Written reply of the Marshall Islands to the questions put by Judge Cançado Trindade at the public sitting held on the afternoon of 16 March 2016

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO CESSATION OF
THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ANDTO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

(Marshall Islandsnited Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections)

Reply ofthe Marshall Islands

to the question put by Judge Cançado Trindade at the end ofthe public sitting of
16 March 2016 at 3 p.m.

*

Question:

The Marshall Islands, in the course of thetensubmissions and oral

arguments, and theUnited Kingdom, in its document on Preliminary Objections
(of 15June 2~1 5a)e both referred to U.N. General Assemresolu on~ons

nuclear dlsarmament. Parallel to the resolutions on the matter which go back to
the early 70's(First Disarmament Decade), tbere have been tworecent

series of General Assembly resolutions, namely: tbose condemning nuclear
weapons, extending from 1982 to date, and those adopted as a follow-up to the

1996 I.C.J. Advisorypinion on NuclearWeap~i txtnding so far from 1997
to 2015.In relation to this last series of General Assembly resolutions,- referred

to by the contending Parties, -ld like to ask both the Marshall Islands and ·
United.Kingdom whether, in tbeir understanding, such General Assembl·
resolutions are constitutive ofan expression of opiniojuris, and, if so, what in
. .
their view is their relevance to the formation of a customary international law
obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, and what is

their incidence upon the question of the existence.of a dispute between the
Parties.

Answer by the MarshaJI Islands:

A) Wbether, in thMarshalllsl undersa'ding, the General Assembly
resolutions referred to in the question are constitutivepression of opinio

iurisand what in its view is their relevance to the formation of a customary
international law obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear

disarmament.

1. IntheMarshallIslands'view,thecustomaryinternationallawobligationto

pursuenegotiationsleadingnucleardisarmamentwasauthoritatively
recognizedforthe firsttimeintheCou·AdvisoryOpinionof 8 July 1996,

whichestablishedthat"[t]hereex:istsan obligationtopursueingoo~ndith

1-5 bringto a conclusionnegotiationsleadingto nucleardi1arrnamentinailits
aspectsunderstrictandeffectiveinternationalcontrol" .

2. AJreadyin theFirstDisarrnamentDecadeof the 1970s,theU.N.General
Assemblybad calleduponStatesto negotiatefor completenuclear
2
disarmament and.a haittothe nucleararmsrace. Since 1982,several
recurringUNGA resolutionshaveunderlinedthe imperativeof negotiationson

nucleardisarmarnent.lllustratively,inthe 1982Nucleararmsfreeze
resolution ,he GeneralAssemblyrecognized"theurgentneedfor a

negotiatedreductionofnuclear-weaponstockpilesleadingtotheir complete 4
elimination".In a 1983resolutionconcerningNuclearweaponsinallaspects ,
the General Assembly,beyondstressing"the urgentneedfor the cessationof

thedevelopmentanddeploymentofnewtypesandsystemsof nuclear
weapons as a stepontheroadto nucleardisannament",recognizedthat

"priorityin disarmarnentnegotiationsshouldbe.givento nuclearweapons".
Similarly,in a 1986resolutiononCessationof thenuclear-armsraceand

nucleqrdisarmament,the GeneralAssemblyexpressedtheviewthat"ali
nationshavea vitalinterestin negotiationsonnucleardisarmament" .In a
1994resolutiononBilateralnuclear-armsnegotiationsandnuclear
6
disar,;,ament,theUNGAstressedthat"it istheresponsibilityof ail Statesto
adoptandimplementmensurestowardsthe attainmentofgeneraland

completedisarmamentundereffectiveinternational control".

3. TheGeneralAssemblyresolutionsonNucleardisarmamentadoptedafterthe
1996AdvisoryOpinionandtheresolutionsfollmyingup onthe Advisory

Opinionareclearontheobligationto pursuenegotiationsleadingtonuclear
disannamentandon itcustomarystatus. In the latterresolutions,the UNGA
bas constantlyunderlined"theunanimousconclusionofthe International

CourtofJusticethatthereexistsan ~bliga tt iursuein goodfaith and
bringto a conclusionnegotiationsleadingtonucleardisarmamentin allits

aspectsunderstrict and effec inievn~tionalcontrol",andcalled"uponall
Statesto fulfilimmediatelythatobligationby commencingmul:tilateral

1
Legalityofthe Threator UseofNuclear Weapons,Advisory Opinion,.lCJ. Reports 1996,
rara. 101 point2F. .
SeeAJRES/S-10/2,30June1978(withoutavote),adoptingtheFinalDocumentof the
TenthSpecialSession (FirsSpecialSessiononDisannament)ofthe GeneralAssembly,esp.
para.50(''achievemenotfnucleardisarmamentwillrequireurgentnegotiationof
agreements").
3
4A/R.ES/37/100B1 ,3December1982(119-17-5),Nuc1eararmsfreeze.
AIRES/38/183D,20December1983(108-19-16),NuclearWeaponsin AilAspects.
s·/R.ES/41/86F4, December1986(130-15-5),Cessationofnuclear-armsraceandnuc1ear
Clisarnâament. ·
6AIRES/49/75L,15December1994(witbouta vote),Bilateralnuclear-annsnegotiationsand
nucleardisarmament.

2-5 7
negotiations Ieading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons.convention"
While there are a number of States abstaining from or voting against these

resolutions, the opposition of these States general]y is not directed against the
recognitionf an obligation to pursue irigood faith and conclude negotiations
on nuclear disannament. This is demonstrated by the separate vote in 2006

retaining operati.veparagraph one welcoming the Court's conclusion regarding
the disannament obligationa vote of 168 to three with five ab.tentions

4. Ina similar vein, iNucleardisarmamentresolutions, the UNGA has
welcomed"the unarùmous reaffinnationalJudges of the Court that there

exists an obligatioailStateto pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disannament in ali its aspects under
9
strict and effective international"

5. In the RMI's view, the attitude of States towards General Assembly

resolutions is an important element for determiningence of a
customary international rule. As the International Court of Justice observed in

Nicaragua v.UnitedStates,"opiniojumay, though with ali due caution. be
deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States
towards certaiG~n esrembllr~sol 10unte iaoe nes, "e Court,

inthe 1996 Advisory Opinion, noted that UNGA resolutions "can, in certain
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a
11
rule or the emergence aopiniojuris".

6. More recently, and by the same token, the International Law Commission's

Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law,
provisionally adopted on first rèadingby the Drafting Committee in

recognize the importance of the attitude of States towards General Assembly

1
See,e.g.,A/R.ES/68/42,5 December2013(133-24-25),Follow-uptotheadvisoryopinionof
theInternationalCourtof Justiceonthelegalityofthethreatoruseofnuclearweapons,
para 1,2,p. 3/3(emphasissupplied). .
AIRES/61/83,6 December2006,Follow-uptotheadvisoryopinionof theInternational
CourtofJusticeonthelegalityof threatoruseofnuclearweapons,was adoptedas a whole
byavoteof 118~27- o2er;tiveparagraphonewasretamedby avoteofto3 (Israel,
Russia,UnitedStates)with5 abstentions(Belarus,France,Latvia,Kyrgyzstan,UI{):See
OfficialRecords,GeneralAssemblyp1enarymeeting,6December2006,A/611PV.67,

f!'26-27.
Seeeg.A/RES/68/47,5 December20i3 (122-44-Nucl diarmament,p. 3/7
10mphasissupplied).
MilitaryandPardmilitar.yActivitiesin andagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav. UnitedStates
o[.America),Merits, Judgment,I.C.J.Repprts 1986,p. 100,para. 188.
1Legalityof theThreator UseojNuclear Weapons,4dvisory Opinion,I.C.,J.Reports 1996,
pp.254-255,para.7Not ~hatthe Courtalsoobservedthat"severa!ofthe resolutionsunder
considerationin thepresentcasehavebeen adoptedwithsubstantialnumbersofnegative
votesandabstentions;thus,althoughthoseresolutionssignofdeepconcem

regardingtheproblemofnuclearweapons,theystiJlfallshortofestablishingtheexistenceof
anopiniojuris ontheillegalityofthe useof sucliweapons."(para.71)

3-5 12
resolutions. Draft Conclusion6 providesthat"fonns of Statepractice
include ... conduct in connect:ionwith resolutionsadoptedbyan international

organizationor at an intergovemrnentalconference".Draft Conclusion10
establishesthat "fonns of evidenceof acceptanceaslaw (opiniojuris) include

... conduct in connectionwithresolutionsadoptedby aninternational
organizationor at an intergovemmentalconference".Sucha view alsofinds
13
resonanceamongscholars .

7. In theRMI's view, the attitudetakenby Statestowardsthe resolutionsadopted

by the General Assemblyfrom 1982to 1995is to be regardedas an indication
of an emerging opiniojuris as to the customarylaw obligationto conduct

negotiationsin goodfaith leadingto general.and complete nuclear
disarmament.With regardto theattitudeof Statestowards the resolutions

adoptedafter 1996,particularlythosewhichclearly affi.rmthe existenceof a
generalobligationto pursuein goodfaithnegotiationsleadingto nuclear

disarmament,this attitudeconstitutes an expressionof opiniojuris which
supportsand confinns the Court'srecognitionin its 1996Advisory·Opinion

that this obligationis imposedby a rulehavinga customarystatus.

B) What is tlteir incidence llpon the quesiion of the existence of a dispute
between the Parties?

8. In theMarshall Islands'view,the opposingattitudesof Statestowards General

Assemblyresolutions may contributeto demonstratingthe·existenceof a
dispute.Such attitudesmay revealopposingviews as to the existenceof an

obligation,asto the interpretationof its scopeand/or asto theway in which
this obligationisto be implemented.However,the importanceto be attached

to a State'sattitudetowardsGeneralAssemblyresolutionsmustbe assessed.in
the light of the specifiecircumstancesof eachcase.In certain situat tiion~,

attitudesimply confinnsthe overallposition of that Statein relationto the
questionwhich constitutesthe subjectmatter of the dispute. ln other
situations,the attitudetowardscertain re$olutionsdoes not ofitself say much

12A/CN.4/L.869,Draft ConclusionsontheIdentificationofcustomaryinternationallaw,
provislonallyadoptedbytheDrafüngCommitteeonthe 14July2015. Inthewordsofthe

Special-Rapporteu:r"Opiniojuris may bededucedfromtheattitudesof Statesvis-à-vissuch
non-bindingtextsthatpurport,explicitlyorimplicitlto declaretheexistinglaw,asmaybe
expressedbybothvoting(infavour,againstor abstaining)ontheresolution,byjoininga
consensus,or bystatementsmadein connectionwiththeresolution". NCN.4/672, p. 65.
1Cf.AntônioAugustoCançadoTrindade,InternationalLawfor Humankind:towardsanew
JusGentium,Vol.316(2005),RecueildesCours,p.l68, ·according towhom"[t]heelement

ofopiniojuris maybemorepredominantinresolutionsofthe declaratorykind;in anycase,
resolutionsofinternational organizatio,ndinparticularthoseofthe UNGeneral
Assembly,hayebeenacceptedas•sources'ofInternationalLawnotonlybytheICJby also
by otherinternational(arbitral)tribunats.Theyoftengiveexpressiontovaluesandaspirations
oftheinternationalcommunityasawhole;'.·

4-5 about the existence of a dispute, for instance because the State's support for
resolutions recognizing the existence of a certain obligation is contradicted by

the subsequent conduct of the State, which does not conform to the obligation
in question.

9. Asto the incidence of the abovernentioned resolutions upon the question of
the existence of a dispute between the Marshall Islands and the United

Kingdom, it is submitted that the diverging voting records of the two Parties
are a clear indication of the opposing views of the Parties. The United

Kingdom has constantly voted against three UNGA resolutions relating to the
obligation recognized in the Advisory Opinion and/or commencement of

multilater14 negotiations on nuclear disarrnament that the Marshall Islands
voted for . By voting against these resolutions, the United Kingdom confirrns
that it ignores the Advisory Opinion and gives a different interpretation to the

prescriptions contained in article VI of the NPT and in the corresponding
customary international rule 1•

·yan den Biesen
gent of the Republic of the Marshall Islands

before the International Court of Justice

14SeeCR2016/9,paras.2 and Il (vandenBiesen),referringto AIRES/68/32,5 December
2013(137-38-20),Follow-up to the2013high-levelmeetingof theGeneralAssemblyon
nucleardisannament;A/RES/68/42,5 December2013(133-24-25),Follow-uptothe

advisoryopinionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeonthelegalityofthe tbreatoruseof
nuclearweap{>ns A;/RES/68/47,5 December2013(122-44-17),Nucleardisarmament.The
threeresolutionswerealsoadoptedin 2014and2015.SeeAJRES/69/58,2 December2014
(139-24-19),Follow-uptothe2013high-levelmeetingoftheGeneralAssemblyonnuclear
disarmament;A/RES/69/43,2December2014(134-23-23),Follow-upto the advisory
opinionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeonthelegalityof thethreator useofnuclear
weapons;A/R.ES/69/482 , December2014(121-44-17),Nucleardisarm.ament;A/RES/70/34,

7 December2015·(140-26-17),Follow-uptothe2013high-levelmeetingofthe General
Assemblyonnucleardisarmament;A/RES/70/56,7December2015(137-24-25),Follow-up
to theadvisoryopinionof theInternational"courtofJusticeonthelegalityof thethreator use
ofnuclearweapons;A!RES/70/52,7December2015(127-43-15),Nucleardisarmament.
15ForUKstatements,see CR2016/9(vandenBiesen- answerto JudgeBennouna's
question),para 11.

5-5