Declaration of Vice-President Gevorgian

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182-20230605-ORD-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
182-20230605-ORD-01-00-EN
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
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Bilingual Document File

DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT GEVORGIAN
Mass interventions create significant tension between the right conferred by Article 63 of the Statute of the Court and the fair administration of justice — Article 63 of the Statute leaves no discretion to reject declarations of intervention once the procedural requirements are met  Several declarations address matters unrelated to the construction of the Genocide Convention.
1. I have voted in favour of today’s Order, which declares as admissible 31 out of the 32 declarations of intervention filed at this stage of the proceedings. I did so because the Court does not have discretion under Article 63 of its Statute to reject interventions once all formal requirements have been met. Nevertheless, I retain serious concerns regarding how the tool of intervention is being utilized in the present case, and how it may affect the equality of the Parties in the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, I would like to highlight that a significant number of declarations of intervention address issues that go beyond the construction of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention”), and therefore circumvent the scope of what it is permissible under Article 63 of the Statute.
I. Effect of the interventions on the sound administration of justice and the equality of the Parties
2. There is no doubt that the intervening States in this case engaged in “active collaboration in litigation strategy”1 for the purpose of pursuing their common political interests. However, I also accept that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute constitutes a right conferred upon each State party, and that this right cannot be curtailed by virtue of a State’s underlying political motives. Indeed, the Court has previously noted that it has no “general discretion to accept or reject a request for permission to intervene for reasons simply of policy”2. Nevertheless, I would like to voice my concern regarding the use of such a litigation strategy and its impact upon the sound administration of justice and the equality of the Parties in the present case.
3. In today’s decision, the Court relies on its Order in the Whaling case, where, faced with an attempt by New Zealand to intervene in support of Australia, the Court held that an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute “cannot affect the equality of the Parties to the dispute”3. However, the circumstances of the present case differ quite substantially. First, contrary to Japan in the Whaling case, the Russian Federation has explicitly objected to the admission of the declarations of intervention. Second, whereas the decision in the Whaling case concerned a single intervention, the present case involves an unprecedented number of no less than 32 declarations of intervention filed by 33 States. These declarations make submissions that exclusively support Ukraine and its positions. This leads to a situation where the views of the Applicant are significantly amplified and the Respondent, in this case the Russian Federation, finds itself in a position where it has to defend itself against 33 written submissions (those of Ukraine and those of the interveners) at once. This inequality could be further exacerbated in future oral proceedings.
1 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, declaration of Judge Owada, p. 12, para. 5.
2 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application by Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 12, para. 17; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 434, para. 36. While the Court has said this in the context of attempts to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute, the same applies a fortiori to interventions under Article 63.
3 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 9, para. 18.
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4. Under such circumstances, there is inherent tension between a right explicitly granted by the Statute — the right to intervene under Article 63 — and a principle that is not explicitly stated but is nevertheless reflected in the Statute as a whole, namely the fair administration of justice, which includes the principle of equality of the parties4. Indeed, it has been recognized that the equality of the parties to a dispute is a “basic principle”5 for the Court and amounts to a general principle of law underlying all types of judicial and arbitral proceedings6.
5. I appreciate that the Court has taken the Respondent’s objections seriously, and that it has recognized the necessity to organize the proceedings in a manner that ensures both “the equality of the parties and the good administration of justice”7. While this statement alleviates some of my concerns, it does not fully resolve them. In this regard, I recall Judge Owada’s view, who argued that
“the Court, should it find it necessary under the particular circumstances of the case, is in a position to examine and determine proprio motu whether such intervention would be in keeping with the principles of ensuring the fair administration of justice, including, inter alia, the equality of the Parties in the proceedings before the Court . . . The Court has the discretion to rule such a declaration inadmissible if its admission should unduly compromise fundamental principles of justice underlying its jurisdiction or the fairness of the proceedings.”8
6. I do not argue that the Court should have declared the 32 declarations of intervention as outright inadmissible in this case. However, I think the Court could have engaged in a more substantive analysis regarding how the admission of the declarations may compromise the equality of parties and whether this principle could in theory be compromised to an extent that the sound administration of justice would require the rejection of otherwise admissible declarations of intervention.
7. I also note that the Respondent has taken the position that the mass intervention strategy pursued by the intervening States amounts to an “abuse of process”9. In its Order, the Court took the view that a declaration of intervention “should be found inadmissible on the ground of abuse of process only in exceptional circumstances”10. While I believe that the circumstances of the present case are indeed “exceptional”, the Court has never upheld an argument based upon an alleged abuse of process. I therefore understand that the Court is reluctant to open this Pandora’s box in view of the precedent it may set.
4 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 86.
5 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 26, para. 31.
6 See e.g. Robert Kolb, “General Principles of Procedural Law” in Andreas Zimmermann et al., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2019), p. 969; Malcom Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International Court: 1920-2015, Vol. III (Brill/Nijhoff 2016), p. 1079.
7 Order, para. 52.
8 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, declaration of Judge Owada, p. 11, para. 1.
9 Written Observations of the Russian Federation on the Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention, 24 March 2023, paras. 64-74.
10 Order, para. 57.
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II. Circumvention of the permissible scope of interventions under Article 63
8. Finally, I would like to highlight that intervention under Article 63 is limited to the construction of the provisions in question at the relevant stage of the proceedings, in this case Article IX of the Genocide Convention. Regrettably, several declarations make submissions that go beyond this limited scope and make claims, inter alia, on the existence of a dispute between the Parties11 or on the compliance of the Respondent with the Court’s provisional measures Order of March 202212. Other States have used their declarations to opine on the facts of the case or to make political statements and legal allegations against the Russian Federation13.
9. In this regard, I welcome the Court’s statement that it “will not consider” such remarks14. Nevertheless, the fact that such statements have been made en masse and are publicly available, including on the website of the Court, creates a significant amount of political pressure on judges to decide this case in a particular way. I fear that such litigation strategies therefore have the potential to compromise the Court’s fair and impartial administration of justice.
(Signed) Kirill GEVORGIAN.
___________
11 See e.g. Declaration of Germany, para. 30; Declaration of Liechtenstein, para. 18; Declaration of Portugal, para. 31.
12 See e.g. Declaration of Estonia, para. 10; Declaration of Spain, para. 8; Declaration of Ireland, para. 8.
13 See e.g. Declaration of Lithuania, para. 16; Declaration of New Zealand, para. 11.
14 Order, para. 84.

Bilingual Content

381
DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT GEVORGIAN
Mass interventions create significant tension between the right conferred
by Article 63 of the Statute of the Court and the fair administration of
justice — Article 63 of the Statute leaves no discretion to reject declarations
of intervention once the procedural requirements are met — Several
declarations address matters unrelated to the construction of the Genocide
Convention.
1. I have voted in favour of today’s Order, which declares as admissible
31 out of the 32 Declarations of intervention filed at this stage of the proceedings.
I did so because the Court does not have discretion under Article 63
of its Statute to reject interventions once all formal requirements have been
met. Nevertheless, I retain serious concerns regarding how the tool of intervention
is being utilized in the present case, and how it may affect the
equality of the Parties in the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, I would
like to highlight that a significant number of Declarations of intervention
address issues that go beyond the construction of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the
“Genocide Convention”), and therefore circumvent the scope of what it is
permissible under Article 63 of the Statute.
I. Effect of the Interventions on the Sound Administration
of Justice and the Equality of the Parties
2. There is no doubt that the intervening States in this case engaged in
“active collaboration in litigation strategy”1 for the purpose of pursuing their
common political interests. However, I also accept that intervention under
Article 63 of the Statute constitutes a right conferred upon each State party,
and that this right cannot be curtailed by virtue of a State’s underlying political
motives. Indeed, the Court has previously noted that it has no “general
discretion to accept or reject a request for permission to intervene for reasons
simply of policy”2. Nevertheless, I would like to voice my concern regarding
1 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New
Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, declaration of Judge Owada, p. 12,
para. 5.
2 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application by Malta for Permission
to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 12, para. 17; Territorial and Maritime
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 434, para. 36. While the Court has said this in the context
381
DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE GEVORGIAN, VICE-PRÉSIDENT
[Traduction]
Intervention massive créant d’importantes tensions entre le droit que
confère l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour et la bonne administration de la
justice — Article 63 du Statut ne laissant pas le pouvoir discrétionnaire de
rejeter des déclarations d’intervention lorsque les exigences formelles sont
satisfaites — Plusieurs déclarations traitant de questions sans rapport avec
l’interprétation de la convention sur le génocide.
1. J’ai voté en faveur de l’ordonnance que la Cour a rendue ce jour, par
laquelle celle-ci a jugé recevables 31 des 32 déclarations d’intervention
présentées à ce stade de la procédure. J’ai voté en ce sens, parce que, en vertu
de l’article 63 de son Statut, la Cour ne dispose pas du pouvoir discrétionnaire
de rejeter des interventions lorsque toutes les exigences formelles sont
satisfaites. Néanmoins, je demeure vivement préoccupé par l’utilisation qui
est faite de l’intervention en l’espèce et par l’incidence que ce mécanisme
pourrait avoir par la suite sur l’égalité des Parties. En outre, je tiens à souligner
qu’un grand nombre de déclarations d’intervention traitent de questions
qui dépassent l’interprétation de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide (ci-après la « convention sur le génocide »)
et contournent ainsi la portée autorisée par l’article 63 du Statut.
I. Effet des interventions sur la bonne administration
de la justice et l’égalité des Parties
2. Il ne fait aucun doute que les États intervenants en la présente instance
agissent en « concertation »1 pour poursuivre leurs intérêts politiques
communs. Toutefois, je reconnais aussi que l’intervention fondée sur l’article
63 du Statut constitue un droit conféré à chaque État partie et que ce
droit ne saurait être restreint en raison des mobiles politiques sous-jacents
d’un État. De fait, la Cour a dit par le passé qu’elle n’avait aucun « pouvoir
discrétionnaire lui permettant d’accepter ou de rejeter une requête à fin d’intervention
pour de simples raisons d’opportunité »2. Je tiens cependant à
1 Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), déclaration d’intervention de
la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, déclaration du juge
Owada, p. 12, par. 5.
2 Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête de Malte à fin
d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 12, par. 17 ; Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie), requête du Honduras à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2011 (II), p. 434, par. 36. Même si cette déclaration de la Cour concernait des tentatives
382 allegations of genocide (decl. gevorgian)
the use of such a litigation strategy and its impact upon the sound administration
of justice and the equality of the Parties in the present case.
3. In today’s decision, the Court relies on its Order in the Whaling in the
Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) case (hereinafter Whaling case), where, faced
with an attempt by New Zealand to intervene in support of Australia, the
Court held that an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute “cannot affect
the equality of the Parties to the dispute”3. However, the circumstances of
the present case differ quite substantially. First, contrary to Japan in the
Whaling case, the Russian Federation has explicitly objected to the admission
of the Declarations of intervention. Second, whereas the decision in the
Whaling case concerned a single intervention, the present case involves an
unprecedented number of no less than 32 Declarations of intervention filed
by 33 States. These Declarations make submissions that exclusively support
Ukraine and its positions. This leads to a situation where the views of the
Applicant are significantly amplified and the Respondent, in this case the
Russian Federation, finds itself in a position where it has to defend itself
against 33 written submissions (those of Ukraine and those of the interveners)
at once. This inequality could be further exacerbated in future oral
proceedings.
4. Under such circumstances, there is inherent tension between a right
explicitly granted by the Statute — the right to intervene under Article 63 —
and a principle that is not explicitly stated but is nevertheless reflected in the
Statute as a whole, namely the fair administration of justice, which includes
the principle of equality of the parties4. Indeed, it has been recognized that
the equality of the parties to a dispute is a “basic principle”5 for the Court
and amounts to a general principle of law underlying all types of judicial and
arbitral proceedings6.
5. I appreciate that the Court has taken the Respondent’s objections
seriously,
and that it has recognized the necessity to organize the proceedings
in a manner that ensures both “the equality of the parties and the good administration
of justice”7. While this statement alleviates some of my concerns,
of attempts to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute, the same applies a fortiori to
interventions under Article 63.
3 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New
Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 9, para. 18.
4 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against
UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 86.
5 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 26, para. 31.
6 See e.g. Robert Kolb, “General Principles of Procedural Law” in Andreas Zimmermann
et al., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed., Oxford
University Press, 2019), p. 969; Malcolm Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International
Court: 1920-2015, Vol. III (Brill/Nijhoff, 2016), p. 1079.
7 Order, para. 52.
allégations de génocide (décl. gevorgian) 382
exprimer mes inquiétudes quant à l’utilisation de pareille stratégie judiciaire
et à l’incidence de celle-ci sur la bonne administration de la justice et l’égalité
des Parties en l’espèce.
3. Dans sa décision de ce jour, la Cour se fonde sur l’ordonnance qu’elle a
rendue en l’affaire relative à la Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique
(Australie c. Japon) (ci-après l’« affaire relative à la Chasse à la baleine »),
dans laquelle elle a jugé, à propos de la tentative de la Nouvelle-Zélande
d’intervenir en soutien à l’Australie, qu’une intervention fondée sur l’article
63 du Statut « ne p[ouvai]t pas compromettre l’égalité entre les Parties
au différend »3. Toutefois, les circonstances de la présente espèce sont tout
à fait différentes. D’une part, contrairement au Japon dans l’affaire relative à
la Chasse à la baleine, la Fédération de Russie s’est expressément opposée
à la recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention. D’autre part, alors que la
décision dans ladite instance ne concernait qu’une seule intervention,
un nombre sans précédent de pas moins de 32 déclarations d’intervention
ont été déposées par 33 États en la présente espèce. Ces déclarations
contiennent des observations ayant pour objet exclusif de soutenir l’Ukraine
et ses positions. Il en résulte que les vues de la demanderesse sont considérablement
amplifiées et que la défenderesse — la Fédération de Russie — est
amenée à se défendre contre 33 exposés écrits (celui de l’Ukraine et ceux des
intervenants) à la fois. Cette inégalité pourrait encore être exacerbée dans
le cadre de la future procédure orale.
4. Dans ces conditions, il existe une tension inhérente entre un droit
expressément conféré par le Statut — celui d’intervenir en vertu de l’article
63 — et un principe qui n’est pas énoncé explicitement, mais que le
Statut reflète néanmoins de manière générale, à savoir la bonne administration
de la justice, qui inclut le principe de l’égalité des parties à un différend4.
Ce principe a en effet été reconnu comme « fondamental »5 pour la Cour et
constitue un principe général de droit sous-jacent à tous types de procédure
judiciaire ou arbitrale6.
5. Je sais que la Cour a pris au sérieux les objections de la défenderesse
et qu’elle a admis la nécessité d’organiser la procédure de manière à garantir
à la fois « l’égalité des parties et la bonne administration de la justice »7.
Si elle apaise certaines de mes craintes, cette déclaration ne les dissipe pas
d’intervention fondées sur l’article 62 du Statut de la Cour, il en va de même a fortiori pour
celles fondées sur l’article 63.
3 Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), déclaration d’intervention de
la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 9, par. 18.
4 Jugements du Tribunal administratif de l’OIT sur requêtes contre l’UNESCO, avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 86.
5 Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-
Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 26, par. 31.
6 Voir, par exemple, Robert Kolb, « General Principles of Procedural Law » dans Andreas
Zimmermann et al. (dir. publ.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary
(3e éd., Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 969 ; Malcolm Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and
Practice of the International Court: 1920-2015, vol. III (Brill/Nijhoff, 2016), p. 1079.
7 Ordonnance, par. 52.
383 allegations of genocide (decl. gevorgian)
it does not fully resolve them. In this regard, I recall Judge Owada’s view,
who argued that
“the Court, should it find it necessary under the particular circumstances
of the case, is in a position to examine and determine proprio motu
whether such intervention would be in keeping with the principles of
ensuring the fair administration of justice, including, inter alia, the
equality of the Parties in the proceedings before the Court . . . The Court
has the discretion to rule such a declaration inadmissible if its admission
should unduly compromise fundamental principles of justice underlying
its jurisdiction or the fairness of the proceedings.”8
6. I do not argue that the Court should have declared the 32 Declarations
of intervention as outright inadmissible in this case. However, I think the
Court could have engaged in a more substantive analysis regarding how the
admission of the Declarations may compromise the equality of parties and
whether this principle could in theory be compromised to an extent that the
sound administration of justice would require the rejection of otherwise
admissible Declarations of intervention.
7. I also note that the Respondent has taken the position that the mass intervention
strategy pursued by the intervening States amounts to an “abuse of
process”9. In its Order, the Court took the view that a declaration of intervention
“should be found inadmissible on the ground of abuse of process only in
exceptional circumstances”10. While I believe that the circumstances of the
present case are indeed “exceptional”, the Court has never upheld an argument
based upon an alleged abuse of process. I therefore understand that the
Court is reluctant to open this Pandora’s box in view of the precedent it may
set.
II. Circumvention of the Permissible Scope of Interventions
under Article 63
8. Finally, I would like to highlight that intervention under Article 63 is
limited to the construction of the provisions in question at the relevant stage
of the proceedings, in this case Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
Regrettably, several Declarations make submissions that go beyond this
limited scope and make claims, inter alia, on the existence of a dispute
between the Parties11 or on the compliance of the Respondent with the
8 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New
Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, declaration of Judge Owada, p. 11,
para. 1.
9 Written Observations of the Russian Federation on the Admissibility of the Declarations
of intervention, 24 March 2023, paras. 64-74.
10 Order, para. 57.
11 See e.g. Declaration of Germany, para. 30; Declaration of Liechtenstein, para. 18;
Declaration of Portugal, para. 31.
allégations de génocide (décl. gevorgian) 383
totalement pour autant. À cet égard, je rappellerai les vues du juge Owada,
qui s’est exprimé ainsi :
« [L]a Cour, si elle l’estime nécessaire eu égard aux circonstances
propres à l’affaire, est fondée à examiner proprio motu la question
de savoir si une telle intervention est conforme aux principes qui soustendent
la bonne administration de la justice, notamment celui
de l’égalité entre les Parties à l’instance dont elle est saisie … [L]a
Cour … peut … juger la déclaration irrecevable si elle estime que l’intervention
compromettrait indûment les principes fondamentaux à la
base de sa compétence ou l’équité de la procédure. »8
6. Je ne prétends pas que la Cour aurait dû juger irrecevables d’emblée les
32 déclarations d’intervention déposées en la présente espèce. Je pense
cependant qu’elle aurait pu rechercher plus avant en quoi la recevabilité des
déclarations était susceptible de porter atteinte à l’égalité des parties et si ce
principe pouvait en théorie être compromis au point que la bonne administration
de la justice nécessiterait le rejet de déclarations d’intervention par
ailleurs recevables.
7. Je relève également que la défenderesse est d’avis que la stratégie de
l’intervention massive poursuivie par les États intervenants est constitutive
d’un « abus de procédure »9. Dans son ordonnance, la Cour a estimé qu’une
déclaration d’intervention « ne pou[v]ait être jugée irrecevable pour abus de
procédure que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles »10. Si, à mon sens, les
circonstances de l’espèce sont bel et bien « exceptionnelles », la Cour n’a
jamais accueilli un argument reposant sur une allégation d’abus de procédure.
Je comprends donc la réticence de la Cour à ouvrir la boîte de Pandore,
compte tenu du précédent qui pourrait en découler.
II. Contournement de la portée autorisée des interventions
fondées sur l’article 63
8. Enfin, je tiens à souligner que l’intervention fondée sur l’article 63 est
limitée à l’interprétation des dispositions en cause au stade pertinent de la
procédure, en l’occurrence l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide. Il est
regrettable que plusieurs déclarations contiennent des observations qui vont
au-delà de cette portée limitée et formulent des prétentions concernant,
notamment, l’existence d’un différend entre les Parties11 ou le respect, par la
8 Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), déclaration d’intervention de
la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, déclaration du juge
Owada, p. 11, par. 1.
9 Observations écrites de la Fédération de Russie sur la recevabilité des déclarations
d’intervention, 24 mars 2023, par. 64-74.
10 Ordonnance, par. 57.
11 Voir, par exemple : déclaration de l’Allemagne, par. 30 ; déclaration du Liechtenstein,
par. 18 ; déclaration du Portugal, par. 31.
384 allegations of genocide (decl. gevorgian)
Court’s provisional measures Order of March 202212. Other States have used
their Declarations to opine on the facts of the case or to make political statements
and legal allegations against the Russian Federation13.
9. In this regard, I welcome the Court’s statement that it “will not consider”
such remarks14. Nevertheless, the fact that such statements have been made
en masse and are publicly available, including on the website of the Court,
creates a significant amount of political pressure on judges to decide this
case in a particular way. I fear that such litigation strategies therefore have
the potential to compromise the Court’s fair and impartial administration of
justice.
(Signed) Kirill Gevorgian.
___________
12 See e.g. Declaration of Estonia, para. 10; Declaration of Spain, para. 8; Declaration of
Ireland, para. 8.
13 See e.g. Declaration of Lithuania, para. 16; Declaration of New Zealand, para. 11.
14 Order, para. 84.
allégations de génocide (décl. gevorgian) 384
défenderesse, de l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires que
la Cour a rendue en mars 202212. D’autres États ont mis leur déclaration à
profit pour exprimer leurs vues sur les faits de l’espèce ou pour formuler des
déclarations politiques et des allégations juridiques contre la Fédération de
Russie13.
9. À cet égard, je me félicite de la décision de la Cour de « ne [pas] examiner[]
» ces observations14. Toutefois, le fait que ces déclarations aient été
présentées en masse et qu’elles aient été rendues accessibles au public,
notamment sur le site Internet de la Cour, fait peser de fortes pressions politiques
visant à inciter les juges à statuer dans un sens particulier. Je crains
qu’une telle stratégie risque par conséquent de compromettre l’administration
équitable et impartiale de la justice par la Cour.
(Signé) Kirill Gevorgian.
___________
12 Voir, par exemple : déclaration de l’Estonie, par. 10 ; déclaration de l’Espagne, par. 8 ;
déclaration de l’Irlande, par. 8.
13 Voir, par exemple : déclaration de la Lituanie, par. 16 ; déclaration de la Nouvelle-Zélande,
par. 11.
14 Ordonnance, par. 84.

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Declaration of Vice-President Gevorgian

Order
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