Culminated

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 8 July 1991, Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit’at Jaradah and the delimitation of their maritime areas. Qatar founded the jurisdiction of the Court upon certain agreements between the Parties stated to have been concluded in December 1987 and December 1990, the subject and scope of the commitment to accept that jurisdiction being determined by a formula proposed by Bahrain to Qatar in October 1988 and accepted by the latter State in December 1990 (the “Bahraini formula”). As Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar, the Parties agreed that the written proceedings should first be addressed to the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. After a Memorial of the Applicant and Counter-Memorial of the Respondent had been filed, the Court directed that a Reply and a Rejoinder be filed by each of them, respectively.

On 1 July 1994 the Court delivered a first Judgment on the above-mentioned questions. It took the view that both the exchanges of letters of December 1987 between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Qatar, and between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain, and the document entitled “Minutes” and signed at Doha in December 1990 constituted international agreements creating rights and obligations for the Parties ; and that by the terms of those agreements they had undertaken to submit to the Court the whole of the dispute between them. In the latter regard, the Court pointed out that the Application of Qatar did not cover some of the constitutive elements that the Bahraini formula was supposed to cover. It accordingly decided to give the Parties the opportunity to submit to it “the whole of the dispute” as circumscribed by the Minutes of 1990 and that formula, while fixing 30 November 1994 as the time-limit within which the Parties were, jointly or separately, to take action to that end. On the prescribed date, Qatar filed a document entitled “Act”, which referred to the absence of an agreement between the Parties to act jointly and declared that it was submitting “the whole of the dispute” to the Court. On the same day, Bahrain filed a document entitled “Report” in which it indicated, inter alia, that the submission to the Court of “the whole of the dispute” must be “consensual in character, that is, a matter of agreement between the Parties”. By observations submitted to the Court at a later time, Bahrain indicated that the unilateral “Act” of Qatar did not “create that jurisdiction [of the Court] or effect a valid submission in the absence of Bahrain’s consent”. By a second Judgment on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, delivered on 15 February 1995, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it between Qatar and Bahrain, and that the Application of Qatar, as formulated on 30 November 1994, was admissible. The Court, having proceeded to an examination of the two paragraphs constituting the Doha Agreement, found that, in that Agreement, the Parties had reasserted their consent to its jurisdiction and had defined the object of the dispute in accordance with the Bahraini formula ; it further found that the Doha Agreement permitted the unilateral seisin and that it was now seised of the whole of the dispute. By two Orders, the Court subsequently fixed and then extended the time-limit within which each of the Parties could file a Memorial on the merits.

Following the objections raised by Bahrain as to the authenticity of certain documents annexed to the Memorial and Counter-Memorial of Qatar, the Court, by an Order of 30 March 1998, fixed a time-limit for the filing, by the latter, of a report concerning the authenticity of each of the disputed documents. By the same Order, the Court directed the submission of a Reply on the merits of the dispute by each of the Parties. Qatar having decided to disregard the challenged documents for the purposes of the case, the Court, by an Order of 17 February 1999, decided that the Replies would not rely on those documents. It also granted an extension of the time-limit for the filing of the said Replies.

In its Judgment of 16 March 2001, the Court, after setting out the procedural background in the case, recounted the complex history of the dispute. It noted that Bahrain and Qatar had concluded exclusive protection agreements with Great Britain in 1892 and 1916 respectively, and that that status of protected States had ended in 1971. The Court further cited the disputes which had arisen between Bahrain and Qatar on the occasion, inter alia, of the granting of concessions to oil companies, as well as the efforts made to settle those disputes.

The Court first considered the Parties’ claims to Zubarah. It stated that, in the period after 1868, the authority of the Sheikh of Qatar over Zubarah had been gradually consolidated, that it had been acknowledged in the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 29 July 1913 and definitively established in 1937. It further stated that there was no evidence that members of the Naim tribe had exercised sovereign authority on behalf of the Sheikh of Bahrain within Zubarah. Accordingly, it concluded that Qatar had sovereignty over Zubarah.

Turning to the Hawar Islands, the Court stated that the decision by which the British Government had found in 1939 that those islands belonged to Bahrain did not constitute an arbitral award, but that did not mean that it was devoid of legal effect. It noted that Bahrain and Qatar had consented to Great Britain settling their dispute at the time and found that the 1939 decision must be regarded as a decision that was binding from the outset on both States and continued to be so after 1971. Rejecting Qatar’s arguments that the decision was null and void, the Court concluded that Bahrain had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands.

The Court observed that the British decision of 1939 did not mention Janan Island, which it considered as forming a single island with Hadd Janan. It pointed out, however, that in letters sent in 1947 to the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain, the British Government had made it clear that “Janan Island is not regarded as being included in the islands of the Hawar group”. The Court considered that the British Government, in so doing, had provided an authoritative interpretation of its 1939 decision, an interpretation which revealed that it regarded Janan as belonging to Qatar. Accordingly, Qatar had sovereignty over Janan Island, including Hadd Janan.

The Court then turned to the question of the maritime delimitation. It recalled that international customary law was the applicable law in the case and that the Parties had requested it to draw a single maritime boundary. In the southern part, the Court had to draw a boundary delimiting the territorial seas of the Parties, areas over which they enjoyed territorial sovereignty (including sea-bed, superjacent waters and superjacent aerial space). In the northern part, the Court had to make a delimitation between areas in which the Parties had only sovereign rights and functional jurisdiction (continental shelf, exclusive economic zone).

With respect to the territorial seas, the Court considered that it had to draw provisionally an equidistance line (a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured) and then to consider whether that line must be adjusted in the light of any special circumstances. As the Parties had not specified the baselines to be used, the Court recalled that, under the applicable rules of law, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea was the low-water line along the coast. It observed that Bahrain had not included a claim to the status of archipelagic State in its formal submissions and that the Court was therefore not requested to take a position on that issue. In order to determine what constituted the Parties’ relevant coasts, the Court first had to establish which islands came under their sovereignty. Bahrain had claimed to have sovereignty over the islands of Jazirat Mashtan and Umm Jalid, a claim which had not been contested by Qatar. As to Qit’at Jaradah, the nature of which was disputed, the Court held that it should be considered as an island because it was above water at high tide ; the Court added that the activities which had been carried out by Bahrain were sufficient to support its claim of sovereignty over the island. With regard to low-tide elevations, the Court, after noting that international treaty law was silent on the question whether those elevations should be regarded as “territory”, found that low-tide elevations situated in the overlapping area of the territorial seas of both States could not be taken into consideration for the purposes of drawing the equidistance line. That was true of Fasht ad Dibal, which both Parties regarded as a low-tide elevation. The Court then considered whether there were any special circumstances which made it necessary to adjust the equidistance line in order to obtain an equitable result. It found that there were such circumstances which justified choosing a delimitation line passing on the one hand between Fasht al Azm and Qit’at ash Shajarah and, on the other, between Qit’at Jaradah and Fasht ad Dibal.

In the northern part, the Court, citing its case law, followed the same approach, provisionally drawing an equidistance line and examining whether there were circumstances requiring an adjustment of that line. The Court rejected Bahrain’s argument that the existence of certain pearling banks situated to the north of Qatar, and which were predominantly exploited in the past by Bahraini fishermen, constituted a circumstance justifying a shifting of the line. It also rejected Qatar’s argument that there was a significant disparity between the coastal lengths of the Parties calling for an appropriate correction. The Court further stated that considerations of equity required that the maritime formation of Fasht al Jarim should have no effect in determining the boundary line.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

8 July 1991

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2000/5 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Monday 29 May 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2000/6 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 30 May 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 1 July 1994

Jurisdiction and Admissibility

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Vice-President Schwebel

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Valticos (translation)

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 15 February 1995

Jurisdiction and Admissibility

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Judgment of 16 March 2001

Merits

English French

Press release 2001/9

16 March 2001

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) - The Court finds that Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah and Janan Island and that the low-tide elevation of Fasht ad Dibal falls under the sovereignty of Qatar; it finds that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar Islands and the island of Qit'at Jaradah; and it draws a single maritime boundary between the two States

Available in:

English French

Correspondence

25 September 1997

Correspondence

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 27 October 1966, the General Assembly decided that the Mandate for South West Africa was terminated and that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory. In 1969 the Security Council called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from the Territory, and on 30 January 1970 it declared that the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia was illegal and that all acts taken by the South African Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate were illegal and invalid; it further called upon all States to refrain from any dealings with the South African Government that were incompatible with that declaration. On 29 July 1970, the Security Council decided to request of the Court an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. In its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, the Court found that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw its administration immediately. It found that States Members of the United Nations were under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration. Finally, it stated that it was incumbent upon States which were not Members of the United Nations to give assistance in the action which had been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Request for Advisory Opinion

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

5 August 1970

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1971 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 27 January, from 8 February to 17 March, and on 21 June 1971, the President, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971

Available in:

English French

English French

Correspondence

29 July 1970

Correspondence

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

By a letter dated 7 August 1998, the Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the Registry Decision 1998/297 of 5 August 1998, by which the Economic and Social Council requested the Court for an advisory opinion on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, and on the legal obligations of Malaysia in that case. The Special Rapporteur, Mr. Cumaraswamy, was facing several lawsuits filed in Malaysian courts by plaintiffs who asserted that he had used defamatory language in an interview published in a specialist journal and who were seeking damages for a total amount of US$112 million. However, according to the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Cumaraswamy had been speaking in his official capacity as Special Rapporteur and was thus immune from legal process by virtue of the above-mentioned Convention.

Written statements having been filed by the Secretary-General and by various States, public sittings were held on 7, 8 and 10 December 1998, during which the Court heard oral statements by the representative of the United Nations and three States, including Malaysia. In its Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999, having concluded that it had jurisdiction to render such an opinion, the Court noted that a Special Rapporteur entrusted with a mission for the United Nations must be regarded as an expert on mission within the meaning of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. It observed that Malaysia had acknowledged that Mr. Cumaraswamy was an expert on mission and that such experts enjoyed the privileges and immunities provided for under the Convention in their relations with States parties, including those of which they were nationals. The Court then considered whether the immunity applied to Mr. Cumaraswamy in the specific circumstances of the case. It emphasized that it was the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, who had the primary responsibility and authority to assess whether its agents had acted within the scope of their functions and, where he so concluded, to protect those agents by asserting their immunity. The Court observed that, in the case concerned, the Secretary-General had been reinforced in his view that Mr. Cumaraswamy had spoken in his official capacity by the fact that the contentious Article several times explicitly referred to his capacity as Special Rapporteur, and that in 1997 the Commission on Human Rights had extended his mandate, thereby acknowledging that he had not acted outside his functions by giving the interview. Considering the legal obligations of Malaysia, the Court indicated that, when national courts are seised of a case in which the immunity of a United Nations agent is in issue, they must immediately be notified of any finding by the Secretary-General concerning that immunity and that they must give it the greatest weight. Questions of immunity are preliminary issues which must be expeditiously decided by national courts in limine litis. As the conduct of an organ of a State, including its courts, must be regarded as an act of that State, the Court concluded that the Government of Malaysia had not acted in accordance with its obligations under international law in the case concerned.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Request for Advisory Opinion

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

10 August 1998

Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Written Statement of the Government of Malaysia

Available in:

Written Comments of the Government of the United States of America

6 November 1998

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 10 August 1998

Decision on furnishing of information; fixing of time-limits : Written Statements and Written Comments on Written Statements

Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 21 August 1995, the New Zealand Government filed in the Registry a document entitled “Request for an Examination of the Situation” in which reference was made to a “proposed action announced by France which will, if carried out, affect the basis of the Judgment rendered by the Court on 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case”, namely “a decision announced by France in a media statement of 13 June 1995” by the President of the French Republic, according to which “France would conduct a final series of eight nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific starting in September 1995”. In that Request, the Court was reminded that, at the end of its 1974 Judgment, it had found that it was not called upon to give a decision on the claim submitted by New Zealand in 1973, that claim no longer having any object, by virtue of the declarations by which France had undertaken not to carry out further atmospheric nuclear tests. That Judgment contained a paragraph 63 worded as follows

“Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court’s function to contemplate that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute . . .”

New Zealand asserted that this paragraph gave it the “right”, in such circumstances, to request “the resumption of the case begun by application on 9 May 1973”, and observed that the operative part of the Judgment concerned could not be construed as showing any intention on the part of the Court definitively to close the case. On the same day, the New Zealand Government also filed in the Registry a “Further Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures” in which reference was made, inter alia, to the Order for the indication of provisional measures made by the Court on 22 June 1973, which was principally aimed at ensuring that France would refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls.

After holding public hearings on 11 and 12 September 1995, the Court made its Order on 22 September 1995. The Court found that, when inserting into paragraph 63 the sentence “the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute”, it had not excluded a special procedure for access to it (unlike those mentioned in the Court’s Statute, such as the filing of a new application, or a request for interpretation or revision, which would have been open to the Applicant in any event) ; however, it found that that special procedure would only be available to the Applicant if circumstances were to arise which affected the basis of the 1974 Judgment. And that, it found, was not the case, as the decision announced by France in 1995 had related to a series of underground tests, whereas the basis of the Judgment of 1974 was France’s undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric nuclear tests. Consequently, New Zealand’s Request for provisional measures and the Applications for permission to intervene submitted by Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia as well as the Declarations of Intervention made by the last four States, all of which were proceedings incidental to New Zealand’s main request, likewise had to be dismissed.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

21 August 1995

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Summary of the Order of 22 September 1995

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 3 April 1998, the Republic of Paraguay filed in the Registry an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. Paraguay based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute and on Article I of the Optional Protocol which accompanies the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and which gives the Court jurisdiction as regards the settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of that Convention. In its Application, Paraguay indicated that, in 1992, the authorities of the Commonwealth of Virginia had arrested a Paraguayan national, charged and convicted him of culpable homicide and sentenced him to death without informing him of his rights as required by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention. Those rights included the right to request that the relevant consular office of the State of which he was a national be advised of his arrest and detention and the right to communicate with that office. It was further alleged by the Applicant that the authorities of the Commonwealth of Virginia had not advised the Paraguayan consular officers, who were therefore only able to render assistance to him from 1996, when the Paraguayan Government learned of the case by its own means. Paraguay asked the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States of America had violated its international legal obligations towards Paraguay and that the latter was entitled to “restitution in kind”.

The same day, 3 April 1998, Paraguay also submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the national concerned was not executed pending a decision by the Court. At a public hearing on 9 April 1998, the Court made an Order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Paraguay. The Court unanimously found that the United States of America should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that the Paraguayan national concerned was not executed pending the decision by the Court. By an Order the same day, the Vice-President, acting as President, having regard to the Court’s Order for the indication of provisional measures and the agreement of the Parties, fixed the time-limits for the filing of the Memorial and the Counter-Memorial. Paraguay filed its Memorial on 9 October 1998.

By letter of 2 November 1998, Paraguay indicated that it wished to discontinue the proceedings with prejudice. The United States of America concurred in the discontinuance on 3 November. On 10 November 1998, the Court therefore made an Order placing on record the discontinuance and directing the case to be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of the Republic of Paraguay

3 April 1998

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French

Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay

9 October 1998

Available in:

English

Oral proceedings

Orders

Order of 9 April 1998

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 9 April 1998

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of President Schwebel

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Summary 1998/3

Summary of the Order of 9 April 1998

Available in:

English French

Summary 1998/4

Summary of the Order of 10 November 1998

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 20 March 1993, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948, as well as various matters which Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed were connected therewith. The Application invoked Article IX of the Genocide Convention as the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court. Subsequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina also invoked certain additional bases of jurisdiction.

On 20 March 1993, immediately after the filing of its Application, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute and, on 1 April 1993, Yugoslavia submitted written observations on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Request for provisional measures, in which it, in turn, recommended the Court to order the application of provisional measures to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By an Order dated 8 April 1993, the Court, after hearing the Parties, indicated certain provisional measures with a view to the protection of rights under the Genocide Convention. On 27 July 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted a new Request for the indication of provisional measures and, on 10 August 1993, Yugoslavia also submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures. By an Order dated 13 September 1993, the Court, after hearing the Parties, reaffirmed the measures indicated in its Order of 8 April 1993 and declared that those measures should be immediately and effectively implemented. Then, within the extended time-limit of 30 June 1995 for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, Yugoslavia, referring to Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, raised preliminary objections concerning both the admissibility of the Application and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the case.

In its Judgment of 11 July 1996, the Court rejected the preliminary objections raised by Yugoslavia and found that it had jurisdiction to deal with the dispute on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, dismissing the additional bases of jurisdiction invoked by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among other things, it found that the Convention bound the two Parties and that there was a legal dispute between them falling within the provisions of Article IX.

By an Order dated 23 July 1996, the President of the Court fixed 23 July 1997 as the time-limit for the filing by Yugoslavia of its Counter-Memorial on the merits. The Counter-Memorial was filed within the prescribed time-limit and contained counter-claims, by which Yugoslavia requested the Court, among other things, to adjudge and declare that Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible for acts of genocide committed against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for other violations of the Genocide Convention. The admissibility of the counter-claims under Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court having been called into question by Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court ruled on the matter, declaring, in its Order of 17 December 1997, that the counter-claims were admissible as such and formed part of the proceedings in the case. The Reply of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Rejoinder of Yugoslavia were subsequently filed within the time-limits laid down by the Court and its President. During 1999 and 2000, various exchanges of letters took place concerning new procedural difficulties which had emerged in the case. In April 2001, Yugoslavia informed the Court that it wished to withdraw its counter-claims. As Bosnia and Herzegovina had raised no objection, the President of the Court, by an Order of 10 September 2001, placed on record the withdrawal by Yugoslavia of the counter-claims it had submitted in its Counter-Memorial. On 4 May 2001, Yugoslavia submitted to the Court a document entitled “Initiative to the Court to reconsider ex officio jurisdiction over Yugoslavia”, in which it first asserted that the Court had no jurisdiction ratione personae over Serbia and Montenegro and secondly requested the Court to “suspend proceedings regarding the merits of the case until a decision on this Initiative”, i.e., on the jurisdictional issue, had been rendered. On 1 July 2001, it also filed an Application for revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 ; this was found to be inadmissible by the Court in its Judgment of 3 February 2003. In a letter dated 12 June 2003, the Registrar informed the Parties to the case that the Court had decided that it could not accede to the Applicant’s request to suspend the proceedings on the merits.

Following public hearings held between 27 February 2006 and 9 May 2006, the Court rendered its Judgment on the merits on 26 February 2007. It began by examining the new jurisdictional issues raised by the Respondent arising out of its admission as a new Member of the United Nations in 2001. The Court affirmed that it had jurisdiction on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, stating in particular that its 1996 Judgment, whereby it found it had jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention, benefited from the “fundamental” principle of res judicata, which guaranteed “the stability of legal relations”, and that it was in the interest of each Party “that an issue which has already been adjudicated in favour of that party be not argued again”. The Court then made extensive findings of fact as to whether alleged atrocities had occurred and, if so, whether they could be characterized as genocide. After determining that massive killings and other atrocities were perpetrated during the conflict throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court found that these acts were not accompanied by the specific intent that defines the crime of genocide, namely the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group. The Court did, however, find that the killings in Srebrenica in July 1995 were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of Bosnian Muslims in that area and that what happened there was indeed genocide. The Court found that there was corroborated evidence which indicated that the decision to kill the adult male population of the Muslim community in Srebrenica had been taken by some members of the VRS (Army of the Republika Srpska) Main Staff. The evidence before the Court, however, did not prove that the acts of the VRS could be attributed to the Respondent under the rules of international law of State responsibility. Nonetheless, the Court found that the Republic of Serbia had violated its obligation contained in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention to prevent the Srebrenica genocide. The Court observed that this obligation required States that are aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed, to employ all means reasonably available to them to prevent genocide, within the limits permitted by international law

The Court further held that the Respondent had violated its obligation to punish the perpetrators of genocide, including by failing to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with respect to the handing over for trial of General Ratko Mladić. This failure constituted a violation of the Respondent’s duties under Article VI of the Genocide Convention.

In respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s request for reparation, the Court found that, since it had not been shown that the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact have been averted if Serbia had attempted to prevent it, financial compensation for the failure to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica was not the appropriate form of reparation. The Court considered that the most appropriate form of satisfaction would be a declaration in the operative clause of the Judgment that Serbia had failed to comply with the obligation to prevent the crime of genocide. As for the obligation to punish acts of genocide, the Court found that a declaration in the operative clause that Serbia had violated its obligations under the Convention and that it must transfer individuals accused of genocide to the ICTY and must co-operate fully with the Tribunal would constitute appropriate satisfaction.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

20 March 1993

Available in:

English French

Supplementary Submission in support of the Application of the Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting legal proceedings against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the basis of the 1948 Genocide Convention and in the support of its Request for an Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection

22 March 1993

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English

Document submitted by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as constituting additional source of jurisdiction

31 March 1993

Available in:

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

20 March 1993

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English

22 March 1993

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Written Observations on the Request submitted by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English

Withdrawal of Counter-claims by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

20 April 2001

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 8 April 1993

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge ad hoc Kreca

English French Bilingual

Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma

English French Bilingual

Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 11 July 1996

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 March 1995, Spain filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Canada with respect to a dispute relating to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, as amended on 12 May 1994, to the implementing regulations of that Act, and to certain measures taken on the basis of that legislation, more particularly the boarding on the high seas, on 9 March 1995, of a fishing boat, the Estai, sailing under the Spanish flag. Spain indicated, inter alia, that by the amended Act an attempt was made to impose on all persons on board foreign ships a broad prohibition on fishing in the Regulatory Area of the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), that is, on the high seas, outside Canada’s exclusive economic zone, while expressly permitting the use of force against foreign fishing boats in the zones that that Act terms the “high seas”. Spain added that the implementing regulation of 3 March 1995 “expressly permit[s] such conduct as regards Spanish and Portuguese ships on the high seas”. The Application of Spain alleged the violation of various principles and norms of international law and stated that there was a dispute between Spain and Canada which, going beyond the framework of fishing, seriously affected the very principle of the freedom of the high seas and, moreover, implied a very serious infringement of the sovereign rights of Spain. As a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Application referred to the declarations of Spain and of Canada made in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. As Canada contested the jurisdiction of the Court, on the basis of its aforementioned declaration, it was decided that the written pleadings should focus initially upon that question of jurisdiction. A Memorial of the Applicant and a Counter-Memorial of the Respondent were filed in that respect. By an Order dated 8 May 1996, the Court decided not to authorize the presentation of a Reply of the Applicant and a Rejoinder of the Respondent.

In its Judgment of 4 December 1998, the Court found that the dispute between the Parties was a dispute that had “ar[isen]” out of “conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area” and “the enforcement of such measures”, and that, consequently, it was within the terms of one of the reservations in the Canadian declaration. The Court found that it therefore had no jurisdiction to adjudicate in the case.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

28 March 1995

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Kingdom of Spain (French version only)

28 September 1995

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

French

Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Counter-Memorial of Canada (French version only)

29 February 1996

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

French

Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 2 May 1995

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 8 May 1996

Decision to not authorize filing of Reply and Rejoinder on question of jurisdiction

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

The Minquiers and Ecrehos are two groups of islets situated between the British island of Jersey and the coast of France. Under a Special Agreement between France and the United Kingdom, the Court was asked to determine which of the Parties had produced the more convincing proof of title to these groups of islets. After the conquest of England by William, Duke of Normandy, in 1066, the islands had formed part of the Union between England and Normandy which lasted until 1204, when Philip Augustus of France conquered Normandy but failed to occupy the islands. The United Kingdom submitted that the islands then remained united with England and that this situation was placed on a legal basis by subsequent treaties between the two countries. France contended that the Minquiers and Ecrehos were held by France after 1204, and referred to the same medieval treaties as those relied on by the United Kingdom. In its Judgment of 17 November 1953, the Court considered that none of those treaties stated specifically which islands were held by the King of England or by the King of France. Moreover, what was of decisive importance was not indirect presumptions based on matters in the Middle Ages, but direct evidence of possession and the actual exercise of sovereignty. After considering this evidence, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos belonged to the United Kingdom.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

6 December 1951

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1953 (bilingual version)

Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from September 17th to October 8th, and November 17th, 1953, the Vice-President, M. Guerrero, presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 17 November 1953

(including the text of the declaration of Judge Alvarez)

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Individual Opinion of Judge Basdevant (translation)

English French Bilingual

Individual Opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro (translation)

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 1953/2

Summary of the Judgment of 17 November 1953

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 November 1992, the Islamic Republic of Iran filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America with respect to the destruction of Iranian oil platforms. The Islamic Republic founded the jurisdiction of the Court upon a provision of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States, signed at Tehran on 15 August 1955. In its Application, Iran alleged that the destruction caused by several warships of the United States Navy, in October 1987 and April 1988, to three offshore oil production complexes, owned and operated for commercial purposes by the National Iranian Oil Company, constituted a fundamental breach of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity and of international law. Time-limits for the filing of written pleadings were then fixed and subsequently extended by two Orders of the President of the Court. On 16 December 1993, within the extended time-limit for filing the Counter-Memorial, the United States of America filed a preliminary objection to the Court’s jurisdiction. In accordance with the terms of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended ; by an Order of 18 January 1994, the Court fixed 1 July 1994 as the time-limit within which Iran could present a written statement of its observations and submissions on the objection, which was filed within the prescribed time-limit.

In its Judgment of 12 December 1996, the Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by the United States of America and found that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of 1955, to entertain the claims made by Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty, which protects freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the Parties.

When filing its Counter-Memorial, the United States of America submitted a counter-claim requesting the Court to adjudge and declare that, through its actions in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988, Iran had also breached its obligations under Article X of the Treaty of 1955. Iran having disputed the admissibility of that counter-claim under Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules, the Court ruled on the matter in an Order of 10 March 1998. It found that the counter-claim was admissible as such and formed part of the current proceedings, and directed Iran to submit a Reply and the United States to submit a Rejoinder. Those pleadings were filed within the extended time-limits thus fixed. In its Order of 1998, the Court also stated that it was necessary, in order to ensure strict equality between the Parties, to reserve the right of Iran to present its views in writing a second time on the counter-claim, in an additional pleading, the filing of which might be the subject of a subsequent Order. Such an Order was made by the Vice-President on 28 August 2001, and Iran subsequently filed its additional pleading within the time-limits fixed. Public sittings on the claim of Iran and the counter-claim of the United States of America were held from 17 February to 7 March 2003.

The Court delivered its Judgment on 6 November 2003. Iran had contended that, in attacking on two occasions and destroying three offshore oil production complexes, owned and operated for commercial purposes by the National Iranian Oil Company, the United States had violated freedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties as guaranteed by the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. It sought reparation for the injury thus caused. The United States had argued in its counter-claim that it was Iran which had violated the 1955 Treaty by attacking vessels in the Gulf and otherwise engaging in military actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce and navigation between the United States and Iran. The United States likewise sought reparation.

The Court first considered whether the actions by American naval forces against the Iranian oil complexes were justified under the 1955 Treaty as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States (Art. XX, para. 1 (d), of the Treaty). Interpreting the Treaty in light of the relevant rules of international law, it concluded that the United States was only entitled to have recourse to force under the provision in question if it was acting in self-defence. The United States could exercise such a right of self-defence only if it had been the victim of an armed attack by Iran and the United States actions must have been necessary and proportional to the armed attack against it. After carrying out a detailed examination of the evidence provided by the Parties, the Court found that the United States had not succeeded in showing that these various conditions were satisfied, and concluded that the United States was therefore not entitled to rely on the provisions of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty.

The Court then examined the issue of whether the United States, in destroying the platforms, had impeded their normal operation, thus preventing Iran from enjoying freedom of commerce “between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties” as guaranteed by the 1955 Treaty (Art. X, para. 1). It concluded that, as regards the first attack, the platforms attacked were under repair and not operational, and that at that time there was thus no trade in crude oil from those platforms between Iran and the United States. Accordingly, the attack on those platforms could not be considered as having affected freedom of commerce between the territories of the two States. The Court reached the same conclusion in respect of the later attack on two other complexes, since all trade in crude oil between Iran and the United States had been suspended as a result of an embargo imposed by an Executive Order adopted by the American authorities. The Court thus found that the United States had not breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty and rejected Iran’s claim for reparation.

In regard to the United States counter-claim, the Court, after rejecting the objections to jurisdiction and admissibility raised by Iran, considered whether the incidents attributed by the United States to Iran infringed freedom of commerce or navigation between the territories of the Parties as guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. The Court found that none of the ships alleged by the United States to have been damaged by Iranian attacks was engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two States. Nor did the Court accept the generic claim by the United States that the actions of Iran had made the Persian Gulf unsafe for shipping, concluding that, according to the evidence before it, there was not, at the relevant time, any actual impediment to commerce or navigation between the territories of Iran and the United States. The Court accordingly rejected the United States counter-claim for reparation.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

2 November 1992

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion by Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion by Judge Higgins

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 12 December 1996

Preliminary Objection

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Judgment of 6 November 2003

Merits

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

English French

Summary 2003/2

Summary of the Judgment of 6 November 2003

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 12 March 1991, while proceedings were still in progress in the case brought by Guinea-Bissau against Senegal concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Guinea-Bissau filed a further Application instituting proceedings against Senegal, in which the Court was asked to adjudge and declare :

“What should be, on the basis of the international law of the sea and of all the relevant elements of the case, including the future decision of the Court in the case concerning the Arbitral ‘award’ of 31 July 1989, the line (to be drawn on a map) delimiting all the maritime territories appertaining respectively to Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.”

For its part, Senegal indicated that it expressed every reservation as to the admissibility of that fresh claim, and possibly as to the Court’s jurisdiction. At a meeting held by the President of the Court with the representatives of the Parties on 5 April 1991, the latter agreed that no measure should be taken in the case until the Court had delivered its decision in the other case pending between the two States. The Court delivered its Judgment in that case on 12 November 1991 indicating, inter alia, that it considered it “highly desirable that the elements of the dispute that were not settled by the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 be resolved as soon as possible, as both Parties desire”. The Parties then initiated negotiations. As they were able to conclude an “accord de gestion et de coopération”, they subsequently, at a meeting with the President of the Court on 1 November 1995, notified him of their decision to discontinue the proceedings. By a letter dated 2 November 1995, the Agent of Guinea-Bissau confirmed that his Government, by virtue of the agreement reached by the two Parties on the disputed zone, had decided to discontinue the proceedings. By a letter dated 6 November 1995, the Agent of Senegal confirmed that his Government agreed to that discontinuance. On 8 November 1995, the Court made an Order recording the discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.