Preliminary Objections of Colombia | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Document Number

18778

Document Type

Case

154 - Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Incidental Proceedings

Preliminary objections

Date of the Document

Thu, 08/14/2014 - 12:00

Document File

18778.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ____________________________________________ QUESTION OF THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND COLOMBIA BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE NICARAGUAN COAST (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA) PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA VOLUME I 14 AUGUST 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION...........................................................1 Chapter 2 HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TERRITORIALAND MARITIME DISPUTE (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA) CASE, THE JUDGMENT OF 19 NOVEMBER 2012,AND ITS AFTERMATH .................................................................5 A. The Phases of Adjudication and the Preceding Judgment..................................................................5 B. Colombia's Denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá .........................................1.........................2 Chapter 3 FIRST OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION UNDER THE PACT OF BOGOTÁ RATIONE TEMPORIS ...............................27 A. Introduction.............................................................27 B. The Pact of Bogotá Allows Parties to Withdraw from the Treaty by Unilateral Denunciatio...........................................................29 (1) T he relevanT feaTures of The P acT of B ogoTá .................................................................29 (2) T he law and Procedure of denunciaTion under The PacT o fB ogoTá ............................................33 C. Colombia's Denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá was in Accordance with the Requirements of the Pact of Bogotá ...............................................57 D. Conclusion .....................................9........................5 Appendix to Ch. 3 The Pact of Bogotá ............................61 iChapter 4 SECOND PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE JUDGMENT OF 19 NOVEMBER 2012 DOES NOT GRANT THE COURT A CONTINUING JURISDICTION ...........................................................65 A. Introduction.............................................................65 B. There Is No Jurisdictional Basis for Nicaragua's Claim under the Statute ...........................................67 C. The Court's Jurisdiction Is Preserved Only When the Parties or the Court Expressly So Provide ........68 D. The Judgment of 19 November 2012 Fully Decided the Subject-Matter of the Dispute Introduced by Nicaragua with ItsApplication of 6 December 2001 ....................................................74 (1) The JudgmenT of 19 novemBer 2012...................74 (2) There is no conTinuing JurisdicTion over The suBJec-maTTer of nicaragua sa PPlicaTio........80 E. Conclusion ....................................2.........................8 Chapter 5 THIRD PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE NICARAGUA'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA .....................................83 A. Introduction.............................................................83 B. The Parties' Written and Oral Submissions iTerritorial and Maritime Dispute Regarding Nicaragua's I(3) Claim ............................................85 (1) The issues raised in The a PPlicaTionof 16 sePTemBer 2013 were exTensively argued By n icaragua and colomBia in The wriTTen suBmissions Preceding ThJudgmenT inTerriTorial anM ariTiMedispuTe.....................85 (2) The issues raised in The a PPlicaTionof 16 sePTemBer 2013 were exTensively argued Byn icaragua and colomBia in The oral Phase Preceding The JudgmenT in TerriTorial and M ariTiMd ispuTe..................................................93 C. The Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 Did Not Uphold Nicaragua's I(3) Claim ........................99 ii (1) The c ourT uPheld nicaragua s i(3) 19 novemBer 2012..............................................99 (2) The c ourT did noT uPhold claim on The meriTs D. The Court's Judgment With Respect to Nicaragua's I(3) Claim is Res Judicata .................108 (1) The law .............................................................108 (2) Because The issues raised in aPPlicaTion of 16 s already Been decided By The udgmenT ,They are res judicaTa E. Conclusion: Nicaragua's Claim in this Case Is Barred bRyes Judicata .........................................134 Chapter 6 FOURTH PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM THAT IS AN ATTEMPT TO APPEAL AND REVISE THE COURT JUDGMENT OF 19 NOVEMBER 2012..................................................137 A. Introduction...........................................................137 B. Nicaragua's Attempt to Has No Basis in the Statute ...................................139 (1) udgmenTs of The wiThouT aPPeal...................................................139 (2) nicaragua s aPPlicaTion is TanTamounT To an aPPeal.................................................................141 C. Nicaragua Also Seeks to Revise the Court's Judgment without Meeting the Requisites of the Statut.e...................................................................144 (1) The sTaTuTory requiremenTs for revising a udgmenT Based on The discovery of a new facT are cumulaTive (2) nicaragua s a PPlicaTion is Based on claimed “new facTs” ........................................................146 (3) The only form nicaragua may lodge such an aPPlicaTion is ThaT ofa rTicle61..............................................151 (4) nicaragua has requiremenTs ofa ii D. Conclusions ...........................................................156 Chapter 7 PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FIRSTAND SECOND REQUESTS IN NICARAGUA'S APPLICATION ..............................159 A. Introduction...........................................................159 B. The Inadmissibility of Nicaragua's First Request .160 (1) as TaTe cannoT esTaBlish a conTinenTal shelf wiThouT an enTiTlemenT .....................................160 (2) in order To esTaBlish iTs conTinenTal shelf Beyond 200 nauTical miles a s TaTe requires a recommendaTion By The clcs........................161 (3) T he clcs has noT made a recommendaTion .....163 (4) in These circumsTances , The icJ cannoT delimiT The conTinenTal shelf Beyond 200 nauTical miles .............................................164 (5) c onclusion .........................................................168 C. The Inadmissibility of Nicaragua's Second Request ...........................................69...................1 (1) inadmissiBiliTy as a consequence of inadmissiBiliTy of (or lack of JurisdicTion over )The firsTr equesT ....................................169 (2) T he requesT is inadmissiBle Because , if granTed , The c ourT s decision would Be wiThouT oBJecT ...................................................170 (3) T he requesT is a disguised ,BuT unfounded , requesT for Provisional measures .....................171 (4) T he requesT is inadmissiBle Because iT concerns a non -exisTenT disPuTe .......................172 (5) c onclusion .........................................................172 Chapter 8 SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS ...173 SUBMISSIONS............................................................175 LIST OF ANNEXES AND FIGURES........................177 iv Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1. Colombia respectfully Court of Justice (the Court) cannot adjudicate on the matters brought by Nicaragua's Application of 16 September 2013. accordance with Article 79 of the Rules of Court, t his Pleading sets out Colombia's preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and also to the admissibility of the claims in Nicaragua's Application. 1.2. In its Application, Nicaragua has requested the Court to adjudge and declare, “First: The precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. Second: The principles and rules of international law that determine the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use resources, pending the delimitation of the maritime boundary between them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's coast.” 1 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application of the Republic of Nicaragua instituting proceedings a gainst t he Republic of Colombia, 16 Sept (“Application”), p. 8, para. 12. iv1.3. In its Application, Nicaragua purports to base the jurisdiction of the Court on two grounds. The first is that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based on Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific 2 Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) of 30 April 1948.” As an additional ground, “Nicaragua submits that the subject -matter of the present Application remains within t he jurisdiction of the Court established in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute ( Nicaragua v. Colombia) of which the Court was seised by the Application dated 6 December 2001, submitted by Nicaragua, in as much as the Court did not in its Judgment dated 19 November 2012 definitively determine the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia in the area beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, which question was and remains before the Court in that case.”3 1.4. Colombia submits that neither of the grounds which Nicaragua invokes affords it jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, its Application is barred by the res judicata effect of the Court 's Judgment of 19 November 2012. Nicaragua's Application also fails jurisdiction and admissibility on other grounds as detailed below. 1.5. Chapter 2 of this pleading reviews the history of this dispute beginning in 2001, the Judgment of the Court of 19 November 2012 in Territorial and Maritime Dispute , and 2 3 Application, at para. 8. Ibid., at para. 10. 21.3. In its Application, Nicaragua purports to base the jurisdiction of the Court on two grounds. The first is that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based on Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific 2 Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) of 30 April 1948.” As an additional ground, “Nicaragua submits that the subject -matter of the present Application remains within t he jurisdiction of the Court established in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute ( Nicaragua v. Colombia) of which the Court was seised by the Application dated 6 December 2001, submitted by Nicaragua, in as much as the Court did not in its Judgment dated 19 November 2012 definitively determine the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia in the area beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, which question was and remains before the Court in that case.”3 1.4. Colombia submits that neither of the grounds which Nicaragua invokes affords it jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, its Application is barred by the res judicata effect of the Court 's Judgment of 19 November 2012. Nicaragua's Application also fails jurisdiction and admissibility on other grounds as detailed below. 1.5. Chapter 2 of this pleading reviews the history of this dispute beginning in 2001, the Judgment of the Court of 19 November 2012 in Territorial and Maritime Dispute , and 2 3 Application, at para. 8. Ibid., at para. 10. 2Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 without complying with the requirements of the Statute. 1.10. Chapter 7 presents Colombia's fifth preliminary objection which demonstrates that the first and second requests of Nicaragua's Application are inadmissible because the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereafter “CLCS”) has not made the requisite recommendation. 1.11. Chapter 8 summarizes Colombia's objections to jurisdiction and admissibility , and is followed by Colombia's submissions. 4Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 without complying with the requirements of the Statute. 1.10. Chapter 7 presents Colombia's fifth preliminary objection which demonstrates that the first and second requests of Nicaragua's Application are inadmissible because the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereafter “CLCS”) has not made the requisite recommendation. 1.11. Chapter 8 summarizes Colombia's objections to jurisdiction and admissibility , and is followed by Colombia's submissions. 4 question of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina.” 4 2.3. The Court also concluded that it had jurisdiction under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá – the same jurisdictional basis sought by Nicaragua in its present Application – to adjudicate the dispute concerning sovereignty over a group of Colombian islands in the Caribbean – different from those already men tioned – and upon the maritime d elimitation between the Parties. 5 2.4. On 25 February 2010 and 10 June 2010, respectively, the Republic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Honduras each filed an Application for permission to intervene pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute of the Court. In separate judgments dated 4 May 2011, the Court denied permission to intervene to either Costa Rica or Honduras, because, in its opinion, each had failed to demonstrate that it possessed an interest of a legal nature which 6 might be affected by the decision in the main proceedings. 2.5. The written proceedings on the merits consisted of two full rounds of pleadings. After the closing of this phase, public hearings were held between 23 April and 4 May 2012. 4 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 861, para. 90. 5 Ibid., p. 876, para. 142 (3) (a) and (b). 6 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 348 at p. 373, paras. 90-91; Ibid., Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene p. 420 at p. 444, paras. 75-76. 6 question of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina.” 4 2.3. The Court also concluded that it had jurisdiction under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá – the same jurisdictional basis sought by Nicaragua in its present Application – to adjudicate the dispute concerning sovereignty over a group of Colombian islands in the Caribbean – different from those already men tioned – and upon the maritime d elimitation between the Parties. 5 2.4. On 25 February 2010 and 10 June 2010, respectively, the Republic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Honduras each filed an Application for permission to intervene pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute of the Court. In separate judgments dated 4 May 2011, the Court denied permission to intervene to either Costa Rica or Honduras, because, in its opinion, each had failed to demonstrate that it possessed an interest of a legal nature which 6 might be affected by the decision in the main proceedings. 2.5. The written proceedings on the merits consisted of two full rounds of pleadings. After the closing of this phase, public hearings were held between 23 April and 4 May 2012. 4 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 861, para. 90. 5 Ibid., p. 876, para. 142 (3) (a) and (b). 6 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 348 at p. 373, paras. 90-91; Ibid., Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene p. 420 at p. 444, paras. 75-76. 6and extent of the delimitation to be effected, Nicaragua submitted: “On a substantive level, Nicaragua originally requested of the Court, and continues to so request, that all maritime areas of Nicaragua and Colombia be delimited on the basis of international law; that is, in a way that guarantees to the Parties an equitable result. (…) But whatever method or procedure is adopted by the Court to effect the delimitation, the aim of Nicaragua is that the decision leaves no more maritime areas pending delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. This was and is the main objective of Nicaragua since it filed its Application 10 in this case.” 2.10. At the hearing of 1 May 2012, Nicaragua insisted on a delimitation of all maritime entitlements between itself and Colombia, emphasizing that the appropriate form of delimitation was “a con tinental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties.” 11 This Submission I(3) was deliberated by the Court in terms of its admissibility, and also, in terms of its merits. 2.11. For its part, Colombia, at all stages of the proceedings in the merits, rejected Nicaragua 's contention on what was to be 10 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 , p. 671, para. 134; Ibid., Public Sitting 23 April 2012, CR2012/8 , pp. 24 -25, paras. 43 -44 (Nicaraguan Agent). (Emphasis added) 11 Ibid., Public Sitting 1 May 2012, CR2012/15 Corr. , p. 50, Final Submission I(3) (Nicaraguan Agent). 8and extent of the delimitation to be effected, Nicaragua submitted: “On a substantive level, Nicaragua originally requested of the Court, and continues to so request, that all maritime areas of Nicaragua and Colombia be delimited on the basis of international law; that is, in a way that guarantees to the Parties an equitable result. (…) But whatever method or procedure is adopted by the Court to effect the delimitation, the aim of Nicaragua is that the decision leaves no more maritime areas pending delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. This was and is the main objective of Nicaragua since it filed its Application in this case.”10 2.10. At the hearing of 1 May 2012, Nicaragua insisted on a delimitation of all maritime entitlements between itself and Colombia, emphasizing that the appropriate form of delimitation was “a con tinental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties.” 11 This Submission I(3) was deliberated by the Court in terms of its admissibility, and also, in terms of its merits. 2.11. For its part, Colombia, at all stages of the proceedings in the merits, rejected Nicaragua 's contention on what was to be 10 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 , p. 671, para. 134; Ibid., Public Sitting 23 April 2012, CR2012/8 , pp. 24 -25, paras. 43 -44 (Nicaraguan Agent). (Emphasis added) 11 Ibid., Public Sitting 1 May 2012, CR2012/15 Corr. , p. 50, Final Submission I(3) (Nicaraguan Agent). 8over the cays in dispute as well as for drawing the maritime delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. 2.16. In it, the Court described the distance of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina in relation to bot h the Nicaraguan and Colombian mainland coasts. It said: “The islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are situated opposite the mainland coast of Nicaragua. San Andrés is approximately 105 nautical miles from Nicaragua. Providencia and Santa Catalina are located some 47 nautical miles north-east of San Andrés and approximately 125 nautical miles from Nicaragua. All three islands are approximately 380 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia.” 16 2.17. Section II dealt with sovereignty ov er the seven islands in dispute.17 In this regard, the Court noted: “… under the terms of the 1928 Treaty, Colombia has sovereignty over ‘San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and over the other islands, islets and reefs forming par 18 t of the San Andrés Archipelago’…” 2.18. With respect to the sovereignty over the other islands of the San Andrés Archipelago claimed by Nicaragua, the Court confirmed Colombia's sovereignty, stating that: “Having considered the entirety of the arguments and evidence put forward by the Parties, the Court 16 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 638, para. 22. 17 Ibid., pp. 641-662, paras. 25-103. 18 Ibid., p. 646, para. 42. 10over the cays in dispute as well as for drawing the maritime delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. 2.16. In it, the Court described the distance of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina in relation to bot h the Nicaraguan and Colombian mainland coasts. It said: “The islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are situated opposite the mainland coast of Nicaragua. San Andrés is approximately 105 nautical miles from Nicaragua. Providencia and Santa Catalina are located some 47 nautical miles north-east of San Andrés and approximately 125 nautical miles from Nicaragua. All three islands are approximately 380 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia.” 16 2.17. Section II dealt with sovereignty ov er the seven islands 17 in dispute. In this regard, the Court noted: “… under the terms of the 1928 Treaty, Colombia has sovereignty over ‘San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and over the other islands, islets and reefs forming par t of the San Andrés Archipelago’…” 18 2.18. With respect to the sovereignty over the other islands of the San Andrés Archipelago claimed by Nicaragua, the Court confirmed Colombia's sovereignty, stating that: “Having considered the entirety of the arguments and evidence put forward by the Parties, the Court 16 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 638, para. 22. 17 Ibid., pp. 641-662, paras. 25-103. 18 Ibid., p. 646, para. 42. 10a continental shelf of both Parties” as requested by Nicaragua in its final submission I(3).24 2.22. The Court analysed the jurisprudence referred to by Nicaragua in support of its claim for a continental shelf delimitation, in particular, the Judgment of 14 March 2012 rendered by ITLOS in the case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary betw een Bangladesh and Mya nmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) and the Judgment of 8 October 2007 in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras). 2.23. With regard to the Judgment by ITLOS, the Court summarized the geographical circumstances and consequent conclusions of the Tribunal, evidencing essential differences with the geographical context in the case under adjudication. The Court recalled that in the ITLOS Judgment, the Tribunal did not determine the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles; it extended the line of the single maritime boundary beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit until it reached the area where the rights of third States may be affected. In doing so, the Tribunal underlined that, in view of the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks covers practically the entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a “unique situation” as 24 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 665, para. 113. 12a continental shelf of both Parties” as requested by Nicaragua in its final submission I(3).24 2.22. The Court analysed the jurisprudence referred to by Nicaragua in support of its claim for a continental shelf delimitation, in particular, the Judgment of 14 March 2012 rendered by ITLOS in the case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary betw een Bangladesh and Mya nmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) and the Judgment of 8 October 2007 in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras). 2.23. With regard to the Judgment by ITLOS, the Court summarized the geographical circumstances and consequent conclusions of the Tribunal, evidencing essential differences with the geographical context in the case under adjudication. The Court recalled that in the ITLOS Judgment, the Tribunal did not determine the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles; it extended the line of the single maritime boundary beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit until it reached the area where the rights of third States may be affected. In doing so, the Tribunal underlined that, in view of the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks covers practically the entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a “unique situation” as 24 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 665, para. 113. 12 delimitation line which has a defined course ’. Nicaragua suggested that ‘the Court could make that delimitation by defining the boundary in words such as “the boundary is the median line between the outer edge of Nicaragua 's continental shelf fixed in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia's 200‑mile zone”’. This formula, Nicaragua suggested, ‘does not require the Court to determin e precisely where the outer edge of Nicaragua's shelf lies ’. The outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the 28sis of the recommendations of the Commission.” 2.26. The Court proceeded to examine this “general formulation” proposed by Nicaragua and decided that since Nicaragua had “…not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia 's mainland coast, the Court is not in a position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia, as requested by Nicaragua, even using 29 the general formulation proposed by it.” 2.27. Therefore, after evaluating Nicaragua 's evidence, the Court concluded that “Nicaragua 's claim contained in its final submission I(3) cannot be upheld.” 30 28 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. 29 Ibid., p. 669, para. 129. 30 Ibid., p. 670, para. 131 and p. 719, para. 251 (3). 14 delimitation line which has a defined course ’. Nicaragua suggested that ‘the Court could make that delimitation by defining the boundary in words such as “the boundary is the median line between the outer edge of Nicaragua 's continental shelf fixed in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia's 200‑mile zone”’. This formula, Nicaragua suggested, ‘does not require the Court to determin e precisely where the outer edge of Nicaragua's shelf lies ’. The outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the28asis of the recommendations of the Commission.” 2.26. The Court proceeded to examine this “general formulation” proposed by Nicaragua and decided that since Nicaragua had “…not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia 's mainland coast, the Court is not in a position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia, as requested by Nicaragua, even using 29 the general formulation proposed by it.” 2.27. Therefore, after evaluating Nicaragua 's evidence, the Court concluded that “Nicaragua 's claim contained in its final submission I(3) cannot be upheld.” 30 28 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. 29 Ibid., p. 669, para. 129. 30 Ibid., p. 670, para. 131 and p. 719, para. 251 (3). 142.31. The Court concluded and described the relevant area as follows: “The relevant area comprises that part of the maritime space in which the potential entitlements of the parties overlap. It follows that, in the present case, the relevant area cannot stop, as Colombia maintains it should, at the western coasts of the Colombian islands. Nicaragua 's coast, and the Nicaraguan islands adjacent thereto, project a potential maritime entitlement across the sea bed and water column for 200 nautical miles. That potential entitlement thus extends to t he sea bed and water column to the east of the Colombian islands where, of course, it overlaps with the competing potential entitlement of Colombia derived from those islands. Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a line in the east 200 nautical m iles from the baselines from which the bread35 of Nicarag ua's territorial sea is measured.” 2.32. The Court recalled that “…the relevant area cannot extend beyond the area in which the entitlements of both Parties overlap. Accordingly, if either Party has no entitlement in a particular area, whether because of an agreement it has concluded with a third State or because that area lies beyond a judici ally determined boundary between that Party and a third State, that area cannot be treated as36art of the relevan t area for present purposes.” 35 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 683, para. 159. 36 Ibid., pp. 685-686, para. 163. 162.31. The Court concluded and described the relevant area as follows: “The relevant area comprises that part of the maritime space in which the potential entitlements of the parties overlap. It follows that, in the present case, the relevant area cannot stop, as Colombia maintains it should, at the western coasts of the Colombian islands. Nicaragua 's coast, and the Nicaraguan islands adjacent thereto, project a potential maritime entitlement across the sea bed and water column for 200 nautical miles. That potential entitlement thus extends to t he sea bed and water column to the east of the Colombian islands where, of course, it overlaps with the competing potential entitlement of Colombia derived from those islands. Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a line in the east 200 nautical m iles from the baselines from which the bread35 of Nicarag ua's territorial sea is measured.” 2.32. The Court recalled that “…the relevant area cannot extend beyond the area in which the entitlements of both Parties overlap. Accordingly, if either Party has no entitlement in a particular area, whether because of an agreement it has concluded with a third State or because that area lies beyond a judici ally determined boundary between that Party and a third State, that area cannot be treated as36art of the relevan t area for present purposes.” 35 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 683, para. 159. 36 Ibid., pp. 685-686, para. 163. 16Santa Catalina would entirely overlap any similar entitlement found to appertain to Serranilla or Bajo Nuevo. 40 2.36. The Court concluded that, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the need to avoid a cut -off effect on either State – and the ensuing requirement for San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina not to be cut off from the entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to their east, even in the area within 200 nautical miles of their coasts but beyond 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan baselines 41 – the result achieved by the application of the line provisionally adopted in the previous section of the Judgment did not produce such a disproportionality as to create an 42 inequitable result. 2.37. In determining the course of the maritime boun dary, the Court considered that “…it must take proper account both of the disparity in coastal length and the need to avoid cutting either State off from the maritime spaces into which its coasts project. In the view of the Court, an equitable result which gives proper weight to those relevant considerations is achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines 43 along lines of latitude.” 40 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 689, para. 175. 41 Ibid., pp. 716-717, para. 244. 42 Ibid., p. 717, para. 247. 43 Ibid., p. 710, para. 236. 18Santa Catalina would entirely overlap any similar entitlement found to appertain to Serranilla or Bajo Nuevo. 40 2.36. The Court concluded that, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the need to avoid a cut -off effect on either State – and the ensuing requirement for San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina not to be cut off from the entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to their east, even in the area within 200 nautical miles of their coasts but beyond 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan baselines 41– the result achieved by the application of the line provisionally adopted in the previous section of the Judgment did not produce such a disproportionality as to create an 42 inequitable result. 2.37. In determining the course of the maritime boun dary, the Court considered that “…it must take proper account both of the disparity in coastal length and the need to avoid cutting either State off from the maritime spaces into which its coasts project. In the view of the Court, an equitable result which gives proper weight to those relevant considerations is achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines 43 along lines of latitude.” 40 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 689, para. 175. 41 Ibid., pp. 716-717, para. 244. 42 Ibid., p. 717, para. 247. 43 Ibid., p. 710, para. 236. 18Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the points with co-ordinates: Latitude north Longitude west 2.40. All of the above may be summarized as follows: (i) the 1. 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34.7˝ Court declared admissible Nicaragua's submission on its alleged 2. 13° 31ʹ 08.0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59.4˝ continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast; (ii) it 3. 13° 03ʹ 15.8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22.7˝ analysed that submission on its merits; and, (iii) in the operative 4. 12° 50ʹ 12.8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22.6˝ 5. 12° 07ʹ 28.8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27.7˝ part of the Judgment, it made a final delimitation of all overlapping entitlements, deciding in full, on all the submissions 6. 12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ presented by the Parties. The decisions consisted in: (a) finding From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along the parallel of latitude (co- “admissible the Republic of Nicaragua 's claim contained in its ordinates 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ N) until it reaches the 200- nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which final submission I(3)”; (b) the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is Republic of Nicaragua measured. From point 6 (with co-ordinates 12° 00ʹ submission I(3)”; and, (c) deciding that “the line of the single 04.5˝ N and 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ W), located on a 12- nautical-mile envelope of arcs around maritime boundary del imiting the continental shelf and the Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line shall continue along that envelope of arcs until it reaches exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragua and the point 7 (with co-ordinates 12° 11ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the 38ʹ 16.6˝ W) which is located on the parallel points with co-ordinates” which were indicated in the op erative passing through the southernmost point on the 12 - nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East - part of the Judgment. Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12 -nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays at point 8 (with co -ordinates B. Colombia's Denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá 12° 11 ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° 28ʹ 29.5˝ W) and 2.41. Colombia denounced the Pact of Bogotá, on continues along that envelope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9 with co -ordinates 12° 24 ʹ 27 November 2012. On that date, the Minister of Foreign 09.3˝ N and 81° 14ʹ 43.9˝ W). From that point the boundary line follows the parallel of lat itude Affairs of Colombia transmitted to the depository, the General (co-ordinates 12° 24 ʹ 09.3˝ N) until it reaches the Secretariat of the Organization of American State 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from 45 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, pp. 718-720, para. 251. 20Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the points with co-ordinates: Latitude north Longitude west 2.40. All of the above may be summarized as follows: (i) the 1. 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34.7˝ Court declared admissible Nicaragua's submission on its alleged 2. 13° 31ʹ 08.0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59.4˝ continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast; (ii) it 3. 13° 03ʹ 15.8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22.7˝ analysed that submission on its merits; and, (iii) in the operative 4. 12° 50ʹ 12.8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22.6˝ 5. 12° 07ʹ 28.8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27.7˝ part of the Judgment, it made a final delimitation of all overlapping entitlements, deciding in full, on all the submissions 6. 12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ presented by the Parties. The decisions consisted in: (a) finding From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along the parallel of latitude (co- “admissible the Republic of Nicaragua 's claim contained in its ordinates 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ N) until it reaches the 200- nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which final submission I(3)”; (b) the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is Republic of Nicaragua measured. From point 6 (with co-ordinates 12° 00ʹ submission I(3)”; and, (c) deciding that “the line of the single 04.5˝ N and 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ W), located on a 12- nautical-mile envelope of arcs around maritime boundary del imiting the continental shelf and the Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line shall continue along that envelope of arcs until it reaches exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragua and the point 7 (with co-ordinates 12° 11ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the 38ʹ 16.6˝ W) which is located on the parallel points with co-ordinates” which were indicated in the op erative passing through the southernmost point on the 12 - nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East - part of the Judgment. Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12 -nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays at point 8 (with co -ordinates B. Colombia's Denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá 12° 11 ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° 28ʹ 29.5˝ W) and 2.41. Colombia denounced the Pact of Bogotá, on continues along that envelope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9 with co -ordinates 12° 24 ʹ 27 November 2012. On that date, the Minister of Foreign 09.3˝ N and 81° 14ʹ 43.9˝ W). From that point the boundary line follows the parallel of lat itude Affairs of Colombia transmitted to the depository, the General (co-ordinates 12° 24 ʹ 09.3˝ N) until it reaches the Secretariat of the Organization of American State 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from 45 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, pp. 718-720, para. 251. 20notification o f denunciation purs uant to Article LVI of the 46 Pact. 2.42. Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá, which governs withdrawal from the treaty, provides that: “ARTICLE LVI The present Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced upon one year's notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force with respect to the state denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the remaining signatories. The denunciation shall be addressed to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other Contracting Parties. The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the 47 transmission of the particular notification.” 2.43. The full terms of the Note of 27 November 2012, wherein the Minister stated that Colombia 's denunciation of the Pact took effect “as of today” (27 November 2012) with regard to the procedures that were initiated after its notice – in conformity with Article LVI – are as follows: “I have the honour to address Your Excellency, in accordance with article LVI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, on the occasion of notifying the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, as s uccessor of the Pan American Union, that the Republic of 46 o Annex 1: Diplomatic Note N GACIJ 79357 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia to the Secretary -General of the Organization of American States, 27 Nov. 2012. 47 Annex 18: Text of the Pact of Bogotá, in the Four Authentic Languages, English, Article LVI.Emphasisadded) 22notification o f denunciation purs uant to Article LVI of the 46 Pact. 2.42. Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá, which governs withdrawal from the treaty, provides that: “ARTICLE LVI The present Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced upon one year's notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force with respect to the state denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the remaining signatories. The denunciation shall be addressed to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other Contracting Parties. The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the 47 transmission of the particular notification.” 2.43. The full terms of the Note of 27 November 2012, wherein the Minister stated that Colombia 's denunciation of the Pact took effect “as of today” (27 November 2012) with regard to the procedures that were initiated after its notice – in conformity with Article LVI – are as follows: “I have the honour to address Your Excellency, in accordance with article LVI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, on the occasion of notifying the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, as s uccessor of the Pan American Union, that the Republic of 46 o Annex 1: Diplomatic Note N GACIJ 79357 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia to the Secretary -General of the Organization of American States, 27 Nov. 2012. 47 Annex 18: Text of the Pact of Bogotá, in the Four Authentic Languages, English, Article LVI.Emphasisadded) 22subsequent to the tra nsmission of the notification, that is, 27 November 2012. 2.45. On 28 November 2012, the Department of International Law of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the OAS informed States Parties to the Pact and the Permanent Missions of the Member States that on 27 November 2012 it had received Note GACIJ No. 79357 by which the Republic of Colombia “denounced” the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement “Pact of Bogotá”, signed in Bogotá, 30 April 1948. The OAS note reads as follows: “The Department of International Law of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS) has the honor to greet the High Contracting Parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) and the other Permanent Missions before the OAS with the object of notifying that on 27 November, 2012 it received from the Republic of Colombia the note GACIJ No. 79357, attached to the present one, by which the latter withdrew from said Treaty, adopted on 30 April 1948 durin g the Ninth International American Conference.” 49 49 Annex 2: Note N o OEA/2.2/109/12 from the Department of International Law, Secretariat for Legal Affairs to thHigh Contracting Parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) and to the other Permanent Missions to the OAS, 28 Nov. 2012. The original text in Spanish reads as follows: “El Departamento de Derecho Internacional de la Secretaría de Asuntos Jurídicos de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) tiene el honor de saludar a las Altas Partes Contratantes del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas (Pacto de Bogotá) y a las demás Misiones Permanentes ante la OEA con el objeto de poner en su conocimiento que con fecha 27 de noviembre de 2012 recibió por parte de la República de Colombia la Nota GACIJ No. 79357, adjunta a la presente, mediante la cual den uncia dicho Tratado 24subsequent to the tra nsmission of the notification, that is, 27 November 2012. 2.45. On 28 November 2012, the Department of International Law of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the OAS informed States Parties to the Pact and the Permanent Missions of the Member States that on 27 November 2012 it had received Note GACIJ No. 79357 by which the Republic of Colombia “denounced” the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement “Pact of Bogotá”, signed in Bogotá, 30 April 1948. The OAS note reads as follows: “The Department of International Law of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS) has the honor to greet the High Contracting Parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) and the other Permanent Missions before the OAS with the object of notifying that on 27 November, 2012 it received from the Republic of Colombia the note GACIJ No. 79357, attached to the present one, by which the latter withdrew from said Treaty, adopted on 30 April 1948 durin g the Ninth International American Conference.” 49 49 Annex 2: Note N o OEA/2.2/109/12 from the Department of International Law, Secretariat for Legal Affairs to tHigh Contracting Parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) and to the other Permanent Missions to the OAS, 28 Nov. 2012. The original text in Spanish reads as follows: “El Departamento de Derecho Internacional de la Secretaría de Asuntos Jurídicos de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) tiene el honor de saludar a las Altas Partes Contratantes del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas (Pacto de Bogotá) y a las demás Misiones Permanentes ante la OEA con el objeto de poner en su conocimiento que con fecha 27 de noviembre de 2012 recibió por parte de la República de Colombia la Nota GACIJ No. 79357, adjunta a la presente, mediante la cual den uncia dicho Tratado 24 Chapter 3 FIRST OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION UNDER THE PACT OF BOGOTÁ RATIONE TEMPORIS A. Introduction 3.1. In instituting these proceedings, Nicaragua has put forward, as its principal basis of jurisdiction, Art icle XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. On the face of its Application, several issues do not appear to be in contention: first, that N icaragua is a party to the Pact ; second, that Colombia, whi ch had been a party to the Pact, lawfully and effectively denounced it, on 27 November 2012, in accordance wi th its terms ; third, that Colombia notification of denunciation stated that, in accordance with Article LVI of the Pact , “the denunciation... shall apply as of today with respect to proceedings which may be initiated subsequent to the present notice...”; and, fourth, that Nicaragua's Application has been lodged after the date of the transmission of the notice of denunciation. The essential point that Nicaragua avers in its Application that “in accordance with Article LVI of the Pact, that denunciation will take effect after one year, so that the Pact remains in force for Colombia until 27 November 2013.” 50 In doing so, Nicaragua errs in its interpretation of Article LVI. 50 Application, para. 9. 26 Chapter 3 FIRST OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION UNDER THE PACT OF BOGOTÁ RATIONE TEMPORIS A. Introduction 3.1. In instituting these proceedings, Nicaragua has put forward, as its principal basis of jurisdiction, Art icle XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. On the face of its Application, several issues do not appear to be in contention: first, that N icaragua is a party to the Pact ; second, that Colombia, whi ch had been a party to the Pact, lawfully and effectively denounced it, on 27 November 2012, in accordance wi th its terms ; third, that Colombia notification of denunciation stated that, in accordance with Article LVI of the Pact , “the denunciation... shall apply as of today with respect to proceedings which may be initiated subsequent to the present notice...”; and, fourth, that Nicaragua's Application has been lodged after the date of the transmission of the notice of denunciation. The essential point that Nicaragua avers in its Application that “in accordance with Article LVI of the Pact, that denunciation will take effect after one year, so that the Pact remains in force for Colombia until 27 November 2013.” 50 In doing so, Nicaragua errs in its interpretation of Article LVI. 50 Application, para. 9. 263.2. The conclusion in 1948 of an American treaty on pacific settlement, which included under certain conditions acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of a permanent international judicial institution, the International Court of Justice, was considered a significant step by the American States and was not undertaken lightl y: the Pact contained a number of important safeguards, one of which was the right to terminate that acceptance with immediate effect. 3.3. Colombia will show that the Court is without jurisdiction under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá because Colombia 's notification of denunciation of the Pact was transmitted to the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on 27 November 2012. From the date of transmission (27 November 2012), Colombia no longer accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI of the Pact. As the present case was instituted by Nicaragua on 16 September 2013, long after 27 November 2012 (the date on which Colombia 's consent to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI of the Pact ceased to have effect as provided in its Article LVI), the Court has no jurisdiction over this case. 3.4. After a brief introduction to the features and organization of the Pact of Bogotá (Section B (1) and the Appendix), Section B (2) (a) and (b) of the present Chapter will consider Arti cle LVI in accordance with the general rule for the interpretation of treaties in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter “VCLT”). Section B (2) (c) then considers 283.2. The conclusion in 1948 of an American treaty on pacific settlement, which included under certain conditions acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of a permanent international judicial institution, the International Court of Justice, was considered a significant step by the American States and was not undertaken lightl y: the Pact contained a number of important safeguards, one of which was the right to terminate that acceptance with immediate effect. 3.3. Colombia will show that the Court is without jurisdiction under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá because Colombia 's notification of denunciation of the Pact was transmitted to the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on 27 November 2012. From the date of transmission (27 November 2012), Colombia no longer accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI of the Pact. As the present case was instituted by Nicaragua on 16 September 2013, long after 27 November 2012 (the date on which Colombia 's consent to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI of the Pact ceased to have effect as provided in its Article LVI), the Court has no jurisdiction over this case. 3.4. After a brief introduction to the features and organization of the Pact of Bogotá (Section B (1) and the Appendix), Section B (2) (a) and (b) of the present Chapter will consider Arti cle LVI in accordance with the general rule for the interpretation of treaties in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter “VCLT”). Section B (2) (c) then considers 2814 Parties, out of the 35 Members of the Organiza tion of American States (OAS). Two States — El Salvador in 1973 and Colombia in 2012 — having denounced the Pact. 3.6. The Pact of Bogotá has eight chapters and 60 articles: - Chapter One. General Obligations to Settle Disputes by Pacific Means - Chapter Two. Procedures of Good Offices and Mediation - Chapter Three. Procedure of Investigation and Conciliation - Chapter Four. Judicial Procedure - Chapter Five. Procedure of Arbitration - Chapter Six. Fulfilment of Decisions - Chapter Seven. Advisory Opinions - Chapter Eight. Final Provisions 3.7. As apparent in the chapter titles and as described in more detail in the Appendix to the present chapter, the Pact of Bogotá deals with a number of distinct substantive and procedural obligations. Four of the eight chapters of the Pact — Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five — deal with specific procedures for dispute settlement. The remaining four Chapters deal with other undertakings and obligations of the treaty partners such as, for Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case. On 25 February 2014 it was invoked against Nicaragua by Costa Rica in the Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (the proceedings of which were joined with those of the Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River case on 17 Apr. 2013) and in the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean case. 3014 Parties, out of the 35 Members of the Organiza tion of American States (OAS). Two States — El Salvador in 1973 and Colombia in 2012 — having denounced the Pact. 3.6. The Pact of Bogotá has eight chapters and 60 articles: - Chapter One. General Obligations to Settle Disputes by Pacific Means - Chapter Two. Procedures of Good Offices and Mediation - Chapter Three. Procedure of Investigation and Conciliation - Chapter Four. Judicial Procedure - Chapter Five. Procedure of Arbitration - Chapter Six. Fulfilment of Decisions - Chapter Seven. Advisory Opinions - Chapter Eight. Final Provisions 3.7. As apparent in the chapter titles and as described in more detail in the Appendix to the present chapter, the Pact of Bogotá deals with a number of distinct substantive and procedural obligations. Four of the eight chapters of the Pact — Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five — deal with specific procedures for dispute settlement. The remaining four Chapters deal with other undertakings and obligations of the treaty partners such as, for Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case. On 25 February 2014 it was invoked against Nicaragua by Costa Rica in the Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (the proceedings of which were joined with those of the Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River case on 17 Apr. 2013) and in the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean case. 30 c) The existence of a ny fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation; d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.” 3.9. Article XXXI refers to and adopts the language of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the ‘Optional Clause’, which provides for the ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ of the Court through a system of interlocking declarations). Article XXXI has a similar effect, though limited to the Parties to the Pact, as would a series of interlocking Optional Clause declarations. At the same time, as the Court has said, the commitment under Article XXXI is “an autonomous commitment, independent of any other which the parties may have undertaken or may under take by depositing with the United Nations Secretary -General a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Statute.” 58 3.10. As a provision of a treaty, the application of Article XXXI is subject to the conditions prescribed in other provisions of the Pact. Under the Pact, the commitment to submit to the procedures specified in the Pact applies only where “a controversy arises between two or more signatory states which, in the opinion of the parties, cann ot be settled by direct 58 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p.69, at p. 85, para. 36. 32 c) The existence of a ny fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation; d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.” 3.9. Article XXXI refers to and adopts the language of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the ‘Optional Clause’, which provides for the ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ of the Court through a system of interlocking declarations). Article XXXI has a similar effect, though limited to the Parties to the Pact, as would a series of interlocking Optional Clause declarations. At the same time, as the Court has said, the commitment under Article XXXI is “an autonomous commitment, independent of any other which the parties may have undertaken or may under take by depositing with the United Nations Secretary -General a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Statute.” 58 3.10. As a provision of a treaty, the application of Article XXXI is subject to the conditions prescribed in other provisions of the Pact. Under the Pact, the commitment to submit to the procedures specified in the Pact applies only where “a controversy arises between two or more signatory states which, in the opinion of the parties, cann ot be settled by direct 58 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p.69, at p. 85, para. 36. 32 (2) THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF DENUNCIATION UNDE R THE PACT OF B OGOTÁ (a)The provision: Article LVI,firstandsecondparagraphs 3.12. Article 54 of the VCLT provides, in relevant part, that “The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. . . .” As will be recalled, Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá provides for denunciation of the Pact: “The present Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced upon one year's notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force with respect to the state denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the remaining signatories. The denunciation shall be addressed to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other Contracting Parties. The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notif ication.” (Emphasis added) 3.13. Article LVI of the Pact has two paragraphs. The first paragraph sets forth the right of a State Party to denounce the Pact, the modalities for exercising such a right and the effect of denunciation. The second paragraph specif ically addresses the effect of notice of denunciation on the “procedures” under Chapters Two to Five of the Pact. The second paragraph of Article LVI reads: “The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the 34 (2) THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF DENUNCIATION UNDE R THE PACT OF B OGOTÁ (a)The provision: Article LVI,firstandsecondparagraphs 3.12. Article 54 of the VCLT provides, in relevant part, that “The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. . . .” As will be recalled, Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá provides for denunciation of the Pact: “The present Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced upon one year's notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force with respect to the state denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the remaining signatories. The denunciation shall be addressed to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other Contracting Parties. The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notif ication.” (Emphasis added) 3.13. Article LVI of the Pact has two paragraphs. The first paragraph sets forth the right of a State Party to denounce the Pact, the modalities for exercising such a right and the effect of denunciation. The second paragraph specif ically addresses the effect of notice of denunciation on the “procedures” under Chapters Two to Five of the Pact. The second paragraph of Article LVI reads: “The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the 34Article LVI, and in particular its second paragraph, need to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning, to secure for the provision an effet utile, and to avoid a result which is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. 3.16. It is clear, from the text of the second paragraph of Article LVI, that, during the year following transmission of the notification of the denunciation , no new procedures , including judicial ones, may be initiated. Any other interpretation that might allow procedures to be initiated after the transmission of the notification would deprive the second paragraph of effet utile. If the intention was to allow the initiation of new procedures, it would have been sufficient simply to refer to pending procedures and it would have been unnecessary to limit the pending procedures to those that were “ initiated prior” to the “transmission” of the denunciation notification. Thus, the effect of giving noti ce of denunciation is that, while the Pact itself only ceases to be in force for the denouncing State one year later, no new procedures (including proceedings before the International Court of Justice) may be instituted against the denouncing State after the date of the transmission of the notification of denunciation to the Secretary -General of the OAS. 3.17. As will be shown below, this results from a good faith interpretation of the terms of the Pact in their context and in the light of the Pact 's object and purpose. The meaning is also 36Article LVI, and in particular its second paragraph, need to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning, to secure for the provision an effet utile, and to avoid a result which is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. 3.16. It is clear, from the text of the second paragraph of Article LVI, that, during the year following transmission of the notification of the denunciation , no new procedures , including judicial ones, may be initiated. Any other interpretation that might allow procedures to be initiated after the transmission of the notification would deprive the second paragraph of effet utile. If the intention was to allow the initiation of new procedures, it would have been sufficient simply to refer to pending procedures and it would have been unnecessary to limit the pending procedures to those that were “ initiated prior” to the “transmission” of the denunciation notification. Thus, the effect of giving noti ce of denunciation is that, while the Pact itself only ceases to be in force for the denouncing State one year later, no new procedures (including proceedings before the International Court of Justice) may be instituted against the denouncing State after the date of the transmission of the notification of denunciation to the Secretary -General of the OAS. 3.17. As will be shown below, this results from a good faith interpretation of the terms of the Pact in their context and in the light of the Pact 's object and purpose. The meaning is also 36procedures in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five after the date of notification fall outside the protective mantle of the second paragraph of Article LVI and are devoid of legal effect. 3.20. The second paragraph of Article LVI makes a distinction between pending procedures initiated before the transmission of the notification of denunciation and procedures initiated after the transmission. The second paragraph is clear that denunciation has no effect with respect to procedures that are pending at the time of transmission of the notification of denunciation, having been initiated prior to the transmission of the notification of denunciation. A contrario, denunciation does have effect as regards any other procedures not pending at the time of transmission of the notification because they purported to be initiated after the transmission of the notification. 3.21. Hence the second paragraph of Article LVI includes provisions with regard to specific procedures under the Pact: - As regards those already pending at the time of transmission of the notification of denunciation, the denunciation has no effect. This conforms to the normal position with regard to international litigation. Jurisdiction is to be determined at the moment of the institution of the proceedings and is not affected by the subsequent withdrawal of consent to jurisdiction, 38procedures in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five after the date of notification fall outside the protective mantle of the second paragraph of Article LVI and are devoid of legal effect. 3.20. The second paragraph of Article LVI makes a distinction between pending procedures initiated before the transmission of the notification of denunciation and procedures initiated after the transmission. The second paragraph is clear that denunciation has no effect with respect to procedures that are pending at the time of transmission of the notification of denunciation, having been initiated prior to the transmission of the notification of denunciation. A contrario, denunciation does have effect as regards any other procedures not pending at the time of transmission of the notification because they purported to be initiated after the transmission of the notification. 3.21. Hence the second paragraph of Article LVI includes provisions with regard to specific procedures under the Pact: - As regards those already pending at the time of transmission of the notification of denunciation, the denunciation has no effect. This conforms to the normal position with regard to international litigation. Jurisdiction is to be determined at the moment of the institution of the proceedings and is not affected by the subsequent withdrawal of consent to jurisdiction, 38the VCLT. There is therefore no necessity for recourse to the travaux préparatoires . Nor should this interpretation of the second paragraph of Article LVI occasion any surprise. States frequently take care to ensure that their consent to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal may be terminated with immediate effect. This is, for example, expressly the case with a number of d eclarations of acceptance of the Court 's jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, in which States reserve the right to terminate their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction with immediate effect . 68 For example, the United Kingdom 's declaration of 5 July 200 4 includes the following: “1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accept as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance… 2. The Government of the United Kingdom also reserve the right at any time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary -General of the United Nations, and with effect as from the 68 States reserving the right to terminate their optional clause declarations with immediate effect include Botswana (1970), Canada (1994), Cyprus (1988), Germany (2008), Kenya (1965), Madagascar (1992), Malawi (1966), Malta (1966, 1983), Mauritius (1968), Nigeria (1998), Peru (2003), Portugal (2005), Senegal (1985), Slovakia (2004), Somalia (1963), Swaziland (1969), Togo (1979) and the United Kingdom (2005). See Tomuschat in Zimmermann et al (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary (2 nd ed., 2012), pp. 678 -680, Article 36, MN 74 (Tomuschat refers to denunciation wit h immediate effect as “the price to be paid for adherence by States to the optional clause. And it corresponds to the logic of a jurisdictional system which is still largely based on unfettered sovereignty.” – p. 678). 40the VCLT. There is therefore no necessity for recourse to the travaux préparatoires . Nor should this interpretation of the second paragraph of Article LVI occasion any surprise. States frequently take care to ensure that their consent to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal may be terminated with immediate effect. This is, for example, expressly the case with a number of d eclarations of acceptance of the Court 's jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, in which States reserve the right to terminate their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction with immediate effect . 68 For example, the United Kingdom 's declaration of 5 July 200 4 includes the following: “1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accept as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance… 2. The Government of the United Kingdom also reserve the right at any time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary -General of the United Nations, and with effect as from the 68 States reserving the right to terminate their optional clause declarations with immediate effect include Botswana (1970), Canada (1994), Cyprus (1988), Germany (2008), Kenya (1965), Madagascar (1992), Malawi (1966), Malta (1966, 1983), Mauritius (1968), Nigeria (1998), Peru (2003), Portugal (2005), Senegal (1985), Slovakia (2004), Somalia (1963), Swaziland (1969), Togo (1979) and the United Kingdom (2005). See Tomuschat in Zimmermann et al (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary (2 nd ed., 2012), pp. 678 -680, Article 36, MN 74 (Tomuschat refers to denunciation wit h immediate effect as “the price to be paid for adherence by States to the optional clause. And it corresponds to the logic of a jurisdictional system which is still largely based on unfettered sovereignty.” – p. 678). 40 3. This Convention shall continue to be applicable to arbitral awards in respect of which recognition or enforcement proceedings have been instituted before the denunciation takes effect .” (E mphasis added) For the New York Convention, the relevant date is the date on which the denunciation takes effect. Note how precisely the New York Convention specifies that date in Article XIII (1). 3.26. Similarly, the Additional Protocol to the European 70 Convention on State Immunity of 16 May 1972 provides in Article 13(2) that: “Such denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the Secretary-General of such notifi cation. The Protocol shall, however, continue to apply to proceedings introduced in conformity with the provisions of the Protocol before the date on which such denunciation takes effect.” (Emphasis added) 3.27. Article 31(2) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 71 2 December 2004 addresses the effect of denunciation on the Convention itself and then deals with its effect on pending proceedings. Here again, the Convention specifies clearly the relevant date of the institution of a proceeding not affected by denunciation: 70 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on State Immunity (Basel, 16 May 1972), Council of Europe, 1495 UNTS 182. 71 UN Doc. A/RES/59/38, Annex. 42 3. This Convention shall continue to be applicable to arbitral awards in respect of which recognition or enforcement proceedings have been instituted before the denunciation takes effect .” (E mphasis added) For the New York Convention, the relevant date is the date on which the denunciation takes effect. Note how precisely the New York Convention specifies that date in Article XIII (1). 3.26. Similarly, the Additional Protocol to the European 70 Convention on State Immunity of 16 May 1972 provides in Article 13(2) that: “Such denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the Secretary-General of such notifi cation. The Protocol shall, however, continue to apply to proceedings introduced in conformity with the provisions of the Protocol before the date on which such denunciation takes effect.” (Emphasis added) 3.27. Article 31(2) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 71 2 December 2004 addresses the effect of denunciation on the Convention itself and then deals with its effect on pending proceedings. Here again, the Convention specifies clearly the relevant date of the institution of a proceeding not affected by denunciation: 70 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on State Immunity (Basel, 16 May 1972), Council of Europe, 1495 UNTS 182. 71 UN Doc. A/RES/59/38, Annex. 42denunciation on the two treaties and then for the specific effect on the pending proceedings, indicating the precise relevant dates. 3.29. As in the treaties covered above, the Pact of Bogotá in Article LVI addressed the general effect of denunciation and the effect on the pending procedures separately in its first and second paragraphs. Again, as in the treaties referenced above, Article LVI of the Pact dealing with denunciation is very specific about the relevant date of t he initiation of the pending procedures. Under the Pact, only those proceedings initiated prior to the transmission of the notification of denunciation are unaffected by denunciation. 3.30. In 1948, th e American States, for whom consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice was a new and major departure, decided to reserve their freedom to withdraw such consent with immediate effect should circumstances so require, but to do so without effect on pending proceedings. That is precisely what was achieved by the second sentence of Article LVI. 3.31. This is also consistent with the State practice of the parties to the Pact. Of the sixteen States that ratified or acceded 74 to the Pact , two have denounced it, namely El Salvador in 1973, and C olombia in 2012. Colombia 's denunciation 74 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia (denounced 2012), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador (denounced 1973), Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. 44denunciation on the two treaties and then for the specific effect on the pending proceedings, indicating the precise relevant dates. 3.29. As in the treaties covered above, the Pact of Bogotá in Article LVI addressed the general effect of denunciation and the effect on the pending procedures separately in its first and second paragraphs. Again, as in the treaties referenced above, Article LVI of the Pact dealing with denunciation is very specific about the relevant date of t he initiation of the pending procedures. Under the Pact, only those proceedings initiated prior to the transmission of the notification of denunciation are unaffected by denunciation. 3.30. In 1948, th e American States, for whom consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice was a new and major departure, decided to reserve their freedom to withdraw such consent with immediate effect should circumstances so require, but to do so without effect on pending proceedings. That is precisely what was achieved by the second sentence of Article LVI. 3.31. This is also consistent with the State practice of the parties to the Pact. Of the sixteen States that ratified or acceded 74 to the Pact , two have denounced it, namely El Salvador in 1973, and C olombia in 2012. Colombia 's denunciation 74 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia (denounced 2012), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador (denounced 1973), Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. 44 (c)Theordinary meaningsiconfirmedbythetravauxpréparatoires 3.33. The interpretation above results clearly from the application of the general rule on the interpretation of treaties of VCLT Article 31. There is therefore no necessity for recourse to the travaux préparatoires . Nevertheless, such recourse is permitted under Article 32 of the VCLT in order to confirm the ordinary meaning resulting from the application of the general rule. The travaux confirm the ordinary meaning. 3.34. The extended exercise that began at Montevideo in 1933 and culminated in the adoption of the Pact of Bogotá in 1948 was intended to update the various instruments for peaceful 76 settlement in the Americas by systematizing in a single instrument the different m echanisms for pacific dispute settlement in the existing treaties. 3.35. The pre-1936 treaties referring to conflict resolution and their procedures were unsystematic in a number of ways. One, of 1902, concerning compulsory arbitration, had only six ratifications. The other, of 1929, also dealing with arbitration, had more ratifications, but they were accompanied by reservations with respect to the scope of the arbitration clause. With the exception of the Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration (1902) 77 and the Genera l Treaty of Inter -American Arbitration 76 Pact of Bogotá, Arts. LVIII and LVIX. 77 Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration, Mexico, 29 Jan. 1902. See Annex 17: Inter-American Treaties from 1902 to 1936, Clauses of Denunciation. 46 (c)Theordinary meaningsiconfirmedbythetravauxpréparatoires 3.33. The interpretation above results clearly from the application of the general rule on the interpretation of treaties of VCLT Article 31. There is therefore no necessity for recourse to the travaux préparatoires . Nevertheless, such recourse is permitted under Article 32 of the VCLT in order to confirm the ordinary meaning resulting from the application of the general rule. The travaux confirm the ordinary meaning. 3.34. The extended exercise that began at Montevideo in 1933 and culminated in the adoption of the Pact of Bogotá in 1948 was intended to update the various instruments for peaceful 76 settlement in the Americas by systematizing in a single instrument the different m echanisms for pacific dispute settlement in the existing treaties. 3.35. The pre-1936 treaties referring to conflict resolution and their procedures were unsystematic in a number of ways. One, of 1902, concerning compulsory arbitration, had only six ratifications. The other, of 1929, also dealing with arbitration, had more ratifications, but they were accompanied by reservations with respect to the scope of the arbitration clause. With the exception of the Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration (1902) 77 and the Genera l Treaty of Inter -American Arbitration 76 Pact of Bogotá, Arts. LVIII and LVIX. 77 Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration, Mexico, 29 Jan. 1902. See Annex 17: Inter-American Treaties from 1902 to 1936, Clauses of Denunciation. 46initiated, were to take effect after a year. On the other hand, Article 9 of General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration signed at Washington on 5 January 1929 provided in relevant part that “[t]his treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of one year 's previous notice at the expiration of which it shall cease to be in force as regards th e Party denouncing the same, but shall rem80n in force as regards the other signatories.” This provision , which does not deal with the pending procedures, is similar to the remaining treaties up to 1936. 81 3.37. In the context of a regional law -making effort to secure region-wide subscription to a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism, the challenge for the conveners of the conference begun at Montevideo was to secure a draft which would attract 80 In Spanish: “…Este tratado regirá indefinidamente, pero podrá ser denunciado mediante aviso anticipado de un año, transcurrido el cual cesará en sus efectos para el denunciante, quedando subsistente para los demás signatarios.”. 81 See in Annex 17, excer pts of the following on denunciation: Treaty of Compulsory Arbitration, 29 Jan. 1902, Article 22; Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between the American States (The Gondra Treaty), 3 May 1923, Article IX; General Convention of Inter -American Conciliation, 5 Jan. 1929, Article 16; General Treaty of Inter -American Arbitration, 5 Jan. 1929, Article 9; Protocol of Progressive Arbitration,Jan. 1929; Anti -War Treaty of Non -Aggression and Conciliation (The Saavedra -Lamas Pact), 10 Oct. 1933, Article 17; Additional Protocol to the General Convention on Inter-American Conciliation, 26 Dec. 1933; Convention on Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 5; Additional Protocol Relative to Non -Intervention, 23 Dec. 1936, Artic le 4; Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 7; Inter - American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 9; Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American States, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 8. 48initiated, were to take effect after a year. On the other hand, Article 9 of General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration signed at Washington on 5 January 1929 provided in relevant part that “[t]his treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of one year 's previous notice at the expiration of which it shall cease to be in force as regards th e Party denouncing the same, but shall rem80n in force as regards the other signatories.” This provision , which does not deal with the pending procedures, is similar to the remaining treaties up to 1936. 81 3.37. In the context of a regional law -making effort to secure region-wide subscription to a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism, the challenge for the conveners of the conference begun at Montevideo was to secure a draft which would attract 80 In Spanish: “…Este tratado regirá indefinidamente, pero podrá ser denunciado mediante aviso anticipado de un año, transcurrido el cual cesará en sus efectos para el denunciante, quedando subsistente para los demás signatarios.”. 81 See in Annex 17, excer pts of the following on denunciation: Treaty of Compulsory Arbitration, 29 Jan. 1902, Article 22; Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between the American States (The Gondra Treaty), 3 May 1923, Article IX; General Convention of Inter -American Conciliation, 5 Jan. 1929, Article 16; General Treaty of Inter -American Arbitration, 5 Jan. 1929, Article 9; Protocol of Progressive Arbitration,Jan. 1929; Anti -War Treaty of Non -Aggression and Conciliation (The Saavedra -Lamas Pact), 10 Oct. 1933, Article 17; Additional Protocol to the General Convention on Inter-American Conciliation, 26 Dec. 1933; Convention on Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 5; Additional Protocol Relative to Non -Intervention, 23 Dec. 1936, Artic le 4; Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 7; Inter - American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 9; Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American States, 23 Dec. 1936, Article 8. 483.40. One month later, however, on 16 December 1938, during the Lima Conference, t he United States submitted an amended second draft of its Project .84 This new draft contained the language that would eventually become the second paragraph of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá (hereafter “the U .S. Proposal”). This language was highlighted in the original text in order to indicate that it represented a new provision by 85 comparison with the earlier texts . Article XXII of the US Proposal read: “ARTICLE XXII: The present treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely, but may be denounced by means of one year 's notice given to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the treaty shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounce it, but shall remain in effect for the remaining high contracting parties. Denunciation shall not affect any pending proceedings instituted before notice of denunciation is given.” 86(Italics in original). 3.41. Thus, what became the second paragraph of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá had its origin in the proposal by the United States of 16 December 1938, a proposal made with the evident intention of ensuring that a State that was party to the Pact could withdraw its consent to be bound by any of the procedures – 84 Annex 6: Delegation of the Un ited States of America to the Eighth International Conference of American States, Projects Presented by the United States, Topic 1, Treaty of Consolidation of American Peace 85reements, 16 Dec. 1938, at pp. 193-194. In the English version of the US Propo sal, all new matters were in italics while in the Spanish version the new text appears in bold. 86 Annex 6, at p. 203. 503.40. One month later, however, on 16 December 1938, during the Lima Conference, t he United States submitted an amended second draft of its Project .84 This new draft contained the language that would eventually become the second paragraph of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá (hereafter “the U .S. Proposal”). This language was highlighted in the original text in order to indicate that it represented a new provision by 85 comparison with the earlier texts . Article XXII of the US Proposal read: “ARTICLE XXII: The present treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely, but may be denounced by means of one year 's notice given to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the treaty shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounce it, but shall remain in effect for the remaining high contracting parties. Denunciation shall not affect any pending proceedings instituted before notice of denunciation is given.” 86(Italics in original). 3.41. Thus, what became the second paragraph of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá had its origin in the proposal by the United States of 16 December 1938, a proposal made with the evident intention of ensuring that a State that was party to the Pact could withdraw its consent to be bound by any of the procedures – 84 Annex 6: Delegation of the Un ited States of America to the Eighth International Conference of American States, Projects Presented by the United States, Topic 1, Treaty of Consolidation of American Peace 85reements, 16 Dec. 1938, at pp. 193-194. In the English version of the US Propo sal, all new matters were in italics while in the Spanish version the new text appears in bold. 86 Annex 6, at p. 203. 50the Lima Co nference that “all new matter had been 88 underlined.” 3.44. The U.S. delegation thus deliberately drew attention to the new language which was not part of the previous Inter - American instruments. All the negotiating States were, accordingly, made aware of the ch ange which was being introduced and which modified the effect of denunciation in contrast to what it had been in the earlier multilateral instruments. 3.45. Of the various drafts related to the coordination and consolidation of American peace agreements present ed to the Lima Conference, only that presented by the United States addressed the matter of denunciation. 89 3.46. On 21 December 1938, the Lima Conference adopted Resolution XV, which made particular mention in its preamble of the draft “on the Consolidation of American Peace Agreements”, submitted by the United States, because it structured the “process of pacific solution of differences 88 Annex 10: Delegation of the United States of America to the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 9-27 Dec. 1938, Report of the Meetings of Sub-Committee 1 of Committee I, Consolidation of American Peace Instruments and Agreements, 19 Dec. 1938, at p. 5. It is to be noted that the U.S. delegation highlighted in italics the additions, which include the second paragraph of what became Art. LVI (see Annex 6, Art. XXII at p. 203). 89 Annex 4: Comparative Chart of Drafts presented by American States to the First Commission at the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, Dec. 1938. 52the Lima Co nference that “all new matter had been 88 underlined.” 3.44. The U.S. delegation thus deliberately drew attention to the new language which was not part of the previous Inter - American instruments. All the negotiating States were, accordingly, made aware of the ch ange which was being introduced and which modified the effect of denunciation in contrast to what it had been in the earlier multilateral instruments. 3.45. Of the various drafts related to the coordination and consolidation of American peace agreements present ed to the Lima Conference, only that presented by the United States addressed the matter of denunciation. 89 3.46. On 21 December 1938, the Lima Conference adopted Resolution XV, which made particular mention in its preamble of the draft “on the Consolidation of American Peace Agreements”, submitted by the United States, because it structured the “process of pacific solution of differences 88 Annex 10: Delegation of the United States of America to the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 9-27 Dec. 1938, Report of the Meetings of Sub-Committee 1 of Committee I, Consolidation of American Peace Instruments and Agreements, 19 Dec. 1938, at p. 5. It is to be noted that the U.S. delegation highlighted in italics the additions, which include the second paragraph of what became Art. LVI (see Annex 6, Art. XXII at p. 203). 89 Annex 4: Comparative Chart of Drafts presented by American States to the First Commission at the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, Dec. 1938. 523.48. In September 1945, the Inter- American Juridical Committee s ubmitted its “Prel iminary draft for the Inter - American System of Peace”. The report attached to it states that “Part VII of the Preliminary Draft of the Juridical Committee, entitled ‘Final Provisions’ follows the general lines already approved by the American States .”93 In Part VII, Final Provisions, Article XXIX includes the U.S. Proposal in a formula similar to that contained in the final version of the Pact of Bogotá. It reads: “Article XXIX. (…) [Paragraph 3] The present treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of notice given to the Pan American Union one year in advance, at the expiration of which it will cease to be in force as regards the party denouncing the same, but shall remain in force as regards the other signatories. Notice of the denunciation shall be transmitted by the Pan American Union to the other signatory governments. Denunciation shall not affect any pending proceedings instituted before notice of denunciation is given.” 94 “This treaty will be valid indefinitely, but maybe denounced through notice of one year in advance to the Pan-American Union, [and] the other signatory Governments. The denunciation will not have any effect on procedures pending and initiated prior to the transmission of that notice.” 93 Annex 14: Inter-American Juridical Committee, Draft of an Inter- American Peace System and an Accompanying Report, Article XXIX,4 Sept. 1945, Article XXIX, at p. 22. 94 Annex 14, at pp. 11-12. 543.48. In September 1945, the Inter- American Juridical Committee s ubmitted its “Prel iminary draft for the Inter - American System of Peace”. The report attached to it states that “Part VII of the Preliminary Draft of the Juridical Committee, entitled ‘Final Provisions’ follows the general lines already approved by the American States .”93 In Part VII, Final Provisions, Article XXIX includes the U.S. Proposal in a formula similar to that contained in the final version of the Pact of Bogotá. It reads: “Article XXIX. (…) [Paragraph 3] The present treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of notice given to the Pan American Union one year in advance, at the expiration of which it will cease to be in force as regards the party denouncing the same, but shall remain in force as regards the other signatories. Notice of the denunciation shall be transmitted by the Pan American Union to the other signatory governments. Denunciation shall not affect any pending proceedings instituted before notice of denunciation is given.” 94 “This treaty will be valid indefinitely, but maybe denounced through notice of one year in advance to the Pan-American Union, [and] the other signatory Governments. The denunciation will not have any effect on procedures pending and initiated prior to the transmission of that notice.” 93 Annex 14: Inter-American Juridical Committee, Draft of an Inter- American Peace System and an Accompanying Report, Article XXIX,4 Sept. 1945, Article XXIX, at p. 22. 94 Annex 14, at pp. 11-12. 54 96 Commission's Drafting Committee, the then Article LV (now Article LVI) was divided into two paragraphs: “This treaty will be in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced through advance notice of one year, and will cease to have effect for the party making the denunciation, and remains in force for the other signatories. The denunciation will be made to the Pan -American Union , which will transmit it to the other contracting parties. The denunciation will not have any effect on proceedings pending and initiated prior to the transmission of the respective notice.” 97 3.51. As can be seen, the U.S. Proposal of 1938 on the matter of denunciation was almost identical to the final text adopted in the Pact of Bogotá. But it had an important structural modification: the separation of the single paragraph in the original into two paragraphs to better reflect the different subject matters of each paragraph. The second paragraph makes abundantly clear that only those pending proceedings that were initiated prior to the transmission of the denunciation notice remain unaffected. Of the other drafting changes introduced by the Drafting Committe e in 1948, the principal change was the replacement of the expression “before notice of denunciation is given” by the expression “prior to the transmission of the particular notification”. That was a change which served to emphasize that the critical date was that of transmission. Both the reference of the second paragraph to the Drafting Committee 96 Annex 16: Minutes of the Second Part of the Fourth Session of the Coordination Commission, Ninth International Conference of American States, 29 Apr. 1948, p. 537. 97 Ibid., p. 541. 56 96 Commission's Drafting Committee, the then Article LV (now Article LVI) was divided into two paragraphs: “This treaty will be in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced through advance notice of one year, and will cease to have effect for the party making the denunciation, and remains in force for the other signatories. The denunciation will be made to the Pan -American Union , which will transmit it to the other contracting parties. The denunciation will not have any effect on proceedings pending and initiated prior to the transmission of the respective notice.” 97 3.51. As can be seen, the U.S. Proposal of 1938 on the matter of denunciation was almost identical to the final text adopted in the Pact of Bogotá. But it had an important structural modification: the separation of the single paragraph in the original into two paragraphs to better reflect the different subject matters of each paragraph. The second paragraph makes abundantly clear that only those pending proceedings that were initiated prior to the transmission of the denunciation notice remain unaffected. Of the other drafting changes introduced by the Drafting Committe e in 1948, the principal change was the replacement of the expression “before notice of denunciation is given” by the expression “prior to the transmission of the particular notification”. That was a change which served to emphasize that the critical date was that of transmission. Both the reference of the second paragraph to the Drafting Committee 96 Annex 16: Minutes of the Second Part of the Fourth Session of the Coordination Commission, Ninth International Conference of American States, 29 Apr. 1948, p. 537. 97 Ibid., p. 541. 56effect of denunciation on the Pact 's other obligations, from the immediate effect on procedures initiated after denunciation. C. Colombia's Denunciation o f the Pact of Bogotá was in Accordance with the Requirements of the Pact of Bogotá 3.54. Colombia denounced the Pact, with immediate effect, on 27 November 2012. On that date, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia transmitted t o the depositary, the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, a notification of denunciation pursuant to Article LVI of the Pact . It will be convenient to set it out again: “I have the honor to address Your Excellency, in accordance wit h article LVI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, on the occasion of notifying the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, as successor of the Pan American Union, that the Republic of Colombia denounces as of today from the ‘American Treaty on Pacific Settlement’, signed on 30 April 1948, the instrument of ratification of which was deposited by Colombia on 6 November 1968. The denunciation from the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement is in force as of today with regard to p rocedures that are initiated after the present notice, in conformity with Article LVI, second paragraph...” 98 98 Annex 1. The original text in Spanish says: “Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Su Excelencia, de conformidad con el artículo LVI del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas, con ocasión de dar aviso a la Secretaria General de la Organización de Estados Americanos, a su digno cargo, como sucesora de la Unión 58effect of denunciation on the Pact 's other obligations, from the immediate effect on procedures initiated after denunciation. C. Colombia's Denunciation o f the Pact of Bogotá was in Accordance with the Requirements of the Pact of Bogotá 3.54. Colombia denounced the Pact, with immediate effect, on 27 November 2012. On that date, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia transmitted t o the depositary, the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, a notification of denunciation pursuant to Article LVI of the Pact . It will be convenient to set it out again: “I have the honor to address Your Excellency, in accordance wit h article LVI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, on the occasion of notifying the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, as successor of the Pan American Union, that the Republic of Colombia denounces as of today from the ‘American Treaty on Pacific Settlement’, signed on 30 April 1948, the instrument of ratification of which was deposited by Colombia on 6 November 1968. The denunciation from the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement is in force as of today with regard to p rocedures that are initiated after the present notice, in conformity with Article LVI, second paragraph...” 98 98 Annex 1. The original text in Spanish says: “Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Su Excelencia, de conformidad con el artículo LVI del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas, con ocasión de dar aviso a la Secretaria General de la Organización de Estados Americanos, a su digno cargo, como sucesora de la Unión 58American States informed the States Parties to the Pact and the Permanent Missions of the other Member States of the OAS that on 27 November 2012 it had received Note GACIJ No. 79357 by which the Republic of Colombia “denounced” the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement “Pact of Bogotá”, signed in 99 Bogotá, 30 April 1948. No State Party to the Pact reacted to that Note. D. Conclusion 3.58. For the reasons set out in the present chapter, and in accordance with the terms of the first and second paragraphs of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá, the International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings commenced by Nicaragua against Colombia on 16 September 2013, sin ce the proceedings were instituted after the transmission of Colombia's notice of denunciation of the Pact. 99 Annex 2. 60American States informed the States Parties to the Pact and the Permanent Missions of the other Member States of the OAS that on 27 November 2012 it had received Note GACIJ No. 79357 by which the Republic of Colombia “denounced” the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement “Pact of Bogotá”, signed in 99 Bogotá, 30 April 1948. No State Party to the Pact reacted to that Note. D. Conclusion 3.58. For the reasons set out in the present chapter, and in accordance with the terms of the first and second paragraphs of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá, the International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings commenced by Nicaragua against Colombia on 16 September 2013, sin ce the proceedings were instituted after the transmission of Colombia's notice of denunciation of the Pact. 99 Annex 2. 60be settled by d irect negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels. 100 3A.4. Articles III and IV states the Parties' freedom to choose the procedure that they consider most appropriate, although no new procedure may be commenced until the initiated one is concluded. Article V excludes the application of the Pa ct's procedures to matters within domestic jurisdiction. 3A.5. According to Article VI: “The aforesaid procedures … may not be applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral aw ard or by decision of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty.” 3A.6. Article VII restricts recourse to diplomatic protection, providing as follows: “The High Contracting Parties bind themselves not to make diplomatic representations in order to protect their nationals, or to refer a controversy to a court of international jurisdiction for that purpose, when the said nationals have had available the means to place their case before competent domestic courts of the respective state.” 3A.7. The last provision in Chapter One concerns the right of individual and collective self-defense, and reads: “Neither recourse to pacific means for the solution of controversies, nor the recommendation of their use, shall, in the case of an armed attack, be ground 100 This restriction in Article II was discussed by the CouBorder and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 69. 62be settled by d irect negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels. 100 3A.4. Articles III and IV states the Parties' freedom to choose the procedure that they consider most appropriate, although no new procedure may be commenced until the initiated one is concluded. Article V excludes the application of the Pa ct's procedures to matters within domestic jurisdiction. 3A.5. According to Article VI: “The aforesaid procedures … may not be applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral aw ard or by decision of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty.” 3A.6. Article VII restricts recourse to diplomatic protection, providing as follows: “The High Contracting Parties bind themselves not to make diplomatic representations in order to protect their nationals, or to refer a controversy to a court of international jurisdiction for that purpose, when the said nationals have had available the means to place their case before competent domestic courts of the respective state.” 3A.7. The last provision in Chapter One concerns the right of individual and collective self-defense, and reads: “Neither recourse to pacific means for the solution of controversies, nor the recommendation of their use, shall, in the case of an armed attack, be ground 100 This restriction in Article II was discussed by the CouBorder and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 69. 623A.11. Chapter Seven, also a single article, makes special provision for seeking advisory opinions from the Court: “The parties concerned in the solution of a controversy may, by agreement, petition the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on any juridical question. The petition shall be made through th e Council of the Organization of American States.” 3A.12. Chapter Eight (Final Provisions) has the following articles: - Art. LII ratification - Art. LIII coming into effect - Art. LIV adherence; withdrawal of reservations - Art. LV reservations - Art. LVI denunciation - Art. LVII registration - Art. LVIII treaties that cease to be in force as between the parties .102 - Art. LVIX excludes application of foregoing article to procedures already initiated or agreed upon on the basis of such treaties 3A.13. Finally, Article LX provides that the Treaty shall be called the “Pact of Bogotá.” 102 Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States, of 3 May 1923; General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, of 5 Jan. 1929; General Treaty of Inter -American Arbitration and Additional Protocol of Progressive Arbitration, of 5 Jan. 1929; Additional Protocol to the General Convention of Inter -American Conciliation, of 26 Dec. 1933; A-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, of 10 Oct. 1933; Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfilment of the Existing Treaties between the American States, of 23 Dec. 1936; In-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation, of 23 Dec. 1936; Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, of 23 Dec. 1936. 643A.11. Chapter Seven, also a single article, makes special provision for seeking advisory opinions from the Court: “The parties concerned in the solution of a controversy may, by agreement, petition the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on any juridical question. The petition shall be made through th e Council of the Organization of American States.” 3A.12. Chapter Eight (Final Provisions) has the following articles: - Art. LII ratification - Art. LIII coming into effect - Art. LIV adherence; withdrawal of reservations - Art. LV reservations - Art. LVI denunciation - Art. LVII registration - Art. LVIII treaties that cease to be in force as between the parties .102 - Art. LVIX excludes application of foregoing article to procedures already initiated or agreed upon on the basis of such treaties 3A.13. Finally, Article LX provides that the Treaty shall be called the “Pact of Bogotá.” 102 Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States, of 3 May 1923; General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, of 5 Jan. 1929; General Treaty of Inter -American Arbitration and Additional Protocol of Progressive Arbitration, of 5 Jan. 1929; Additional Protocol to the General Convention of Inter -American Conciliation, of 26 Dec. 1933; A-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, of 10 Oct. 1933; Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfilment of the Existing Treaties between the American States, of 23 Dec. 1936; In-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation, of 23 Dec. 1936; Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, of 23 Dec. 1936. 64final Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully dealt with the subject-matter of t hose proceedings and brought an end to the case, and the case was thereafter removed from the list of pending cases. 4.3. The notion that the subject -matter of Nicaragua 's Application remains within the jurisdiction of the Court established in Territorial and Maritime Dispute is devoid of merit. Nicaragua cites no provision of the Court 's Statute or the Rules of Court, and no legal authority, for its contention. In addition to ignoring the fact that the Court 's Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully delimited the maritime areas between the Parties – a decision that has the preclusive effect of res 104 judicata – Nicaragua's claim to jurisdiction disregards the consensual basis of jurisdiction in international law. Other than the routine sequ encing of the phases of a case – for example, reserving issues of com pensation to a subsequent phase –, the Court can preserve jurisdiction over a claim which it has already decided only in the exceptional case where it has expressly reserved jurisdiction as to subsequent events wh ich may affect the very basis of its judgment. By contrast, the Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully exhausted the Court 's jurisdiction without any such reservation. 104 Chap. 5, infra. 66final Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully dealt with the subject-matter of t hose proceedings and brought an end to the case, and the case was thereafter removed from the list of pending cases. 4.3. The notion that the subject -matter of Nicaragua 's Application remains within the jurisdiction of the Court established in Territorial and Maritime Dispute is devoid of merit. Nicaragua cites no provision of the Court 's Statute or the Rules of Court, and no legal authority, for its contention. In addition to ignoring the fact that the Court 's Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully delimited the maritime areas between the Parties – a decision that has the preclusive effect of res 104 judicata – Nicaragua's claim to jurisdiction disregards the consensual basis of jurisdiction in international law. Other than the routine sequ encing of the phases of a case – for example, reserving issues of com pensation to a subsequent phase –, the Court can preserve jurisdiction over a claim which it has already decided only in the exceptional case where it has expressly reserved jurisdiction as to subsequent events wh ich may affect the very basis of its judgment. By contrast, the Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully exhausted the Court 's jurisdiction without any such reservation. 104 Chap. 5, infra. 664.6. Nicaragua does not purport to seek either an interpretation of the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 or its revision, notwithstanding the fa ct, discussed in Chapter 6 below, that Nicaragua's Application is tantamount to a request to revise the Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute without complying with the conditions laid out in Article 61. It follows that Nicaragua has not provided an y legal basis for its second basis of jurisdiction. C. The Court's Jurisdiction Is Preserved Only When the Parties or the Court Expressly So Provide 4.7. Apart from interpretation and revision, there are only three situations where the Court can exercise a contin uing jurisdiction over a case. The first is where the parties to the original case specifically agree to the possibility of returning to the Court after it has rendered its judgment. The second arises where the Court, in its Judgment, expressly reserves ju risdiction over specific issues arising in connection with the original case for a subsequent phase of the proceedings. The third is an exceptional case, for example, one in which non -compliance with a resp ondent's unilateral commitment – which, in the Court's view, has caused the object of the dispute to disappear – will affect the very “basis” of the Court 's Judgment. That was the situation confronted by the Court in the Nuclear Tests cases. 4.8. Examples of the first two situations may be found in the current list of pending cases pu blished on the Court 's website – 684.6. Nicaragua does not purport to seek either an interpretation of the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 or its revision, notwithstanding the fa ct, discussed in Chapter 6 below, that Nicaragua's Application is tantamount to a request to revise the Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute without complying with the conditions laid out in Article 61. It follows that Nicaragua has not provided an y legal basis for its second basis of jurisdiction. C. The Court's Jurisdiction Is Preserved Only When the Parties or the Court Expressly So Provide 4.7. Apart from interpretation and revision, there are only three situations where the Court can exercise a contin uing jurisdiction over a case. The first is where the parties to the original case specifically agree to the possibility of returning to the Court after it has rendered its judgment. The second arises where the Court, in its Judgment, expressly reserves ju risdiction over specific issues arising in connection with the original case for a subsequent phase of the proceedings. The third is an exceptional case, for example, one in which non -compliance with a resp ondent's unilateral commitment – which, in the Court's view, has caused the object of the dispute to disappear – will affect the very “basis” of the Court 's Judgment. That was the situation confronted by the Court in the Nuclear Tests cases. 4.8. Examples of the first two situations may be found in the current list of pending cases pu blished on the Court 's website – 68Court] reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case.” 108 The Court made no such res ervation in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case. 4.11. The Court adopted a similar approach to compensation in the Corfu Channel case. After finding that it had jurisdiction to assess the amount of compensation and stating that “further 109 proceedings on this issue are necessary”, the Court held in the operative part of the Judgment that the assessment of the amount of compensation was reserved for future consideration, with the procedure on that subject regulated by an Order issued on the 110 same day. Similarly, in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua , the Court found it appropriate to determine the nature and amount of the reparation due “in a subsequent phase of the proceedings”, and held in its dispositif that, failing agreement bet ween the parties, the issue of reparations was reserved for “the subsequent procedure in the case.” 111 108 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005 , pp. 281- 282, paras. 345 (6) and (14). 109 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949 , I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 26. 110 Ibid., p. 36. 111 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) , Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986 , pp. 142-143, para. 284 and p. 149, para. 292 (15). And see a number of other cases where the Court has similarly reserved its jurisdiction in express terms: Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 693, para. 165 (8); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 45, para. 90 (6); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzó w (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), Judgment of September 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 64 (8) and (9). 70Court] reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the 108 case.” The Court made no such res ervation in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case. 4.11. The Court adopted a similar approach to compensation in the Corfu Channel case. After finding that it had jurisdiction to assess the amount of compensation and stating that “further proceedings on this issue are necessary”, 109 the Court held in the operative part of the Judgment that the assessment of the amount of compensation was reserved for future consideration, with the procedure on that subject regulated by an Order issued on the same day. 110 Similarly, in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua , the Court found it appropriate to determine the nature and amount of the reparation due “in a subsequent phase of the proceedings”, and held in its dispositif that, failing agreement bet ween the parties, the issue of reparations was reserved for “the subsequent procedure in the 111 case.” 108 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005 , pp. 281- 282, paras. 345 (6) and (14). 109 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949 , I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 26. 110 Ibid., p. 36. 111 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) , Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986 , pp. 142-143, para. 284 and p. 149, para. 292 (15). And see a number of other cases where the Court has similarly reserved its jurisdiction in express terms: Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 693, para. 165 (8); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 45, para. 90 (6); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzó w (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), Judgment of September 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 64 (8) and (9). 704.14. In the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case, the Court explained, at paragraph 63, the situation in the following way: “Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court 's function to contemplate that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute; th e denunciation by France, by letter dated 2 January 1974, of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot constitute by itself an obstacle to the presentatio n of such a request.” 113 4.15. In Request for an Examination of th e Situation in Accordance with P aragraph 63 of the Court`s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, the Court agreed with New Zealand that paragraph 63 of its Judgment of 20 December 1974 could not have intended to confine the Applicant's access only to the legal procedures provided in Articles 40(1), 60 and 61 (as France had argued) 114 which would have been available to it in any event. The Court stated that: “Whereas by inserting the above -mentioned words 113 Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) , J udgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 477, para. 63. 114 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court 's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, I.C.J. Reports 1995 , p p. 300-301, para. 40. 724.14. In the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case, the Court explained, at paragraph 63, the situation in the following way: “Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court 's function to contemplate that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute; th e denunciation by France, by letter dated 2 January 1974, of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot constitute by itself an obstacle to the presentatio n of such a request.” 113 4.15. In Request for an Examination of th e Situation in Accordance with P aragraph 63 of the Court`s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, the Court agreed with New Zealand that paragraph 63 of its Judgment of 20 December 1974 could not have intended to confine the Applicant's access only to the legal procedures provided in Articles 40(1), 60 and 61 (as France had argued) 114 which would have been available to it in any event. The Court stated that: “Whereas by inserting the above -mentioned words 113 Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) , J udgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 477, para. 63. 114 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court 's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, I.C.J. Reports 1995 , p p. 300-301, para. 40. 72Nicaragua's claim , 118 and by otherwise fully delimiting the maritime boundary between the Parties, the Court plainly indicated that nothing more was left to decide in this respect. When the Co urt also concluded that Nicaragua had “not 119 established” its claim as to the outer continental shelf , the Court did not qualify its finding by allowing Nicaragua to make another attempt to establish its claim to the outer continental shelf at “a later stage”. Nor does the Judgment even contemplate a reconsideration of the Nicaraguan claim in future proceedings. As the next Chapter fully deals with Colombia's objection to jurisdiction on the basis of res judicata, for present purposes it suffices to briefly set out, as the following section does, some factual and legal considerations on the basis of which the Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully decided the subject-matter of the dispute introduced by Nicaragua in its Application of 6 December 2001, and that the re is therefore no question of a continuing jurisdiction that could attach to the subject -matter of Nicaragua's Application of 16 September 2013. D. The Judgment of 19 November 2012 Fully Decided the Subject-Matter of the Dispute Introduced by Nicaragua with Its Application of 6 December 2001 (1) T HE JUDGMENT OF 19 N OVEMBER 2012 4.17. Both the reasoning and operative part of the Court 's Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute show that the 118 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 119gment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 719, para. 251 (3). Ibid., p. 669, para. 129. 74Nicaragua's claim , 118 and by otherwise fully delimiting the maritime boundary between the Parties, the Court plainly indicated that nothing more was left to decide in this respect. When the Co urt also concluded that Nicaragua had “not 119 established” its claim as to the outer continental shelf , the Court did not qualify its finding by allowing Nicaragua to make another attempt to establish its claim to the outer continental shelf at “a later stage”. Nor does the Judgment even contemplate a reconsideration of the Nicaraguan claim in future proceedings. As the next Chapter fully deals with Colombia's objection to jurisdiction on the basis of res judicata, for present purposes it suffices to briefly set out, as the following section does, some factual and legal considerations on the basis of which the Judgment of 19 November 2012 fully decided the subject-matter of the dispute introduced by Nicaragua in its Application of 6 December 2001, and that the re is therefore no question of a continuing jurisdiction that could attach to the subject -matter of Nicaragua's Application of 16 September 2013. D. The Judgment of 19 November 2012 Fully Decided the Subject-Matter of the Dispute Introduced by Nicaragua with Its Application of 6 December 2001 (1) T HE JUDGMENT OF 19 N OVEMBER 2012 4.17. Both the reasoning and operative part of the Court 's Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute show that the 118 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 119gment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 719, para. 251 (3). Ibid., p. 669, para. 129. 74entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia 's mainland coast” and that, consequently, “the Court is not in a position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia, as requested by Nicaragua, even using the general formulati on proposed by it .”121 The Court consequently concluded that Nicaragua 's claim contained in its final submission I(3) “cannot be upheld”, a conclusion that formally appears in the dispositif where the decision was unanimous. 122 4.20. In the light of that “decision” , the Court indicated that it “must consider what maritime delimitation it is to effect”, bearing in mind that “there can be no question of determining a maritime boundary between the mainland coasts of the Parties, as these are significantly more than 400 nautical miles apart.” 123 In order to determine what the Court was called on to decide, the Court found it necessary to turn to the Nicaraguan Application and Nicaragua 's submissions. In its Application, it will be recalled, Nicaragua asked the Court “to d etermine the course of the single maritime boundary between the areas of continental shelf 121 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 129. 122 Ibid., p. 670, para. 131and p. 719, para. 251 (3).The use of the formula “cannot uphold” is also important as it states a rejection by the Court of a given claim or submission on the merits. A recent example of this is the Frontier Dispute Judgment wherein the Court, by using the same language of the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case, decided not to uphold (i.e., rejected) certain territorial claims and submissions made by Burkina Faso and Niger. See: I.C.J., Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, 123April 2013, p. 42, para. 98 and p. 50, para. 114(1). Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia ), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 670, para. 132. 76entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia 's mainland coast” and that, consequently, “the Court is not in a position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia, as requested by Nicaragua, even using 121 the general formulati on proposed by it .” The Court consequently concluded that Nicaragua 's claim contained in its final submission I(3) “cannot be upheld”, a conclusion that formally appears in the dispositif where the decision was 122 unanimous. 4.20. In the light of that “decision” , the Court indicated that it “must consider what maritime delimitation it is to effect”, bearing in mind that “there can be no question of determining a maritime boundary between the mainland coasts of the Parties, 123 as these are significantly more than 400 nautical miles apart.” In order to determine what the Court was called on to decide, the Court found it necessary to turn to the Nicaraguan Application and Nicaragua 's submissions. In its Application, it will be recalled, Nicaragua asked the Court “to d etermine the course of the single maritime boundary between the areas of continental shelf 121 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 129. 122 Ibid., p. 670, para. 131and p. 719, para. 251 (3).The use of the formula “cannot uphold” is also important as it states a rejection by the Court of a given claim or submission on the merits. A recent example of this is the Frontier Dispute Judgment wherein the Court, by using the same language of the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case, decided not to uphold (i.e., rejected) certain territorial claims and submissions made by Burkina Faso and Niger. See: I.C.J., Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, 16 April 2013, p. 42, para. 98 and p. 50, para. 114(1). 123 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia ), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 670, para. 132. 76completely with the subject -matter of the dispute brought by Nicaragua is confirmed by the Court's statement that “[t]he Court must not exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Parties, but it must also 128 exercise that jurisdiction to its full extent…” 4.23. Thus, when the Court set out the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties at paragraph 237 of its Judgment, after having decided that Nicaragua 's submission I(3) could not be upheld, it described both Point A and Point B situated at the end of the 200-nautical-mile parallels as “endpoints”. In other words, the Court clearly viewed its decision as final and comprehensive. The operative part of the Judgment, where each of the parallel lines is defined as extending “until it reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the territorial sea of Nicarag ua is measured”, bears this out .129 Indeed, had the Court not intended to adjudicate and thus not to dispose of the entire subject -matter of the claims, it would have refrained from stating endpoints of the delimitation lines and deferred to the competence of the CLCS, as it did in Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 130 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Hond uras). Moreover, any perpetuation of the Court 's jurisdiction to entertain Nicaragua 's 128 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia ), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 , p. 671, para. 136; citiContinental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , p. 23, para. 19. 129 Ibid., pp. 719-720, para. 251 (4). 130 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 759, para. 319. 78completely with the subject -matter of the dispute brought by Nicaragua is confirmed by the Court's statement that “[t]he Court must not exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Parties, but it must also 128 exercise that jurisdiction to its full extent…” 4.23. Thus, when the Court set out the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties at paragraph 237 of its Judgment, after having decided that Nicaragua 's submission I(3) could not be upheld, it described both Point A and Point B situated at the end of the 200-nautical-mile parallels as “endpoints”. In other words, the Court clearly viewed its decision as final and comprehensive. The operative part of the Judgment, where each of the parallel lines is defined as extending “until it reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the territorial sea of Nicarag ua is measured”, bears this out .29 Indeed, had the Court not intended to adjudicate and thus not to dispose of the entire subject -matter of the claims, it would have refrained from stating endpoints of the delimitation lines and deferred to the competence of the CLCS, as it did in Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 130 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Hond uras). Moreover, any perpetuation of the Court 's jurisdiction to entertain Nicaragua 's 128 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia ), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 , p. 671, para. 136; citiContinental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , p. 23, para. 19. 129 Ibid., pp. 719-720, para. 251 (4). 130 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 759, para. 319. 78 133 disputes related to this submission.” 4.26. Once the Court has decided a claim in a final judgment, it has exhausted its mandate for the adjudication of that dispute. The Court has no residual or inherent power which could enable a State to resubmit the same claim by characterizing it as only a later stage of the same proceeding, but not a new proceeding. When the claim is dealt with, whether on grounds of jurisdiction or merits, the proceedings and the consent to jurisdiction on which they were based are terminated and cannot be revived by a new application. Accordingly, once jurisdiction is exhausted, as it was by the Judgment of 19 November 2012, the case is removed from the list of pending cases, as occurred with respect to Territorial and Maritime Dispute. (2) T HERE IS NO CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT - MATTER OF N ICARAGUA S A PPLICATION 4.27. The concept of some sort of self -perpetuating jurisdiction, as claimed by Nicaragua, is incompatible with the fundamental principle of res judicata, as set out in Colombia 's third objection to jurisdiction discussed in the next Chapter. Paragraph 10 of the Nicaraguan Application, however, rests on the assumption that dismissal of a claim still leaves a kind of 133 Republic of Nicaragua, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. Part I: Executive Summary, 24 June 2013, p. 2, para. 8. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive %20Summary.pdf (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014) 80 133 disputes related to this submission.” 4.26. Once the Court has decided a claim in a final judgment, it has exhausted its mandate for the adjudication of that dispute. The Court has no residual or inherent power which could enable a State to resubmit the same claim by characterizing it as only a later stage of the same proceeding, but not a new proceeding. When the claim is dealt with, whether on grounds of jurisdiction or merits, the proceedings and the consent to jurisdiction on which they were based are terminated and cannot be revived by a new application. Accordingly, once jurisdiction is exhausted, as it was by the Judgment of 19 November 2012, the case is removed from the list of pending cases, as occurred with respect to Territorial and Maritime Dispute. (2) T HERE IS NO CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT - MATTER OF N ICARAGUA S A PPLICATION 4.27. The concept of some sort of self -perpetuating jurisdiction, as claimed by Nicaragua, is incompatible with the fundamental principle of res judicata, as set out in Colombia 's third objection to jurisdiction discussed in the next Chapter. Paragraph 10 of the Nicaraguan Application, however, rests on the assumption that dismissal of a claim still leaves a kind of 133 Republic of Nicaragua, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. Part I: Executive Summary, 24 June 2013, p. 2, para. 8. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive %20Summary.pdf (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014) 80jurisdiction ad futurum. However, no party should be harassed by serial applications pursuing the same claim. E. Conclusion 4.30. While it is within the Court 's power to preserve jurisdiction over all or part of the subject-matter of a case it has decided, it did not do so in the instant case. To the contrary, the Court fully dealt with, and decided, the subject -matter of the dispute brought by Nicaragua with its Application of 6 December 2001. With its Judgment of 19 November 2012, the Court exhausted its jurisdiction in the case. Consequently, Nicaragua cannot bring a claim on the subject -matter of the Judgment of 19 November 2012, based on the contention that its present Application remains under the jurisd iction of the Court which had been established in the prior case. 82jurisdiction ad futurum. However, no party should be harassed by serial applications pursuing the same claim. E. Conclusion 4.30. While it is within the Court 's power to preserve jurisdiction over all or part of the subject-matter of a case it has decided, it did not do so in the instant case. To the contrary, the Court fully dealt with, and decided, the subject -matter of the dispute brought by Nicaragua with its Application of 6 December 2001. With its Judgment of 19 November 2012, the Court exhausted its jurisdiction in the case. Consequently, Nicaragua cannot bring a claim on the subject -matter of the Judgment of 19 November 2012, based on the contention that its present Application remains under the jurisd iction of the Court which had been established in the prior case. 82 “The dispute concerns the delimitation of the boundaries between, on the one hand, the continental shelf of Nicaragua beyond the 200 - nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured, and on the other hand, the continental shelf of Colombia. Nicaragua requests the Court to: (1) determine the precise course of the boundary of the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia in accordance with the principles and rules of international law, and (2) indicate the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping claims and the use of its resources pending the precise delimitation of the line of the boundary.”39 In Section V of its Application, under the heading “Decision Requested”, Nicaragua has requested the Court to adjudge and declare, inter alia, “FIRST: The precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. SECOND: The principles and rules of international law that determine the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources, pending the delimitation of the maritime boundary between them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's coast.”140 5.4. As is apparent on its face, the first request in this Application is no more than a reincarnation of Nicaragua's claim 139 140 Application, para. 2. Application, para. 12. 84 “The dispute concerns the delimitation of the boundaries between, on the one hand, the continental shelf of Nicaragua beyond the 200 - nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured, and on the other hand, the continental shelf of Colombia. Nicaragua requests the Court to: (1) determine the precise course of the boundary of the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia in accordance with the principles and rules of international law, and (2) indicate the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping claims and the use of its resources pending the precise delimitation of the line of the boundary.”39 In Section V of its Application, under the heading “Decision Requested”, Nicaragua has requested the Court to adjudge and declare, inter alia, “FIRST: The precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. SECOND: The principles and rules of international law that determine the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources, pending the delimitation of the maritime boundary between them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's coast.”140 5.4. As is apparent on its face, the first request in this Application is no more than a reincarnation of Nicaragua's claim 139 140 Application, para. 2. Application, para. 12. 84This area was depicted on Figure I in Nicaragua's Memorial and Figure 3-1 in its Reply. It manifestly comprised areas within which Nicaragua, in its present Application, asks the Court now to determine a continental shelf boundary. (For ease of reference, the relevant figure s are reproduced following this page.) Second, Nicaragua claimed a continental shelf boundary that lay beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. However, the Court will recall that, after its 2001 Application, Nicaragua 's position on continental shelf delimitation with Colombia evolved through the several phases of that case. It is useful to follow those changes of position in order to appreciate the significance of Nicaragua's I(3) claim. In its Application to the Court of 6 December 2001, Nicaragua 's second request to the Court was “to determine the course of the single maritime boundary between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia, in accordance with equitable principles and relevant circumstances recognized by general international law as applicable to such a delimitation of a single maritime 141 boundary.” Nicaragua maintained that claim in its Memorial, arguing that “the appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal framewor k constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia, is a single maritime boundary in the form of a median line between these mainland coasts.”142 141 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application, 6 December 2001, p. 8, para. 8. 142 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 634, para. 15. 86This area was depicted on Figure I in Nicaragua's Memorial and Figure 3-1 in its Reply. It manifestly comprised areas within which Nicaragua, in its present Application, asks the Court now to determine a continental shelf bound(For ease of reference, the relevant figure s are reproduced following this page.) Second, Nicaragua claimed a continental shelf boundary that lay beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. However, the Court will recall that, after its 2001 Application, Nicaragua 's position on continental shelf delimitation with Colombia evolved through the several phases of It is useful to follow those changes of position in order to appreciate the significance of Nicaragua's I(3) claim. In its Application to the Court of 6 December 2001, Nicaragua 's second request to the Court was “to determine the course of the single maritime boundary between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia, in accordance with equitable principles and relevant circumstances recognized by general international law as applicable to such a delimitation of a single maritime boundary.”1Nicaragua maintained that claim in its Memorial, arguing that “the appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal framewor k constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia, is a single maritime boundary in the form of a median line between these mainland coasts.”2 141 Territorial and Maritime Dispute v. Colombia), 142lication, 6 December 2001, p. 8, para. 8. Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 634, para. 15. 86 116° 30' 115° 30' 114° 30' 113° 30' 112° 30' 111° 30' 110° 30' 9° 30' 200 M 772° 772° Punta Gallinas FIGURE 330' Venezuela 30' Delimitation Area Cabo de la VerRiohacha 773° 773° 30' Punta de la Cruz 100 30' 774° 774° 30' 30' Continental Shelf Cabo de la Aguja The Delimitation Area according to Nicaragua 775° Barranquilla 775° Outer limit of Nicaragua's Colombia Punta Faro 0 Cartagena 30' 30' 776° Golfo de 776° Punta de la Garita Morrosquillo 30' 30' 777° 777° Uraba Golfo de 30' 30' 778° 778° 30' 30' P. San Blas 779° BaNjouCeavoy 779° 30' Panama 30' Colon Serranilla Cay 880° 880° Roncador Cay Serrana Cay 30' 30' 881° 881° ProIsvliadnedncia EaCstaSysoutheast GolMfoodsequloitsos 30' 30' SSaaAannndddrés S Catalina 882° AlbCuarqysuerque 882° tai h 30' C Punta Mona 30' MiCskaiytos t u Almirante P 883° CoIrsnlands 883° erlas C GàrDacioiass d P t Pu 30' Punta Castilla Puerto Limon 30' Punta del Mono Costa Rica 884° 884° Honduras Nicaragua 30' 30' 30' 30' 30' 30' 30' 9° 30' 116° 115° 114° 113° 112° 111° 110° Based on NM Figure 1 Figure 3-1 from the Nicaraguan Reply Figure 2 88 5.7. In its Memorial, Nicaragua eschewed the relevance of geological and geomorphological factors. It stated: “The position of the Government of Nicaragua is that geological and geomorphological factors have no relevance for the delimitation of a single maritime boundary within the delimitation area. As demonstrated by the pertinent graphics, the parties have overlapping legal interests within the delimitation area, and it is legally appropriate that these should be divided by means of an 143 equidistance line.” Indeed, Figure I in Nicaragua Delimitation Area” showed a shaded respective mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia with a median line just beyond the 200 Colombia's baselines. 5.8. Colombia, in its Counter -Memorial, joined issue on this point, noting that “the two mainland nautical miles apart in the area covered by Nicaragua claim.” 144 Colombia proceeded to rebut Nicaragua 's claim to areas more than 200 nautical miles from the relevant baselines of the parties, relying on the Court 's judgments in Nicaragua v. 145 Honduras and Gulf of Maine. 5.9. In Nicaragua 's Reply, filed on 18 September 2009, Nicaragua changed its submission. 143 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua Memorial of Nicaragua, Vol. I, pp. 215-216, para. 3.58. 144 Ibid., Counter-Memorial of Colombia, Vol. I, p. 313, para. 7.12. 145 Ibid., at pp. 319-321, paras.7.18-7.20. 88delimitation of a single maritime boundary, but rather a continental shelf boundary between the mainl and coasts of the Parties following a specific set of co -ordinates that lay more than 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua 's baselines and which depended on the identification of the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. 146 As evidence in support of t his new submission, Nicaragua annexed certain technical information, including the Preliminary Information it had provided to the CLCS and a delimitation of its clai med shelf with that of Colombia. 147 5.10. In its Reply, Nicaragua also rejected Colombia 's position that Nicaragua did not have an entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, insisting that “Article 76 of the Convention establishes the bases of entitlement to the continental margin and entitlement is logically anterior to the process of delimitation.” 148 Contrary to the position it had taken in its Memorial, Nicaragua then proceeded to argue on the basis of “geological and other evidence determining the outer limit of the respective continental margins of Nicaragua and Colombia.” 149 Specifically, Nicaragua contended: “For Nicaragua, there is clear topographical and geological continuity between the Nicaraguan land mass and the Nicaraguan Rise which is a shallow area of continental crust extending from Nicaragua to Jamaica. Its southern limit is sharply defined by 146 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Reply of Nicaragua, Vol. I, Chapter III. 147 Ibid., Vol. I, at p. 90, para. 3.38. 148 Ibid., pp. 79-80, para. 3.14. (Italics in original) 149 Ibid., p. 81, para. 3.20. 90delimitation of a single maritime boundary, but rather a continental shelf boundary between the mainl and coasts of the Parties following a specific set of co -ordinates that lay more than 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua 's baselines and which depended on the identification of the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. 146 As evidence in support of t his new submission, Nicaragua annexed certain technical information, including the Preliminary Information it had provided to the CLCS and a delimitation of its clai med shelf with that of Colombia. 147 5.10. In its Reply, Nicaragua also rejected Colombia 's position that Nicaragua did not have an entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, insisting that “Article 76 of the Convention establishes the bases of entitlement to the continental margin and entitlement is logically anterior to the process of delimitation.” 148 Contrary to the position it had taken in its Memorial, Nicaragua then proceeded to argue on the basis of “geological and other evidence determining the outer limit of the respective continental margins of Nicaragua and Colombia.” 149 Specifically, Nicaragua contended: “For Nicaragua, there is clear topographical and geological continuity between the Nicaraguan land mass and the Nicaraguan Rise which is a shallow area of continental crust extending from Nicaragua to Jamaica. Its southern limit is sharply defined by 146 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Reply of Nicaragua, Vol. I, Chapter III. 147 Ibid., Vol. I, at p. 90, para. 3.38. 148 Ibid., pp. 79-80, para. 3.14. (Italics in original) 149 Ibid., p. 81, para. 3.20. 90its claim vis-à-vis Colombia for an extended continental shelf and its case for its delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines. 5.13. In its Rejoinder, Colombia drew the Court 's attention to the fact that Nicaragua had shifted its argument from one based on a mainland-to-mainland median line relying on geography to one based on “…an outer continental shelf claim based exclusively on geology and geomorphology; and it has introduced a brand new claim to divide equally what is alleged to be the overlapping physical continental shelves of the Parties ' mainland 154 coasts.” Colombia pointed out that “what Nicaragua is now seeking from the Court is… (ii) recognition of a claim to extended continental shelf rights under Ar ticle 76 of the 1982 Convention …”. 155 Colombia challenged not only the admissibility of the new continental shelf claim 156 but also its merits. 157 Colombia concluded in its Rejoinder: “The new continental shelf claim [of Nicaragua] also lacks any merit. Nicaragua has neither demonstrated nor established any entitlement to outer continental shelf rights, and no such rights exist in this part of the Caribbean. Moreover, there is no basis for effecting a continental shelf delimitation based on the physical characteri stics 154 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia ), Rejoinder of Colombia, Vol. I, pp. 113-114, para. 4.2. (Emphasis added) 155 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 117, para. 4.7. 156 Ibid., at pp. 122-136, paras. 4.15-4.35. 157 Ibid., at pp. 136-156, paras. 4.36-4.69. 92its claim vis-à-vis Colombia for an extended continental shelf and its case for its delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines. 5.13. In its Rejoinder, Colombia drew the Court 's attention to the fact that Nicaragua had shifted its argument from one based on a mainland-to-mainland median line relying on geography to one based on “…an outer continental shelf claim based exclusively on geology and geomorphology; and it has introduced a brand new claim to divide equally what is alleged to be the overlapping physical continental shelves of the Parties ' mainland 154 coasts.” Colombia pointed out that “what Nicaragua is now seeking from the Court is… (ii) recognition of a claim to extended continental shelf rights under Ar ticle 76 of the 1982 Convention …”. 155 Colombia challenged not only the admissibility of the new continental shelf claim 156 but also its merits. 157 Colombia concluded in its Rejoinder: “The new continental shelf claim [of Nicaragua] also lacks any merit. Nicaragua has neither demonstrated nor established any entitlement to outer continental shelf rights, and no such rights exist in this part of the Caribbean. Moreover, there is no basis for effecting a continental shelf delimitation based on the physical characteri stics 154 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia ), Rejoinder of Colombia, Vol. I, pp. 113-114, para. 4.2. (Emphasis added) 155 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 117, para. 4.7. 156 Ibid., at pp. 122-136, paras. 4.15-4.35. 157 Ibid., at pp. 136-156, paras. 4.36-4.69. 92 But whatever method or procedure is adopted by the Court to effect the delimitation, the aim of Nicaragua is that the decision leaves no more maritime areas pending delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. This was and is the main objective of Nicaragua since it filed its Application in this case. (See sketch-map No. 2, p. 663).” 159 5.16. At the hearing on 24 April 2012, Dr. Cleverly undertook to “describe in more detail the geological and geomorphological aspects, particularly of the continental shelf.” 160 He proceeded to present geomorphological and bathymetric data purporting to prove Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf well into the 200-nautical-mile shelf and exclusive economic zone of mainland Colombia. 5.17. Dr. Cleverly was followed by Pro fessor Lowe, who sought to provide a legal basis for Nicaragua 's claim “that Nicaragua's landmass continues under the sea in a north -easterly direction for about 500 nautical miles, overlapping Colombia 's 200-nautical-mile zone.” 161 He proceeded to argue th at the alleged overlap between Nicaragua 's extensive claim and Colombia's entitlement to 200 nautical miles of continental shelf should be divided by equitable principles, in the instant case by a median line. 159 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 670, para. 134. 160 Ibid., Public Sitting, 24 April 201, CR 2012/9, p. 10, para. 2 (Cleverly). 161 Ibid., p. 26, para. 28 (Lowe). 94 But whatever method or procedure is adopted by the Court to effect the delimitation, the aim of Nicaragua is that the decision leaves no more maritime areas pending delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. This was and is the main objective of Nicaragua since it filed its Application in this case. (See sketch-map No. 2, p. 663).” 159 5.16. At the hearing on 24 April 2012, Dr. Cleverly undertook to “describe in more detail the geological and geomorphological aspects, particularly of the continental shelf.” 160 He proceeded to present geomorphological and bathymetric data purporting to prove Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf well into the 200-nautical-mile shelf and exclusive economic zone of mainland Colombia. 5.17. Dr. Cleverly was followed by Pro fessor Lowe, who sought to provide a legal basis for Nicaragua 's claim “that Nicaragua's landmass continues under the sea in a north -easterly direction for about 500 nautical miles, overlapping Colombia 's 200-nautical-mile zone.” 161 He proceeded to argue th at the alleged overlap between Nicaragua 's extensive claim and Colombia's entitlement to 200 nautical miles of continental shelf should be divided by equitable principles, in the instant case by a median line. 159 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 670, para. 134. 160 Ibid., Public Sitting, 24 April 201, CR 2012/9, p. 10, para. 2 (Cleverly). 161 Ibid., p. 26, para. 28 (Lowe). 945.21. On 27 April 2012, Mr. Bundy, on behalf of Colombia, returned to the question of whether Nicaragua, in making a claim to an extended continental shelf, had fulfilled the obligations prescribed by Article 76 of UNCLOS. He elaborated on the critical obligation in Article 76(8) .164 Mr. Bundy drew attention to Ni caragua's submission to the CLCS (which it had, for some reason, not filed with the Court in its Reply): “…the preliminary information that Nicaragua did ultimately file, I think, in April 2010 quite clearly states ‘some of the data and the profiles descri bed below do not satisfy the exacting standards required by the CLCS for a full submission, as detailed in the Commission's Guidelines.’ …The material that Nicaragua submitted, both as preliminary information, and under Annexes 16 -18 to its Reply, is utterly insufficient to establish any outer continental shelf limits under the Commission's Guidelines, which are the fundamental source of instruction for the technical 165 implementation of Article 76.” Mr. Bundy then proceeded to review the substance of Nicaragua's data and to rebut it. 5.22. In the second round of oral argument, Mr. Cleverly, on 1 May 2012, sought to defend the quality of the data which Nicaragua had submitted to the CLCS, on which Nicaragua was 164 Territorial and M aritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 27 April 2012, CR 2012/12 , p. 54, para. 52 ff, d rawing attention, in particular, to para. 407 of the judgment of ITLOS in Bangladesh v. Myanmar (see para. 54, at p. 55). That holding tracked the ICJ j udgment in Nicaragua v. Honduras as noted by Mr. Bundy at p. 55, para. 55. 165 Ibid., p. 56, paras. 59-60 (Bundy). 965.21. On 27 April 2012, Mr. Bundy, on behalf of Colombia, returned to the question of whether Nicaragua, in making a claim to an extended continental shelf, had fulfilled the obligations prescribed by Article 76 of UNCLOS. He elaborated on the critical obligation in Article 76(8) .164 Mr. Bundy drew attention to Ni caragua's submission to the CLCS (which it had, for some reason, not filed with the Court in its Reply): “…the preliminary information that Nicaragua did ultimately file, I think, in April 2010 quite clearly states ‘some of the data and the profiles descri bed below do not satisfy the exacting standards required by the CLCS for a full submission, as detailed in the Commission's Guidelines.’ …The material that Nicaragua submitted, both as preliminary information, and under Annexes 16 -18 to its Reply, is utterly insufficient to establish any outer continental shelf limits under the Commission's Guidelines, which are the fundamental source of instruction for the technical 165 implementation of Article 76.” Mr. Bundy then proceeded to review the substance of Nicaragua's data and to rebut it. 5.22. In the second round of oral argument, Mr. Cleverly, on 1 May 2012, sought to defend the quality of the data which Nicaragua had submitted to the CLCS, on which Nicaragua was 164 Territorial and M aritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 27 April 2012, CR 2012/12 , p. 54, para. 52 ff, d rawing attention, in particular, to para. 407 of the judgment of ITLOS in Bangladesh v. Myanmar (see para. 54, at p. 55). That holding tracked the ICJ j udgment in Nicaragua v. Honduras as noted by Mr. Bundy at p. 55, para. 55. 165 Ibid., p. 56, paras. 59-60 (Bundy). 965.24. On 4 May 2012, Mr. Bundy, on behalf of Colombia, devoted the bulk of his presentation to a refutation of Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf and, in particular, to Nicaragua's evidence based on geology and 171 geomorphology purporting to support its claim . He was particularly detailed with respect to the geologic and 172 geomorphologic claims in Nicaragua's revised case. 5.25. In its oral arguments, Nicaragua had insisted that it was not asking for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limits of its continental shelf, but rather for the Court to say that Nicaragua's shelf was divided from that of Colombia by a delimitation line that has a defined course. 173 But at the end of the oral hearing, Nicaragua 's final submission I(3) requested a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts overlapping entitlements to a co ntinental shelf of both Parti es. 174 Hence, Nicaragua's claim in its various formulations (i) required Nicaragua to establish that it was entitled to a continental shelf lying more than 200 miles from its baselines and (ii) requested the delimitation of that continental shelf and Colombi a's continental shelf entitlement. 5.26. Thus, the written and oral pleadings show that the Parties, the legal basis and the remedy sought in the Nicaraguan Application of 16 September 2013 are identical in all these 171 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 4 May 2012, CR 2012/16, at p. 42, paras. 33ff (Bundy). 172 Ibid., p. 45, paras. 51ff. 173 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. 174 Ibid., p. 636, para. 17. 985.24. On 4 May 2012, Mr. Bundy, on behalf of Colombia, devoted the bulk of his presentation to a refutation of Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf and, in particular, to Nicaragua's evidence based on geology and 171 geomorphology purporting to support its claim . He was particularly detailed with respect to the geologic and 172 geomorphologic claims in Nicaragua's revised case. 5.25. In its oral arguments, Nicaragua had insisted that it was not asking for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limits of its continental shelf, but rather for the Court to say that Nicaragua's shelf was divided from that of Colombia by a delimitation line that has a defined course. 173 But at the end of the oral hearing, Nicaragua 's final submission I(3) requested a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts overlapping entitlements to a co ntinental shelf of both Parti es. 174 Hence, Nicaragua's claim in its various formulations (i) required Nicaragua to establish that it was entitled to a continental shelf lying more than 200 miles from its baselines and (ii) requested the delimitation of that continental shelf and Colombi a's continental shelf entitlement. 5.26. Thus, the written and oral pleadings show that the Parties, the legal basis and the remedy sought in the Nicaraguan Application of 16 September 2013 are identical in all these 171 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 4 May 2012, CR 2012/16, at p. 42, paras. 33ff (Bundy). 172 Ibid., p. 45, paras. 51ff. 173 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. 174 Ibid., p. 636, para. 17. 98the subject-matter of the Applic ation”; 179and “the claim to an extended continental shelf [fell] within t he dispute between the 180 Parties.” The Court provided a fully reasoned explanation of its decision to uphold the admissibility of Nicaragua 's Submission I(3): “109. …The fact that Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf is a new claim, introduced in the Reply, does not, in itself, render the claim inadmissible. The Court has held that ‘the mere fact that a claim is new is not in itself decisive for the issue of admissibil ity’ (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II) , p.695, para.110). Rather , ‘ the decisive consideration is the nature of the connection between that claim and the one formulated in the Application instituting proceedings ’ (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p.657, para. 41). 110. For this purpose it is not sufficient that there should be a link of a general nature between the two claims. In order to be admissible, a new claim must satisfy one of two alternative tests: it must either be implicit in the Application or must arise directly out of the question which is the subject - matter of the Application (ibid.). 111. The Court notes that the original claim concerned the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf between the Parties. In particular, the Application defined the dispute as ‘ a group of relat ed legal issues subsisting between the Republic of 179 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 180gment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 665, para. 110. Ibid., p. 665, para. 111. 100the subject-matter of the Applic ation”; 179and “the claim to an extended continental shelf [fell] within t he dispute between the 180 Parties.” The Court provided a fully reasoned explanation of its decision to uphold the admissibility of Nicaragua 's Submission I(3): “109. …The fact that Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf is a new claim, introduced in the Reply, does not, in itself, render the claim inadmissible. The Court has held that ‘the mere fact that a claim is new is not in itself decisive for the issue of admissibil ity’ (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II) , p.695, para.110). Rather , ‘ the decisive consideration is the nature of the connection between that claim and the one formulated in the Application instituting proceedings ’ (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p.657, para. 41). 110. For this purpose it is not sufficient that there should be a link of a general nature between the two claims. In order to be admissible, a new claim must satisfy one of two alternative tests: it must either be implicit in the Application or must arise directly out of the question which is the subject - matter of the Application (ibid.). 111. The Court notes that the original claim concerned the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf between the Parties. In particular, the Application defined the dispute as ‘ a group of relat ed legal issues subsisting between the Republic of 179 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 180gment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 665, para. 110. Ibid., p. 665, para. 111. 100UNCLOS and in particular Article 76, its own jurisprudence and the Judgment of 14 March 2012 rendered by ITLOS in the Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal(Bangladesh/Myanmar). 5.30. The Court concluded that Nicaragua had not established that it had a continental shelf margin overlapping with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to a continental shelf; consequently, it did not uphold Nicaragua 's claim contained in its final submission I(3). The Court said: “128. The Court recalls that in the second round of oral argument, Nicaragua stated that it was ‘not asking [the Court] for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicaragua 's continental shelf’ . Rather, it was ‘asking [the Court] to say that Nicaragua 's continental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia 's continental shelf entitlement by a delimitation line which has a defined course ’. Nicaragua suggested that ‘the Court could make that delimitation by defining the boundary in words such as “the boundary is the median line between the outer edge of Nicaragua 's continental shelf fixed in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia's 200 ‑mile zone” . This formula, Nicaragua suggested, “does not require the Court to determine precisel y where the outer edge of Nicaragua's shelf lies ”. The outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission.’ 129. However, since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to 102UNCLOS and in particular Article 76, its own jurisprudence and the Judgment of 14 March 2012 rendered by ITLOS in the Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal(Bangladesh/Myanmar). 5.30. The Court concluded that Nicaragua had not established that it had a continental shelf margin overlapping with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to a continental shelf; consequently, it did not uphold Nicaragua 's claim contained in its final submission I(3). The Court said: “128. The Court recalls that in the second round of oral argument, Nicaragua stated that it was ‘not asking [the Court] for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicaragua 's continental shelf’ . Rather, it was ‘asking [the Court] to say that Nicaragua 's continental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia 's continental shelf entitlement by a delimitation line which has a defined course ’. Nicaragua suggested that ‘the Court could make that delimitation by defining the boundary in words such as “the boundary is the median line between the outer edge of Nicaragua 's continental shelf fixed in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia's 200 ‑mile zone” . This formula, Nicaragua suggested, “does not require the Court to determine precisel y where the outer edge of Nicaragua's shelf lies ”. The outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission.’ 129. However, since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to 102 184 entitlements of the parties overlap.” Given that Nicaragua had not established any continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, and a coastal State has no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone beyond the same 200-nautical-mile limit, the Court concluded that there were no overlapping entitlements between the Parties situated more than 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua 's baselines that could be delimited. The Court explained the position in the following way: “Leaving out of account any Nicaraguan claims to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles means that there can be no question of determining a maritime boundary between the mainland coasts of the Parties, as these are significantly more than 400 nautical miles apart. There is, however, an overlap between Nicaragua 's entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone extending to 200 nautical miles from its mainland coast and adjacent islands and Colombia 's entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone from the islands over which the Court has held that Colombia has sovereignty…”. 185 To which the Court later added: “Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a line in the east 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of Nicaragua's territorial sea is measured.” 186 This is the area depicted on s ketch-map No. 7 to the Court 's Judgment. 184 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 683, para. 159. 185 Ibid., p. 670, para. 132. 186 Ibid., p. 683, para.159. 104 184 entitlements of the parties overlap.” Given that Nicaragua had not established any continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, and a coastal State has no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone beyond the same 200-nautical-mile limit, the Court concluded that there were no overlapping entitlements between the Parties situated more than 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua 's baselines that could be delimited. The Court explained the position in the following way: “Leaving out of account any Nicaraguan claims to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles means that there can be no question of determining a maritime boundary between the mainland coasts of the Parties, as these are significantly more than 400 nautical miles apart. There is, however, an overlap between Nicaragua 's entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone extending to 200 nautical miles from its mainland coast and adjacent islands and Colombia 's entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone from the islands over which the Court has held th185 Colombia has sovereignty…”. To which the Court later added: “Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a line in the east 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of Nicaragua's territorial sea is measured.” 186 This is the area depicted on s ketch-map No. 7 to the Court 's Judgment. 184 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 683, para. 159. Sketch Map No. 7 from ICJ’s 2012 Judgment 185 Ibid., p. 670, para. 132. 186 Ibid., p. 683, para.159. 1045.32. These decisions appeared in the operative part of the Judgment, and as such they are final and binding and have the force of res judicata. Accordingly, having refused to uphold Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, the Court unanimously decided the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties in the operative part of the Judgment and did not extend the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nautical miles from 187 Nicaragua's baseline. Thus the Court: “(4) Unanimously, Decides that the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the points with co‑ordinates: Latitude north Longitude west 1. 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34.7˝ 2. 13° 31ʹ 08.0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59.4˝ 3. 13° 03ʹ 15.8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22.7˝ 4. 12° 50ʹ 12.8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22.6˝ 5. 12° 07ʹ 28.8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27.7˝ 6. 12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along the parallel of latitude (co‑ordinates 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ N) until it reaches the 200‑nautical‑mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured . From point 6 (with co‑ordinates 12° 00 ʹ 04.5˝ N and 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ W), located on a 12‑nautical‑mile envelope of arcs around Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line 187 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 719, para. 251 (4). 1065.32. These decisions appeared in the operative part of the Judgment, and as such they are final and binding and have the force of res judicata. Accordingly, having refused to uphold Nicaragua's claim to an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, the Court unanimously decided the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties in the operative part of the Judgment and did not extend the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nautical miles from 187 Nicaragua's baseline. Thus the Court: “(4) Unanimously, Decides that the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the points with co‑ordinates: Latitude north Longitude west 1. 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34.7˝ 2. 13° 31ʹ 08.0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59.4˝ 3. 13° 03ʹ 15.8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22.7˝ 4. 12° 50ʹ 12.8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22.6˝ 5. 12° 07ʹ 28.8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27.7˝ 6. 12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along the parallel of latitude (co‑ordinates 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ N) until it reaches the 200‑nautical‑mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured . From point 6 (with co‑ordinates 12° 00 ʹ 04.5˝ N and 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ W), located on a 12‑nautical‑mile envelope of arcs around Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line 187 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 719, para. 251 (4). 106unanimously deciding “the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragu a and the Republic of Colombia”, 190 produced a res judicata. D. The Court's Judgment With Respect to Nicaragua's I(3) Claim is Res Judicata (1) T HE LAW 5.35. Res judicata bars reopening a judgment in circumstances in which there is an identity between “the three traditional elements… persona, petitum, causa petendi”. 191 There are affirmative and defensive consequences to the principle of res judicata. The affirmative consequence is that the substance of the holding is definitive and binding. The defensive consequence relates to the protection of a respondent from being harassed again and again by an applicant, who has had its day in court, at considerable cost to the respondent, but has failed to vindicate its claim. This latter consequence, which is addressed to the protection of the respondent, implements the maxims ne bis in idem and nemo bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. 5.36. The applicability of res judicata to the decisions of the Court has been confirmed by the Court both by reference to 190 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, pp. 719-720, para. 251 (4). 191 Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 Concerning the Case of The Chorzów Factory (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ Series A. No. 13, Judgment No. 11 of 16 December 1927 , at p. 20. Dissenting Opinion by M. Anzilotti at p. 23. 108unanimously deciding “the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragu a and the Republic of Colombia”, 190 produced a res judicata. D. The Court's Judgment With Respect to Nicaragua's I(3) Claim is Res Judicata (1) T HE L AW 5.35. Res judicata bars reopening a judgment in circumstances in which there is an identity between “the three traditional elements… persona, petitum, causa petendi”. 191 There are affirmative and defensive consequences to the principle of res judicata. The affirmative consequence is that the substance of the holding is definitive and binding. The defensive consequence relates to the protection of a respondent from being harassed again and again by an applicant, who has had its day in court, at considerable cost to the respondent, but has failed to vindicate its claim. This latter consequence, which is addressed to the protection of the respondent, implements the maxims ne bis in idem and nemo bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. 5.36. The applicability of res judicata to the decisions of the Court has been confirmed by the Court both by reference to 190 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, pp. 719-720, para. 251 (4). 191 Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 Concerning the Case of The Chorzów Factory (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ Series A. No. 13, Judgment No. 11 of 16 December 1927 , at p. 20. Dissenting Opinion by M. Anzilotti at p. 23. 108 regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an exceptional nature, specially laid down for that purpose. Article 59 of the Statute, notwithstanding its negative wording, has at its core the positive statement that the parties are bound by the decision of the Court in respect of the particular case. Article 60 of the Statute provides that the judgment is final and without appeal; Article 61 places close limits of time and substance on the ability of the parties to se ek the revision of the judgment…” 194 5.38. That analysis makes clear that the legal force of a res judicata is such that it may even overcome a deficiency in the standing of one of the parties that subsequently comes to light: “123. The operative part of a judgment of the Court possesses the force of res judicata. The operative part of the 1996 Judgment stated, in paragraph 47 (2) (a), that the Court found ‘that, on the basis of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has jurisdiction to decide upon the dispute ’. That jurisdiction is thus established with the full weight of the Court 's judicial authority. For a party to assert today that, at the date the 1996 Judgment was given, the Court had no power to give it, because one of the parties can now be seen to have been unable to come before the Court is, for the reason given in the preceding paragraph, to call in question the force as res judicata of the operative clause of the Judgment. At first sight, therefore, the Court need not examine the Respondent's objection to jurisdiction based on its contention as to its lack of status in 1993.”195 194 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 195gment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 90, para. 115. (Emphasis added) Ibid., p. 43, at p. 94, para. 123. 110 regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an exceptional nature, specially laid down for that purpose. Article 59 of the Statute, notwithstanding its negative wording, has at its core the positive statement that the parties are bound by the decision of the Court in respect of the particular case. Article 60 of the Statute provides that the judgment is final and without appeal; Article 61 places close limits of time and substance on the ability of the parties to se ek the revision of the judgment…” 194 5.38. That analysis makes clear that the legal force of a res judicata is such that it may even overcome a deficiency in the standing of one of the parties that subsequently comes to light: “123. The operative part of a judgment of the Court possesses the force of res judicata. The operative part of the 1996 Judgment stated, in paragraph 47 (2) (a), that the Court found ‘that, on the basis of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has jurisdiction to decide upon the dispute ’. That jurisdiction is thus established with the full weight of the Court 's judicial authority. For a party to assert today that, at the date the 1996 Judgment was given, the Court had no power to give it, because one of the parties can now be seen to have been unable to come before the Court is, for the reason given in the preceding paragraph, to call in question the force as res judicata of the operative clause of the Judgment. At first sight, therefore, the Court need not examine the Respondent's objection to jurisdiction based on its contention as to its lack of status in 1993.”195 194 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 195gment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 90, para. 115. (Emphasis added) Ibid., p. 43, at p. 94, para. 123. 110 permissible; superfluous statements in the operative clause are not. It follows that each and every part of the operative clause must fall strictly 196 within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction.” (2) B ECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN N ICARAGUA S A PPLICATION OF 16S EPTEMBER 2013 HAVE ALREADY BEEN DECIDED BY THE C OURT IN ITS JUDGMENT ,THEY ARE RES JUDICATA 5.41. The “main grounds on which Nicaragua 's claim is based”, 197 insofar as they relate to the delimitation that Nicaragua seeks, are set out in sub-paragraphs (a) through (e) of paragraph 11 of the Application in the instant case. To be more precise, what Nicaragua calls “grounds” details the petitum (object) and causa petendi (legal ground) of its present claim. Each of those grounds, as will be shown, was previously raised by Nicaragua in Territorial and Maritime Dispute and each was decided in the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012. (a) The First Ground in Nicaragua's Application 5.42. Nicaragua's first argument (sub -paragraph (a)) is that “Nicaragua is entitled under UNCLOS and under customary international law to a continental shelf extending throughout its continental margin.” 198 Nicaragua argued precisely the same 196 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), I.C.J Reports 2009, (Declaration of Judge Abraham), at p. 28 (in original). 197 Application, para. 11. 198 Application, para. 11(a). 112 permissible; superfluous statements in the operative clause are not. It follows that each and every part of the operative clause must fall strictly 196 within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction.” (2) B ECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN N ICARAGUA S A PPLICATION OF 16 SEPTEMBER 2013 HAVE ALREADY BEEN DECIDED BY THE C OURT IN ITS JUDGMENT ,THEY ARE RES JUDICATA 5.41. The “main grounds on which Nicaragua 's claim is based”, 197 insofar as they relate to the delimitation that Nicaragua seeks, are set out in sub-paragraphs (a) through (e) of paragraph 11 of the Application in the instant case. To be more precise, what Nicaragua calls “grounds” details the petitum (object) and causa petendi (legal ground) of its present claim. Each of those grounds, as will be shown, was previously raised by Nicaragua in Territorial and Maritime Dispute and each was decided in the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012. (a) The First Ground in Nicaragua's Application 5.42. Nicaragua's first argument (sub -paragraph (a)) is that “Nicaragua is entitled under UNCLOS and under customary international law to a continental shelf extending throughout its continental margin.” 198 Nicaragua argued precisely the same 196 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), I.C.J Reports 2009, (Declaration of Judge Abraham), at p. 28 (in original). 197 Application, para. 11. 198 Application, para. 11(a). 112continental shelf entitlement extending to the outer limit of its 202 margin exists ipso facto and ab initio. Nor did the Court fail to take account of this argument. In its Judgment, the Court referred to the fact that both Parties “agree that coastal States have ipso facto and ab initio rights to the continental shelf.” But the Court went on to note that: “However, Nicaragua and Colombia disagree about the nature and content of the rules governing the entitlements of coastal States to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” 203 That was also an issue that the Court decided in its Ju dgment with respect to Nicaragua's claim, as will be explained below. 5.45. Thus, it follows that Nicaragua's second “ground” was fully considered and decided by the Court in rendering its Judgment of 19 November 2012 and, because of the identity of persona, petitum and causa petendi, is barred by res judicata. (c) The Third Ground in Nicaragua's Application 5.46. Nicaragua's third ground (sub -paragraph (c)) is that: “That continental margin includes an area beyond Nicaragua 's 200-nautical-mile maritime zone and in part overlaps with the 202 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 24 April 2012, CR 2012/9 , p. 22, para. 4, p. 24, para. 18, para. 26, para. 27 and p. 32, para. 59 (Lowe). 203 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 666, para. 115. 114continental shelf entitlement extending to the outer limit of its 202 margin exists ipso facto and ab initio. Nor did the Court fail to take account of this argument. In its Judgment, the Court referred to the fact that both Parties “agree that coastal States have ipso facto and ab initio rights to the continental shelf.” But the Court went on to note that: “However, Nicaragua and Colombia disagree about the nature and content of the rules governing the entitlements of coastal States to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the br203th of the territorial sea is measured.” That was also an issue that the Court decided in its Ju dgment with respect to Nicaragua's claim, as will be explained below. 5.45. Thus, it follows that Nicaragua's second “ground” was fully considered and decided by the Court in rendering its Judgment of 19 November 2012 and, because of the identity of persona, petitum and causa petendi, is barred by res judicata. (c) The Third Ground in Nicaragua's Application 5.46. Nicaragua's third ground (sub -paragraph (c)) is that: “That continental margin includes an area beyond Nicaragua 's 200-nautical-mile maritime zone and in part overlaps with the 202 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 24 April 2012, CR 2012/9 , p. 22, para. 4, p. 24, para. 18, para. 26, para. 27 and p. 32, para. 59 (Lowe). 203 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 666, para. 115. 114 13 117° 30' 116° 30' 115° 30' 114° 30' 113° 30' 112° 30' 111° 30' 110° 30' 9° 30' 30' 30' 200 M 772° 772° FIGURE 3-10 Venezuela 30' 30' 773° 773° NicaraCgoualomAbiraea oCfoolvoemrlbaipap'sin2g00mMar(gEiEnsZ) limit 100 30' 30' Co(natcicnoerndtainlgShtoelafrLtiicm leit7s6) 774° 774° 30' 30' Area of Overlapping Continental Margins 775° 0 775° Colombia 30' 30' 776° 776° t i mi l Z 30' E 30' E M0 0 2s 777° 'a 777° i b m o l Co 30' 30' 778° 778° 30' 30' 779° 779° 30' Panama 30' Area of overlappinggins 880° 880° 30' 30' 881° 881° 30' 30' 882° 882° 30' 30' 883° 883° 30' 30' Costa Rica 884° 884° Honduras Nicaragua 117° 30' 116° 30' 115° 30' 114° 30' 113° 30' 112° 30' 111° 30' 110° 30' 9° 30' Figure 3-10 from the Nicaraguan Reply Figure 4 116 117° 30' 116° 30' 115° 30' 114° 30' 30' 772° FIGURE 3-11 30' 773° 30' 774° 30' 775° Figure 3-11 from the Nicaraguan Reply 30' 776° ti m il Z 30' E E 0M 0 2 777° s ib' mo l Co 30' 778° 30' 779° 30' 880° 30' 881° 30' Providencia 882° 30' Miskito Cay 883° Area oLfionovefeoorlfvaeepqrpluanivgagioiannrsgins 30' 884° Honduras Nicaragua Co(natcicnoerndtainlgSh toelafrLtiicmleit7s6) 30' 30' 30' 30' 117° 116° 115° 114° 1165.48. Nicaragua also asserted in its Reply that “[t]he extent of the natural prolongation of the Nicaraguan continental shelf in the area of delimitation is a physical fact that can be verified 207 scientifically with data that are in the public domain.” Nicaragua added that entitlements to continental shelf areas in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS “depend upon the 208 geological and geomorphological evidence .” Nicaragua appended and discussed the evidence that it maintained established its continental m argin beyond 200 nautical miles in its Reply and in oral argument. 209 5.49. The Court did not accept that Nicaragua had established that it has a continental margin that extends beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit such that it overlaps with Colombia 's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to a continental shelf, measured 210 from Colombia's mainland coast. Accordingly, the Court did not uphold Nicaragua's I(3) claim. 5.50. Thus, Nicaragua's third “ground” in the instant case was fully considered and decided by the Cour t in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 and, because of the identity of persona, petitum and causa petendi, is barred by res judicata. 207 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Reply 208Nicaragua, Vol. I, p. 12, para. 27. 209 Ibid., p. 99, para. 3.65. Ibid., pp. 89 -90, paras. 3.37-3.40 and Annexes 16 -18 to the Reply (Vol. II); see also Ibid., Public Sitting 24 April 2012, CR 201pp. 10-21, paras. 1-38 (Cleverly). 210 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para.129. 1185.48. Nicaragua also asserted in its Reply that “[t]he extent of the natural prolongation of the Nicaraguan continental shelf in the area of delimitation is a physical fact that can be verified 207 scientifically with data that are in the public domain.” Nicaragua added that entitlements to continental shelf areas in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS “depend upon the 208 geological and geomorphological evidence .” Nicaragua appended and discussed the evidence that it maintained established its continental m argin beyond 200 nautical miles in its Reply and in oral argument. 209 5.49. The Court did not accept that Nicaragua had established that it has a continental margin that extends beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit such that it overlaps with Colombia 's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to a continental shelf, measured 210 from Colombia's mainland coast. Accordingly, the Court did not uphold Nicaragua's I(3) claim. 5.50. Thus, Nicaragua's third “ground” in the instant case was fully considered and decided by the Cour t in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 and, because of the identity of persona, petitum and causa petendi, is barred by res judicata. 207 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Reply 208Nicaragua, Vol. I, p. 12, para. 27. 209 Ibid., p. 99, para. 3.65. Ibid., pp. 89 -90, paras. 3.37-3.40 and Annexes 16 -18 to the Reply (Vol. II); see also Ibid., Public Sitting 24 April 2012, CR 201pp. 10-21, paras. 1-38 (Cleverly). 210 Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para.129. 1185.53. In this regard, Nicaragua 's Application differs from the situation which the Court confronted in the Haya de la Torre case. In that case, Colombia had requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Colombia was not bound, in the execution of the Court's earlier Judgment in the Asylum case, to deliver Mr. Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities. The Court, however, noted that in the Asylum case, Peru had not demanded the surrender of the refugee. Accordingly, the Court stated that “[t]his question was not submitted to the Court and consequently 215 was not decided by it.” As the Court further explained: “As mentioned above, the question of the surrender of the refugee was not decided by the Judgment of November 20 t. This question is new; it was raised th by Peru in its Note to Co lombia of November 28 , 1950, and was submitted to the Court by the Application of Colombia of December 13 t, 1950. There is consequently no res judicata upon the question of surrender.” 216 5.54. By contrast, the question, or “dispute” regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines set forth in Nicaragua 's Application was raised in the earlier case and was explicitly decided by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. Because of the identity of persona, petitum and causa petendi in the prior case and the instant case, t he question of delimitation beyond 200 miles is res judicata. 215 th Haya de la Torre, Judgment of June 13 , 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, 21671, at p. 79. Ibid., p. 80. 1205.53. In this regard, Nicaragua 's Application differs from the situation which the Court confronted in the Haya de la Torre case. In that case, Colombia had requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Colombia was not bound, in the execution of the Court's earlier Judgment in the Asylum case, to deliver Mr. Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities. The Court, however, noted that in the Asylum case, Peru had not demanded the surrender of the refugee. Accordingly, the Court stated that “[t]his question was not submitted to the Court and consequently 215 was not decided by it.” As the Court further explained: “As mentioned above, the question of the surrender of the refugee was not decided by the Judgment of November 20 t. This question is new; it was raised th by Peru in its Note to Co lombia of November 28 , 1950, and was submitted to the Court by the Application of Colombia of December 13 t, 1950. There is consequently no res judicata upon the question of surrender.” 216 5.54. By contrast, the question, or “dispute” regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines set forth in Nicaragua 's Application was raised in the earlier case and was explicitly decided by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. Because of the identity of persona, petitum and causa petendi in the prior case and the instant case, t he question of delimitation beyond 200 miles is res judicata. 215 th Haya de la Torre, Judgment of June 13 , 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, 21671, at p. 79. Ibid., p. 80. 120 them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua 's 218 coast.” 5.57. Here again, the Court is presented with a legal reincarnation, for the second request in Nicaragua 's Application of 16 September 2013 materially reproduces and relies on the same arguments as in its final submission I(3) in Territorial and Maritime Dispute. In its Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute, the Court recalled that “…in the second round of oral arguments, Nicaragua stated that it was ‘not asking (the Court) for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicaragua 's continental shelf ’. Rather it was ‘asking (the Court) to say that Nicaragua's continental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia's continental shelf entitlement by a delimitation line which has a defined cou rse’. Nicaragua suggested that ‘ the Court could make that delimitation by defining the boundary in words such as “the boundary is the median line between the outer edge of Nicaragua 's continental shelf fixed in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia's 200-mile zone”.’ This formula, Nicaragua suggested, ‘ does not re quire the Court to determine precisely where the outer edge of Nicaragua 's shelf lies ’. The outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission.” 219 5.58. Nicaragua's final submission, to which the Court referred in the above quotation, had been preceded by Professor's Lowe's 218 219 Application, para. 12. (Emphasis added) Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. (Emphasis added) 122 them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua 's 218 coast.” 5.57. Here again, the Court is presented with a legal reincarnation, for the second request in Nicaragua 's Application of 16 September 2013 materially reproduces and relies on the same arguments as in its final submission I(3) in Territorial and Maritime Dispute. In its Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute, the Court recalled that “…in the second round of oral arguments, Nicaragua stated that it was ‘not asking (the Court) for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicaragua 's continental shelf ’. Rather it was ‘asking (the Court) to say that Nicaragua's continental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia's continental shelf entitlement by a delimitation line which has a defined cou rse’. Nicaragua suggested that ‘ the Court could make that delimitation by defining the boundary in words such as “the boundary is the median line between the outer edge of Nicaragua 's continental shelf fixed in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia's 200-mile zone”.’ This formula, Nicaragua suggested, ‘ does not re quire the Court to determine precisely where the outer edge of Nicaragua 's shelf lies ’. The outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission.” 219 5.58. Nicaragua's final submission, to which the Court referred in the above quotation, had been preceded by Professor's Lowe's 218 219 Application, para. 12. (Emphasis added) Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. (Emphasis added) 122Court could proceed to effect a delimitation merely by declaring the applicable principle, by reference to which “ [t]he outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later 222 stage…”. 5.61. Nicaragua's request, Professor Lowe insisted, was entirely altruistic: when the Court had declared the basic principles proposed and its submission on how they should be applied, the Parties would then be able to implement their rights and duties in their respective sea areas: “It is all very well to mock or express exasperation at changes in position. But this is not a typical adversarial case. It is a case where the two sides have a common interest in working towards the finding of a final, equ itable boundary so that they can get on with the management and exploitation of their marine resources and the implementation of their rights and duties in their respective sea areas. We have tried to be helpful by indicating what we regard as the basic pr inciples, accepted by both sides, and making our submissions as to how those principles can be applied in order to 223 reach an equitable result.” 5.62. Because the question is whether Nicaragua's second Request is barred by res judicata, the point of this analysis is not to show the absurdity of Nicaragua's request but only to show that we have been here before. Nicaragua's second request, like the first, is barred by res judicata because, inter alia, the second 222 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombi a), 223gment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. Ibid., Public Sitting 1 May 2012, CR 2012/15, p. 26, para. 53 (Lowe). (Emphasis added) 124Court could proceed to effect a delimitation merely by declaring the applicable principle, by reference to which “ [t]he outer limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later 222 stage…”. 5.61. Nicaragua's request, Professor Lowe insisted, was entirely altruistic: when the Court had declared the basic principles proposed and its submission on how they should be applied, the Parties would then be able to implement their rights and duties in their respective sea areas: “It is all very well to mock or express exasperation at changes in position. But this is not a typical adversarial case. It is a case where the two sides have a common interest in working towards the finding of a final, equ itable boundary so that they can get on with the management and exploitation of their marine resources and the implementation of their rights and duties in their respective sea areas. We have tried to be helpful by indicating what we regard as the basic pr inciples, accepted by both sides, and making our submissions as to how those principles can be applied in order to 223 reach an equitable result.” 5.62. Because the question is whether Nicaragua's second Request is barred by res judicata, the point of this analysis is not to show the absurdity of Nicaragua's request but only to show that we have been here before. Nicaragua's second request, like the first, is barred by res judicata because, inter alia, the second 222 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombi a), 223gment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 669, para. 128. Ibid., Public Sitting 1 May 2012, CR 2012/15, p. 26, para. 53 (Lowe). (Emphasis added) 124c. Nicaragua's Second Request invokes the same rationale as in the previous case 5.66. The argument which Nicaragua developed to support its second claim is identical to the rationale invoked for Nicaragua's request for a declaration of general principles and their mode of application in Territorial and Maritime Dispute. In the latter, the ostensible rationale was to allow the parties to “get on with the management and exploitation of marine resources and the implementation of their rights and duties in their respective 225 areas.” In the cu rrent case, the ostensible rationale is that each Party “conduct itself in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources in such a manner as to avoid causing harm to the interests of the other.” 226 A State cannot evade the consequences of res judicata by juggling a few words. d. The issues in Nicaragua's Second Request were fully joined by Colombia in the previous case 5.67. Nor was this a marginal issue for Colombia in the prior proceedings. Colombia joined issue and str ongly opposed Nicaragua's proposition. In this regard, by first clarifying that the essence of Nicaragua 's argument “seems to be that Nicaragua has a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm 227 even if the outer edge of the margin has not been established”, 225 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 1 May 2012, CR 2012/15, p. 26, para. 53 (Lowe). 226 227 Application, para. 11(e). Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 4 May 2012, CR 2012/16, p. 50, para. 75 (Bundy). 126c. Nicaragua's Second Request invokes the same rationale as in the previous case 5.66. The argument which Nicaragua developed to support its second claim is identical to the rationale invoked for Nicaragua's request for a declaration of general principles and their mode of application in Territorial and Maritime Dispute. In the latter, the ostensible rationale was to allow the parties to “get on with the management and exploitation of marine resources and the implementation of their rights and duties in their respective 225 areas.” In the cu rrent case, the ostensible rationale is that each Party “conduct itself in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources in such a manner as to avoid causing harm to the interests of the other.” 226 A State cannot evade the consequences of res judicata by juggling a few words. d. The issues in Nicaragua's Second Request were fully joined by Colombia in the previous case 5.67. Nor was this a marginal issue for Colombia in the prior proceedings. Colombia joined issue and str ongly opposed Nicaragua's proposition. In this regard, by first clarifying that the essence of Nicaragua 's argument “seems to be that Nicaragua has a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm 227 even if the outer edge of the margin has not been established”, 225 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 1 May 2012, CR 2012/15, p. 26, para. 53 (Lowe). 226 227 Application, para. 11(e). Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 4 May 2012, CR 2012/16, p. 50, para. 75 (Bundy). 126 shelf in the Bay of Bengal extending more than 200 nm from the land territory of each of the two parties. 80. That was a critical factor for the Tribunal in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the boundary beyond 200 nm. At several junctures in its judgment, the Tribunal underscored the fact that ‘ [T]he Parties do not differ on the scientific aspect116f the sea -bed and subsoil of the Bay of Bengal ’ ; that both parties ' submissions contained data indicating their entitlement to the continental margin beyond 200 nm 11; that the scientific evi118ce was what the Tribunal termed ‘uncontested’ , and that the Bay of Bengal itself presents a unique situation with respect to the existence of an extended continental shelf, as was acknowledged during the negotiations at the Third United229tions Conference on the Law of the Sea.” e. The issues i n Nicaragua's Secon d Request were fully discussed by the Court in i ts Judgment of 19 November 2012 5.69. Far from being a marginal issue for the Court in Territorial and Maritime Dispute , Nicaragua's final submission I(3) as well as the legal arguments and rationale designed to support it were fully analyzed by the Court, as illustrated by the Court's use of the words “even using the general formulation proposed by it” at paragraph 129 of the 2012 Judgment, “However, since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, ha s not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to 229 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 4 May 2012, CR 2012/16 , p. 51, para s. 79-80 (Bundy). (Emphasis added) 128 shelf in the Bay of Bengal extending more than 200 nm from the land territory of each of the two parties. 80. That was a critical factor for the Tribunal in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the boundary beyond 200 nm. At several junctures in its judgment, the Tribunal underscored the fact that ‘ [T]he Parties do not differ on the scientific aspect116f the sea -bed and subsoil of the Bay of Bengal ’ ; that both parties ' submissions contained data indicating their entitlement to the continental margin beyond 200 nm 117; that the scientific evi118ce was what the Tribunal termed ‘uncontested’ , and that the Bay of Bengal itself presents a unique situation with respect to the existence of an extended continental shelf, as was acknowledged during the negotiations at the Third Unite229ations Conference on the Law of the Sea.” e. The issues i n Nicaragua's Secon d Request were fully discussed by the Court in i ts Judgment of 19 November 2012 5.69. Far from being a marginal issue for the Court in Territorial and Maritime Dispute , Nicaragua's final submission I(3) as well as the legal arguments and rationale designed to support it were fully analyzed by the Court, as illustrated by the Court's use of the words “even using the general formulation proposed by it” at paragraph 129 of the 2012 Judgment, “However, since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, ha s not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to 229 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Public Sitting 4 May 2012, CR 2012/16, p. 51, para s. 79-80 (Bundy). (Emphasis added) 1285.72. The question of rights and obligations , between Colombia and Nicaragua, in the continental shelf beyond 20 0 nautical miles was finally characterized and decided in the 2012 Judgment as one necessarily requiring the implementation of the procedure of Article 76. The prior implementation of the Article 76 procedure was deemed necessary for the purpose of establishing the overlapping entitlement that could possibly presuppose a delimitation dispute. 5.73. In rejecting Nicaragua 's request, the Court affirmed the well-established rule according to which “the task o f delimitation consists in resol ving the overlapping claims by drawing a line of separation of the maritime areas concerned.” 232 Subsequently the Court underlined the applicability of this rule at paragraphs 140 and 141 of the 2012 Judgment. 5.74. Accordingly, the Judgment of 19 November 2012 constitutes res judica ta with respect to Nicaragua 's second request in its Application of 16 September 2013. g. Nicaragua's presupposition of overlapping entitlements is designed to circumvent the effect of the res judicata of the Judgment of 19 November 2012 5.75. Before concluding the discussion of the bar by res judicata of Nicaragua's second Request, Colombia would draw attention to a stratagem practi sed by Nicaragua in its Application. By presupposing the existence of overlapping 232 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, para.77. 1305.72. The question of rights and obligations , between Colombia and Nicaragua, in the continental shelf beyond 20 0 nautical miles was finally characterized and decided in the 2012 Judgment as one necessarily requiring the implementation of the procedure of Article 76. The prior implementation of the Article 76 procedure was deemed necessary for the purpose of establishing the overlapping entitlement that could possibly presuppose a delimitation dispute. 5.73. In rejecting Nicaragua 's request, the Court affirmed the well-established rule according to which “the task o f delimitation consists in resol ving the overlapping claims by drawing a line of separation of the maritime areas concerned.” 232 Subsequently the Court underlined the applicability of this rule at paragraphs 140 and 141 of the 2012 Judgment. 5.74. Accordingly, the Judgment of 19 November 2012 constitutes res judica ta with respect to Nicaragua 's second request in its Application of 16 September 2013. g. Nicaragua's presupposition of overlapping entitlements is designed to circumvent the effect of the res judicata of the Judgment of 19 November 2012 5.75. Before concluding the discussion of the bar by res judicata of Nicaragua's second Request, Colombia would draw attention to a stratagem practi sed by Nicaragua in its Application. By presupposing the existence of overlapping 232 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, para.77. 130continental shelf. Of course, Nicaragua 's written submissions and oral arguments in the earlier proceeding clearly demonstrate that Nicaragua then believed that it had established both on legal grounds and by submission of data its entitlement to an extended 233 continental shelf. In its new Application, Nicaragua claims that it has established (we assume again) such an entitlement based on a final submission it made to the CLCS in June 2013 – yet still witho ut fulfilling the procedure and obligations under Article 76 of UNCLOS, which include, significantly, the review and recommendation of the CLCS. But, that aside, according to Nicaragua's assertion, the Court could now be in a position to do what it could not do in the earlier decision. Nicaragua purports to justify its position on the basis of alleged new geological and geomorphological facts which it itself failed to provide the Court in the earlier proceeding. 5.78. The Court has already made clear that an e ffort such as this, designed to circumvent the doctrine of res judicata, will not succeed. In the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) , the Court discussed the rigorous procedure under Article 61 of the Statute, especially with r egard to new facts in the context of its relationship with res judicata: “This [the principle of res judicata ] does not however mean that, should a party to a case believe that elements have come to light subsequent to the decision of the Court which tend to show that the Court's conclusions may have been based on incorrect or insufficient facts, the decision must 233 Application, para. 4. 132continental shelf. Of course, Nicaragua 's written submissions and oral arguments in the earlier proceeding clearly demonstrate that Nicaragua then believed that it had established both on legal grounds and by submission of data its entitlement to an extended 233 continental shelf. In its new Application, Nicaragua claims that it has established (we assume again) such an entitlement based on a final submission it made to the CLCS in June 2013 – yet still witho ut fulfilling the procedure and obligations under Article 76 of UNCLOS, which include, significantly, the review and recommendation of the CLCS. But, that aside, according to Nicaragua's assertion, the Court could now be in a position to do what it could not do in the earlier decision. Nicaragua purports to justify its position on the basis of alleged new geological and geomorphological facts which it itself failed to provide the Court in the earlier proceeding. 5.78. The Court has already made clear that an e ffort such as this, designed to circumvent the doctrine of res judicata, will not succeed. In the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) , the Court discussed the rigorous procedure under Article 61 of the Statute, especially with r egard to new facts in the context of its relationship with res judicata: “This [the principle of res judicata ] does not however mean that, should a party to a case believe that elements have come to light subsequent to the decision of the Court which tend to show that the Court's conclusions may have been based on incorrect or insufficient facts, the decision must 233 Application, para. 4. 132of Bogotá under which Nicaragua has p urported to institute this case.237 E. Conclusion: Nicaragua's Claim in this Case is Barred by res judicata 5.80. In its Application, Nicaragua admits that it had already “sought a declaration from the Court describing the course of the boundary of its continental shelf throughout the area of the overlap between its continental shelf entitlement and that of 238 Colombia.” This is the same claim that Nicaragua is making in the present Application. During the 11 years of the proceedings in the earlier case, Nicaragua had its day in Court, with ample opportunity to make its case and provide evidence and facts to substantiate its claim, but it was unsuccessful. Nicaragua admits that, with respect to its 2001 Application, it had submitted “Prel iminary Information to the Commission on the Limits of the Con tinental Shelf on 7 April 2010” , 239 while during the proceedings it took the view that it had established the legal and factual basis of its claim but that the “Court considered that Nicaragua had not then established that it has a continental margin that extends beyond 200 nautical miles from 240 [its] baselines.” This means that Nicaragua did not meet its burden of proof and the Court did not uphold Nicaragua's claim. 237 Nicaragua's effort to circumvent the requirements of Article 61 of the Statute is discussed in Chapter 6 infra. 238 Application, para. 4. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 134of Bogotá under which Nicaragua has p urported to institute this case.237 E. Conclusion: Nicaragua's Claim in this Case is Barred by res judicata 5.80. In its Application, Nicaragua admits that it had already “sought a declaration from the Court describing the course of the boundary of its continental shelf throughout the area of the overlap between its continental shelf entitlement and that of 238 Colombia.” This is the same claim that Nicaragua is making in the present Application. During the 11 years of the proceedings in the earlier case, Nicaragua had its day in Court, with ample opportunity to make its case and provide evidence and facts to substantiate its claim, but it was unsuccessful. Nicaragua admits that, with respect to its 2001 Application, it had submitted “Prel iminary Information to the Commission on the Limits of the Con tinental Shelf on 7 April 2010” , 239 while during the proceedings it took the view that it had established the legal and factual basis of its claim but that the “Court considered that Nicaragua had not then established that it has a continental margin that extends beyond 200 nautical miles from 240 [its] baselines.” This means that Nicaragua did not meet its burden of proof and the Court did not uphold Nicaragua's claim. 237 Nicaragua's effort to circumvent the requirements of Article 61 of the Statute is discussed in Chapter 6 infra. 238 Application, para. 4. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 134 Chapter 6 FOURTH PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM THAT IS AN ATTEMPT TO APPEAL AND REVISE THE COURT 'S JUDGMENT OF A. Introduction 6.1. As Chapter 5 has shown, in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Nicaragua had asked the Court to delimit the continental shelf between the Parties situated in areas lying beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines.The Court did not upho ld Nicaragua's submission. It did, however, effect a full and final delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Parties, including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. decision of the Court is “final and without appeal” under Article 60 of the Court's Statute. 6.2. The Statute provides for only two procedures by which a judgment of the Court can be revisited. The first, under Article 60, involves a request for interpr “dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment”. second, under Article 61, involves a request to revise a judgment based on the discovery of a new fact. 6.3. In its present application, Nicaragua is inviting the Court to revisit a judgment effecting a full and final delimitation of the 136 Chapter 6 FOURTH PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM THAT IS AN ATTEMPT TO APPEAL AND REVISE THE COURT 'S JUDGMENT OF A. Introduction 6.1. As Chapter 5 has shown, in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Nicaragua had asked the Court to delimit the continental shelf between the Parties situated in areas lying beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines.The Court did not upho ld Nicaragua's submission. It did, however, effect a full and final delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Parties, including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. decision of the Court is “final and without appeal” under Article 60 of the Court's Statute. 6.2. The Statute provides for only two procedures by which a judgment of the Court can be revisited. The first, under Article 60, involves a request for interpr “dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment”. second, under Article 61, involves a request to revise a judgment based on the discovery of a new fact. 6.3. In its present application, Nicaragua is inviting the Court to revisit a judgment effecting a full and final delimitation of the 136maritime boundary between the Parties, including the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, and to determine the delimitation of the continental shelf which Nicaragua had requested from the Court in the earlier case and which the Court had not upheld. The Statute affords no jurisdictional basis for what is in effect an appeal from its earlier Judgment in contravention to Article 60 of the Court's Statute (Section B). 6.4. Nicaragua's Application also attempts to revise the Court's Judgment without complying with the conditions for revision set forth in Article 61 of the Statute. While the Court in its earlier Judgment ruled t hat Nicaragua had not established a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles that could overlap with Colombia 's entitlement , Nicaragua's Application in this case asserts that now Nicaragua is able to establish that entitlement on the basis o f new information that it submitted to the CLCS in June 2013, after the 2012 Judgment had been rendered. On this basis, Nicaragua argues that the Court should proceed to delimit the areas of overlap that it did not delimit in its 2012 Judgment: “Nicaragua submitted its final information to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on 24 June 2013. Nicaragua's submission to the Commission demonstrates that Nicaragua 's continental margin extends more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured, and also (i) traverses an area that lies more than 200 nautical miles from Colombia and also (ii) partly 138maritime boundary between the Parties, including the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, and to determine the delimitation of the continental shelf which Nicaragua had requested from the Court in the earlier case and which the Court had not upheld. The Statute affords no jurisdictional basis for what is in effect an appeal from its earlier Judgment in contravention to Article 60 of the Court's Statute (Section B). 6.4. Nicaragua's Application also attempts to revise the Court's Judgment without complying with the conditions for revision set forth in Article 61 of the Statute. While the Court in its earlier Judgment ruled t hat Nicaragua had not established a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles that could overlap with Colombia 's entitlement , Nicaragua's Application in this case asserts that now Nicaragua is able to establish that entitlement on the basis o f new information that it submitted to the CLCS in June 2013, after the 2012 Judgment had been rendered. On this basis, Nicaragua argues that the Court should proceed to delimit the areas of overlap that it did not delimit in its 2012 Judgment: “Nicaragua submitted its final information to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on 24 June 2013. Nicaragua's submission to the Commission demonstrates that Nicaragua 's continental margin extends more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured, and also (i) traverses an area that lies more than 200 nautical miles from Colombia and also (ii) partly 138Permanent Cou rt of International Justice virtually without debate, and has remained unchang ed in the Statute of this Court. 242 As noted in Chapter 5, 243the fundamental character of the principle appears from the terms of the Court 's Statute and the United Nations Charter. To recall the words of the Court in the Genocide case: “The fundamental character of that principle [ res judicata] appears from the terms of the Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United Nations. The underlying character and purpose of the principle are reflected in the judicial practice of the Court. That principle signifies that the decisions of the Court are not only binding on the parties, but are final, in the sense that they cannot be reopened by the parties as regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an exceptional 244 nature, specially laid down for that purpose.” 6.8. The Court went on to elaborate on the principle of res judicata and the finality of its judgments. In a passage that exposes the fundamental juri sdictional deficiencies in Nicaragua's new Application , the Court referred to two purposes, one general, the other specific, that underlie the principle: “First, the stability of legal relations requires that litigation come to an end. The Court's function, 242 As stated in fn 192 in Chapter 5 supra, in the negotiations for the establishment of the Permanent Court, the Minutes record thres judicata was expressly mentioned as a general principle of law to which Article 38 of the Statute referred. Minutes of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, at p. 335. 243 Chapter 5, Section D (1) supra. 244 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 90, para. 115. 140Permanent Cou rt of International Justice virtually without debate, and has remained unchang ed in the Statute of this Court. 242 As noted in Chapter 5, 243 the fundamental character of the principle appears from the terms of the Court 's Statute and the United Nations Charter. To recall the words of the Court in the Genocide case: “The fundamental character of that principle [ res judicata] appears from the terms of the Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United Nations. The underlying character and purpose of the principle are reflected in the judicial practice of the Court. That principle signifies that the decisions of the Court are not only binding on the parties, but are final, in the sense that they cannot be reopened by the parties as regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an exceptional 244 nature, specially laid down for that purpose.” 6.8. The Court went on to elaborate on the principle of res judicata and the finality of its judgments. In a passage that exposes the fundamental juri sdictional deficiencies in Nicaragua's new Application , the Court referred to two purposes, one general, the other specific, that underlie the principle: “First, the stability of legal relations requires that litigation come to an end. The Court's function, 242 As stated in fn 192 in Chapter 5 supra, in the negotiations for the establishment of the Permanent Court, the Minutes record thres judicata was expressly mentioned as a general principle of law to which Article 38 of the Statute referred. Minutes of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, at p. 335. 243 Chapter 5, Section D (1) supra. 244 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 90, para. 115. 140 answers to questions the Court did not decide in 246 the original judgment.” 6.10. Notwithstanding this, the issue that Nicaragua asks the Court to decide in its Application of 16 September 2013 is the same as the one decided in the 2012 Judgment: the issues raised in both cases have already been determined by the Court in a judgment that is final and without appeal. 6.11. Nicaragua's Application states that the dispute concerns the delimitation of the boundaries between, on the one hand, the continental shelf of N icaragua beyond the 200 -nautical-mile limit from its baselines and, on the other hand, th e continental shelf of Colombia. 247 Nicaragua therefore requests the Court to adjudge and declare the precise course of the maritime boundary between the Parties in the areas of continental shelf beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. 6.12. But in the prior case, Nicaragua also indicated that the dispute concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf with Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, and Nicaragua formally requested the Court to delimit the maritime boundary in this area by means of its Submission I(3). The Court considered the Parties' pleadings on this i ssue, and ruled 246 I.C.J. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning theTemple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 247mbodia v. Thailand), Judgment of 11 Nov. 2013, p. 25, para. 66. Application, p. 1, para. 2. 142 answers to questions the Court did not decide in 246 the original judgment.” 6.10. Notwithstanding this, the issue that Nicaragua asks the Court to decide in its Application of 16 September 2013 is the same as the one decided in the 2012 Judgment: the issues raised in both cases have already been determined by the Court in a judgment that is final and without appeal. 6.11. Nicaragua's Application states that the dispute concerns the delimitation of the boundaries between, on the one hand, the continental shelf of N icaragua beyond the 200 -nautical-mile limit from its baselines and, on the other hand, th e continental shelf of Colombia. 247 Nicaragua therefore requests the Court to adjudge and declare the precise course of the maritime boundary between the Parties in the areas of continental shelf beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012. 6.12. But in the prior case, Nicaragua also indicated that the dispute concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf with Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, and Nicaragua formally requested the Court to delimit the maritime boundary in this area by means of its Submission I(3). The Court considered the Parties' pleadings on this i ssue, and ruled 246 I.C.J. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning theTemple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 247mbodia v. Thailand), Judgment of 11 Nov. 2013, p. 25, para. 66. Application, p. 1, para. 2. 142this Judgment is final and without appeal …” 248 The Court lacks jurisdiction over a claim that is tantamount to an appeal. C. Nicaragua Also Seeks to Revise the Court's Judgment without Meeting the Requisites of the Statute 6.14. As noted above, the second procedure whereby a judgment of the Court can be revisited involves a request for revision of a judgment under Article 61 of the Statute based on the discovery of a new fact. Nicaragua's new Application is not only an appeal from the Court 's 2012 Judgment, but is also a disguised attempt to revise that Judgment based on the alleged discovery of new facts; but Nicaragua seeks to accomplish this without complying with the strict conditi ons laid out in Article 61 for the admissibility of a request for revision. (1) THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR REVISING A JUDGMENT BASED ON THE DISCOVERY OF A NEW FACT ARE CUMULATIVE 6.15. If a party to a case believes that new elements have come to light subsequ ent to the decision of the Court which tend s to show that the Court 's conclusions may have been based on incorrect or insufficient facts, its only recourse is to file a request for revision under Article 61 of the Statute. As the Court put it in its Judgment in the Genocide case: “The Statute provides for only one procedure in such an event: the procedure under Article 61, 248 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application of Nicaragua, 26 Nov. 2013, p. 14, para. 19. 144this Judgment is final and without appeal …” 248 The Court lacks jurisdiction over a claim that is tantamount to an appeal. C. Nicaragua Also Seeks to Revise the Court's Judgment without Meeting the Requisites of the Statute 6.14. As noted above, the second procedure whereby a judgment of the Court can be revisited involves a request for revision of a judgment under Article 61 of the Statute based on the discovery of a new fact. Nicaragua's new Application is not only an appeal from the Court 's 2012 Judgment, but is also a disguised attempt to revise that Judgment based on the alleged discovery of new facts; but Nicaragua seeks to accomplish this without complying with the strict conditi ons laid out in Article 61 for the admissibility of a request for revision. (1) THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR REVISING A JUDGMENT BASED ON THE DISCOVERY OF A NEW FACT ARE CUMULATIVE 6.15. If a party to a case believes that new elements have come to light subsequ ent to the decision of the Court which tend s to show that the Court 's conclusions may have been based on incorrect or insufficient facts, its only recourse is to file a request for revision under Article 61 of the Statute. As the Court put it in its Judgment in the Genocide case: “The Statute provides for only one procedure in such an event: the procedure under Article 61, 248 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application of Nicaragua, 26 Nov. 2013, p. 14, para. 19. 144 (e) the application for revision must be ‘made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact’ and before ten years have elapsed from the date of the judgment.” 250 6.18. An application for revision is only admissible if all of these conditions are satisfied. In the words of the Court: “If any 251 one of them is not met, the application must be dismissed .” Given that revision is an exceptional procedure, the Court has also emphasized that: “In the interests of the stability of legal 252 relations, those restrictions must be rigorously applied.” (2) N ICARAGUA 'S A PPLICATION IS BASED ON CLAIMED “NEW FACTS ” 6.19. As noted above, Nicaragua 's Application purports to adduce a new fact, or facts, which purportedly justify the Court revising its 2012 Judgment in which it had effected a full and final delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Parties, including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. But Nicaragua's Application does not acknowledge that it is 250 Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El Salvador v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 398-399, para. 19. 251 Ibid, p. 399, para. 20; citing Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Prelim inary Objections (Yugoslavia 252Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 12, para. 17. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 92, para. 120. 146 (e) the application for revision must be ‘made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact’ and before ten years have elapsed from the date of the judgment.” 250 6.18. An application for revision is only admissible if all of these conditions are satisfied. In the words of the Court: “If any 251 one of them is not met, the application must be dismissed .” Given that revision is an exceptional procedure, the Court has also emphasized that: “In the interests of the stability of legal 252 relations, those restrictions must be rigorously applied.” (2) N ICARAGUA 'S APPLICATION IS BASED ON CLAIMED “NEW FACTS ” 6.19. As noted above, Nicaragua 's Application purports to adduce a new fact, or facts, which purportedly justify the Court revising its 2012 Judgment in which it had effected a full and final delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Parties, including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. But Nicaragua's Application does not acknowledge that it is 250 Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El Salvador v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 398-399, para. 19. 251 Ibid, p. 399, para. 20; citing Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Prelim inary Objections (Yugoslavia 252Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 12, para. 17. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 92, para. 120. 146 June 2013 after the Court had rendered its Judgment. In contrast to what Nicaragua filed in its earlier case, Nicaragua considers that the “final information” it provided in its CLCS Submission in June 2013 “demonstrates that Nicaragua 's continental margin extends more than 200 nautical miles” from its baselines. 256In footnote 4 of its Application, Nicaragua refers to the Executive Summary of its CLCS Submission in support of i ts contention. The Executive Summary refers to the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 and acknowledges that “[t]he Court did not determine the boundary of the continental shelf of Nicaragua and Colombia beyond this 200 nautical miles limit, as requested by Nicaragua and observed that Nicaragua had only submitted preliminary information to 257 the Commission.” It then sta tes that: “Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice and after undertaking a thorough assessment and review of the scientific data of the areas concerned, Nicaragua ha d completed its full submission .” 258 In Table 1 of the 256 257 Application, p. 2, para. 5. Republic of Nicaragua, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 . Part I: Executive Summary,24 June 2013, p. 2, para. 5. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive %20Summary.pdf (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014). (Emphasis added) 258 Republic of Nicaragua, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 . Part I: Executive Summary,24 June 2013, p. 2, para. 6. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive %20Summary.pdf (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014). 148 June 2013 after the Court had rendered its Judgment. In contrast to what Nicaragua filed in its earlier case, Nicaragua considers that the “final information” it provided in its CLCS Submission in June 2013 “demonstrates that Nicaragua 's continental margin extends more than 200 nautical miles” from its baselines.256 In footnote 4 of its Application, Nicaragua refers to the Executive Summary of its CLCS Submission in support of i ts contention. The Executive Summary refers to the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012 and acknowledges that “[t]he Court did not determine the boundary of the continental shelf of Nicaragua and Colombia beyond this 200 nautical miles limit, as requested by Nicaragua and observed that Nicaragua had only submitted preliminary information to 257 the Commission.” It then sta tes that: “Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice and after undertaking a thorough assessment and review of the scientific data of the areas concerned, Nicaragua ha d completed its full submission .” 258 In Table 1 of the 256 257 Application, p. 2, para. 5. Republic of Nicaragua, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 . Part I: Executive Summary,24 June 2013, p. 2, para. 5. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive %20Summary.pdf (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014). (Emphasis added) 258 Republic of Nicaragua, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 . Part I: Executive Summary,24 June 2013, p. 2, para. 6. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive %20Summary.pdf (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014). 148 1 7 15°N 14°N 13°N 12°N 11°N 10°N 9°N 8 11 74°W 74°W 12 75°W 13 75°W 21 Sea COLOMBIA Caribbean 76°W 22 76°W 47 48 77°W 65 77°W 68 66 69 89 78°W 78°W 91 120 18 September 2009 79°W (Nicaragua v. Colombia) 79°W 121 froReply of the Government of Nicaragua PANAMA Nicaragua’s Extended Continental Shelf Claim 24 June 2013 80°W 80°W 164 Limits of the Continental Shelf Claim from The Republic of Nicaragua’s Nicaragua’s Extended Continental Shelf 81°W 300 Providencia I. 150 San Andrés I. 82°W 100 200 Miskitos Cays Kilometers Datum: WGS-84al Miles Merca50r Projectionat 14°N) 83°W Little Corn I. SHELF CLAIMS100 Great Corn I. Prepared by: International Mapping COSS0TA 0RICAIIIIC 84°W NICARAGUA’S EXTENDED CONTINENTAL HO15°NAS 14°N NIC13°NUA 12°N 11°N Figure 6 150 (3) THE ONLY FORM OF ACTION BY WHICH LODGE SUCH AN A PPLICATION IS THAT OF 6.21. The only procedure by which Nicaragua may re-open the Court's previous judgment on the basis of the discovery of claimed new facts is by means of a request for accordance with the requirements of Article 61. Nicaragua has not availed itself of this procedure. 6.22. Nor is the reason why it has failed to do so reasonable: if it had requested a revision, Nicaragua could not have satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 61 for the admissibility of such a request. In order for a request for revision to be admissible, Nicaragua would have had to show that such facts were of a decisive nature (which is dubious given that the two “outer limits” are not far apart – see Figure 6); that they were unknown to the Court and Nicaragua when the Judgment was given; and that the application for revision was being made within six months of their discovery. been able to satisfy these conditions, which is more than doubtful, Nicaragua would also have had to sh ignorance of the claimed new facts during the original proceedings was not due to its own negligence. Nicaragua would not have been able to make that showing. Yet, that is a further requisite for a party seeking to revise a judgment. 150 (4) N ICARAGUA HAS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF A RTICLE 61 6.23. It may be recalled that Nicaragua became a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in May 2000. As of that date, therefore, Nicaragua knew, or should have known, that if it wished to claim a continental shelf extending more than 200 nautical miles from its baselines, it would have to satisfy the criteria and obligations set forth in Article 76 of the Convention. 6.24. On 6 December 2001, Nicaragua then initiated proceedings against Colombia by its Application filed with the Registry. During the proceedings that ensued, Nicaragua had ample opportunity to substantiate its claim to a continental shelf extending more than 200 nautical miles from its baselines. For the first eight years of the proceedings, Nicaragua took the position that geological and geomorphological factors were completely irrelevant to the delimitation it was requesti ng (a mainland-to-mainland median line), even though that delimitation lay more than 200 nautical miles from its coast. As Nicaragua's Memorial stated: “The position of the Government of Nicaragua is that geological and geomorphological factors have no relevance for the delimitation of a single 259 maritime boundary within the delimitation area.” 259 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Memorial of Nicaragua, Vol. I, p. 215, para. 3.58. 152 (4) N ICARAGUA HAS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF A RTICLE 61 6.23. It may be recalled that Nicaragua became a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in May 2000. As of that date, therefore, Nicaragua knew, or should have known, that if it wished to claim a continental shelf extending more than 200 nautical miles from its baselines, it would have to satisfy the criteria and obligations set forth in Article 76 of the Convention. 6.24. On 6 December 2001, Nicaragua then initiated proceedings against Colombia by its Application filed with the Registry. During the proceedings that ensued, Nicaragua had ample opportunity to substantiate its claim to a continental shelf extending more than 200 nautical miles from its baselines. For the first eight years of the proceedings, Nicaragua took the position that geological and geomorphological factors were completely irrelevant to the delimitation it was requesti ng (a mainland-to-mainland median line), even though that delimitation lay more than 200 nautical miles from its coast. As Nicaragua's Memorial stated: “The position of the Government of Nicaragua is that geological and geomorphological factors have no relevance for the delimitation of a single 259 maritime boundary within the delimitation area.” 259 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Memorial of Nicaragua, Vol. I, p. 215, para. 3.58. 1526.27. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall what the Court said about the ability of a party, during the original proceedings, to ascertain “facts upon which an application for revision is based” in order to determine whether such party has been negligent. The case in question concerned Tunisia 's request to revise the Court 's 1982 Judgment in the Tunisia v. Libya continental shelf case based on the discovery by Tunisia of the co-ordinates of certain offshore petroleum concessions after the Judgment was given. The Court observed: “The Court must however consider whether the circumstances were such that means were available to Tunisia to ascertain the details of the co - ordinates of the concession from other sources: and indeed whether it was in Tunisia's own interests to do so. If such be the case, it does not appear to the Court that it is open to Tunisia to rely on those co- ordinates as a fact that was ‘unknown’ to it for the purposes 261Article 61, paragraph 1, of the Statute.” 6.28. In Tunisia v. Libya, the Court found that the new facts upon which Tunisia's request rested could have been obtained by Tunisia during the prior proceedings and that it was in Tunisia 's interests to obtain them. Accordingly, the Court rejected the request for revision because one of the “essential conditions” of admissibility for a request for revision – namely, “ignorance of a new fact not due to negligence” – was lacking. 262 261 Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. 262orts 1985, pp. 204-205, para. 23. Ibid, pp. 206-207, para. 28. 1546.27. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall what the Court said about the ability of a party, during the original proceedings, to ascertain “facts upon which an application for revision is based” in order to determine whether such party has been negligent. The case in question concerned Tunisia 's request to revise the Court 's 1982 Judgment in the Tunisia v. Libya continental shelf case based on the discovery by Tunisia of the co-ordinates of certain offshore petroleum concessions after the Judgment was given. The Court observed: “The Court must however consider whether the circumstances were such that means were available to Tunisia to ascertain the details of the co - ordinates of the concession from other sources: and indeed whether it was in Tunisia's own interests to do so. If such be the case, it does not appear to the Court that it is open to Tunisia to rely on those co- ordinates as a fact that was ‘unknown’ to it for the purposes 261Article 61, paragraph 1, of the Statute.” 6.28. In Tunisia v. Libya, the Court found that the new facts upon which Tunisia's request rested could have been obtained by Tunisia during the prior proceedings and that it was in Tunisia 's interests to obtain them. Accordingly, the Court rejected the request for revision because one of the “essential conditions” of admissibility for a request for revision – namely, “ignorance of a new fact not due to negligence” – was lacking. 262 261 Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. 262orts 1985, pp. 204-205, para. 23. Ibid, pp. 206-207, para. 28. 154Information and submitted to the Court in the prior case. In this case, the Court would still lack jurisdic tion to consider Nicaragua's claims, for Nicaragua would simply be trying to re - argue evidence that was fully canvassed by the Parties in the original case and ruled on by the Court in its Judgment . 263That would be tantamount to an appeal, which as explained in Section B of this Chapter, is prohibited by Article 60 of the Statute. 6.32. Thus, Nicaragua, by its present Application is in reality inviting the Court either to revise its Judgment based on claimed new facts that were not introduced in the earli er case or to re- open its Judgment based on old facts that the Court has already considered. Regardless of whether Nicaragua 's present Application is based on claimed new facts or a reassessment of old facts, it represents an attempt to evade the requirem ents of the Statute. D. Conclusions 6.33. There is no jurisdictional basis for the Court to entertain what is in reality an attempt by Nicaragua to appeal the Court 's Judgment of 19 November 2012, or to revise that Judgment under the guise of a fresh case. Trying to submit a new case in order to re-litigate issues that were argued in the earlier case and decided with the force of res judicata in the 2012 Judgment violates Article 60 of the Statute. By the same token, trying to 263 See Chapter 5, Section B, supra. 156Information and submitted to the Court in the prior case. In this case, the Court would still lack jurisdic tion to consider Nicaragua's claims, for Nicaragua would simply be trying to re - argue evidence that was fully canvassed by the Parties in the original case and ruled on by the Court in its Judgment . 263That would be tantamount to an appeal, which as explained in Section B of this Chapter, is prohibited by Article 60 of the Statute. 6.32. Thus, Nicaragua, by its present Application is in reality inviting the Court either to revise its Judgment based on claimed new facts that were not introduced in the earli er case or to re- open its Judgment based on old facts that the Court has already considered. Regardless of whether Nicaragua 's present Application is based on claimed new facts or a reassessment of old facts, it represents an attempt to evade the requirem ents of the Statute. D. Conclusions 6.33. There is no jurisdictional basis for the Court to entertain what is in reality an attempt by Nicaragua to appeal the Court 's Judgment of 19 November 2012, or to revise that Judgment under the guise of a fresh case. Trying to submit a new case in order to re-litigate issues that were argued in the earlier case and decided with the force of res judicata in the 2012 Judgment violates Article 60 of the Statute. By the same token, trying to 263 See Chapter 5, Section B, supra. 156 Chapter 7 PRELIMINARY OBJECTION T OF THE FIRST AND SEO NICARAGUA 'S APPLICATION A. Introduction 7.1. If Colombia's objections to jurisdiction in the previous chapters are rejected, Colombia objects, in the alternative, to the admissibility of Nicaragua's Application. More specifically, it is Colombia's submission that both the first and the second request set out in Nicaragua's Application to the Court 265 inadmissible. 7.2. Nicaragua's First Request is inadmissible because of Nicaragua's failure to recommendation. 7.3. Nicaragua's Second Request is inadmissible as a consequence of the inadmissibility of its first request. Even considering the second request independently of the first, it would also be inadmissible because, if it were to be granted, the 264 Application, para. 12. 265 Because it concerns admissibility, the present objection is submitted, and is to be envisaged, only in the perspective of the hypothetical situation in which the Court – contrary to Colombia's main prayer – were to find that it has jurisdiction. As a consequence, the present objection to admissibility and the arguments supporting it should not be misconstrued as indicating in any manner acceptance by Colombia of the main tenets on which Nicaragua's application is based. 158 Chapter 7 PRELIMINARY OBJECTION T OF THE FIRST AND SEO NICARAGUA 'S APPLICATION A. Introduction 7.1. If Colombia's objections to jurisdiction in the previous chapters are rejected, Colombia objects, in the alternative, to the admissibility of Nicaragua's Application. More specifically, it is Colombia's submission that both the first and the second request set out in Nicaragua's Application to the Court 265 inadmissible. 7.2. Nicaragua's First Request is inadmissible because of Nicaragua's failure to recommendation. 7.3. Nicaragua's Second Request is inadmissible as a consequence of the inadmissibility of its first request. Even considering the second request independently of the first, it would also be inadmissible because, if it were to be granted, the 264 Application, para. 12. 265 Because it concerns admissibility, the present objection is submitted, and is to be envisaged, only in the perspective of the hypothetical situation in which the Court – contrary to Colombia's main prayer – were to find that it has jurisdiction. As a consequence, the present objection to admissibility and the arguments supporting it should not be misconstrued as indicating in any manner acceptance by Colombia of the main tenets on which Nicaragua's application is based. 158decision of the Court would be inapplicable and would concern a non-existent dispute. B. The Inadmissibility of Nicaragua's First Request (1) AS TATECANNOTESTABLISHA CONTINENTALSHELF WITHOUTAN ENTITLEMENT (a) The need for an entitlement 7.4. In order to exercise the rights described in UNCLOS Article 77, the coastal State must have an entitlement to the 266 shelf, based on “sovereignty over the land territory.” 7.5. Entitlement, a term of art, is defined differently as regards the continental shelf inside and outside the 200-nautical- mile line. (b) Entitlement within 200 nautical miles of the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured 7.6. Inside 200 nautical miles, entitlement is automatic ipso jure. UNCLOS Article 76(1) states: “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea… to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines…”. 266 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Judgment of 14 March 2012, para. 409. 160decision of the Court would be inapplicable and would concern a non-existent dispute. B. The Inadmissibility of Nicaragua's First Request (1) AS TATECANNOTESTABLISHA CONTINENTALSHELF WITHOUTAN ENTITLEMENT (a) The need for an entitlement 7.4. In order to exercise the rights described in UNCLOS Article 77, the coastal State must have an entitlement to the 266 shelf, based on “sovereignty over the land territory.” 7.5. Entitlement, a term of art, is defined differently as regards the continental shelf inside and outside the 200-nautical- mile line. (b) Entitlement within 200 nautical miles of the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured 7.6. Inside 200 nautical miles, entitlement is automatic ipso jure. UNCLOS Article 76(1) states: “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea… to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines…”. 266 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Judgment of 14 March 2012, para. 409. 1607.9. The establishment by the coastal State of the outer limits of its continental shelf “on the basis of the recommendations” of the CLCS (i.e., delineated in conformity with such recommendations) is “final and binding” under Article 76(8) and, consequently, to use the language of the 270 Bangladesh/Myanmar judgment, opposable “to other States.” 7.10. Under the second sentence of Article 76(8), the CLCS recommendations are to resolve “matters related to the establishment of the outer limits” of the continental shelf. Such matters include the existence of the prerequisites for the delineation of the outer limit of the continental shelf. 7.11. The recommendation of the CLCS is thus the prerequisite for transforming an inherent 271 but inchoate right into an entitlement whose external limit is “final and binding” under Article 76(8) and opposable erga omnes. The language used in Article 76(8) and Annex II, Articles 4, 7 and 8 is mandatory: States parties to UNCLOS, who want to establish the limit of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, must follow the procedure of the CLCS. 270 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal(Bangladesh/Myanmar) , 271OS Judgment of 14 March 2012, para. 407. UNCLOS Article 77(3). 1627.9. The establishment by the coastal State of the outer limits of its continental shelf “on the basis of the recommendations” of the CLCS (i.e., delineated in conformity with such recommendations) is “final and binding” under Article 76(8) and, consequently, to use the language of the 270 Bangladesh/Myanmar judgment, opposable “to other States.” 7.10. Under the second sentence of Article 76(8), the CLCS recommendations are to resolve “matters related to the establishment of the outer limits” of the continental shelf. Such matters include the existence of the prerequisites for the delineation of the outer limit of the continental shelf. 7.11. The recommendation of the CLCS is thus the prerequisite for transforming an inherent 271 but inchoate right into an entitlement whose external limit is “final and binding” under Article 76(8) and opposable erga omnes. The language used in Article 76(8) and Annex II, Articles 4, 7 and 8 is mandatory: States parties to UNCLOS, who want to establish the limit of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, must follow the procedure of the CLCS. 270 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal(Bangladesh/Myanmar) , 271OS Judgment of 14 March 2012, para. 407. UNCLOS Article 77(3). 162 273 which it was received.” In Nicaragua's case, no mention is made of the establishment of a subcommission, which, in the practice of the CLCS, is the first step towards examination of the merits of a submission. (4)IN THESECIRCUMSTANCES , THE ICJ CANNOTDELIMITTHE CONTINENTALSHELFBEYOND 200 NAUTICALMILES (a) In the absence of a CLCS recommendation, the ICJ cannot take up Nicaragua's Application 7.15. The ICJ cannot consider the Application by Nicaragua because the CLCS has not ascertained that the conditions for determining the extension of the outer edge of Nicaragua's continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical mile line are satisfied and, consequently, has not made a recommendation. 7.16. The present case must be distinguished from the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, as well as the recent Bangladesh/India case. 274 In the former case, the ITLOS could decide on delimitation notwithstanding the impossibility of delineating the external limit of Myanmar's continental shelf due to the denial of Bangladesh's consent to the consideration by the CLCS of Myanmar's submission. In Bangladesh/Myanmar the 273 Doc. CLCS/83 of 31 March 2014, Progress of the work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf , Statement by the Chair , 274a 86. (See link in fn 272) between the People 's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of India, 7 July 2014. Available at: www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2705 (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014) 164 273 which it was received.” In Nicaragua's case, no mention is made of the establishment of a subcommission, which, in the practice of the CLCS, is the first step towards examination of the merits of a submission. (4)IN THESECIRCUMSTANCES , THE ICJ CANNOTDELIMITTHE CONTINENTALSHELFBEYOND 200 NAUTICALMILES (a) In the absence of a CLCS recommendation, the ICJ cannot take up Nicaragua's Application 7.15. The ICJ cannot consider the Application by Nicaragua because the CLCS has not ascertained that the conditions for determining the extension of the outer edge of Nicaragua's continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical mile line are satisfied and, consequently, has not made a recommendation. 7.16. The present case must be distinguished from the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, as well as the recent Bangladesh/India case. 274 In the former case, the ITLOS could decide on delimitation notwithstanding the impossibility of delineating the external limit of Myanmar's continental shelf due to the denial of Bangladesh's consent to the consideration by the CLCS of Myanmar's submission. In Bangladesh/Myanmar the 273 Doc. CLCS/83 of 31 March 2014, Progress of the work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf , Statement by the Chair , 274a 86. (See link in fn 272) between the People 's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of India, 7 July 2014. Available at: www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2705 (Last visited: 4 Aug. 2014) 164it has a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In paragraph 126 of its Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute of 2012 – which begins with a quotation from the Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment of 2007 – the Court stated: “…that ‘any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to UNCLOS] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental She lf established thereunder’… Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that 276 Convention.” 7.19. Thus the obligations set out in Article 76 (in particular, to submit an application to the CLCS and to establish the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles on the basis of the recommendations of the CLCS) apply to all States parties to UNCLOS even when their claim concerns an area to which a State that is not a party to UNCLOS has an entitlement. 7.20. All United Nations member States, including non-parties to UNCLOS, and therefore also Colombia, are to be notified of the submissions deposited with the CLCS. The duty to notify is 276 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 , p p. 668 -669, para. 126Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 759, para. 319. (Emphasis added) 166it has a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In paragraph 126 of its Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute of 2012 – which begins with a quotation from the Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment of 2007 – the Court stated: “…that ‘any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to UNCLOS] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental She lf established thereunder’… Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that 276 Convention.” 7.19. Thus the obligations set out in Article 76 (in particular, to submit an application to the CLCS and to establish the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles on the basis of the recommendations of the CLCS) apply to all States parties to UNCLOS even when their claim concerns an area to which a State that is not a party to UNCLOS has an entitlement. 7.20. All United Nations member States, including non-parties to UNCLOS, and therefore also Colombia, are to be notified of the submissions deposited with the CLCS. The duty to notify is 276 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p p. 668 -669, para. 126Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 759, para. 319. (Emphasis added) 1667.22. The role recognized for non-parties to UNCLOS in the work of the CLCS is further confirmation of the view that a non- Party can claim the inadmissibility of a request to the ICJ for delimitation of an area of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles when the procedure before the Commission has not reached its conclusion with the adoption of a recommendation concerning the coastal State's entitlement. 7.23. It follows that Colombia is entitled to rely on the lack of a recommendation of the CLCS in order to show that Nicaragua's request to the ICJ for delimitation is inadmissible. (5)C ONCLUSION 7.24. For all of the above reasons, Nicaragua's First Request is inadmissible. 23 Sept. 2013; Annex 22: Note No S -DM-13-035351 from the Acting Colombian Foreign Minister to the Secretary -General of the United Nations, 24 Sept. 2013; Annex 27: United Nations General Assembly Document No A/68/743, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Colombia o the Secretary-General of the United Nations with Annex (6 Feb. 2014Feb.1 2014; Annex 26: Note from the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica and Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nation, 5 Feb. 2014. See also, Annex 19: Note No MCRONU -438-2013 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the Secretar-General of the United Nations, 15 July 2013; Annex 20: Note No LOS/15 from the Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations, 12 Sept. 2013; Annex 23: Note No DGPE/DG/665/22013 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 30 Sept. 2013; Annex 24: United Nations General Assembly Document No A/68/741, Note from the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the Secreta-General of the United Nations, (20 Jan. 2014 ), 7 Feb. 2014 ; Annex 25: Note No DGPE/FRONT/082/14 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 3 Feb. 2014. 1687.22. The role recognized for non-parties to UNCLOS in the work of the CLCS is further confirmation of the view that a non- Party can claim the inadmissibility of a request to the ICJ for delimitation of an area of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles when the procedure before the Commission has not reached its conclusion with the adoption of a recommendation concerning the coastal State's entitlement. 7.23. It follows that Colombia is entitled to rely on the lack of a recommendation of the CLCS in order to show that Nicaragua's request to the ICJ for delimitation is inadmissible. (5)C ONCLUSION 7.24. For all of the above reasons, Nicaragua's First Request is inadmissible. 23 Sept. 2013; Annex 22: Note No S -DM-13-035351 from the Acting Colombian Foreign Minister to the Secretary -General of the United Nations, 24 Sept. 2013; Annex 27: United Nations General Assembly Document No A/68/743, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Colombia o the Secretary-General of the United Nations with Annex (6 Feb. 2014Feb.1 2014; Annex 26: Note from the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica and Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nation, 5 Feb. 2014. See also, Annex 19: Note No MCRONU -438-2013 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the Secretar-General of the United Nations, 15 July 2013; Annex 20: Note No LOS/15 from the Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations, 12 Sept. 2013; Annex 23: Note No DGPE/DG/665/22013 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 30 Sept. 2013; Annex 24: United Nations General Assembly Document No A/68/741, Note from the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the Secreta-General of the United Nations, (20 Jan. 2014 ), 7 Feb. 2014 ; Annex 25: Note No DGPE/FRONT/082/14 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 3 Feb. 2014. 168Colombia, the Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the request for the delimitation of seabed areas beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, or if the request to that effect is inadmissible, there cannot be jurisdiction, or the request cannot be admissible, to decide whatever issue pending a decision on such delimitation. (2)T HEREQUESTIS INADMISSIBLEBECAUSE ,IF GRANTED , THE C OURT S DECISIONWOULDBE WITHOUTOBJECT 7.28. Even if we consider the Second Request independently of the Court's jurisdiction to decide on the First Request, or of that request's admissibility, strong considerations compel the conclusion that the Second Request is inadmissible. 7.29. The request is for the statement by the Court of the principles and rules that determine the rights and duties of the two States in the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources which would apply “pending the delimitation of the maritime boundary between them beyond 283 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's coast.” In other words: pending the decision on Nicaragua's First Request. 7.30. But there would be no time-frame within which to apply the decision on the Second Request pending the decision on the First Request, as the Court would deal with both requests simultaneously. Consequently, the request is inadmissible 283 Application, para. 12. 170Colombia, the Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the request for the delimitation of seabed areas beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, or if the request to that effect is inadmissible, there cannot be jurisdiction, or the request cannot be admissible, to decide whatever issue pending a decision on such delimitation. (2)T HEREQUESTIS INADMISSIBLEBECAUSE ,IF GRANTED ,THE C OURT S DECISIONWOULDBE WITHOUTOBJECT 7.28. Even if we consider the Second Request independently of the Court's jurisdiction to decide on the First Request, or of that request's admissibility, strong considerations compel the conclusion that the Second Request is inadmissible. 7.29. The request is for the statement by the Court of the principles and rules that determine the rights and duties of the two States in the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources which would apply “pending the delimitation of the maritime boundary between them beyond 283 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's coast.” In other words: pending the decision on Nicaragua's First Request. 7.30. But there would be no time-frame within which to apply the decision on the Second Request pending the decision on the First Request, as the Court would deal with both requests simultaneously. Consequently, the request is inadmissible 283 Application, para. 12. 170 (4)THEREQUESTIS INADMISSIBLEBECAUSEIT CONCERNSA NON - EXISTENTDISPUTE 7.32. The Second Request cannot succeed also if envisaged as asking the Court to give a solution to a dispute between the parties. 7.33. There is no evidence of an opposition of views between Nicaragua and Colombia concerning a hypothetical legal regime to be applied pending the decision on the maritime boundary beyond 200 nautical miles of Nicaragua's coast. Consequently, the Second Request would concern a non-existent dispute. For this reason also, it is inadmissible. (5)C ONCLUSION 7.34. For all of the above reasons, Nicaragua's Second Request is inadmissible. 172 (4)THEREQUESTIS INADMISSIBLEBECAUSEIT CONCERNSA NON - EXISTENTDISPUTE 7.32. The Second Request cannot succeed also if envisaged as asking the Court to give a solution to a dispute between the parties. 7.33. There is no evidence of an opposition of views between Nicaragua and Colombia concerning a hypothetical legal regime to be applied pending the decision on the maritime boundary beyond 200 nautical miles of Nicaragua's coast. Consequently, the Second Request would concern a non-existent dispute. For this reason also, it is inadmissible. (5)C ONCLUSION 7.34. For all of the above reasons, Nicaragua's Second Request is inadmissible. 172written and oral pleadings . In its Judgment of 19 November 2012, the Court found that claim admissible but did not uphold it. Consequently, that Judgment constitutes a res judicata which bars reopening and relitigation of the claim by means of a new application. Fourth, t he Court lacks jurisdiction overNicaragua's Application because it is, in fact, an attempt to appeal and revise the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012, without complying with (and, indeed, without being able to comply with) the requirements of the Statute. Fifth, even if one were to assume, quod non, that the Court had jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá or that ihas retained jurisdict ion on the basis of its prior Judgment, the present Application would be inadmissible because the CLCS has not made the requisite recommendation. The Second Request of Nicaragua is also inadmissible, for its connection with the First and for other reasons. 174written and oral pleadings . In its Judgment of 19 November 2012, the Court found that claim admissible but did not uphold it. Consequently, that Judgment constitutes a res judicata which bars reopening and relitigation of the claim by means of a new application. Fourth, t he Court lacks jurisdiction overNicaragua's Application because it is, in fact, an attempt to appeal and revise the Court's Judgment of 19 November 2012, without complying with (and, indeed, without being able to comply with) the requirements of the Statute. Fifth, even if one were to assume, quod non, that the Court had jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá or that ihas retained jurisdict ion on the basis of its prior Judgment, the present Application would be inadmissible because the CLCS has not made the requisite recommendation. The Second Request of Nicaragua is also inadmissible, for its connection with the First and for other reasons. 174176 VOLUME II: LIST OFANNEXESAND FIGURES ANNEXES Annex 1 Diplomatic Note N Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, 27 Nov. 2012. .................................1 Annex 2 Note N o OEA/2.2/109/12 from the OAS Department of International Law, Secretariat for LegalAffairs to the High Contracting Parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) and to the other Permanent Missions to the Organization ofAmerican States, 28 Nov. 2012. .............................................................5 Annex 3 Diplomatic Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, 24 Nov. 1973. .............................................................9 Annex 4 Comparative Chart of Drafts presented by American States to the First Commission at the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, Perú, Dec. 1938. .................................13 Annex 5 Delegation of the United States of America to the First Commission at the Eighth International Conference ofAmerican States, Lima, Perú, Draft on Consolidation of American Peace Agreements, Topic 1. Perfecting and Coordination of Inter- American Peace Instruments, 15 Nov. 1938. ...........19 176Annex 6 Delegation of the United States of America to the Eighth International Conference ofAmerican States, Projects Presented by the United States, Topic 1, Treaty of Consolidation of American Peace Agreements, 16 Dec. 1938. ............................35 Annex 7 Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, 3-26 Dec. 1933, Resolution XXXV, Code of Peace,Approved 23 Dec. 1933.....49 Annex 8 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, 1-23 Dec. 1936, Resolution XXVIII, Code of Peace, Approved 21 Dec. 1936. ......................................7....................6 Annex 9 Memorandum from the General Director of the Pan-American Union, to the United States Under Secretary of State, 28 Dec. 1937. .............................71 Annex 10 Delegation of the United States of America to the Eighth International Conference ofAmerican States, Lima, 9-27 Dec. 1938, Report of the Meetings of Sub-Committee 1 of Committee I, Consolidation of American Peace Instruments and Agreements, 19 Dec. 1938. ................................75 Annex 11 Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 9-27 Dec. 1938, Resolution XV, Perfection and Coordination of Inter-American Peace Instruments,Approved 21 Dec. 1938. ...........79 Annex 12 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Text of Document A: Draft Treaty for the Coordination of Inter-American Peace Agreements, Minutes of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, 1944. .......83 178 Annex 13 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Text of Document B: Draft of an Alternative Treaty Relating to Peaceful Procedures, and Document C: Report to Accompany the Draft Treaty for the Coordination of Inter-American Peace Agreements and Draft of an Alternative Treaty, Minutes of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, 1944. ...................................................101 Annex 14 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Draft of an Inter-American Peace System and an Accompanying Report, Article XXIX, 4 Sept. 1945. ...........................................................117 Annex 15 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Inter- American Peace System: Definitive Project Submitted to the Consideration of the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota, Article XXVI,18 Nov. 1947......................123 Annex 16 Minutes of the Second Part of the Fourth Session of the Coordination Commission, Ninth International Conference of American States, 29 Apr. 1948. .........................................................1 Annex 17 Inter-American Treaties from 1902 to 1936, Clauses of Denunciation. .......................................1 Annex 18 Text of the Pact of Bogotá, in the FourAuthentic Languages (English, French, Portuguese, Spanish). .................................................................141 Annex 19 Note N MCRONU-438-2013 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 15 July 2013. .....................1 Annex 20 Note N oLOS/15 from the Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations, 12 Sept. 2013. ......195 178Annex 21 Communication from the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica and Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York, 23 Sept. 2013. ...............................................199 o Annex 22 Note N S-DM-13-035351 from the Acting Colombian Foreign Minister to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, 24 Sept. 2013. ......203 Annex 23 Note N DGPE/DG/665/22013 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panamá to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, 30 Sept. 2013. ......207 Annex 24 United Nations General Assembly Document N A/68/741, Note from the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, (20 Jan. 2014), 7 Feb. 2014 .............................................................213 Annex 25 Note N DGPE/FRONT/082/14 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panamá to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, 3 Feb. 2014. .......... 17 Annex 26 Note from the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica and Panamá to the Secretary-General of the United Nation, 5 Feb. 2014. ...................................221 Annex 27 United Nations General Assembly Document N A/68/743, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the Secretary-General of the United Nations withAnnex (6 Feb. 2014), 11 Feb. 2014. ..........................................................225 180 FIGURES I. FIGURES IN CHAPTER 5 Figure 1 Figure 1 from the Nicaraguan Memorial (in Territorial and Maritime Dispute) Figure 2 Figure 3-1 from the Nicaraguan Reply (in Territorial and Maritime Dispute) Figure 3 Sketch-map No. 7 from the Court’s 2012 Judgment (in Territorial and Maritime Dispute) Figure 4 Figure 3-10 from the Nicaraguan Reply (in Territorial and Maritime Dispute) Figure 5 Figure 3-11 from the Nicaraguan Reply (in Territorial and Maritime Dispute) II. FIGURE IN CHAPTER 6 Figure 6 Nicaragua’s Extended Continental Shelf Claims 180

Document file FR

154-20140814-WRI-01-00-FR.pdf

Document Long Title

Preliminary Objections of Colombia