INTERNATIONAL COURT OF füSTICE
ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY
THE PROVISIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF
GOVERNMENT OF I(OSOVO
Request for Advisory Opinion
Response by the Republic of Albania
to the Questions Asked by the Judges
21 December 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Answer to the Question Asked by Judge Koroma
I. General Remarks
II. History ofInternational Law
III. The Practice of the International Law Commission
IV. The Disintegration ofYugoslavia and of the former Soviet Union
V. The 1991Guidelines on Recognition
VI. The Practice ofthe Badinter Commission
VII. Security Council Practice
VIII. Conclusion
Answer to the Question Asked by Judge Bennouna
I. General Remarks
II. Was the Issue of the Declaration of lndependence of Kosovo Put
before the Voters?
III. Conclusion
Answer to the Question Asked by Judge Cançado Trindade
I. General RemarliS
II. The Importance of the Renvoi
III. The Acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
Principles in Annex 2
IV. The Importance of the Renvoi for Issues of Self-Determination and/or
Secession
V. What Are the Factual Preconditions for the Configurations of a
"People" and of Its Eligibility into Statehood under General
International Law"?
1Answer to the Question Asked by Judge Kotoma
Judge Koroma has asked the following ·question: "It has been contended that
international law does not prohibit the secession of a territory from a sovereign State.
Could participants in these proceedings address the Comi on the principles and rules
of international law, if any, which, outside the colonial context, permit the secession
of a territory :froma sovereign State without:the latter's consent?"
I.General Remarks
1. The way the question has been put could be interpreted as implying that a
special rule of permission is necessary for a secession of a territory :from a
sovereign State without the latter's consent to be in conformity with
international law. However, it is sl,'lbmittedthat this would not be a correct
interpretation. Rather, the question is whether international law includes a rule
requiring the consent of a sovereign State for the secession of a territory as
condition for the conformity of this secession with international law.
2. If such a rule requiring the consent caimot be established it is not necessary to
find a rule expressly permitting the secession of a territory. It is submitted that
history, practice of States and opinio juris clearly indicate that no such rule
requiring consent for secession can be established. Of course, constitutional
law may prohibit secession without the consent of the central authorities of a
State.
IL History of International Law
3. Albania has already referred to the fact that after the United States declared
their independence from Britain a lengthy discussion arose to what extent this
declaration was valid and could have the consequence of establishing a new
State. The matter was not solved at that time, but when the Latin Americai1
States declared their independence it was established by practice and opinio
2 juris that third States could recognize new States after a declaration of
1
independence if the new State had become effective. This was the rule
recognized in general international law since about 1820. For a new rule to
corne _intoexistence it would have tp be shown that state practice and opinio
juris have changed. It is submitted that no such new practice can be shown.
III. The Practice of the International Law Commission
4. The International Law Corn.missiondiscussed the issue whether international
law contains a right to secession or a prohibition of secession during its early
sessions. It can1eto the conclusion that international law has neither provided
for a right to secession nor conde~ed secession aiming at the acquisition of
independence. In its deliberations on Art. 18 of the Draft Declarntion on
Rights and Duties of States the principle of non-recognition of territorial
acquisition by illegal force was explicitly limited to acquisition "by another
state", thereby excluding the case of secession. 2 This shows that the
International Law Commission, in 1949, was clearly of the opinion that the
rule had not changed.
IV. The Disintegration ofYugoslavia and of the former Soviet Union
5. It is well-known that with the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the
former Soviet Union many now sovereign States declared their independence
from either Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, respectively the Russian
Federation. As far as could be established no State and no international
organization took the view that those declarations of independence as acts of
secession were in violation of international law if the former sovereign did not
give its consent.
1Albania, April 2009, par. 44 with citations.
2Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1949, pp. 112-113.
3 6. It is true that in most cases a final agreement was reached. However, this
cannot be seen as establishing a new rule of international law according to
which the consentof the former sovereign is a necessary requirement.
7. Itis submitted that the correctness of this interpretation can be shown by the
guidelines on the recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union adopted by the M1nisters of the European Union on 16
December 1991, as well as by the practice of the so-called Badinter
Commission andthe practice of the UnitedNations SecurityCouncil.
V. The 1991 Guidelines on Recognition
8. The guidelines on recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union lay down the following requirements for recognition: "Respect
for the provisions of the Charter o:fthe United Nations and the commitments
subscribed in the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris, especially
with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; Guarantees for
the rights of ethnie and national groups and minorities in accordance with the
commitments subscribed in the ~amework of the CSCE; Respect for the
inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and
by common agreement; Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard
to disarmament and nuclear non~proliferation as well as to security and
regional stability; Commitment to settle by agreement, including where
appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State
succession and regional disputes."
9. Itwas declared that the European Community and its member States would
not recognize entities which are the result of aggression. They would take
account of the effects ofecognitiori.on neighbouring States.3
3Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union, Unîtes Nations Security Council, Doc./23293, 17December 1991, Annex II.
4 10.It is submitted that the lack in these guidelines of any requirement of the
consent of the former sovereign is clear proof for the non-existence of such a
rule in international law. The Foreign Ministers of the European Union would
have included such a requirement if they had been of the opinion that this was
required by international law. In that respect the declaration by the Foreign
Ministers is an importantexpression of Statepractice.
11.On the basis of these guidelines recognitions of new States were expressed
without the former sovereign giving a formal consent. This was in particular
true forthe recognition of Croatia. 4
VI. The Practice of the Badinter Commission
12.The European Community set up an Arbitration Commission which dealt with
many of the issues arising in the context of the dissolution of fonner
Yugoslavia. The Arbitration Commission consisted of the President of the
French Conseil Constitutionnel, the President of the German Federal
Constitutional Court, the President of the Italian Constitutional Court, the
President of the Spanish Constihitional Court and the President of the Belgian
Cour d'Arbitrage. The President of the French Conseil Constitutionnel,
Badinter, becamethe President ofthis Commission.
13.The way the Badinter-Commission dealt with the dissolution of Yugoslavia is
clear evidence for the view of all itsmembers that secession does not require
consent of the former sovereign. In Opinion no. 8 of 4 July 1992 under 2 the
followingparagraph is to be found: 1
"The Commission finds that the existence of a federal state, which is
made up of a number of separate entities, is seriously compromised
when a majority of these' entities, embracing a greater part of the
4 For details see S. Oeter, Yugoslavia, Dissolufü;m, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Vol. 4, 2000, 1563, 1568-1573.
5 territory and population, constitute themselves as sovereign states with
a result that federal authority may no longer be effectively exercised."
14. It follows that the Arbitration Commission has not required consent of the
former sovereign for the act by which the former entities of the Federal State
constitute themselves as sovereigri States. The Commission explains that
recognition in this context is witnes~ to the conviction that the political entity
so recognized is a reality and confers on its certain rights and obligations
under intemational law. 5
15. The Opinion no. 10 of 4 July: 1992 also shows that the Arbitration
Commission did not consider the consent of the former sovereign as necessary
for secession. In par. 4 of this opinion the Arbitration Commission deals with
recognition. It underlines that recognition is purely declaratory in its impact
but adds that it is nonetheless a discretionary act that other States may perform
when they choose and in the manner of their owi1choosing, subject only to
compliance with the imperatives of;general international law, and paiiicularly
those prohibiting the use of force in dealings with other States or guaranteeing
the rights of ethnie, religious and linguistic minorities.
16. It is submitted that the Arbitration Commission would have added the consent
of the former sovereign as a requirement for the recognition of a new State
brought about by secession, if the Commission would have been of that
opm10n.
VII. Security Council Practice
17. As Albania and other States have'·shoW11,Security Council practice is clear
evidence for the position that the consent of the former sovereign is no
requirement under public international law for secession. The Security Council
has dealt with cases of intervention by third States bringing about secession
5Opinion no. 8, International Legal Materials 31 (1992), 1522.
6Loc. cit., 1526.
6 and has called upon States not to .recognize the respective entity as State.
However, nothing of that s01i has happened in the case of Kosovo. The
Secmity Council has never acted on"thebasis of a rnle requiring consent of the
former sovereignfor a secession.
VIII. Conclusion
18.Albania concludes, therefore, that no rule of public international law exists
which prohibits secession of a ten-itory from a sovereign State without the
latter's consent.
7Answer to the QuestionAsked by Judge Bennouna
Judge Bennouna has asked the following question: "Est-ce que les auteurs de la
déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance des institutions provisoires d'administration
autonome du Kosovo ont fait auparavant cfampagne,lors de l'élection de novembre
2007 de l'assemblée des institutions provisoires d'administration autonome du
Kosovo, sur la base de leur volonté de déclarer unilatéralement, une fois élus,
l'indépendance du Kosovo, ou bien ont-ils, au moins, présenté à leurs électeurs la
déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance du Kosovo comme l'une des alternatives de
leur action future?"
"Did the authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo previously campaign, during the election
of November 2007 for the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self
Government of Kosovo, on the basis of their willingness, once elected, to declare
Kosovo independentunilaterally, or did they at least present the mùlateral declaration
of Kosovo's independence to their electors as one of the alternatives for their future
action?"
I.General Remarks
1. The elections referred to in the question by Judge Bennouna, held on 17
November 2007, were simultaneousthree-levelelections - for the Assembly of
Kosovo, municipal assemblies and directly elected mayors. The electoral
campaign was a rather short one, limited to only 21 days. International
observers were agreed that in general, both the elections and the electoral
process were conducted in line with European and international standards for
democraticelections. As the Council of EuropeElection Observation Mission
in Kosovo (CEEOM V) pointed out in its preliminary statement on 18
November 2007, the campaign was peaceful, but rather low profile compared
to previous elections, political entities preferring the massive use of posters
7Council of Europe Elections Observation Mission'in Kosovo (CEEOM V), Press Release - 801(2007).
8 and billboards to big political rallies.- In addition, the main political leaders
were often out of Kosovo taking part in the negotiation process on the future
9
status.
2. The two processes, that is, the electoral one, and the future status negotiations,
were progressing simultaneously, but were clearly distinct. At that time the
negotiation process was led by a Troïka, including representatives of the
European Union, the United States, and the Russian Federation. It bears
mentioning here that the Statement 'of27 September 2007 on Kosovo by the
Contact Group Ministers meeting in New York emphasized that any
settlement needs to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo, ensure standards
implementation with regard to Kospvo's multi-ethnic character and promote
the future stability of the region. 10I:urther,the Contact Group expressed their
hope that elections, due in Kosovo on 17 November, would take place with
full participation of all communities and against a calm and orderly
background. 11
3. The elections were scheduled by the Special Representative of the Secretary
General of the United Nations, heading the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in K.osov6 (UNMIK), Mr. Joachim Rücker, on 1
September 2007. The holding of the elections was announced by Mr. Rücker
on the understanding reached with:the main political leaders in Kosovo that
the elections could be postponed at any time if they were seen as interfering
with the process of determining Kosovo's final status.
II. Was the Issue of the Declaration of !Independence of Kosovo Put before the
Voters?
8Ibidem.
9
Preliminary statement of the Council of Europe Election Observation Mission in Kosovo (CEEOM
V), available at: http://www. coe.int/t/dc/fileslevents/2007 _kosovolprelim _statement _(lastp
accessed on 20 December 2009).
10In Dossier submitted to the Court by the Secretary-General, Material relating to the Establishment of
UMMIK Administration of Kosovo - Future stat1s process (Part II-I), p. 156; available at:
http://www. icj-cij.org/doclcet/files/141/15040.pclf (last accessed on 20 December 2009).
11Ibid. p. 157.
9 4. It should be mentioned beforehand that the 17 November 2007 elections
principally concemed the election of persans to lead Kosovo' s governing
structures on the wide range of issues over which those structures had assumed
control. That said, the option of independence for Kosovo was part of the
12
electoral programs of the main political parties, and of public discussions
13
and analysis in the media. The programs of some of the main political
parties, namely the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the New
Kosovo Alliance (AK.R) are clear evidence for that. 14According to the AK.R
program, the "driving force" of their activity was the sovereign and
independent state of Kosova with a developed economy and integrated into
Euro-Atlantic structures. 15
5. Information broadcast in Albanian and English through mainstream media
outlets such as "BBC", "Voice of America" and "Deutsche Welle", as well as
in the Serb media itself made it clear that independence for Kosovo indeed
was a major option. 16 Both political programs and campaigning by the
majority of the Kosovar political parties and the media coverage confirm that
independence as a major option was clearly on the agenda and was presented
to the voters.
6. The elections were, as already explained, simultaneous three-level elections
for the provisional self-government.institutions of Kosovo. For that reason, the
main focus of the campaign rested on issues such as economic development,
employment, and so on. The low vo,terturnout can be seen as an expression of
dissatisfaction regarding economic difficulties facing the population, of the
fatigue and frustration over the protracted negotiation process on the final
status, and last but not least, elections were negatively affected by bad
12LDK program, pp. 1, 5-6.
13See the Local Media Monitoring Reports for the period August 2007 - November 2007 prepared by
the UNMIK at: http://www.unmikonline.org/dpillocalmed.nspfD300?0penForm (last accessed on 20
December 2009).
14See respectively LDK, PDK, AKR and AAK programs.
15
AKR program, p. 3.
16See the respective websites ofthese media outlets for more information.
10 weather 17. In any case, the voting results show that the winner of the elections
18
was the Dernocratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), whose leader announced a few
days before the elections that Pristina would declare independence 'shortly'
after Decernber 10,2007. 19
7. The people of Kosovo, as rnentioned in Albania's earlier staternent, 20 had
already overwhelrningly voted for the independence of Kosovo in an
independence referendurn organize'd in Kosovo frorn 26 to 30 Septernber
1991, following the abolition of K.osovo's autonornous status by Serbia in
1989. Of 87 percent of the population that took part in the referendurn, 99.87
21
percent voted for the independence: of K.osovo. There can be no doubt that
the overwhelrning rnajority of the people of Kosovo were in favour of
independence.
III. Conclusion
8. The position of the people of Kosovo, as previously shown through the
referendurn of 1991, has been clearly in favour of independence. Therefore,
the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008 by its
dernocratically elected representatives was an expression of that popular will,
17
CNN reported that 'International election organizers blamed the low turnout in part on poor
weather.', available at:http://www. cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/J Ill 8/kosovo. electionlindex.html
(last accessed on 20 December 2009). As reported by the Kosovo daily newspaper Express: "Election
organizers mentioned the bad weather, with snow and rain, as the first factor for the low turn out in
elections. Joachim Rücker, Tim Guldimann and îylazllum Baraliu mentioned it as well." ln Local
Media Monitoring Report 18 November 2007, prepared by UNMIK at:
http://www. unmikonline. orgldpi/localmed nsjOrJ3?penForm&Seq= 1 #_ Refi·eshKW_Media (last
accessed on 20 December 2009).
18PDK got 34,3%, LDK got 22,6%, AKR got 12,~ 1%, LDD-PSHDK, and AAK got 9,6% of the votes.
For a detailed list of the results see the chart on Elections Statisticson p. 4 at:
http:/lwww.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/07/39006_en.pdf(1astaccessed on 20 December 2009).
19 As reported by B92 (Serbian media outlet), available at: http://www.b92.net/englnews/politics
article.php ?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=12&nav_id=!=45331.
20Albania's Written Comments, April 2009, par. 10.
21 See inter alia D. Bethlehem and M. Weller (~ds.), The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law:
General Issues Part I, Cambridge International Documents Series Volume 5, Cambridge University
Press, 1997, p. xxx; N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, Macmillan Publishers Ltd.: London, 1998,
p.347.
11namely of the pouvoir constituant'.of the people of Kosovo. The massive
popular celebrations on Kosovo's Independence Day, on 17 February 2008,
provide an excellent acknowledgment of popular support for the constituting
act of the Republic of Kosovo.
12Answer to the Question Asked by Judge Cançado Trindade
Judge Cançado Trindade has asked the following question: "United Nations Security
Council resolution 1244 (1999) refers, in its paragraph 11 (a), to "substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo'', taking full account of the Rambouillet
Accords. In your understanding, what is the meaning of this renvoi to the Rambouillet
Accords? Does it have a bearing on the issues of self-determination and/or secession?
If so, what would be the prerequisites of àlpeople's eligibility into statehood, in the
framework of the legal regime set up by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)?
And what are the factual preconditions for the configurations of a "people", and of its
eligibility into statehood, under general international law?"
I. General Remarks
1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) refers four times to
the Rambouillet Accords. Par. 11 (a) states that the international civil presence
will promote the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, ta.king full account of annex 2 and
of the Rambouillet Accords (S/1999/648).
2. Par. 11 (e) states that it is a responsibility of the international civil presence to
facilita.te a political process designed to determine Kosovo' s future status,
ta.king into account the Rambouillet Accords (S/1999/648).
3. Annex 1 states in the penultimate paragraph that the G-8 Foreign Ministers
adopted the following general prin,ciples on the political solution: A political
process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, ta.king full account of
the Rambouillet Accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the
region.
13 4. Annex 2 par. 8 envisages a political process towards the establishment of an
interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self
government for Kosovo, taldng full.account of the Rambouillet Accords and
the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region.
IL The Importance of the Renvoi
5. The Renvoi to the Rambouillet Accords has the meaning that the very detailed
provisions of the Rambouillet Accords concerning the interim phase before
reaching a final solution should be taken into account by the international civil
and security presence in Kosovo. It is clear that the details are not binding
obligations. In all the Renvoi provisions the wording is "taking full accOlmt"
or "taldng into account" the Rambotüllet Accords.
6. However, the Renvoi provisions have a very important additional meaning.
The Rambouillet Accords did not specify the final solution for Kosovo.
Rather, they left open the question whether Kosovo would become fully
independent or not. This is the consequence of the wording of Chapter 8, Art.
I, par. 3 of the final version of the Rambouillet Interim Agreement which reads
as follows:
"Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an
international meeting shall be convened to detennine a mechanism for
a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people,
opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to
undertalΠa comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this
Agreement and to consider proposals for any Party for additional
measures." 22
22S/1999/648 (Dossier No. 30).
14 7. This provision in the Rambouillet Accords shows that the final status of full
independence on the basis of the "will of the people" was foreseen as one of
the possibilities of the outcome of the interim process.t is of great importance
that the Renvoi to the Rambouillet Accords confirms this possibility as being
in line with Resolution 1244 (1999).
8. As outlined by Alba.niaalready, the reference to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia appearing in the last two
references to Rambouillet creates a balance in the wording of the resolution. It
is confirmed that the procedure as such does not in any way affect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On
the other hand it is made clear that the political process ma.y lead to a final
status of independence of Kosovo.
III. The Acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Principles in Annex
i
9. In the preamble to Resolution 1244 (1999) it is stated expressly that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has accepted the principles which have
become Annex 2 of the resolution.
10. Part 9 of the preamble reads:
"Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the
Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/615, armex 1 to this
resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia of the principles set f01ih in points 1 to 9 of the paper
presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this
resolution), and the Federa.1Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to
that paper."
11.By this construction of Resolution 1244 (1999) it has been confirmed that the
possibility of full independence of Kosovo existing under the Rambouillet
15 Accords was accepted by all those concerned as part of the principles for a
solution of the Kosovo crisis.
12. This is also shown by the first operative paragraph of the resolution. Here, the
Security Council "Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall
be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as fmiher elaborated in the
principles and other required elements in annex 2;"
13. In operative part par. 2 the Council welcomes "the acceptance by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred
to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal
Republic ofYugoslavia in their rapid implementation";
14. It is also relevant that the reference :toChapter VII of the Chruier of the United
Nations is worded in the following manner:
"...Determined to ensure the safety and security of international
personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their
responsibilities 1mder the present resolution, ru1d acting for these
purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations".
15. By this wording it is made clear that the responsibilities of all those concerned,
including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are conditioned by the·
possibilities for the outcome of the political process as to the final status of
Kosovo.
IV. The Importance of the Renvoi for Issues of Self-Determination and/or Secession
16. Since the reference to the Rambonillet Accords includes the reference to a
final settlement for Kosovo, "on thP-basis of the will of the people", it follows
that this is of relevance for self-determination or secession. By the
construction of Resofotion 1244 the Security Council has recognized that the
16 will of the people of Kosovo is ofidecisive importa11cein that context. The
people of Kosovo is recognized in this Renvoi.
17. This is confirmed by the Constitütional Framework for Provisional Self
Government of Kosovo, promulgated by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the United Natîons on 15 May 2001 which proclaims that
"Kosovo is an entity under interim international administration which, with its
people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes." 23
18. The construction of Resolution 1244 (1999) shows that the people of Kosovo
is seen as eligible for statehood if the process started by Resolution 1244
should end with this result. Since the process did not reach any mutually
accepted result the people of Kosovo could exercise its right of self
determination.
V. What Are the Factual Preconditions for the Configurations of a "People" and of Its
Eligibility into Statehood under General International Law"?
19. The Canadian Supreme Court, in the Quebec case discussed the meaning of
the notion of people concerning the right to self-determination. Itstated that
the meaning of the term "people" remains somewhat uncertain. According to
the Comi it is clear that a people may include only a po1iion of the population
of an existing State. The definition of the term cannot be restricted to the
population of existing States because that would render the granting of a right
to self-determination largely duplicative. 24
20. It is submitted that the following elements are of importance in the context of
defining a people having a right to external self-determination:
23Art. 1.1 of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK/Reg./2001/9, 15
May 2001.
24
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, International Legal Materials 37 (1998),
1370 S.
17 1. A subjective element concerning the identity of the people.
2. A historical element concerning the development into a specific entity
of that people.
3. Linguistic, cultural and religious elements will frequently be of
importance for creating the necessary identity.
21. The people of Kosovo, being of more than 90% of Albanian linguistic, cultmal
and historical origin, forms a people in the sense of the right to self
determination.
22. As explained by Albania and other participants the people of Kosovo, having
been brutally suppressed for ten years by Serbia, has exercised its right of self
determination by the Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008 in full
conformity with international law.
18
Reply of Albania to questions posed by Judges Koroma, Bennouna and Cançado Trindade at the close of the oral proceedings