5 JUIN 2023
ORDONNANCE
ALLÉGATIONS DE GÉNOCIDE AU TITRE DE LA CONVENTION POUR LA PRÉVENTION ET LA RÉPRESSION DU CRIME DE GÉNOCIDE (UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)
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ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
5 JUNE 2023
ORDER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
CHRONOLOGY OF THE PROCEDURE 1-24
I. INTRODUCTION 25-32
II. CONFORMITY OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 82 OF THE RULES OF COURT 33-40
III. OBJECTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION 41-85
A. Objection based on the alleged intention behind the declarations of intervention 42-46
B. Objection based on an alleged infringement of the equality of the Parties and the good administration of justice 47-53
C. Objection based on an alleged abuse of process 54-60
D. Objection based on the alleged inadmissibility of the declarations of intervention at the preliminary objections stage 61-71
E. Objection based on the argument that the declarations of intervention presuppose the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of Ukraine’s Application 72-76
F. Objection based on the argument that intervention cannot concern the construction of compromissory clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention 77-81
G. Objection alleging that the declarations of intervention go beyond the construction of the Genocide Convention 82-85
IV. OBJECTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF CANADA AND THE NETHERLANDS 86-89
V. OBJECTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 90-98
VI. CONCLUSION 99-101
OPERATIVE CLAUSE 102
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2023
2023
5 June
General List
No. 182
5 June 2023
ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION
ORDER
Present: Judge BENNOUNA, Acting President; President DONOGHUE; Vice-President GEVORGIAN; Judges TOMKA, ABRAHAM, YUSUF, XUE, SEBUTINDE, BHANDARI, SALAM, IWASAWA, NOLTE, CHARLESWORTH, BRANT; Judge ad hoc DAUDET; Registrar GAUTIER.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 48 and 63 of the Statute of the Court and to Articles 82, 83, 84 and 86 of the Rules of Court,
Makes the following Order:
1. On 26 February 2022, Ukraine filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Russian Federation concerning “a dispute . . . relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention” or the “Convention”).
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2. In its Application, Ukraine seeks to base the Court’s jurisdiction on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
3. Together with the Application, Ukraine submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures with reference to Article 41 of the Statute and to Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
4. The Registrar immediately communicated the Application to the Russian Federation, in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, and the Request for the indication of provisional measures, in accordance with Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. He also notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the filing of the Application and the Request by Ukraine.
5. In addition, by a letter dated 2 March 2022, the Registrar informed all States entitled to appear before the Court of the filing of the Application and the Request for the indication of provisional measures.
6. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, the Registrar subsequently notified the Member States of the United Nations through the Secretary-General, and any other State entitled to appear before the Court, of the filing of the Application, by transmission of the printed bilingual text.
7. Since the Court included no judge of Ukrainian nationality upon the Bench, Ukraine proceeded to exercise the right conferred upon it by Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case; it chose Mr Yves Daudet.
8. By letters dated 1 March 2022, the Registrar informed the Parties that, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of its Rules, the Court had fixed 7 and 8 March 2022 as the dates for the oral proceedings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures. By a letter dated 5 March 2022, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands stated that his Government had decided not to participate in the oral proceedings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures.
9. A public hearing was held on 7 March 2022, in which the Russian Federation did not participate. By a letter dated 7 March 2022, received in the Registry shortly after the closure of the hearing, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands transmitted a document setting out “the position of the Russian Federation regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the Court in th[e] case”.
10. By an Order dated 16 March 2022, the Court indicated the following provisional measures:
“(1) The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine;
(2) The Russian Federation shall ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons
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which may be subject to its control or direction, take no steps in furtherance of the military operations referred to in point (1) above;
(3) Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.”
11. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to States parties to the Genocide Convention the notification provided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute. In addition, in accordance with Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to the United Nations, through its Secretary-General, the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court.
12. By an Order dated 23 March 2022, the Court fixed 23 September 2022 and 23 March 2023 as the respective time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Ukraine and the Counter-Memorial of the Russian Federation. The Memorial of Ukraine was filed on 1 July 2022.
13. On 21 July 2022, the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter “Latvia”) filed in the Registry of the Court a declaration of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. Subsequently, declarations of intervention under the same provision were filed by the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter “Lithuania”) on 22 July 2022, New Zealand on 28 July 2022 and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter the “United Kingdom”) on 5 August 2022. In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each declaration of intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court had fixed 15 September 2022 as the time-limit for the submission of written observations on these declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to appear before the Court.
14. By a letter dated 18 August 2022, the Russian Federation asked the Court to postpone the time-limit for the submission of written observations on the above-mentioned declarations of intervention until after the time-limit set out in Article 79bis, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court for the submission of preliminary objections and preferably no earlier than 17 October 2022. The Russian Federation also requested to be given at least two months for the submission of written observations on any further declarations of intervention. Having ascertained the views of Ukraine, which opposed the request, the Court decided to postpone the time-limit for the submission of written observations on the declarations of Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand and the United Kingdom from 15 September to 17 October 2022.
15. Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court were filed by the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter “Germany”) on 5 September 2022, the United States of America (hereinafter the “United States”) on 7 September 2022, the Kingdom of Sweden (hereinafter “Sweden”) on 9 September 2022, Romania on 13 September 2022, the French Republic (hereinafter “France”) on 13 September 2022, the Republic of Poland (hereinafter “Poland”) on 15 September 2022 and the Italian Republic (hereinafter “Italy”) on
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15 September 2022. In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each declaration of intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court had fixed 17 October 2022 as the time-limit for the submission of written observations on these declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to appear before the Court.
16. On 17 October 2022, within the time-limit fixed by the Court (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above), Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations on the declarations of intervention submitted by Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Sweden, Romania, France, Poland and Italy. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a copy of the other Party’s observations, and copies of the observations of both Parties to the above-mentioned declarant States.
17. Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court were filed by the Kingdom of Denmark (hereinafter “Denmark”) on 16 September 2022, Ireland on 19 September 2022, the Republic of Finland (hereinafter “Finland”) on 21 September 2022, the Republic of Estonia (hereinafter “Estonia”) on 22 September 2022, the Kingdom of Spain (hereinafter “Spain”) on 29 September 2022, Australia on 30 September 2022, the Portuguese Republic (hereinafter “Portugal”) on 7 October 2022, the Republic of Austria (hereinafter “Austria”) on 12 October 2022, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (hereinafter “Luxembourg”) on 13 October 2022 and the Hellenic Republic (hereinafter “Greece”) on 13 October 2022. In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each declaration of intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court had fixed 15 November 2022 as the time-limit for the submission of written observations on these declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to appear before the Court.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the time-limit thus fixed. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a copy of the other Party’s observations, and copies of the observations of both Parties to Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Spain, Australia, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg and Greece.
18. On 3 October 2022, within the time-limit prescribed by Article 79bis, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Russian Federation raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application. Consequently, by an Order of 7 October 2022, having noted that, by virtue of Article 79bis, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, the Court fixed 3 February 2023 as the time-limit within which Ukraine could present a written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by the Russian Federation. Ukraine filed its written statement within the time-limit thus fixed.
19. The Republic of Croatia (hereinafter “Croatia”) and the Czech Republic filed declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court on 19 October 2022 and 31 October 2022, respectively. In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each declaration of intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court had fixed 16 December 2022 as
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the time-limit for the submission of written observations on these declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to appear before the Court.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the time-limit thus fixed. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a copy of the other Party’s observations and copies of the observations of both Parties to Croatia and the Czech Republic.
20. By letters dated 31 October 2022, the Court informed the States parties to the Genocide Convention that, taking into account the number of declarations of intervention filed in the case, it considered that the interest of the sound administration of justice and procedural efficiency would be advanced if any State that intended to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred on it by Article 63 of the Statute of the Court would file its declaration not later than 15 December 2022.
21. Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court were filed by the Republic of Bulgaria (hereinafter “Bulgaria”) on 18 November 2022, the Republic of Malta (hereinafter “Malta”) on 24 November 2022, the Kingdom of Norway (hereinafter “Norway”) on 24 November 2022, the Kingdom of Belgium (hereinafter “Belgium”) on 6 December 2022, Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter “the Netherlands”), jointly, on 7 December 2022, the Slovak Republic (hereinafter “Slovakia”) on 7 December 2022, the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter “Slovenia”) on 7 December 2022, the Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter “Cyprus”) on 13 December 2022 and the Principality of Liechtenstein (hereinafter “Liechtenstein”) on 15 December 2022. In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each declaration of intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court had fixed 30 January 2023 as the time-limit for the submission of written observations on these declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to appear before the Court.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the time-limit thus fixed. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a copy of the other Party’s observations and copies of the observations of both Parties to Bulgaria, Malta, Norway, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Liechtenstein.
22. By letters dated 31 January 2023, the Registrar informed the Parties and the declarant States that, in light of the fact that the Russian Federation had filed objections to the admissibility of the declarations of intervention, the Court was required, pursuant to Article 84, paragraph 2, of its Rules, to hear the Parties and the States seeking to intervene on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention, and had decided to do so by means of a written procedure. The Registrar further stated that the Court had fixed 13 February 2023 as the time-limit within which the States seeking to intervene could furnish their written observations on the admissibility of their declarations and 13 March 2023 as the time-limit within which Ukraine and the Russian Federation could furnish their written observations thereon.
The States seeking to intervene filed written observations within the time-limit thus fixed, and the Registrar immediately transmitted copies thereof to the Parties.
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23. By a letter dated 27 February 2023, the Russian Federation requested that the Court extend from 13 March 2023 to 24 April 2023 the time-limit for the submission by the Parties of their written observations on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention. By a letter dated 3 March 2023, Ukraine objected to such an extension. By letters dated 7 March 2023, the Parties and the States seeking to intervene were informed that the Court had extended the time-limit for the submission by the Parties of their written observations on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention to 24 March 2023. Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the time-limit thus extended by the Court. In its written observations, the Russian Federation requested that the Court hold oral proceedings on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention. On 27 March 2023, the Registrar transmitted to each Party a copy of the other Party’s observations, and copies of the observations of both Parties to the States seeking to intervene. He also recalled to the Parties and States seeking to intervene that the Court had already decided that it would hear them on the question of the admissibility of the declarations of intervention by means of a written procedure, a decision duly communicated to them by letters dated 31 January 2023, and that the Court could therefore not accede to the request of the Russian Federation to hold oral proceedings on that question.
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24. President Donoghue, a national of one of the States seeking to intervene, considered it appropriate not to exercise the functions of the presidency in the proceedings relating to the admissibility of the declarations of intervention submitted under Article 63 of the Statute. Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court states that, in the event of the inability of the President to carry out the duties of the presidency, these shall be exercised by the Vice-President, or failing that, by the senior judge. Pursuant to Article 32, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, Vice-President Gevorgian was not in a position, as a national of one of the Parties to the case, to preside in respect of any phase of the case. Judges Tomka and Abraham, senior judges, declined to assume the functions of the presidency for the purposes of the proceedings relating to the admissibility of the declarations of intervention on the ground that each of them is a national of a State seeking to intervene. It therefore fell to Judge Bennouna, next in seniority, to assume the functions of the presidency in these proceedings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
25. Article 63 of the Statute of the Court provides that:
“1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such States forthwith.
2. Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.”
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26. The Court recalls that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute, which is an incidental proceeding, involves the exercise of a right by a State party to a convention the construction of which is in question before the Court (Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 5, para. 7; Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76; S.S. “Wimbledon”, Judgments, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 12).
27. The object of the intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is limited to the construction of the convention concerned. In this context, the Court is not required to ascertain whether the State seeking to intervene has “an interest of a legal nature” which “may be affected by the decision [of the Court]” in the main proceedings, as it is obliged to do when it is seised of an application for permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute. The legal interest of the declarant State in the construction of the convention is presumed by virtue of its status as a party thereto.
28. When a declaration of intervention is filed, the Court must ensure that it falls within the provisions of Article 63 of the Statute and that it meets the requirements set forth in Article 82 of the Rules (Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 5-6, para. 8; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Declaration of Intervention, Order of 4 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 216; Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 76-77).
29. In the present case, the declarations of intervention concern the construction of provisions of the Genocide Convention relating to the jurisdiction of the Court and, in some instances, of provisions relating to the merits of the case.
30. The States seeking to intervene and Ukraine submit that the declarations of intervention are admissible, given that they meet all the requirements set out in Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court.
31. The Russian Federation, for its part, considers that the declarations are inadmissible. It raises a number of objections that are addressed to all the declarations, and others that are addressed to only some of them, namely the joint declaration of Canada and the Netherlands and the declaration of the United States.
32. Although the declarations of intervention were presented separately, the Court, in accordance with the principle of the good administration of justice, will decide on their admissibility in a single Order.
II. CONFORMITY OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 82 OF THE RULES OF COURT
33. The Court will first examine whether the declarations of intervention comply with the requirements set out in Article 82 of its Rules.
34. The Court recalls that, under Article 82, paragraph 1, of the Rules, a State that desires to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred upon it by Article 63 of the Statute shall file
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a declaration to that effect, signed in the manner provided for in Article 38, paragraph 3, of the Rules, by the agent of the State or by its diplomatic representative in the country where the Court has its seat, or by some other duly authorized person. In addition, Article 82, paragraph 1, of the Rules provides that a declaration of intervention shall be filed as soon as possible, and not later than the date fixed for the opening of the oral proceedings. The Court notes that all the declarations of intervention comply with the above-mentioned requirements.
35. Under Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Rules, a declaration of intervention filed under Article 63 of the Statute shall contain:
“(a) particulars of the basis on which the declarant State considers itself a party to the convention;
(b) identification of the particular provisions of the convention the construction of which it considers to be in question;
(c) a statement of the construction of those provisions for which it contends;
(d) a list of the documents in support, which documents shall be attached.”
36. Turning to the requirement set out in Article 82, paragraph 2 (a), of the Rules, the Court observes that all the declarations of intervention submitted in the case specify when the declarant State deposited its instrument of ratification of, or accession or succession to the Genocide Convention, and thus establish the basis on which the declarant State considers itself party to the Genocide Convention.
37. With respect to the particular provisions to be identified under Article 82, paragraph 2 (b), of the Rules, the Court notes that all the declarations of intervention filed refer to Article IX of the Genocide Convention as a provision the construction of which is in question in the case. The Court notes that, in their declarations, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain limit their interventions to the construction of Article IX. The other declarations refer, in addition to Article IX, to other articles of the Convention the construction of which the States consider to be in question in the case, in particular Articles I, II, III, IV and VIII. The Court concludes that all these declarations, which concern at least one provision of the Genocide Convention, meet the requirement of Article 82, paragraph 2 (b), of the Rules.
38. Concerning the requirement set out in Article 82, paragraph 2 (c), of the Rules, namely that a declaration of intervention should contain a statement of the construction of the provisions in question for which the declarant State contends, the Court observes that all the declarations of intervention filed in the case contain such a statement on the provisions identified.
39. Finally, the Court turns to the requirement contained in Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules, namely that a declaration of intervention shall contain a list of documents in support, which documents shall be attached to the declaration. The Court observes that, while the declaration filed by Austria does not contain a “list of documents in support”, such documents, which are clearly identified as being in support of the declaration, are however annexed thereto. The Court thus considers that Austria has complied with the requirement under Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the
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Rules. With respect to the declaration of intervention filed by Lithuania, the Court notes that this declarant State refers to Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules and states that “at this stage, its Declaration of Intervention only relies on readily available documents and that it has no specific document to submit in support of its Declaration”. In these circumstances, the Court considers that, by making reference to readily available documents, Lithuania has complied with the requirement of Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules. The Court notes that all other declarations filed in the case contain a list of documents in support, and that those documents are attached to each of the declarations. The Court thus concludes that all the declarations of intervention filed in the case meet the requirement set out in Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules.
40. In light of the above, the Court concludes that the declarations of intervention filed in the case meet all the requirements of Article 82 of its Rules. In the next section, it will examine the objections raised by the Russian Federation concerning the admissibility of all the declarations of intervention filed under Article 63 of the Statute (Section III), before addressing the objections that relate exclusively to the joint declaration of Canada and the Netherlands (Section IV) and the declaration of the United States (Section V).
III. OBJECTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION
41. The Court will now examine the objections raised by the Russian Federation with respect to all the declarations of intervention.
A. Objection based on the alleged intention behind the declarations of intervention
42. The Russian Federation argues that the declarations of intervention are not “genuine” since the real object of the interventions is not the construction of the Genocide Convention but the pursuit by the declarant States of a joint case with Ukraine, such that they become de facto co-applicants. Recalling the decisions of the Court in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) (Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 3) and the case concerning Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 71), the Russian Federation contends that a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute must be “genuine”. In this regard, the Russian Federation asserts that the Court must consider the text of the declaration and the context within which it was filed in order to ascertain whether the real intention behind the intervention is the submission of observations on the construction of the convention in question. According to the Russian Federation, the circumstances in the present case show that the real intention of the declarant States is not to express their own views regarding the construction of the relevant provisions of the Genocide Convention but rather to side with and advocate for Ukraine in these proceedings.
43. Ukraine and the declarant States maintain that the declarations of intervention concern the construction of relevant provisions of the Genocide Convention and that the intentions of the declarant States are irrelevant to the admissibility of the declarations.
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44. The Court recalls that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute allows a third State not party to the proceedings, but which is party to a convention the construction of which is in question in those proceedings, to present to the Court its observations on the construction of that convention. In determining the admissibility of a declaration of intervention, the Court’s task is limited to ascertaining whether that declaration relates to the interpretation of a convention in question in the proceedings (Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 77; Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 5-6, para. 8). Thus, in the Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) case, the Court ascertained only whether the declaration of intervention of Cuba related to the interpretation of a convention in question in those proceedings. It concluded that, for the most part, the declaration concerned questions that had already been decided with the authority of res judicata in earlier proceedings, and for that reason did not satisfy the conditions of a genuine intervention (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 77). The Court considers that the question of a State’s motivation when filing a declaration of intervention is not relevant for the purposes of the admissibility of that declaration.
45. Moreover, while many of the declarant States express similar views on the construction of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, which are close to the views of Ukraine, this does not constitute a reason to find that the declarations are inadmissible, since, under the Rules of Court, each State may identify the provisions of the convention the construction of which it considers to be in question and set out its position thereon.
46. The Court therefore concludes that the objection to admissibility based on the alleged intention behind the declarations of intervention cannot be upheld.
B. Objection based on an alleged infringement of the equality of the Parties and the good administration of justice
47. The Russian Federation submits that allowing the declarant States to intervene would affect the equality of the Parties and the good administration of justice. It alleges that the States seeking to intervene align themselves with and represent the same interest as Ukraine, and that, if the declarations of intervention are found admissible, the Russian Federation will be forced to respond not only to the arguments advanced by Ukraine but also to those of the thirty-three declarant States acting as de facto co-applicants. The Russian Federation maintains that Ukraine and the declarant States should be considered as “parties in the same interest” within the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute. The Russian Federation also states that it is concerned that seven of the sixteen judges on the Bench in this case (including the President of the Court) are nationals of States “that have announced their intention to intervene to support Ukraine in these proceedings”.
48. Ukraine and the declarant States contend that the admissibility of the declarations of intervention would not affect the equality of the Parties or the good administration of justice, since the intervening State only submits observations on the construction of the convention in question and does not become a party to the proceedings. Similarly, they consider that the fact that some judges on the Bench are nationals of States seeking to intervene does not affect the equality of the Parties.
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49. The Court recalls that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute has a limited scope, since the intervening State can only submit observations on the construction of the convention in question and does not become a party to the proceedings. The Court thus concluded in its Order in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) that such an intervention did not affect the equality of the parties to the dispute (Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 9, para. 18).
50. The Court cannot limit the number of intervening States in the present case, since this would encroach on the right of States to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute.
51. The Court observes that the fact that some judges on the Bench are nationals of States seeking to intervene cannot affect the equality of the Parties because intervening States do not become parties to the proceedings. In any event, all judges are bound by their duty of impartiality.
52. Finally, the Court has taken note of the concerns of the Russian Federation. It is incumbent on the Court to organize the proceedings in a manner which ensures the equality of the parties and the good administration of justice. Should any declarations of intervention be found admissible at the present stage, the Court will ensure that each Party will have a fair opportunity and the necessary time to respond to the observations of the intervening States.
53. The Court therefore concludes that admitting the declarations of intervention in the present case would not infringe the principles of equality of the parties or the good administration of justice, and that the objection raised by the Russian Federation in this regard cannot be upheld.
C. Objection based on an alleged abuse of process
54. The Russian Federation submits that the declarations of intervention are inadmissible because they constitute an abuse of process. In particular, it argues that the procedure of intervention is used by the declarant States in a manner wholly alien to its purpose, with the aim of causing harm to the Russian Federation. It recalls that several States filed declarations of intervention after publicly stating their intention to support Ukraine’s case before the Court, in some cases even “at the express request of the Ukrainian side”. Thus, for the Russian Federation, those States do not seek in good faith to put before the Court their positions as to the proper construction of the Genocide Convention. Rather, they have filed their declarations of intervention in pursuit of a collective strategy of supporting the Applicant against the Respondent.
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55. The Court observes that this objection was raised for the first time in the written observations of the Russian Federation on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention filed on 24 March 2023 (see paragraph 23 above), to which neither Ukraine nor the States seeking to intervene have had the opportunity to respond. However, the Court considers that Ukraine and the States seeking to intervene have not suffered any prejudice as a result of this fact.
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56. The Court recalls that “[a]n abuse of process goes to the procedure before a court or tribunal”, in particular to the question of whether a State has misused that procedure to such an extent that its case should therefore be rejected at the preliminary stage (see Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 336, para. 150).
57. The Court has observed that only in exceptional circumstances should it reject a claim based on a valid title of jurisdiction on the ground of abuse of process (ibid.; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 22 July 2022, para. 49; Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 36, para. 93; Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), pp. 42-43, para. 113). Similarly, the Court is of the view that a declaration of intervention should be found inadmissible on the ground of abuse of process only in exceptional circumstances.
58. With regard to the Russian Federation’s contentions of abuse of process based on public statements by declarant States that they were acting in support of Ukraine, the Court has already concluded above that, in considering the admissibility of a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute, its task is not to look into the motivation or intention of the declarant State, but rather to ascertain whether the declaration of intervention relates to the interpretation of the convention in question (see paragraph 44 above).
59. The Court considers that in the present case there are no exceptional circumstances that would render the declarations of intervention inadmissible.
60. The Court therefore concludes that the Russian Federation’s objection to admissibility based on an abuse of process cannot be upheld.
D. Objection based on the alleged inadmissibility of the declarations of intervention at the preliminary objections stage
61. The Russian Federation submits that the declarations of intervention are not admissible at the current stage of the proceedings because the Court must first rule on the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application of Ukraine. The Russian Federation argues that the practice of the Court militates against admitting declarations of intervention prior to the decision on the preliminary objections. In this connection, it refers in particular to: the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), where the Court found the declaration of intervention of El Salvador inadmissible at the stage of the proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the application instituting the proceedings; the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France), where the Court deferred consideration of Fiji’s applications for intervention under Article 62 of the Statute until it had considered the questions of its jurisdiction and of the admissibility of the applications instituting the proceedings; and the case concerning the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case (New Zealand v. France), where the Court did not consider the declarations of intervention before it had ruled on the admissibility of New Zealand’s original request for an examination of the situation.
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The Russian Federation further submits that, since the Court has not yet ruled on the existence of a dispute in the present case, its subject-matter and the provisions of the Convention that may be in question, the declarant States cannot show that their intervention is directed at the construction of provisions in dispute.
62. Ukraine and the declarant States argue that the declarations of intervention are admissible at the preliminary objections stage and that the Court need not first establish the existence and subject-matter of the dispute between the Parties. They contend that the Statute and Rules of Court do not restrict intervention to certain phases of the proceedings and that it does not follow from the practice of the Court that the Court must first rule on the preliminary objections before determining the admissibility of the declarations of intervention.
* *
63. The Court observes that Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules do not restrict the right of intervention to a particular phase of the proceedings, or to a certain type of provision in a convention. Notably, Article 63 of the Statute provides that the right to intervene exists “[w]henever the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question”. This means that a State can intervene at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings in respect of provisions that have a bearing on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court.
64. In the view of the Court, the decisions cited by the Russian Federation do not show that declarations of intervention are as a matter of principle inadmissible during the preliminary objections phase.
65. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), El Salvador, in its declaration of intervention, failed to identify the provisions of any convention the interpretation of which, in its view, would be in question at the stage of the proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the application instituting the proceedings (see the declaration of intervention the Republic of El Salvador filed on 15 August 1984). Moreover, this declaration referred to conventions that could only concern the merits of the case. It is in those circumstances that the Court decided that the declaration of intervention of El Salvador was inadmissible at the stage of the proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the application instituting the proceedings (Declaration of Intervention, Order of 4 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 216).
66. In the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France), Fiji’s applications for permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute related exclusively to the merits of the cases (see the two applications for permission to intervene in the cases submitted by the Government of Fiji on 16 and 18 May 1973). The Court thus found that Fiji’s applications, by their very nature, presupposed that the Court had jurisdiction over the cases and that the applications instituting proceedings of Australia and New Zealand were admissible. For that reason, it deferred consideration of Fiji’s applications to a later stage (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Application for Permission to Intervene, Order of 12 July 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 321; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Application for Permission to Intervene, Order of 12 July 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 325).
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67. Finally, in the case concerning the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case (New Zealand v. France), the Court dismissed New Zealand’s request that the situation be examined in accordance with a previous judgment. It thus dismissed the incidental proceedings relating to that request, including the applications and declarations aimed at intervening under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute (Order of 22 September 1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995, pp. 306-307, paras. 67-68).
68. The Court does not consider that it must decide on the existence and scope of the dispute between the Parties before ruling on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention. Article 63 of the Statute gives States a right to intervene whenever the construction of a multilateral convention is in question, and Article 82, subparagraph 2 (b), of the Rules of Court provides that a State seeking to intervene must identify “the particular provisions of the convention the construction of which it considers to be in question”. If the construction of certain provisions is in question at the stage of the preliminary objections, States will be allowed to intervene at that stage to present their construction of those provisions.
69. In the case at hand, the construction of Article IX and of other provisions of the Genocide Convention concerning the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is in question at the present stage of the proceedings. Indeed, in its Application, Ukraine seeks to base the Court’s jurisdiction on Article IX of the Genocide Convention (see paragraph 2 above). The Russian Federation subsequently filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application (see paragraph 18 above) and it stated in its written observations on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention that the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae was among the questions raised in its preliminary objections.
70. The Court considers that all the declarations of intervention at least partly concern certain provisions of the Genocide Convention the construction of which is in question at the present stage of the proceedings.
71. The Court therefore concludes that the objection based on the alleged inadmissibility of the declarations of intervention at the preliminary objections stage cannot be upheld.
E. Objection based on the argument that the declarations of intervention presuppose the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of Ukraine’s Application
72. The Russian Federation argues that even if the declarations of intervention ostensibly concern, partly or entirely, issues of jurisdiction, they in effect address matters that presuppose that the Court has jurisdiction or that Ukraine’s Application is admissible. In the Respondent’s view, if the Court allows the declarant States to intervene at this stage, it will, in substance, be prejudging the preliminary objections. Relying on the Court’s rejection of El Salvador’s declaration of intervention in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Russian Federation contends that the presence in a declaration of intervention of arguments relating to the merits or presupposing that the Court has jurisdiction renders the said declaration wholly inadmissible at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings.
73. Ukraine and the declarant States argue that the declarations of intervention do not presuppose the Court’s jurisdiction or the admissibility of the Application. They contend that the
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declarations concern the construction of the compromissory clause contained in Article IX of the Convention. They add that a declaration of intervention that encompasses questions relating to jurisdiction and to the merits is not necessarily inadmissible in its entirety.
* *
74. The Court has already stated that declarations of intervention may be admissible at the preliminary objections stage (see Section III.D above). It is of the view that the construction of provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Court, such as the compromissory clause and provisions that are relevant to determining jurisdiction ratione materiae in a given case, may be in question in the preliminary objections phase. Such a construction may thus constitute the subject-matter of an intervention at this stage. However, the Court cannot take into consideration, at the preliminary objections stage, observations on the construction of provisions of a convention relating to the merits of the case. When a declaration of intervention concerns both the jurisdiction of the Court and the merits of the case, the Court will only take into account, at the preliminary objections stage, the elements relevant to determining jurisdiction.
75. The Court thus concludes that the declarations of intervention are admissible at the current stage in so far as they concern the construction of the provisions relating to its jurisdiction.
76. For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot uphold the objection raised by the Russian Federation.
F. Objection based on the argument that intervention cannot concern the construction of compromissory clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention
77. The Russian Federation contends that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute cannot concern the construction of compromissory clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention, because that provision, which does not concern a substantive right, cannot constitute the subject-matter of a dispute. The Russian Federation considers that, under the guise of the construction of Article IX of the Convention, the declarant States “advocate for the existence of a dispute in this case” or comment on its scope, but these are matters relating to the application rather than the interpretation of a treaty. The Russian Federation argues that, in any event, it cannot be asserted that the construction of Article IX of the Convention is in question until after the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, and the mere filing of preliminary objections does not attest to the existence of a dispute on the construction of that provision. Further, the Russian Federation maintains that the travaux préparatoires of Article 63 (in particular the report of the French representative to the Council of the League of Nations on the draft Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice) and the Judgment in the Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) case show that Article 63 does not envisage intervention in respect of compromissory clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention, but only in respect of substantive provisions.
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78. According to Ukraine and the declarant States, it follows from Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court that intervention under these provisions may concern the construction of any provision of a convention in question, including compromissory clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
* *
79. The Court has already concluded that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute may concern any provision the construction of which is in question at a specific stage of the proceedings. In particular, compromissory clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention may be the subject-matter of an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute, and such an intervention may be admitted at the preliminary objections stage (see Section III.D above). In the Court’s view, the construction of Article IX is in question at the current stage of the proceedings and the declarant States are entitled to present their construction of that provision.
80. The Court considers that the excerpt from the travaux préparatoires of Article 63 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice cited by the Russian Federation does not reveal an intention to exclude the construction of compromissory clauses from the purview of interventions, but only states that
“[t]he observations in the draft project of The Hague by one of our Colleagues draw attention to the following case: it might happen that a case appearing unimportant in itself might be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, and that the Court might take a decision on this case, laying down certain principles of international law which, if they were applied to other countries, would completely modify the principles of the traditional law of this country, and which might therefore have serious consequences. The question has been raised whether, in view of such an alternative, the States not involved in the dispute should not be given the right of intervening in the case in the interest of the harmonious development of the law, and otherwise after the closure of the case, to exercise, in the same interest, influence on the future development of the law.” (League of Nations, Permanent Court of International Justice, Documents concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the League of Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption by the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court (1921), p. 50.)
In addition, the requirement that an intervention under Article 63 must relate to the subject-matter of the proceedings (Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76) does not mean that the right to intervene is confined to substantive provisions of the relevant convention.
81. The Court therefore cannot uphold this objection of the Russian Federation.
G. Objection alleging that the declarations of intervention go beyond the construction of the Genocide Convention
82. The Russian Federation submits that the declarations of intervention should be found inadmissible because they seek to address issues unrelated to the construction of the Genocide Convention, and that their admission would prejudge questions relating to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae. In particular, the Russian Federation contends that the declarations refer to
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the existence of a dispute between the Parties, whereas this is an evidentiary question that must be determined by taking into account the facts of the case. Similarly, the Russian Federation states that the declarations should not be concerned with the question of whether genocide has occurred in Ukraine, as this is a question for the merits. According to the Russian Federation, other references in the declarations that go beyond the construction of the Genocide Convention concern rules of international law related to the doctrine of abuse of rights, the use of force, jus in bello, war crimes, territorial integrity and territorial acquisition, as well as alleged violations by the Russian Federation of the Court’s Order on provisional measures. The Russian Federation concludes that, at the very least, the declarations should be found inadmissible at the jurisdictional stage, or their consideration postponed until the Court has determined the scope of its jurisdiction ratione materiae.
83. Ukraine and the declarant States consider that the declarations of intervention relate solely to questions of construction of the Genocide Convention. In particular, if the declarations sometimes refer to rules and principles of international law outside the Genocide Convention, it is only in the context of interpreting the provisions of that instrument.
* *
84. The Court has already stated that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is limited to the construction of the provisions in question at the relevant stage of the proceedings. The Court is of the view that the declarations of intervention at issue generally concern the construction of the provisions of the Genocide Convention. However, to the extent that some declarations also address other matters, such as the existence of a dispute between the Parties, the evidence, the facts or the application of the Convention in the present case, the Court will not consider them. Further, while some of the declarations also refer to other rules and principles of international law outside the Genocide Convention, such references will only be considered by the Court in so far as they concern the construction of the Convention’s provisions, in accordance with the customary rule of interpretation reflected in Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
85. The Court therefore cannot uphold this objection of the Russian Federation.
IV. OBJECTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF CANADA AND THE NETHERLANDS
86. The Russian Federation raises an additional objection with respect to the admissibility of the joint declaration of intervention of Canada and the Netherlands. It argues that this declaration is inadmissible because joint declarations of intervention are not envisaged by Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court, since these provisions refer to the intervention of a State in the singular.
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87. Ukraine, Canada and the Netherlands contend that there is no obstacle to the filing of a joint declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute.
* *
88. The Court considers that there is nothing in the Statute or the Rules preventing States from filing a joint declaration of intervention. While Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court refer to the right of a State to file a declaration of intervention, the use of the generic singular simply means that every State party to the relevant convention can intervene in the proceedings, but it does not prohibit the filing of a joint declaration by those States. In fact, the joint presentation of shared views can advance the good administration of justice.
89. The Court therefore cannot uphold this objection of the Russian Federation.
V. OBJECTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECLARATION OF INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES
90. The Russian Federation raises an additional objection with respect to the admissibility of the declaration of intervention of the United States, contending that this declaration is inadmissible as a result of the reservation of the United States to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The Russian Federation makes three arguments in support of this objection. First, it submits that the term “convention” in Article 63 of the Statute must be taken to mean a convention whose provisions to be interpreted and whose compromissory clause affording jurisdiction to the Court are in force between the State seeking to intervene and the parties to a case. According to the Russian Federation, a State that has made a reservation to a compromissory clause has in effect “immunised” itself from any effect of a judicial interpretation of a treaty by the Court and thus has no special interest to be protected through Article 63 of the Statute. Secondly, the Russian Federation asserts that Article 63 implies the existence of a jurisdictional link between the parties to the main case and the State seeking to intervene, and that such a link is missing when the State seeking to intervene has made a reservation to the compromissory clause. Thirdly, the Russian Federation takes the view that intervention under Article 63 must conform to the principle of reciprocity, and that a State that could not be brought before the Court as a respondent by another State should not be permitted to intervene against that same State.
91. The United States takes the view that its reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention has no bearing on its right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute. It considers that the Russian Federation is attempting to add conditions to the requirements of Article 63 and that the arguments it advances should therefore be rejected. The United States first contends that the “special interest” requirement asserted by the Russian Federation is not to be found in the text of Article 63, according to which the interest of a State party in the interpretation of a treaty does not depend on whether that State party has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. The United States submits that, in the event that its declaration of intervention is deemed admissible, the construction of the provisions of the Convention to be given by the Court in this case will be binding on it under Article 63, paragraph 2. It adds that such will be the case regardless of whether any other State is able to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in a future case involving it. The United States further contends that Article 63 of the Statute does not require the existence of a “jurisdictional link” between the parties and the State seeking to intervene, as such a requirement is not reflected in that provision, in the
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practice of the Court or in the drafting history of Article 63. Finally, the United States maintains that the Russian Federation erroneously invokes the principle of reciprocity by conflating intervention under Article 63 with the status of party to the proceedings.
92. Ukraine considers that the fact that the United States maintains a reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention does not affect that State’s right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute.
* *
93. The Court has already concluded that the declarations of intervention may be admissible at the current stage of the proceedings in so far as they concern the construction of Article IX and of other provisions of the Genocide Convention that are relevant for the determination of the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court (see Sections III.D and III.F above). However, it must now ascertain whether the United States’ reservation to Article IX of the Convention renders that State’s declaration of intervention inadmissible in so far as the current stage of the proceedings is concerned.
94. The Court notes that the United States has entered the following reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which reservation is currently in force:
“That with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.”
The Court has found that that reservation “had the effect of excluding that Article from the provisions of the Convention in force” between the United States and another party to a dispute (Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 924, para. 24). Consequently, by virtue of that reservation, the United States is not bound by Article IX of the Convention.
95. The Court considers that the United States may not intervene in relation to the construction of Article IX of the Convention while it is not bound by that provision. The reservation of the United States excludes the legal effect of that Article in relation to that State. Consequently, the legal interest that the United States is presumed to have in the construction of the Genocide Convention, as a party to that instrument, does not exist in respect of Article IX. Moreover, by declaring that it “recognizes that, by availing itself of the right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute, the construction of the Convention given by the judgment in this case will be equally binding upon [it]”, the United States cannot overcome the fact that it has entered a reservation to Article IX of the Convention, which is thus not binding upon it.
96. In the Court’s view, the declaration of intervention of the United States, in so far as it concerns the construction of Article IX, does not fall within the scope of Article 63 of the Statute, which permits States parties to a convention to intervene in relation to the construction of any of its provisions in question before the Court, provided that they are bound by the provision in question.
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Therefore, when a State seeks to intervene under Article 63 but is not bound by a provision of the convention due to a reservation, its declaration under Article 63 cannot be found admissible in respect of the construction of that provision. Thus, the Court finds that the declaration of the United States is inadmissible in so far as it concerns Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
97. The Court notes that the United States also seeks to intervene to present its construction of other provisions of the Convention that could be in question at this stage of the proceedings, in particular provisions that may be relevant for the determination of the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae in the present case. The Court emphasizes that at the preliminary objections stage, the construction of any other provision of the Convention may only be relevant in so far as it concerns the construction of Article IX and the determination of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae thereunder. Since the United States has entered a reservation to that Article, the Court considers that it cannot intervene at the current stage to present its construction of other provisions of the Convention that could be relevant to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae under Article IX.
98. The Court concludes that the declaration of intervention of the United States is inadmissible in so far as it concerns the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings. The Court upholds the objection of the Russian Federation in so far as it relates to that phase.
VI. CONCLUSION
99. The Court concludes that the declarations of intervention filed in this case, except for the declaration submitted by the United States, are admissible at the preliminary objections stage in so far as they concern the construction of Article IX and other provisions of the Genocide Convention that are relevant for the determination of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae in the present case. Accordingly, the Court will not, at this stage, have regard to any part of the written or oral observations of the declarant States going beyond the scope thus fixed.
*
100. The Court further recalls that Article 86 of its Rules provides as follows:
“1. If an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is admitted, the intervening State shall be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents annexed, and shall be entitled, within a time-limit to be fixed by the Court, or by the President if the Court is not sitting, to submit its written observations on the subject-matter of the intervention.
2. These observations shall be communicated to the parties and to any other State admitted to intervene. The intervening State shall be entitled, in the course of the oral proceedings, to submit its observations with respect to the subject-matter of the intervention.”
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101. In accordance with this provision, the States whose declarations of intervention are admissible at the current stage will be furnished with copies of the Memorial of Ukraine, the Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation and the Written Statement of Ukraine on those preliminary objections. Further, the Court will set a time-limit for the declarant States to file their written observations on the subject-matter of their intervention as admitted at the current stage.
*
* *
102. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
(1) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides that the declarations of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute submitted by Australia, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are admissible at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings in so far as they concern the construction of Article IX and other provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that are relevant for the determination of the jurisdiction of the Court;
IN FAVOUR: Acting President Bennouna; President Donoghue; Vice-President Gevorgian; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Yusuf, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth, Brant; Judge ad hoc Daudet;
AGAINST: Judge Xue;
(2) Unanimously,
Decides that the declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute submitted by the United States of America is inadmissible in so far as it concerns the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings;
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(3) By fourteen votes to one,
Fixes 5 July 2023 as the time-limit for the filing, by the States whose declarations of intervention have been deemed admissible at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings, of the written observations referred to in Article 86, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
IN FAVOUR: Acting President Bennouna; President Donoghue; Vice-President Gevorgian; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Yusuf, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth, Brant; Judge ad hoc Daudet;
AGAINST: Judge Xue.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifth day of June, two thousand and twenty-three, in thirty-six copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of Ukraine, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Governments of Australia, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, respectively.
(Signed) Mohamed BENNOUNA,
Acting President.
(Signed) Philippe GAUTIER,
Registrar.
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Vice-President GEVORGIAN appends a declaration to the Order of the Court; Judge ABRAHAM appends a declaration to the Order of the Court; Judge XUE appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court; Judge BHANDARI appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.
(Initialled) M.B.
(Initialled) Ph.G.
___________
2023
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
ALLÉGATIONS DE GÉNOCIDE
AU TITRE DE LA CONVENTION
POUR LA PRÉVENTION ET LA RÉPRESSION
DU CRIME DE GÉNOCIDE
(UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)
RECEVABILITÉ
DES DÉCLARATIONS D’INTERVENTION
ORDONNANCE DU 5 JUIN 2023
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE
UNDER THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION
ORDER OF 5 JUNE 2023
No de vente :
Sales number
© 2024 CIJ/ICJ, Nations Unies/United Nations
Tous droits réservés/All rights reserved
imprimé en france/printed in france
1288 ISSN 0074-4441
ISBN 978-92-1-003204-9
e-ISBN 978-92-1-106590-9
Mode officiel de citation :
Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention
pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), recevabilité des déclarations
d’intervention, ordonnance du 5 juin 2023, C.I.J. Recueil 2023, p. 354
Official citation:
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Admissibility of the Declarations
of Intervention, Order of 5 June 2023, I.C.J. Reports 2023, p. 354
ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE
UNDER THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION
ALLÉGATIONS DE GÉNOCIDE
AU TITRE DE LA CONVENTION
POUR LA PRÉVENTION ET LA RÉPRESSION
DU CRIME DE GÉNOCIDE
(UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)
RECEVABILITÉ
DES DÉCLARATIONS D’INTERVENTION
5 JUNE 2023
ORDER
5 JUIN 2023
ORDONNANCE
354
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Paragraphes
Qualités 1-24
I. Introduction 25-32
II. Conformité des déclarations d’intervention aux exigences
énoncées à l’article 82 du règlement de la Cour
33-40
III. Objections de la Fédération de Russie concernant l’ensemble
des déclarations d’intervention
41-85
A. Objection fondée sur l’intention qui sous-tendrait les déclarations
d’intervention
42-46
B. Objection fondée sur une atteinte alléguée à l’égalité des Parties et
à la bonne administration de la justice
47-53
C. Objection fondée sur un abus de procédure allégué 54-60
D. Objection fondée sur l’irrecevabilité alléguée des déclarations
d’intervention au stade des exceptions préliminaires
61-71
E. Objection fondée sur l’argument selon lequel les déclarations
d’intervention présupposent la compétence de la Cour et la
recevabilité de la requête de l’Ukraine
72-76
F. Objection fondée sur l’argument selon lequel l’intervention ne
peut avoir trait à l’interprétation de clauses compromissoires telles
que l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide
77-81
G. Objection selon laquelle les déclarations d’intervention sortent du
cadre de l’interprétation de la convention sur le génocide
82-85
IV. Objection de la Fédération de Russie concernant la déclaration
conjointe d’intervention du Canada et des Pays-Bas 86-89
V. Objection de la Fédération de Russie concernant la déclaration
d’intervention des États-Unis
90-98
VI. Conclusion 99-101
Dispositif 102
354
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
Chronology of the Procedure 1-24
I. Introduction 25-32
II. Conformity of the Declarations of Intervention with the
Requirements Set Out in Article 82 of the Rules of Court
33-40
III. Objections of the Russian Federation with respect to all the
Declarations of Intervention
41-85
A. Objection based on the alleged intention behind the Declarations
of intervention
42-46
B. Objection based on an alleged infringement of the equality of the
Parties and the good administration of justice
47-53
C. Objection based on an alleged abuse of process 54-60
D. Objection based on the alleged inadmissibility of the Declarations
of intervention at the preliminary objections stage
61-71
E. Objection based on the argument that the Declarations of
intervention presuppose the Court’s jurisdiction and the
admissibility of Ukraine’s Application
72-76
F. Objection based on the argument that intervention cannot concern
the construction of compromissory clauses such as Article IX of
the Genocide Convention
77-81
G. Objection alleging that the Declarations of intervention go beyond
the construction of the Genocide Convention
82-85
IV. Objection of the Russian Federation with respect to the
Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada and the
Netherlands
86-89
V. Objection of the Russian Federation with respect to the
Declaration of Intervention of the United States
90-98
VI. Conclusion 99-101
Operative Clause 102
355
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
ANNÉE 2023
5 juin 2023
ALLÉGATIONS DE GÉNOCIDE
AU TITRE DE LA CONVENTION
POUR LA PRÉVENTION ET LA RÉPRESSION
DU CRIME DE GÉNOCIDE
(UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)
RECEVABILITÉ
DES DÉCLARATIONS D’INTERVENTION
ORDONNANCE
Présents : M. Bennouna, juge, faisant fonction de président ;
Mme Donoghue,
présidente ; M. Gevorgian, viceprésident
; MM. Tomka, Abraham, Yusuf, Mmes Xue,
Sebutinde, MM. Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte,
Mme Charlesworth, M. Brant, juges ; M. Daudet, juge
ad hoc ; M. Gautier, greffier.
La Cour internationale de Justice,
Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
Vu les articles 48 et 63 de son Statut et les articles 82, 83, 84 et 86 de son
Règlement,
Rend l’ordonnance suivante :
1. Le 26 février 2022, l’Ukraine a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête
introductive d’instance contre la Fédération de Russie au sujet d’« un
différend … concernant l’interprétation, l’application et l’exécution de la
2023
5 juin
Rôle général
no 182
355
2023
5 June
General List
No. 182
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2023
5 June 2023
ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE
UNDER THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTERVENTION
ORDER
Present: Judge Bennouna, Acting President; President Donoghue;
Vice-President Gevorgian; Judges Tomka, Abraham,
Yusuf, Xue, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte,
Charlesworth, Brant; Judge ad hoc Daudet; Registrar
Gautier.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 48 and 63 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 82, 83, 84 and 86 of the Rules of Court,
Makes the following Order:
1. On 26 February 2022, Ukraine filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application instituting proceedings against the Russian Federation concerning
“a dispute . . . relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of
356 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
convention de 1948 pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
» (ci-après la « convention sur le génocide » ou la « convention »).
2. Dans sa requête, l’Ukraine entend fonder la compétence de la Cour sur
le paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 du Statut de celle-ci et sur l’article IX de la
convention sur le génocide.
3. En même temps que la requête, l’Ukraine, se référant à l’article 41 du
Statut de la Cour et aux articles 73, 74 et 75 de son Règlement, a présenté une
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires.
4. Le greffier a immédiatement donné communication à la Fédération de
Russie de la requête, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 40 du Statut
de la Cour, et de la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires,
conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 73 du Règlement de la Cour.
Le greffier a également informé le Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies du dépôt par l’Ukraine de cette requête et de cette demande.
5. En outre, par lettre en date du 2 mars 2022, le greffier a informé tous les
États admis à ester devant la Cour du dépôt de la requête et de la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires.
6. En application du paragraphe 3 de l’article 40 du Statut de la Cour,
le greffier a par la suite informé les États Membres de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies, par l’entremise du Secrétaire général, ainsi que tout autre
État admis à ester devant la Cour, du dépôt de la requête par transmission du
texte bilingue imprimé de celle-ci.
7. La Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de nationalité ukrainienne,
l’Ukraine s’est prévalue du droit que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l’article 31
du Statut de la Cour de procéder à la désignation d’un juge ad hoc pour
siéger en l’affaire ; elle a désigné M. Yves Daudet.
8. Par lettres en date du 1er mars 2022, le greffier a fait connaître aux
Parties que la Cour, conformément au paragraphe 3 de l’article 74 de son
Règlement, avait fixé aux 7 et 8 mars 2022 les dates de la procédure orale sur
la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires. Par lettre en date du
5 mars 2022, l’ambassadeur de la Fédération de Russie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas a indiqué que son gouvernement avait décidé de ne pas participer
à la procédure orale sur la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires.
9. Une audience publique, à laquelle la Fédération de Russie n’a pas participé,
s’est tenue le 7 mars 2022. Par lettre en date du même jour, reçue au
Greffe peu après la clôture de l’audience, l’ambassadeur de la Fédération de
Russie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas a transmis un document exposant
« la position de la Fédération de Russie en ce qui concerne l’incompétence de
la Cour en [l’]affaire ».
10. Par ordonnance en date du 16 mars 2022, la Cour a indiqué les mesures
conservatoires suivantes :
« 1) La Fédération de Russie doit suspendre immédiatement les opérations
militaires qu’elle a commencées le 24 février 2022 sur le territoire
de l’Ukraine ;
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 356
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide” (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention” or the “Convention”).
2. In its Application, Ukraine seeks to base the Court’s jurisdiction on
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article IX of the
Genocide Convention.
3. Together with the Application, Ukraine submitted a Request for the
indication of provisional measures with reference to Article 41 of the Statute
and to Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
4. The Registrar immediately communicated the Application to the
Russian Federation, in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court, and the Request for the indication of provisional measures,
in accordance with Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court.
He also notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the filing of
the Application and the Request by Ukraine.
5. In addition, by a letter dated 2 March 2022, the Registrar informed all
States entitled to appear before the Court of the filing of the Application and
the Request for the indication of provisional measures.
6. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, the
Registrar subsequently notified the Member States of the United Nations
through the Secretary-General, and any other State entitled to appear before
the Court, of the filing of the Application, by transmission of the printed
bilingual text.
7. Since the Court included no judge of Ukrainian nationality upon the
Bench, Ukraine proceeded to exercise the right conferred upon it by
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court to choose a judge ad hoc
to sit in the case; it chose Mr Yves Daudet.
8. By letters dated 1 March 2022, the Registrar informed the Parties that,
pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of its Rules, the Court had fixed 7 and
8 March 2022 as the dates for the oral proceedings on the Request for the
indication of provisional measures. By a letter dated 5 March 2022, the
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands
stated that his Government had decided not to participate in the oral proceedings
on the Request for the indication of provisional measures.
9. A public hearing was held on 7 March 2022, in which the Russian
Federation did not participate. By a letter dated 7 March 2022, received in
the Registry shortly after the closure of the hearing, the Ambassador of the
Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands transmitted a document
setting out “the position of the Russian Federation regarding the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court in th[e] case”.
10. By an Order dated 16 March 2022, the Court indicated the following
provisional measures:
“(1) The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military
operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of
Ukraine;
357 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
2) La Fédération de Russie doit veiller à ce qu’aucune des unités militaires
ou unités armées irrégulières qui pourraient agir sous sa direction
ou bénéficier de son appui, ni aucune organisation ou personne qui pourrait
se trouver sous son contrôle ou sa direction, ne commette d’actes
tendant à la poursuite des opérations militaires visées au point 1
ci-dessus ;
3) Les deux Parties doivent s’abstenir de tout acte qui risquerait d’aggraver
ou d’étendre le différend dont la Cour est saisie ou d’en rendre le
règlement plus difficile. »
11. Sur les instructions données par la Cour conformément au paragraphe
1 de l’article 43 de son Règlement, le greffier a adressé aux États
parties à la convention sur le génocide la notification prévue au paragraphe 1
de l’article 63 du Statut. En outre, en application des dispositions du paragraphe
3 de l’article 69 du Règlement, il a adressé la notification prévue au
paragraphe 3 de l’article 34 du Statut à l’Organisation des Nations Unies, par
l’entremise de son Secrétaire général.
12. Par ordonnance en date du 23 mars 2022, la Cour a fixé au
23 septembre 2022 et au 23 mars 2023, respectivement, les dates
d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt du mémoire de l’Ukraine et du contremémoire
de la Fédération de Russie. L’Ukraine a déposé son mémoire le
1er juillet 2022.
13. Le 21 juillet 2022, la République de Lettonie (ci-après la « Lettonie »)
a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une déclaration d’intervention fondée sur le
paragraphe 2 de l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour. Par la suite, des déclarations
d’intervention fondées sur la même disposition ont été déposées par la
République de Lituanie (ci-après la « Lituanie ») le 22 juillet 2022, la
Nouvelle-Zélande le 28 juillet 2022, et le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne
et d’Irlande du Nord (ci-après le « Royaume-Uni ») le 5 août 2022. En application
du paragraphe 1 de l’article 83 du Règlement de la Cour, le greffier a
immédiatement transmis une copie certifiée conforme de chacune des déclarations
d’intervention à l’Ukraine et à la Fédération de Russie, qui ont été
informées que la Cour avait fixé au 15 septembre 2022 la date d’expiration
du délai pour le dépôt d’observations écrites sur ces déclarations.
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de ce même article, le greffier a également
transmis copie des déclarations au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies ainsi qu’aux États admis à ester devant la Cour.
14. Par lettre en date du 18 août 2022, la Fédération de Russie a prié la
Cour de reporter l’échéance prévue pour le dépôt d’observations écrites sur
les déclarations d’intervention susmentionnées à une date qui serait postérieure
à l’expiration du délai pour le dépôt des exceptions préliminaires visé
au paragraphe 1 de l’article 79bis du Règlement de la Cour et qui, de préférence,
ne serait pas antérieure au 17 octobre 2022. La Fédération de Russie a
aussi demandé à bénéficier d’un délai d’au moins deux mois pour présenter
des observations écrites sur toutes nouvelles déclarations d’intervention.
Après avoir consulté l’Ukraine, qui s’est opposée à la demande, la Cour a
décidé de reporter au 17 octobre 2022 la date d’expiration du délai pour le
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 357
(2) The Russian Federation shall ensure that any military or irregular
armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any
organizations and persons which may be subject to its control or direction,
take no steps in furtherance of the military operations referred to
in point 1 above;
(3) Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate
or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to
resolve.”
11. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43, paragraph 1,
of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to States parties to the
Genocide Convention the notification provided for in Article 63, paragraph 1,
of the Statute. In addition, in accordance with Article 69, paragraph 3, of the
Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to the United Nations, through its
Secretary-General, the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3,
of the Statute of the Court.
12. By an Order dated 23 March 2022, the Court fixed 23 September 2022
and 23 March 2023 as the respective time-limits for the filing of the Memorial
of Ukraine and the Counter-Memorial of the Russian Federation. The
Memorial of Ukraine was filed on 1 July 2022.
13. On 21 July 2022, the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter “Latvia”) filed in
the Registry of the Court a Declaration of intervention under Article 63,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. Subsequently, Declarations of
intervention under the same provision were filed by the Republic of Lithuania
(hereinafter “Lithuania”) on 22 July 2022, New Zealand on 28 July 2022 and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter the
“United Kingdom”) on 5 August 2022. In accordance with Article 83, paragraph
1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar immediately transmitted
certified copies of each Declaration of intervention to Ukraine and the
Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court had fixed
15 September 2022 as the time-limit for the submission of written observations
on these Declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the same
Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the Declarations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to
appear before the Court.
14. By a letter dated 18 August 2022, the Russian Federation asked the
Court to postpone the time-limit for the submission of written observations
on the above-mentioned Declarations of intervention until after the timelimit
set out in Article 79bis, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court for the
submission of preliminary objections and preferably no earlier than
17 October 2022. The Russian Federation also requested to be given at least
two months for the submission of written observations on any further
Declarations of intervention. Having ascertained the views of Ukraine,
which opposed the request, the Court decided to postpone the time-limit for
the submission of written observations on the Declarations of Latvia,
358 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
dépôt des observations écrites sur les déclarations de la Lettonie, de la
Lituanie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni, initialement fixée au
15 septembre 2022.
15. Des déclarations d’intervention fondées sur le paragraphe 2 de l’article
63 du Statut de la Cour ont été déposées par la République fédérale
d’Allemagne (ci-après l’« Allemagne ») le 5 septembre 2022, les États-Unis
d’Amérique (ci-après les « États-Unis ») le 7 septembre 2022, le Royaume de
Suède (ci-après la « Suède ») le 9 septembre 2022, la Roumanie le 13 septembre
2022, la République française (ci-après la « France ») le 13 septembre
2022, la République de Pologne (ci-après la « Pologne ») le 15 septembre
2022, et la République italienne (ci-après l’« Italie ») le 15 septembre
2022. En application du paragraphe 1 de l’article 83 du Règlement de la
Cour, le greffier a immédiatement transmis une copie certifiée conforme de
chacune des déclarations d’intervention à l’Ukraine et à la Fédération de
Russie, qui ont été informées que la Cour avait fixé au 17 octobre 2022 la
date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt d’observations écrites sur ces déclarations.
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de ce même article, le greffier a
également transmis copie des déclarations au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies ainsi qu’aux États admis à ester devant la Cour.
16. Le 17 octobre 2022, dans le délai fixé par la Cour (voir les paragraphes
14 et 15 ci-dessus), l’Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie ont déposé
des observations écrites sur les déclarations d’intervention présentées par la
Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Nouvelle-Zélande, le Royaume-Uni, l’Allemagne,
les États-Unis, la Suède, la Roumanie, la France, la Pologne et l’Italie.
Le greffier a immédiatement transmis à chacune des Parties copie des observations
de l’autre et copie des observations des deux Parties aux États
déclarants susmentionnés.
17. Des déclarations d’intervention fondées sur le paragraphe 2 de l’article 63
du Statut de la Cour ont été déposées par le Royaume du Danemark (ci-après
le « Danemark ») le 16 septembre 2022, l’Irlande le 19 septembre 2022, la
République de Finlande (ci-après la « Finlande ») le 21 septembre 2022,
la République d’Estonie (ci-après l’« Estonie ») le 22 septembre 2022, le
Royaume d’Espagne (ci-après l’« Espagne ») le 29 septembre 2022, l’Australie
le 30 septembre 2022, la République portugaise (ci-après le « Portugal ») le
7 octobre 2022, la République d’Autriche (ci-après l’« Autriche ») le
12 octobre 2022, le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (ci-après le « Luxembourg »)
le 13 octobre 2022, et la République hellénique (ci-après la « Grèce ») le
13 octobre 2022. En application du paragraphe 1 de l’article 83 du Règlement
de la Cour, le greffier a immédiatement transmis une copie certifiée conforme
de chacune des déclarations d’intervention à l’Ukraine et à la Fédération de
Russie, qui ont été informées que la Cour avait fixé au 15 novembre 2022 la
date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt d’observations écrites sur ces déclarations.
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de ce même article, le greffier a
également transmis copie des déclarations au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies ainsi qu’aux États admis à ester devant la Cour.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 358
Lithuania, New Zealand and the United Kingdom from 15 September to
17 October 2022.
15. Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court were filed by the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter
“Germany”) on 5 September 2022, the United States of America
(hereinafter the “United States”) on 7 September 2022, the Kingdom of
Sweden (hereinafter “Sweden”) on 9 September 2022, Romania on 13 Sep-tember
2022, the French Republic (hereinafter “France”) on 13 September
2022, the Republic of Poland (hereinafter “Poland”) on 15 September 2022
and the Italian Republic (hereinafter “Italy”) on 15 September 2022. In
accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar
immediately transmitted certified copies of each Declaration of intervention
to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed that the Court
had fixed 17 October 2022 as the time-limit for the submission of written
observations on these Declarations. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the
same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the Declarations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to States entitled to
appear before the Court.
16. On 17 October 2022, within the time-limit fixed by the Court (see
paragraphs 14 and 15 above), Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written
observations on the Declarations of intervention submitted by Latvia,
Lithuania, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States,
Sweden, Romania, France, Poland and Italy. The Registrar immediately
transmitted to each Party a copy of the other Party’s observations, and copies
of the observations of both Parties to the above-mentioned declarant States.
17. Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court were filed by the Kingdom of Denmark (hereinafter
“Denmark”) on 16 September 2022, Ireland on 19 September 2022, the Republic
of Finland (hereinafter “Finland”) on 21 September 2022, the Republic
of
Estonia (hereinafter “Estonia”) on 22 September 2022, the Kingdom of
Spain (hereinafter “Spain”) on 29 September 2022, Australia on 30 September
2022, the Portuguese Republic (hereinafter “Portugal”) on 7 October 2022,
the Republic of Austria (hereinafter “Austria”) on 12 October 2022, the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (hereinafter “Luxembourg”) on 13 October
2022 and the Hellenic Republic (hereinafter “Greece”) on 13 October 2022.
In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the
Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each Declaration of
intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed
that the Court had fixed 15 November 2022 as the time-limit for the submission
of written observations on these Declarations. In accordance with
paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the
Declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to
States entitled to appear before the Court.
359 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
L’Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie ont présenté des observations écrites
dans le délai ainsi fixé. Le greffier a immédiatement transmis à chacune des
Parties copie des observations de l’autre et copie des observations des deux
Parties au Danemark, à l’Irlande, à la Finlande, à l’Estonie, à l’Espagne,
à l’Australie, au Portugal, à l’Autriche, au Luxembourg et à la Grèce.
18. Le 3 octobre 2022, dans le délai prescrit par le paragraphe 1 de l’article
79bis du Règlement de la Cour, la Fédération de Russie a soulevé des
exceptions préliminaires d’incompétence de la Cour et d’irrecevabilité de la
requête. En conséquence, par ordonnance du 7 octobre 2022, la Cour, ayant
noté que la procédure sur le fond était suspendue en vertu des dispositions
du paragraphe 3 de l’article 79bis de son Règlement, a fixé au 3 février 2023
la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel l’Ukraine pourrait présenter un
exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions sur les exceptions
préliminaires soulevées par la Fédération de Russie. L’Ukraine a déposé son
exposé écrit dans le délai ainsi fixé.
19. La République de Croatie (ci-après la « Croatie ») et la République
tchèque ont déposé des déclarations d’intervention fondées sur le paragraphe
2 de l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour le 19 octobre 2022 et le 31 octobre
2022, respectivement. En application du paragraphe 1 de l’article 83 du
Règlement de la Cour, le greffier a immédiatement transmis une copie certifiée
conforme de chacune des déclarations d’intervention à l’Ukraine et à la
Fédération de Russie, qui ont été informées que la Cour avait fixé au
16 décembre 2022 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt d’observations
écrites sur ces déclarations. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de ce même
article, le greffier a également transmis copie des déclarations au Secrétaire
général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ainsi qu’aux États admis à ester
devant la Cour.
L’Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie ont présenté des observations écrites
dans le délai ainsi fixé. Le greffier a immédiatement transmis à chacune des
Parties copie des observations de l’autre et copie des observations des deux
Parties à la Croatie et à la République tchèque.
20. Par lettres en date du 31 octobre 2022, la Cour a informé les États
parties à la convention sur le génocide que, compte tenu du nombre de déclarations
qui avaient été déposées en l’affaire, elle estimait qu’il serait dans
l’intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice et de l’économie procédurale
que tout État souhaitant se prévaloir du droit d’intervention que lui
confère l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour déposât sa déclaration au plus tard le
15 décembre 2022.
21. Des déclarations d’intervention fondées sur le paragraphe 2 de
l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour ont été déposées par la République
de Bulgarie (ci-après la « Bulgarie ») le 18 novembre 2022, la République de
Malte (ci-après « Malte ») le 24 novembre 2022, le Royaume de Norvège
(ci-après la « Norvège ») le 24 novembre 2022, le Royaume de Belgique
(ci-après la « Belgique ») le 6 décembre 2022, le Canada et le Royaume des
Pays-Bas (ci-après les « Pays-Bas »), conjointement, le 7 décembre 2022, la
République
slovaque (ci-après la « Slovaquie ») le 7 décembre 2022, la Répu-
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 359
Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the
time-limit thus fixed. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a
copy of the other Party’s observations, and copies of the observations of both
Parties to Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Spain, Australia, Portugal,
Austria, Luxembourg and Greece.
18. On 3 October 2022, within the time-limit prescribed by Article 79bis,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Russian Federation raised preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the
Application. Consequently, by an Order of 7 October 2022, having noted
that, by virtue of Article 79bis, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the
proceedings on the merits were suspended, the Court fixed 3 February 2023
as the time-limit within which Ukraine could present a written statement of
its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by the
Russian Federation. Ukraine filed its written statement within the time-limit
thus fixed.
19. The Republic of Croatia (hereinafter “Croatia”) and the Czech
Republic filed Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court on 19 October 2022 and 31 October 2022, respectively.
In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the
Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each Declaration of
intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed
that the Court had fixed 16 December 2022 as the time-limit for the submission
of written observations on these Declarations. In accordance with
paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the
Declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to
States entitled to appear before the Court.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the
time-limit thus fixed. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a
copy of the other Party’s observations and copies of the observations of both
Parties to Croatia and the Czech Republic.
20. By letters dated 31 October 2022, the Court informed the States
parties to the Genocide Convention that, taking into account the number of
Declarations of intervention filed in the case, it considered that the interest
of the sound administration of justice and procedural efficiency would be
advanced if any State that intended to avail itself of the right of intervention
conferred on it by Article 63 of the Statute of the Court would file its
Declaration not later than 15 December 2022.
21. Declarations of intervention under Article 63, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court were filed by the Republic of Bulgaria (hereinafter
“Bulgaria”) on 18 November 2022, the Republic of Malta (hereinafter
“Malta”) on 24 November 2022, the Kingdom of Norway (hereinafter
“Norway”) on 24 November 2022, the Kingdom of Belgium (hereinafter
“Belgium”) on 6 December 2022, Canada and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands (hereinafter “the Netherlands”), jointly, on 7 December 2022, the
Slovak Republic (hereinafter “Slovakia”) on 7 December 2022, the Repub360
allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
blique de Slovénie (ci-après la « Slovénie ») le 7 décembre 2022, la République
de Chypre (ci-après « Chypre ») le 13 décembre 2022, et la Principauté
du Liechtenstein (ci-après le « Liechtenstein ») le 15 décembre 2022.
En application du paragraphe 1 de l’article 83 du Règlement de la Cour,
le greffier a immédiatement transmis une copie certifiée conforme de
chacune des déclarations d’intervention à l’Ukraine et à la Fédération de
Russie, qui ont été informées que la Cour avait fixé au 30 janvier 2023 la date
d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt d’observations écrites sur ces déclarations.
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de ce même article, le greffier a
également transmis copie des déclarations au Secrétaire général de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies ainsi qu’aux États admis à ester devant
la Cour.
L’Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie ont présenté des observations écrites
dans le délai ainsi fixé. Le greffier a immédiatement transmis à chacune des
Parties copie des observations de l’autre et copie des observations des deux
Parties à la Bulgarie, à Malte, à la Norvège, à la Belgique, au Canada, aux
Pays-Bas, à la Slovaquie, à la Slovénie, à Chypre et au Liechtenstein.
22. Par lettres en date du 31 janvier 2023, le greffier a informé les Parties
et les États déclarants que, la Fédération de Russie ayant fait objection à la
recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention, la Cour devait, conformément
au paragraphe 2 de l’article 84 de son Règlement, entendre les Parties ainsi
que les États désireux d’intervenir sur la recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention,
et avait décidé à cet égard de procéder par voie écrite. Le greffier
a en outre indiqué que la Cour avait fixé au 13 février 2023 la date d’expiration
du délai dans lequel les États désireux d’intervenir pourraient fournir
leurs observations écrites sur la recevabilité de leurs déclarations et au
13 mars 2023 celle du délai dans lequel l’Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie
pourraient communiquer leurs observations écrites sur la recevabilité
desdites déclarations.
Les États désireux d’intervenir ont présenté des observations écrites dans
le délai ainsi fixé et le greffier en a immédiatement transmis copie aux
Parties.
23. Par lettre en date du 27 février 2023, la Fédération de Russie a prié la
Cour de reporter au 24 avril 2023 la date d’expiration du délai, initialement
fixée au 13 mars 2023, dans lequel les Parties devaient soumettre leurs
observations écrites sur la recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention.
Par lettre en date du 3 mars 2023, l’Ukraine s’est opposée à ce report. Par
lettres en date du 7 mars 2023, les Parties et les États désireux d’intervenir
ont été informés que la Cour avait prorogé au 24 mars 2023 la date d’expiration
du délai dans lequel les Parties pourraient déposer leurs observations
écrites sur la recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention. L’Ukraine et
la Fédération de Russie ont présenté des observations écrites dans le délai
ainsi prorogé par la Cour. Dans ses observations écrites, la Fédération de
Russie a prié la Cour de tenir des audiences sur la recevabilité des déclarations
d’intervention. Le 27 mars 2023, le greffier a transmis à chacune des
Parties copie des observations de l’autre et copie des observations des deux
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 360
lic of Slovenia (hereinafter “Slovenia”) on 7 December 2022, the Republic
of Cyprus (hereinafter “Cyprus”) on 13 December 2022 and the Principality
of Liechtenstein (hereinafter “Liechtenstein”) on 15 December 2022.
In accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the
Registrar immediately transmitted certified copies of each Declaration of
intervention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which were informed
that the Court had fixed 30 January 2023 as the time-limit for the submission
of written observations on these Declarations. In accordance with paragraph
2 of the same Article, the Registrar also transmitted copies of the
Declarations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to
States entitled to appear before the Court.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations within the
time-limit thus fixed. The Registrar immediately transmitted to each Party a
copy of the other Party’s observations and copies of the observations of both
Parties to Bulgaria, Malta, Norway, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Liechtenstein.
22. By letters dated 31 January 2023, the Registrar informed the Parties
and the declarant States that, in light of the fact that the Russian Federation
had filed objections to the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention,
the Court was required, pursuant to Article 84, paragraph 2, of its Rules, to
hear the Parties and the States seeking to intervene on the admissibility of
the Declarations of intervention, and had decided to do so by means of a
written procedure. The Registrar further stated that the Court had fixed
13 February 2023 as the time-limit within which the States seeking to intervene
could furnish their written observations on the admissibility of their
Declarations and 13 March 2023 as the time-limit within which Ukraine and
the Russian Federation could furnish their written observations thereon.
The States seeking to intervene filed written observations within the timelimit
thus fixed, and the Registrar immediately transmitted copies thereof to
the Parties.
23. By a letter dated 27 February 2023, the Russian Federation requested
that the Court extend from 13 March 2023 to 24 April 2023 the time-limit for
the submission by the Parties of their written observations on the admissibility
of the Declarations of intervention. By a letter dated 3 March 2023,
Ukraine objected to such an extension. By letters dated 7 March 2023, the
Parties and the States seeking to intervene were informed that the Court had
extended the time-limit for the submission by the Parties of their written
observations on the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention to
24 March 2023. Ukraine and the Russian Federation filed written observations
within the time-limit thus extended by the Court. In its written
observations, the Russian Federation requested that the Court hold oral
proceedings on the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention.
On 27 March 2023, the Registrar transmitted to each Party a copy of the
other Party’s observations, and copies of the observations of both Parties to
361 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
Parties aux États désireux d’intervenir. Il a également rappelé aux Parties
et aux États désireux d’intervenir que la Cour avait déjà décidé de les
entendre sur la question de la recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention
au moyen d’une procédure écrite, décision qui leur avait été dûment communiquée
par lettres en date du 31 janvier 2023, et que la Cour ne pouvait donc
accéder à la demande de la Fédération de Russie tendant à ce qu’elle tienne
des audiences sur cette question.
*
24. Mme Donoghue, présidente de la Cour, a estimé qu’il n’était pas opportun
pour elle, en tant que ressortissante de l’un des États désireux d’intervenir,
d’exercer la présidence dans la procédure relative à la recevabilité des
déclarations d’intervention déposées en vertu de l’article 63 du Statut.
Le paragraphe 1 de l’article 13 du Règlement de la Cour dispose que, lorsque
le président est empêché d’exercer la présidence, celle-ci est assurée par le
vice-président ou, à défaut, par le juge doyen. Selon le paragraphe 1 de
l’article 32 du Règlement de la Cour, M. Gevorgian, vice-président, n’était
pas en mesure, en tant que ressortissant de l’une des Parties à l’affaire, d’en
présider quelque phase que ce soit. Chacun d’entre eux étant ressortissant
d’un État désireux d’intervenir, MM. Tomka et Abraham, juges doyens, se
sont abstenus d’exercer la présidence aux fins de la procédure relative à la
recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention. Suivant l’ordre de préséance,
c’est donc à M. le juge Bennouna qu’il est revenu de l’assurer dans cette
procédure.
* * *
I. Introduction
25. L’article 63 du Statut de la Cour est ainsi libellé :
« 1. Lorsqu’il s’agit de l’interprétation d’une convention à laquelle
ont participé d’autres États que les parties en litige, le Greffier les avertit
sans délai.
2. Chacun d’eux a le droit d’intervenir au procès et, s’il exerce cette
faculté, l’interprétation contenue dans la sentence est également obligatoire
à son égard. »
26. La Cour rappelle que l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 du Statut,
qui est une procédure incidente, concerne l’exercice d’un droit par un État
partie à une convention dont l’interprétation est en cause devant la Cour
(Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), déclaration
d’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février 2013, C.I.J.
Recueil 2013, p. 5, par. 7 ; Haya de la Torre (Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1951, p. 76 ; Vapeur Wimbledon, arrêts, 1923, C.P.J.I. série A no 1,
p. 12).
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 361
the States seeking to intervene. He also recalled to the Parties and States
seeking to intervene that the Court had already decided that it would hear
them on the question of the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention
by means of a written procedure, a decision duly communicated to them by
letters dated 31 January 2023, and that the Court could therefore not accede
to the request of the Russian Federation to hold oral proceedings on that
question.
*
24. President Donoghue, a national of one of the States seeking to intervene,
considered it appropriate not to exercise the functions of the presidency
in the proceedings relating to the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention
submitted under Article 63 of the Statute. Article 13, paragraph 1, of
the Rules of Court states that, in the event of the inability of the President to
carry out the duties of the presidency, these shall be exercised by the Vice-
President, or failing that, by the senior judge. Pursuant to Article 32,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, Vice-President Gevorgian was not in a
position, as a national of one of the Parties to the case, to preside in respect
of any phase of the case. Judges Tomka and Abraham, senior judges, declined
to assume the functions of the presidency for the purposes of the proceedings
relating to the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention on the
ground that each of them is a national of a State seeking to intervene. It therefore
fell to Judge Bennouna, next in seniority, to assume the functions of the
presidency in these proceedings.
* * *
I. Introduction
25. Article 63 of the Statute of the Court provides that:
“1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which States other
than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar
shall notify all such States forthwith.
2. Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings;
but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will
be equally binding upon it.”
26. The Court recalls that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute,
which is an incidental proceeding, involves the exercise of a right by a State
party to a convention the construction of which is in question before the
Court (Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of
Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports
2013, p. 5, para. 7; Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 76; S.S. “Wimbledon”, Judgments, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 1, p. 12).
362 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
27. L’objet de l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 du Statut est limité à
l’interprétation de la convention en cause. Dans ce contexte, la Cour n’a pas
à rechercher si l’État qui désire intervenir possède « un intérêt d’ordre juridique
» qui est « pour lui en cause » dans la procédure principale, comme elle
est tenue de le faire quand elle est saisie d’une requête à fin d’intervention au
titre de l’article 62 du Statut. L’intérêt juridique que possède l’État déclarant
dans l’interprétation de la convention est présumé en raison de sa qualité de
partie à celle-ci.
28. Lorsqu’une déclaration d’intervention est déposée, la Cour doit s’assurer
qu’elle entre dans les prévisions de l’article 63 du Statut et qu’elle
satisfait aux exigences prévues par l’article 82 du Règlement (Chasse à la
baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), déclaration d’intervention
de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013,
p. 5-6, par. 8 ; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-Unis d’Amérique), déclaration d’intervention,
ordonnance du 4 octobre 1984, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 216 ; Haya de la Torre
(Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 76-77).
29. Dans la présente affaire, les déclarations d’intervention portent sur
l’interprétation de dispositions de la convention sur le génocide relatives à la
compétence de la Cour et, dans certains cas, de dispositions qui concernent
le fond de l’affaire.
30. Les États désireux d’intervenir, ainsi que l’Ukraine, soutiennent que
les déclarations d’intervention sont recevables, dans la mesure où elles satisfont
pleinement aux exigences énoncées à l’article 63 du Statut et à l’article 82
du Règlement de la Cour.
31. La Fédération de Russie, pour sa part, considère que les déclarations
sont irrecevables. Elle soulève un certain nombre d’objections qui sont dirigées
contre l’ensemble des déclarations, ou contre certaines d’entre elles
seulement, à savoir la déclaration conjointe du Canada et des Pays-Bas et
celle des États-Unis.
32. Bien que les déclarations d’intervention aient été présentées séparément,
la Cour, conformément au principe de bonne administration de la
justice, statuera sur leur recevabilité par une même ordonnance.
II. Conformité des déclarations d’intervention
aux exigences énoncées à l’article 82 du Règlement de la Cour
33. La Cour examinera d’abord le point de savoir si les déclarations d’intervention
sont conformes aux exigences énoncées à l’article 82 de son
Règlement.
34. La Cour rappelle que, selon le paragraphe 1 de l’article 82 du
Règlement, un État qui désire se prévaloir du droit d’intervention que lui
confère l’article 63 du Statut dépose à cet effet une déclaration, signée
comme il est indiqué au paragraphe 3 de l’article 38 du Règlement, par
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 362
27. The object of the intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is limited
to the construction of the convention concerned. In this context, the Court is
not required to ascertain whether the State seeking to intervene has “an
interest of a legal nature” which “may be affected by the decision [of the
Court]” in the main proceedings, as it is obliged to do when it is seised of an
application for permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute. The
legal interest of the declarant State in the construction of the convention is
presumed by virtue of its status as a party thereto.
28. When a declaration of intervention is filed, the Court must ensure that
it falls within the provisions of Article 63 of the Statute and that it meets the
requirements set forth in Article 82 of the Rules (Whaling in the Antarctic
(Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of
6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 5-6, para. 8; Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Declaration of Intervention, Order of 4 October
1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 216; Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 76-77).
29. In the present case, the Declarations of intervention concern the
construction of provisions of the Genocide Convention relating to the jurisdiction
of the Court and, in some instances, of provisions relating to the
merits of the case.
30. The States seeking to intervene and Ukraine submit that the
Declarations of intervention are admissible, given that they meet all the
requirements set out in Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules
of Court.
31. The Russian Federation, for its part, considers that the Declarations
are inadmissible. It raises a number of objections that are addressed to all the
Declarations, and others that are addressed to only some of them, namely
the Joint Declaration of Canada and the Netherlands and the Declaration of
the United States.
32. Although the Declarations of intervention were presented separately,
the Court, in accordance with the principle of the good administration of
justice, will decide on their admissibility in a single Order.
II. Conformity of the Declarations of Intervention
with the Requirements Set Out in Article 82 of the Rules of Court
33. The Court will first examine whether the Declarations of intervention
comply with the requirements set out in Article 82 of its Rules.
34. The Court recalls that, under Article 82, paragraph 1, of the Rules,
a State that desires to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred upon it
by Article 63 of the Statute shall file a declaration to that effect, signed in the
manner provided for in Article 38, paragraph 3, of the Rules, by the agent of
363 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
l’agent de cet État ou le représentant diplomatique de celui-ci dans le pays où
la Cour a son siège, ou par une autre personne dûment autorisée. Le paragraphe
1 de l’article 82 du Règlement dispose en outre qu’une déclaration
d’intervention est déposée le plus tôt possible avant la date fixée pour l’ouverture
de la procédure orale. La Cour constate que toutes les déclarations
d’intervention respectent les exigences susmentionnées.
35. Aux termes du paragraphe 2 de l’article 82 du Règlement, la déclaration
d’intervention déposée au titre de l’article 63 du Statut doit contenir :
« a) des renseignements spécifiant sur quelle base l’État déclarant se
considère comme partie à la convention ;
b) l’indication des dispositions de la convention dont il estime que l’interprétation
est en cause ;
c) un exposé de l’interprétation qu’il donne de ces dispositions ;
d) un bordereau des documents à l’appui, qui sont annexés. »
36. Pour ce qui est de l’exigence énoncée à l’alinéa a) du paragraphe 2 de
l’article 82 du Règlement, la Cour constate que toutes les déclarations d’intervention
présentées en l’espèce précisent la date à laquelle l’État déclarant
a déposé son instrument de ratification, d’adhésion ou de succession à la
convention sur le génocide, établissant ainsi la base sur laquelle l’État déclarant
se considère comme partie à la convention sur le génocide.
37. S’agissant des dispositions qu’il convient d’indiquer selon l’alinéa b)
du paragraphe 2 de l’article 82 du Règlement, la Cour relève que toutes les
déclarations d’intervention déposées se réfèrent à l’article IX de la convention
sur le génocide comme étant une disposition dont l’interprétation est en
cause en l’espèce. La Cour relève que, dans leurs déclarations, l’Allemagne,
l’Autriche, la Bulgarie, la Croatie, l’Espagne, la Grèce, Malte, la République
tchèque, la Slovaquie et la Slovénie limitent leurs interventions à l’interprétation
de l’article IX. Quant aux autres déclarations, elles se réfèrent,
en plus de l’article IX, à d’autres articles de la convention dont les États estiment
que l’interprétation est en cause en l’espèce, notamment aux articles
premier, II, III, IV et VIII. La Cour conclut que toutes ces déclarations, qui
concernent au moins une disposition de la convention sur le génocide, satisfont
à l’exigence visée à l’alinéa b) du paragraphe 2 de l’article 82 du
Règlement.
38. Pour ce qui est de l’exigence énoncée à l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 2 de
l’article 82 du Règlement, selon laquelle une déclaration d’intervention doit
contenir un exposé de l’interprétation que l’État déclarant donne des dispositions
en cause, la Cour constate que toutes les déclarations d’intervention
déposées en l’espèce contiennent l’exposé en question, relatif aux dispositions
indiquées.
39. Enfin, la Cour en vient à l’exigence formulée à l’alinéa d) du paragraphe
2 de l’article 82 du Règlement, selon laquelle une déclaration
d’intervention contient un bordereau des documents à l’appui, lesquels y sont
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 363
the State or by its diplomatic representative in the country where the Court
has its seat, or by some other duly authorized person. In addition, Article 82,
paragraph 1, of the Rules provides that a declaration of intervention shall be
filed as soon as possible, and not later than the date fixed for the opening of
the oral proceedings. The Court notes that all the Declarations of intervention
comply with the above-mentioned requirements.
35. Under Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Rules, a declaration of intervention
filed under Article 63 of the Statute shall contain:
“(a) particulars of the basis on which the declarant State considers itself
a party to the convention;
(b) identification of the particular provisions of the convention the construction
of which it considers to be in question;
(c) a statement of the construction of those provisions for which it
contends;
(d) a list of the documents in support, which documents shall be
attached.”
36. Turning to the requirement set out in Article 82, paragraph 2 (a), of the
Rules, the Court observes that all the Declarations of intervention submitted
in the case specify when the declarant State deposited its instrument of ratification
of, or accession or succession to the Genocide Convention, and thus
establish the basis on which the declarant State considers itself party to the
Genocide Convention.
37. With respect to the particular provisions to be identified under
Article 82, paragraph 2 (b), of the Rules, the Court notes that all the
Declarations of intervention filed refer to Article IX of the Genocide
Convention as a provision the construction of which is in question in the
case. The Court notes that, in their Declarations, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain
limit their interventions to the construction of Article IX. The other
Declarations refer, in addition to Article IX, to other articles of the
Convention the construction of which the States consider to be in question in
the case, in particular Articles I, II, III, IV and VIII. The Court concludes
that all these Declarations, which concern at least one provision of the
Genocide Convention, meet the requirement of Article 82, paragraph 2 (b),
of the Rules.
38. Concerning the requirement set out in Article 82, paragraph 2 (c), of
the Rules, namely that a declaration of intervention should contain a statement
of the construction of the provisions in question for which the declarant
State contends, the Court observes that all the Declarations of intervention
filed in the case contain such a statement on the provisions identified.
39. Finally, the Court turns to the requirement contained in Article 82,
paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules, namely that a declaration of intervention shall
contain a list of documents in support, which documents shall be attached to
364 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
annexés. La Cour relève que la déclaration déposée par l’Autriche ne contient
pas de « bordereau des documents à l’appui », mais que de tels documents,
clairement présentés comme étant fournis à l’appui de la déclaration, sont
néanmoins annexés à celle-ci. Elle estime donc que l’Autriche a respecté
l’exigence énoncée à l’alinéa d) du paragraphe 2 de l’article 82 du Règlement.
Quant à la déclaration d’intervention déposée par la Lituanie, la Cour note
que cette dernière mentionne l’alinéa d) du paragraphe 2 de l’article 82 du
Règlement et indique qu’« à ce stade sa déclaration d’intervention s’appuie
uniquement sur des documents facilement accessibles » et qu’« elle n’a pas de
document particulier à soumettre à l’appui de sa déclaration ». Dans ces
conditions, la Cour estime que, en se référant à des documents facilement
accessibles, la Lituanie a respecté l’exigence énoncée à l’alinéa d) du paragraphe
2 de l’article 82 du Règlement. La Cour constate que toutes les autres
déclarations déposées en l’espèce contiennent un bordereau des documents à
l’appui, lesquels y sont annexés. La Cour conclut en conséquence que toutes
les déclarations d’intervention déposées en l’espèce sont conformes à l’exigence
énoncée à la disposition susvisée.
40. À la lumière de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut que les déclarations
d’intervention déposées en l’espèce satisfont à l’ensemble des exigences
de l’article 82 de son Règlement. Elle examinera, dans la section qui suit,
les objections soulevées par la Fédération de Russie relatives à la recevabilité
de l’ensemble des déclarations d’intervention présentées au titre de
l’article 63 du Statut (section III), avant de se pencher sur les objections
visant spécifiquement la déclaration conjointe du Canada et des Pays-Bas
(section IV) et la déclaration des États-Unis (section V).
III. Objections de la Fédération de Russie concernant l’ensemble
des déclarations d’intervention
41. La Cour examinera à présent les objections soulevées par la Fédération
de Russie concernant l’ensemble des déclarations d’intervention.
A. Objection fondée sur l’intention qui sous-tendrait
les déclarations d’intervention
42. La Fédération de Russie soutient que les déclarations d’intervention
ne sont pas « véritables » car les interventions n’ont pas pour objet réel d’interpréter
la convention sur le génocide, mais de permettre aux États déclarants
d’épouser la cause de l’Ukraine et de devenir ainsi des codemandeurs de
facto. Rappelant les décisions rendues par la Cour dans l’affaire relative à la
Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon) (déclaration
d’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février 2013, C.I.J.
Recueil 2013, p. 3) et l’affaire Haya de la Torre (Colombie c. Pérou) (arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 71), la Fédération de Russie fait valoir que, conforméallegations
of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 364
the declaration. The Court observes that, while the Declaration filed by
Austria does not contain a “list of documents in support”, such documents,
which are clearly identified as being in support of the Declaration, are
however annexed thereto. The Court thus considers that Austria has complied
with the requirement under Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules.
With respect to the Declaration of intervention filed by Lithuania, the Court
notes that this declarant State refers to Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the
Rules and states that “at this stage, its Declaration of Intervention only relies
on readily available documents and that it has no specific document to submit
in support of its Declaration”. In these circumstances, the Court considers
that, by making reference to readily available documents, Lithuania has
complied with the requirement of Article 82, paragraph 2 (d), of the Rules.
The Court notes that all other Declarations filed in the case contain a list of
documents in support, and that those documents are attached to each of the
Declarations. The Court thus concludes that all the Declarations of
intervention filed in the case meet the requirement set out in Article 82, paragraph
2 (d), of the Rules.
40. In light of the above, the Court concludes that the Declarations of
intervention filed in the case meet all the requirements of Article 82 of its
Rules. In the next section, it will examine the objections raised by the
Russian Federation concerning the admissibility of all the Declarations of
intervention filed under Article 63 of the Statute (Section III), before
addressing the objections that relate exclusively to the Joint Declaration of
Canada and the Netherlands (Section IV) and the Declaration of the
United States (Section V).
III. Objections of the Russian Federation with respect to all
the Declarations of Intervention
41. The Court will now examine the objections raised by the Russian
Federation with respect to all the Declarations of intervention.
A. Objection Based on the Alleged Intention behind
the Declarations of Intervention
42. The Russian Federation argues that the Declarations of intervention
are not “genuine” since the real object of the interventions is not the construction
of the Genocide Convention but the pursuit by the declarant States of a
joint case with Ukraine, such that they become de facto co-applicants.
Recalling the decisions of the Court in the case concerning Whaling in the
Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) (Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand,
Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 3) and the case concerning
Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 71),
the Russian Federation contends that a declaration of intervention under
365 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
ment à l’article 63 du Statut, il doit s’agir d’une « véritable » déclaration d’intervention.
À cet égard, elle affirme que la Cour doit examiner le texte de la
déclaration et le contexte dans lequel celle-ci a été déposée afin de s’assurer
que l’intention réelle qui sous-tend l’intervention est de présenter des observations
sur l’interprétation de la convention en cause. Selon la Fédération de
Russie, il ressort des circonstances de l’espèce que l’intention réelle des États
déclarants n’est pas d’exprimer leurs propres vues sur l’interprétation des
dispositions pertinentes de la convention sur le génocide, mais de prendre
parti pour l’Ukraine et de la défendre dans la présente procédure.
43. L’Ukraine et les États déclarants soutiennent que les déclarations
d’intervention portent sur l’interprétation de dispositions pertinentes de
la convention sur le génocide et que les intentions des États déclarants
sont dépourvues de pertinence aux fins de la recevabilité desdites déclarations.
* *
44. La Cour rappelle que l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 du Statut
permet à un État tiers au procès, qui est partie à une convention dont l’interprétation
est en cause dans celui-ci, de présenter à la Cour ses observations
sur l’interprétation de ladite convention. Lorsqu’elle se prononce sur la recevabilité
d’une déclaration d’intervention, la Cour doit seulement rechercher
si la déclaration considérée a trait à l’interprétation d’une convention en
cause dans l’instance en cours (Haya de la Torre (Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 77 ; Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie
c. Japon), déclaration d’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance
du 6 février 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 5-6, par. 8). Ainsi, dans l’affaire
Haya de la Torre (Colombie c. Pérou), la Cour a seulement recherché si la
déclaration d’intervention de Cuba avait trait à l’interprétation d’une convention
en cause dans cette instance. Elle en a conclu que, pour l’essentiel, cette
déclaration portait sur des questions déjà tranchées avec force de chose jugée
dans une procédure antérieure, et pour cette raison qu’elle ne remplissait pas
les conditions d’une véritable intervention (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 77).
La Cour estime que la question de savoir quelles sont les motivations d’un
État pour déposer une déclaration d’intervention est dépourvue de pertinence
aux fins de la recevabilité de celle-ci.
45. En outre, s’il est vrai que bon nombre d’États déclarants expriment des
vues similaires quant à l’interprétation des dispositions de la convention sur
le génocide, proches de celles de l’Ukraine, il n’y a pas lieu d’en conclure
que les déclarations sont, de ce fait, irrecevables, étant donné que le Règlement
de la Cour permet à chaque État d’indiquer les dispositions de la convention
dont il estime que l’interprétation est en cause et d’exposer sa position à
ce sujet.
46. La Cour conclut en conséquence que l’objection à la recevabilité
fondée sur l’intention qui sous-tendrait les déclarations d’intervention ne
peut être retenue.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 365
Article 63 of the Statute must be “genuine”. In this regard, the Russian
Federation asserts that the Court must consider the text of the declaration
and the context within which it was filed in order to ascertain whether the
real intention behind the intervention is the submission of observations on
the construction of the convention in question. According to the Russian
Federation, the circumstances in the present case show that the real intention
of the declarant States is not to express their own views regarding the
construction of the relevant provisions of the Genocide Convention but
rather to side with and advocate for Ukraine in these proceedings.
43. Ukraine and the declarant States maintain that the Declarations of
intervention concern the construction of relevant provisions of the Genocide
Convention and that the intentions of the declarant States are irrelevant to
the admissibility of the Declarations.
* *
44. The Court recalls that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute
allows a third State not party to the proceedings, but which is party to a
convention the construction of which is in question in those proceedings, to
present to the Court its observations on the construction of that convention.
In determining the admissibility of a declaration of intervention, the Court’s
task is limited to ascertaining whether that declaration relates to the interpretation
of a convention in question in the proceedings (Haya de la Torre
(Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 77; Whaling in the
Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand,
Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 5-6, para. 8). Thus, in the
Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) case, the Court ascertained only
whether the Declaration of intervention of Cuba related to the interpretation
of a convention in question in those proceedings. It concluded that, for the
most part, the Declaration concerned questions that had already been decided
with the authority of res judicata in earlier proceedings, and for that reason
did not satisfy the conditions of a genuine intervention (Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 77). The Court considers that the question of a State’s motivation
when filing a declaration of intervention is not relevant for the
purposes of the admissibility of that declaration.
45. Moreover, while many of the declarant States express similar views on
the construction of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, which are
close to the views of Ukraine, this does not constitute a reason to find that
the Declarations are inadmissible, since, under the Rules of Court, each
State may identify the provisions of the convention the construction of which
it considers to be in question and set out its position thereon.
46. The Court therefore concludes that the objection to admissibility based
on the alleged intention behind the Declarations of intervention cannot be
upheld.
366 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
B. Objection fondée sur une atteinte alléguée à l’égalité
des Parties et à la bonne administration de la justice
47. La Fédération de Russie soutient que le fait de permettre aux États
déclarants d’intervenir compromettrait l’égalité des Parties et la bonne administration
de la justice. Elle allègue que les États désireux d’intervenir se
rangent aux côtés de l’Ukraine, dont ils épousent la cause, et que, si leurs
déclarations d’intervention sont jugées recevables, elle se verra contrainte de
répondre non seulement aux arguments avancés par l’Ukraine, mais encore
à ceux des 33 États déclarants agissant comme codemandeurs de facto. Selon
la Fédération de Russie, l’Ukraine et les États déclarants doivent être considérés
comme des « parties faisant cause commune » au sens du paragraphe 5
de l’article 31 du Statut. La Fédération de Russie se dit en outre inquiète de
ce que sept des seize juges siégeant en l’affaire (dont la présidente de la Cour)
sont ressortissants d’États « qui ont annoncé leur intention d’intervenir pour
soutenir l’Ukraine dans la présente instance ».
48. Selon l’Ukraine et les États déclarants, la recevabilité des déclarations
d’intervention ne porterait pas atteinte à l’égalité des Parties ou à la bonne
administration de la justice, puisqu’il s’agit seulement, pour l’État intervenant,
de présenter des observations au sujet de l’interprétation de la
convention concernée, sans être partie à l’instance. Ils considèrent, de même,
que le fait que certains juges siégeant en l’affaire aient la nationalité d’un État
désireux d’intervenir ne compromet pas l’égalité des Parties.
* *
49. La Cour rappelle que l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 du Statut a
une portée limitée, en ce sens que l’État intervenant peut seulement présenter
des observations au sujet de l’interprétation de la convention concernée et
qu’il n’acquiert pas la qualité de partie à l’instance. C’est pourquoi la Cour,
dans l’ordonnance qu’elle a rendue en l’affaire relative à la Chasse à la
baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), a conclu qu’une telle intervention
ne compromettait pas l’égalité entre les parties au différend
(déclaration d’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ordonnance du 6 février
2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 9, par. 18).
50. La Cour ne saurait limiter le nombre d’États intervenants en l’espèce,
puisque cela porterait atteinte au droit d’intervenir que l’article 63 du Statut
confère aux États.
51. La Cour observe que le fait que certains juges siégeant en l’affaire
aient la nationalité d’un État désireux d’intervenir ne peut pas compromettre
l’égalité des Parties, puisque les États intervenants n’acquièrent pas la qualité
de parties à l’instance. En tout état de cause, les juges sont tous tenus par leur
devoir d’impartialité.
52. Enfin, la Cour a pris note des préoccupations de la Fédération de
Russie. Il incombe à la Cour d’organiser la procédure de manière à garantir
l’égalité des parties et la bonne administration de la justice. Au cas où des
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 366
B. Objection Based on an Alleged Infringement of the Equality
of the Parties and the Good Administration of Justice
47. The Russian Federation submits that allowing the declarant States to
intervene would affect the equality of the Parties and the good administration
of justice. It alleges that the States seeking to intervene align themselves
with and represent the same interest as Ukraine, and that, if the Declarations
of intervention are found admissible, the Russian Federation will be forced
to respond not only to the arguments advanced by Ukraine but also to those
of the 33 declarant States acting as de facto co-applicants. The Russian
Federation maintains that Ukraine and the declarant States should be considered
as “parties in the same interest” within the meaning of Article 31,
paragraph 5, of the Statute. The Russian Federation also states that it is
concerned that seven of the sixteen judges on the Bench in this case (including
the President of the Court) are nationals of States “that have announced
their intention to intervene to support Ukraine in these proceedings”.
48. Ukraine and the declarant States contend that the admissibility of the
Declarations of intervention would not affect the equality of the Parties or
the good administration of justice, since the intervening State only submits
observations on the construction of the convention in question and does not
become a party to the proceedings. Similarly, they consider that the fact that
some judges on the Bench are nationals of States seeking to intervene does
not affect the equality of the Parties.
* *
49. The Court recalls that intervention under Article 63 of the Statute has
a limited scope, since the intervening State can only submit observations on
the construction of the convention in question and does not become a party
to the proceedings. The Court thus concluded in its Order in the case
concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) that such an intervention
did not affect the equality of the parties to the dispute (Declaration
of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports
2013, p. 9, para. 18).
50. The Court cannot limit the number of intervening States in the present
case, since this would encroach on the right of States to intervene under
Article 63 of the Statute.
51. The Court observes that the fact that some judges on the Bench are
nationals of States seeking to intervene cannot affect the equality of the
Parties because intervening States do not become parties to the proceedings.
In any event, all judges are bound by their duty of impartiality.
52. Finally, the Court has taken note of the concerns of the Russian
Federation. It is incumbent on the Court to organize the proceedings in a
manner which ensures the equality of the parties and the good administra367
allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
déclarations d’intervention seraient jugées recevables à ce stade, la Cour
veillera à ce que chaque Partie ait la possibilité et le temps nécessaire pour
répondre, de façon équitable, aux observations des États intervenants.
53. La Cour conclut, en conséquence, que le fait d’accueillir les déclarations
d’intervention en l’espèce n’est pas susceptible de porter atteinte aux
principes de l’égalité des parties ou de la bonne administration de la justice,
et que l’objection soulevée par la Fédération de Russie à cet égard ne peut
être retenue.
C. Objection fondée sur un abus de procédure allégué
54. La Fédération de Russie soutient que les déclarations d’intervention
sont irrecevables car elles constituent un abus de procédure. Elle avance, en
particulier, que les États déclarants utilisent la procédure d’intervention
d’une manière tout à fait étrangère à sa finalité, et cela dans l’objectif de
nuire à la Fédération de Russie. Elle rappelle que plusieurs États ont déposé
une déclaration d’intervention après avoir publiquement indiqué leur intention
d’appuyer la thèse de l’Ukraine devant la Cour, parfois même « à la
demande expresse de la partie ukrainienne ». Par conséquent, la Fédération
de Russie considère que ces États ne cherchent pas à présenter à la Cour, en
toute bonne foi, leurs positions quant à la juste interprétation de la convention
sur le génocide. Les déclarations d’intervention qu’ils ont déposées
serviraient au contraire une stratégie collective consistant à soutenir la
demanderesse contre la défenderesse.
* *
55. La Cour observe que cette objection a été soulevée pour la première
fois dans les observations écrites de la Fédération de Russie sur la recevabilité
des déclarations d’intervention déposées le 24 mars 2023 (voir le
paragraphe 23 ci-dessus), auxquelles ni l’Ukraine ni les États désireux d’intervenir
n’ont eu la possibilité de répondre. Cependant, la Cour estime que
l’Ukraine et les États désireux d’intervenir n’ont subi aucun préjudice de ce
fait.
56. La Cour rappelle qu’« [u]n abus de procédure se rapporte à la procédure
engagée devant une cour ou un tribunal », et en particulier à la question
de savoir si un État a détourné la procédure à un tel point que sa demande
devrait être rejetée, de ce fait, dès la phase préliminaire (voir Immunités et
procédures pénales (Guinée équatoriale c. France), exceptions préliminaires,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2018 (I), p. 336, par. 150).
57. La Cour a observé que seules des circonstances exceptionnelles
peuvent justifier qu’elle rejette, pour abus de procédure, une demande fondée
sur une base de compétence valable (Immunités et procédures pénales
(Guinée équatoriale c. France), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 2018 (I), p. 336, par. 150 ; voir également Application de la convenallegations
of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 367
tion of justice. Should any Declarations of intervention be found admissible
at the present stage, the Court will ensure that each Party will have a fair
opportunity and the necessary time to respond to the observations of the
intervening States.
53. The Court therefore concludes that admitting the Declarations of
intervention in the present case would not infringe the principles of equality
of the parties or the good administration of justice, and that the objection
raised by the Russian Federation in this regard cannot be upheld.
C. Objection Based on an Alleged Abuse of Process
54. The Russian Federation submits that the Declarations of intervention
are inadmissible because they constitute an abuse of process. In particular, it
argues that the procedure of intervention is used by the declarant States in a
manner wholly alien to its purpose, with the aim of causing harm to the
Russian Federation. It recalls that several States filed Declarations of
intervention after publicly stating their intention to support Ukraine’s case
before the Court, in some cases even “at the express request of the Ukrainian
side”. Thus, for the Russian Federation, those States do not seek in good faith
to put before the Court their positions as to the proper construction of the
Genocide Convention. Rather, they have filed their Declarations of
intervention in pursuit of a collective strategy of supporting the Applicant
against the Respondent.
* *
55. The Court observes that this objection was raised for the first time in
the written observations of the Russian Federation on the admissibility of
the Declarations of intervention filed on 24 March 2023 (see paragraph 23
above), to which neither Ukraine nor the States seeking to intervene have
had the opportunity to respond. However, the Court considers that Ukraine
and the States seeking to intervene have not suffered any prejudice as a result
of this fact.
56. The Court recalls that “[a]n abuse of process goes to the procedure
before a court or tribunal”, in particular to the question of whether a State
has misused that procedure to such an extent that its case should therefore be
rejected at the preliminary stage (see Immunities and Criminal Proceedings
(Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2018 (I), p. 336, para. 150).
57. The Court has observed that only in exceptional circumstances should
it reject a claim based on a valid title of jurisdiction on the ground of abuse
of process (Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v.
France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 336,
para. 150; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
368 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
tion pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Gambie c.
Myanmar), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2022 (II), p. 497,
par. 49 ; Violations alléguées du traité d’amitié, de commerce et de droits
consulaires de 1955 (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 36, par. 93 ; Certains
actifs iraniens (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (I), p. 42-43, par. 113).
De même, la Cour estime qu’une déclaration d’intervention ne pourrait être
jugée irrecevable pour abus de procédure que dans des circonstances
exceptionnelles.
58. S’agissant des allégations d’abus de procédure formulées par la
Fédération de Russie sur la base de déclarations publiques dans lesquelles les
États déclarants ont affirmé agir en soutien de l’Ukraine, la Cour a déjà
conclu plus haut qu’il ne lui appartient pas, au moment d’examiner la recevabilité
d’une déclaration d’intervention fondée sur l’article 63 du Statut, de
s’interroger sur la motivation ou l’intention de l’État déclarant, mais de
rechercher si la déclaration d’intervention a trait à l’interprétation de la
convention en question (voir le paragraphe 44 ci-dessus).
59. La Cour considère qu’il n’existe pas, dans le cas d’espèce, de circonstances
exceptionnelles de nature à rendre irrecevables les déclarations
d’intervention.
60. La Cour conclut en conséquence que l’objection à la recevabilité
opposée par la Fédération de Russie pour abus de procédure ne peut être
retenue.
D. Objection fondée sur l’irrecevabilité alléguée des déclarations
d’intervention au stade des exceptions préliminaires
61. La Fédération de Russie soutient que les déclarations d’intervention ne
sont pas recevables au stade actuel de la procédure car la Cour doit d’abord
statuer sur les exceptions préliminaires d’incompétence et d’irrecevabilité
de la requête de l’Ukraine. La Fédération de Russie avance que la pratique de
la Cour va à l’encontre de la recevabilité de déclarations d’intervention avant
qu’il ait été statué sur les exceptions préliminaires. Sur ce point, elle
mentionne en particulier : l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires
au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-Unis d’Amérique), dans
laquelle la Cour a jugé la déclaration d’intervention d’El Salvador irrecevable
au stade de la procédure sur la compétence de la Cour et la recevabilité
de la requête introductive d’instance ; les affaires des Essais nucléaires
(Australie c. France et Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), dans lesquelles la Cour
a ajourné l’examen des requêtes à fin d’intervention soumises par Fidji au
titre de l’article 62 du Statut en attendant d’avoir examiné la question de sa
compétence et celle de la recevabilité des requêtes introductives d’instance ;
et l’affaire relative à la Demande d’examen de la situation au titre du paragraphe
63 de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour le 20 décembre 1974 dans l’affaire
des Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France) (Nouvelle-Zélande
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 368
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2022 (II), p. 497, para. 49; Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 36, para. 93; Certain Iranian
Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), pp. 42-43, para. 113). Similarly,
the Court is of the view that a declaration of intervention should be found
inadmissible on the ground of abuse of process only in exceptional circumstances.
58. With regard to the Russian Federation’s contentions of abuse of
process based on public statements by declarant States that they were acting
in support of Ukraine, the Court has already concluded above that, in considering
the admissibility of a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of
the Statute, its task is not to look into the motivation or intention of the
declarant State, but rather to ascertain whether the declaration of intervention
relates to the interpretation of the convention in question (see para-
graph 44 above).
59. The Court considers that in the present case there are no exceptional
circumstances that would render the Declarations of intervention inadmissible.
60. The Court therefore concludes that the Russian Federation’s objection
to admissibility based on an abuse of process cannot be upheld.
D. Objection Based on the Alleged Inadmissibility of the Declarations
of Intervention at the Preliminary Objections Stage
61. The Russian Federation submits that the Declarations of intervention
are not admissible at the current stage of the proceedings because the Court
must first rule on the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction and the admissibility
of the Application of Ukraine. The Russian Federation argues that
the practice of the Court militates against admitting declarations of intervention
prior to the decision on the preliminary objections. In this connection,
it refers in particular to: the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
where the Court found the Declaration of intervention of El Salvador inadmissible
at the stage of the proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of the
Court and the admissibility of the application instituting the proceedings;
the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France),
where the Court deferred consideration of Fiji’s applications for intervention
under Article 62 of the Statute until it had considered the questions of its
jurisdiction and of the admissibility of the applications instituting the
proceedings; and the case concerning the Request for an Examination of the
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of
20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case
369 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
c. France), dans laquelle la Cour n’a pas traité les déclarations d’intervention
avant de s’être prononcée sur la recevabilité de la demande initiale d’examen
de la situation présentée par la Nouvelle-Zélande. La Fédération de Russie
fait encore valoir que, faute pour la Cour de s’être prononcée sur l’existence
d’un différend en l’espèce, l’objet de celui-ci et les dispositions de la convention
susceptibles d’être en cause, les États déclarants ne peuvent pas
démontrer que leur intervention porterait sur l’interprétation de dispositions
contestées.
62. L’Ukraine et les États déclarants soutiennent que les déclarations d’intervention
sont recevables au stade des exceptions préliminaires et que la
Cour n’a pas à établir au préalable l’existence et l’objet du différend qui
oppose les Parties. Ils soulignent que le Statut et le Règlement de la Cour ne
restreignent pas l’intervention à certaines phases de la procédure, et qu’il ne
ressort pas de la pratique de la Cour qu’il convient de se prononcer tout
d’abord sur les exceptions préliminaires avant de décider de la recevabilité
des déclarations d’intervention.
* *
63. La Cour fait observer que l’article 63 du Statut et l’article 82 du
Règlement ne limitent pas le droit d’intervention à une phase particulière de
la procédure, ni à un certain type de disposition d’une convention. Ainsi,
l’article 63 du Statut dispose que le droit d’intervenir existe « [l]orsqu’il s’agit
de l’interprétation d’une convention à laquelle ont participé d’autres États
que les parties en litige ». Il en résulte qu’un État peut intervenir au stade des
exceptions préliminaires relativement à des dispositions ayant une incidence
sur la question de la compétence de la Cour.
64. Selon la Cour, il ne résulte pas des décisions citées par la Fédération
de Russie que les déclarations d’intervention sont, par principe, irrecevables
dans la phase des exceptions préliminaires.
65. Dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua
et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-Unis d’Amérique), El Salvador, dans
sa déclaration d’intervention, n’a indiqué aucune disposition d’une convention,
quelle qu’elle soit, dont l’interprétation aurait été, selon lui, en cause au
stade de la procédure sur la compétence de la Cour et la recevabilité de la
requête introductive d’instance (voir la déclaration d’intervention de la
République d’El Salvador, déposée le 15 août 1984). En outre, cette déclaration
se référait à des conventions qui ne pouvaient concerner que le fond de
l’affaire. C’est dans ces conditions que la Cour a décidé que la déclaration
d’intervention d’El Salvador était irrecevable au stade de la procédure
sur la compétence de la Cour et la recevabilité de la requête introductive
d’instance (déclaration d’intervention, ordonnance du 4 octobre 1984,
C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 216).
66. Dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France et
Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), les requêtes à fin d’intervention déposées par
Fidji au titre de l’article 62 du Statut concernaient exclusivement le fond des
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 369
(New Zealand v. France), where the Court did not consider the Declarations
of intervention before it had ruled on the admissibility of New Zealand’s
original request for an examination of the situation. The Russian Federation
further submits that, since the Court has not yet ruled on the existence of a
dispute in the present case, its subject-matter and the provisions of the
Convention that may be in question, the declarant States cannot show that
their intervention is directed at the construction of provisions in dispute.
62. Ukraine and the declarant States argue that the Declarations of
intervention are admissible at the preliminary objections stage and that the
Court need not first establish the existence and subject-matter of the dispute
between the Parties. They contend that the Statute and Rules of Court do not
restrict intervention to certain phases of the proceedings and that it does not
follow from the practice of the Court that the Court must first rule on the
preliminary objections before determining the admissibility of the Declarations
of intervention.
* *
63. The Court observes that Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the
Rules do not restrict the right of intervention to a particular phase of the
proceedings, or to a certain type of provision in a convention. Notably,
Article 63 of the Statute provides that the right to intervene exists “[w]henever
the construction of a convention to which States other than those
concerned in the case are parties is in question”. This means that a State can
intervene at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings in respect of
provisions that have a bearing on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court.
64. In the view of the Court, the decisions cited by the Russian Federation
do not show that declarations of intervention are as a matter of principle
inadmissible during the preliminary objections phase.
65. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), El Salvador, in
its Declaration of intervention, failed to identify the provisions of any
convention the interpretation of which, in its view, would be in question at
the stage of the proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of the Court and the
admissibility of the application instituting the proceedings (see the
Declaration of intervention the Republic of El Salvador filed on 15 August
1984). Moreover, this declaration referred to conventions that could only
concern the merits of the case. It is in those circumstances that the Court
decided that the Declaration
of intervention of El Salvador was inadmissible
at the stage of the proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of the Court and
the admissibility of the application instituting the proceedings (Declaration
of Intervention, Order of 4 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 216).
66. In the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v.
France), Fiji’s applications for permission to intervene under Article 62 of
the Statute related exclusively to the merits of the cases (see the two applica370
allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
affaires (voir les deux requêtes à fin d’intervention soumises par le
Gouvernement de Fidji les 16 et 18 mai 1973). La Cour a donc jugé que les
requêtes soumises par Fidji, de par leur nature même, présupposaient que la
Cour était compétente pour connaître des affaires et que les requêtes introductives
d’instance de l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande étaient
recevables. Elle a donc reporté l’examen des requêtes de Fidji à un stade
ultérieur (Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), requête à fin d’intervention,
ordonnance du 12 juillet 1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 321 ; Essais
nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin d’intervention,
ordonnance du 12 juillet 1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 325).
67. Enfin, dans l’affaire relative à la Demande d’examen de la situation au
titre du paragraphe 63 de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour le 20 décembre 1974
dans l’affaire des Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France) (Nouvelle-
Zélande c. France), la Cour a écarté la demande de la Nouvelle-Zélande
tendant à ce que la situation soit examinée conformément à un arrêt rendu
précédemment. Par conséquent, elle a écarté les procédures incidentes relatives
à cette demande, dont les requêtes et déclarations à fin d’intervention
présentées au titre des articles 62 et 63 du Statut (ordonnance du 22 septembre
1995, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 306-307, par. 67-68).
68. La Cour n’estime pas devoir se prononcer sur l’existence et la portée
du différend entre les Parties avant de statuer sur la recevabilité des déclarations
d’intervention. L’article 63 du Statut confère aux États un droit
d’intervenir lorsque l’interprétation d’une convention multilatérale est en
cause, et l’alinéa b) du paragraphe 2 de l’article 82 du Règlement de la Cour
dispose qu’un État désireux d’intervenir doit indiquer les « dispositions de la
convention dont il estime que l’interprétation est en cause ». Si l’interprétation
de certaines dispositions est en cause au stade des exceptions
préliminaires, les États seront admis à intervenir à ce stade pour présenter
leur interprétation à leur égard.
69. En l’espèce, l’interprétation de l’article IX et d’autres dispositions
de la convention sur le génocide concernant la compétence ratione
materiae de la Cour est en cause au stade actuel de la procédure. En effet,
dans sa requête, l’Ukraine entend fonder la compétence de la Cour sur
l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide (voir le paragraphe 2 ci-dessus).
La Fédération de Russie a déposé par la suite des exceptions préliminaires
d’incompétence de la Cour et d’irrecevabilité de la requête (voir le paragraphe
18 ci-dessus) et elle a indiqué, dans ses observations écrites sur la
recevabilité des déclarations d’intervention, que la compétence ratione
materiae de la Cour figurait parmi les questions soulevées dans ses exceptions
préliminaires.
70. La Cour estime que toutes les déclarations d’intervention ont trait, du
moins en partie, à certaines dispositions de la convention sur le génocide
dont l’interprétation est en cause à ce stade de la procédure.
71. La Cour conclut, en conséquence, que l’objection fondée sur l’irrecevabilité
alléguée des déclarations d’intervention au stade des exceptions
préliminaires ne peut être retenue.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 370
tions for permission to intervene in the cases submitted by the Government
of Fiji on 16 and 18 May 1973). The Court thus found that Fiji’s applications,
by their very nature, presupposed that the Court had jurisdiction over
the cases and that the applications instituting proceedings of Australia and
New Zealand were admissible. For that reason, it deferred consideration of
Fiji’s applications to a later stage (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
Application for Permission to Intervene, Order of 12 July 1973, I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 321; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Application
for Permission to Intervene, Order of 12 July 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 325).
67. Finally, in the case concerning the Request for an Examination of the
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of
20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case (New
Zealand v. France), the Court dismissed New Zealand’s request that the
situation be examined in accordance with a previous judgment. It thus
dismissed the incidental proceedings relating to that request, including the
applications and declarations aimed at intervening under Articles 62 and 63
of the Statute (Order of 22 September 1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995, pp. 306-307,
paras. 67-68).
68. The Court does not consider that it must decide on the existence and
scope of the dispute between the Parties before ruling on the admissibility of
the declarations of intervention. Article 63 of the Statute gives States a right
to intervene whenever the construction of a multilateral convention is in
question, and Article 82, subparagraph 2 (b), of the Rules of Court provides
that a State seeking to intervene must identify “the particular provisions of
the convention the construction of which it considers to be in question”.
If the construction of certain provisions is in question at the stage of the
preliminary objections, States will be allowed to intervene at that stage to
present their construction of those provisions.
69. In the case at hand, the construction of Article IX and of other provisions
of the Genocide Convention concerning the Court’s jurisdiction ratione
materiae is in question at the present stage of the proceedings. Indeed, in its
Application, Ukraine seeks to base the Court’s jurisdiction on Article IX of
the Genocide Convention (see paragraph 2 above). The Russian Federation
subsequently filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and
the admissibility of the Application (see paragraph 18 above) and it stated in
its written observations on the admissibility of the Declarations of intervention
that the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae was among the questions
raised in its preliminary objections.
70. The Court considers that all the Declarations of intervention at least
partly concern certain provisions of the Genocide Convention the construction
of which is in question at the present stage of the proceedings.
71. The Court therefore concludes that the objection based on the alleged
inadmissibility of the Declarations of intervention at the preliminary objections
stage cannot be upheld.
371 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
E. Objection fondée sur l’argument selon lequel les déclarations
d’intervention présupposent la compétence de la Cour
et la recevabilité de la requête de l’Ukraine
72. La Fédération de Russie avance que, même si elles portent apparemment,
en tout ou en partie, sur des questions de compétence, les déclarations
d’intervention abordent en réalité des points qui présupposent que la Cour
est compétente ou que la requête de l’Ukraine est recevable. Selon la défenderesse,
si la Cour autorise les États déclarants à intervenir à ce stade, elle
préjugera en substance des exceptions préliminaires. S’appuyant sur le rejet,
par la Cour, de la déclaration d’intervention d’El Salvador en l’affaire des
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci
(Nicaragua c. États-Unis d’Amérique), la Fédération de Russie soutient que
la présence, dans une déclaration d’intervention, d’arguments relatifs au
fond, ou qui présupposent que la Cour est compétente, rend ladite déclaration
entièrement irrecevable au stade de la compétence.
73. Selon l’Ukraine et les États déclarants, les déclarations d’intervention
ne présupposent ni la compétence de la Cour ni la recevabilité de la requête.
Ils soulignent que ces déclarations ont trait à l’interprétation de la clause
compromissoire énoncée à l’article IX de la convention. Ils ajoutent qu’une
déclaration d’intervention qui englobe des questions relatives à la compétence
et au fond n’est pas nécessairement irrecevable dans son intégralité.
* *
74. La Cour a déjà dit que les déclarations d’intervention peuvent être
recevables au stade des exceptions préliminaires (voir la section III.D
ci-dessus). Elle est d’avis que l’interprétation des dispositions relatives
à sa compétence, telles que la clause compromissoire et les dispositions
qui sont pertinentes aux fins de la détermination de la compétence ratione
materiae dans une affaire donnée, peut être en cause dans la phase des
exceptions préliminaires et constituer ainsi l’objet d’une intervention à ce
stade. En revanche, la Cour ne saurait prendre en considération, au stade
des exceptions préliminaires, les observations sur l’interprétation des
dispositions de la convention relatives au fond de l’affaire. Lorsqu’une
déclaration d’intervention porte en même temps sur la compétence de la
Cour et sur le fond de l’affaire, la Cour ne prendra en compte, au stade
des exceptions préliminaires, que les éléments pertinents aux fins de la
compétence.
75. La Cour conclut, en conséquence, que les déclarations d’intervention
sont recevables au stade actuel de la procédure en ce qu’elles portent sur
l’interprétation des dispositions relatives à sa compétence.
76. Pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus, la Cour ne peut retenir l’objection
soulevée par la Fédération de Russie.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 371
E. Objection Based on the Argument that the Declarations
of Intervention Presuppose the Court’s Jurisdiction
and the Admissibility of Ukraine’s Application
72. The Russian Federation argues that even if the Declarations of
intervention ostensibly concern, partly or entirely, issues of jurisdiction,
they in effect address matters that presuppose that the Court has jurisdiction
or that Ukraine’s Application is admissible. In the Respondent’s view, if
the Court allows the declarant States to intervene at this stage, it will,
in substance, be prejudging the preliminary objections. Relying on the
Court’s rejection of El Salvador’s Declarations of intervention in the case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Russian Federation
contends that the presence in a declaration of intervention of arguments
relating to the merits or presupposing that the Court has jurisdiction renders
the said declaration
wholly inadmissible at the jurisdictional stage of the
proceedings.
73. Ukraine and the declarant States argue that the Declarations of
intervention do not presuppose the Court’s jurisdiction or the admissibility
of the Application. They contend that the Declarations concern the construction
of the compromissory clause contained in Article IX of the Convention.
They add that a declaration of intervention that encompasses questions relating
to jurisdiction and to the merits is not necessarily inadmissible in its
entirety.
* *
74. The Court has already stated that declarations of intervention may be
admissible at the preliminary objections stage (see Section III.D above). It is
of the view that the construction of provisions relating to the jurisdiction of
the Court, such as the compromissory clause and provisions that are relevant
to determining jurisdiction ratione materiae in a given case, may be in question
in the preliminary objections phase. Such a construction may thus
constitute the subject-matter of an intervention at this stage. However, the
Court cannot take into consideration, at the preliminary objections stage,
observations on the construction of provisions of a convention relating to the
merits of the case. When a declaration of intervention concerns both the
jurisdiction of the Court and the merits of the case, the Court will only take
into account, at the preliminary objections stage, the elements relevant to
determining jurisdiction.
75. The Court thus concludes that the Declarations of intervention are
admissible at the current stage in so far as they concern the construction of
the provisions relating to its jurisdiction.
76. For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot uphold the objection
raised by the Russian Federation.
372 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
F. Objection fondée sur l’argument selon lequel l’intervention
ne peut avoir trait à l’interprétation de clauses compromissoires
telles que l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide
77. La Fédération de Russie soutient que l’intervention au titre de l’article
63 du Statut ne peut avoir trait à l’interprétation de clauses
compromissoires telles que l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide, car
cette disposition, qui ne porte pas sur un droit substantiel, ne saurait constituer
l’objet d’un différend. Elle considère que, sous prétexte d’interpréter
l’article IX de la convention, les États déclarants « défendent l’idée qu’il
existe un différend dans la présente affaire » ou formulent des observations
quant à la portée de celui-ci, ces questions relevant pourtant de l’application
d’un traité, et non de son interprétation. La Fédération de Russie fait valoir
que, en tout état de cause, nul ne peut affirmer que l’interprétation de
l’article IX de la convention est en cause tant que l’on n’a pas dépassé le stade
de la compétence, et que le simple fait que des exceptions préliminaires aient
été soulevées n’atteste pas l’existence d’un différend concernant l’interprétation
de cet article. Elle soutient en outre qu’il ressort des travaux préparatoires
de l’article 63 (notamment du rapport établi par le représentant de la France
à l’intention du Conseil de la Société des Nations sur le projet de Statut de la
Cour permanente de Justice internationale) et de l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire
Haya de la Torre (Colombie c. Pérou) que l’article 63 ne prévoit pas d’interventions
en ce qui concerne des clauses compromissoires telles que
l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide, ces interventions étant limitées
aux dispositions de fond.
78. Selon l’Ukraine et les États déclarants, il résulte de l’article 63 du
Statut et l’article 82 du Règlement de la Cour que l’intervention au titre de
ces dispositions peut avoir trait à l’interprétation de toute disposition d’une
convention en cause, y compris des clauses compromissoires telles que
l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide.
* *
79. La Cour a déjà conclu que l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 du
Statut peut concerner toute disposition dont l’interprétation est en cause au
stade pertinent de la procédure. En particulier, des clauses compromissoires
telles que l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide peuvent constituer
l’objet d’une intervention fondée sur l’article 63 du Statut, et pareille intervention
peut être jugée recevable au stade des exceptions préliminaires (voir
la section III.D ci-dessus). De l’avis de la Cour, l’interprétation de l’article IX
est en cause à ce stade de la procédure et les États déclarants sont en droit de
présenter leur interprétation de cette disposition.
80. La Cour considère que l’extrait des travaux préparatoires de l’article
63 du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale cité par la
Fédération de Russie ne révèle pas l’intention d’exclure l’interprétation des
clauses compromissoires du champ des interventions, mais indique seulement
que
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 372
F. Objection Based on the Argument that Intervention
Cannot Concern the Construction of Compromissory Clauses
such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention
77. The Russian Federation contends that intervention under Article 63 of
the Statute cannot concern the construction of compromissory clauses such
as Article IX of the Genocide Convention, because that provision, which
does not concern a substantive right, cannot constitute the subject-matter of
a dispute. The Russian Federation considers that, under the guise of the
construction of Article IX of the Convention, the declarant States “advocate
for the existence of a dispute in this case” or comment on its scope, but these
are matters relating to the application rather than the interpretation of a
treaty. The Russian Federation argues that, in any event, it cannot be asserted
that the construction of Article IX of the Convention is in question until after
the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, and the mere filing of preliminary
objections does not attest to the existence of a dispute on the
construction of that provision. Further, the Russian Federation maintains
that the travaux préparatoires of Article 63 (in particular the report of
the French representative to the Council of the League of Nations on the
draft Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice) and the
Judgment in the Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) case show that
Article 63 does not envisage intervention in respect of compromissory
clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention, but only in respect
of substantive provisions.
78. According to Ukraine and the declarant States, it follows from
Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court that intervention
under these provisions may concern the construction of any provision of a
convention in question, including compromissory clauses such as Article IX
of the Genocide Convention.
* *
79. The Court has already concluded that intervention under Article 63 of
the Statute may concern any provision the construction of which is in question
at a specific stage of the proceedings. In particular, compromissory
clauses such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention may be the
subject-matter of an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute, and such an
intervention may be admitted at the preliminary objections stage (see
Section III.D above). In the Court’s view, the construction of Article IX is in
question at the current stage of the proceedings and the declarant States are
entitled to present their construction of that provision.
80. The Court considers that the excerpt from the travaux préparatoires
of Article 63 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
cited by the Russian Federation does not reveal an intention to exclude the
construction of compromissory clauses from the purview of interventions,
but only states that
373 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
« [l]es observations à l’avant-projet de La Haye présentées par l’un de
nos collègues attirent l’attention sur le cas suivant : il pourrait se produire
qu’un cas qui a l’air peu important en lui-même soit soumis à la juridiction
de la Cour et que la Cour prenne au sujet de ce cas une décision
énonçant certains principes de droit international qui, s’ils étaient appliqués
à d’autres pays, modifieraient complètement les principes de droit
traditionnel dans ce pays et qui, par là, pourraient avoir des conséquences
graves. On s’est demandé si, en vue d’une telle hypothèse, il ne
devrait pas être donné aux États non parties en cause le droit d’intervenir
au procès dans l’intérêt de l’harmonieux développement du droit et
d’exercer autrement après la clôture du procès, dans le même intérêt, une
influence sur le futur développement du droit. » (Société des Nations,
Cour permanente de Justice internationale, Documents au sujet des
mesures prises par le Conseil de la Société des Nations aux termes de
l’article 14 du Pacte et de l’adoption par l’Assemblée du Statut de la
Cour permanente (1921), p. 50.)
De plus, l’exigence qu’une intervention fondée sur l’article 63 se rapporte à
l’objet de l’instance (Haya de la Torre (Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1951, p. 76) ne signifie pas que le droit d’intervenir se limite aux
dispositions de fond de la convention en cause.
81. En conséquence, la Cour ne peut retenir l’objection soulevée par la
Fédération de Russie à cet égard.
G. Objection selon laquelle les déclarations d’intervention sortent
du cadre de l’interprétation de la convention sur le génocide
82. La Fédération de Russie avance que les déclarations d’intervention
devraient être jugées irrecevables car elles cherchent à traiter de questions
sans rapport avec l’interprétation de la convention sur le génocide, et que les
accueillir comme recevables préjugerait de questions relatives à la compétence
ratione materiae de la Cour. Elle soutient en particulier que les
déclarations font mention de l’existence d’un différend entre les Parties, alors
qu’il s’agit là d’une question de preuve qu’il convient de trancher en tenant
compte des faits de l’espèce. De même, la Fédération de Russie affirme que
les déclarations ne devraient pas aborder la question de savoir si un génocide
s’est produit en Ukraine, cette question relevant du fond. Selon elle, les
autres éléments des déclarations qui sortent du cadre de l’interprétation de la
convention sur le génocide concernent des règles de droit international relatives
à la doctrine de l’abus de droit, à l’emploi de la force, au jus in bello, aux
crimes de guerre, à l’intégrité territoriale et à l’acquisition de territoires,
ainsi que des violations alléguées, par la Fédération de Russie, de l’ordonnance
en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour.
La Fédération de Russie conclut que les déclarations devraient à tout le
moins être jugées irrecevables au stade de la compétence ou qu’il devrait être
sursis à leur examen jusqu’à ce que la Cour ait établi la portée de sa compétence
ratione materiae.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 373
“[t]he observations in the draft project of The Hague by one of our
Colleagues
draw attention to the following case: it might happen that a
case appearing unimportant in itself might be submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Court, and that the Court might take a decision on this case,
laying down certain principles of international law which, if they were
applied to other countries, would completely modify the principles of
the traditional law of this country, and which might therefore have serious
consequences. The question has been raised whether, in view of
such an alternative, the States not involved in the dispute should not be
given the right of intervening in the case in the interest of the harmonious
development of the law, and otherwise after the closure of the case,
to exercise, in the same interest, influence on the future development of
the law.” (League of Nations, Permanent Court of International Justice,
Documents concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the League of
Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption by the
Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court (1921), p. 50.)
In addition, the requirement that an intervention under Article 63 must relate
to the subject-matter of the proceedings (Haya de la Torre (Colombia v.
Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76) does not mean that the right to
intervene is confined to substantive provisions of the relevant convention.
81. The Court therefore cannot uphold this objection of the Russian
Federation.
G. Objection Alleging that the Declarations of Intervention Go
beyond the Construction of the Genocide Convention
82. The Russian Federation submits that the Declarations of intervention
should be found inadmissible because they seek to address issues unrelated
to the construction of the Genocide Convention, and that their admission
would prejudge questions relating to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione mat-
eriae. In particular, the Russian Federation contends that the Declarations
refer to the existence of a dispute between the Parties, whereas this is an
evidentiary question that must be determined by taking into account the
facts of the case. Similarly, the Russian Federation states that the Declarations
should not be concerned with the question of whether genocide has occurred
in Ukraine, as this is a question for the merits. According to the Russian
Federation, other references in the Declarations that go beyond the construction
of the Genocide Convention concern rules of international law related to
the doctrine of abuse of rights, the use of force, jus in bello, war crimes,
territorial integrity and territorial acquisition, as well as alleged violations
by the Russian Federation of the Court’s Order on provisional measures. The
Russian Federation concludes that, at the very least, the Declarations should
be found inadmissible at the jurisdictional stage, or their consideration postponed
until the Court has determined the scope of its jurisdiction ratione
materiae.
374 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
83. L’Ukraine et les États déclarants considèrent que les déclarations d’intervention
ne traitent que de questions d’interprétation de la convention sur
le génocide. En particulier, si les déclarations renvoient parfois à des règles
et principes de droit international ne figurant pas dans la convention sur le
génocide, c’est uniquement dans le contexte de l’interprétation des dispositions
de cet instrument.
* *
84. La Cour a déjà souligné que l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 du
Statut est limitée à l’interprétation des dispositions en cause au stade pertinent
de la procédure. Elle estime que les déclarations d’intervention
considérées concernent, de façon générale, l’interprétation des dispositions
de la convention sur le génocide. Toutefois, dans la mesure où certaines
déclarations traitent également d’autres questions, telles que l’existence d’un
différend entre les Parties, les éléments de preuve, les faits ou l’application de
la convention en l’espèce, la Cour ne les examinera pas. En outre, bien que
certaines des déclarations renvoient aussi à d’autres règles et principes de
droit international, en dehors de la convention sur le génocide, la Cour n’examinera
ces références que dans la mesure où elles ont trait à l’interprétation
des dispositions de la convention, conformément à la règle coutumière d’interprétation
qui trouve son expression à l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 3 de
l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités.
85. En conséquence, la Cour ne peut retenir l’objection soulevée par la
Fédération de Russie à cet égard.
IV. Objection de la Fédération de Russie
concernant la déclaration conjointe d’intervention
du Canada et des Pays-Bas
86. La Fédération de Russie soulève une objection additionnelle concernant
la recevabilité de la déclaration conjointe d’intervention du Canada et
des Pays-Bas. Elle allègue que cette déclaration est irrecevable car les déclarations
conjointes d’intervention ne sont prévues ni par le paragraphe 2 de
l’article 63 du Statut ni par l’article 82 du Règlement de la Cour, ces deux
dispositions mentionnant l’intervention d’un État au singulier.
87. L’Ukraine, le Canada et les Pays-Bas affirment que rien ne fait obstacle
au dépôt d’une déclaration conjointe d’intervention au titre de l’article 63
du Statut.
* *
88. La Cour considère que rien dans le Statut ou le Règlement n’empêche
des États de présenter une déclaration conjointe d’intervention. Si le paragraphe
2 de l’article 63 du Statut et l’article 82 du Règlement de la Cour
font mention du droit d’un État de déposer une déclaration d’intervention,
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 374
83. Ukraine and the declarant States consider that the Declarations of
intervention relate solely to questions of construction of the Genocide
Convention. In particular, if the Declarations sometimes refer to rules and
principles of international law outside the Genocide Convention, it is only in
the context of interpreting the provisions of that instrument.
* *
84. The Court has already stated that intervention under Article 63 of the
Statute is limited to the construction of the provisions in question at the relevant
stage of the proceedings. The Court is of the view that the Declarations
of intervention at issue generally concern the construction of the provisions
of the Genocide Convention. However, to the extent that some Declarations
also address other matters, such as the existence of a dispute between the
Parties, the evidence, the facts or the application of the Convention in the
present case, the Court will not consider them. Further, while some of the
Declarations also refer to other rules and principles of international law
outside the Genocide Convention, such references will only be considered by
the Court in so far as they concern the construction of the Convention’s
provisions, in accordance with the customary rule of interpretation reflected
in Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treat-ies.
85. The Court therefore cannot uphold this objection of the Russian Fed-
eration.
IV. Objection of the Russian Federation
with respect to the Joint Declaration of Intervention
of Canada and the Netherlands
86. The Russian Federation raises an additional objection with respect to
the admissibility of the Joint Declaration of intervention of Canada and the
Netherlands. It argues that this Declaration is inadmissible because joint
declarations of intervention are not envisaged by Article 63, paragraph 2, of
the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court, since these provisions refer
to the intervention of a State in the singular.
87. Ukraine, Canada and the Netherlands contend that there is no obstacle
to the filing of a joint declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the
Statute.
* *
88. The Court considers that there is nothing in the Statute or the Rules
preventing States from filing a joint declaration of intervention. While
Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules of Court
refer to the right of a State to file a declaration of intervention, the use of the
375 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
l’emploi du singulier générique signifie simplement que chaque État partie à
la convention en cause peut intervenir dans la procédure, mais n’interdit pas
auxdits États de présenter une déclaration conjointe. En réalité, la présentation
conjointe de positions communes peut aller dans le sens d’une bonne
administration de la justice.
89. La Cour ne peut donc retenir l’objection soulevée par la Fédération de
Russie à cet égard.
V. Objection de la Fédération de Russie concernant
la déclaration d’intervention des États-Unis
90. La Fédération de Russie soulève une objection additionnelle concernant
la recevabilité de la déclaration d’intervention des États-Unis, affirmant
qu’elle est irrecevable du fait de la réserve que ces derniers ont formulée à
l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide. La Fédération de Russie avance
trois arguments à l’appui de cette objection. Premièrement, elle soutient que
le terme « convention » qui figure à l’article 63 du Statut doit s’entendre d’une
convention dont les dispositions soumises à interprétation et la clause
compromissoire donnant compétence à la Cour sont en vigueur entre l’État
désireux d’intervenir et les parties à l’instance. Il en serait ainsi parce qu’un
État ayant formulé une réserve à une clause compromissoire d’un traité s’est
de fait « prémuni » contre tout effet d’une interprétation judiciaire du traité
par la Cour et, partant, n’a pas d’intérêt particulier à protéger au moyen de
l’article 63 du Statut. Deuxièmement, la Fédération de Russie affirme que cet
article suppose l’existence d’un lien juridictionnel entre les parties à l’instance
principale et l’État demandant à intervenir, lien qui n’existe pas lorsque
ledit État a formulé une réserve à la clause compromissoire. Troisièmement,
la Fédération de Russie estime que l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 doit
se conformer au principe de réciprocité, et qu’un État qui ne peut être attrait
devant la Cour par un autre État en tant que défendeur ne devrait pas être
autorisé à intervenir contre cet État.
91. Les États-Unis estiment que la réserve qu’ils ont formulée à l’article IX
de la convention sur le génocide est sans effet sur le droit d’intervenir que
leur confère l’article 63 du Statut. Ils considèrent que la Fédération de Russie
tente d’ajouter des conditions aux exigences de l’article 63 et, en conséquence,
que les arguments qu’elle avance devraient être rejetés. D’une part,
les États-Unis affirment que l’exigence relative à un « intérêt particulier »
invoquée par la Fédération de Russie ne figure pas dans le libellé de
l’article 63, selon lequel l’intérêt d’un État partie dans l’interprétation d’un
traité ne dépend pas du fait qu’il ait ou non accepté la compétence de la Cour.
Les États-Unis affirment que, dans le cas où leur déclaration d’intervention
serait jugée recevable, l’interprétation des dispositions de la convention que
donnera la Cour en l’espèce sera obligatoire à leur égard en vertu du paragraphe
2 de l’article 63. Ils ajoutent qu’il en ira ainsi, qu’un autre État puisse
ou non invoquer la compétence de la Cour dans une future affaire qui
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 375
generic singular simply means that every State party to the relevant convention
can intervene in the proceedings, but it does not prohibit the filing of a
joint declaration by those States. In fact, the joint presentation of shared
views can advance the good administration of justice.
89. The Court therefore cannot uphold this objection of the Russian
Federation.
V. Objection of the Russian Federation with respect
to the Declaration of Intervention of the United States
90. The Russian Federation raises an additional objection with respect to
the admissibility of the Declaration of intervention of the United States,
contending that this Declaration is inadmissible as a result of the reservation
of the United States to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The Russian
Federation makes three arguments in support of this objection. First, it
submits that the term “convention” in Article 63 of the Statute must be taken
to mean a convention whose provisions to be interpreted and whose compromissory
clause affording jurisdiction to the Court are in force between the
State seeking to intervene and the parties to a case. According to the Russian
Federation, a State that has made a reservation to a compromissory clause
has in effect “immunized” itself from any effect of a judicial interpretation of
a treaty by the Court and thus has no special interest to be protected through
Article 63 of the Statute. Secondly, the Russian Federation asserts that
Article 63 implies the existence of a jurisdictional link between the parties
to the main case and the State seeking to intervene, and that such a link is
missing when the State seeking to intervene has made a reservation to the
compromissory clause. Thirdly, the Russian Federation takes the view that
intervention under Article 63 must conform to the principle of reciprocity,
and that a State that could not be brought before the Court as a respondent by
another State should not be permitted to intervene against that same State.
91. The United States takes the view that its reservation to Article IX of
the Genocide Convention has no bearing on its right to intervene under
Article 63 of the Statute. It considers that the Russian Federation is attempting
to add conditions to the requirements of Article 63 and that the arguments
it advances should therefore be rejected. The United States first contends
that the “special interest” requirement asserted by the Russian Federation is
not to be found in the text of Article 63, according to which the interest of a
State party in the interpretation of a treaty does not depend on whether that
State party has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. The United States
submits that, in the event that its Declaration of intervention is deemed
admissible, the construction of the provisions of the Convention to be given
by the Court in this case will be binding on it under Article 63, paragraph 2.
It adds that such will be the case regardless of whether any other State is able
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in a future case involving it.
376 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
les concernerait. D’autre part, selon les États-Unis, l’article 63 du Statut
n’impose pas l’existence d’un « lien juridictionnel » entre les parties et l’État
désireux d’intervenir, étant donné que ni le texte de cette disposition ni la
pratique de la Cour ni l’historique de la rédaction de l’article 63 ne font
ressortir une telle exigence. Enfin, les États-Unis soutiennent que c’est à tort
que la Fédération de Russie invoque le principe de réciprocité, en pratiquant
un amalgame entre l’intervention au titre de l’article 63 et la qualité de partie
à l’instance.
92. L’Ukraine considère que le fait que les États-Unis maintiennent une
réserve à l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide n’a pas d’incidence sur
le droit de cet État d’intervenir au titre de l’article 63 du Statut.
* *
93. La Cour a déjà conclu que les déclarations d’intervention peuvent être
recevables au stade actuel de la procédure en ce qu’elles ont trait à l’interprétation
de l’article IX et d’autres dispositions de la convention sur le génocide
pertinentes aux fins de la détermination de sa compétence ratione materiae
(voir les sections III.D et III.F ci-dessus). Toutefois, elle doit à présent rechercher
si la réserve que les États-Unis ont formulée à l’article IX de la
convention rend la déclaration d’intervention de cet État irrecevable pour
autant qu’elle se rapporte au stade actuel de la procédure.
94. La Cour relève que les États-Unis ont assorti l’article IX de la
convention sur le génocide de la réserve ci-après, qui est actuellement en
vigueur :
« En ce qui concerne l’article IX de la Convention, pour qu’un différend
auquel les États-Unis sont parties puisse être soumis à la juridiction
de la Cour internationale de Justice en vertu de cet article, le consentement
exprès des États-Unis est nécessaire dans chaque cas. »
La Cour a conclu que cette réserve « a[vait] pour effet d’exclure cet article des
dispositions de la convention en vigueur » entre les États-Unis et une autre
partie à un différend (Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. États-
Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 924, par. 24). En conséquence, en vertu de cette
réserve, les États-Unis ne sont pas liés par l’article IX de la convention.
95. La Cour considère que les États-Unis ne peuvent intervenir dans le
cadre de l’interprétation de l’article IX de la convention, alors qu’ils ne sont
pas liés par cette disposition. En effet, la réserve des États-Unis exclut l’effet
juridique de cet article à leur égard. Par conséquent, l’intérêt juridique qu’ils
sont présumés avoir dans l’interprétation de la convention sur le génocide,
en tant que partie à celle-ci, n’est pas présent en ce qui concerne l’article IX.
En outre, par leur déclaration selon laquelle ils « reconnaissent que, puisqu’ils
se prévalent du droit d’intervenir prévu à l’article 63 du Statut, l’interprétation
de la convention que contiendra l’arrêt qui sera rendu en l’espèce sera
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 376
The United States further contends that Article 63 of the Statute does not
require the existence of a “jurisdictional link” between the parties and the
State seeking to intervene, as such a requirement is not reflected in that
provision, in the practice of the Court or in the drafting history of Article 63.
Finally, the United States maintains that the Russian Federation erroneously
invokes the principle of reciprocity by conflating intervention under
Article 63 with the status of party to the proceedings.
92. Ukraine considers that the fact that the United States maintains a
reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention does not affect that
State’s right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute.
* *
93. The Court has already concluded that the Declarations of intervention
may be admissible at the current stage of the proceedings in so far as they
concern the construction of Article IX and of other provisions of the
Genocide Convention that are relevant for the determination of the jurisdiction
ratione materiae of the Court (see Sections III.D and III.F above).
However, it must now ascertain whether the United States’ reservation to
Article IX of the Convention renders that State’s Declaration of intervention
inadmissible in so far as the current stage of the proceedings is concerned.
94. The Court notes that the United States has entered the following reservation
to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which reservation is
currently in force:
“That with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any
dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article,
the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.”
The Court has found that that reservation “had the effect of excluding that
Article from the provisions of the Convention in force” between the
United States and another party to a dispute (Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of
2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 924, para. 24). Consequently, by
virtue of that reservation, the United States is not bound by Article IX of the
Convention.
95. The Court considers that the United States may not intervene in relation
to the construction of Article IX of the Convention while it is not bound
by that provision. The reservation of the United States excludes the legal
effect of that Article in relation to that State. Consequently, the legal interest
that the United States is presumed to have in the construction of the Genocide
Convention, as a party to that instrument, does not exist in respect of
Article IX. Moreover, by declaring that it “recognizes that, by availing itself
of the right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute, the construction of
the Convention given by the judgment in this case will be equally binding
377 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
également obligatoire à leur égard », les États-Unis ne peuvent remédier
au fait qu’ils ont formulé une réserve à l’article IX de la convention, lequel
n’entraîne donc aucune obligation à leur égard.
96. Selon la Cour, la déclaration d’intervention des États-Unis, dans la
mesure où elle a trait à l’interprétation de l’article IX, n’entre pas dans les
prévisions de l’article 63 du Statut, qui permet aux États parties à une
convention d’intervenir dans une affaire au sujet de l’interprétation d’une de
ses dispositions en cause devant la Cour, étant entendu qu’ils sont liés par la
disposition en question. Ainsi, lorsqu’un État demande à intervenir au titre
de l’article 63, mais qu’il n’est pas lié par une disposition de la convention en
raison d’une réserve, sa déclaration fondée sur ledit article ne peut être
considérée comme recevable pour ce qui est de l’interprétation de cette
disposition. Par conséquent, la Cour conclut que la déclaration des États-
Unis est irrecevable dans la mesure où elle a trait à l’article IX de la
convention sur le génocide.
97. La Cour relève que les États-Unis demandent également à intervenir
pour exposer leur interprétation d’autres dispositions de la convention
susceptibles d’être en cause à ce stade de la procédure, notamment de dispositions
qui pourraient être pertinentes aux fins de la détermination de la
portée de sa compétence ratione materiae en l’espèce. La Cour souligne que,
au stade des exceptions préliminaires, l’interprétation de toute autre disposition
de la convention ne peut être pertinente que dans la mesure où celle-ci a
trait à l’interprétation de l’article IX et à l’établissement de la compétence
ratione materiae de la Cour au titre de celui-ci. Les États-Unis ayant formulé
une réserve à cet article, la Cour estime qu’ils ne peuvent pas intervenir à ce
stade pour exposer leur interprétation d’autres dispositions de la convention
qui seraient pertinentes aux fins de la compétence ratione materiae qu’elle
tient de l’article IX.
98. La Cour conclut que la déclaration d’intervention des États-Unis est
irrecevable dans la mesure où elle a trait au stade de la procédure sur les
exceptions préliminaires. Elle retient l’objection soulevée par la Fédération
de Russie en ce qu’elle a trait à cette phase.
VI. Conclusion
99. La Cour conclut que les déclarations d’intervention déposées en l’affaire,
à l’exception de celle présentée par les États-Unis, sont recevables au
stade des exceptions préliminaires en ce qu’elles ont trait à l’interprétation
de l’article IX et d’autres dispositions de la convention sur le génocide pertinentes
aux fins de la détermination de sa compétence ratione materiae en
l’espèce. En conséquence, la Cour ne prendra en considération, à ce stade,
aucun des éléments présentés dans les observations écrites ou orales par les
États déclarants qui sortirait du cadre ainsi fixé.
*
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 377
upon [it]”, the United States cannot overcome the fact that it has entered
a reservation to Article IX of the Convention, which is thus not binding
upon it.
96. In the Court’s view, the Declaration of intervention of the United
States, in so far as it concerns the construction of Article IX, does not fall
within the scope of Article 63 of the Statute, which permits States parties to
a convention to intervene in relation to the construction of any of its provisions
in question before the Court, provided that they are bound by the
provision in question. Therefore, when a State seeks to intervene under
Article 63 but is not bound by a provision of the convention due to a reservation,
its declaration under Article 63 cannot be found admissible in respect
of the construction of that provision. Thus, the Court finds that the Declaration
of the United States is inadmissible in so far as it concerns Article IX of the
Genocide Convention.
97. The Court notes that the United States also seeks to intervene to present
its construction of other provisions of the Convention that could be in
question at this stage of the proceedings, in particular provisions that may be
relevant for the determination of the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione
materiae in the present case. The Court emphasizes that at the preliminary
objections stage, the construction of any other provision of the Convention
may only be relevant in so far as it concerns the construction of Article IX
and the determination of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae thereunder.
Since the United States has entered a reservation to that Article,
the Court considers that it cannot intervene at the current stage to present its
construction of other provisions of the Convention that could be relevant to
the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae under Article IX.
98. The Court concludes that the Declaration of intervention of the
United States is inadmissible in so far as it concerns the preliminary objections
stage of the proceedings. The Court upholds the objection of the
Russian Federation in so far as it relates to that phase.
VI. Conclusion
99. The Court concludes that the Declarations of intervention filed in this
case, except for the Declaration submitted by the United States, are admissible
at the preliminary objections stage in so far as they concern the
construction of Article IX and other provisions of the Genocide Convention
that are relevant for the determination of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione
materiae in the present case. Accordingly, the Court will not, at this stage,
have regard to any part of the written or oral observations of the declarant
States going beyond the scope thus fixed.
*
378 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
100. La Cour rappelle en outre que l’article 86 de son Règlement dispose
ce qui suit :
« 1. Si une intervention fondée sur l’article 63 du Statut est déclarée
recevable, l’État intervenant reçoit copie des pièces de procédure et des
documents annexés et a le droit de présenter, dans un délai fixé par la
Cour ou, si elle ne siège pas, par le Président, des observations écrites
sur l’objet de l’intervention.
2. Ces observations sont communiquées aux parties et à tout autre
État autorisé à intervenir. L’État intervenant a le droit de présenter
au cours de la procédure orale des observations sur l’objet de
l’intervention. »
101. Conformément à cette disposition, les États dont les déclarations
d’intervention sont recevables au stade actuel recevront copie du mémoire
de l’Ukraine, des exceptions préliminaires de la Fédération de Russie et
de l’exposé écrit de l’Ukraine sur ces exceptions préliminaires. En outre,
la Cour fixera le délai dans lequel les États déclarants pourront déposer
leurs observations écrites sur l’objet de leur intervention telle qu’elle a été
déclarée recevable au stade actuel.
* * *
102. Par ces motifs,
La Cour,
1) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit que les déclarations d’intervention présentées au titre de l’article 63 du
Statut par la République fédérale d’Allemagne, l’Australie, la République
d’Autriche, le Royaume de Belgique, la République de Bulgarie, le Canada
et le Royaume des Pays-Bas, la République de Chypre, la République de
Croatie, le Royaume du Danemark, le Royaume d’Espagne, la République
d’Estonie, la République de Finlande, la République française, la République
hellénique, l’Irlande, la République italienne, la République de Lettonie, la
Principauté du Liechtenstein, la République de Lituanie, le Grand-Duché de
Luxembourg, la République de Malte, le Royaume de Norvège, la Nouvelle-
Zélande, la République de Pologne, la République portugaise, la Roumanie,
le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, la République
slovaque, la République de Slovénie, le Royaume de Suède et la République
tchèque sont recevables au stade des exceptions préliminaires en ce qu’elles
ont trait à l’interprétation de l’article IX et d’autres dispositions de la convention
pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide pertinentes aux
fins de la détermination de la compétence de la Cour ;
pour : M. Bennouna, juge, faisant fonction de président ; Mme Donoghue,
présidente ; M. Gevorgian, vice-président ; MM. Tomka, Abraham,
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 378
100. The Court further recalls that Article 86 of its Rules provides as
follows:
“1. If an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is admitted, the
intervening State shall be furnished with copies of the pleadings and
documents annexed, and shall be entitled, within a time-limit to be fixed
by the Court, or by the President if the Court is not sitting, to submit its
written observations on the subject-matter of the intervention.
2. These observations shall be communicated to the parties and to
any other State admitted to intervene. The intervening State shall be
entitled, in the course of the oral proceedings, to submit its observations
with respect to the subject-matter of the intervention.”
101. In accordance with this provision, the States whose Declarations of
intervention are admissible at the current stage will be furnished with copies
of the Memorial of Ukraine, the Preliminary Objections of the Russian
Federation and the Written Statement of Ukraine on those preliminary
objections. Further, the Court will set a time-limit for the declarant States to
file their written observations on the subject-matter of their intervention as
admitted at the current stage.
* * *
102. For these reasons,
The Court,
(1) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides that the Declarations of intervention under Article 63 of the
Statute submitted by Australia, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of
Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic
of Finland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the
Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway,
the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of
Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are
admissible at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings in so far as
they concern the construction of Article IX and other provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that
are relevant for the determination of the jurisdiction of the Court;
in favour: Acting President Bennouna; President Donoghue; Vice-
President Gevorgian; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Yusuf, Sebutinde,
379 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
Yusuf, Mme Sebutinde, MM. Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte,
Mme Charlesworth, M. Brant, juges ; M. Daudet, juge ad hoc ;
contre : Mme Xue, juge ;
2) À l’unanimité,
Dit que la déclaration d’intervention présentée au titre de l’article 63 du
Statut par les États-Unis d’Amérique est irrecevable dans la mesure où elle a
trait au stade des exceptions préliminaires ;
3) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Fixe au 5 juillet 2023 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt, par les
États dont les déclarations d’intervention ont été jugées recevables au stade
des exceptions préliminaires, des observations écrites prévues au paragraphe
1 de l’article 86 du Règlement de la Cour.
pour : M. Bennouna, juge, faisant fonction de président ; Mme Donoghue,
présidente ; M. Gevorgian, vice-président ; MM. Tomka, Abraham,
Yusuf, Mme Sebutinde, MM. Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte,
Mme Charlesworth, M. Brant, juges ; M. Daudet, juge ad hoc ;
contre : Mme Xue, juge.
Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le cinq juin deux mille vingt-trois, en trente-six exemplaires,
dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront
transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de l’Ukraine, au Gouvernement
de la Fédération de Russie et aux Gouvernements de la République fédérale
d’Allemagne, de l’Australie, de la République d’Autriche, du Royaume de
Belgique, de la République de Bulgarie, du Canada, de la République de
Chypre, de la République de Croatie, du Royaume du Danemark, du
Royaume d’Espagne, de la République d’Estonie, des États-Unis d’Amérique,
de la République de Finlande, de la République française, de la
République hellénique, de l’Irlande, de la République italienne, de la
République de Lettonie, de la Principauté du Liechtenstein, de la République
de Lituanie, du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, de la République de Malte, du
Royaume de Norvège, de la Nouvelle-Zélande, du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
de la République de Pologne, de la République portugaise, de la Roumanie,
du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, de la République
slovaque, de la République de Slovénie, du Royaume de Suède et de la
République tchèque.
Le juge faisant fonction de président,
(Signé) Mohamed Bennouna.
Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe Gautier.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 379
Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth, Brant; Judge ad hoc
Daudet;
against: Judge Xue;
(2) Unanimously,
Decides that the Declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute
submitted by the United States of America is inadmissible in so far as it
concerns the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings;
(3) By fourteen votes to one,
Fixes 5 July 2023 as the time-limit for the filing, by the States whose
Declarations of intervention have been deemed admissible at the preliminary
objections stage of the proceedings, of the written observations
referred to in Article 86, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
in favour: Acting President Bennouna; President Donoghue; Vice-
President Gevorgian; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Yusuf, Sebutinde,
Bhandari, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth, Brant; Judge ad hoc
Daudet;
against: Judge Xue.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifth day of June, two thousand and twentythree,
in thirty-six copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the
Court and the others transmitted to the Government of Ukraine, the
Government of the Russian Federation, and the Governments of Australia,
the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria,
Canada, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland,
the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the
Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese
Republic, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the
Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, respectively.
(Signed) Mohamed Bennouna,
Acting President.
(Signed) Philippe Gautier,
Registrar.
380 allégations de génocide (ordonnance 5 VI 23)
M. le juge Gevorgian, vice-président, joint une déclaration à l’ordonnance
; M. le juge Abraham joint une déclaration à l’ordonnance ;
Mme la juge Xue joint à l’ordonnance l’exposé de son opinion dissidente ;
M. le juge Bhandari joint une déclaration à l’ordonnance.
(Paraphé) M.B.
(Paraphé) Ph.G.
allegations of genocide (order 5 VI 23) 380
Vice-President Gevorgian appends a declaration to the Order of the
Court; Judge Abraham appends a declaration to the Order of the Court;
Judge Xue appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court;
Judge Bhandari appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.
(Initialled) M.B.
(Initialled) Ph.G.
Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention
Order of 5 June 2023