Culminated

Code

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the French Republic

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/6

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/5

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 April 1972, the United Nations Administrative Tribunal gave, in Judgement No. 158, its ruling on a complaint by a former United Nations staff member concerning the non-renewal of his fixed-term contract. The staff member resorted to the machinery set up by the General Assembly in 1955, and applied for the review of this ruling to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements, which decided that there was a substantial basis for the application and requested the Court to give an advisory opinion on two questions arising from the Applicant’s contentions. In its Advisory Opinion of 12 July 1973, the Court decided to comply with the Committee’s request considering that the review procedure was not incompatible with the general principles of litigation. It expressed the opinion that, contrary to those contentions, the Tribunal had not failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and had not committed a fundamental error in procedure having occasioned a failure of justice.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Request for Advisory Opinion

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

3 July 1972

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Written Statements (Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Fasla)

15 September 1972

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 September 1958, Belgium instituted proceedings against Spain in connection with the adjudication in bankruptcy in Spain, in 1948, of the above-named company, formed in Toronto in 1911. The Application stated that the company’s share-capital belonged largely to Belgian nationals and claimed that the acts of organs of the Spanish State whereby the company had been declared bankrupt and liquidated were contrary to international law and that Spain, as responsible for the resultant damage, was under an obligation either to restore or to pay compensation for the liquidated assets. In May 1960, Spain filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, but before the time-limit fixed for its observations and submissions thereon Belgium informed the Court that it did not intend to go on with the proceedings. Accordingly, the case was removed from the List by an Order of 10 April 1961.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

English French Bilingual

French

Correspondence

23 September 1958

Correspondence

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala to the President of the International Court of Justice

9 September 1952

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

Statement of the Observations of the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein

11 May 1953

Verbatim record 1953/1 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on November 10th and 18th, 1953, the President, Sir Arnold McNair, presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1955/2 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on February 10th to 24th, March 2nd to 8th, and April 6th, 1955, the President, Mr. Hackworth, presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 18 November 1953

Preliminary Objection (including the text of the declaration of Judge Klaestad)

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 6 April 1955

Second Phase

English French

Summary 1955/1

Summary of the Judgment of 6 April 1955

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

The case was brought before the Court by Application by the United States following the occupation of its Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants on 4 November 1979, and the capture and holding as hostages of its diplomatic and consular staff. On a request by the United States for the indication of provisional measures, the Court held that there was no more fundamental prerequisite for relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, and it indicated provisional measures for ensuring the immediate restoration to the United States of the Embassy premises and the release of the hostages. In its decision on the merits of the case, at a time when the situation complained of still persisted, the Court, in its Judgment of 24 May 1980, found that Iran had violated and was still violating obligations owed by it to the United States under conventions in force between the two countries and rules of general international law, that the violation of these obligations engaged its responsibility, and that the Iranian Government was bound to secure the immediate release of the hostages, to restore the Embassy premises, and to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States Government. The Court reaffirmed the cardinal importance of the principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations. It pointed out that while, during the events of 4 November 1979, the conduct of militants could not be directly attributed to the Iranian State — for lack of sufficient information — that State had however done nothing to prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion or oblige the militants to withdraw from the premises and release the hostages. The Court noted that, after 4 November 1979, certain organs of the Iranian State had endorsed the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate them, so that those acts were transformed into acts of the Iranian State. The Court gave judgment, notwithstanding the absence of the Iranian Government and after rejecting the reasons put forward by Iran in two communications addressed to the Court in support of its assertion that the Court could not and should not entertain the case. The Court was not called upon to deliver a further judgment on the reparation for the injury caused to the United States Government since, by Order of 12 May 1981, the case was removed from the List following discontinuance.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Judgments

Judgment of 24 May 1980

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

English French

Summary 1980/1

Summary of the Judgment of 24 May 1980

Available in:

English French

The Court then considered the question of the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons in the light of the provisions of the Charter relating to the threat or use of force. It observed, inter alia, that those provisions applied to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. In addition it stated that the principle of proportionality might not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances. However at the same time, a use of force that was proportionate under the law of self-defence had, in order to be lawful, to meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict, including, in particular, the principles and rules of humanitarian law. It pointed out that the notions of a “threat” and “use” of force within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stood together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case was illegal — for whatever reason — the threat to use such force would likewise be illegal.

The Court then turned to the law applicable in situations of armed conflict. From a consideration of customary and conventional law, it concluded that the use of nuclear weapons could not be seen as specifically prohibited on the basis of that law, nor did it find any specific prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in the treaties that expressly prohibited the use of certain weapons of mass destruction. The Court then turned to an examination of customary international law to determine whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such flowed from that source of law. Noting that the members of the international community were profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50 years constituted the expression of an opinio juris, it did not consider itself able to find that there was such an opinio juris. The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such was hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the doctrine of deterrence on the other. The Court then dealt with the question whether recourse to nuclear weapons ought to be considered as illegal in the light of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict and of the law of neutrality. It laid emphasis on two cardinal principles : (a) the first being aimed at the distinction between combatants and non-combatants ; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets while (b) according to the second of those principles, unnecessary suffering should not be caused to combatants. It follows that States do not have unlimited freedom of choice in the weapons they use. The Court also referred to the Martens Clause, according to which civilians and combatants remained under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.

The Court indicated that, although the applicability to nuclear weapons of the principles and rules of humanitarian law and of the principle of neutrality was not disputed, the conclusions to be drawn from it were, on the other hand, controversial. It pointed out that, in view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, the use of such weapons seemed scarcely reconcilable with respect for the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict. The Court was led to observe that “in view of the current state of international law and of the elements of fact at its disposal, [it] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. The Court added, lastly, that there was an obligation to pursue in good faith and to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Request for Advisory Opinion

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

6 January 1995

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Available in:

English

Orders

Order of 1 February 1995

Fixing of time-limits: Written Statements and Written Comments on the Written Statements

Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 May 1996, the Government of Botswana and the Government of Namibia notified jointly to the Registrar of the Court a Special Agreement which had been signed between them on 15 February 1996 and had entered into force on 15 May 1996, for the submission to the Court of the dispute existing between them concerning the boundary around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the legal status of that island. The Special Agreement referred to a Treaty between Great Britain and Germany concerning the respective spheres of influence of the two countries, signed on 1 July 1890, and to the appointment on 24 May 1992 of a Joint Team of Technical Experts to determine the boundary between Namibia and Botswana around Kasikili/Sedudu Island on the basis of that Treaty and of the applicable principles of international law. Unable to reach a conclusion on the question submitted to it, the Joint Team of Technical Experts recommended recourse to a peaceful settlement of the dispute on the basis of the applicable rules and principles of international law. At a Summit Meeting held in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 15 February 1995, the Presidents of the two States agreed to submit the dispute to the Court.

Taking account of the relevant provisions of the Special Agreement, the Court, by an Order dated 24 June 1996, fixed time-limits for the filing, by each of the Parties, of a Memorial and a Counter-Memorial. Those pleadings were duly filed within the time-limits fixed.

The Court, in view of the agreement between the Parties, also authorized the filing of a Reply by each Party. The Replies were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.

In its Judgment of 13 December 1999, the Court began by stating that the island in question, which in Namibia is known as “Kasikili”, and in Botswana as “Sedudu”, is approximately 3.5 sq km in area, that it is located in the Chobe River, which divides around it to the north and south, and that it is subject to flooding of several months’ duration, beginning around March. It briefly outlined the historical context of the dispute, then examined the text of the 1890 Treaty, which, in respect of the region concerned, located the dividing line between the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Germany in the “main channel” of the River Chobe. In the Court’s opinion, the real dispute between the Parties concerned the location of that main channel, Botswana contending that it was the channel running north of Kasikili/Sedudu Island and Namibia the channel running south of the island. Since the Treaty did not define the notion of “main channel”, the Court itself proceeded to determine which was the main channel of the Chobe River around the Island. In order to do so, it took into consideration, inter alia, the depth and the width of the channel, the flow (i.e., the volume of water carried), the bed profile configuration and the navigability of the channel. After considering the figures submitted by the Parties, as well as surveys carried out on the ground at different periods, the Court concluded that “the northern channel of the River Chobe around Kasikili/Sedudu Island must be regarded as its main channel”. Having invoked the object and purpose of the 1890 Treaty and its travaux préparatoires, the Court examined at length the subsequent practice of the parties to the Treaty. The Court found that that practice did not result in any agreement between them regarding the interpretation of the Treaty or the application of its provisions. The Court further stated that it could not draw conclusions from the cartographic material “in view of the absence of any map officially reflecting the intentions of the parties to the 1890 Treaty” and in the light of “the uncertainty and inconsistency” of the maps submitted by the Parties to the dispute. It finally considered Namibia’s alternative argument that it and its predecessors had prescriptive titles to Kasikili/Sedudu Island by virtue of the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction over it since the beginning of the century, with the full knowledge and acceptance of the authorities of Botswana and its predecessors. The Court found that, while the Masubia of the Caprivi Strip (territory belonging to Namibia) did indeed use the island for many years, they did so intermittently, according to the seasons and for exclusively agricultural purposes, without it being established that they occupied the island à titre de souverain, i.e., that they were exercising functions of State authority there on behalf of the Caprivi authorities. The Court therefore rejected that argument. After concluding that the boundary between Botswana and Namibia around Kasikili/Sedudu Island followed the line of deepest soundings in the northern channel of the Chobe and that the island formed part of the territory of Botswana, the Court recalled that, under the terms of an agreement concluded in May 1992 (the “Kasane Communiqué”), the Parties had undertaken to one another that there should be unimpeded navigation for craft of their nationals and flags in the channels around the Island.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

29 May 1996

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Orders

Order of 24 June 1996

Fixing of time-limits: Memorials and Counter-Memorials

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 27 February 1998

Fixing of time-limit: Replies

English French

Press releases

On 27 February 1998, the Court delivered two Judgments on the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Court first began by dismissing the Respondents’ respective objections to jurisdiction on the basis of the alleged absence of a dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention. It declared that it had jurisdiction on the basis of Article 14, paragraph 1, of that Convention to hear the disputes between Libya and the respondent States concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The Court then went on to dismiss the objection to admissibility based on Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). Lastly, it found that the objection raised by each of the respondent States on the ground that those resolutions would have rendered the claims of Libya without object did not, in the circumstances of the case, have an exclusively preliminary character.

In June 1999, the Court authorized Libya to submit a Reply, and the United Kingdom and the United States to file Rejoinders. Those pleadings were filed by the Parties within the time-limits laid down by the Court and its President.

By two letters of 9 September 2003, the Governments of Libya and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and of Libya and the United States on the other, jointly notified the Court that they had “agreed to discontinue with prejudice the proceedings”. Following those notifications, the President of the Court, on 10 September 2003, made an Order in each case placing on record the discontinuance of the proceedings with prejudice, by agreement of the Parties, and directing the removal of the case from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

3 March 1992

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

3 March 1992

volume I

English

volume I, basic documents

English

volume II

English

volume III

English

Observations and Submissions of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom (French version only)

22 December 1995

Judgment of 27 February 1998

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

English French

Summary 1998/2

Summary of the Judgment of 27 February 1998

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 14 April and 5 June 1972, respectively, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against Iceland concerning a dispute over the proposed extension by Iceland, as from 1 September 1972, of the limits of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from a distance of 12 to a distance of 50 nautical miles. Iceland declared that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and declined to be represented in the proceedings or file pleadings. At the request of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, the Court in 1972 indicated, and in 1973 confirmed, provisional measures to the effect that Iceland should refrain from implementing, with respect to their vessels, the new regulations regarding the extension of the zone of its exclusive fishing rights, and that the annual catch of those vessels in the disputed area should be limited to certain maxima. In Judgments delivered on 2 February 1973, the Court found that it possessed jurisdiction ; and in Judgments on the merits of 25 July 1974, it found that the Icelandic regulations. constituting a unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 nautical miles were not opposable to either the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, that Iceland was not entitled unilaterally to exclude their fishing vessels from the disputed area, and that the Parties were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

14 April 1972

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Interim Measures submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

19 July 1972

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Order of 18 August 1972

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 25 July 1974

Merits

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings against France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific region. France stated that it considered the Court manifestly to lack jurisdiction and refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings. By two Orders of 22 June 1973, the Court, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, indicated provisional measures to the effect, inter alia , that pending judgment France should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. By two Judgments delivered on 20 December 1974, the Court found that the Applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and that it was therefore not called upon to give any decision thereon. In so doing the Court based itself on the conclusion that the objective of Australia and New Zealand had been achieved inasmuch as France, in various public statements, had announced its intention of carrying out no further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of the 1974 series.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

9 May 1973

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1973 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 21, 22, 23 and 25 May 1973, President Lachs presiding, and on 22 June 1973, Vice-President Ammoun presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1974 (bilingual version)

Oral arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the public sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 July and 20 December 1974, President Lachs presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press release 1974/12 (French version only)

Culminated

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal)

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom)

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

Written proceedings

29 April 1999

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

5 January 2000

Available in:

5 July 2000

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Monday 10 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 10 May 1999, at 5.10 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 3.35 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 20 April 2004, at 11 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 21 April 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 22 April 2004, at 4.10 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 23 April 2004, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

19 February 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

28 February 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

27 February 2004

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Orders

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Declaration of Vice-President Weeramantry

Declaration by Judge Shi

Declaration by Judge Koroma

Declaration by Judge Vereshchetin

Separate opinion by Judge Oda

Separate opinion by Judge Parra-Aranguren

Dissenting opinion by Judge ad hoc Kreca