DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF
Dissent to the need for the indication of provisional measures — The undertaking of
Azerbaijan adequately addressed the rights which the Court found plausible — It removed the risk
of irreparable prejudice and urgency — The good faith of a State making a commitment regarding
its conduct is to be presumed — It is erroneous to require that Azerbaijan’s undertakings correspond
in all respects to the measures requested — There was no need to repeat in amended form elements
of Azerbaijan’s assurances in the dispositif — The reporting requirement imposed on Azerbaijan
appears as an assumption that it did not make its assurances in good faith — Such appearance should
have been avoided — The request by Armenia was rendered without object by Azerbaijan’s
undertaking.
1. I disagree with the Court’s decision to indicate provisional measures despite the precise and
detailed undertakings made before it by Azerbaijan on 12 October 2023. Interim measures are
indicated at a time when the request of Armenia has ceased to have any object following the
declaration by the Agent of Azerbaijan. This decision is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the
Court according to which provisional measures need not be indicated in circumstances where the
respondent has given adequate assurances.
2. Article 41 of the Statute provides that “[t]he Court shall have the power to indicate, if it
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party”. The rights to be preserved are not those of individuals
or populations, but of the States that are parties to a dispute before the Court. It is therefore the duty
of the Court to specify clearly, before indicating provisional measures, the nature of the plausible
rights of the applicant or respondent State which ought to be preserved due to the existence of a risk
of irreparable harm before a final decision is made by the Court. This is one of the fundamental
prerequisites for the exercise by the Court of its power to grant interim measures of protection.
3. In the present case, the Court limits itself to the identification of the rights of persons which
it finds plausible (Order, para. 40), but does not clearly define which are the rights claimed by
Armenia that are considered plausible and should consequently be protected pending final decision
by the Court. It is simply stated in paragraph 41 of the Order that “the Court considers plausible at
least some of the rights asserted by Armenia that it claims to have been violated” (emphasis added).
The question is which ones? Unfortunately, the answer to this question cannot be found in the Order.
4. Thus, we can only assume that the plausible rights on the basis of which the Court has
decided to exercise its power to indicate provisional measures are those of persons identified in
paragraph 40 of the Order. If that is the case, in view of the absence of any other identification by
the Court of rights which it found plausible, it may be stated that the plausible rights in question are
the following: “the right of persons not to find themselves compelled to flee their place of residence
for fear that they will be targeted because they belong to a protected group under CERD, and the
right of those persons to be guaranteed a safe return” (Order, para. 40). It may further be assumed
that these are the rights which the Court considers Armenia may seek compliance with under CERD
pending a final decision on the merits.
5. The question then arises whether the above-mentioned rights asserted by Armenia on behalf
of individuals of Armenian ethnic origin and which the Court apparently found plausible, and
presumably worthy of protection, have been adequately addressed by the undertaking made by
Azerbaijan on 12 October 2023. The full text of the undertaking is reproduced in paragraph 61 of the
- 2 -
Order. It may, however, be useful to quote at least the first part of the undertaking read before the
Court by the Agent, which is as follows:
“(a) Azerbaijan undertakes to do all in its power to ensure, without distinction as to
national or ethnic origin:
(a) The security of residents in Garabagh including their safety and humanitarian
needs, including through:
(i) the provision of food, medicines and other essential supplies to Garabagh;
(ii) providing access to available medical treatment; and
(iii) maintaining the supply of public utilities, including gas and electricity;
(b) The right of the residents of Garabagh to freedom of movement and residence,
including the safe and prompt return of those residents that choose to return to
their homes, and the safe and unimpeded departure of any resident wishing to
leave Garabagh; and
(c) The protection of the property of persons who have left Garabagh.”
6. In paragraph 62 of the Order, the Court states that
“the undertakings of the Agent of Azerbaijan, which were made publicly before the
Court and formulated in a detailed manner, are aimed at addressing the situation of
persons of Armenian national or ethnic origin in Nagorno-Karabakh following the
operation commenced by Azerbaijan in this region on 19 September 2023. The Court is
of the view that the undertakings made by the Agent of Azerbaijan on behalf of his
Government are binding and create legal obligations for Azerbaijan.”
The Court also recalls that “[o]nce a State has made such a commitment concerning its conduct, its
good faith in complying with that commitment is to be presumed” (Questions relating to the Seizure
and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures,
Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 158, para. 44).
7. Notwithstanding these statements, the Court comes to the conclusion that the undertaking
by the Agent of Azerbaijan does not remove the risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by
Armenia. In the words of the Court,
“even taking into account the undertakings made by the Agent of Azerbaijan on behalf
of his Government at the public hearing on the afternoon of 12 October 2023,
irreparable prejudice could be caused to the rights invoked by Armenia and there is still
urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to
those rights before the Court gives its final decision” (Order, para. 65).
The reference to “the rights invoked by Armenia” must be understood, in my view, as an allusion to
the rights found to be plausible by the Court and not to all rights claimed by Armenia in the present
case.
8. The only reason given by the Court for this conclusion is that “the undertakings do not
correspond in all respects to the measures requested by Armenia” (Order, para. 63). This is an
erroneous assessment. There is nothing in the Order which indicates that all ten measures requested
- 3 -
by Armenia in the present proceedings are based on plausible rights under CERD and would
consequently require protection until a final decision by the Court. It is therefore neither logical nor
legally tenable to demand that the undertakings by Azerbaijan should correspond “in all respects” to
the measures requested by Armenia. The Court itself does not indicate most of those measures in the
present Order and states that, “having considered the terms of the provisional measures requested by
Armenia and the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the measures to be indicated need
not be identical to those requested” (Order, para. 68).
9. Another erroneous approach taken by the Court consists, in my view, in the stark
contradiction between the manner in which the undertaking of Azerbaijan is dealt with in this case
and the jurisprudence of the Court regarding formal assurances by States in the context of requests
for provisional measures. I believe that it is incorrect for the majority to depart from that
long-standing and established case law without giving valid or clear reasons. It should indeed be
recalled that, with the exception of the Order on provisional measures in the case concerning Certain
Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), the Court has in the past always taken into account
a formal undertaking of the kind given by Azerbaijan and concluded that, in light of such undertaking,
no risk of irreparable harm existed. (See, inter alia, Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of
America) (Interim Protection), Order of 24 October 1957, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 112; Passage
through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J.
Reports 1991, p. 18, para. 27; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 155,
para. 72.)
10. The situation was quite different in the case concerning Certain Documents and Data
(Timor-Leste v. Australia) with regard to the undertaking by Australia. The written assurances given
by the Attorney General of Australia were qualified and contained a national security exception. The
Court observed in this regard:
“Given that, in certain circumstances involving national security, the Government
of Australia envisages the possibility of making use of the seized material, the Court
finds that there remains a risk of disclosure of this potentially highly prejudicial
information.” (Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents
and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014,
I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 158, para. 46.)
Consequently, the Court considered that the undertaking by Australia made “a significant
contribution towards mitigating the imminent risk of irreparable prejudice”, but did not remove the
risk entirely (ibid., p. 159, para. 47). In the present case, the Order does not at all explain in which
manner the undertaking by Azerbaijan was insufficient or fell short of removing the imminent risk
of irreparable prejudice. I find this very unfortunate.
11. As the Court has observed on several occasions, the Court’s power to indicate interim
measures will only be exercised if there is urgency, in the sense that “there is a real and imminent
risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights in dispute before the Court gives its final
decision” (see, for example, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of
23 July 2018, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (II), p. 428, para. 61). In other words, there is urgency when there
is a risk that the substance of the disputed rights or the rights recognized as plausible by the Court
might suffer irreparable harm before a judgment is given on the merits so as to render such a judgment
without any value. The two conditions –– urgency and risk of irreparable harm –– are internally
linked. In the present case, both conditions were removed by the undertaking made by Azerbaijan
before the Court. The undertaking by Azerbaijan addressed directly the rights which the Court found
- 4 -
plausible with respect to persons who may have felt compelled to flee their place of residence and to
those who may require guarantees of safe return.
12. Consequently, the assurances given by Azerbaijan have rendered superfluous any need to
indicate provisional measures by the Court. However, instead of acknowledging this situation and
finding that the circumstances do not require the exercise of the Court’s power under Article 41 of
the Statute, as was done by the Court in Belgium v. Senegal or in Passage through the Great Belt
(Finland v. Denmark), the majority in the present case decided to reproduce in the operative part of
the Order, in a partially amended form, two of the elements of the undertaking by Azerbaijan. There
was no need whatsoever to do that since the repetition of certain amended elements of the assurances
in the dispositif does not add anything to the preservation of the substantive rights found plausible
by the Court or to the undertakings made by Azerbaijan before the Court, which directly address
those rights and guarantee that no acts susceptible of causing irreparable prejudice will occur before
a final decision by the Court.
13. Finally, I find it not only contradictory but odd that the Court should, on the one hand,
recall its dictum in Timor-Leste v. Australia that the good faith of a State making a commitment
concerning its conduct is to be presumed, while, on the other hand, it requests Azerbaijan in the
operative part of the Order to report to the Court within eight weeks on the steps taken to give effect
to its own public undertaking. This reporting requirement on a State’s own specific and precise
undertakings before the Court sounds more like a presumption that the assurances were not made in
good faith, particularly when read together with the statement in the Order that “the undertakings
made by the Agent of Azerbaijan on behalf of his Government are binding and create legal
obligations for Azerbaijan” (Order, para. 62). It should have been avoided. Moreover, this reporting
requirement was unnecessary given the undertaking by Azerbaijan that it would facilitate inspections
by the United Nations and co-operation with the ICRC in the concerned territory.
14. For the reasons stated above, I have voted against all three subparagraphs of the operative
part of the Order. For the same reasons, I am of the view that the Court should not have exercised its
power to indicate provisional measures in view of the fact that Azerbaijan had formally and solemnly
undertaken before it that it would not only guarantee the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to
the rights of persons who might have felt compelled to flee their residences in
Nagorno-Karabakh/Garabagh, but would protect, and not damage or destroy, cultural monuments,
artefacts and sites which are important for the population of Armenian ethnic origin in the territory
as well as documents relating to their identity or the registration of their property. Azerbaijan’s formal
undertakings have, in my opinion, rendered without object the fifth Request by Armenia for interim
measures.
(Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed YUSUF.
___________
642
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF
Dissent to the need for the indication of provisional measures — The
undertaking of Azerbaijan adequately addressed the rights which the Court
found plausible — It removed the risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency —
The good faith of a State making a commitment regarding its conduct is to
be presumed — It is erroneous to require that Azerbaijan’s undertakings
correspond in all respects to the measures requested — There was no need
to repeat in amended form elements of Azerbaijan’s assurances in the
dispositif — The reporting requirement imposed on Azerbaijan appears as
an assumption that it did not make its assurances in good faith — Such
appearance should have been avoided — The request by Armenia was
rendered without object by Azerbaijan’s undertaking.
1. I disagree with the Court’s decision to indicate provisional measures
despite the precise and detailed undertakings made before it by Azerbaijan
on 12 October 2023. Interim measures are indicated at a time when the
request of Armenia has ceased to have any object following the declaration
by the Agent of Azerbaijan. This decision is inconsistent with the jurisprudence
of the Court according to which provisional measures need not be
indicated in circumstances where the respondent has given adequate
assurances.
2. Article 41 of the Statute provides that “[t]he Court shall have the power
to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either
party”. The rights to be preserved are not those of individuals or populations,
but of the States that are parties to a dispute before the Court. It is therefore
the duty of the Court to specify clearly, before indicating provisional measures,
the nature of the plausible rights of the applicant or respondent State
which ought to be preserved due to the existence of a risk of irreparable
harm before a final decision is made by the Court. This is one of the fundamental
prerequisites for the exercise by the Court of its power to grant
interim measures of protection.
3. In the present case, the Court limits itself to the identification of the
rights of persons which it finds plausible (Order, para. 40), but does not
clearly define which are the rights claimed by Armenia that are considered
plausible and should consequently be protected pending final decision by the
Court. It is simply stated in paragraph 41 of the Order that “the Court considers
plausible at least some of the rights asserted by Armenia that it claims
642
OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE YUSUF
[Traduction]
Désaccord sur la nécessité d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires — Engagements
de l’Azerbaïdjan couvrant suffisamment les droits jugés plausibles
par la Cour — Engagements supprimant le risque de préjudice irréparable et
l’urgence — Bonne foi d’un État prenant un engagement quant à son comportement
devant être présumée — Exigence à tort d’une correspondance à tous
égards entre les engagements de l’Azerbaïdjan et les mesures sollicitées — Nul
besoin de répéter dans le dispositif, sous forme modifiée, des éléments des
assurances de l’Azerbaïdjan — Obligation imposée à l’Azerbaïdjan de faire
rapport semblant supposer une absence de bonne foi des assurances données
— Nécessité d’éviter une telle impression — Demande de l’Arménie
rendue sans objet par les engagements de l’Azerbaïdjan.
1. Je ne souscris pas à la décision de la Cour d’indiquer des mesures
conservatoires malgré les engagements précis et détaillés pris devant elle par
l’Azerbaïdjan le 12 octobre 2023. L’indication de ces mesures intervient
alors que la demande de l’Arménie est devenue sans objet du fait de la déclaration
de l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan. La décision ainsi rendue n’est pas conforme
à la jurisprudence de la Cour, selon laquelle il n’y a pas lieu d’indiquer
de mesures conservatoires lorsque le défendeur a donné des assurances
adéquates.
2. L’article 41 du Statut dispose que « [l]a Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si
elle estime que les circonstances l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires
du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire ». Les droits à sauvegarder
sont non pas ceux de personnes ou de populations, mais ceux des États
qui sont parties à un différend dont est saisie la Cour. Il incombe donc à cette
dernière de préciser clairement, avant d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires,
la nature des droits plausibles de l’État demandeur ou défendeur qui
doivent être sauvegardés face au risque qu’un préjudice irréparable leur soit
causé avant qu’elle ne rende sa décision définitive. C’est là une des conditions
fondamentales de l’exercice par la Cour de son pouvoir d’indiquer des
mesures conservatoires.
3. En la présente espèce, la Cour se contente de recenser les droits des personnes
qu’elle juge plausibles (ordonnance, par. 40), sans préciser clairement
lesquels des droits revendiqués par l’Arménie sont considérés comme plausibles
et devraient de ce fait être protégés en attendant sa décision définitive. Il
est simplement dit, au paragraphe 41 de l’ordonnance, que « la Cour considère
comme plausibles au moins certains des droits invoqués par l’Arménie dont
643 application of the cerd (diss. op. yusuf)
to have been violated” (emphasis added). The question is which ones? Unfortunately,
the answer to this question cannot be found in the Order.
4. Thus, we can only assume that the plausible rights on the basis of which
the Court has decided to exercise its power to indicate provisional measures
are those of persons identified in paragraph 40 of the Order. If that is the
case, in view of the absence of any other identification by the Court of rights
which it found plausible, it may be stated that the plausible rights in question
are the following:
“the right of persons not to find themselves compelled to flee their place
of residence for fear that they will be targeted because they belong to a
protected group under CERD, and the right of those persons to be guaranteed
a safe return” (Order, para. 40).
It may further be assumed that these are the rights which the Court considers
Armenia may seek compliance with under CERD pending a final decision
on the merits.
5. The question then arises whether the above-mentioned rights asserted
by Armenia on behalf of individuals of Armenian ethnic origin and which
the Court apparently found plausible, and presumably worthy of protection,
have been adequately addressed by the undertaking made by Azerbaijan on
12 October 2023. The full text of the undertaking is reproduced in paragraph
61 of the Order. It may, however, be useful to quote at least the first
part of the undertaking read before the Court by the Agent, which is as
follows:
“(a) Azerbaijan undertakes to do all in its power to ensure, without distinction
as to national or ethnic origin:
(a) The security of residents in Garabagh including their safety and
humanitarian needs, including through:
(i) the provision of food, medicines and other essential supplies
to Garabagh;
(ii) providing access to available medical treatment; and
(iii) maintaining the supply of public utilities, including gas and
electricity;
(b) The right of the residents of Garabagh to freedom of movement
and residence, including the safe and prompt return of those residents
that choose to return to their homes, and the safe and
unimpeded departure of any resident wishing to leave Garabagh;
and
(c) The protection of the property of persons who have left Garabagh.”
6. In paragraph 62 of the Order, the Court states that
application de la ciedr (op. diss. yusuf) 643
elle dit qu’ils ont été violés » (les italiques sont de moi). Reste à savoir lesquels.
Il est regrettable qu’aucune réponse ne soit donnée dans l’ordonnance.
4. Ainsi, on peut seulement conjecturer que les droits plausibles sur la base
desquels la Cour décide d’exercer son pouvoir d’indiquer des mesures
conservatoires sont les droits des personnes désignés au paragraphe 40 de
l’ordonnance. Si tel est bien le cas, la Cour ne précisant pas davantage quels
droits elle juge plausibles, on peut dire que ces droits sont les suivants :
« le droit des personnes de ne pas se voir obligées de fuir leur lieu de
résidence par crainte d’être prises pour cible en raison de leur appartenance
à un groupe protégé par la CIEDR, et leur droit de se voir garantir
un retour en toute sécurité » (ordonnance, par. 40).
On peut en outre supposer que ce sont là les droits dont la Cour estime que
l’Arménie peut demander le respect au titre de la CIEDR dans l’attente d’une
décision définitive au fond.
5. La question se pose alors de savoir si les droits susmentionnés, que l’Arménie
invoque au nom des personnes d’origine ethnique arménienne et dont
la Cour juge manifestement qu’ils sont plausibles, et méritent vraisemblablement
d’être protégés, sont suffisamment couverts par les engagements pris
par l’Azerbaïdjan le 12 octobre 2023. Le texte intégral de ces engagements
dont l’agent a donné lecture devant la Cour est reproduit au paragraphe 61 de
l’ordonnance, mais il peut être utile d’en citer ici au moins la première
partie :
« a) L’Azerbaïdjan s’engage à faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour
garantir, sans distinction fondée sur l’origine ethnique ou nationale :
a) la sécurité des habitants au Garabagh, y compris en veillant à la
sûreté de leur personne et en subvenant à leurs besoins humanitaires,
notamment par :
i) l’approvisionnement du Garabagh en denrées alimentaires,
médicaments et autres produits de première nécessité ;
ii) l’accès aux soins médicaux disponibles ; et
iii) le maintien des services publics, notamment l’approvisionnement
en gaz et en électricité ;
b) le droit des habitants du Garabagh de circuler librement et de
choisir leur lieu de résidence, y compris en permettant le retour
sûr et rapide de ceux qui choisissent de regagner leur foyer, et le
départ sûr et sans obstacle de tous ceux qui veulent quitter le
Garabagh ; [et]
c) la protection des biens des personnes qui ont quitté le Garabagh. »
6. Au paragraphe 62 de l’ordonnance, la Cour constate que
644 application of the cerd (diss. op. yusuf)
“the undertakings of the Agent of Azerbaijan, which were made publicly
before the Court and formulated in a detailed manner, are aimed at
addressing the situation of persons of Armenian national or ethnic origin
in Nagorno-Karabakh following the operation commenced by Azerbaijan
in this region on 19 September 2023. The Court is of the view that the
undertakings made by the Agent of Azerbaijan on behalf of his Government
are binding and create legal obligations for Azerbaijan.”
The Court also recalls that “[o]nce a State has made such a commitment concerning
its conduct, its good faith in complying with that commitment is to
be presumed” (Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain
Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures,
Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 158, para. 44).
7. Notwithstanding these statements, the Court comes to the conclusion
that the undertaking by the Agent of Azerbaijan does not remove the risk of
irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Armenia. In the words of the
Court,
“even taking into account the undertakings made by the Agent of Azerbaijan
on behalf of his Government at the public hearing on the afternoon
of 12 October 2023, irreparable prejudice could be caused to the rights
invoked by Armenia and there is still urgency, in the sense that there is
a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to those rights before
the Court gives its final decision” (Order, para. 65).
The reference to “the rights invoked by Armenia” must be understood, in my
view, as an allusion to the rights found to be plausible by the Court and not
to all rights claimed by Armenia in the present case.
8. The only reason given by the Court for this conclusion is that “the
undertakings do not correspond in all respects to the measures requested by
Armenia” (Order, para. 63). This is an erroneous assessment. There is nothing
in the Order which indicates that all ten measures requested by Armenia
in the present proceedings are based on plausible rights under CERD and
would consequently require protection until a final decision by the Court. It
is therefore neither logical nor legally tenable to demand that the undertakings
by Azerbaijan should correspond “in all respects” to the measures
requested by Armenia. The Court itself does not indicate most of those
measures in the present Order and states that, “having considered the terms
of the provisional measures requested by Armenia and the circumstances of
the case, the Court finds that the measures to be indicated need not be identical
to those requested” (ibid., para. 68).
9. Another erroneous approach taken by the Court consists, in my view, in
the stark contradiction between the manner in which the undertaking of
Azerbaijan is dealt with in this case and the jurisprudence of the Court
application de la ciedr (op. diss. yusuf) 644
« les engagements de l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan, qui ont été pris publiquement
devant elle, et formulés de manière détaillée, visent à remédier à la
situation dans laquelle se trouvent les personnes d’origine nationale ou
ethnique arménienne au Haut-Karabakh depuis l’opération déclenchée
par l’Azerbaïdjan dans la région le 19 septembre 2023. Elle est d’avis que
les engagements pris par l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan au nom de son gouvernement
sont contraignants et créent des obligations juridiques à la
charge de cet État. »
La Cour rappelle également que, « [d]ès lors qu’un État a pris un tel engagement
quant à son comportement, il doit être présumé qu’il s’y conformera de
bonne foi » (Questions concernant la saisie et la détention de certains documents
et données (Timor-Leste c. Australie), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 3 mars 2014, C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 158, par. 44).
7. Nonobstant ces déclarations, la Cour parvient à la conclusion que les
engagements de l’Azerbaïdjan n’éliminent pas le risque qu’un préjudice irréparable
soit causé aux droits revendiqués par l’Arménie. Selon elle,
« même compte tenu des engagements pris par l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan
au nom de son gouvernement à l’audience publique tenue l’après-midi du
12 octobre 2023, un préjudice irréparable pourrait être causé aux droits
invoqués par l’Arménie et l’urgence persiste, c’est-à-dire qu’il existe un
risque réel et imminent qu’un préjudice irréparable soit causé à ces droits
avant que la Cour ne rende sa décision définitive » (ordonnance, par. 65).
La référence aux « droits invoqués par l’Arménie » doit se comprendre, à
mon sens, comme renvoyant aux droits que la Cour a jugés plausibles et non
à tous les droits revendiqués par l’Arménie en la présente espèce.
8. La seule raison que donne la Cour pour expliquer sa conclusion est que
les engagements « ne correspondent pas à tous égards aux mesures sollicitées
» (ordonnance, par. 63). Il s’agit là d’une erreur d’appréciation. Rien
dans l’ordonnance n’indique que les dix mesures demandées par l’Arménie à
la présente phase de la procédure sont toutes fondées sur des droits plausibles
découlant de la CIEDR qui nécessiteraient d’être protégés jusqu’à ce
que la Cour se prononce de manière définitive. Il n’est par conséquent ni
logique ni défendable au regard du droit d’exiger que les engagements de
l’Azerbaïdjan correspondent « à tous égards » aux mesures sollicitées par
l’Arménie. La Cour elle-même ne prescrit pas la plupart de ces mesures dans
son ordonnance et dit que, « ayant examiné le libellé des mesures conservatoires
sollicitées par l’Arménie ainsi que les circonstances de l’affaire, [elle]
estime que les mesures à indiquer n’ont pas à être identiques à celles qui sont
sollicitées » (ibid., par. 68).
9. Une autre approche erronée ressort, selon moi, de la contradiction
flagrante entre la manière dont la Cour traite les engagements de l’Azerbaïdjan
en l’espèce et sa jurisprudence concernant les assurances formelles
645 application of the cerd (diss. op. yusuf)
regarding formal assurances by States in the context of requests for provisional
measures. I believe that it is incorrect for the majority to depart
from that long-standing and established case law without giving valid or
clear reasons. It should indeed be recalled that, with the exception of the
Order on provisional measures in the case concerning Certain Documents
and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), the Court has in the past always taken
into account a formal undertaking of the kind given by Azerbaijan and
concluded that, in light of such undertaking, no risk of irreparable harm
existed. (See, inter alia, Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America),
Interim Protection, Order of 24 October 1957, I.C.J. Reports 1957,
p. 112; Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional
Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 18, para. 27; Questions
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 155, para. 72.)
10. The situation was quite different in the case concerning Certain Documents
and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia) with regard to the undertaking
by Australia. The written assurances given by the Attorney General of
Australia were qualified and contained a national security exception. The
Court observed in this regard:
“Given that, in certain circumstances involving national security, the
Government of Australia envisages the possibility of making use of the
seized material, the Court finds that there remains a risk of disclosure of
this potentially highly prejudicial information.” (Questions relating to
the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-
Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014,
I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 158, para. 46.)
Consequently, the Court considered that the undertaking by Australia made
“a significant contribution towards mitigating the imminent risk of irreparable
prejudice”, but did not remove the risk entirely (ibid., p. 159, para. 47).
In the present case, the Order does not at all explain in which manner
the undertaking by Azerbaijan was insufficient or fell short of removing
the imminent risk of irreparable prejudice. I find this very unfortunate.
11. As the Court has observed on several occasions, the Court’s power to
indicate interim measures will only be exercised if there is urgency, in the
sense that “there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will
be caused to the rights in dispute before the Court gives its final decision”
(see, for example, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab
Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018, I.C.J. Reports
2018 (II), p. 428, para. 61). In other words, there is urgency when there is a
risk that the substance of the disputed rights or the rights recognized as
plausible by the Court might suffer irreparable harm before a judgment is
application de la ciedr (op. diss. yusuf) 645
données par les États dans le contexte de demandes en indication de mesures
conservatoires. Je pense qu’il n’est pas correct, de la part de la majorité, de
s’écarter de cette jurisprudence constante et bien établie sans donner de raisons
claires ou valables. Il convient ainsi de rappeler que, hormis dans
l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue en l’affaire
relative à Certains documents et données (Timor-Leste c. Australie), la Cour,
par le passé, a toujours tenu compte d’engagements formels comparables à
ceux donnés par l’Azerbaïdjan en l’espèce, et conclu qu’au vu de ces engagements
il n’existait aucun risque de préjudice irréparable. (Voir, notamment,
Interhandel (Suisse c. États-Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 24 octobre 1957, C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 112 ; Passage par le
Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance
du 29 juillet 1991, C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 18, par. 27 ; Questions concernant
l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 28 mai 2009, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 155,
par. 72.)
10. La situation dans l’affaire relative à Certains documents et données
(Timor-Leste c. Australie) était relativement différente pour ce qui est de
l’engagement pris par l’Australie. Les assurances écrites données par son
Attorney General étaient assorties de réserves et contenaient une exception
de sécurité nationale. La Cour avait relevé à cet égard ce qui suit :
« Étant donné que, dans certaines circonstances touchant à la sécurité
nationale, le Gouvernement de l’Australie envisage la possibilité de faire
usage des éléments saisis, la Cour considère qu’un risque subsiste que
ces informations qui peuvent se révéler hautement préjudiciables soient
divulguées. » (Questions concernant la saisie et la détention de certains
documents et données (Timor-Leste c. Australie), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 3 mars 2014, C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 158, par. 46.)
Par conséquent, la Cour avait estimé que l’engagement de l’Australie « contribu[
ait] de manière importante à atténuer le risque imminent de préjudice
irréparable », mais ne le supprimait pas entièrement (ibid., p. 159, par. 47). En
la présente espèce, il n’est nullement expliqué dans l’ordonnance en quoi les
engagements de l’Azerbaïdjan seraient insuffisants ou loin de supprimer le
risque imminent de préjudice irréparable. Je trouve cela fort regrettable.
11. Ainsi que la Cour l’a fait observer à plusieurs reprises, le pouvoir
qu’elle a d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires n’est exercé que s’il y a
urgence, c’est-à-dire « s’il existe un risque réel et imminent qu’un préjudice
irréparable soit causé aux droits en litige avant qu[’elle] ne rende sa décision
définitive » (voir, par exemple, Application de la convention internationale
sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Qatar
c. Émirats arabes unis), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 23 juillet
2018, C.I.J. Recueil 2018 (II), p. 428, par. 61). Autrement dit, il y a urgence
lorsqu’il existe un risque que la substance des droits en litige ou des droits
reconnus comme plausibles par la Cour subisse un préjudice irréparable
646 application of the cerd (diss. op. yusuf)
given on the merits so as to render such a judgment without any value. The
two conditions — urgency and risk of irreparable harm — are internally
linked. In the present case, both conditions were removed by the undertaking
made by Azerbaijan before the Court. The undertaking by Azerbaijan
addressed directly the rights which the Court found plausible with respect to
persons who may have felt compelled to flee their place of residence and to
those who may require guarantees of safe return.
12. Consequently, the assurances given by Azerbaijan have rendered
superfluous any need to indicate provisional measures by the Court. However,
instead of acknowledging this situation and finding that the
circumstances do not require the exercise of the Court’s power under Article
41 of the Statute, as was done by the Court in Belgium v. Senegal or in
Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), the majority in the
present case decided to reproduce in the operative part of the Order, in a partially
amended form, two of the elements of the undertaking by Azerbaijan.
There was no need whatsoever to do that since the repetition of certain
amended elements of the assurances in the dispositif does not add anything
to the preservation of the substantive rights found plausible by the Court or
to the undertakings made by Azerbaijan before the Court, which directly
address those rights and guarantee that no acts susceptible of causing irreparable
prejudice will occur before a final decision by the Court.
13. Finally, I find it not only contradictory but odd that the Court should,
on the one hand, recall its dictum in Timor-Leste v. Australia that the good
faith of a State making a commitment concerning its conduct is to be presumed,
while, on the other hand, it requests Azerbaijan in the operative part
of the Order to report to the Court within eight weeks on the steps taken to
give effect to its own public undertaking. This reporting requirement on a
State’s own specific and precise undertakings before the Court sounds more
like a presumption that the assurances were not made in good faith, particularly
when read together with the statement in the Order that “the undertakings
made by the Agent of Azerbaijan on behalf of his Government are binding
and create legal obligations for Azerbaijan” (Order, para. 62). It should have
been avoided. Moreover, this reporting requirement was unnecessary given
the undertaking by Azerbaijan that it would facilitate inspections by the
United Nations and co-operation with the ICRC in the concerned territory.
14. For the reasons stated above, I have voted against all three subparagraphs
of the operative part of the Order. For the same reasons, I am of the
view that the Court should not have exercised its power to indicate provisional
measures in view of the fact that Azerbaijan had formally and
solemnly undertaken before it that it would not only guarantee the fulfilment
of its obligations with respect to the rights of persons who might have felt
compelled to flee their residences in Nagorno-Karabakh/Garabagh, but
application de la ciedr (op. diss. yusuf) 646
avant qu’un arrêt ne soit rendu au fond, ce qui priverait cet arrêt de toute
valeur. Les deux conditions requises — l’urgence et le risque de préjudice
irréparable — sont intrinsèquement liées. En la présente espèce, toutes deux
ont été supprimées par les engagements pris par l’Azerbaïdjan devant la
Cour. Ces engagements couvrent directement les droits dont la Cour a jugé
qu’ils étaient plausibles dans le cas des personnes qui se seraient senties obligées
de fuir leur lieu de résidence et de celles qui voudraient se voir garantir
un retour en toute sécurité.
12. Par conséquent, les assurances données par l’Azerbaïdjan ont rendu
superflue toute indication par la Cour de mesures conservatoires. Or, au lieu
de reconnaître cette situation et de conclure que les circonstances n’appellent
pas l’exercice par la Cour du pouvoir que lui confère l’article 41 du Statut,
comme ce fut le cas dans l’affaire Belgique c. Sénégal ou dans celle du
Passage par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark), la majorité a décidé
dans la présente instance de reproduire dans le dispositif de l’ordonnance, en
les modifiant partiellement, deux éléments des engagements de l’Azerbaïdjan.
Cela n’était nullement nécessaire car la répétition dans le dispositif de
certains éléments modifiés des assurances données n’ajoute rien à la sauvegarde
des droits substantiels que la Cour a jugés plausibles ni aux engagements
pris devant elle par l’Azerbaïdjan, lesquels couvrent directement ces
droits et garantissent qu’aucun acte susceptible de causer un préjudice irréparable
ne se produira avant que la Cour ne statue de manière définitive.
13. Enfin, je trouve non seulement contradictoire mais aussi curieux que la
Cour, d’un côté, rappelle qu’il convient de présumer la bonne foi d’un État
qui prend un engagement quant à son comportement, comme elle l’a dit en
l’affaire Timor-Leste c. Australie, et, de l’autre, enjoigne à l’Azerbaïdjan,
dans le dispositif de l’ordonnance, de lui présenter sous huit semaines un
rapport sur les dispositions qu’il aura prises pour donner effet à ses propres
engagements publics. Cette obligation faite à un État de rendre compte sur
les engagements spécifiques et précis qu’il a pris devant la Cour semble plutôt
présumer que les assurances n’ont pas été données de bonne foi, en
particulier quand il est dit ailleurs dans l’ordonnance que « les engagements
pris par l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan au nom de son gouvernement sont contraignants
et créent des obligations juridiques à la charge de cet État »
(ordonnance, par. 62). Il aurait fallu éviter cela. Au reste, cette obligation de
faire rapport est inutile puisque l’Azerbaïdjan s’est engagé à faciliter les inspections
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et à coopérer avec le Comité
international de la Croix-Rouge dans le territoire concerné.
14. Pour les raisons qui précèdent, j’ai voté contre l’ensemble des trois
points du dispositif. J’estime, pour les mêmes raisons, que la Cour n’aurait
pas dû exercer son pouvoir d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires étant
donné que l’Azerbaïdjan s’est formellement et solennellement engagé devant
elle non seulement à se conformer à ses obligations s’agissant des droits des
personnes qui se seraient senties obligées de fuir leur lieu de résidence au
Haut-Karabakh/Garabagh, mais aussi à protéger et à ne pas endommager ou
647 application of the cerd (diss. op. yusuf)
would protect, and not damage or destroy, cultural monuments, artefacts and
sites which are important for the population of Armenian ethnic origin in the
territory as well as documents relating to their identity or the registration of
their property. Azerbaijan’s formal undertakings have, in my opinion, rendered
without object the fifth Request by Armenia for interim measures.
(Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.
___________
application de la ciedr (op. diss. yusuf) 647
détruire les monuments, artefacts et sites culturels sur ce territoire qui sont
importants pour les personnes d’origine ethnique arménienne, ainsi que les
documents liés à l’enregistrement, à l’identité et à la propriété privée de ces
personnes. Les engagements formels pris par l’Azerbaïdjan rendaient sans
objet, selon moi, la cinquième demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
de l’Arménie.
(Signé) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.
___________
Dissenting opinion of Judge Yusuf