jasenovac and other
concentration camps, including a large number of people from
the territory of Bosnia-Herzeyovina. Both Croat and Muslim
fascists formed the government of the lndependent State of
Croatia. The perpetïators of the genocide against the Ssrbs
inclcided Croats a:rdliilits!ims froBosnia--Herzegovir-ra.
B.1.2.23. Alija izettsegovic presented his pclitical
programme for thetransiormationof Bosnia-Herzegovi~ia a tOan
lslamic statein his"isiamic Declaration"publisheci ir~1990. B.1.2.24. The quintessence of A. Izetbegovic's
political programme is spelled out in the following part of the
"lslamic Declaration":
"Thefirstandthemostimportantof theseconclusions
is definitely the one about the incompatibility of Islam and
non-lslamicsystems.Therecanbe nopeacenorcoexistence
between the 'Ismalic faith' and 'non-lslamic'social and
politicalinstitutions.Thefailureof these institutionsto function
and the instabilityof regimesin Muslimcountries, manifestedin
frequent changes and coup de etats are as a rule the
consequence of their a priori opposition to Islam as the
fundamental and guiding feeling of the people in these
countries. Claimingfor itselfthe rightto regulate itsown world,
Islam clearly rules out any right or possibility of action of any
foreign ideology on itsturf. Namely,there is no room for the lay
principle and the state should be an expression of the moral
concepts of religionand supportiveofthem."(Boldtype isours).
8.1.2.25. In pursuit of this programme, Mr.
lzetbegovic established linkswith certain lslamic regimes and
enliçted support of many Islamiccountriesto acl~ievethat end.
8.1.2.26. Fortacticalreasons,Mr.lzetbegovicentered
an alliance with the CkoatianDemocratic Cornmunityin order to
join r'arcesagainst the Serbs.
8.1.2.27. Contrary to the Constitution of the SR of
Bosnia- Herzegovina and the laws in force. many important
decisions are being ta~enon an basis of outvoting, i.e. Sy the
jointvote of the representativeçof the Democratic Action Party
andtheCroatian DerriocraticCornmunity.Alideuisionsreq -ardirij
independence have been taken in this way. The Serb
represeniatives in the republican government ayencies h;iv:+been totally ignored in such decision-making.
B.1.2.28. ln 1990 and 1991, the Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovinawerevilifiedinthe media,particularlybythe
Sarajevo Television, as well as in the press.
8.1.2.29. Physicalviolence against persons belonging
to the Serb nationality came to a head on 1 March 1992 on the
day of the referendumwhen a numberof Mulimsshot at a Serb
wedding party inSarajevo.Whilethe perpetratorswere identified
soon after, no steps were taken to arrest them.
B.1.2.30.Atthetimewhen hewasabout to proclaim an
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina,A. lzetbegovic was forming
paramilitaryunitsandarming themclandestinely,preparingthem
to resist the right of the Serb people to self-determination in
Bosnia-Herzegovinaby force.
B.1.2.31. During the withdrawal of Jugoslav People's
Army units from Sarajevo and Tuzla, the military forces
controlled by A. lzetbgovic attacked those units,despite the fact
that their own promises that they would let Jugoslav People's
Army withdraw peacefully, which provesthat A. lzetbegovic had
wanted armed conflicts to break out.
B.1.2.32. lzetbegovic repeated on a number of
occasions that an independent and unified Bosnia was more
important to him than peace.
B.1.2.33. Preparing itself, and attempting, to deny
the Serb people the rightsstemming from the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples by force, the
government of A. lzetbegovic hascommitted a flagrant violation
of its obligation, accordinto which: "EverySt:atehasthe dutyto refrainfrom any forcible
action which depriives peoples referred to above in the
elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence."
B.1.2.34.Tlnementionedfactsareafactualbasiswhich
justifies the invocation by the Serbsliving in the territory of the
formerYugoslavrepublicof Bosnia-Herzegovinaof the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples so as to
safeguard their free political, economic, cultural andover-al1
social development.
B.1.2.35. It is clear now that the Croats of
Bosnia-Herzegovina also felt threatened by A, Izetbegovic's
regime, so that they also formed a separate state unit of
Herceg-Bosnia.
B.1.2.36. T~he1994ContactGroupPlanonthe creation
of the union of theNluslim-Croatianfederationand the Republic
of Srpska rejects the practice pursued by the A.lzetbegovic's
regimeto resist by forcethe rightsof Serbs living in the territory
of the former Yug~oslavrepublic of Bosnia- Herzegovina,
stemming from the principle of equal rights and
self-determinationof peoples. Byaccepting this proposition, A.
Izetbegovic's regime admittedto having previouslyvioiated the
inalienable rights of Serbs.
B.1.2.37. Had this regime accepted the Serb
Democratic Party proposal (the Resolutionon the position of
Bosnia-Herzegovinain settlingthe Yugoslavcrisis, Annex.p. 878)
of October 1991or the CoutilheroPlanof 1992,the fighting with
al1the grave consecjuencesin its train wwid not have broken
out. 8.1.2.38. Byrefusingto recognizetimely the demands
of the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina,based on the principle of
equal rights and self- deterination of peoples, the Applicant
State has grossly violated the right of that people to
self-determination,
8.1.2.39.The Applicant State violated the obligations
deriving from the principle of equal rightsand self-determination
of peoples by breaking away from Yugoslavia unilaterally and
seeking to contest by force the exercise of the rights of the
Serbs living in the territory of the former Yugoslav republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, belonging them on the basis of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
The Applicant State cannot enter into the
international treaties of the predecessor State on the basis of
succession because it flagrantly violated the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples.
8.1.3. The entry of the ApplicantState intothe 1948
Genocide
Conventionby notificationof successioncontravenes
internationallaw
B.1.3.1. As the 1978 Vienna Convention on the
Succession of States in Respectof Treatieshas notentered into
force, the succession of states to international treaties is
regulated by the customary rules of international law.
B.1.3.2. As only few states have ratified the 1978
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, the treaty rules set forth in the Convention have not
been transformed into rules ofcustomary law. B.1.3.3. The partiesare,therefore,not bound by the
rules of the 1978 V'iennaConvention on the Succession of
Statesin Resepctof Treaties (~nnex.p.880)e,xcept in case if the
rules of this Convent:ionare in force as the rules of customary
law. However,even if rules of the 1978 ViennaConvention on
the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties were to be
applied, the Note on Succession by the Applicant State of 29
December 1992 would runcounter to those rules.
B.1.3.4. Article 6 of the 1978 ViennaConvention on
the Successionof Statesin RespectofTreatiesreadsasfollows:
"ThepresentConventionappiies onlyto the effect of
a succession of Statesoccurring inconformitywith international
law and, in particular, the principles of international law
embodied in the Charterof the United Nations."
B.1.3.5. As the Applicant State has violated the
obligations deriving from the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, the Vienna Convention on the
Succession of Statesin Respect ofTreatiescsuld not apply to
this case even if itad corne into force.
B.1.4.Relevantirulesof customaryinternationallaw
8.1.4.1 Para4.2.1.44.of the Memoriâl(p. 151) says:
"Thesespecialfeaturesstrengthenthegeneralprincrpfeexposeci
in Articl34 of the 1978 Conventionon Sirccessionof Statesin
respect of Treaties vvhicfi, aseen aaove, purely c~difiesthe
csntempsrary practicze of States.Accordhg ted this prs\liâ~sri: 'When a part or parts of the territory of a State
separate to form one or more States, whether or not the
predecessor continues to exist:
'(a) any treaty in force at the date of succession of
States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State
which has becorne a successor State continues in force in
respect of each successor State so formed.'"
In the preceeding paragraphs of the Memorial (pp.
149-1 51) the Applicant has mentionedsome of the opinions of
the authors which do not corroboratetheApplicant's own claim.
In any case, such opinions are held only by a minority of
international legal scholars. (ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, Fourth Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990,p.670,
Annex. p. 920) The Applicant has not referred to the practice
codified by this Article. And it could not do so, because the
case in point, ive.Art. 34, indicates to the contrary.
Art. 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the
Succession of States in Respectof Treatiesis not applicable as
ruleof customary internationallaw.Ithas been introducedin the
Convention not as the result of codification but as a result of
progressive development. (Statementby Swissrepresentative Ritterat
the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in respect of
Treaties, Vienna, 31 Jul- 23 August 1978, pp. 52-55; Statement of the
Spanish representative at the Vienna Conference, ip. 59;Statement of
U.K. representative Sir lan Sinclair, ibid. pp. 59, 60; Statement by Turkish
representative Dogan, ibid. 66,Annex. pp. 920-926)
8.1.4.2. The Applicant says in paragraph 4.2.1.42. of
the Memorial (p. 150): "Automatic continuity is particularly well
established inrespect ofconventionsof humanitariancharacter."
The Applicant refers here to the opinion expressed inOppenheim's Treatise, 9th edition. However, the full opinion
reads as follows:
"lt may happen that a part of a state secedes and
becomes a separate state. In such cases the practice before
1945 tended to support the conclusion that the new state did
not succeed to the treaties of the state of which it was formerly
a part but rather began its internationalexistencefree from any
such treaty inheritaiice (except for those treaty rights and
obligations locally connected with its territory), and this is
probably still the correct positiontoday. Practice since 1956 has
been equivocal, ancl aiso limited (apart from the situation of
dependent territories emerging to independence, to which
special considerations apply and which calls for separate
treatment in para. 661).
"However, while with regard to treaties generally the
position is essentially similar to that obtaining in the case of
absorption (para. 62) there is more room for the view that in
case of separation resultinginthe emergence of a new statethe
latter is bound by - or at least entitled to enter int- general
treaties of 'law-making' nature, especially those of a
humanitarian character, previously binding on it as part of the
state from which it has separated. Thus Pakistan and Burma,
when accepting in 1949 theobiigations of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organization, recognized as binding upon
them the various internationallabour conventions which applied
to their territories when forming part of India. Sirnilarly Pakistan
considered itself a party to the Conventionfer the Suppression
of Traffic in Women and Children l921 by \tirtue of the fact that
lndia became a parfy of that Convention before the
establishment of Pakistan as an ii~clependen;state.
"The state from which the secession has takev placecontinues in principle, and despite itsterritorialdiminution, to be
bound by its treaties, although in particular cases its loss of the
territory in question may have consequences for the continued
operation of the treaty." (Oppenheim'InternationalLaw,ninth edition,
Vol.1,editedby Sir Robert Jennings QC and Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC,
1992, pp.222, 223,Annex. p928)
Consequently, the relevant paragraph has been
worded very carefully to reflect the uncertain nature of those
rights - "there is more room for the view that in case of
separation resulting in the emergence of a new state the latter
is bound by -or at least entitledto enterinto -general treaties
of 'law- making' nature, especially those of a humanitarian
character". (Bold type is ours.) Practice shows that this
prudence regardingthe formulation ofthe above paragraph was
appropriate and has confirmed an alternative view that new
states are entitled to accede to general treaties...
B.1.4.3. The newstates established in the territory of
the former USSR - Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Latvia, Lithuania, Moidova, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan- have not acted in line with the rule
set out in Art. 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convenion on the
succession of states with respect to treaties.Al1of them acted
in line with the "clean slate" rule and entered into the treaties of
the predecessor state by means of accession.
5.1.4.4. Thus, notes on accession were
communicated to the depositary of the 1948 Genocide
Convention, to which the USSRwas a party, Armenia (23 June
1993), Estonia (21 October ! 991), Georgia (11 October 1993),
Latvia (14 April 1992) and Msldova (26 January 1993); they
became parties to the Con\,;.ention in accordance with its
provisions. Other newstatescreatedinthe territoryof the formerUSSR are not parties to this Convention.
Another example is the Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forrnsof RacialDiscrimination (1966) to which
the USSR was a party (4 February 1969). By means of
accession, this Convention was acceded to by Armenia (23
June 923), Estonia (21October 1991), Latvia(1 4 April 1992)and
Moldova (26January 1993).Other new states are not parties to
this Convention.
Thirdly, t:he International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966) to which the USSR was a party (16
October 1973), was entered into by means of accession by
Armenia (23June 1993),Azerbaijan (13August 1992), Georgia
(3 May 1994),Kyrgyzstan(7October 1994),Estonia (21October
1991), Latvia (14 Apri1992), Lithuania(20 November 1991) and
Moldova (26January 1993).Othernewstates havenot acceded
to the Covenant and are not its contracting parties.
(MultilaterTreaties deposited wtheSecretary-General,Status at31
December 1993.)
B.1.4.5. The Czech Republic and the Republic of
Slovakia, as new states, do not act in accordance with the rule
set out in Art. 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convenion on the
Succession of State:sin Respect of Treaties either. They, too,
proceed from the "clean slate"rule and enter into the treaties to
which the the predecessor state vilas a party at iheir own
discretion by eitheraccession or successi~n.Theyerrterinto the
treafies of which the UNSecretary General Içthe depssitory by
succession whereas they enter inbo ather rnultilateral treaties
mainly by accession.
The Interiiational Convention against Apartheid in
Sports (1985), of whiichCSSHwas a party (29 July 1987) wasentered into by the Czech Republicby notification of succession
(22 February 1993),but Slovakiadid not. Onthe other hand,the
Convention and the Statute on the Freedomof Traffic (1921) of
which CSSRwas a party (29October 1923)was entered into on
the basis of succession by Slovakia (28 May 1993), but not by
the Czech Republic. Likewise, the Convention on the
International Regime of Maritime Ports (1923) of which
Czechoslovakia was a party (10 July 1931) wasentered into on
the basis of succession by Slovakia (28 May 1993) but not by
the Czech Republic.
(Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General,S31tus as at
December 1993.)
B.1.4.6. The new Stateswhich were created in the
territory of the SFRYdid not act in line with the rule set forth in
Art. 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convenion on the Succession of
States in Respectof Treaties.Theyacted inaccordance withthe
"clean slate" rule and chose the treatiesof the SFRYwhich they
wished to enter into. They intended to enter into the treaties of
which the Secretary General of the United Nations is the
depositary mainly by notification of succession whereas they
entered into other multilateral treatiesby accession.
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of which the SFRY is a
party (29August 1950) hasnot been entered into by the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Hence,it is not a party to this
Convention.
(Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General,S31tus as at
December 1 993.)
8.1.4.7. TheApplicantStatedid notact inaccordance
with Art. 34 of the 1978ViennaConvenionon the Succession ofStates in Respectto Treaties,but followed the "clean slate" rule.
The SFRY,i.e.the FRY,is a partyto the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the
Acquisition of Nationality (1961)and the Applicant State has not
addressed a note on succession to this Protocol. The Applicant
State has not addressed a noteof successionwith regard to the
1946 Protocol ameriding the Agreements, Conventions and
Protocols on Narcotic Drugs, concluded at The Hague (1912),
Geneva (1925, 1931,1936)and at Bangkok (1931)to which the
SFRY, i.e. the FRY,has been a party since 19 May 1948. The
applicant state has not furnished the note on succession to the
1972 Protocol ameniding the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs (1961) of which SFRY, i.e. FRYhas been a party since 23
June 1978. The samieapplies to the Customs Convention on
Containers (1956),01which the SFRY,i.e. the FRY,has been a
party since 9 March '1961 or to the Customs Convention on the
Temporary Importation of Commercial Road Vehicles (1956) of
which the SFRY,i.e. the FRY,has been a party since 12 June
1961 or to the EuropfeanConvenion on the Customs Treatment
of Pallets used in lnternational Transport (l960) of which the
SFRY, i.e. the FRY,kiasbeen a party since 19 June 1964 or to
the Convention on Road Signs and Signals (1968) of which the
SFRY, i.e. the FRY,has been a partysince 6 June 1977or to the
European Agreement concerningthe Work of Crews ofVehicles
Engaged in InternaticinalRoadTransport (AETR) (1970) ofwhich
the SFRY, i.e. the FRY, has been a party since 17 December
1974 orto the Agreementon lnternationalCarriageof Perishable
Foodstuffs arid on Special Equipment to be used for such
Carriage (ATP) (19710)of which the SFRY, i.e. the FRY, hâs
been a party since 21 Decernber 1 975 or to the Agreement for
Facilitating the Interriational Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educ=atlorial,Scientific and Cultural Characaer
(1949) of which the SFRY,i.e. the FRY,has been a partv sicrie
30 June 1950 or to the Convention on the Continental She16(1958) of which the SFRY,i.e.the FRY,has been a party since
18January 1966or to the Conventionrelatingto the Distribution
of Programme-carring Singals transmitted by Satellite (1974) of
which the SFRY, i.e. the FRY, has been a party since 29
December 1976or to the Protocolon Arbitration Clauses (1923)
of which the SFRY, i.e. the FRY, has been a party since 13
March 1959 or to the Convenion on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (1927)of whichthe SFRY,i.e.the FRY,has been
a party since 13 March 1959 or to the Declaration recognizing
the Right to a Flag of States having no Sea-coast (1921) of
which Yugoslavia has been a party since 7 May 1930 or to the
Convention on the InternationalRegimeof MaritimePorts(1923)
of which Yugoslavia has been a partysince 20 November 1931.
(Multilateral Treatiesdeposited with the Secretary-General31Statusas at
December 1993.)
The new states which were created in the territory of
the SFRY entered into, by means of accession, the following
treaties, concluded within the Council of Europe, of which the
SFRY, i.e. the FRY,had been a party: EuropeanConvention on
the Equivalence of Diplomas Leading to Admission to
Universities, 1953, European Cultural Convention, 1954,
European Convention on the Equivalence of Periods of
University Study, 1956, EuropeanAgreement on the Academic
Recognition of University Qualification, 1959, Protocol to the
European Convention on the Equivalenceof Diplomas Leading
to Admission to Universities, 1964, Convention on the
Eiaboration of European Pharmacopoeia, 1964, European
Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentences of
Conditionally Released Offenders, 1964, European Convention
on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, 1969,
European Agreement on Continued Paymerit of Scholarships
Studying Abroad, 1969,EuropeanConventionfor the protection
of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, 1976, EuropeanConvention on the InternationalEffects of Deprivation of the
Right to drive a Motor Vehicle, 1976,EuropeanConvention for
the Protection of ,Animais for Slaughter, 1979, European
Convention on Spec:tatorViolenceand Misbehaviourat Sports
Eventsand in Particularat Football Matches,1985, Convention
for the Protectionof the Architectual Heritageof Europe, 1985,
Anti-DopingConvention,1989.However,theApplicantState has
not entered into any of those conventions.
Clearly,inviewofthe aboveconsiderations,the notes
on the succession by the Applicant Statewere no formal proof
of the continuity of 1:htreaties, but an actual choice made to
enter into treaties, which proves that the Applicant State
considered itself free from al1treaties to which the SFRY had
been a party, i.e. that like al1other new states concerned it
proceeded from the "cleanslate"rule.
B.1.4.8. IiAfterall, the note on succession of 29
December 1992says as follows:
"The Govlernmentof the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, having considered the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9
December 1948,to which the formerSocialist FederalRepublic
of Yugoslaviawas a party,wishesto succeedto the same and
undertakes faithfully'toperformand carryout all the stipulations
therein contained with effect from 6 march 1992,the date on
which the Republic: of Bosnia and Herzegovina becarne
independent." (Bold type isours).
Itisself-evideritthat theapplicantstate'sgoverriment
had not been guidecl by the idea of automatic continuity whsn
it drew up the said note, butratherby the idea of freelyjoiriiq
the treaties to which the SFRY,Le.the FRY,was a part?. B.1.4.9. The FRY continues the rights and duties
established by the treaties of the SFRY. For international
purposes, the FRY is identical to the SFRY. This is why the
position of the FRY cannot be equated with that of the new
states created in the territory of the former SFRY.The registries
of al1depositaries mention the FRYas a party as of the date of
submission of its instrumentsof ratification or accession made
by the SFRY, the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, i.e. the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes.All newstates created
in the territory of the former SFRYare mentioned as parties as
of the date of submission of their notes of succession or
accession. :
I3.i.4.10.The"cleanslate"rule hasbeen and remains
in force as:a rule of customary internationallaw for new states.
The new st-atesfreely choose which treaties of the predecessor
state they wiHenter into, with the exception, of course, of the
treaties pertaining to borders and territorial regimes.
Cases of joining treaties by notification of accession
are most common but the joining of treaties by notification of
succession -seems to be tolerated as well in cases where
succession' occurred in comfority with international law, i.e.
under the cirkumstances and terms which developed in the
decolonization process. In the latter case, customary law rules
on the joining of treaties by means of succession are applied
and they were developed in the decolonization process and
codified inthe 1978 ViennaConventionon Succession of States
in Respect of Treaties.
B.1.4.11. Notification of succession is a manner of
entry into treaties of the predecessor state in cases where the
new state has based its existence upon the principle of equal
rights and self-determinationof peoples. Inthis particular case,the Applicant State has based its existenceon the violation of
duties deriving frolm the principle of equal rights and
self-determinationof peoples, and thus cannot makeuseof the
notification of succession as a method of entry into the
internationaltreaties of its predecessorstate.
8.1.4.12. The FR of Yugoslavia objected that in its
view the succession of the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinawas not in comfority with internationallaw
and the UN Secretary-General,as the depository, noticed that
objection in his Reporton the Statusof MultilateralTreatiesfor
1994. (~ultilateralTreatsepositedwiththeSecretary-GenerStatusas
at 31 December 1993,pl97 Annex.p. 931)
8.1.4.13. The Applicant State could and may enter
into internationaltreaties by notificationof accession.
Fourthpreliminaryobjection
B.2. As it was recognizedin contraventionof the rules of
internationallaw and as there are four states in existance
in the territoryof the former Yugoslavrepublicof
Bosnia-Herzegovina,the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinais not a partyto the 1948 Genocide
Convenion
B.2.1. Thie so-calleci Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovinawas accorded recognition on extra-legalgrounds
and in the absence of a central governmentexercisingeffective
control over the relevait territary. Secondly, and witheut
prejudiceto the first c:onsideration,the statehoodofB~snia arid
Herzegovina is invalid in that the political entity claimingstatehood does notsatisfythe principle of the self-determination
of peoples recognised in the Charter ofthe United Nations and
in general international lawand havingthe status of jus cogens.
B.2.2. The recognition of the so-called Republic of
Bosnia- Herzegovina was granted at a time when the
international legal conditions for the recognition of it as a state
had not been fulfilled.
B.2.3. At the time when recognition was granted, a
civil war was raging in the territory of the former Yugoslav
republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinaand the authorities in Sarajevo
did not control most of the territory which they laid claim to. At
the moment of recognition, there was another state in existence
in the larger part of the territory of the former Yugoslav republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina -the BosnianSerb Republic (Republic of
Srpska) with which the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina was in conflict.
8.2.4. At the time of the recognition, there was no
stable central authority, nor did the majority of the population
accept the Bosnia- Herzegovina which had been recognized.
This is corroborated by the fact that new states soon emerged
apart from the Republic of Srpska astruly independent from the
central authority: the Republic of Herceg-Bosnia and the
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia.
8.2.5. Theso-called Republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina
has never existed as a state in the territory which it maintains is
its state terri.tory.At presentfour statesexist in this territory with
unstable mutual relations, in which relations of partnership or
ceasefires often give way to hostilities.
8.2.6. Giventhatthe actswherebytheApplicant Statewas constituted as an independent state have violated the
duties stemming from the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and that this principle is a ius
cogens rule, the said violations cannot be rectified by the
recognition of that state.
8.2.7. Consequently, the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot enter into the 1948 Genocide
Convention by succession.
PRELlMlNARYOBJECTIONTO THE COURT'S
JURlSDlCTlON RATIONEMATERIAE
Fifthpreliminary objection
C. There is no dispute between the partieswhich would be
covered by Article IX of the 1948 GenocideConvention
C.1. The '948 Genocide Convention can only apply
when the State concerned hasterritorialjurisdiction in the areas
in which the breaches of the Convention are alleged to have
occurred. The keyprovisions of the Convention involve theduty
of States parties 'to prevent and to punish the crime of
genocide' (Article 1), the enactmentof the necessary legislation
to give effect to the Ccnvention (Article Sj, and the trial of
persons charged with genocide 'bya cornpeten1 tribunalcfihe
State in the territory of which the act was cornmitt;ed'(Article 6).The Respondent Statedid not haveterritiorialjurisdiction, either
for enforcement purposes or for prescriptive purposes, in the
relevant areas in the period to which the Application relates.
C.2.The responsibilityof a Stateparty prescribed by
the 1948 Genocide Convention does not cover the claimes
contained in the submissions of the Applicant State. Theduties
prescribed by the Convention relate to 'the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide' when this crime is
committed by individuals:the provisions of Articles IV,V, VI and
VI1make this abundary clear.
C.3. These two considerations jointly and severally
preclude the existence of jurisdiction in accordance with Article
IXof the Genocide Convention.
C.4. The Memorial of the Applicant State is based
upon a fundamentally erroneous construction of the 1948
Genocide Convention and, in consequence the requests
containedin the 'Submissions' (Memorial,pp. 293-95)are based
on allegations of Stateresponsibilitywhich fall outsidethe scope
of the Convention and of its cornpromissory clause. PRELlMlNARY OBJECTIONSTO THE COURT'S
JURlSDlCTlON RATIONETEMPORIS
D. Even if the Convenion on the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide of 1948 is inforce
between the parties, it has not been in force, i.e. it has not
been operative since 6 March 1992
Sixth preliminary objection
D.1. In case the Court qualifies the Note of Succession as
accession, the 1948 Genocide Convenion has been in
force between the parties since 29 March 1993
D.1.1. This FR of Yugoslavia asks the Court to
consider and decide on this preliminary objection only unless it
does not accept any of the above mentioned objections under
A, B and C.
D.1.2. The FR of Yugoslavia does not see any
poçsibility for the Notification cf Succession whereby the
so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinaintendedto enter into
the 1948 Genocide C~onvenion to be considered as itsaccession
to this C~nvention.
D.1.3. Ifthe Courtturns down ttie positiofthe FSY
setsut inparagraph 0.1.2,the FRYugoslavia req~ieststheCot~rtto consider the following: It follows from the Memorialthat the
Applicant State isagreedto haveits Notificationof Succession
interpreted as accession to the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Paragraph 4.2.1.51.of the Memorial (p. 153)reads as follows:
"lt therefore appears that:
...........
iii) as such it has automaticallysucceeded it to the
1948 Convention on Genocide or, alternatively (and
complementarily) it has established it acceptance of the
Conventionthroughitscommunicationto the Secretary-General
of 29 December1992; .."
D.1.4. Inaccordanceto Art.Xlllof the 1948Genocide
Convention:
The present Conventionshall corne into force on the
ninethieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth
instrumentof ratificationor accession.
Any ratificationor accessioneffected,subsequentto
the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day
following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or
accession."
D.1.5. Should the Court, therefore, qualify the
notification of succession as accession, the 1948 Genocide
Convention would takeeffect for the parties,pursuantto Art.Xlll
of this Convention ninety days after the deposition of
instruments, Le.on 29 March 1993.Inthatcase,the Courtwould
have jurisdiction asofthat date. Seventhpreliminaryobjecti~n
D.2. Shouldthe Courtconcludethat the entryof the
so-calledRepublicof Bosnia-Herzegovina by succession
intothe 1948 Genocied Convention was validfor any
reason, thisConventionwouldbe operativebetween the
partiesas of 29 December1992
0.2.1. IfthleCourtholdsthattheApplicant State could
nevertheless have eriteredthe 1948 Genocide Convention, that
Convention did not become applicable to the parties on the
basis of notification of succession as of 6 March 1992 when
according to the Applicant the Applicant State became
independent.
0.2.2. Ifthe multilateraltreaty entereolintoby the new
state by notification of succession was operative between the
new state and other states parties at the date wher! the new
state won its independence, the notification of succesion made
after that date would have retroactive effect on the application
of that international treaty which contravenesthe lawof treaties.
This would introduce legal uncertainty intothe new state's legal
relations with states partiesta multilateraitreaties because the
state parties would iiot know whether a multilateal treâtÿ was
applicable to the nevi state untilthe latter notifies successioto
that treaty. As there ir;no timc lirnit for the notification of
succession, the period of uncertainty wolild be interminable.
D.2.3. This problem was highlighted in particular by
Israel,Great Britaîna.nd the United Si2f5~ in theii uomments on
Article 18 of the Draft Cor!ventiori csncerniwj the effects a! a
notification of succesion. (SiiccessioofStaie:irresject of Traaiies.
First rappcrt cn succession rafStates ir! rof.'T'reat5ÿsSirFraccirVallat,Special Rapporteur, Document AlCN.41278and Add.1- 6, Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1974,vol. Part One, p. 56).
D.2.4.This problem did not emerge in the practice of
decolonization because the new de-colonized states prior to
acquiring independence or in the short period following the
acquisition of it addressed a note on the temporary application
of treaties through the UNSecretary-Generalto al1UN member
states. These states expressed their intent by such a note to
temporarily apply the predecessor state's multilateral treaties in
the new state's relations withthe states partiesto those treaties
and reservedfor themselvesthe right to decide inthe temporary
application period on which treaties they would enter by
succession or accession, i.e. which treaties were to remain in
force and which were to be terminated. (Report of the Commission
to the General Assembly, Document A/9610/Rev.l, Report of the
lnternational LawCommissionon the work of itstwenty-sixthsession 6 May
-26 July 1974, Yearbook on the InternationalLaw Commission, 1974, vol
II, Part One, pp. 187-1Annex. p.934)
D.2.5.Thenotesontemporarilyapplication of treaties
were used by Antigua and Barbuda (Noteof 4 November 1981),
Bahamas (Note of 10 July 1973), Barbados (Note of 16 March
1967), Belize (Note of 29 September 1982), Botswana (Note of
October 1966), Brunei (Noteof 1 January 1984), Burundi (Note
of 26 June 1964), Grenada (Note of 19 August 1974), Guyana
(Note of 30 June 1966), Lesotho (Note of 22 March 1967),
Malawi (Note of 24 November 1964), Mauritius (Note of 12
March 1968), Nauru (28 May 1968), Papua New Guinea (Note
of 16 September 1975 and 24 September 1980), Saint
Christopher and Nevis (Noteof 15 November1983),Saint Lucia
(Note of 5 April 1979), Saint Vincentand the Grenadines (Note
of 30 September 1983), Solomon Islands (Note of 7 July 1978),
Surinam (Note of 29 November 1975), Swaziland (Note of 22October 1968), Tanganyika (Note of 9 December 1961) and
Zambia (Note of 1 Çeptem ber 1965). (Annex.pp. 941-973)
D.2.6. All those states subsequently entered into
particular multilateral treaties by separate notes either on the
basis of succession or by accession, as was registered by the
depositary.
Asfor theViefina Conventionon DiplomatieRelations
adopted on 18 April 1961 the countries proceeded in the
following manner; Aritigua and Barbuda did not enter; Bahamas
entered by notification of succession on 17 March 1977);
Barbados - by notification of successio~ on 6 May 1968; Belize
did not enter; Botswanaentered by notificationof succession on
11 April 1969); Brunei did not enter; Burundi - by notification of
accession on 1 May 1968); Grenadadid not enter; Guyana - by
notification of accession on 28 December 1972; Lesotho - by
notification of accession on 26 November 1969; Malawi - by
notification of acceission on 28 March 1968 Mauritids - $Iy
notification of succession on 18 July 1969; Nauru - by
notification of succeissionon6 May 1978; Papa New Guinea -
by notification of succession on 4 December 1975; Sairit
Christopher and Nevisdid not enter;Saint Lucia- by notification
of succession on 27 Augiist 1986; Saint Vincent atalithe
Grenadines did not enter; the Solornon Islands did not enter:
Surinam did not entcrr;Swaziland - by notification of accessiori
on 25 April 1969); Zstrribiby notification osuccession Qn16
June 7975.
(Mijitiiatei'Treatiec; deposited with the Secretary-Ger~eral.
Status as at 31 December 1993.)
D.2.7.S.silvlnihr?problern oftheternporary effect~f
the notification of sric:ceszion,the Intern~tisna!LawCatnmissicr~
proposcd a solution which was formulateo inArticles23 arid 27of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties. (Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly, Document A/9610/Rev.l., Report of the lnternational Law
Commission on the work of its twenty-sixthsession 6-M26 July 1974,
Yearbook on the lnternationalLaw Commission, 1974,vol. II, One, p.
235, 236,Annex. p. 975)
D.12.8.Article 23 of the 1978 Vienna Convenion on
Succession:of States in Respectof Treaties reads as follows:
"1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is
otherwise agreed, a newly independent State which makes a
notification of succession under article 17 or article 18,
paragraph 2,shall be considered a party to the treaty from the
date of the succession of States or from the date of entry into
force of the treaty, whichever is the later date.
"2. Nevertheless,the operation of the treaty shall be
considered as suspended as between the newly independent
State and the other partiesto the treaty untilthe date of making
of the notification of succession except in so far as that treaty
rnay be applied provisionally in accordance with Art. 27 or as
may be otherwise agreed.
"3..."
D.2.9. Pursuant to Article 72 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reflects the general
rule of law of treaties, the consequences cf the suspension of
the operation of a treaty are:
"1.Unlessthe treatyotherwiseprovides or the parties
otherwise agree, the suspension of the operation of a t:eaty
under its provisions or in accordance with the present
Convention: "a) releasesthe parties beiween which the opstation
of the treaty is suspended from the obligation io perfcrrm the
treaty in their mutual relations dtiring the pesiûd of the
suspension;
"b).."
0.2.10. Thepractice of using noies cn the temporary
application of treatie:; has been set ut in Article 27 of the 1978
Vienna Convention on Succession of SCatesin Respect of
Treaties and read as follows:
"1. If, at the date of the succession of States, a
multilateraltreâty was in force in respectof the territory to whtch
the succession of States relates and the newly independent
State gives notice of its intention that the treaty should be
applied provisionaiiy in respect of its territory, that treaty shall
appiy provisionally between the newly independent S'rai2 arsd
any party which exprcssly so agrees oï by reason cf ils'~o~di;;ct
D.2,11.Theabove mentisned rides setforih inAr-kt9s
23 arid 27 of the reievan: Vienna Convenion refIectthe rcclesof
customary international law; if the Court decides that th9
Appiicant State may enter into the 1948 Gent-zcideConver?ti=-;n
by notification of succession and considering th& ti-mAppllcast
Siaie has not offered by a separate rietc "i ~cliei=ia tre:if
Conver;tion ierr?poi-;oiriicyippiicabic, the r~ilesc>fthis et.i3~^rve:~tiofi
,>p.. >-.-.
vvould becorne opera~liile betiiveen the parfies as of 29 Clt ,-~,:L-.C!
1992. E. CONCLUSIONS REGARDINGTHE LAW
E.1.
The circumstances which constutute the background against
which the 'Submissions' of the Memorial are formulated, in so
far as the 'Submissilons'may be said to relate to the genocide
Convention (Which is denied by the Respondent State), are
dominated by elements of civil strife and, consequently, no
international dispute is involved over which the Court can
properly exercise its competence.
E.2. Alijai lzetbegovic has overstepped his powers
established by the Constitution by granting the authorization for
proceedings to be ir-iitiatedto settle the dispute.
E.3. The 1978ViennaConvenion on the Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties has not corne into force and
does not apply between the parties.
E.4. Art. 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties has not been the
result of codification and thus does not appfy as a rule 00
customary international law.
E.5. Present-daypractice has confirrnedthe oid "ciean
slate" rule with respect ta the newly-forrnedstateç. These séa'ces
enter irito the predecessor state's multilateral international
treaties by notification of accessiorii or succession if their
succession is inaccerdar~cewith Ir~lernatianlaw.
E.6.Thenotificationofsuccession hhas been created as
a pabieirlar instrurnerInthe decolonisation practiceand inyiies
that a newly-formed siate has açquired its independence i1-1accordance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples.
E.7.TheApplicant has violatedthe duties stemming
from the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples by its acts on the independence of State and thus it
cannot become a party to the 1948 Genocide Convention by
means of notification of succession.
E.8. The recognition of the newly-formed state was
granted in contravention of the rules of internationallaw. Given
that the Applicant State has, by claiming independence, has
violated the duties deriving from the ius cogens rule, the new
state's recognition cannot deny the illegal nature of those acts
and consequently, despite recognition, the Applicant State
cannot enter into the 1948 Convention on the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide by notification of
succession.
E.9. As the FR of Yugoslavia has not exercised
jurisdiction or any other authority in the relevant areas in the
period to which the Application relates,the required conditions
have not been achieved for the application of ArticlIX of the
1948 Genocide Convention.
E.10. The Applicant State could have entered into
the 1948Genocide Convention byaccession and agreesthat its
notification of succession of 29 December 1992 should be
interpreted as its accession to the Convention. The FR of
vtigoslavia holds that such an lnterpretationis impossible but if
the Court believes the contrary, this means that the 1948
Genocide Convenion has been in force between the pa~ies
since 29 March 1993. E.11. If the Court holds that the notification of
succession of 29 December 1992 has produced valid legal
effects, the 1948Genocide Conventionwould becomeoperative
between the parties as of 29 December 1992.
FRYugoslavia asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
First preliminary objection
A.1. Whereas civil war excludes the existence
of an international dispute,
the Application of the so-called Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not admissible.
Second preliminary objection
A.2.Whereas Alija lzetbegovic did not serve as the
President of the Republic at the time when he granted the
authorization to initiate proceedings and whereas the decision
to initiate proceedings was not taken by the Presidency nor the
Government as the competent organs, the authorization for the
initiation and conduct of proceedings was granted in violationof a rules of interna1 law of fundamental significance and,
consequently ,
the Application bythe so-called Republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina
is not admissible.
Third preliminary ob~ection
B.1. Whereas the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina has by its acts on independence flagrantly
violated the duties stemming from the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples and for that reason the
Notification of Succession, dated 29 December 1992, of the
Applicant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishmen of the Crime of Genocide has no legal effect,
Whereas the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina has not become a state party to the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide in accordance with the provisisons of the Convention
itself,
The so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is not a state party to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and consequently
the Court has no jurisdiction over this Case.
Fourth preliminarv objection 8.2. Whereas the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovinahasbeenrecognizedincontraventionofthe
rules of internationallawand that it has neverbeen established
in the territory andnthe form in which it pretends to exist ever
since its illegal decla.rationof independence,and that there are
at present four state.~in existencein the territory of the former
YugoslavrepublicofBosnia-Herzegovinat ,heso-calledRepublic
of Bosnia-Herzegovinais not a partyto the 1948 Conventionon
the Preventionand F'unishmentof the Crimeof Genocide, and
consequently,
the Court has no jurisdiction over this Case.
Fifthpreliminary objection
C. Whereasthe Case in point is an interna1conflict
between four sides in which the FRof Yugoslaviais not taking
part and whereas thie FR of Yugoslavia did not exercise any
jurisdiction over thetlisputed areasin the period under review,
Whereas the Mernorial of the Applicant State is
based upon afundannentally erroneousconstructionof the 1948
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide and, in consequence the claims contained in the
'Submissions' are based on allegations of State responsibility
which fall outside tlhe scope of the Convention and of its
compromissory clause,
there is no international dispute under Article IX of th1948
Convention on the Preventionand Punishmentof the Crime of
Genocide and, consequently,
the Court has no jurisdiction over this Case.If the Court does not accept any of the above-mentioned
preliminary objections,
Sixth preliminary objection
D.1. Without prejudice to the above exposed
preliminary objections, whereas the Notification of Succession,
dated 29 December 1992, whereby the so-called Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina expressed the intention to enter into the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide can only produce the effect of accession to
the Convention,
the Court has jurisdiction over this Case as of 29 March 1993
and, thus, the Applicant's claims pertaining to the alleged acts
or facts which occurred prior to that date do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
In case the. Court refuses to adopt the preliminary objection
under D.1.
Seventh preliminarv objection
D.2.. Without prejudice to the sixth preliminary
objection, if the Applicant State's Notification of Succession,
dated 29 December 1992, is construed on the basis that it has
the effect that the Applicant State became a party to the 1948
Genocide Convention from 6 March 1992,according to the rule
of customary international law, the 1948 Convention on the
Preventionand Punishmentof the Crimeof Genocide would not
be operative between the parties prior to 29 December 1992and, accordingly this would not conferjurisdiction on the Court
in respect of events occuring prior to 29 December 1992 and
consequently,
the Applicant's claims pertaining to the alleged acts or facts
which occurred prior to 29 December1992do notfall within the
jurisdiction of theouirt.
TheFederal RepublicofYugoslavia reservesitsright
to supplemet or amend its submissions in the light of further
pleadings.
Belgrade, 25 June 1995
Rodoljub Etinski
Agent of the Government
of the FRof Yugoslavia
Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia