DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CHARLESWORTH
Explanation of the negative vote Distinction between maritime entitlements and maritime delimitation Factors pertinent for the determination of maritime entitlements The first question as a question of maritime entitlement.
Interpretation of customary international law Methodological approach.
Extended continental shelf Interpretation of UNCLOS.
Relationship between exclusive economic zone and continental shelf The Court’s Judgment in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) Bay of Bengal cases.
Relevance of the practice of States Executive summaries of submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Generality of practice Opinio juris Evaluation of the practice Legal conviction as to an equitable delimitation.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This opinion explains why I have voted against all subparagraphs of the operative clause of today’s Judgment. The questions that the Court had set out to address in the present phase of the proceedings were cast in abstract terms, detached from the specific facts of the case before the Court (see paragraph 14 of the Judgment). This was the reason I supported the Order of 4 October 2022. In my view, however, the Court’s reasoning allows considerations specific to this case to colour its discussion of abstract principles.
II. THE FIRST QUESTION
2. The first question was worded as follows:
“Under customary international law, may a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State?” (Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Order of 4 October 2022.)
A. Maritime entitlements and maritime delimitation
3. The first question concerns the determination of a maritime entitlement — specifically, a coastal State’s maritime entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines (“extended continental shelf”)1. This question is distinct from, albeit complementary to,
1 I use the term “baselines” as a shorthand for “baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”, and I treat it as synonymous to “coast”. I use the term “extended continental shelf” to denote the continental shelf extending to the outer edge of the continental margin, where that edge extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the coastal State’s baselines.
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the question of maritime delimitation
2. The two questions are governed by different legal rules, and they can give rise to separate disputes3.
4. As the Judgment affirms (Judgment, para. 42), the determination of maritime entitlements is the first step in any maritime delimitation. In that step, the question is whether, under international law, a coastal State may claim to exercise jurisdiction over a maritime area. Where, however, multiple coastal States may lay claim to exercise jurisdiction over the same maritime area, this jurisdiction may not be exercised concurrently by all coastal States, at least not without their consent. It is in such circumstances that maritime delimitation is employed to resolve situations of multiple entitlements over the same maritime area. The process of maritime delimitation determines the spatial ambit of each coastal State’s jurisdiction over part of that common maritime area4, and thereby sanctions the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction as recognized by international law.
5. The object of any maritime delimitation is to achieve an equitable solution5. In a situation in which multiple coastal States have entitlements over the same area, therefore, the delimitation process will almost inevitably result in each coastal State sacrificing part of its maritime entitlement and exercising jurisdiction over a maritime area that is less than its full entitlement6. For example, where the coasts of two States are 100 nautical miles apart, either State is in theory entitled to a continental shelf that reaches the other State’s shores. However, this does not mean that either State may exercise continental shelf jurisdiction on the basis of this entitlement to its full extent. It is left to the process of maritime delimitation to determine the areas over which each coastal State may exercise the jurisdiction to which it is entitled under international law.
6. Whether a coastal State is entitled under international law to exercise sovereign rights for the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf’s natural resources is a question of maritime entitlement. What parts of the continental shelf should be found to appertain to this coastal State where another coastal State is also entitled to sovereign rights over the same continental shelf is a question of maritime delimitation and its effects.
B. The determination of maritime entitlements in the Court’s jurisprudence
7. The Court has a considerable jurisprudence on maritime entitlements. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the Court explained that “[i]t is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coasts”7. This point was affirmed with respect to a State’s entitlement to a continental
2 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 30, para. 27.
3 South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Award of 29 October 2015, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXXIII, p. 65, para. 156.
4 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (2nd edn., Oxford: Hart 2019), p. 6; see also Prosper Weil, The law of maritime delimitation — Reflections (transl. Maureen MacGlashan, Cambridge: Grotius Publications 1989), p. 3.
5 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 59, para. 48; see also Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 59, para. 70; Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 67, para. 235.
6 Delimitation of maritime areas between Canada and France, Decision of 10 June 1992, RIAA, Vol. XXI, p. 289, para. 67; ibid., dissenting opinion of Prosper Weil, p. 307, para. 17.
7 Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 133.
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shelf in Black Sea
8. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea concurs, having held that “[a] coastal State’s entitlement to the continental shelf exists by the sole fact that the basis of entitlement, namely, sovereignty over the land territory, is present”9. This is not necessarily to say that maritime entitlements are contingent on the presence or on the integrity of the land territory in perpetuity. The legal conception of maritime entitlements may well need to adapt to modern challenges10. It simply means that, under customary international law, entitlements at sea are derivative of the title to land.
8. As a result, when determining a coastal State’s entitlement to maritime areas, the Court refers only to the question of whether the State has sovereignty over the relevant land territory, as well as to the characteristics of that land territory (because, for example, not all maritime features generate an entitlement to a continental shelf)11. No other factors have been found to inform the question of a coastal State’s entitlement to a maritime area — certainly not factors pertaining to other coastal States’ maritime entitlements in the vicinity. The logic of determining each State’s maritime entitlements in isolation can also be seen in the constraints applicable to the establishment of the outer edge of the continental margin under Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”), leaving aside the question of whether these constraints form part of customary international law. None of these constraints contemplates the presence of other States.
9. The maritime entitlements of other States will of course inform the question of delimitation. This point is illustrated in the Court’s Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute with respect to the relationship between a State’s entitlement to a territorial sea and another State’s entitlement to a continental shelf12. In that Judgment, the Court discussed “the overlap . . . between the territorial sea entitlement of Colombia derived from each island and the entitlement of Nicaragua to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone”13. The Court’s point of departure was that a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf (in that case, Nicaragua’s) may well extend into — and thus overlap with — another State’s entitlement to a territorial sea (in that case, Colombia’s). However, the Court clarified that, in such a situation, the former State’s entitlement would not be given effect, namely, that the former State be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a continental shelf that extends within the latter State’s territorial sea14.
8 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 89, para. 77: “The title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive economic zone is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea through the projection of the coasts or the coastal fronts.” That Judgment also cites from North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands): “the land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96). See also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 36, para. 86: “continental shelf rights are legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State”.
9 Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 107, para. 409.
10 See, for example, “Sea-level rise in relation to international law: Additional paper to the first issues paper (2020), by Bogdan Aurescu and Nilüfer Oral, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on sea-level rise in relation to international law”, UN doc. A/CN.4/761 (13 February 2023), para. 155; see also “Resolution 5/2018: Committee on International law and sea level rise”, International Law Association Reports of Conferences, Vol. 78 (2018), p. 29.
11 Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS, which forms part of customary international law: Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 674, para. 139.
12 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 690, paras. 177-178.
13 Ibid., p. 690, para. 177 (emphasis added).
14 Ibid., pp. 690-691, paras. 178-180; see also Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 51, para. 169, which refers to a process of “giving more weight” to one coastal State’s entitlement than the other’s.
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10. By contrast, today’s Judgment holds that, in a specific maritime area (the area within 200 nautical miles from a coastal State’s baselines), a specific type of competing maritime entitlement (the entitlement to an extended continental shelf) is precluded (Judgment, para. 79). Other maritime entitlements in the same area — for example, a third State’s maritime entitlement to an exclusive economic zone, or a fourth State’s entitlement to a territorial sea — are legally valid, and the ensuing overlap is to be resolved through maritime delimitation. The entitlement to an extended continental shelf, however, is not. On that basis, the Court does not proceed to maritime delimitation (Judgment, paras. 86 and 91).
C. Methodological approach
11. The Court’s task in this case is essentially an interpretative one: it consists in identifying the contours of the entitlement to an extended continental shelf under customary international law. There is no doubt that UNCLOS reflects many aspects of the customary international law of the sea: some of its provisions codify pre-existing rules of customary international law, others crystallize then-emerging rules, and yet others have since given rise to a general practice accepted as law, generating new customary rules15. For that reason, I share the Court’s view that recourse to the Convention can assist in the interpretation of the rules of customary international law that are reflected in it. At the same time, the methods of treaty interpretation are not fully transposable to the context of the interpretation of customary international law, and not all interpretative methods apply with equal force in the two processes16. The interpreter must keep in mind that custom is neither generated, nor modified, nor extinguished in the same manner as a treaty.
12. The majority bases its conclusion on two sets of considerations: first, considerations pertaining to the relationship between the régime of the exclusive economic zone and that of the continental shelf and, second, considerations pertaining to the régime of the extended continental shelf (Judgment, paras. 68 and 74; see also ibid., para. 78). In the following sections, I will explain why, in my view, these factors do not support the Court’s reasoning. I will start with the concept of the extended continental shelf (section D), before turning to its relationship with the exclusive economic zone (section E). I will then set out my misgivings about the Court’s discussion of the practice of States (section F).
D. The concept of the extended continental shelf under customary international law
13. In my view, the conclusion of the Judgment is not supported by the terms of the definition of the continental shelf under customary international law, as reflected in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS17. This provision establishes two methods to determine the limit of the entitlement to a continental shelf: the outer edge of the continental margin, or the distance of 200 nautical miles where that outer edge lies within that distance. The provision does not compel any coastal State to use one method over the other when determining the outer limits of its continental shelf. Customary international law stipulates that a coastal State’s minimum entitlement to a continental shelf extends
15 See, with respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 37, para. 60; see also “Conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YILC), 2018, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 91 (Conclusion 11, para. 1).
16 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 95, para. 178.
17 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 666, para. 118.
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up to 200 nautical miles from its baselines
18, and it recognizes a broader continental shelf where the outer edge of the continental margin extends beyond that distance19.
14. The rule reflected in Article 76, paragraph 1, of the Convention, being a rule of maritime entitlement, is not concerned with the maritime entitlements of other coastal States or with the method through which the outer limits of those entitlements are themselves determined. Therefore, this rule allows an overlap in the same maritime area when two coastal States have used different methods to determine the limits of their maritime entitlements. This is not undermined by the fact that only one of the two methods requires the application of “scientific and technical criteria” (Judgment, para. 75). These criteria are in practice, if not in theory, more difficult to apply than the criterion of distance. It does not follow, however, that the burden of meeting the scientific and technical criteria somehow tarnishes the maritime entitlement thus determined, compared to a maritime entitlement determined with reference to distance.
15. May treaty provisions that have not themselves been affirmed as reflecting custom serve as context for the interpretation of provisions that do reflect custom? The Judgment invokes Article 82, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS — a provision with a doubtful status under customary international law. In essence, the Court relies on the broad text of that provision, which does not indicate any exceptions or qualifications, to offer an interpretation that prevents its application in situations in which a coastal State encroaches upon the 200-nautical-mile zone of another State. This, in turn, is used as context to interpret the definition of the continental shelf under Article 76, paragraph 1, of the Convention. I have some doubts about the Court’s interpretation of Article 82. Whether the purpose of this provision can be served in the situation envisaged by the Court depends, in part, on the interpretation of the “equitable sharing criteria” that will guide the distribution of payments in such a situation, pursuant to Article 82, paragraph 4, of the Convention.
16. Moreover, I am reluctant to attach significance to the fact that the substantive and procedural conditions for determining the outer limits of the extended continental shelf — namely, those enshrined in Article 76, paragraphs 4 to 9 — were the result of a compromise (Judgment, para. 76). Leaving the definition of the continental shelf to one side, the Court has refrained from pronouncing on the status under customary international law of Article 76 of UNCLOS (see Judgment, paragraph 82)20. If the criteria for determining the outer limits of the extended continental shelf are reflective of custom, then the fact that they emerged out of a compromise seems inconsequential. If they are not reflective of custom, then the pertinence of the compromise seems even more limited.
17. The preparatory work of UNCLOS assumes importance in today’s Judgment. As the Judgment acknowledges, however, the question now before the Court was not debated during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Judgment, para. 76). On other occasions, in situations where the preparatory work evidences little or no discussion of a topic, the Court avoided
18 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 33, para. 34: “natural prolongation . . . is in part defined by distance from the shore”.
19 Furthermore, at least under UNCLOS, a maximal limit is established in relation to the outer edge of the continental margin; see Article 76, paragraphs 5 and 6, of UNCLOS.
20 See also Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 666, para. 118.
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drawing any inferences for the purposes of treaty interpretation
21. In my view, the Court should proceed with even greater caution where customary international law is in question.
E. The significance of the exclusive economic zone
18. The Judgment places weight on the fact that the institutions of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf are integrated (Judgment, para. 49) and that their legal régimes are interrelated (Judgment, para. 70). In this regard, two points are worth making.
19. First, while linked, the institutions of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf remain legally distinct, and the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles has not been absorbed by the exclusive economic zone22. The separate character of the two institutions is illustrated by the fact that, in the context of maritime delimitation, the Court maintains the distinction between the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the delimitation of the continental shelf even where it draws a single maritime boundary, despite the fact that the rights accruing in the continental shelf are, in the main, included among the exclusive economic zone rights23. A coastal State’s entitlement to an exclusive economic zone is distinct from its entitlement to a continental shelf (even if the latter only extends up to 200 nautical miles), and indeed a State may enjoy sovereign rights over a continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles even where it has not proclaimed an exclusive economic zone, or where its exclusive economic zone is narrower than 200 nautical miles24.
20. Second, the interrelated character of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is potentially relevant where the two institutions attach to the same coastal State. This was the situation in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta). In that case, Libya had argued that the discontinuity in Malta’s natural prolongation nullified Malta’s own entitlement to a continental shelf on the basis of distance25. Libya’s argument was effectively that Malta was not entitled to a continental shelf of up to 200 nautical miles unless it could prove that this shelf was the natural prolongation of its land territory. In emphasizing the importance of the criterion of distance, the Court rejected Libya’s contention that Malta’s continental shelf was terminated in the absence of natural prolongation in the geomorphological sense26. By contrast, the Court did not address the question of
21 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), pp. 129-130, para. 147; Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 323, para. 70; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 22, para. 41.
22 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 33, paras. 33-34.
23 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 719, para. 251, subpara. 4; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 760-763, para. 321, subparas. 2-3.
24 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 33, para. 34.
25 Ibid., p. 34, para. 36:
“it is Libya’s case that the natural prolongation, in the physical sense, of the land territory into and under the sea is still a primary basis of title to continental shelf. For Libya, as a first step each Party has to prove that the physical natural prolongation of its land territory extends into the area in which the delimitation is to be effected; if there exists a fundamental discontinuity between the shelf area adjacent to one Party and the shelf area adjacent to the other, then the boundary, it is contended, should lie along the general line of that fundamental discontinuity.”
26 Ibid., p. 35, para. 39:
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whether Malta’s continental shelf entitlement could somehow counter Libya’s continental shelf entitlement. That question, as discussed, is a question of delimitation.
21. The fact that a coastal State’s entitlement to an exclusive economic zone does not nullify a priori another coastal State’s entitlement to an extended continental shelf is also reflected in international jurisprudence on maritime delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles. This includes the two Bay of Bengal cases27 and the case of Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean28. In all three cases, at least one coastal State claimed an entitlement to an extended continental shelf lying within another State’s 200-nautical-mile limit. In the cases, three different international courts and tribunals proceeded with the delimitation of the maritime area, and in fact held that the entitlement to an extended continental shelf should be given some effect through the creation of a “grey area”29. While the modalities may vary in each grey area, the upshot is that the coastal State entitled to an extended continental shelf and the coastal State with maritime entitlements up to 200 nautical miles both exercise a degree of jurisdiction in the same maritime area. Following the reasoning adopted by the Court in the present case, the coastal State’s claim to an extended continental shelf should have been declared inadmissible in so far as it lay within 200 nautical miles from the other State’s baselines, and no maritime delimitation would have been possible in that area (see Judgment, paras. 86 and 91). Yet the three courts and tribunals did not declare Bangladesh’s or Kenya’s claims inadmissible in so far as they lay within 200 nautical miles from Myanmar, India or Somalia. Nor did they readjust the delimitation line beyond 200 nautical miles from Bangladesh or Kenya, so that it respects the 200-nautical-mile limit from Myanmar, India or Somalia.
22. Today’s Judgment notes that, in those cases, the grey areas were of limited size and arose as an incidental result, or as a consequence, of maritime delimitation (Judgment, paras. 71-72). This observation, however, overlooks the precedential value of the cases in the context of answering the question of determining maritime entitlements. For the purposes of the abstract question now before the Court, what matters is that the presence of grey areas at the conclusion of maritime delimitation presupposes, before that process, the existence of a maritime area where a State’s entitlement to an extended continental shelf overlaps with another State’s maritime entitlements up to 200 nautical miles from its coasts. If the latter maritime entitlements displaced the former, then maritime delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles in those cases would have been barred altogether, and no grey area would have been possible. The questions of whether grey areas — in the sense of areas of overlapping jurisdiction — should be recognized sparingly, whether they should cover a limited size, or whether they should be avoided altogether, would only come at play at the stage of delimitation.
23. The insistence that the jurisprudence of Bay of Bengal should be distinguished from the present case (Judgment, para. 72) illustrates, in my view, the Court’s oscillation between abstract questions of law and the circumstances of the present case. The only difference between those cases and the case at hand that might be relevant for answering the abstract question before the Court
“It follows that, since the distance between the coasts of the Parties is less than 400 miles, so that no geophysical feature can lie more than 200 miles from each coast, the feature referred to as the ‘rift zone’ cannot constitute a fundamental discontinuity terminating the southward extension of the Maltese shelf and the northward extension of the Libyan as if it were some natural boundary.” (Emphasis added.)
27 Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4; The Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (People’s Republic of Bangladesh v. Republic of India), Award of 7 July 2014, RIAA, Vol. XXXII, p. 1.
28 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 206.
29 Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 120, para. 471; The Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (People’s Republic of Bangladesh v. Republic of India), Award of 7 July 2014, RIAA, Vol. XXXII, p. 147, para. 498; Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 277, para. 197.
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concerns the coastal configuration of the States involved. As the Judgment notes, the previous cases involved States with adjacent coasts (Judgment, paras. 71-72). This, however, does not reduce their relevance to the present case. The distinction between opposite and adjacent coasts
30 is not always clear. Within the same case, the Court commonly finds that the coasts of the litigant parties shift from adjacent to opposite or vice versa31 regardless of whether the coastal States share a land boundary or not, or that they fit in both categories32, or indeed in neither33. But even if the criterion of adjacency could be applied in a sufficiently predictable manner, it is not clear how it could inform a coastal State’s maritime entitlements, which are identified on the basis of the rule reflected in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS.
F. The practice of States
24. The practice of States provides the strongest support for the Court’s conclusion (Judgment, para. 77).
1. Identifying practice
25. There is extensive practice whereby coastal States refrain from claiming that they are entitled to an extended continental shelf that intrudes within 200 nautical miles from another coastal State’s baselines34. This practice is drawn primarily from the executive summaries of submissions to
30 International Hydrographic Organization, “Manual on technical aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — 1982 (TALOS)” (6th edn., 2020), Appendix 1 (Glossary), para. 1: “Adjacent coasts: The coasts lying either side of a land boundary between two adjoining States”. See also ibid., para. 69: “Opposite coasts: The geographical relationship of the coasts of two States facing each other”.
31 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91, para. 170.
32 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 93, para. 88.
33 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 28, para. 36.
34 For example, France, “Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in respect of the areas of French Guiana and New Caledonia: Part 1: Executive Summary” (May 2007), p. 3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/fra07/fra_executivesummary_2007.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “The extension is limited to the west by the area under Australian jurisdiction (EEZ)”; Ghana, “Submission for the Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf of Ghana pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Executive Summary” (April 2009), p. 5, para. 6.2, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gha26_09/ gha_2009execsummary.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “1 (Point OL-GHA-5) [marking the outer limit] is a point where the outer limit line joins to the 200 [nautical miles] from Nigeria’s territorial sea baseline”; Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, “Joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the Ontong Java Plateau: Executive Summary” (May 2009), p. 11, para. 6.5, https://www.un.org/depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fmpgsb32_09/exsumdocs/fmpgsb2009executivesummary.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “1 point (OJP-ECS-004) [marking the outer limit], where the 60 [nautical mile] formula line (Article 76, paragraph 4 (a) (ii) of the Convention) that defines the outer limit of the extended continental shelf intersects the line 200 [nautical miles] from the territorial sea baseline of Nauru”; Mozambique, “Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the Outer Limits of the Extended Continental Shelf of the Republic of Mozambique under the Provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: Executive Summary” (June 2010), p. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/moz52_10/moz_2010_es.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “Point MOZ-OL-92 [marking the outer limit] is located on the 200 [nautical mile] line measured from the territorial sea baseline of South Africa”; Kiribati, “Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary” (December 2012), p. 5, para. 6.3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kir64_2012/kir_es_doc.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “The Western Platform Area (FP_001 to FP_081), defined by 78 fixed points on the Hedberg line, one fixed point on the 200 [nautical mile] line measured from the Kiribati Territorial Sea baseline and one fixed point on the 200 [nautical mile] line of another coastal State”; Canada, “Partial submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean: Executive Summary” (December 2013), pp. 6-7, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can70_13/es_can_en.pdf (visited 30 June 2023):
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the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter “CLCS”) of States party to UNCLOS under Article 76, paragraph 8, of the Convention.
26. This practice appears to be a general one. The generality of the practice is not necessarily to be ascertained with reference to the totality of States, but rather with reference to the States that are concerned with, or in a position to contribute to the formation of, the putative rule35. The relevant States in this context are those that, as a matter of geomorphology, are capable of sustaining a claim to an extended continental shelf intruding within 200 nautical miles from another State’s baselines. Within that pool of coastal States, there appears to be a clear trend among States from several regions. In the International Law Commission’s terminology, therefore, the practice is “sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent”36.
27. I am also prepared to accept that this practice is supported by legal conviction (opinio juris). Identifying the subjective element of custom might be arduous when the relevant practice consists of abstentions, as was the case in Lotus37. By contrast, in this case the Court is presented with an abundance of States expressly limiting their claims at the 200-nautical-mile mark from other States’ baselines. Moreover, the field in question — maritime entitlements — is governed by customary international law, in the sense that customary international law clearly regulates States’ behaviour in the field, even if the precise contours of that regulation may need to be ascertained. In the face of a clearly identifiable pattern of conduct on the part of States, it is reasonable to infer that States conform to a rule of customary international law. The Court in similar situations has accepted that the general practice was accompanied by opinio juris38.
28. This practice cannot be dismissed simply because it emanates from States party to UNCLOS. It is true that the conduct of States that emerges from the executive summaries of their submissions to the CLCS could be attributed to an intention to comply with conventional obligations, rather than with customary law39. But there is nothing in these executive summaries nor in the relevant provisions of the Convention that would suggest that this conduct is peculiar to or triggered by the specific terms of those provisions. In fact, some States party to UNCLOS refrain from claiming an entitlement to areas within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of third States, non-parties of the
“The outer limits of the continental shelf in the Labrador Sea region are defined by 47 fixed points (LS-ECS-001 through LS-ECS-047). These fixed points are either formula points established in accordance with article 76 (4) (a) (i) or (ii), points on the distance or depth constraint lines established in accordance with article 76(5), or a point on the intersection of the line delineating the outer edge of the continental margin and the 200 [nautical mile] limit of the Kingdom of Denmark.”
35 “Conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries”, YILC (2018), Vol. II, Part Two, pp. 100-101 (Commentary to Conclusion 8, paras. 3-4).
36 Ibid., p. 91 (Conclusion 8, para. 1).
37 “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 28.
38 For example, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 40.
39 See “Conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries”, YILC (2018), Vol. II, Part Two, p. 102 (Commentary to Conclusion 9, para. 4).
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Convention, which could only accrue benefits from customary international law rather than from the Convention
40.
2. Evaluating practice
29. More complicated is the determination of the content of the putative rule of customary international law to which the practice conforms. Here, and elsewhere, opinio juris manifests itself in a partial way. In the publicly available documents, most States simply place their claimed outer limit of their extended continental shelf at the 200-nautical-mile mark of another State, without revealing the reasons behind their choice41. Similarly, there is little information as to the legal grounds put forward by States objecting to claims by another State to an extended continental shelf that intrudes within 200 nautical miles from their baselines42. In view of the States’ silence, it is the Court’s task to articulate the legal rule to which the general practice conforms. Practice will inevitably be susceptible to multiple interpretations; in this case, there are several possible rules that would explain the practice. The Court should then identify a legal rule that accommodates the broadest variety of practice, that conforms to the established principles concerning the relevant legal field (here, maritime entitlements), and that is in harmony with international jurisprudence, including the jurisprudence of this Court.
30. On this analysis, it is difficult to conclude that States, in stopping at the 200-nautical-mile limit in their submissions to the CLCS, consider that their entitlement to an extended continental
40 For example, Costa Rica and Ecuador, “Joint Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in Panama Basin pursuant to Part VI of and Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I: Executive Summary” (December 2020), p. 18, para. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/criecu_86_2020/PART-I%20(secured).pdf (visited 30 June 2023), with respect to Colombia; Ecuador, “A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Southern Region of the Carnegie Ridge pursuant to Part VI of and Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I: Executive Summary” (March 2022), p. 16, para. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ecu90_2022/ PartI.pdf (visited 30 June 2023), with respect to Peru.
41 For example, Cook Islands, “Revised Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the Manihiki Plateau: Executive Summary” (December 2021), p. 6, para. 21, https://www.un.org/depts/los/ clcs_new/submissions_files/cok23_09/CKI_REV_ES_DOC.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “5 are points [marking the outer limits of the extended continental shelf] located on the 200 [nautical mile] line of an opposite or adjacent coastal State”; Denmark, “Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: The Continental Shelf North of the Faroe Islands: Executive Summary” (April 2009), p. 12, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ dnk28_09/dnk2009executivesummary.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “To the west, north-west, and south-east, the outer limits of the continental shelf are delineated by the 200 nautical mile limits of Iceland, Jan Mayen and the mainland of Norway, respectively”; Sri Lanka, “Submission made in accordance with the Statement of Understanding adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, on 29 August 1980, contained in Annex II to the Final Act of the Conference, and under paragraph 8 of article 76 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and article 3 of Annex II of the Convention: Part I: Executive Summary” (May 2009), p. 9, para. 4.1, https://www.un.org/depts/los/ clcs_new/submissions_files/lka43_09/lka2009executivesummary.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “Point B . . . [marking the outer limit of the extended continental shelf is] where the outer limits of the extended continental shelf joins the approximate position of another coastal State’s 200 [nautical mile] line”; Bahamas, “Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary” (February 2014), p. 4, para. 6.3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/bhs71_14/BHS-ES-DOC.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “FP 1 [a point marking the outer limit of the extended continental shelf] marks the location of the intersection of the 350 [nautical mile] constraint line with the 200 [nautical mile] line measured from the territorial sea baselines of the United States of America”; Oman, “Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to article 76 (8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Executive Summary” (October 2017), p. 6, para. 7.0.2, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/omn78_17/omn_es.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “1 point [marking the outer limit of the extended continental shelf] on the line 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline of India”.
42 For example, Japan, Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 December 2012), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/jpn_re_chn_28_12_2012.pdf (visited 30 June 2023); Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama, Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (5 February 2014), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/col_cri_pan_re_nic_2014_02_05_e.pdf (visited 30 June 2023).
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shelf is somehow limited by a neighbouring State’s own maritime entitlement. Such a legal conviction would be in tension with the principles governing the establishment of maritime entitlements, including entitlements to an extended continental shelf, as well as with the international practice of maritime delimitations involving an extended continental shelf on the one hand and, on the other, a 200-nautical-mile maritime zone.
31. The most likely explanation for the abundant State practice is, in my view, a legal conviction that, under the applicable rules on maritime delimitation, an entitlement to an extended continental shelf in principle shall be given no effect in so far as it overlaps with another State’s entitlement to a 200-nautical-mile zone. This can be understood as a manifestation of the goal to achieve “an equitable solution”, which, as noted, is the paramount consideration in any delimitation exercise43. The Court recently affirmed that “the achievement of an equitable solution requires that, so far as possible, the line of delimitation should allow the coasts of the Parties to produce their effects in terms of maritime entitlements in a reasonable and mutually balanced way”44.
32. The goal of ensuring an equitable solution has been translated into what the Court refers to as the “usual” three-stage methodology45. While not mandatory, this methodology is based on objective geographical criteria, and it has brought predictability and consistency in maritime delimitation46.
33. The first step towards achieving an equitable solution under the three-stage methodology is to draw a provisional equidistance line. It is reported that an overwhelming majority of maritime delimitation agreements involving States with opposite coasts or with coasts of a hybrid character employs an equidistance line47. In Territorial and Maritime Dispute, the provisional equidistance line was defined as “a line each point on which is an equal distance from the nearest points on the two relevant coasts” of the parties48. When applied to States with opposite coasts lying further than 400 nautical miles apart, the provisional equidistance line ensures that each coastal State is granted a continental shelf of at least 200 nautical miles. It is not obvious why the provisional equidistance line should be drawn differently in a situation involving entitlements to an extended continental shelf49, including those of States with opposite coasts. Even if the provisional equidistance line is drawn with reference to the outer limits of the coastal States’ respective continental shelf
43 See para. 5 above.
44 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 250, para. 124, citing Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 703, para. 215; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 53, para. 101, subpara. (C) (1), Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 43, para. 37, and Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 127, para. 201.
45 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 252, para. 131.
46 Ibid., p. 251, para. 128.
47 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (2nd edn., Oxford: Hart 2019), p. 191, with further references therein.
48 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 695, para. 191; see also Art. 6, para. 1, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf (concluded 29 April 1958; entered into force 10 June 1964), United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 499, p. 311.
49 See Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 117, para. 455; The Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (People’s Republic of Bangladesh v. Republic of India), Award of 7 July 2014, RIAA, p. 139, para. 464; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2017, p. 142, para. 526; Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, pp. 276-277, para. 195.
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entitlements
50, the fact that one of them is entitled to a 200-nautical-mile zone in the relevant area under delimitation may constitute a relevant circumstance warranting the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line at the 200-nautical-mile limit51. In either case, at the end of the maritime delimitation process, the area of the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles of a coastal State will in principle be found to appertain to that coastal State, and not to another State that may be entitled to an extended continental shelf in the same area. While a State’s entitlement to an extended continental shelf remains intact in the abstract, in practice it will likely be subordinated to the neighbouring State’s entitlement to a 200-nautical-mile zone by virtue of the goal of achieving an equitable solution.
34. The executive summaries of States’ submissions to the CLCS should be assessed against this legal background. It then becomes clear that coastal States refrain from claiming an extended continental shelf within 200 nautical miles from their neighbours’ coasts because they hold the legal conviction that principles of maritime delimitation would eventually prevent them from exercising the sovereign rights over that maritime area. Of course, a State cannot unilaterally implement any delimitation through its submission to the CLCS52, nor does the CLCS have any role in the delimitation process53. Nonetheless, a State understandably considers it futile — or indeed inequitable — to claim before the CLCS an area over which, under the governing principles of delimitation that will eventually apply, it will never exercise continental shelf rights. There is little incentive to enter into a costly and lengthy process of establishing one’s entitlement in an area over which one is unlikely ever to exercise jurisdiction.
35. Of course, exceptional situations might call for the adoption of a different outcome. The relevant circumstances of a specific case might justify a delimitation line that does not merely reach the 200-nautical mile limit but exceeds it. One can imagine, for example, a situation where State A has a particularly narrow coastal front but is entitled to an extended continental shelf, whereas State B, lying opposite, has an exceptionally wide coastal front, over which it is entitled to a continental shelf only up to 200 nautical miles. In such a situation, it is conceivable that, in the course of a delimitation, the narrow continental shelf projection of State A’s coastal front be allowed to intrude within State B’s continental shelf entitlement. Exceptional circumstances might also justify the position taken by the few States the submissions of which to the CLCS stand in contrast with the rest.
*
50 As argued by Nicaragua: see Judgment, para. 29.
51 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 33, para. 33: “one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the exclusive economic zone appertaining to that same State.”
52 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 299, para. 112 (1).
53 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 137, para. 112.
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36. In sum, a coastal State’s entitlement to an extended continental shelf is not curtailed because of another coastal State’s entitlement to 200-nautical-mile zones in the same maritime area. Consequently, any overlap between the two entitlements must be resolved through the process of maritime delimitation. In that context, I am persuaded that a coastal State’s entitlement to an extended continental shelf will in principle be sacrificed in order to give effect to another coastal State’s entitlement to 200-nautical-mile zones. This rule ought to be applied with regard to the specific facts of each case, including the case before the Court.
III. CONCLUSION
37. For the reasons set out above, I think that the Court is not in a position today to reject the submissions that Nicaragua made in its written pleadings. In my view, the Court should have responded to both questions formulated in the Order of 4 October 2022, and it should have proceeded to hold oral proceedings to decide the remaining issues dividing the Parties in this case. In voting against the rejection of Nicaragua’s proposed delimitation lines, I do not necessarily endorse Nicaragua’s position on the question of maritime delimitation. Rather, I express my reservations about the Court’s rejection of Nicaragua’s position on the question of maritime delimitation without the benefit of oral argument.
38. My reservations remain regardless of the Court’s answer to the first question. As the term suggests, and as Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules indicates, a party’s final submissions are its final word in a case. By contrast, each party is free to amend the submissions it presents in its written pleadings, provided that it remains within the confines of the dispute as presented in the application54. At the end of its oral argument in the present phase of the proceedings in this case, Nicaragua formally reserved its right to complete its final submissions55.
39. The Judgment shifts its focus from the final submissions presented by Nicaragua at the oral proceedings to the submissions that it had presented in its written pleadings. Those written submissions were formulated at a time before the Court’s decision to direct the Parties to specific questions, and they address issues extending beyond the Court’s focus at the current stage of the proceedings. This fact in itself justifies allowing the Parties to revise their positions on these issues in light of today’s Judgment.
(Signed) Hilary CHARLESWORTH.
___________
54 For that final point, see Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 69, citing Société Commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173; see also Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 21 April 2022, para. 44.
55 CR 2023/27, p. 39, para. 29 (Argüello Gómez).
540
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CHARLESWORTH
Explanation of the negative vote Distinction between maritime entitlements
and maritime delimitation Factors pertinent for the determination
of maritime entitlements The first question as a question of maritime
entitlement.
Interpretation of customary international law Methodological approach.
Extended continental shelf Interpretation of UNCLOS.
Relationship between exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
The Court’s Judgment in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/
Malta) Bay of Bengal cases.
Relevance of the practice of States Executive summaries of submissions
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Generality
of practice Opinio juris Evaluation of the practice Legal conviction
as to an equitable delimitation.
I. Introduction
1. This opinion explains why I have voted against all subparagraphs of the
operative clause of today’s Judgment. The questions that the Court had set
out to address in the present phase of the proceedings were cast in abstract
terms, detached from the specific facts of the case before the Court (see
paragraph 14 of the Judgment). This was the reason I supported the Order of
4 October 2022. In my view, however, the Court’s reasoning allows considerations
specific to this case to colour its discussion of abstract principles.
II. The First Question
2. The first question was worded as follows:
“Under customary international law, may a State’s entitlement to a
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured extend within
200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State?” (Question of the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia
beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v.
Colombia), Order of 4 October 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022 (II), p. 565.)
540
OPINION DISSIDENTE DE Mme LA JUGE CHARLESWORTH
[Traduction]
Explication du vote contre — Distinction entre droits à des espaces maritimes
et délimitation maritime — Facteurs pertinents pour la détermination
des droits à des espaces maritimes — Première question en tant que question
concernant le droit à un espace maritime.
Interprétation du droit international coutumier — Méthodologie.
Plateau continental étendu — Interprétation de la CNUDM.
Relation entre zone économique exclusive et plateau continental — Arrêt
de la Cour en l’affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/
Malte) — Affaires du Golfe du Bengale.
Pertinence de la pratique des États — Résumés des demandes adressées à
la Commission des limites du plateau continental — Caractère général de la
pratique — Opinio juris — Évaluation de la pratique — Conviction juridique
et délimitation équitable.
I. Introduction
1. Dans le présent exposé de mon opinion, j’expliquerai pourquoi j’ai voté
contre tous les alinéas du dispositif de l’arrêt de ce jour. Les questions que la
Cour se proposait d’examiner au stade actuel de l’instance étaient formulées
en termes abstraits, sans rapport avec les faits spécifiques de l’affaire dont
elle est saisie (paragraphe 14 de l’arrêt). C’est pour cette raison que j’ai souscrit
à l’ordonnance du 4 octobre 2022. Selon moi, cependant, le raisonnement
suivi par la Cour dans son arrêt a permis que des considérations propres à
l’espèce viennent troubler son examen de principes abstraits.
II. Première question
2. La première question était formulée comme suit :
« En droit international coutumier, le droit d’un État à un plateau
continental au-delà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles
est mesurée la largeur de sa mer territoriale peut-il s’étendre à
des espaces maritimes en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base
d’un autre État ? » (Question de la délimitation du plateau continental
entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie au-delà de 200 milles marins de la
côte nicaraguayenne (Nicaragua c. Colombie), ordonnance du 4 octobre
2022, C.I.J. Recueil 2022 (II), p. 565.)
54 1 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
A. Maritime Entitlements and Maritime Delimitation
3. The first question concerns the determination of a maritime entitlement
— specifically, a coastal State’s maritime entitlement to a continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines (“extended continental
shelf”)1. This question is distinct from, albeit complementary to, the question
of maritime delimitation2. The two questions are governed by different
legal rules, and they can give rise to separate disputes3.
4. As the Judgment affirms (Judgment, para. 42), the determination of
maritime entitlements is the first step in any maritime delimitation. In that
step, the question is whether, under international law, a coastal State may
claim to exercise jurisdiction over a maritime area. Where, however, multiple
coastal States may lay claim to exercise jurisdiction over the same
maritime area, this jurisdiction may not be exercised concurrently by all
coastal States, at least not without their consent. It is in such circumstances
that maritime delimitation is employed to resolve situations of multiple
entitlements over the same maritime area. The process of maritime delimitation
determines the spatial ambit of each coastal State’s jurisdiction over part
of that common maritime area4, and thereby sanctions the exercise of coastal
State jurisdiction as recognized by international law.
5. The object of any maritime delimitation is to achieve an equitable solution5.
In a situation in which multiple coastal States have entitlements over
the same area, therefore, the delimitation process will almost inevitably
result in each coastal State sacrificing part of its maritime entitlement
and exercising jurisdiction over a maritime area that is less than its full
1 I use the term “baselines” as a shorthand for “baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured”, and I treat it as synonymous to “coast”. I use the term “extended
continental shelf” to denote the continental shelf extending to the outer edge of the continental
margin, where that edge extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the coastal State’s
baselines.
2 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 30,
para. 27.
3 South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s
Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015, United
Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXXIII, p. 65, para. 156.
4 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation
(2nd ed., Oxford: Hart 2019), p. 6; see also Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation —
Reflections (transl. Maureen MacGlashan, Cambridge: Grotius Publications 1989), p. 3.
5 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v.
Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 59, para. 48; see also Continental Shelf (Tunisia/
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 59, para. 70; Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports
2012, p. 67, para. 235.
541
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
A. Droits à des espaces maritimes et délimitation maritime
3. La première question porte sur la détermination du droit à un espace
maritime — dans le cas d’espèce, le droit d’un État côtier à un plateau continental
au-delà de 200 milles marins de ses lignes de base (le « plateau
continental étendu »)1. Cette question est à la fois distincte et complémentaire
de la question de la délimitation maritime2. Ces deux questions sont
gouvernées par des régimes juridiques différents et peuvent donner naissance
à des différends spécifiques3.
4. Comme il est dit au paragraphe 42 de l’arrêt, la première étape dans
toute délimitation maritime consiste à déterminer s’il existe des droits. Pendant
cette première étape, la question qui se pose est celle de savoir si, en
droit international, un État côtier peut prétendre exercer sa juridiction sur un
espace maritime donné. Or, dans les situations où plusieurs États côtiers
peuvent prétendre exercer leur juridiction sur un même espace maritime,
cette juridiction ne saurait être exercée concurremment par tous les États
côtiers, du moins sans leur consentement. C’est dans de telles situations que
l’on a recours à la délimitation maritime pour résoudre les problèmes de
droits concurrents sur un même espace maritime. Le processus de délimitation
maritime détermine l’étendue spatiale de la juridiction de chaque État
côtier sur une partie de cet espace maritime commun4 et sanctionne de ce
fait l’exercice de la juridiction de l’État côtier telle que le droit international
la reconnaît.
5. Toute délimitation maritime a pour objet d’aboutir à une solution équitable5.
Il s’ensuit que, dans une situation dans laquelle plusieurs États côtiers
ont droit à des espaces maritimes dans un même espace, le processus de
délimitation aura presque inévitablement pour résultat que chacun de ces
États devra sacrifier une partie de son droit et exercer sa juridiction sur un
1 J’emploie l’expression « lignes de base » comme abréviation de « lignes de base à partir
desquelles la largeur de la mer territoriale est mesurée » et j’en fais un synonyme de « côte ».
J’emploie l’expression « plateau continental étendu » pour désigner le plateau continental qui
se prolonge jusqu’à la limite extérieure de la marge continentale, lorsque cette limite extérieure
se situe à plus de 200 milles marins des lignes de base de l’État côtier.
2 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 30,
par. 27.
3 Arbitrage entre la République des Philippines et la République populaire de Chine concernant
la mer de Chine méridionale, sentence du 29 octobre 2015 sur la compétence et la
recevabilité, Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales (RSA), vol. XXXIII, p. 65,
par. 156.
4 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation,
Oxford, Hart, 2e éd., 2019, p. 6 ; voir également Prosper Weil, Perspectives du droit de la délimitation
maritime, Paris, Pedone, 1988.
5 Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark
c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 59, par. 48 ; voir également Plateau continental
(Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 59, par. 70 ; Délimitation
de la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar), arrêt, TIDM
Recueil 2012, p. 67, par. 235.
54 2 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
entitlement6. For example, where the coasts of two States are 100 nautical
miles apart, either State is in theory entitled to a continental shelf that
reaches the other State’s shores. However, this does not mean that either
State may exercise continental shelf jurisdiction on the basis of this entitlement
to its full extent. It is left to the process of maritime delimitation to
determine the areas over which each coastal State may exercise the jurisdiction
to which it is entitled under international law.
6. Whether a coastal State is entitled under international law to exercise
sovereign rights for the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf’s
natural resources is a question of maritime entitlement. What parts of the
continental shelf should be found to appertain to this coastal State where
another coastal State is also entitled to sovereign rights over the same continental
shelf is a question of maritime delimitation and its effects.
B. The Determination of Maritime Entitlements
in the Court’s Jurisprudence
7. The Court has a considerable jurisprudence on maritime entitlements.
In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the Court explained that “[i]t is the land
which confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coasts”7.
This point was affirmed with respect to a State’s entitlement to a continental
shelf in Black Sea8. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
concurs, having held that “[a] coastal State’s entitlement to the continental
shelf exists by the sole fact that the basis of entitlement, namely, sovereignty
over the land territory, is present”9. This is not necessarily to say that maritime
entitlements are contingent on the presence or on the integrity of the
land territory in perpetuity. The legal conception of maritime entitlements
6 Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France, Decision of 10 June 1992,
RIAA, Vol. XXI, p. 289, para. 67; ibid., dissenting opinion of Prosper Weil, p. 307, para. 17.
7 Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 133.
8 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2009, p. 89, para. 77: “The title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive economic
zone is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea through the projection of the
coasts or the coastal fronts.” That Judgment also cites from North Sea Continental Shelf
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands): “the
land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to
seaward” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96). See also Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 36, para. 86: “continental shelf
rights are legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty
of the coastal State”.
9 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 107, para. 409.
542
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
espace maritime moins important que celui auquel il aurait théoriquement
droit6. Par exemple, lorsque les côtes de deux États sont éloignées de
100 milles marins l’une de l’autre, chacun de ces États a théoriquement droit
à un plateau continental qui s’étend jusqu’à la côte de l’autre État. Cela
ne signifie pas pour autant que chacun desdits États puisse exercer sa juridiction
sur l’intégralité du plateau continental en arguant de ce droit
théorique. C’est au processus de délimitation maritime qu’il appartient
de déterminer les espaces maritimes sur lesquels chacun des États côtiers
pourra exercer la juridiction que lui reconnaît le droit international.
6. La question de savoir si un État côtier est admis, en droit international,
à exercer des droits souverains sur le plateau continental aux fins de son
exploration et de l’exploitation de ses ressources naturelles est une question
de droit à des espaces maritimes. La question de savoir quelles parties du
plateau continental sont censées relever de cet État côtier lorsqu’un
autre État côtier a lui aussi des droits souverains sur le même plateau continental
est une question de délimitation maritime et des effets que celle-ci
produit.
B. La détermination des droits à des espaces maritimes
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour
7. La Cour a développé une jurisprudence considérable sur la question des
droits à des espaces maritimes. Dans l’affaire des Pêcheries (Royaume-
Uni c. Norvège), elle a expliqué que « [c]’est la terre qui confère à l’État
riverain un droit sur les eaux qui baignent ses côtes »7. Ce principe a été
confirmé, en ce qui concerne le droit d’un État à un plateau continental, par
l’arrêt en l’affaire relative à la Mer Noire8. Le Tribunal international du droit
de la mer y a souscrit lorsqu’il a conclu que « [l]e titre d’un État côtier sur le
plateau continental est établi du fait de l’existence de la souveraineté sur le
territoire terrestre »9. Cela ne veut pas nécessairement dire que le droit à des
espaces maritimes dépende à perpétuité de la présence ou de l’intégrité du
6 Délimitation des espaces maritimes entre le Canada et la République française, décision
du 10 juin 1992, Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XXI, p. 289, par. 67 ; ibid., opinion dissidente de
M. Prosper Weil, p. 307, par. 17.
7 Pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 133.
8 Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009,
p. 89, par. 77 : « Le titre d’un État sur le plateau continental et la zone économique exclusive est
fondé sur le principe selon lequel la terre domine la mer du fait de la projection des côtes ou
des façades côtières. » Cet arrêt cite également les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du
Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays-
Bas) : « la terre est la source juridique du pouvoir qu’un État peut exercer dans les prolongements
maritimes » (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 51, par. 96). Voir également Plateau continental de
la mer Égée (Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 36, par. 86 : « les droits sur le
plateau continental sont, du point de vue juridique, à la fois une émanation de la souveraineté
territoriale de l’État riverain et un accessoire automatique de celle-ci ».
9 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 107, par. 409.
54 3 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
may well need to adapt to modern challenges10. It simply means that, under
customary international law, entitlements at sea are derivative of the title to
land.
8. As a result, when determining a coastal State’s entitlement to maritime
areas, the Court refers only to the question of whether the State has sovereignty
over the relevant land territory, as well as to the characteristics of that
land territory (because, for example, not all maritime features generate an
entitlement to a continental shelf)11. No other factors have been found to
inform the question of a coastal State’s entitlement to a maritime area — certainly
not factors pertaining to other coastal States’ maritime entitlements in
the vicinity. The logic of determining each State’s maritime entitlements in
isolation can also be seen in the constraints applicable to the establishment
of the outer edge of the continental margin under Article 76 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS”
or the “Convention”), leaving aside the question of whether these constraints
form part of customary international law. None of these constraints contemplates
the presence of other States.
9. The maritime entitlements of other States will of course inform the
question of delimitation. This point is illustrated in the Court’s Judgment in
Territorial and Maritime Dispute with respect to the relationship between a
State’s entitlement to a territorial sea and another State’s entitlement to a
continental shelf12. In that Judgment, the Court discussed “the overlap . . .
between the territorial sea entitlement of Colombia derived from each island
and the entitlement of Nicaragua to a continental shelf and exclusive economic
zone”13. The Court’s point of departure was that a State’s entitlement
to a continental shelf (in that case, Nicaragua’s) may well extend into — and
thus overlap with — another State’s entitlement to a territorial sea (in that
case, Colombia’s). However, the Court clarified that, in such a situation, the
former State’s entitlement would not be given effect, namely, that the former
State be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a continental shelf that extends
within the latter State’s territorial sea14.
10 See, for example, “Sea-level rise in relation to international law: Additional paper to the
first issues paper (2020), by Bogdan Aurescu and Nilüfer Oral, Co-Chairs of the Study Group
on sea-level rise in relation to international law”, UN doc. A/CN.4/761, 13 February 2023,
para. 155; see also “Resolution 5/2018: Committee on International law and sea level rise”,
International Law Association Reports of Conferences, Vol. 78 (2018), p. 29.
11 Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS, which forms part of customary international
law: Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 674, para. 139.
12 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 690, paras. 177-178.
13 Ibid., p. 690, para. 177 (emphasis added).
14 Ibid., pp. 690-691, paras. 178-180; see also Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 51, para. 169,
543
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
territoire terrestre. La conception juridique du droit à des espaces maritimes
pourrait très bien être appelée à s’adapter aux défis modernes10. Cela veut
simplement dire que, en droit international coutumier, le droit à des espaces
maritimes découle du droit sur le territoire terrestre.
8. Il s’ensuit que, lorsque la Cour détermine le droit d’un État côtier à des
espaces maritimes, elle examine uniquement la question de savoir si cet État
détient la souveraineté sur le territoire terrestre pertinent, ainsi que les caractéristiques
de ce territoire (parce que, par exemple, toutes les formations
maritimes ne sont pas génératrices d’un droit à un plateau continental)11. Il
est établi qu’aucun autre facteur n’informe la question du droit d’un État
côtier à un espace maritime — en tout cas aucun facteur touchant aux droits
des autres États côtiers de la région à des espaces maritimes. La logique qui
préside au fait que les droits de chaque État à des espaces maritimes sont
déterminés séparément transparaît également dans les contraintes applicables
à la détermination du rebord externe de la marge continentale selon l’article 76
de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (ci-après la
« CNUDM » ou la « convention »), abstraction faite de la question de savoir si
ces contraintes font partie du droit international coutumier. Aucune de ces
contraintes n’a trait à la présence d’autres États.
9. Les droits d’autres États à des espaces maritimes informent cependant
et évidemment la question de la délimitation. La Cour a illustré ce point dans
son arrêt en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime en ce qui concerne
les rapports entre le droit d’un État à une mer territoriale et le droit d’un autre
État à un plateau continental12. Dans cet arrêt, elle a examiné le « chevauchement
de la mer territoriale revendiquée par la Colombie autour de chacune de
ses îles avec le plateau continental et la zone économique exclusive auxquels
peut prétendre le Nicaragua »13. La Cour a pris pour point de départ le fait
que le droit d’un État (le Nicaragua en l’espèce) à un plateau continental
peut empiéter sur la mer territoriale à laquelle un autre État (la Colombie en
l’espèce) peut prétendre, avec pour résultat un chevauchement de leurs
droits. Elle a toutefois précisé que, dans une telle situation, il ne serait pas
donné effet au droit du premier État, à savoir que ce premier État ne serait
pas admis à exercer sa juridiction sur un plateau continental qui se prolongerait
jusque dans la mer territoriale de l’autre État14.
10 Voir, par exemple, « Élévation du niveau de la mer au regard du droit international : note
complémentaire à la première note thématique établie en 2020 par Bogdan Aurescu et Nilüfer
Oral, coprésidents du groupe d’étude sur l’élévation du niveau de la mer au regard du droit
international », Nations Unies, doc. A/CN.4/761, 13 février 2023, par. 155 ; voir également
« Resolution 5/2018: Committee on International law and sea level rise », International Law
Association Reports of Conferences, vol. 78 (2018), p. 29.
11 Paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la CNUDM, qui fait partie du droit international coutumier
: Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II),
p. 674, par. 139.
12 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II),
p. 690, par. 177-178.
13 Ibid., p. 690, par. 177 (les italiques sont de moi).
14 Ibid., p. 691-692, par. 178-180 ; voir également Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans
le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar), arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 51, par. 169, qui
54 4 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
10. By contrast, today’s Judgment holds that, in a specific maritime area
(the area within 200 nautical miles from a coastal State’s baselines), a specific
type of competing maritime entitlement (the entitlement to an extended
continental shelf) is precluded (Judgment, para. 79). Other maritime entitlements
in the same area — for example, a third State’s maritime entitlement
to an exclusive economic zone, or a fourth State’s entitlement to a territorial
sea — are legally valid, and the ensuing overlap is to be resolved through
maritime delimitation. The entitlement to an extended continental shelf,
however, is not. On that basis, the Court does not proceed to maritime delimitation
(ibid., paras. 86 and 91).
C. Methodological Approach
11. The Court’s task in this case is essentially an interpretative one: it consists
in identifying the contours of the entitlement to an extended continental
shelf under customary international law. There is no doubt that UNCLOS
reflects many aspects of the customary international law of the sea: some of
its provisions codify pre-existing rules of customary international law,
others crystallize then-emerging rules, and yet others have since given rise
to a general practice accepted as law, generating new customary rules15. For
that reason, I share the Court’s view that recourse to the Convention can
assist in the interpretation of the rules of customary international law that
are reflected in it. At the same time, the methods of treaty interpretation are
not fully transposable to the context of the interpretation of customary international
law, and not all interpretative methods apply with equal force in the
two processes16. The interpreter must keep in mind that custom is neither
generated, nor modified, nor extinguished in the same manner as a treaty.
12. The majority bases its conclusion on two sets of considerations: first,
considerations pertaining to the relationship between the régime of the
exclusive economic zone and that of the continental shelf and, second,
considerations pertaining to the régime of the extended continental shelf
(Judgment, paras. 68 and 74; see also ibid., para. 78). In the following
which refers to a process of “giving more weight” to one coastal State’s entitlement than the
other’s.
15 See, with respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, North Sea Continental Shelf
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 37, para. 60; see also “Conclusions on identification of customary
international law, with commentaries”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(YILC), 2018, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 91 (Conclusion 11, para. 1).
16 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 95, para. 178.
544
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
10. De son côté, l’arrêt de ce jour soutient que, dans un espace maritime
particulier (l’espace en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un État
côtier), un type particulier de droit concurrent à des espaces maritimes (le
droit à un plateau continental étendu) est exclu (arrêt, par. 79). Les autres
droits à des espaces maritimes dans ce même espace — le droit d’un État
tiers à une zone économique exclusive, par exemple, ou le droit d’un quatrième
État à une mer territoriale — restent légalement opposables, et les
chevauchements qui s’ensuivent doivent être résolus par voie de délimitation
maritime. Ce n’est toutefois pas le cas du droit à un plateau continental
étendu. C’est sur ce fondement que la Cour ne procède pas à une délimitation
maritime (ibid., par. 86 et 91).
C. Méthodologie
11. La tâche qui incombe à la Cour en l’espèce est de caractère essentiellement
interprétatif : il s’agit d’identifier les caractéristiques du droit à un
plateau continental étendu en droit international coutumier. Il ne fait aucun
doute que la CNUDM reflète de nombreux aspects du droit international
coutumier de la mer : certaines de ses dispositions codifient des règles du
droit international coutumier qui existaient avant elle, d’autres ont cristallisé
des règles émergentes, tandis que d’autres encore ont donné naissance à une
pratique générale acceptée comme étant le droit, et de ce fait génératrice de
nouvelles règles coutumières15. Pour cette raison, je partage l’avis de la Cour
selon lequel la convention peut faciliter l’interprétation des règles de droit
international coutumier qui y sont reflétées. Cela étant, les méthodes d’interprétation
des traités ne peuvent pas être transportées telles quelles dans le
contexte de l’interprétation du droit international coutumier, et toutes les
méthodes d’interprétation ne s’appliquent pas avec une égale force sur les
deux plans, conventionnel et coutumier16. L’interprète doit garder à l’esprit
que les modes de création, de modification et d’extinction de la coutume sont
différents de ceux d’un traité.
12. La majorité fonde sa conclusion sur deux séries de considérations : premièrement,
des considérations touchant la relation entre le régime de la zone
économique exclusive et celui du plateau continental, et, deuxièmement, des
considérations touchant le régime du plateau continental étendu (arrêt,
par. 68 et 74 ; voir aussi ibid., par. 78). Dans les sections D à F qui suivent,
renvoie à un procédé consistant à « accorder davantage de poids » au droit d’un État côtier qu’à
celui de l’autre.
15 Au sujet de la convention sur le plateau continental, voir les arrêts Plateau continental de
la mer du Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/
Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 37, par. 60 ; voir aussi « Projets de conclusion
sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs », Annuaire de
la Commission du droit international (ACDI), 2018, vol. II, deuxième partie, p. 94 (conclusion
11, par. 1).
16 Voir Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua
c. États-Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 95, par. 178.
54 5 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
sections, I will explain why, in my view, these factors do not support the
Court’s reasoning. I will start with the concept of the extended continental
shelf (Section D), before turning to its relationship with the exclusive economic
zone (Section E). I will then set out my misgivings about the Court’s
discussion of the practice of States (Section F).
D. The Concept of the Extended Continental Shelf
under Customary International Law
13. In my view, the conclusion of the Judgment is not supported by the
terms of the definition of the continental shelf under customary international
law, as reflected in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS17. This provision
establishes two methods to determine the limit of the entitlement to a continental
shelf: the outer edge of the continental margin, or the distance of
200 nautical miles where that outer edge lies within that distance. The provision
does not compel any coastal State to use one method over the other
when determining the outer limits of its continental shelf. Customary international
law stipulates that a coastal State’s minimum entitlement to a
continental shelf extends up to 200 nautical miles from its baselines18, and it
recognizes a broader continental shelf where the outer edge of the continental
margin extends beyond that distance19.
14. The rule reflected in Article 76, paragraph 1, of the Convention, being
a rule of maritime entitlement, is not concerned with the maritime entitlements
of other coastal States or with the method through which the outer
limits of those entitlements are themselves determined. Therefore, this rule
allows an overlap in the same maritime area when two coastal States have
used different methods to determine the limits of their maritime entitlements.
This is not undermined by the fact that only one of the two methods
requires the application of “scientific and technical criteria” (Judgment,
para. 75). These criteria are in practice, if not in theory, more difficult to
apply than the criterion of distance. It does not follow, however, that the burden
of meeting the scientific and technical criteria somehow tarnishes the
maritime entitlement thus determined, compared to a maritime entitlement
determined with reference to distance.
15. May treaty provisions that have not themselves been affirmed as
reflecting custom serve as context for the interpretation of provisions that do
reflect custom? The Judgment invokes Article 82, paragraph 1, of
UNCLOS — a provision with a doubtful status under customary inter-
17 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 666, para. 118.
18 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
p. 33, para. 34: “natural prolongation . . . is in part defined by distance from the shore”.
19 Furthermore, at least under UNCLOS, a maximal limit is established in relation to the
outer edge of the continental margin; see Article 76, paragraphs 5 and 6, of UNCLOS.
545
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
j’expliquerai pourquoi, selon moi, ces facteurs n’étayent pas le raisonnement
de la Cour. Je commencerai par la notion de plateau continental étendu (section
D), avant d’examiner sa relation avec la zone économique exclusive
(section E). J’exposerai ensuite mes doutes sur l’examen que fait la Cour de
la pratique des États (section F).
D. La notion de plateau continental étendu
en droit international coutumier
13. Selon moi, les termes de la définition du plateau continental en droit
international coutumier telle qu’elle est reflétée dans le paragraphe 1 de l’article
76 de la CNUDM ne corroborent pas la conclusion à laquelle aboutit
l’arrêt17. Cette disposition propose deux méthodes permettant de déterminer
la limite du droit à un plateau continental : le rebord extérieur de la marge
continentale ou la distance de 200 milles marins lorsque ce rebord se trouve
à une distance inférieure. Elle n’oblige aucun État côtier à utiliser l’une de
ces deux méthodes plutôt que l’autre pour déterminer la limite de son plateau
continental. Le droit international coutumier prévoit que le droit de l’État
côtier à un plateau continental s’étend au minimum jusqu’à 200 milles
marins de ses lignes de base18, et il admet un plateau continental plus vaste
lorsque le rebord de la marge continentale se trouve à une distance
supérieure19.
14. La règle que reflète le paragraphe 1 de l’article 76 de la convention vise
le droit à des espaces maritimes et, partant, est indifférente aux droits à des
espaces maritimes d’autres États côtiers ou à la méthode permettant de
déterminer les limites extérieures de ces droits. Il s’ensuit que cette règle
permet un chevauchement ou une concurrence de droits dans le même
espace maritime lorsque deux États côtiers ont utilisé des méthodes différentes
de détermination des limites de leurs droits à des espaces maritimes.
Cela n’est nullement entaché par le fait qu’une seule des deux méthodes
requiert l’application de « critères scientifiques et techniques » (arrêt, par. 75).
Certes, ces critères sont, en pratique sinon en théorie, plus difficiles à appliquer
que le critère de la distance. Il ne s’ensuit néanmoins pas que la difficulté
de satisfaire à ces critères scientifiques et techniques vicierait en quelque
façon le droit à un espace maritime qu’ils auraient servi à déterminer, comparé
au droit à un espace maritime déterminé par référence à la distance.
15. Des dispositions conventionnelles qui ne sont pas réputées refléter le
droit international coutumier peuvent-elles être invoquées à titre de contexte
pour l’interprétation de dispositions qui, elles, reflètent ce droit ? L’arrêt
invoque le paragraphe 1 de l’article 82 de la CNUDM, soit une disposition
17 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II),
p. 666, par. 118.
18 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 33,
par. 34 : « le prolongement naturel … se définit en partie par la distance du rivage ».
19 À cela s’ajoute que, au moins selon la CNUDM, le rebord extérieur de la marge continentale
doit respecter une limite maximale ; voir les paragraphes 5-6 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM.
54 6 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
national law. In essence, the Court relies on the broad text of that provision,
which does not indicate any exceptions or qualifications, to offer an interpretation
that prevents its application in situations in which a coastal State
encroaches upon the 200-nautical-mile zone of another State. This, in turn,
is used as context to interpret the definition of the continental shelf under
Article 76, paragraph 1, of the Convention. I have some doubts about the
Court’s interpretation of Article 82. Whether the purpose of this provision
can be served in the situation envisaged by the Court depends, in part, on the
interpretation of the “equitable sharing criteria” that will guide the distribution
of payments in such a situation, pursuant to Article 82, paragraph 4, of
the Convention.
16. Moreover, I am reluctant to attach significance to the fact that the substantive
and procedural conditions for determining the outer limits of the
extended continental shelf — namely, those enshrined in Article 76, paragraphs
4 to 9 — were the result of a compromise (Judgment, para. 76).
Leaving the definition of the continental shelf to one side, the Court has
refrained from pronouncing on the status under customary international law
of Article 76 of UNCLOS (see ibid., para. 82)20. If the criteria for determining
the outer limits of the extended continental shelf are reflective of
custom, then the fact that they emerged out of a compromise seems inconsequential.
If they are not reflective of custom, then the pertinence of the
compromise seems even more limited.
17. The preparatory work of UNCLOS assumes importance in today’s
Judgment. As the Judgment acknowledges, however, the question now
before the Court was not debated during the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (Judgment, para. 76). On other occasions, in
situations where the preparatory work evidences little or no discussion of a
topic, the Court avoided drawing any inferences for the purposes of treaty
interpretation21. In my view, the Court should proceed with even greater caution
where customary international law is in question.
E. The Significance of the Exclusive Economic Zone
18. The Judgment places weight on the fact that the institutions of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf are integrated (Judgment,
para. 49) and that their legal régimes are interrelated (ibid., para. 70). In this
regard, two points are worth making.
20 See also Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 666, para. 118.
21 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011 (I), pp. 129-130, para. 147; Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial
Guinea v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 323, para. 70; Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 22, para. 41.
546
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
dont le statut en droit international coutumier est douteux. La Cour s’appuie
essentiellement sur la formulation générale de cette disposition, qui ne prévoit
ni exceptions ni tempéraments, pour en donner une interprétation qui
empêche de l’appliquer à des situations où le plateau continental d’un État
empiéterait sur la zone des 200 milles marins d’un autre État. Cette interprétation
lui sert alors de contexte pour interpréter à son tour la définition du
plateau continental selon le paragraphe 1 de l’article 76 de la convention. J’ai
des réserves sur l’interprétation que propose la Cour de l’article 82. La question
de savoir si le but visé par cette disposition peut être atteint dans la
situation envisagée par la Cour dépend en partie de l’interprétation des « critères
de partage équitables » qui encadreront la distribution des contributions
dans cette situation, conformément au paragraphe 4 de l’article 82 de la
convention.
16. De plus, je répugne à attacher une quelconque importance au fait que
les conditions de fond et de procédure qui entrent en ligne de compte pour la
détermination des limites extérieures du plateau continental étendu — à
savoir celles qui sont consacrées dans les paragraphes 4 à 9 de l’article 76 —
sont le résultat d’un compromis (arrêt, par. 76). Laissant de côté la définition
du plateau continental, la Cour s’est abstenue de se prononcer sur le statut de
l’article 76 de la CNUDM en droit international coutumier (ibid., par. 82)20.
Si les critères servant à déterminer les limites extérieures du plateau continental
reflètent la coutume, le fait qu’ils soient le résultat d’un compromis
semble indifférent. S’ils ne la reflètent pas, la pertinence du compromis
semble encore plus limitée.
17. L’arrêt de ce jour accorde de l’importance aux travaux préparatoires de
la CNUDM. Or, comme il le reconnaît lui-même, la question dont est saisie la
Cour n’a pas été débattue pendant la troisième conférence des Nations Unies
sur le droit de la mer (arrêt, par. 76). Dans d’autres affaires, lorsque les travaux
préparatoires faisaient ressortir qu’une question n’avait pas ou guère été débattue,
la Cour évitait de s’appuyer sur eux aux fins d’interprétation d’un traité21.
Il m’est d’avis que la Cour devrait procéder avec encore plus de prudence lorsqu’il
est question de droit international coutumier.
E. Importance de la zone économique exclusive
18. Dans son arrêt, la Cour accorde un poids certain au caractère intégré
des institutions que sont la zone économique exclusive et le plateau
continental (arrêt, par. 49) et au fait qu’elles sont reliées entre elles (ibid.,
par. 70). Là-dessus, deux points méritent d’être soulignés.
20 Voir également Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 2012 (II), p. 666, par. 118.
21 Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de
discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 129-130, par. 147 ; Immunités et procédures pénales (Guinée équatoriale
c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2020, p. 323, par. 70 ; Délimitation maritime et questions
territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 22, par. 41.
54 7 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
19. First, while linked, the institutions of the exclusive economic zone and
of the continental shelf remain legally distinct, and the continental shelf up
to 200 nautical miles has not been absorbed by the exclusive economic
zone22. The separate character of the two institutions is illustrated by the fact
that, in the context of maritime delimitation, the Court maintains the distinction
between the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the
delimitation of the continental shelf even where it draws a single maritime
boundary, despite the fact that the rights accruing in the continental shelf
are, in the main, included among the exclusive economic zone rights23. A
coastal State’s entitlement to an exclusive economic zone is distinct from its
entitlement to a continental shelf (even if the latter only extends up to
200 nautical miles), and indeed a State may enjoy sovereign rights over a
continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles even where it has not proclaimed
an exclusive economic zone, or where its exclusive economic zone is narrower
than 200 nautical miles24.
20. Second, the interrelated character of the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf is potentially relevant where the two institutions attach
to the same coastal State. This was the situation in Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta). In that case, Libya had argued that the discontinuity
in Malta’s natural prolongation nullified Malta’s own entitlement to a
continental shelf on the basis of distance25. Libya’s argument was effectively
that Malta was not entitled to a continental shelf of up to 200 nautical miles
unless it could prove that this shelf was the natural prolongation of its land
territory. In emphasizing the importance of the criterion of distance, the
Court rejected Libya’s contention that Malta’s continental shelf was terminated
in the absence of natural prolongation in the geomorphological
sense26. By contrast, the Court did not address the question of whether
22 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 33,
paras. 33-34.
23 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 719, para. 251, subpara. 4; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), pp. 760-763, para. 321, subparas. 2-3.
24 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 33,
para. 34.
25 Ibid., p. 34, para. 36:
“it is Libya’s case that the natural prolongation, in the physical sense, of the land territory
into and under the sea is still a primary basis of title to continental shelf. For Libya, as a
first step each Party has to prove that the physical natural prolongation of its land territory
extends into the area in which the delimitation is to be effected; if there exists a fundamental
discontinuity between the shelf area adjacent to one Party and the shelf area
adjacent to the other, then the boundary, it is contended, should lie along the general line
of that fundamental discontinuity.”
26 Ibid., p. 35, para. 39:
“It follows that, since the distance between the coasts of the Parties is less than
400 miles, so that no geophysical feature can lie more than 200 miles from each coast, the
547
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
19. Premièrement, s’il est vrai qu’elles sont liées, les deux institutions de la
zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental n’en restent pas moins
juridiquement distinctes, et la notion de plateau continental jusqu’à une distance
de 200 milles marins n’a pas été recouverte par celle de zone
économique exclusive22. Le caractère distinct de ces deux institutions est
encore illustré par le fait que, dans un contexte de délimitation, la Cour
maintient la distinction entre délimitation de la zone économique exclusive
et délimitation du plateau continental, même lorsqu’elle trace une frontière
maritime unique, et ceci en dépit du fait que les droits qui s’attachent au
plateau continental sont en grande partie compris parmi ceux qui s’attachent
à la zone économique exclusive23. Le droit d’un État côtier à une zone économique
exclusive est distinct de son droit à un plateau continental (même si ce
dernier ne s’étend que jusqu’à 200 milles marins), et d’ailleurs un État peut
jouir de droits souverains sur un plateau continental jusqu’à 200 milles
marins même s’il n’a pas déclaré de zone économique exclusive ou si sa zone
économique exclusive ne s’étend pas jusqu’à 200 milles marins24.
20. Deuxièmement, le fait que les institutions de la zone économique
exclusive et du plateau continental sont liées peut être pertinent lorsqu’elles
relèvent l’une et l’autre du même État côtier. Telle était la situation en l’affaire
du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte). Dans cette
affaire, la Libye avait fait valoir que la discontinuité qui affectait le prolongement
naturel de Malte annulait le droit qu’avait Malte au plateau continental
sur la base de la distance25. La Libye prétendait que Malte n’avait pas droit à
un plateau continental jusqu’à 200 milles marins, sauf à prouver que ce plateau
était le prolongement naturel de son territoire terrestre. Soulignant
l’importance du critère de la distance, la Cour a rejeté l’argument de la Libye
voulant que l’absence de prolongement naturel au sens géomorphologique du
terme interrompe en quelque sorte le plateau continental relevant de Malte26.
22 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985,
p. 33-34, par. 33-34.
23 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II),
p. 719, par. 251, point 4 ; Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras
dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 760-763,
par. 321, points 2-3.
24 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 33,
par. 34.
25 Ibid., p. 34, par. 36 :
« la thèse libyenne est que le prolongement naturel, au sens physique, du territoire
terrestre dans et sous la mer demeure une base essentielle du titre sur le plateau
continental. Selon la Libye chacune des Parties doit, en premier lieu, prouver que le
prolongement naturel de son territoire terrestre avance dans la zone où la délimitation
doit s’opérer ; s’il existe une discontinuité fondamentale entre la zone de plateau adjacente
à une Partie et celle adjacente à l’autre, alors, soutient-elle, la limite doit se situer sur la
ligne générale de cette discontinuité fondamentale. »
26 Ibid., p. 35, par. 39 :
« Il s’ensuit que, comme la distance entre les côtes des Parties n’atteint pas 400 milles,
de sorte qu’aucune particularité géophysique ne peut se trouver à plus de 200 milles de
54 8 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
Malta’s continental shelf entitlement could somehow counter Libya’s continental
shelf entitlement. That question, as discussed, is a question of delimitation.
21. The fact that a coastal State’s entitlement to an exclusive economic
zone does not nullify a priori another coastal State’s entitlement to an
extended continental shelf is also reflected in international jurisprudence
on maritime delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles. This includes the two
Bay of Bengal cases27 and the case of Maritime Delimitation in the Indian
Ocean28. In all three cases, at least one coastal State claimed an entitlement
to an extended continental shelf lying within another State’s 200-nauticalmile
limit. In the cases, three different international courts and tribunals
proceeded with the delimitation of the maritime area, and in fact held that
the entitlement to an extended continental shelf should be given some effect
through the creation of a “grey area”29. While the modalities may vary in
each grey area, the upshot is that the coastal State entitled to an extended
continental shelf and the coastal State with maritime entitlements up to
200 nautical miles both exercise a degree of jurisdiction in the same maritime
area. Following the reasoning adopted by the Court in the present case,
the coastal State’s claim to an extended continental shelf should have been
declared inadmissible in so far as it lay within 200 nautical miles from the
other State’s baselines, and no maritime delimitation would have been
possible in that area (see Judgment, paras. 86 and 91). Yet the three courts
and tribunals did not declare Bangladesh’s or Kenya’s claims inadmissible
in so far as they lay within 200 nautical miles from Myanmar, India or
Somalia. Nor did they readjust the delimitation line beyond 200 nautical
miles from Bangladesh or Kenya, so that it respects the 200-nautical-mile
limit from Myanmar, India or Somalia.
22. Today’s Judgment notes that, in those cases, the grey areas were of
limited size and arose as an incidental result, or as a consequence, of marifeature
referred to as the ‘rift zone’ cannot constitute a fundamental discontinuity terminating
the southward extension of the Maltese shelf and the northward extension of the
Libyan as if it were some natural boundary.” (Emphasis added.)
27 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh
v. India), Award of 7 July 2014, RIAA, Vol. XXXII, p. 1.
28 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2021, p. 206.
29 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 120, para. 471; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary
Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award of 7 July 2014, RIAA, Vol. XXXII, p. 147, para. 498;
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021,
p. 277, para. 197.
548
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
En revanche, elle n’a pas abordé la question de savoir si le droit de Malte à un
plateau continental pouvait, d’une façon ou d’une autre, annuler le droit de la
Libye à un plateau continental. Cette question, comme nous l’avons vu, est
une question de délimitation.
21. Le fait que le droit d’un État côtier à une zone économique exclusive
n’annule pas a priori le droit d’un autre État côtier à un plateau continental
se vérifie également dans la jurisprudence internationale en matière de délimitation
maritime au-delà de 200 milles marins. Cette jurisprudence
comprend notamment les deux affaires du Golfe du Bengale27 et l’affaire
relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien28. Dans ces trois
affaires, au moins un État côtier revendiquait un droit à un plateau continental
étendu qui se situait en deçà de la limite des 200 milles marins d’un autre
État. Dans ces affaires, trois cours et tribunaux internationaux ont procédé
à la délimitation de l’espace maritime et ont conclu qu’il fallait accorder
un certain effet au droit à un plateau continental étendu en créant une « zone
grise »29. Sans doute les modalités peuvent-elles varier d’une zone grise à une
autre, mais le résultat est que l’État côtier qui a droit à un plateau continental
étendu et l’État côtier qui a droit à des espaces maritimes jusqu’à 200 milles
marins exercent tous les deux un certain degré de juridiction à l’intérieur
d’un même espace maritime. Si l’on suit le raisonnement de la Cour en la
présente espèce, la prétention de l’État côtier à un plateau continental étendu
aurait dû être déclarée irrecevable dans la mesure où elle se prolongeait
jusqu’à moins de 200 milles marins des lignes de base de l’autre État,
et aucune délimitation n’aurait été possible dans cette zone (arrêt, par. 86
et 91). Or les trois cours et tribunaux n’ont pas déclaré les prétentions du
Bangladesh ou du Kenya irrecevables dans la mesure où elles s’étendaient en
deçà des 200 milles marins du Myanmar, de l’Inde ou de la Somalie. Ils n’ont
pas non plus ajusté la ligne de délimitation au-delà de 200 milles marins du
Bangladesh ou du Kenya de façon qu’elle respecte la limite des 200 milles
marins du Myanmar, de l’Inde ou de la Somalie.
22. Dans son arrêt de ce jour, la Cour observe que, dans ces affaires, les zones
grises étaient de taille limitée et qu’elles étaient le résultat ou la conséquence
chaque côte, la caractéristique appelée “zone d’effondrement” ne constitue pas une
discontinuité fondamentale interrompant, comme une sorte de frontière naturelle,
l’extension du plateau continental maltais vers le sud et celle du plateau continental libyen
vers le nord. » (Les italiques sont de moi.)
27 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 4 ; Arbitrage concernant la frontière maritime dans le golfe du
Bengale (Bangladesh c. Inde), sentence du 7 juillet 2014, Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XXXII, p. 1.
28 Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021,
p. 206.
29 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 120, par. 471 ; Arbitrage concernant la frontière maritime dans
le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh c. Inde), sentence du 7 juillet 2014, Nations Unies, RSA,
vol. XXXII, p. 147, par. 498 ; Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 277, par. 197.
54 9 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
time delimitation (Judgment, paras. 71-72). This observation, however, overlooks
the precedential value of the cases in the context of answering the
question of determining maritime entitlements. For the purposes of the
abstract question now before the Court, what matters is that the presence of
grey areas at the conclusion of maritime delimitation presupposes, before
that process, the existence of a maritime area where a State’s entitlement to
an extended continental shelf overlaps with another State’s maritime entitlements
up to 200 nautical miles from its coasts. If the latter maritime
entitlements displaced the former, then maritime delimitation beyond
200 nautical miles in those cases would have been barred altogether, and no
grey area would have been possible. The questions of whether grey areas —
in the sense of areas of overlapping jurisdiction — should be recognized
sparingly, whether they should cover a limited size, or whether they should
be avoided altogether, would only come at play at the stage of delimitation.
23. The insistence that the jurisprudence of Bay of Bengal should be
distinguished from the present case (Judgment, para. 72) illustrates, in my
view, the Court’s oscillation between abstract questions of law and the circumstances
of the present case. The only difference between those cases and
the case at hand that might be relevant for answering the abstract question
before the Court concerns the coastal configuration of the States involved.
As the Judgment notes, the previous cases involved States with adjacent
coasts (ibid., paras. 71-72). This, however, does not reduce their relevance to
the present case. The distinction between opposite and adjacent coasts30 is
not always clear. Within the same case, the Court commonly finds that the
coasts of the litigant parties shift from adjacent to opposite or
vice versa31 regardless of whether the coastal States share a land boundary or
not, or that they fit in both categories32, or indeed in neither33. But even if the
criterion of adjacency could be applied in a sufficiently predictable manner,
it is not clear how it could inform a coastal State’s maritime entitlements,
which are identified on the basis of the rule reflected in Article 76, paragraph
1, of UNCLOS.
30 International Hydrographic Organization, “Manual on technical aspects of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — 1982 (TALOS)” (6th ed., 2020), Appendix
1 (Glossary), para. 1: “Adjacent coasts: The coasts lying either side of a land boundary
between two adjoining States”. See also ibid., para. 69: “Opposite coasts: The geographical
relationship of the coasts of two States facing each other”.
31 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91, para. 170.
32 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2009, p. 93, para. 88.
33 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 28, para. 36.
549
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
fortuite d’une délimitation maritime (arrêt, par. 71 et 72). Cette observation,
cependant, néglige la valeur de précédent qu’ont ces affaires dans un contexte
où se pose la question de la détermination d’espaces maritimes. Aux fins de
la réponse à donner à la question abstraite dont est saisie la Cour, ce qui
importe est que la présence de zones grises à l’issue d’une délimitation maritime
présuppose l’existence, avant le processus de délimitation, d’un espace
maritime où le droit d’un État à un plateau continental étendu entre en concurrence
avec le droit d’un autre État à des espaces maritimes jusqu’à 200 milles
marins de ses côtes. Si le droit à des espaces maritimes de ce second État
évinçait le droit à un plateau continental du premier, il aurait été exclu de procéder
à la délimitation maritime au-delà de 200 milles marins dans ces affaires
et il n’y aurait eu aucune possibilité de zone grise. Les questions de savoir si
les zones grises — au sens de zones de chevauchement de juridictions — ne
devraient être reconnues qu’avec parcimonie, si elles devraient être de taille
modeste ou s’il faudrait les éviter complètement ne se poseraient qu’au stade
de la délimitation.
23. L’insistance avec laquelle la Cour veut établir une distinction entre les
affaires du Golfe du Bengale et la présente espèce (arrêt, par. 72) illustre, selon
moi, son balancement entre les questions juridiques abstraites et les circonstances
de l’espèce. La seule différence entre ces affaires et la présente espèce
qui puisse éventuellement aider à répondre à la question abstraite dont est saisie
la Cour a trait à la configuration des côtes des États en cause. Comme le
note la Cour dans son arrêt, les affaires du Golfe du Bengale concernaient
deux États adjacents (ibid., par. 71 et 72). Cela n’ôte cependant rien à leur pertinence
pour l’espèce. La distinction entre côtes qui se font face et côtes
adjacentes30 n’est pas toujours évidente. Il arrive fréquemment que, dans une
même espèce, la Cour conclue soit que les côtes des parties en litige passent
du statut de côtes adjacentes à celui de côtes se faisant face ou inversement,
indépendamment du fait que les États côtiers intéressés partagent une frontière
terrestre commune ou non31, soit qu’elles appartiennent simultanément à
l’une et à l’autre catégorie32, soit qu’elles n’appartiennent ni à l’une ni à l’autre33.
Cela dit, même si le critère de l’adjacence se prêtait à une application suffisamment
prévisible, on voit mal comment il pourrait informer les droits de
l’État côtier à des espaces maritimes, sachant que ces droits sont déterminés
selon la règle reflétée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM.
30 Organisation hydrographique internationale, « Guide sur les aspects techniques de la
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer — 1982 (TALOS) », 6e éd., 2020,
appendice 1 (glossaire), par. 1 : « Côtes adjacentes : côtes situées de part et d’autre de la
frontière terrestre entre deux États contigus ». Voir également ibid., par. 69 : « Côtes qui se font
face : relation géographique entre les côtes de deux États qui se font face ».
31 Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 91, par. 170.
32 Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009,
p. 93, par. 88.
33 Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ;
République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 28, par. 36.
55 0 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
F. The Practice of States
24. The practice of States provides the strongest support for the Court’s
conclusion (Judgment, para. 77).
1. Identifying practice
25. There is extensive practice whereby coastal States refrain from claiming
that they are entitled to an extended continental shelf that intrudes within
200 nautical miles from another coastal State’s baselines34. This practice is
34 For example, France, “Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea in respect of the areas of French Guiana and New Caledonia: Part 1: Executive
Summary” (May 2007), p. 3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra07/
fra_executivesummary_2007.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “The extension is limited to the west
by the area under Australian jurisdiction (EEZ)”; Ghana, “Submission for the Establishment
of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf of Ghana pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Executive Summary” (April 2009),
p. 5, para. 6.2, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gha26_09/gha_
2009execsummary.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “1 (Point OL-GHA-5) [marking the outer limit]
is a point where the outer limit line joins to the 200 [nautical miles] from Nigeria’s territorial
sea baseline”; Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands,
“Joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the
Ontong Java Plateau: Executive Summary” (May 2009), p. 11, para. 6.5, https://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fmpgsb32_09/exsumdocs/fmpgsb2009executivesummary.
pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “1 point (OJP-ECS-004) [marking the outer limit], where the
60 [nautical mile] formula line (Article 76, paragraph 4 (a) (ii) of the Convention) that defines
the outer limit of the extended continental shelf intersects the line 200 [nautical miles] from
the territorial sea baseline of Nauru”; Mozambique, “Submission to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf of the Outer Limits of the Extended Continental Shelf of the
Republic of Mozambique under the Provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 1982: Executive Summary” (June 2010), p. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/
los/clcs_new/submissions_files/moz52_10/moz_2010_es.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “Point
MOZ-OL-92 [marking the outer limit] is located on the 200 [nautical mile] line measured
from the territorial sea baseline of South Africa”; Kiribati, “Submission to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary” (December 2012), p. 5, para. 6.3,
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kir64_2012/kir_es_doc.pdf (visited
30 June 2023): “The Western Platform Area (FP_001 to FP_081), defined by 78 fixed points on
the Hedberg line, one fixed point on the 200 [nautical mile] line measured from the Kiribati
Territorial Sea baseline and one fixed point on the 200 [nautical mile] line of another coastal
State”; Canada, “Partial submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
regarding its continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean: Executive Summary” (December 2013),
pp. 6-7, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can70_13/es_can_en.pdf
(visited 30 June 2023):
“The outer limits of the continental shelf in the Labrador Sea region are defined by
47 fixed points (LS-ECS-001 through LS-ECS-047). These fixed points are either formula
points established in accordance with article 76 (4) (a) (i) or (ii), points on the distance or
depth constraint lines established in accordance with article 76 (5), or a point on the intersection
of the line delineating the outer edge of the continental margin and the
200 [nautical mile] limit of the Kingdom of Denmark.”
550
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
F. La pratique des États
24. La pratique des États est l’élément le plus solide sur lequel s’appuie la
conclusion de la Cour (paragraphe 77 de l’arrêt).
1. Détermination de la pratique
25. Il existe une large pratique constituée par les États qui se sont abstenus
de faire valoir leurs droits à un plateau continental étendu dans des espaces
maritimes en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État34.
34 Par exemple, France, « Demande partielle à la Commission des limites du plateau continental
conformément à l’article 76, paragraphe 8, de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
la mer concernant les zones de la Guyane et de la Nouvelle-Calédonie », partie 1 : résumé (mai
2007), p. 3, par. 2.2.1, accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/fra07/fra_resume_2007.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023), par. 2.2.1 :
« L’extension du plateau continental … est limitée à l’ouest par l’espace sous juridiction (ZEE)
de l’Australie » ; Ghana, « Submission for the Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental
Shelf of Ghana pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea: Executive Summary » (avril 2009), p. 5, par. 6.2, https://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/gha26_09/gha_2009execsummary.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin
2023) : « Le point 1 (OL-GHA-5) [marquant la limite extérieure] est un point où la limite extérieure
rejoint la ligne des 200 [milles marins] mesurée à partir des lignes de base de la mer
territoriale du Nigéria » ; États fédérés de Micronésie, Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée et Îles Salomon,
« Joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the
Ontong Java Plateau: Executive Summary » (mai 2009), p. 11, par. 6.5, https://www.un.org/depts/
los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fmpgsb32_09/exsumdocs/fmpgsb2009executivesummary.pdf
(page consultée le 30 juin 2023) : « Le point 1 (OJP-ECS-004) [marquant la limite extérieure du
plateau continental] est situé à l’intersection de la ligne tracée selon la formule des 60 [milles
marins] (litt. a), al. ii), du paragraphe 4 de l’article 76 de la convention) qui fixe la limite extérieure
du plateau continental étendu et de la ligne des 200 [milles marins] mesurée à partir des
lignes de base de la mer territoriale de Nauru » ; Mozambique, « Submission to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the Outer Limits of the Extended Continental Shelf of
the Republic of Mozambique under the Provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 1982: Executive Summary » (juin 2010), p. 6, https://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/moz52_10/moz_2010_es.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin
2023) : « Le point MOZ-OL-92 [marquant la limite extérieure] est situé sur la ligne des 200
[milles marins] mesurée à partir des lignes de base de la mer territoriale de l’Afrique du Sud » ;
Kiribati, « Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive
Summary » (décembre 2012), p. 5, par. 6.3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_
files/kir64_2012/kir_es_doc.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023) : « La zone de la
plate-forme occidentale (Western Platform Area) (point fixe 001 à point fixe 081), définie par
78 points fixes sur la ligne Hedberg, un point fixe sur la ligne des 200 [milles marins] mesurée à
partir des lignes de base de la mer territoriale de Kiribati et un point fixe sur la ligne des 200
[milles marins] d’un autre État » ; Canada, « Demande partielle du Canada à la Commission des
limites du plateau continental concernant son plateau continental dans l’océan Atlantique », résumé
(décembre 2013), p. 7, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can70_13/es_
can_fr.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023) :
« Les limites extérieures du plateau continental dans la région de la mer du Labrador
sont définies par 47 points fixes (LS-ECS-001 à LS-ECS-047). Ces points fixes sont soit
des points établis à l’aide d’une formule, conformément aux sous-alinéas 76 4) a) i) ou (ii),
soit des points situés sur la ligne représentant la contrainte de distance ou celle de profondeur,
ou un point situé à l’intersection de la ligne qui définit le rebord externe de la marge
continentale et de la limite de 200 milles marins du Royaume du Danemark. »
55 1 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
drawn primarily from the executive summaries of submissions to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter “CLCS”) of
States party to UNCLOS under Article 76, paragraph 8, of the Convention.
26. This practice appears to be a general one. The generality of the practice
is not necessarily to be ascertained with reference to the totality of
States, but rather with reference to the States that are concerned with, or in a
position to contribute to the formation of, the putative rule35. The relevant
States in this context are those that, as a matter of geomorphology, are capable
of sustaining a claim to an extended continental shelf intruding within
200 nautical miles from another State’s baselines. Within that pool of coastal
States, there appears to be a clear trend among States from several regions.
In the International Law Commission’s terminology, therefore, the practice
is “sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent”36.
27. I am also prepared to accept that this practice is supported by legal
conviction (opinio juris). Identifying the subjective element of custom might
be arduous when the relevant practice consists of abstentions, as was the
case in Lotus37. By contrast, in this case the Court is presented with an abundance
of States expressly limiting their claims at the 200-nautical-mile mark
from other States’ baselines. Moreover, the field in question — maritime
entitlements — is governed by customary international law, in the sense that
customary international law clearly regulates States’ behaviour in the field,
even if the precise contours of that regulation may need to be ascertained. In
the face of a clearly identifiable pattern of conduct on the part of States, it is
reasonable to infer that States conform to a rule of customary international
law. The Court in similar situations has accepted that the general practice
was accompanied by opinio juris38.
28. This practice cannot be dismissed simply because it emanates from
States party to UNCLOS. It is true that the conduct of States that emerges
from the executive summaries of their submissions to the CLCS could be
attributed to an intention to comply with conventional obligations, rather
35 “Conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries”,
YILC, 2018, Vol. II, Part Two, pp. 100-101 (Commentary to Conclusion 8, paras. 3-4).
36 Ibid., p. 91 (Conclusion 8, para. 1).
37 “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 28.
38 For example, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 40.
551
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
Cette pratique ressort essentiellement des résumés des demandes adressées
à la Commission des limites du plateau continental (ci-après la « Commission
des limites ») par les États parties à la CNUDM en application du
paragraphe 8 de l’article 76 de cette convention.
26. Cette pratique semble générale. Le caractère général d’une pratique
ne doit pas nécessairement s’apprécier au regard de la totalité des États, mais
plutôt de ceux d’entre eux qui sont concernés par la règle putative ou qui sont
en situation de contribuer à sa formation35. Les États pertinents dans notre
contexte sont ceux qui, sur le plan géomorphologique, peuvent revendiquer
un plateau continental se prolongeant dans des espaces maritimes en deçà
de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État. Parmi ces États
pertinents, il semble s’être dégagé une tendance manifeste émanant d’États
appartenant à plusieurs régions différentes. Cela signifie que, selon les
termes de la Commission du droit international, leur pratique est « suffisamment
répandue et représentative, ainsi que constante » pour être réputée
générale36.
27. Je suis également disposée à admettre que cette pratique est corroborée
par l’acceptation comme étant le droit (opinio juris). Déterminer l’élément
subjectif d’une coutume peut se révéler délicat quand la pratique pertinente
consiste en l’abstention, comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire du Lotus37. En
l’espèce, cependant, la Cour se voit présenter un grand nombre d’États qui
ont expressément arrêté leurs prétentions à la ligne des 200 milles marins
tracée à partir des lignes de base d’un autre État. De plus, le domaine en
question — qui est celui du droit à des espaces maritimes — est régi par le
droit international coutumier, en ce sens que le droit international coutumier
réglemente manifestement le comportement des États dans ce domaine,
même si les contours exacts de cette réglementation ont peut-être besoin
d’être précisés. En présence d’un comportement si manifeste et constant des
États, on peut raisonnablement en déduire que lesdits États ont le sentiment
de se conformer à une règle de droit international coutumier. Dans des situations
similaires, la Cour a admis que la pratique générale s’accompagnait de
l’opinio juris38.
28. Cette pratique ne saurait être récusée au simple motif qu’elle est celle
d’États parties à la CNUDM. Le comportement des États qui ressort des
résumés de leurs demandes à la Commission des limites pourrait certes être
attribué à leur volonté de s’acquitter d’obligations conventionnelles plutôt
35 « Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires
y relatifs », rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa
soixante-dixième session, 2018, Nations Unies, doc. A/73/10, p. 144-145, paragraphe 4 du
commentaire de la conclusion 8.
36 Ibid., p. 143 (paragraphe 1 de la conclusion 8).
37 Lotus, arrêt no 9, 1927, C.P.J.I. Recueil, série A no 10, p. 28.
38 Voir, par exemple, Droit de passage sur territoire indien (Portugal c. Inde), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 40.
55 2 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
than with customary law39. But there is nothing in these executive summaries
nor in the relevant provisions of the Convention that would suggest that
this conduct is peculiar to or triggered by the specific terms of those provisions.
In fact, some States party to UNCLOS refrain from claiming an
entitlement to areas within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of third
States, non-parties of the Convention, which could only accrue benefits from
customary international law rather than from the Convention40.
2. Evaluating practice
29. More complicated is the determination of the content of the putative
rule of customary international law to which the practice conforms. Here,
and elsewhere, opinio juris manifests itself in a partial way. In the publicly
available documents, most States simply place their claimed outer limit of
their extended continental shelf at the 200-nautical-mile mark of another
State, without revealing the reasons behind their choice41. Similarly, there is
little information as to the legal grounds put forward by States objecting to
39 See “Conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries”,
YILC, 2018, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 102 (Commentary to Conclusion 9, para. 4).
40 For example, Costa Rica and Ecuador, “A Joint Partial Submission of Data and Information
on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Panama Basin pursuant to Part VI of and
Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I: Executive Summary”
(December 2020), p. 18, para. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
criecu_86_2020/PART-I%20(secured).pdf (visited 30 June 2023), with respect to Colombia;
Ecuador, “A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental
Shelf in the Southern Region of the Carnegie Ridge pursuant to Part VI of and Annex II to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I: Executive Summary”
(March 2022), p. 16, para. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ecu90_
2022/PartI.pdf (visited 30 June 2023), with respect to Peru.
41 For example, Cook Islands, “Revised Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf concerning the Manihiki Plateau: Executive Summary” (December 2021),
p. 6, para. 21, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/cok23_09/CKI_REV_
ES_DOC.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “5 are points [marking the outer limits of the extended
continental shelf] located on the 200 [nautical mile] line of an opposite or adjacent coastal State”;
Denmark, “Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: The
Continental Shelf North of the Faroe Islands: Executive Summary” (April 2009), p. 12, https://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk28_09/dnk2009executivesummary.pdf
(visited 30 June 2023): “To the west, north-west, and south-east, the outer limits of the continental
shelf are delineated by the 200 nautical mile limits of Iceland, Jan Mayen and the mainland
of Norway, respectively”; Sri Lanka, “Submission made in accordance with the Statement
of Understanding adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, on
29 August 1980, contained in Annex II to the Final Act of the Conference, and under paragraph
8 of article 76 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and article 3 of
Annex II of the Convention: Part I: Executive Summary” (May 2009), p. 9, para. 4.1, https://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/lka43_09/lka2009executivesummary.pdf
(visited 30 June 2023): “Point B . . . [marking the outer limit of the extended continental
shelf is] where the outer limits of the extended continental shelf joins the approximate position
of another coastal State’s 200 [nautical mile] line”; Bahamas, “Submission to the Com552
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
que d’obligations de droit international coutumier39. Mais il ne se trouve rien
dans ces résumés et dans les dispositions pertinentes de la convention, qui
donne à penser que ce comportement soit singulier ou qu’il soit déterminé
par les termes exprès desdites dispositions. En fait, certains États parties à la
CNUDM s’abstiennent de revendiquer un droit à des espaces maritimes en
deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’États tiers qui ne sont pas
parties à la CNUDM et qui ne peuvent donc invoquer les dispositions que du
droit international coutumier et non de la CNUDM40.
2. Appréciation de la pratique
29. Il est plus difficile de déterminer la teneur de la règle putative de droit
international coutumier à laquelle la pratique se conforme. Dans ce domaine
parmi d’autres, l’opinio juris se manifeste d’une manière partielle. Dans
leurs documents publics, la plupart des États se contentent de tracer le long
de la ligne des 200 milles marins la limite extérieure du plateau continental
étendu auquel ils prétendent, sans publier le raisonnement sur lequel s’appuie
ce choix41. De même, on dispose de peu d’informations sur les motifs
39 Voir les « Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et
commentaires y relatifs », rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de
sa soixante-dixième session, 2018, Nations Unies, doc. A/73/10, p. 147-148, paragraphe 4 du
commentaire de la conclusion 9.
40 Voir, par exemple, Costa Rica et Équateur, « A Joint Partial Submission of Data and Information
on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Panama Basin pursuant to Part VI
of and Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I: Executive
Summary » (décembre 2020), p. 18, par. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_
files/criecu_86_2020/PART-I%20(secured).pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023), concernant
la Colombie ; Équateur, « A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of
the Continental Shelf in the Southern Region of the Carnegie Ridge pursuant to Part VI of
and Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I: Executive
Summary » (mars 2022), p. 16, par. 6, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_
files/ecu90_2022/PartI.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023), concernant le Pérou.
41 Par exemple, Îles Cook, « Revised Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf concerning the Manihiki Plateau: Executive Summary » (décembre 2021),
p. 6, par. 21, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/cok23_09/CKI_REV_
ES_DOC.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023): « 5 points fixes sont des points [marquant la
limite du plateau continental étendu] situés sur la ligne des 200 [milles marins] d’un État côtier
adjacent ou dont les côtes font face [à celles des Îles Cook] » ; Danemark, « Partial Submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: The Continental Shelf North of the
Faroe Islands: Executive Summary » (avril 2009), p. 12, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_
new/submissions_files/dnk28_09/dnk2009executivesummary.pdf (consulté le 30 juin 2023) :
« À l’ouest, au nord-ouest et au sud-est, la limite extérieure du plateau continental est définie,
respectivement, par les limites des 200 milles marins de l’Islande, de Jan Mayen et de la
Norvège continentale » ; Sri Lanka, « Submission made in accordance with the Statement of
Understanding adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
on 29 August 1980, contained in Annex II to the Final Act of the Conference, and under
paragraph 8 of article 76 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and article 3
of Annex II of the Convention: Part I: Executive Summary » (mai 2009), p. 9, par. 4.1, https://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/lka43_09/lka2009executivesummary.pdf
(page consultée le 30 juin 2023) : « Le point B … [marquant la limite extérieure du plateau
continental étendu] est situé à l’endroit où la limite extérieure du plateau continental étendu
55 3 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
claims by another State to an extended continental shelf that intrudes within
200 nautical miles from their baselines42. In view of the States’ silence, it is
the Court’s task to articulate the legal rule to which the general practice conforms.
Practice will inevitably be susceptible to multiple interpretations; in
this case, there are several possible rules that would explain the practice. The
Court should then identify a legal rule that accommodates the broadest variety
of practice, that conforms to the established principles concerning the
relevant legal field (here, maritime entitlements), and that is in harmony with
international jurisprudence, including the jurisprudence of this Court.
30. On this analysis, it is difficult to conclude that States, in stopping at the
200-nautical-mile limit in their submissions to the CLCS, consider that their
entitlement to an extended continental shelf is somehow limited by a neighbouring
State’s own maritime entitlement. Such a legal conviction would be
in tension with the principles governing the establishment of maritime entitlements,
including entitlements to an extended continental shelf, as well as
with the international practice of maritime delimitations involving an extended
continental shelf on the one hand and, on the other, a 200-nautical-mile
maritime zone.
31. The most likely explanation for the abundant State practice is, in my
view, a legal conviction that, under the applicable rules on maritime delimitation,
an entitlement to an extended continental shelf in principle shall be
given no effect in so far as it overlaps with another State’s entitlement to a
200-nautical-mile zone. This can be understood as a manifestation of the
goal to achieve “an equitable solution”, which, as noted, is the paramount
consideration in any delimitation exercise43. The Court recently affirmed
that “the achievement of an equitable solution requires that, so far as possimission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary” (February 2014), p. 4,
para. 6.3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/bhs71_14/BHS-ES-DOC.
pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “FP 1 [a point marking the outer limit of the extended continental
shelf] marks the location of the intersection of the 350 [nautical mile] constraint line with
the 200 [nautical mile] line measured from the territorial sea baselines of the United States of
America”; Oman, “Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf pursuant to article 76 (8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Executive Summary” (October 2017), p. 6, para. 7.0.2, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/omn78_17/omn_es.pdf (visited 30 June 2023): “1 point [marking the outer
limit of the extended continental shelf] on the line 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea
baseline of India”.
42 For example, Japan, Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 December
2012), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/jpn_re_chn_28_
12_2012.pdf (visited 30 June 2023); Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama, Letter to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (5 February 2014), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/nic66_13/col_cri_pan_re_nic_2014_02_05_e.pdf (visited 30 June 2023).
43 See paragraph 5 above.
553
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
juridiques avancés par les États qui élèvent une objection aux prétentions
d’un autre État à un plateau continental étendu dans des espaces maritimes
en deçà de 200 milles marins de leurs lignes de base42. Compte tenu de ce
silence des États, il appartient à la Cour de définir la règle juridique à laquelle
se conforme la pratique générale. La pratique se prête inévitablement à de
multiples interprétations ; en l’espèce, il existe plusieurs règles possibles qui
sont susceptibles d’expliquer la pratique. La Cour devrait donc identifier une
règle générale qui embrasse la pratique la plus large et la plus variée, qui respecte
les principes établis applicables au domaine juridique pertinent (qui
est ici celui du droit à des espaces maritimes) et qui soit en harmonie avec la
jurisprudence internationale, y compris la jurisprudence de la Cour.
30. Compte tenu de cette analyse, on peut difficilement conclure que les
États qui, dans leurs demandes à la Commission des limites, arrêtent leurs
prétentions à la limite des 200 milles marins, soient convaincus que leur droit
à un plateau continental étendu serait en quelque sorte limité par le droit d’un
État voisin à son propre espace maritime. Une conviction juridique de ce
genre serait en tension avec les principes régissant l’établissement des droits
à des espaces maritimes, parmi lesquels le droit à un plateau continental
étendu, ainsi qu’avec la pratique internationale en matière de délimitations
maritimes impliquant un plateau continental étendu d’un côté et une zone
maritime de 200 milles marins de l’autre.
31. L’explication la plus plausible de cette abondante pratique des États est,
à mon avis, la conviction juridique que, selon les règles applicables de la
délimitation maritime, il ne sera pas donné effet au principe du droit au plateau
continental dans la mesure où il entre en concurrence avec le droit d’un
autre État à une zone de 200 milles marins. On peut y voir une manifestation
de l’objectif qui consiste à aboutir à « une solution équitable » et qui est,
comme nous l’avons rappelé, la première considération à laquelle doit
répondre une délimitation maritime43. La Cour a récemment réaffirmé que,
rejoint la position approximative de la ligne des 200 [milles marins] d’un autre État côtier » ;
Bahamas, « Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive
Summary » (février 2014), p. 4, par. 6.3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_
files/bhs71_14/BHS-ES-DOC.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023) : « Le point FP 1 [marquant la
limite extérieure du plateau continental étendu] est situé à l’intersection de la ligne des 350
[milles marins] et de la ligne des 200 [milles marins] mesurée à partir des lignes de base de la
mer territoriale des États-Unis d’Amérique » ; Oman, « Submission to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to article 76 (8) of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea: Executive Summary » (octobre 2017), p. 6, par. 7.0.2, https://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/omn78_17/omn_es.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023) :
« 1 point [fixe marquant la limite extérieure du plateau continental] situé sur la ligne des
200 milles marins mesurée à partir des lignes de base de la mer territoriale de l’Inde ».
42 Voir, par exemple, Japon, lettre adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies
(28 décembre 2012), https://www.un. org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/jpn_
re_chn_28_12_2012.pdf (page consultée le 30 juin 2023) ; Colombie, Costa Rica et Panama,
lettre adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies (5 février 2014), https://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/col_cri_pan_re_nic_2014_02_05_e.pdf (page
consultée le 30 juin 2023).
43 Voir le paragraphe 5 ci-dessus.
55 4 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
ble, the line of delimitation should allow the coasts of the Parties to produce
their effects in terms of maritime entitlements in a reasonable and mutually
balanced way”44.
32. The goal of ensuring an equitable solution has been translated into
what the Court refers to as the “usual” three-stage methodology45. While not
mandatory, this methodology is based on objective geographical criteria,
and it has brought predictability and consistency in maritime delimitation46.
33. The first step towards achieving an equitable solution under the threestage
methodology is to draw a provisional equidistance line. It is reported
that an overwhelming majority of maritime delimitation agreements involving
States with opposite coasts or with coasts of a hybrid character employs
an equidistance line47. In Territorial and Maritime Dispute, the provisional
equidistance line was defined as “a line each point on which is an equal distance
from the nearest points on the two relevant coasts” of the parties48.
When applied to States with opposite coasts lying further than 400 nautical
miles apart, the provisional equidistance line ensures that each coastal State
is granted a continental shelf of at least 200 nautical miles. It is not obvious
why the provisional equidistance line should be drawn differently in a situation
involving entitlements to an extended continental shelf 49, including
those of States with opposite coasts. Even if the provisional equidistance line
is drawn with reference to the outer limits of the coastal States’ respective
continental shelf entitlements50, the fact that one of them is entitled to a
200-nautical-mile zone in the relevant area under delimitation may constitute
a relevant circumstance warranting the adjustment of the provisional
44 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2021, p. 250, para. 124, citing Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 703, para. 215; see also North Sea Continental Shelf
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 53, para. 101, subpara. (C) (1), Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 43, para. 37, and Maritime Delimitation
in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 127, para. 201.
45 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2021, p. 252, para. 131.
46 Ibid., p. 251, para. 128.
47 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation
(2nd ed., Oxford: Hart 2019), p. 191, with further references therein.
48 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 695, para. 191; see also Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf (concluded 29 April 1958; entered into force 10 June 1964), United Nations, Treaty
Series, Vol. 499, p. 311.
49 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 117, para. 455; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration
(Bangladesh v. I ndia), A ward o f 7 July 2 014, RIAA, Vol. XXXII, p. 139, para. 464;
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment,
ITLOS Reports 2017, p. 142, para. 526; Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
(Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, pp. 276-277, para. 195.
50 As argued by Nicaragua: see Judgment, para. 29.
554
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
« afin d’aboutir à une solution équitable, la ligne de délimitation d[evai]t,
autant que faire se peut, permettre aux côtes des Parties de produire leurs
effets, en matière de droits à des espaces maritimes, d’une manière raisonnable
et équilibrée pour chacune d’entre elles »44.
32. L’objectif qui consiste à aboutir à une solution équitable s’est traduit
dans ce que la Cour appelle sa méthode « habituelle » en trois étapes45. Bien
qu’elle ne soit pas obligatoire, cette méthode, qui est basée sur des critères
géographiques objectifs, a permis d’apporter de la prévisibilité et de la cohérence
au processus de délimitation maritime46.
33. Selon la méthode en trois étapes pour aboutir à une solution équitable,
la première étape consiste à tracer une ligne d’équidistance provisoire. On a
pu écrire que l’immense majorité des accords de délimitation entre États dont
les côtes se font face ou présentent un caractère hybride ont recours à la ligne
d’équidistance47. Dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime, cette
ligne est définie comme « une ligne dont chaque point se trouve à égale distance
des points les plus proches des deux côtes pertinentes » des parties48.
Appliquée à des États dont les côtes se font face et sont séparées par une distance
de plus de 400 milles marins, la ligne d’équidistance provisoire garantit
que chaque État se verra reconnaître un plateau continental d’au moins
200 milles marins. On ne voit pas pourquoi la ligne d’équidistance provisoire
devrait être tracée autrement dans une situation impliquant des droits à
un plateau continental étendu49, y compris lorsque les côtes des États intéressés
se font face. Même si la ligne d’équidistance provisoire est tracée par
rapport aux limites extérieures des droits respectifs au plateau continental
des États côtiers en cause50, le fait que l’un d’eux peut prétendre à une zone
de 200 milles marins dans l’espace pertinent à délimiter peut constituer une
44 Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021,
p. 250, par. 124, citant le Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II), p. 703, par. 215 ; voir également Plateau continental de la mer du Nord
(République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 53, par. 101, al. C, point 1 ; Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 43, par. 37 ; et Délimitation maritime en mer
Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 127, par. 201.
45 Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021,
p. 252, par. 131.
46 Ibid., p. 251, par. 128.
47 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation,
Oxford, Hart, 2e éd., 2019, p. 191, où l’on trouvera des références supplémentaires.
48 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II),
p. 695, par. 191 ; voir également le paragraphe 1 de l’article 6 de la convention sur le plateau
continental conclue le 29 avril 1958 et entrée en vigueur le 10 juin 1964, Nations Unies,
Recueil des traités, vol. 499, p. 311.
49 Voir Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 117, par. 455 ; Arbitrage concernant la frontière maritime
dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh c. Inde), sentence du 7 juillet 2014, RSA, vol. XXXII,
p. 38, par. 77 ; Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans l’océan Atlantique (Ghana/Côte
d’Ivoire), arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2017, p. 142, par. 526 ; Délimitation maritime dans l’océan
Indien (Somalie c. Kenya), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 276-277, par. 195.
50 Comme l’a fait valoir le Nicaragua : voir arrêt, par. 29.
55 5 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
equidistance line at the 200-nautical-mile limit51. In either case, at the end
of the maritime delimitation process, the area of the continental shelf up
to 200 nautical miles of a coastal State will in principle be found to appertain
to that coastal State, and not to another State that may be entitled to
an extended continental shelf in the same area. While a State’s entitlement
to an extended continental shelf remains intact in the abstract, in practice it
will likely be subordinated to the neighbouring State’s entitlement to a
200-nautical-mile zone by virtue of the goal of achieving an equitable solution.
34. The executive summaries of States’ submissions to the CLCS should
be assessed against this legal background. It then becomes clear that coastal
States refrain from claiming an extended continental shelf within 200 nautical
miles from their neighbours’ coasts because they hold the legal conviction
that principles of maritime delimitation would eventually prevent them from
exercising the sovereign rights over that maritime area. Of course, a State
cannot unilaterally implement any delimitation through its submission to the
CLCS52, nor does the CLCS have any role in the delimitation process53.
Nonetheless, a State understandably considers it futile — or indeed inequitable
— to claim before the CLCS an area over which, under the governing
principles of delimitation that will eventually apply, it will never exercise
continental shelf rights. There is little incentive to enter into a costly and
lengthy process of establishing one’s entitlement in an area over which one
is unlikely ever to exercise jurisdiction.
35. Of course, exceptional situations might call for the adoption of a different
outcome. The relevant circumstances of a specific case might justify a
delimitation line that does not merely reach the 200-nautical-mile limit but
exceeds it. One can imagine, for example, a situation where State A has a
particularly narrow coastal front but is entitled to an extended continental
shelf, whereas State B, lying opposite, has an exceptionally wide coastal
front, over which it is entitled to a continental shelf only up to 200 nautical
miles. In such a situation, it is conceivable that, in the course of a delimitation,
the narrow continental shelf projection of State A’s coastal front be
allowed to intrude within State B’s continental shelf entitlement. Excep-
51 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
p. 33, para. 33: “one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into account for the delimitation
of the continental shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the exclusive economic
zone appertaining to that same State”.
52 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/
United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 299, para. 112 (1).
53 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia
beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 137, para. 112.
555
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
circonstance pertinente justifiant un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance
provisoire à la limite des 200 milles marins51. Dans un cas comme dans
l’autre, à la fin du processus de délimitation, la partie du plateau continental
s’étendant jusqu’à 200 milles marins d’un État côtier sera en principe réputée
relever de cet État côtier et non d’un autre État qui pourrait prétendre à un
plateau continental étendu dans le même espace. Bien que, dans l’abstrait, le
droit d’un État à un plateau continental étendu reste entier, dans la pratique,
il sera vraisemblablement subordonné au droit de l’État voisin à une zone de
200 milles marins, au nom de l’objectif consistant à aboutir à une solution
équitable.
34. C’est par rapport à ce contexte juridique qu’il convient d’appréhender les
résumés des demandes déposées par les États à la Commission des limites. Il
devient alors évident que, si les États côtiers s’abstiennent de revendiquer un
plateau continental étendu dans des espaces maritimes en deçà de 200 milles
marins des côtes de leurs voisins, c’est parce qu’ils ont la conviction juridique
que les principes de la délimitation maritime finiraient de toute façon
par les empêcher d’exercer leurs droits souverains sur cet espace maritime.
Bien entendu, un État ne peut pas effectuer unilatéralement une délimitation
en se contentant de déposer sa demande à la Commission des limites52, et
celle-ci n’a par ailleurs aucun rôle à jouer dans le processus de délimitation53.
On comprendra néanmoins qu’un État considère comme vain — voire
inéquitable — de revendiquer devant la Commission des limites un espace
sur lequel, conformément aux principes fondamentaux de la délimitation qui
seront de toute façon appliqués, il n’exercera jamais les droits qui s’attachent
au plateau continental. Il n’a guère de raisons de se lancer dans le long et
coûteux processus visant à faire reconnaître ses droits dans un espace sur
lequel il n’a aucune chance de ne jamais exercer sa juridiction.
35. Il va de soi que des situations exceptionnelles peuvent conduire à adopter
un résultat différent. Les circonstances pertinentes d’un cas particulier
pourraient justifier une ligne de délimitation qui ne s’arrêterait pas simplement
à la limite des 200 milles marins, mais qui la dépasserait. On peut
imaginer une situation, par exemple, où un État A a une façade côtière particulièrement
étroite mais a droit à un plateau continental étendu, alors qu’un
État B, dont les côtes lui font face, a une façade côtière exceptionnellement
large, mais qui ne lui donne droit à un plateau continental que jusqu’à
200 milles marins. Dans une telle situation, on peut concevoir que, dans le
cadre d’une délimitation, il soit permis à la projection de l’étroite façade
51 Voir Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985,
p. 33, par. 33 : « [L]’une des circonstances pertinentes à prendre en compte pour la délimitation
du plateau continental d’un État est l’étendue légalement autorisée de la zone économique
exclusive relevant de ce même État. »
52 Voir Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/
États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 299, par. 112, point 1.
53 Question de la délimitation du plateau continental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie
au-delà de 200 milles marins de la côte nicaraguayenne (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2016 (I), p. 137, par. 112.
55 6 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
tional circumstances might also justify the position taken by the few States
the submissions of which to the CLCS stand in contrast with the rest.
*
36. In sum, a coastal State’s entitlement to an extended continental shelf is
not curtailed because of another coastal State’s entitlement to 200-nautical-
mile zones in the same maritime area. Consequently, any overlap
between the two entitlements must be resolved through the process of maritime
delimitation. In that context, I am persuaded that a coastal State’s
entitlement to an extended continental shelf will in principle be sacrificed in
order to give effect to another coastal State’s entitlement to 200-nautical-mile
zones. This rule ought to be applied with regard to the specific facts of each
case, including the case before the Court.
III. Conclusion
37. For the reasons set out above, I think that the Court is not in a position
today to reject the submissions that Nicaragua made in its written pleadings.
In my view, the Court should have responded to both questions formulated
in the Order of 4 October 2022, and it should have proceeded to hold oral
proceedings to decide the remaining issues dividing the Parties in this case.
In voting against the rejection of Nicaragua’s proposed delimitation lines,
I do not necessarily endorse Nicaragua’s position on the question of maritime
delimitation. Rather, I express my reservations about the Court’s
rejection of Nicaragua’s position on the question of maritime delimitation
without the benefit of oral argument.
38. My reservations remain regardless of the Court’s answer to the first
question. As the term suggests, and as Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules
indicates, a party’s final submissions are its final word in a case. By contrast,
each party is free to amend the submissions it presents in its written
pleadings, provided that it remains within the confines of the dispute as
presented in the application54. At the end of its oral argument in the present
phase of the proceedings in this case, Nicaragua formally reserved its right
to complete its final submissions55.
54 For that final point, see Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 69, citing Société Commerciale
de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173; see also Alleged Violations
of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2022 (I), p. 293, para. 44.
55 CR 2022/27, p. 39, para. 29 (Argüello Gómez).
556
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
côtière de l’État A sur le plateau continental de pénétrer dans le plateau
continental relevant de l’État B. Il se pourrait aussi que des circonstances
exceptionnelles justifient la position adoptée par les rares États dont les
demandes à la Commission des limites tranchent sur les autres.
*
36. Pour résumer, le droit d’un État côtier à un plateau continental
étendu n’est pas diminué par le fait qu’un autre État côtier a droit à une
zone de 200 milles marins dans le même espace maritime. Il s’ensuit que
le chevauchement éventuel de ces deux droits doit être réglé dans le
cadre d’un processus de délimitation maritime. Dans ce contexte, je suis
convaincue que le droit d’un État côtier à un plateau continental étendu sera
sacrifié, en principe, pour donner effet au droit d’un autre État côtier à une
zone de 200 milles marins. Cette règle devrait s’appliquer en fonction
des faits particuliers de chaque espèce, y compris celle dont est saisie la
Cour.
III. Conclusion
37. Pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus, je considère que la Cour n’est pas
aujourd’hui en état de rejeter les conclusions formulées par le Nicaragua
dans ses écritures. Selon moi, la Cour aurait dû répondre aux deux questions
qu’elle a posées dans son ordonnance du 4 octobre 2022 et organiser ensuite
des audiences pour statuer sur le reste des questions qui opposent les Parties.
En votant contre le rejet des lignes de délimitation proposées par le Nicaragua,
je ne souscris pas nécessairement à la position nicaraguayenne sur la
question de la délimitation maritime. Ce que je fais, c’est exprimer les
réserves que m’inspire le fait que la Cour ait rejeté, sans échange de plaidoiries
orales, la position du Nicaragua sur la question de la délimitation
maritime.
38. Mes réserves sont indépendantes de la réponse de la Cour à la première
question. Comme le terme lui-même le suggère et comme il ressort du paragraphe
2 de l’article 60 du Règlement, les conclusions finales d’une partie
constituent son dernier mot dans une affaire. En revanche, chaque partie a la
faculté de modifier les conclusions qu’elle a formulées dans ses écritures, à
condition de ne pas dépasser les limites du différend tel qu’elle l’a décrit dans
sa requête54. Le Nicaragua s’est réservé formellement le droit de compléter
ses conclusions finales55.
54 Sur ce dernier point, voir Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 267, par. 69, citant Société commerciale
de Belgique, arrêt, 1939, C.P.J.I., série A/B no 78, p. 173 ; voir également Violations alléguées
de droits souverains et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colombie),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2022 (I), p. 293, par. 44.
55 CR 2022/27, p. 39, par. 29 (Argüello Gómez).
55 7 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. charlesworth)
39. The Judgment shifts its focus from the final submissions presented by
Nicaragua at the oral proceedings to the submissions that it had presented in
its written pleadings. Those written submissions were formulated at a time
before the Court’s decision to direct the Parties to specific questions, and
they address issues extending beyond the Court’s focus at the current stage
of the proceedings. This fact in itself justifies allowing the Parties to revise
their positions on these issues in light of today’s Judgment.
(Signed) Hilary Charlesworth.
557
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. charlesworth)
39. L’arrêt, d’abord concentré sur les conclusions finales présentées par le
Nicaragua à l’audience, change ensuite d’orientation pour se concentrer sur
les conclusions finales que celui-ci a présentées dans ses écritures. Or ces
conclusions écrites ont été formulées à une époque antérieure à la décision
de la Cour de poser des questions spécifiques aux Parties, et elles portent sur
des questions qui n’entrent pas dans le champ d’intérêt de la Cour au stade
actuel de l’instance. Ce fait en lui-même justifie de donner aux Parties la
faculté de réviser leurs positions sur ces questions à la lumière de l’arrêt de
ce jour.
(Signé) Hilary Charlesworth.
Dissenting opinion of Judge Charlesworth