INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
________________________________________________________
CASE CONCERNING
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 11(1)
OF THE INTERIM ACCORD OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1995
(THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA v. GREECE)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
VOLUME I
________________________________________________________
19 JANUARY 2010VOLUME I TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................
........................................... 4
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .......................................................................
.........................................7
I. HE AIM OFT HEFYROM’ SA PPLICATION.......................................................................
................................... 7
II. HED ISPUTE BETWEEN THEP ARTIES.......................................................................
..........................................8
III.TRUCTURE OF THIS COUNTER -MEMORIAL .......................................................................
.............................. 10
CHAPTER 2: THE “NAME ISSUE” .......................................................................
................................ 11
I.NTRODUCTION .......................................................................
........................................................................... 11
II.HISTORICALB ACKGROUND TO THE N AME ISSUE .......................................................................
....................... 11
A. A Chronology of Events Surrounding the Macedonian Question .................................................11
B. The Name as a Problem of Regional Security .......................................................................
........ 15
III.AST MEDIATION EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE NAME ISSUE.......................................................................
......... 16
A. Mediation Efforts by the European Union .......................................................................
............. 17
B. Mediation Efforts by the United Nations .......................................................................
................ 17
C. The Interim Accord .......................................................................
................................................ 19
D. Recent Greek and International Initiatives .......................................................................
............ 20
CHAPTER 3: THE INTERIM ACCORD AND ITS INTERPRETATION ................................21
I.NTRODUCTION .......................................................................
........................................................................... 21
II.NEGOTIATING HISTORY .......................................................................
............................................................. 21
III.HE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE NTERIM A CCORD .......................................................................
.............. 22
IV. THEO THER AGREEMENTS OF 1995 .......................................................................
.......................................... 27
V. THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THENTERIM A CCORD .......................................................................
............ 28
CHAPTER 4: THE FYROM’S VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERIM ACCORD ......................... 33
I. ECENT EXAMPLES OF T HEFYROM’ SFAILURE TO CONDUCT GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ........................... 33
II. HEFYROM’ SINTERVENTION ING REECE’SINTERNAL AFFAIRS.................................................................... 37
III.HE FYROM’ S HOSTILE ACTIVITIES ANDPROPAGANDA AGAINST GREECE .................................................. 43
A. Hostile Propaganda against Greece by Public Authorities and State-controlled Agencies of
the FYROM .......................................................................
................................................................. 43
B. Activities by Private Entities and Persons Inciting Hostility against Greece Financed and/or
Supported by the FYROM .......................................................................
........................................... 48
C. Persistent Harassment against the Premises of the Greek Liaison Office and its Personnel in
Skopje .......................................................................
......................................................................... 52
IV. THEFYROM’ SCONTINUED USE OF THESUN OF VERGINA .......................................................................
..... 55
V. THE FYROM’ SA PPROPRIATION OFO THERG REEK HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SYMBOLS ........................... 58
VI. THEFYROM’ SBEHAVIOUR BEFORE NTERNATIONAL O RGANISATIONS ...................................................... 60
VII.GREECE’S REACTIONS TO THE FYROM’S BEHAVIOUR PRIOR TO THE BUCHARES
T SUMMIT .................... 65
VIII. CONCLUSION.................................................................................
............................................................... 68
1CHAPTER 5: NATO’S DECISION ON THE FYROM’S MEMBERSHIP ................................69
I.NTRODUCTION :NATO AS AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ................................................... 69
II.NATO’ S ACTIVITIES AS ANA LLIANCE .......................................................................
...................................... 71
III. NATO’S CONSULTATION PROCESS .......................................................................
.......................................... 72
IV. THE NATOE NLARGEMENT PROCESS .......................................................................
......................................75
V. THE FYROM’ S PARTICIPATION INMAP ....................................................................
...................................... 81
VI. THE BUCHAREST DECISION .......................................................................
......................................................85
VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................
...................................................................... 88
CHAPTER 6: THE COURT’S JURISDICTION .......................................................................
........... 89
I.NTRODUCTION .......................................................................
........................................................................... 89
II. HE LAW WITH RESPECT TO JURISDICTION.......................................................................
................................ 90
A. Jurisdiction in Consent-based Adjudication.......................................................................
..........90
B. The Jurisdictional Regime in the Instant Case .......................................................................
....... 92
1. Resolution 817 .......................................................................
........................................................ 93
2. Article 11(1) .......................................................................
........................................................... 95
The Exception in Article 1.......................................................................
................................................ 96
The Exception in Articl.......................................................................
.................................................... 96
III. HED ISPUTEC ONCERNS THE DIFFERENCE R EFERRED TO INA RTICLE5(1) OF THEINTERIM A CCORD AND
ISA CCORDINGLY O UTSIDE THEJURISDICTION OF THE COURT .......................................................................
....... 98
IV. THE DISPUTE S EXCLUDED BY A RTICLE22 OF THE INTERIM A CCORD ........................................................104
V. THE DISPUTE CONCERNS C ONDUCT A TTRIBUTABLE TO NATO ..................................................................... 108
A. The Actions taken in Bucharest with Respect to the FYROM are Attributable to NATO ............ 109
1. The Decision on the Deferral of the Invitation to the FYROM is Attributable to NATO ............. 110
2. NATO Did not Breach any International Obligation..................................................................114
B. The Individual Member States of NATO Cannot be Held Responsible for the Alliance’s
Decision .......................................................................
................................................................... 116
1. The “Veil Effect” .......................................................................
.................................................. 117
2. The Monetary Gold Principle .......................................................................
............................... 122
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................
.......................................................................... 123
CHAPTER 7: THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 11(1) .........124
I.NTRODUCTION .......................................................................
......................................................................... 124
II. HE NON -OBJECTION C LAUSE READ IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE 22)AND THE B UCHAREST SUMMIT .................... 126
A. The Meaning of the Non-Objection Clause in the Context of NATO Accession .......................... 126
1. The Language of the Non-Objection Clause.......................................................................
........ 127
2. Drafting History of the Non-Objection Clause.......................................................................
..... 129
3. Specificity of International Organisations and its Relevance to the Non-Objection Clause...... 133
B. The Relevance of Article 22 .......................................................................
.................................134
1. Article 11(1) Must be Read in Light of Article 22 .................................
35.................................1
2. Greece’s Rights and Obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Prevail over Article 11(1) ..136
C. Greece Did not “Veto” the FYROM’s Accession to NATO........................................................ 138
1. The Sequence of Events Leading to NATO’s Bucharest Declaration ......................................... 138
2. The Role of Greece in the NATO Enlargement Process ............................................................. 141
3. The Consensus Processes of NATO at Bucharest Did not Engage Greece’s International
Responsibility .......................................................................
........................................................... 142
III. HES AFEGUARD CLAUSE AND ITS POTENTIAL A PPLICATION AT BUCHAREST .............................................. 146
A. Interpretation of the Safeguard Clause .......................................................................
............... 147
1. The Language of the Safeguard Clause.......................................................................
............... 147
“if and to the extent that…” .......................................................................
..................................... 147
2 “is to be referred to…” .......................................................................
............................................147
“in such organization or institution”.......................................................................
....................... 148
“differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (19......148
2. The Object and Purpose of the Safeguard Clause ......................................................................
149
3. The Drafting History of the Safeguard Clause.......................................................................
.... 150
4. Non-Existence of Procedural Conditions for the Safeguard Clause to Operate .........................151
The so-called critical date .............................................................152........
.................................................
Putative requirement of formal notice ...................................................152..................
..............................
B. Subsequent Practice of the Parties and the Application of the Safeguard Clause ...................... 153
1. The Requirements for Subsequent Practice .............................................155.......................
..................
2. Practice in International Organizations ..............................................156......................
......................
3. Greece has in Fact Given Notice that the FYROM’s Conduct is not in Accordance with the
Interim Accord ........................................................................
......................................................................
4. Conclusion on Subsequent Practice ....................................................158..................
............................
C. Greece was Entitled to Rely on the Safeguard Clause ............................................................... 158
D. Conclusions as to the Safeguard Clause.......................................................................
.............. 160
IV. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................
........................................................................ 160
CHAPTER 8: THE EXCEPTION OF NON-PERFORMANCE............................................ 163
I. NTRODUCTION .......................................................................
......................................................................... 163
II. HE CONDITIONS TRIGGERING RECOURSE TO THE EXCEPTIO N ON ADIMPLETI CONTRACTUS .......................... 164
A. The Character and Purpose of the Exceptio .......................................................................
........ 165
B. The Legal Régime of the Exceptio .......................................................................
........................ 172
C. Other Possible Defences .......................................................................
...................................... 178
III. HE CONDITIONS TRIGGERING RECOURSE TO THE EXCEPTIO A REM ET IN THE PRESENT C ASE .................... 179
A. Breach of Article 5: The FYROM’s Conduct Towards Negotiations.......................................... 180
B. Breach of Article 6(2): Prohibition of Interference in Internal Affairs....................................... 185
C. Breach of Article 7(1): Prohibition of Hostile Activities and Propaganda................................. 186
D. Breach of Article 7(2): Use of the “Sun of Vergina” by the FYROM ......................................... 191
E. Breach of Article 7(3): Use of Historical and Cultural Symbols ................................................ 193
F. Breach of Article 11: Reference to the FYROM Under the U.N. Name...................................... 193
CHAPTER 9: REMEDIES........................................................................
........196..................
I. NTRODUCTION .......................................................................
......................................................................... 196
II. HE FYROM’ SF IRSTR EQUEST .......................................................................
.............................................. 196
III. HE FYROM’ SSECOND R EQUEST .......................................................................
......................................... 199
IV. THE FYROM’ S“R ESERVATION OF RIGHTS ” ...................................................................
.............................. 201
SUBMISSIONS .....................................................................
.................205.............................
CERTIFICATION ..........................................................
...........................207..........................
LIST OF ANNEXES........................................................................
............209.......................
3 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Additional Protocol to PfPitional Protocol to the Agreement among the States
SOFA Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States
Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status
of their Forces
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
European Organisation for Nuclear Research
CERN
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
KFOR Kosovo Force
MAP Membership Action Plan
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PfP Partnership for Peace
PfP SOFA Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for
Peace regarding the status of their forces
4SC res Security Council resolution
International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property
WIPO
Organisation
56 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
I. THE AIM OF THE FYROM’S APPLICATION
1.1. This Counter-Memorial is filed in accordan ce with the Court’s order of 20 January
2009. It responds to the Applicant’s Memorial dated 20 July 2009.
1.2. It is the position of the former Yugosla v Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter the
“FYROM”), as Applicant in the present proceedings, that Greece engaged in certain conduct
at the Bucharest Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter “NATO”) in
April 2008, and that this conduct of Greece “pre vented the Applicant from receiving an
invitation to proceed with membership of NATO.” 1 As that statement suggests, the
FYROM’s purpose in bringing the present pr oceedings is nothing less than “to pursue
2
membership of NATO and other international organizations.” Having failed to resolve by
negotiations the “difference” referred to in Article 5 of the Interim Accord, and having failed
to persuade NATO Member States that it should nonetheless be invited to accede to NATO,
the FYROM chooses now to pursue its membership aspirations before the Court. On the
3
explicit basis that the FYROM “meets all the requirements for NATO membership,” it calls
on the Court to decide that it was only the conduct of Greece that caused NATO not to invite
the FYROM to accede. Moreover in the sec ond paragraph of its submissions, the FYROM
calls on the Court to make an order that “ex plicitly addresses membership of NATO and
4
other international organizations,” notably the European Union. The Court is apparently to
usher the fully-qualified FYROM into the organi sations it seeks to join, implicitly deciding
on its eligibility in place of the Member States whose collective function this is.
1.3. This request would be remarkable if cons idered only in terms of the general legal
relation between the Court and international organisations, a relation the Court has so far
5
been exceptionally careful to respect. It implies the Court’s making factual and legal
findings as to the internal affairs of internat ional organisations to an unprecedented extent.
But it is equally remarkable when it is considered in the light of the express provisions of the
Interim Accord, notably Article 22, a provision the FYROM vi rtually ignores. Article 22
expressly preserves from the operation of th e other provisions of the Interim Accord,
including Article 11(1), “the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral
agreements already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international
organizations.” As will be demonstrate d, at Bucharest Greece exercised its rights and
1 Memorial, para 1.1.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., para 5.63.
4 Ibid., para 1.17, and for the terms of the order sought, see ibid., p. 123.
e.g.ee Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14
April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992 p. 3 at p. 15 (paras. 39-42).
7fulfilled its duties as a Member of NATO. Its conduct in doing so, having regard to Article
22, cannot possibly constitute a breach of the Interim Accord. This alone provides a
sufficient answer to the present Application – both in terms of the jurisdiction of the Court
and the merits of the claim of breach of Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord. It does so, quite
apart from other issues of the interpretation and application of the Accord, elaborated in this
Counter-Memorial.
II. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
1.4. At the core of the dispute be tween the Parties is the “name issue.” It is fundamental
to an understanding of the case before the Court that that issue is expressly excluded from its
jurisdiction by Article 21(2) of the Interim Acco rd. In pursuing its membership aspirations
before the Court, the FYROM asks the Court to look behind the decision of NATO taken at
Bucharest. By that decision, NATO determ ined that the membership process for the
FYROM should continue, but that an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty could
not be extended to the FY ROM immediately. The deci sion was based on NATO’s
determination, reached through its own internal processes, that the “name issue” had as at
April 2008 not yet been resolved; and the prior determination that the resolution of that issue
was a necessary condition for the accession of the FYROM to the Alliance. The FYROM’s
Application entwines the “name issue,” which the Interim Accord expressly excludes from
jurisdiction, with the membership decisions of NATO, which, as decisions of a closed, non-
universal alliance, are reached under the provisions of a multilateral instrument and are
themselves outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
1.5. The FYROM not only asks the Court to adj udicate upon the decision of NATO taken
at Bucharest. It also asks the Court to adjudicate upon the conduct of a NATO member State
at that meeting. The Court was clear in the 1948 Advisory Opinion that it could not examine
the internal processes of a member State which lead to a decision on a question of
membership. That case concerned admission of St ates to the United Nations under the
terms of UN Charter Article 4. The criteria for admission there are relatively open—i.e., the
substantive conditions are not onerous in comparison to admission criteria under certain other
instruments, and the Security Council and Gene ral Assembly in practice have applied the
criteria so as to achieve ma ximum participation of States in the Organization. The North
Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, under Article 10, requires considerable commitments on the
part of acceding States, and NATO, in applying Article 10, has added further substantive
requirements that a State must meet before NATO extends an invitation to accede. The
principle of deference to internal processes which the Court expressed in 1948 applies at least
as strongly to the criteria under a closed, non-universal alliance such as NATO.
1.6. Like other organisations, NATO has its own procedure for determining whether to
enlarge its membership. Under the NATO procedure for enlargement, a State aspiring to join
6
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948pp. 57, 60.
8the Alliance does not apply; it is invited; and invitation is not a simple, one-step process, but,
rather, an on-going series of evaluations a nd negotiation. The Me mber States of NATO
conduct this process on the basis of consen sus: there is no parliamentary vote and no
mechanism of objection or veto in the Alliance. The invitation procedure is consistent with
the character of NATO as a closed, non-univers al alliance, and it ha s been described and
applied by the competent authorities of NATO.
1.7. In its Application to the Court, the FYROM says that it “met its obligations under the
Interim Accord not to seek to be designate d as a member of NATO with any designation
other than ‘the former Yugos lav Republic of Macedonia.’” But this rewrites Article 11(1),
which does not use the concept of formal “designation” as a member: instead it asks whether
the FYROM “is to be referred to” in NATO for any purpose other than as the FYROM. This
is the condition at the heart of the Safeguard Clause, deliberately drafted to protect Greece’s
interests. Greece’s chief protected interest is in achieving a mutually agreed settlement of the
“name issue.” The Interim Acco rd protects that interest by providing that the obligation in
Article 11(1), “not to object” to membership applications of the FYROM, does not operate if
the FYROM “is to be referred to” in any organisation other than by the agreed name.
1.8. The FYROM argues that, outside the na rrow circumstances of making formal
application to international organisations, it is free to use whatever designation it wishes in
its international relations. Yet such an ar gument is hardly consistent with FYROM’s
statement that its application…
“has the sole purpose of protecting the Interim Accord from further violations,
in light of the fact that this is a key agreement which is of essential importance
for the normal relations between Macedonia [ sic] and Greece. Macedonia is
strongly convinced that the respect for and the co8sistent application of the
Interim Accord is beneficial for both Parties…”
The Interim Accord, incorporating and extending the requirement of United Nations Security
Council resolution 817 (1993) (hereinafter “S C res 817 (1993)”), establishes a provisional
name, mandatory for the FYROM “for all purposes” in intern ational organisations. The
FYROM has acted repeatedly in disregard of the Interim Accord. Time and again, when
admitted to international organisations, the FYROM has reverted to its “constitutional”
name. It seeks now, through the intervention of the Court, to gain admission to yet another
organisation, and thereby to entrench its own, unilaterally chosen name. If permitted, this
would have the result of overriding the agreed process of settlement and further undermining
the Interim Accord.
7
8 Application of 13 November 2008, p 4 para 6.
Aide Memoire annexed to Letter of Slobodan Tasovski, Permanent Representative of the FYROM to
the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 17 November 2008: Annex 158.
9 III. STRUCTURE OF THIS COUNTER-MEMORIAL
1.9. Greece’s Counter-Memorial proceeds as follows.
1.10. Chapters 2 – 5 present essential material s for an understanding of the dispute.
Chapter 2 briefly outlines the history of the dispute over the name, and shows its links to the
“Macedonian question” as it develo ped out of the dissolution of O ttoman rule in the region.
Against this background, Chapter 3 describes the Interim Accord of 1995, adopted by the
parties as a provisional “holding operation” pending an agreed settlement of the dispute.
Chapter 4 outlines the various breaches of the Interim Accord by the FYROM and the
exchanges between the parties in that regard. Chapter 5 addresses the decision of NATO
reached in April 2008 at Bucharest in light of the particular characteristics of that
organisation as a closed military alliance.
1.11. Chapters 6 – 8 present Greece’s legal arguments. Chapter 6 shows that the present
case, in light of Article 5(1), as an attempt to adjudicate upon the name issue, falls outside the
Court’s jurisdiction; and, in any event, in light of Article 22, is excluded. It also deals with
the Monetary Gold problem associated with the eff ective impleading of NATO and its
Member States. In the event that the Court nevertheless determines that it has jurisdiction in
the case, Chapter 7 considers Greece’s conduct at th e Bucharest NATO Summit and shows
that this was consistent with Greece’s obligations under Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord,
read in the light of Article 22. Chapter 8 shows that, under the principle of the exceptio non
adimpleti contractus, the FYROM’s breaches of the Interim Accord are conditions which
would have permitted non-performance (if no n-performance there was) of corresponding
obligations.
Chapter 9 addresses in further detail the FYROM’s far-reaching requests for remedies.
10 CHAPTER 2: THE “NAME ISSUE”
I. INTRODUCTION
2.1. Since 1991, when the FYROM emerged as an independent State in the
Balkans, the new country’s appropria tion of the name the “Republic of
Macedonia” has raised an issue of securi ty and stability in the region. Below and
in Section III, Greece will review its numerous attempts to resolve the issue with
the FYROM. But, despite Greece’s atte mpts and significant concessions, the
critical issue of the FYROM’s name remains unresolved.
2.2. The Court is not the forum for a debate over the name issue per se. This
is made clear by Article 5 of the Interim Accord, read with Article 21(2). The
FYROM’s application nevertheless requires an understanding of the importance
of the dispute to regional stability, and – of direct re levance to this case – an
understanding of NATO’s position at th e Bucharest Summit that the FYROM
cannot be invited to accede to its ranks before the dispute has been resolved.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE NAME ISSUE
2.3. The area known as “historical M acedonia”thefers to the Ancient
Kingdom of Macedonia at the time of King Philip (4 century BC), father of
Alexander the Great. Almost 90% of that territory is located today within the
region of Greek Macedonia. “Geographical Macedonia” in modern times
(primarily since the latter part of the 19hcentury), refers to a wider geographical
region in the Southern Balkans whichth lies today inside Greece, the FYROM,
Bulgaria and Albania. The late 20 century breakdown of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the emergence of the FYROM as an independent
State triggered renewed concerns over the constitutional name and, more
particularly, over the political purposes for which the Government of the FYROM
has employed it.
A. A Chronology of Events Surrounding the Macedonian Question
2.4. The region in which geographi cal Macedonia is found was under the
rule of the Ottoman Empire for some fi ve hundred years. Ottoman control over
the Macedonian region was completed w ith the conquest of the main Byzantine
city of Thessaloniki in 1430. Ottoman ru le in the Balkans, including the regions
of “geographical Macedonia”, lasted un til the liberation of Thessaloniki in
October 1912. Earlier, by a series of uprisings and wars in the 19 thcentury, a
number of independent successor States emerged, first with Greece in the 1820s,
followed by Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria. The antagonism among the new
States over the region of geographical Macedonia gave rise to the so-called
11 th
“Macedonian Question”, which emerged in the last part of the 19 century
following the 1878 Congress of Berlin and the rise of hostilities between
Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs for succession to the Ottomans in their European
possessions. Despite the numerous uprisings within geographical Macedonia, the
Ottomans retained control over the regi on until the Balkan Wars of 1912 and
1913.
2.5. In 1912, the Kingdom of Greece, the Kingdom of Bulgaria, the
Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Mont enegro joined forces to defeat the
Ottoman army in geographical Macedonia. 10 Following the two Balkan Wars of
1912-1913 and the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, signed in August 1913, the
Ottoman territories in the geographi cal Macedonia were apportioned between
Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. Slightly more than half the territory of Macedonia
went to Greece, slightly more than one -third to Serbia, and the remainder was
divided between Bulgaria and Albania. 11
2.6. The Serbian part of Macedonia was incorporated into the new Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In 1929 that State changed its name to the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 12 and the territory that currently constitutes the FYROM
was included with South Serbia in the Banovina (province) of Vardar. 13The
Kingdom of Yugoslavia ceased to exist in 1941, a victim of the Second World
War; the territory of the present-day FYROM fell under the control of Bulgaria
and Albania under Italian control.
2.7. The Macedonian territories which went to Greece corre spond to a great
extent to the territory of “historical M acedonia”. As a result, such territories
formed a separate administrative region in Greece designated by the name
Macedonia. 14 This region was the only part of “geographical Macedonia” that
15
bore the name “Macedonia” until the Second World War.
9 See e.g. N. Dwight Harris, “The Macedonian Question and the Balkan War” (1913) 7
American Political Science Review pp. 197-216.
10
See, e.g., Ernst Christian Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913,
11mbridge, Harvard University Press, 1938 pp. 76-8 .
The size of the Macedonian lands in four neighbouring countries is estimated today at
approximately 66600 sq. klm, shared by Greece (33850 sq.k.), FYROM (25713 sq. k), Bulgaria
(6450sq.k.) and the remaining area in Albania.
12Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,Boulder, Westview Press,
1993 p 16.
13See Cohen, 18 (map 1.1), p.149; Željan Šuster, Historical Dictionary of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia London, Scarecrow Press, 1999, p.183.
14
See article 1 of the Law No 524/1914 “on Administrative Division and Administration of the
New Countries”, published in Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece, No 404 A of 31
15cember 1914: Annex 144.
See infra para 2.10.
122.8. The 1940s were a decade of strife in Greece. 16 Italy invaded Greece on
28 October 1940, followed by Germany on 6 April 1941. The occupation of
Greece was divided among three powers – Italy, Germany and Bulgaria – and this
lasted until October 1944.
2.9. The liberation of Greece in 1944 and th e withdrawal of the occupying
forces afforded Greece only a brief respite from conflict. With the start of the
Civil War in 1946, Greek Macedonia was once again threatened – this time by the
17
irredentist ambitions of Yugoslavia under Josef Broz Tito.
2.10. In 1946, the Serbian portion of Macedonia was renamed the People's
Republic of Macedonia as a component of the newly proclaimed Federal People's
18
Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s ambitions at that time included the
incorporation of the Mace donian territories of Greece and Bulgaria into a
Yugoslav or South Slav Federation, 19 to which end Yugoslavia undertook both
20
diplomatic and military efforts. Yugoslavia actively supported the armed
insurgency in Greece and urged Greek Macedonians to join its ranks. 21 Yugoslav
16John S. Koliopoulos, Plundered Loyalties. Axis Occupatio n and Civil Strife in Greek West
Macedonia, 1941-1949, London: Hurst & Company, 1999, 158ff.
17U.S. and UK official observers shared Greece’s concern in this regard: Evangelos Kofos, “The
Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece, 1943-1949” in John O. Iatrides &
Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy ,University Park,
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Pre ss, 1995 p.274, citing memoranda of the U.S.
State and War Departments (ibid, pp.305-6 n85), and British Foreign Office communications
(ibid, p.311 n98). Yugoslavia and Bulgaria co nferred with one another about the possibility of
annexing and dividing parts of Greek Macedonia: Kofos, 307 ff.; Edgar O’Ballance, The Greek
Civil War 1944-1949 ,London: Faber and Faber, 1966 p.195; and Turkey considered that Greek
Macedonia might be separated to form a new State: Kofos, p.306 n. 87. See also David H. Close,
18e origins of the Greek civil war ,London, Longman, 1995pp. 110-1.
Constitution of Yugoslavia, adopted 30 Jan 1946, Art 2 para 1: reprinted in English translation
in Amos J. Peaslee, ed., Constitutions of Nations vol III 2edn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1956, p.757. See also Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a
Multinational State ,Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997, p. 46.
19Pavkovic, ibid., p. 40.
20
See Memorandum transmitted to the Security Council by Greece, contai ning texts of World
21r II and immediate post-war Yugoslav statements: A/47/877-S/25158, 25 January 1993: Annex 146
Ivo Banac, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split and the Greek Civil War’ in John O. Iatrides & Linda
Wrigley, eds, Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, University Park,
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Pr ess, 1995,p.258, p.266. See also Charles R.
Shrader, The Withered Vine. Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945-
1949,Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1999, pp.175-86; Amikam Nachmani, ‘Civil War and
Foreign Intervention in Greece, 1946-49’ (1990) 25 Journal of Contemporary History 489, 500-
01.
13support for the insurgency gave rise to border incidents with Greece, leading to a
situation of which the Security Council took note. 22
2.11. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union
and Bulgaria advocated the annexation of certain provinces of northern Greece. A
year later, at secret meetings in Bled and Euxinograd, Yugoslav and Bulgarian
leaders agreed on the foundati ons of a future federation in the Balkans; it was
expected that an outcome to the Civil War favourable to the insurgents would
open the way for Greek Macedonia’s incorporation in a united Macedonian entity
within the planned federation under Yugos lav auspices. The Stalin-Tito feud in
1948 and the victory of the Greek government over the insurgency in 1949
frustrated these plans.23
2.12. In 1963 the People’s Republic of Macedonia was renamed the “Socialist
Republic of Macedonia” and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was
renamed the “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. The renaming gave rise
to renewed Greek concerns over possible te rritorial claims by Yugoslavia to the
Greek region of Macedonia. The Greek government viewed these measures as the
continuation of unfriendly acts. Yugoslavia , as a Non-Aligned State in the Cold
War, did not however wish to fall in to open conflict with Greece, and the
Yugoslav federal government in Belgrade re strained expansionist aspirations in
Skopje.
2.13. In the years preceding the collaps e of the Yugoslav Federation, a
growing Slav Macedonian nationalism began to re-emerge in the Socialist
Republic of Macedonia, calling for an independent and “united” Macedonia.
2.14. In September 1991, the former federa tive unit of the Socialist Republic
of Macedonia assumed the name “Re publika Makedonija”. Immediately
following the FYROM’s independence and over the years since, Greece has
contested the FYROM’s attempt to appropriate the Macedonian name and has
drawn attention to the irredentist ambitions which the use of the name implies.
2.15. The European Communities/European Union struggled to find a formula
responsive to concerns over pe ace and stability in the region. One of a series of
attempts was contained in the reports of the Arbitration Commission of the
Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia (herei nafter “Badinter Commission”).
Opinion Number 6 of 11 January 1992 stated, inter alia, that the FYROM had
“renounced all territorial claims of any kind in an unambiguous statement binding
22
The Security Council by SC res 15, 19 Dec 1946, under Article 34 of the UN Charter
established a Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents. The Commission
presented its Report (in three volumes) in 1947: Report to the Security Council, S/360, 27 May
2347.
Adam B. Ulam, “The Background of the Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute,” (1951) 13 Review of
Politics 39, 55-63.
14in international law” and that the constitutional name of the State therefore could
24
not “imply any territorial cl aim against another State.” The difficulty with this
particular attempt at settlement was that it was predicated on an assumption that
most other relevant parties did not share. The member States of the European
Community did not concur that the FYROM could be recognised under its
constitutional name. 25 The Security Council, in SC res 817 (1993), understood
that settlement of the difference concerning the name is necessary “in the interest
of the maintenance of peaceful and good- neighbourly relations in the region.”
The Secretary-General said that normalisation of relations between Greece and
the FYROM was relevant “to pea ce and stability in the region.” 26 The serious
difficulties encountered in other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia further drew attention to the delicacy of the situation and the potential
of irredentist claims, however stated or implied, to destabilise international
relations.
B. The Name as a Problem of Regional Security
2.16. The transformation of the federati ve Socialist Republic of Macedonia
into an independent State with the constitutional name “Republika Makedonija”
introduced new elements into the historic Macedonian controversy.
2.17. Greece’s primary concern with the FYROM’s constitutional name is
that, while it formally refers to the new, independent State lying within the
borders of the former Yugoslav Republic , the term “Macedonia” is also a
reference to a broader geographical regi on in Southeast Europe – a region that
includes substantial territory and population within Greece and other States.
2.18. The use of one and the same name to denote both a broad geographical
region in the Balkans and a newly independe nt State that occupies little over a
third of that region inevitably creates c onfusion and even a sense of historical
“injustice”. It is the Greek position that the FYRO M’s constitutional name
involves a form of irredentist propaganda threatening to Greece and other States
in the region. Because the above constitutional name conveys the impression of
a “lost” Macedonian homeland that rightfully belongs to all “Macedonians,” its
appropriation by the FYROM’s authori ties and their long-term campaign to
entrench its use by others amounts to incitement in a region in which questions of
borders, languages and the identity of peoples have repeatedly given rise to strife.
The FYROM’s actions confirm Greece’s position, as will be shown in more detail
in Chapter 4.
24Opinion No 6 (“On the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European
Community and its Member States”) (1992) 31 ILM 1507, 1511.
25See infra paras 2.22-2.24.
26Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to SC res 845 (1993),22 Sept 1993, para 8: S/26483.
152.19. The use of the constitutional name “Macedonia” is part and parcel of an
overall programme intended to spur claims to “rectify” the settled borders of the
region. As a further part of its pr ogramme, the FYROM has attempted to
appropriate symbols of central importance to Greece and to Greek national
identity. A salient example is the Sun of Vergina. In 1977, Greek archaeologists
discovered in Vergina the burial complex of the royal dynasty of Philip II the
Macedon. The principal bur ial chamber contained, inter alia, a larnax bearing a
sixteen-pointed gold star or sun. 27 The recurrence of the symbol on other objects
unearthed at the site s uggests its particular conn ection to the royal dynasty.
Vergina is a town in the Greek prefectur e of Imathia. The significance of the
symbol and of the Vergina site was well- recognised in Greece before authorities
in the FYROM attempted to appropriate it for their own purposes. Use of the
symbol as the main design of the FYROM national flag was a provocation,
implying as it did the territorial expansion of the FYROM into northern Greece.
2.20. To the same end, schools and publications use a map depicting a “united
Macedonia”. On this State-sanctioned map, the official borders between the
FYROM and its neighbours are faintly i ndicated, while the Macedonian regions
of Greece are printed in the same colour as the territory of the FYROM. These
Greek territories are designated as “[t]he Aegean part of Macedonia under
Greece”. The word “Greece” is placed sout h of Mt. Olympus, and, following the
same logic, the word “Bulgaria” is placed outside the Bulgarian Pirin region. 28
Moreover, the authorities in Skopje have continued to publish maps of Greek
Macedonia using outdated Slav or Turkish names for Greek loca tions. In short,
the FYROM portrays the current borders of Greece as a temporary anomaly and
the Macedonian regions of its neighbours as either being under foreign
occupation, or simply an inalienable part of the Macedonian “ tatkovina” or
“homeland”. Such misuse of history and cartography evokes a nationalist
ideology which the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the modern system of
international law in general should have put to rest.
III. PAST MEDIATION EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE NAME ISSUE
2.21. The seriousness of the name issue i mmediately attracted the concern of
multilateral institutions, and several effo rts have been undertaken to resolve it
27See (1977-8) 24 Archaeological Reports 3 on the discovery of the Vergina burial complex. For
photos of the larnax, see Miriam Ervin Caskey, “News Letter from Greece,” (1978) 82 American
Journal of Archaeology 339, 345 (fig 11); and Memorandum of Greece concerning the application
of the FYROM for admission to the United Natio ns, circulated also as UN doc., A/47/877-
S/25158, 25 January 1993: Annex 146.
28See school maps of the FYROM, in: Svetozar Naumovski, Novica Veljanovski, Simo
Mladenovski and Stojan Kiselinovski, History Textbook, Grade II, Skopje 1992 at p. 44, Blagoj
Cukarski (ed.) History Atlas for primary school, Skopje, 1997 at pp 72 and 85: Annex 81.
16through mediation and good offices. The main attempts to settle the issue are
summarised here in the order they began.
A. Mediation Efforts by the European Union
2.22. Upon the FYROM’s independence, the Greek government asked its
partners in the EU to refrain from rec ognising the new State until the name issue
was satisfactorily resolved. Greece’s concer ns were that competing claims to
Macedonian identity and heritage, co mbined with potential irredentist
movements, would disrupt the peace process in the Balkans. 29
2.23. The Council of Foreign Ministers carri ed out an extensive analysis of
the complexities of potential recogn ition of the former Yugoslav Socialist
Republic of Macedonia. An Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting at Brussels on 16
December 1991 set out three requirements that the FYROM would have to meet
as conditions of its recognition by the Community and its member States: the
FYROM must not put forward territorial claims against its neighbours; it must not
engage in hostile propaganda against Gr eece; and it must not use a name that
might entail or imply territorial claims. 30
2.24. The parties failed to reach an agreement in the negotiations which
ensued concerning the name and the Eu ropean Council of Lisbon issued a
resolution in June 1992, stating:
“The European Council... expresses its readiness to recognise [the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] within its existing
borders according to their Declaration on 16 December 1991 under
a name which does not include the term Macedonia.” 31
The Government in Skopje rejected EU recognition on these terms.
B. Mediation Efforts by the United Nations
29See e.g. letter from President Constantine Karamanlis, dated 3 January 1992, in which he
stresses his own identity as a Macedonian and employ s historical and cultural arguments to assert
that the neighbouring state “has ab solutely no right, either historical or ethnological, to use the
name ‘‘Macedonia”: Memorial, Annex 109. In January 1993, Foreign Minister Michael
Papaconstantinou, presented a Memorandum opposing admission of the FYROM to the UN under
its constitutional name, on the grounds that Skopje was seekingmonopolize the Macedonian
name, despite occupying only 38.5 % of the Macedonian re gion. In this way, he asserted: ‘“the
name conveys in itself expansio nist visions bot h over the land and the heritage of Macedonia
through the centuries” (para 10): Annex 146.
30Declaration on Yugoslavia: Ex traordinary EPC Ministerial M eeting, Brussels, 16 Dec 1991:
reprinted (1992) 31 ILM 1485, 1486.
31European Council in Lisbon, Conclusions of the Presidency, doc. SN 3321/ 1/92 Lisbon 26/27
June 1992, available at : http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon/default_en.htm: Annex 1.
172.25. On 7 April 1993, the Security Council adopted SC res 817 (1993), by
which it recommended the application for admission of the new State under the
provisional name “the former Y ugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. The
provisional name is a major stipulation attached to the admission of the FYROM
to the UN. The name is to be empl oyed “for all purposes within the United
Nations [...] pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of
the State.” United Nations Security Council resolution 845 (1993) (hereinafter
“SC res 845 (1993)”), was subsequently adopted on 18 June 1993, encouraging
the FYROM and Greece “to continue thei r efforts under the auspices of the
Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues
between them.” 32 Constitutional amendments were enacted to remove provisions
that suggested an official State interest in the status of minority groups and the
territories they inhabit in neighbouri ng States. Also, the new Member State
committed itself not to fly the flag bearing the Sun of Vergina and to refrain from
the use of certain other historical sym bols which tended to express territorial
aspirations against neighbouring States. Recognition of the FYROM by Member
States of the European Union and its admission as a member State of the United
Nations took place in a framework of these commitments and of the provisional
33
name.
2.26. It was understood generally, and accept ed specifically by Greece, that the
provisional name was subj ect to a final settlement, to be reached through
negotiation between the FYROM and Greece. The UN decided to facilitate the
required negotiations with the aim of ending “the difference over the name of the
state,” which “need[ed] to be resolved in the interest of peaceful and good-
neighbourly relations in the region.” 34The task of mediation between the parties
was entrusted to the Secretary-General, who appointed Cyrus Vance and Lord
Owen as his representatives. A series of intensive negotiations resulted in a text
regulating the whole range of bilateral relations and proposing a composite name
“Nova Makedonija” for international use. 35 However, because of domestic
pressures in both countries, neither party took action regarding the text for about
eighteen months. In Athens, the government eventually adopted the position that
the neighbouring State could not use th e word “Macedonia” or any of its
32
33SC res 845 (1993), 18 June 1993, para 2.
The terms “name” and “designation” are intercha ngeable and the use of one rather than the
other involves no legal distinction. The Security Council in resolution 817 (1993) of 7 Apr 1993
recommended admission of the FYROM, “this St ate being provisionally referred to for all
purposes within the United Nations as ‘the fo rmer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’...” In the
French language version, the phrase is “cet Etat de vant être désigné provisoirement, à toutes fins
utiles à l’Organisation, sous le nom d’ ‘ex-République yougoslav e de Macédoine’...” (emphasis
added).
34SC res 817 (1993), 7 Apr 1993, 3 preambular para.
35Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to SC res 817 (1993), 26 May 1993, Annex V:
S/25855.
18derivatives in its title. This at the time was an absolute position. As will be seen,
Greece has since proposed compromise formulae, reflecting a considerable
modification of its position and a willi ngness to take account of the FYROM’s
views.
C. The Interim Accord
2.27. Eventually, the two countries agreed to normalise their relations. With the
references to the name issue removed, the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
was signed by the foreign ministers of the FYROM, Greece and the UN Secretary
General’s Representative, and witnes sed by Cyrus Vance. The parties’
commitment under the Interim Accord to ne gotiate toward a definitive settlement
of the difference was in accordance w ith SC res 817 (1993) and SC res 845
(1993).
2.28. Under the Accord, Athens was to recognise its neighbour under its
provisional name, resume normal economic relations and proceed to facilitate the
development of further economic and comm ercial relations. Skopje, for its part,
agreed to amend certain c ontentious articles in its c onstitution, to change the
national flag by removing the “Sun of Vergina” symbol, and to avoid such actions
as the use of symbols compri sing part of the historical or cultural heritage of
Greece. The parties also undertook to prohibit hostile actions or propaganda by
state-controlled agencies or private entit ies which might incite “violence, hatred
36
or hostility”. The Accord was to last for seven years and to be automatically
renewable unless one of the parties should decide to terminate it by giving twelve
months notice.
2.29. In the first years of the Accord, the Greek government adopted an open-
door policy towards its neighbour, offering broad economic support as well as
political support within the EU and other international organisations. Particularly
striking was the supportive stance Greece took toward the FYROM in stabilising
the country during a period of internal disturbances in 2001. These voluntary
measures went considerably beyond Greece’s obligations under the Interim
Accord.
2.30. Meanwhile, negotiations continued regarding the name issue. Athens and
Skopje began to hold direct, informal discussions and for the first time, the Greek
government considered the possibility of allowing a composite name. Departing
from the policies of its former Presid ent Gligorov, the FYROM also appeared
ready to find and adopt a mutually accep table name. To support resolution of the
issue, Greece had offered the FYROM a package with favourable prospects for
economic development, as well as active support for its candidacy to membership
36
1891 UNTS 3, entered into force 13 Oct 1995.
19in international organisations in which Greece was a member. The FYROM
seemed eager to take advantage of the opportunity. Unfortunately, in early 2001,
before an agreement could be reached between the parties, a serious conflict
erupted in the FYROM. The internal pol itical settlement which resolved the
conflict left the FYROM’s government with no room to compromise on the name
issue. Meanwhile United States attention was distracted by the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001 and the negotiation process lagged.
D. Recent Greek and International Initiatives
2.31. In November 2004, the executive branch of the United States announced
that it henceforth would refer to the FYROM by the constitutional name,
“Republic of Macedonia.” This strengthened the resolve of the FYROM to reject
a negotiated settlement.
2.32. The Greek government made a furthe r gesture of good will towards the
FYROM, and recommended negotiations for converting the “Interim” into a
“Permanent” Accord. At the EU C ouncil meeting of December 2005, Greece
voted in favour of the FYROM’s candidate status, under the “provisional” name
adopted by the UN twelve years earlier.
2.33. The Government in Skopje made no reciprocal attempt at accommodation.
The FYROM’s Prime Minister Nikola Gr uevski, elected in 2006, palliated, and
even encouraged, nationalist sentiments in the FYROM. Particular initiatives
appeared calculated to inflame Greek public opinion. For example, streets,
highways, stadiums, and airports were st ripped of their old titles and given the
names of Ancient Macedonian kings; stat ues of eminent Macedonian historical
figures were erected in multiple cities. These and other measures, breaches of the
letter and spirit of the Interim Accord, are addressed in Chapter 4 of this Counter-
Memorial. The effect of the conduc t of the new FYROM government was to
undermine the negotiation process.
2.34. In September 2007 Greece decided to favour a mutually acceptable
37
composite name to be negotiated by the UN mediator, Matthew Nimetz.
37
See Letter of the Prime Minister of Greece to the United Nations Secretary General of 14 April
2008: Annex 9.
20 CHAPTER 3: THE INTERIM ACCORD AND ITS
INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
3.1. The FYROM represents the dispute it submitted to the Court as being
exclusively limited to the interpretation and implementation of Article 11(1) of
the Interim Accord. However, this text ca nnot be properly interpreted in clinical
isolation, i.e. in detachment from the ge neral context of this provision, which is
the Interim Accord as a whole; an agreemen t that needs in turn to be read against
its own background in order to be fully understood.
II. NEGOTIATING HISTORY
3.2. It should be recalled that the Interim Accord came in the wake of Security
Council resolutions 817 and 845 (1993). The first Resolution, adopted on 7 April
1993, noting that “a dispute has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to
be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good neighbouring
relations in the region,” recommended to the General Assembly that the
Applicant “be admitted to membership in the UN, this State provisionally being
referred to for all purposes within the UN as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of
the State.”
3.3. The Resolution also urged the parties to continue to c ooperate with the
Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, who had been exercising
their good offices with a view to settli ng the dispute and pr omoting confidence-
building measures among the parties, and requested the Secretary-General to
report to it on the outcome of their initiative.
3.4. On 14 May 1993, after an intense period of discussions with the parties
over successive drafts, Mr. Vance and Lord Owen submitted to Greece and the
FYROM their draft “Treaty confirming the Existing Frontier and Establishing
Measures for Confidenc38Building, Friends hip and Cooperation” (hereinafter the
“Vance-Owen draft”).
3.5. This draft was intended to put an end to the dispute, by resolving the n
ame
issue (its Article 5 provided, “The Republic of Nova Makedonija hereby agrees to
38UN doc. S/25855, Annex V: Memorial, Annex 33
21use that name for all offici al purposes”), and establishing a permanent regime of
good neighbourly relations and cooperation between the parties. But both parties
rejected the proposed solution to the name issue.
3.6. On 18 June, after receiving a repo rt by the Secretary-General on the
Vance-Owen efforts and the rejecti on of their draft by the parties, 39 the Security
Council adopted Resolution 845 (1993), urging the parties to continue
their
efforts under the auspices of the Secr etary-General “to arrive at a speedy
settlement of the remaining issues between them,” and commending to them the
Vance-Owen draft “as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference.”
3.7. The Secretary-General subsequently appointed Mr. Cyrus Vance as his
special envoy for this matter. After more than two years of difficult and
discontinuous negotiations, as well as no fewer than nine drafts, the parties
concluded the Interim Accord and signe d it in New York on 13 September 1995.
The signing was witnessed by Mr. Vance as Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the UN.
III. THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM ACCORD
3.8. The Interim Accord, as the adjective “interim” indicates, has not settled
the dispute between the parties, particularly its fons et origo, the name issue, as
the Vance-Owen draft would have done. Its more modest purpose was to
normalise, as much as possible, the relati ons between the parties, in spite of the
persistence of the dispute over the name, while awaiti ng, and in the expectation
of, a final satisfactory solution to be negotiated in good faith by both parties.
3.9. But in order for the Interim Accord to achieve this purpose, it had to be
without prejudice to the position of the part ies on the name issue, in the sense of
not weighing in favour of one position or the other, but acting as a “holding
operation” on that issue, until the parties agree on a final resolution.
3.10. The provisions of the Interim Accord thus fall into two categories,
corresponding to the double purpose of the Interim Accord: (a) provisions dealing
with the normalisation of the relati ons between the two parties, including
confidence-building measures and cooperation, which are literally taken from the
Vance-Owen draft with only slight modifications; (b) provisions relating to the
enduring dispute over the name, which e ither did not figure in the Vance-Owen
draft (as it would have resolv ed that dispute), such as Article 5, or which had to
be redrafted to adapt them to the persis tence of the core dispute over the name
39UN doc.S/25 855.: Memorial, Annex 33
22and to the purpose and function of the Interim Accord as a “holding operation” on
that issue (Arts.1(1); 11(1); 21(2); 23(2)).
3.11. The Interim Accord retains the same titles of the sections of the Vance-
Owen draft, with the exception of section C, comprising Article 11, which
changes from “European Institutions” in the Vance-Owen draft to “International,
Multilateral and Regional Institutions” in the Interim Accord.
3.12. The Interim Accord is composed of a Preamble and 23 articles divided
into six sections. They are briefly surveyed in what follows, with special
emphasis on the provisions most relevant to the dispute before the Court.
3.13. Section A, “Friendly Relations and Confidence-Building Measures,”
comprises eight articles.
3.14. Article 1 provides for Greece’s r ecognition of the FYROM as an
independent and sovereign State “under the provisional designation” set forth in
SC res 817(1993) (which is not mentioned directly but referred to in a side letter);
the establishment of diplomatic rela tions between Greece and the FYROM and
the opening in the meantime of liaison offices in their respective capitals.
3.15. Article 2 confirms the existing front ier between the parties as enduring
and inviolable. Article 3 expresses the mutual respect of each party for the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the other. Article 4
registers the commitment of the parties to refrain from the threat or use of force,
the violation of the existing frontier or the assertion of claims to change the
frontier or to any part of the other’s territory.
3.16. Article 5 deals with the crucial a nd continuing contention over the name.
It provides:
“1. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to
Security Council resolution 845(19 93) with a view to reaching
agreement on the difference descri bed in that resolution and in
Security Council resolution 817(1993).
2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the
name of the Party of the Second Pa rt, each Party reserves all of its
rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in this
Interim Accord. The Parties shal l cooperate with a view to
facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective
positions as to the name of the Pa rty of the Second Part. In this
23 context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing
with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and
commerce between them in a manner consistent with their
respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the
Second Part. The Parties shall take practical m easures so that the
difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not
obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the
Party of the Second Part and third parties.”
3.17. This provision calls for two remarks: Paragraph 1 imposes a positive
obligation to continue negotiating under th e auspices of the Secretary-General of
the UN with a view to reaching a final agreement on the name issue. Whilst it is
true, as the FYROM contends, that this is an obligation of means or “best efforts”
and not of result, it is nonetheless a “hard” obligation: the expression “best
efforts” obliges the parties to engage in good faith in “meaningful negotiations”.
3.18. The Court, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, said the following
about the “obligation to negotiate”:
“(a) The parties are under an obligation to enter into
negotiations with a view to arrivi ng at an agreement..... They are
under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations
are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them
insists upon its own position without contemplating any
modification of it.”40
As shown in Chapter 4 below, the FYROM has “insist[ed] upon its own position”
since the entry into force of the Interi m Accord and, notwith standing significant
concessions by Greece, has consistently refused to “contemplat[e] any
modification of it [its initial position].”
3.19. Paragraph 2 addresses the bilateral or inter-se relations of the parties, in
which they undertake to adopt practical measures that would facilitate commerce
and communications between them “in a manner consistent with their respective
positions in regard to the name” issue. This provision of the Interim Accord
functions as “an interim measure of protection”, safeguarding the positions of the
parties, so that their conduct does not tilt the balance on the outstanding issue
(i.e., the difference concerning name) in favour of one party or the other.
3.20. Article 6 constitutes a declaration by the FYROM that nothing in its
40 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969,p.3, para.85.
24constitution can be interpre ted as laying claim on terr itories beyond its existing
borders. In particular, it clarifies the meaning of the Preamble and Article 3 of
the FYROM’s Constitution, and provides a further assurance that Article 49 of
that instrument is not to be interpreted as supporting in terference in the internal
affairs of other States. As will be shown in Chapter 4, events in the 1990s in other
parts of the former Yugoslavia, as well as Western Balkan history more generally,
had given rise to concern that irredentist policies might be pursued under the
guise of protecting the citizens of neighbouring States.
3.21. Article 7 addresses in its first pa ragraph the prohibition of hostile
propaganda and activities, as well as inci tement to hatred and violence, whether
by State agencies or private entities. In its second paragraph, Article 7 prohibits
the FYROM from using “in any way the sym bol [the Sun of Vergina] in all its
forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force [of the Interim
Accord].”
3.22. The third paragraph of Article 7 is of particular interest, as it sets out a
procedure for handling claims of viola tions of the preceding paragraph. It
provides:
“If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of
its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it
shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and
the other Party shall take appropri ate corrective action or indicate
why it does not consider it necessary to do so.”
It is to be noted that this procedure is limited specifically to claims of abuse of
historic or cultural symbols. This is why the procedure is incorporated in Article
7, immediately after the paragraph on the prohibition of the use by the FYROM
of the Sun of Vergina symbol. This procedure is not for the settlement of any
other type of claim or di spute under the Interim Accor d. For this la tter purpose,
there is a special provision in the Inte rim Accord, the compromissory clause of
Article 21(2), on the basis of which the present case was instituted.
3.23. Finally, in Article 8 the Parties underta ke not to impede the movement of
people or goods between their territories or through their territory to that of the
other Party. This is a further concession by Greece to the FYROM, which is a
land-locked State.
3.24. Section B of the Interim Accord, en titled “Human and Cultural Rights”,
comprises two articles, Articles 9 and 10. Apart from the affirmation of principles
in Article 9(1), Article 9(2) states that no provision in the relevant human rights
25instruments shall be interpreted as giving a right to take any action contrary t
o the
aims and principles of the UN Charter including the principle of territorial
integrity of States.
3.25. Section C of the Interim Accord is entitled “International, Multilateral and
Regional Institutions”. It consists solely of Article 11, on which the FYROM
bases its case. The first paragraph of Article 11 provides:
“1. Upon entry into force of the Interim Accord, the Party of the
First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the
membership of the Party of the Second Part in international,
multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which
the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the
First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred
to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be
referred to in such organization or institution differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution
817(1993).”
3.26. The interpretation of this paragraph is the subject of Chapters 6 and 7
below. It suffices to note here that whilst this provision imposes an obligation on
Greece in the form of a limitation on a pre- existing right, the obligation is not
“absolute” as contended by the FYROM. For its existence depends on the
continuous fulfilment and observance of a condition, failing which the obligation
ceases to operate and Greece recovers its fu ll liberty to exercise the right whose
existence is preserved by the condition. As abundantly demonstrated in Chapters
4 and 7 below, the condition on which th e existence of Greece’s obligation under
Article 11(1) depends has not been met. Moreover, this obligation is part and
parcel of a larger bundle of rights and obligations exchanged by the parties in the
Interim Accord, and as such cannot be treated in isolation.
3.27. Section D of the Interim Accord entit led “Treaty Relations” (Articles 12
to 14) and Section E entitled “Economic , Commercial, Environmental and Legal
Relations” (Articles 15 to 20) are of lesser pertinence to the present case.
3.28. Section F of the Interim Accord contai ns the “Final Clauses” (Articles 21
to 23). Article 21 deals with the settlement of disputes. Paragraph 2 provides:
“Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties
concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim
Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International
26 Court of Justice, except for the diffe rence referred to in Article 5,
paragraph 1.”
The difference excepted from the Court’s jurisdiction is the difference over the
name. It is discussed in Chapter 6.
3.29. Article 22 is concerned with the consequences of the Interim Accord for
third parties, including internati onal organisations and, conversely, the
consequences of pre-existing treaty oblig ations on those of the Interim Accord.
The article has two distinct components . The first component, which is not
relevant here, is an assurance that the In terim Accord “is not directed against any
other State or entity”. But the second co mponent of Article 22 reserves the prior
rights and obligations of Greece under bila teral and multilateral agreements with
other States or internati onal organisations. This provi sion super-ordinates the
obligations which either party to the Interim Accord may have under those other
treaties over the obligations flowing from the Interim Accord.
3.30. Article 23 deals with the entry into force and the durati on of the Interim
Accord. It provides that it “shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive
agreement”; but that after seven years a Party can withdraw from it, within twelve
months’ (written) notice.
IV. THE OTHER AGREEMENTS OF 1995
3.31. Following on the signature of the Interim Accord, on 13 September 1995
two Memoranda on Practical Measures were adopted pursuant to the directive of
Article 5(2). One Memorandum, signed in Skopje on 13 October 1995, addresses
the Movement of Persons and Goods a nd official correspondence between the
Parties; the second, signed in Athens on 20 October 1995, provides for the
Establishment of Liaison Bureaus in the respective capitals of the Parties.
3.32. Both Memoranda address the issue of the use of the name, but only in the
mutual or bilateral relations of the Parties, pursuant to the provisions of Article
5(2) of the Interim Accord. This paragraph provides:
“...the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing with
the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and commerce
between them in a manner consistent with their respective
positions in regard to the name [issue].”
3.33. The provisional solution adopted with regard to communications and
exchange of documents was as follows: when Greek authorities receive
communications or documents bearing the constitutional name of the FYROM
27(which Greece does not recognise), they would not refuse them or send them
back, but would affix on them a seal bearing the name “the FYROM”. In parallel,
the latter, when receiving communications or documents bearing the provisional
name, would affix on them a seal bearing its constitutional name.
3.34. The second Memorandum establishes a similar procedure with respect to
the denomination of the Liaison offices, particularly with regard to the FYROM’s
office in Athens. Here again, within th e premises of the Liaison office, the
FYROM would use its constitutional name. Bu t at the entrance of the building or
near the entrance of the house “there will be placed an inscription bearing
“FYROM” (and “an indication that it was placed by a third party”).
3.35. In other words, each State agreed to refer to the FYROM by the name of
its choice within its territorial jurisdiction and in its diplomatic premises. This is
obviously a conservatory measure of their respective claims, so that relations and
exchanges can take place, without prejudice to their respective positions on the
name issue, i.e., without tilting the balance in favour of one or the other.
3.36. The two Memoranda are in fact complements to the Interim Accord,
concluded pursuant, and in order to gi ve effect, to Arti cle 5(2), which is
addressed to the exclusively bilateral relations between the Parties, in an
exclusively bilateral setting.
3.37. Article 5(2) as well as the two en suing Memoranda do not address and
have no relevance to the relations of the Parties in multilateral settings such as
international and regional organisations, which are subject to a different legal
regulation under Article 11 of the Interim Accord.
V. THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE INTERIM ACCORD
3.38. The Interim Accord has three salient legal characteristics.
3.39. First, the Interim Accord is a modus vivendi. A modus vivendi is “an
arrangement of a temporary and provisional nature concluded between subjects o41
international law which gives rise to binding obligations on the parties.” As a
modus vivendi, the Interim Accord is intended to be provisional or temporary,
bridging a time-gap in the regulation of the controverted subject-matter between
the parties, until it is replaced by a more permanent arrangement. It thus fulfils
the function of setting out modalities allowing for the relations between the
parties to continue, in sp ite of persisting disagreement between them, or before
41 Walter Rudolf, “Modus Vivendi ”, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.),Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, vol. III (1997), p. 442.
28they reach a final agreement on the subject-matter of their relations. A modus
vivendi can, and usually does, as in the case of the Interim Accord, also have a
protective function, as was mentioned befo re, i.e., as an interim measure of
protection or a “holding operation,” to main tain or preserve the subject-matter of
the dispute in its actual state (“ en l’état ”), so that it neither evolves through
accretion of practice nor is deliberately changed in favour of one party or the
other, particularly as a result of the continuing relations or activities governed by
the modus vivendi.
3.40. Second, whilst provisional, the Interim Accord is legally binding as long
as it lasts. Its binding character gives it ut ility, for, by entering into it, the parties
seek to establish a sure footing for th eir relations, pending definitive settlement.
Its terms are mandatory and of continuing character. Often a modus vivendi is
established by a simplified or informal agreement. This is not the case of the
Interim Accord, which was negotiated at length and adopted under the auspices of
the United Nations. But even when it is the result of an implied agreement (or
acquiescence), as42n the two cases where the Court found that such a modus
vivendi existed, it remains a legally binding agreement. The fact that it is
intended to be temporary and to be replaced by a more permanent agreement does
not make it any less binding or exacting while it lasts. In this respect, a
particularity of the Interim Accord s hould be noted. Notwith standing Article 23
(according to which, absent a final agreem ent between the partie s, each of them
can unilaterally denounce it after seven y ears, upon twelve months notice), those
parts of the Interim Accord deriving from SC res 817 (1993) (imposing on the
FYROM the provisional arrangement of be ing “provisionally re ferred to for all
purposes within the United Nations as the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’”) would continue to be in force and binding on the FYROM, on the
basis of the Security Counc il Resolution, even in the case of de nunciation of the
Interim Accord. Those parts, incorporated by “renvoi” to the provisions of SC res
817 (1993), would continue to be in force until the realization of the condition set
out by the Security Council for their cessation, namely, the “settlement of the
difference that has arisen over the name of that State”.
3.41. Third, the Interim Accord is a synallagmatic agreement. Given its subject
matter and function as a pr ovisional measure of pr otection or as a holding
operation, and by its terms the Interim Accord cannot be construed as a unilateral
42 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Lybian Arab Ja mahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982 ,
p.18,. para. 93-95; Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.90, para. 84-
86 (although in this case, the modus vivendiwas a document internal to French colonial
administration).
29contract imposing obligations on one party only. It is necessarily a synallagmatic
or reciprocal contract by which both parties exchange engagements or
considerations, those of each party being conditioned by those of the other.
3.42. Certain effects of the In terim Accord were immedi ate and final; others
were to be deployed over time, in a continuous manner. Thus, Greece recognised
the FYROM as an independent sovereign Stat e, in spite of the persistence of the
dispute over the name, and undertook to guarantee the freedom of movement of
persons and goods between the two countries and across its terr itory. Both these
effects were important concessions to the FYROM.
3.43. The FYROM, for its part, undertook to change its flag, to renounce any
irredentist claim on Greek territory, to abstain from irredentist conduct and
repress all related activities, and above all, to negotiate in good faith with a view
to reaching a final solution to the name issue. These, particularly the obligation to
negotiate, were the concessions the FYROM committed itself to make to Greece
in return for recognition, the guaran tee of freedom of movement and the
normalisation of their relations.
3.44. The Interim Accord as a “holding operation” or interim measure of
protection was thus meant to keep the name issue in suspense, not so much in the
inter se relations between the parties in exclusively bilateral settings (where each
was allowed to maintain its position until reaching agreement), but on the
multinational level, by permitting the normalisation of multilateral relations
through the exclusive use of the FYROM’s provisional name or designation until,
through “meaningful negotiations,” a mutually satisfactory solution would be
reached.
3.45. That was the balance struck by Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord, the
condition under which Greece accepted that Accord and the obligations that came
with it. It is that balance that the Inte rim Accord has to ma intain and guarantee
until a final agreement on the name issue is reached.
3.46. The attempt to use the Interim Accord, and more particularly Article
11(1), as a shield behind which to subvert that balance destroys the very object of
the agreement.
3.47. This consistent strategy of the FY ROM was explicitly described by its
President in a debate over the name issue in Parliament on 3 November 2008, in
which the President declared:
30 “…in the recent years Republic of Macedonia had a strategy
which, due to understandable reasons, was never publicly
announced, but it was a strategy that all governments and chiefs of
State stick to so far, regardless of their political orientation. A
strategy which was functional and which gave results…
First of all in the negotiati ons under the UN auspices we
participated actively,
But our position was always the same and unchanged , and that
was the so-called dual formula. That means the use of the
constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia […] in all
international organizations and in bilateral relations with all
countries, with a compromise so lution to be found only for the
bilateral relations with the Republic of Greece […]. In regard to
NATO and the European Union, having in mind the Greek
membership in these structures and its right to veto in accession of
new members, the plan was that our advancement until the full
membership should be done with the temporary reference.
According this concept, the right moment to solve the dispute with
Greece should have happened when Macedonia would be
completely integrated in the NATO alliance and the European
Union. That means that when we will be fully equal and we will
have the same possibilities and mechanisms available as Greece
has and when the accession itself cannot be used for blackmails
and conditioning.” 43
3.48. The whole debate abundantly demons trates that at no time was the
FYROM willing to engage in “meaningful negotiations,” in the sense already
explained, with a view to reaching a fina l agreement on the name issue; rather, it
has always been intent on circumve nting Article 11(1) through skewed
interpretations that purport to reduce its ambit to inter-se relations, even within
multilateral institutional settings, in viol ation of the text, the context and the
function of this Article.
3.49. In sum, the Interim Accord as a synallagmatic agreement constitutes a
single transaction registering an exchange of considerations. No single article or
provision, even if it imposes an obligati on on one party only, can be treated as
43 Stenography notes from the 7 tsequel of the 27thsession of the Parliament of the
Republic of Macedonia, held on 3 November 2008 : Annex 104.
31self-standing, in isolation from the rest. Th is is because such an obligation is part
and parcel of a bundle of rights and obligations, accepted by one party in
exchange for a corresponding bundle assumed by the other.
32 CHAPTER 4: THE FYROM’S VIOLATIONS OF THE
INTERIM ACCORD
4.1. The historical review and the analysis of the Interim Accord in the
previous chapters would be incomple te without a brief summary of the
FYROM’s conduct with respect to the obligations which it assumed in the
Interim Accord. The summary that follows focuses on the FYROM’s
actual violations; an analysis of those legal obligations and the
significance of the FYROM’s violations of them for this case will be
undertaken in Chapter 8 below.
I. RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE FYROM’S FAILURE TO
CONDUCT GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS
4.2. This section will focus on recen t examples of the FYROM’s
failure to conduct good faith negotia tions, which have now led to a
deadlock.
4.3. It will be recalled th at in its SC res 845 (1993), the Security
Council defined the framework of the negotiation process between Greece
and the FYROM in urging “the par ties to continue their efforts under the
auspices of the Secretary-General [and] to arrive at a speedy settlement of
the remaining issues between them” (emphasis added). This framework
was then explicitly adopted by the part ies in the Interim Accord itself, as
explained in Chapter 3 above.
4.4. Since the adoption of SC res 845 (1993), the UN mediator, Mr.
Nimetz, has submitted various proposals to the Parties in an effort to solve
the name “difference”. This procedure under the auspices of the United
Nations continues today. However, th e FYROM has failed to engage in
good faith negotiations, as the following examples show.
4.5. In September 2007, in contravention of SC res 817 (1993), SC res
845 (1993) and GA Resolution 47/225 (1993), Mr. Crvenkovski declared
before the plenary of the General Asse mbly, “the name of my country 44
the Republic of Macedonia and will be the Republic of Macedonia.”
4.6. Two months later on November 2, 2007, the Prime Minister of the
FYROM declared in relation to th e Draft Framework Understanding
submitted by the UN Mediator Matthew Nimetz that: “[…] there is one
point, which definitely we cannot accep t –the one that says that the
44
Statement made by President Crvenkovski in September 2007 before the
General Assemblth United NationsOfficial Records of the General Assembly, Sixty
Second Session, 4Plenary Meeting, doc. A/62/PV.4 at p. 29: Annex 5.
33Republic of Macedonia should accept a name different from its
constitutional one for international use. This provision of the document is
unacceptable for the Republic of M acedonia and we cannot discuss it.
Hence it may be considered that the Macedonian Government is rejecting
this provision.”45
4.7. On 3 April, 2008, during the NATO Summit in Bucharest, the
FYROM’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Milošoski, declared in a press
conference: “[…] we are Macedonians and our country is46he Republic of
Macedonia which will be our name for good […].”
4.8. On 3 November 2008, just before the FYROM submitted its
application to this Court, its Parlia ment held a session offering a “Draft
Resolution for solving the dispute a bout the name of the Republic of
Macedonia.” During the de bate, the FYROM’s President, Mr. Branko
Crvenkovski, made a statement regarding the country’s traditional
position on the name issue. The following excerpts of that speech are
evidence of the FYROM’s uncompromising stance.
“First of all, in the negotiations under the UN auspices we
participated actively, but our position was always the same
and unchanged. And that was the so called dual formula.
That means the use of the constitutional name of the
Republic of Macedonia […] in all international
organizations and in bilateral relations with all countries,
with a compromise solution to be found only for the
bilateral relations with the Republic of Greece [...]
Fourth, as regards the dual formula as a possible
compromise for solving the dispute we do not have either
the understanding or the support of any Member State of
the Alliance or the [European] Union. On the contrary, that
position is considered by everyone including our major
supporters and friends, as a position which obstructs or
interrupts the negotiations from our side . That was fully
publicly, clearly and explicitly announced to us and that is
45 “Prime Minister Gruevski’s statement on Nimetz’s draft-framework of
understanding” Macedonian Information Agency, dated 2 November 2007, available at:
http://www.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?vId+29113595&lId=2 , visited on 16 November
2009: Annex 128.
46 “NATO Bucharest 2008-Milososki: No invitation for Macedonia, defeat of
NATO principles”, Macedonian Information Agency,dated 3 April 2008, available at:
http://www.mia.mk/default.aspx?vId=40811596&lId=2, visited on 20 November 2009:
Annex 135.
34 something that this Parliament 47d the entire Macedonian
public should be aware of.”
4.9. During the same session of Parliament, the FYROM’s Prime
Minister, Mr. Gruevski, confirmed the intransige nce of his country with
respect to the so-called “dual formula” throughout the negotiation process
following the signature of the Interim Accord:
“This act [the signature of the Interim Accord of 1995] was
triumphantly celebrated at Skopje’s ‘Macedonia Square,’
and we were told that that name will only be used for a
couple of months. [...] Since that period [...] the same
politicians continually repeated that the maximum
Macedonia must concede is that it will use the dual
formula, which means the use of one name in its relations
with Greece and the use of its constitutional name
internationally, and that in no circumstances we cross that
red line.” 48
“Thus, in only a few months those Macedonian politicians
who had promoted the dual formula, and up until 2005-
2006 considered it the ma ximum compromise […],
drastically changed their pos ition, suddenly calling us,
who have now been in power fo r the last couple of years
[…], firm, uncompromising pol iticians who are going to 49
isolate the country with such [hardline] attitudes […]”.
Statements such as these show th at the FYROM’s position on the name
issue has undergone no modification whatsoever in spite of the obligations
which were imposed by the Security Council. Rather, the FYROM has
sought to exploit the formal negotia tion process as a way of delaying
resolution of the difference in the hope that it could use the time to
gradually persuade third party States to recognise its constitutional name.
As Mr. Crvenkovski himself said, the FYROM has adopted this “position
for repealing the negotiat ions, or at least freezing them for a longer
period.” 50 The dual formula was and remains the FYROM’s tool for
avoiding the negotiation of a name that is satisfactory to both Parties.
47 th th
Stenography notes from the 7 sequel of the 27 session of the Parliament of
the Republic of Macedonia, held on 3 November 2008 (emphasis added), pp. 27-7/11 and
27-7/ 12: Annex 104.
48 Ibid. at p. 27-7/14.
49 Ibid. at p. 27-7/17.
50 Ibid. at p. 27-7/13.
354.10. Greece, for its part, has demonstrated a willingness to participate
in the negotiation process in good faith by modifying its policy on the
name issue in an effort to secure a solution. According to the letter sent by
Prime Minister Karamanlis to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on 14
April 2008:
“In order to revitalize talks, in September 2007, the Greek
Government announced in Parlia ment that it was ready to
accept a composite name that could include ‘Macedonia’ as
the basis for a mutually acceptable solution. T51s
represented a major unilateral change in our policy.”
4.11. A letter sent by Ambassador Mr. Mourikis to members of the
Security Council on 14 April 2008 reiterates Greece’s willingness to
effect a major change of the Greek position. 52
4.12. The following examples further illustrate the FYROM’s
intransigence on the name issue:
• the FYROM’s submission of numerous applications for
admission to international organisations, including
NATO, using its constitutional name rather than that
designated in Resolution 817;
• the FYROM’s use of its consti tutional name both in its
official correspondence with international organisations
and in the sessions and meetings of their organs; and
• the FYROM’s attempts to gain recognition of its
constitutional name by third States, pending
negotiations under the auspices of the UN.
4.13. A corollary of good faith negotiati on is to maintain a cordial
relationship. Yet, the FYROM has refused to abstain from actions which
exacerbate the dispute. Examples, whic h will be detailed below, include
the propagation of irredentist claims on Greek territor y, appropriation of
Greek historical symbols, and unwill ingness to protect the Greek Liaison
51 Letter of the Prime Minister of Gr eece to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, dated 14 April 2008, forwarded tthe United Nations Secretary General by
Letter of Ambassador John Mourikis, Permanen t Representative of Greece to the United
Nations under reference F.4608/434/AS1121, dated 15 April 2008: Annex 9.
52 Letter of Ambassador Mourikis Perm anent Representative of Greece to the
United Nations to H.E. Ambassador Wang Guangya Permanent Representative of China
to the United Nations, dated 14 April 2008, Ref. F.4608/450/AS 1161. The same letter
was sent to the other 14 Permanent Representatives of the Security Council: Annex 54.
36Office and Greek Consulate in Skopje from ongoing harassment and
vandalism.
II. THE FYROM’S INTERVENTION IN GREECE’S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS
4.14. Irredentism arising from extreme Macedonian nationalism, such as
the concept of a “Greater Macedonia ” that includes Greek territory, has
expressed itself, inter alia, in the FYROM’s interventionist policy with
respect to what it insi sts on presenting as a “Macedonian minority” in
Northern Greece.
4.15. In spite of its obligations under th e Interim Accord, as well as a
1992 amendment to its own Constitution pledging not to in terfere in the
sovereign rights or internal affairs of other States, 53 the FYROM has
persisted in meddling in Greece’s internal politics, including purporting to
“protect” what it styles “ethnic Macedonians that have never had
Macedonian nationality”. 54
4.16. On numerous occasions, the FY ROM’s political leaders have
attended meetings of associations representin g so-called “Macedonians
from the Aegean Part of Macedonia”, 55which promote irredentist policies
and engage in hostile propaganda against Greece. On 24 April 2006, then-
Prime Minister Vlado Butskovski was invited by the “Union of
Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia” to speak at the 12 thEaster Rally,
during which he stressed that the G overnment “had opened up political
dialogue for the permanent solution of the problems of Macedonians in
53 In January 1992, the FYROM adopted Constitutional Amendment II, which
provides: “in the exercise of this concern the Republic will not interfere in the sovereign
rights of other states or in their internal affairs.”
54 See the definition of “Diaspora” on the website of the FYROM’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, available at : http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemId=340isited
on 20 November 2009: Annex 110. The FYROM officially proclaimed and gave legal
basis to its policy of unilaterally asseg the existence of “et hnic Macedonians” in
Article 49 of its 1991 Constitution, which states: “the Republic cares for the status and
rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries, as
well as Macedonian expatriates, assists thei r cultural development and promotes links
with them. The Republic cares for the cultural, economic and social rights of the citizens
of the Republic abroad.”
55 For instance in 2005 the Minister of Culture Blagoj Stefanovski attended the
“25th meeting of Macedonians from the Aeg ean Part of Macedonia” Petse Stefanovski,
“The pan-macedonian meeting in Trnovo”, A1 Television, dated 31 July 2005, available
at: http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=49437, visited on 9 December
2009: Annex 115. On 13 April 1999 the then President of the FYROM Kiro Gligorov
attended the meeting of the “Association of the expulsed Macedonians from the Aegean
Part of Macedonia” held at the Village Tri Tsesmi,. I. Bojadziski, “A humble celebration
with non hidden emotions”, Makedonija Denes, dated 14 April 1999: Annex 112.
37 56
the Aegean Part of Macedonia.” Prime Minister Gruevski, in a speech to
the 26 “Pan-Macedonian Meeting” at Trnovo, held on 31 July 2006,
“gave his pledge to the Aegeans that after sixteen years of silence from
the Macedonian state, he would try to broach this issue with Greece and
the international community.” 57 The following year, Prime Minister
Gruevski once again addressed the “Aegean Macedonians” at their 27 th
meeting in Trnovo, stating:
“Nobody will be in position to make Macedonians,
wherever they are, renounce their existence or stop feeling
as Macedonians” 58
and
“The requests of Macedonians expelled from Aegean
Macedonia will be realized after Macedonia becomes full
member of the European Union.” 59
4.17. Another example of the FYROM’s interference in the interna l
affairs of Greece can be found in a statement of Prime Minister Gruevski
made on 14 October 2008 concerning th e arrest of four local residents
near the city of Florina, in northwest Greece, following a protest against a
military exercise. The FYROM’s Prime Minister stated:
“[…] every country is ent itled to organize military
exercises, but when they are practically taking place in
front of the yards of citizen s and are not relocated after
numerous demands of the population, it becomes obvious
that some other motive is in question. We are talking about
a demonstration of power and attempt of spreading fear
56 “ Prime Minister Butskovski at Brest village. European Standards and Rights
for the Children Refugees”, Dnevnik, dated 25 April 2006, available at:
http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=4E19A74B492D1643AF7624F6B91F0708&arc=
1, visited on 10 December 2009: Annex 116.
57 “The new government will solve the problem of the Expelled Macedonians”,
Utrinski Vesnik, dated 31 July 2006, available at:
http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=2145&stID=74115&pR=3 : Annex 117.
58
Petse Stefanovski, “Border Meeting in Trnovo. The Borders will fall down with
59e Unity of Macedonians”, Vreme, dated 30 July 2007: Annex 123.
Zanetta Zdravkovska, “Gruevski at the All Macedonian Gathering in Trnovo.
The Aegean Macedonians will realize th eir rights after accession in the EU,” Dnevnik,
dated 30 July 2007: Annex124.
38 among the population, which is far from democratic move
of a EU member country […]”. 60
On 15 October 2008, Prime Minister Gruevski referred to “military
exercises near th61vill ages in northern Greece, populated with ethnic
Macedonians”. The FYROM’s Defence Minister, Mr. Zoran
Konjanovski, expressed his regrets “about the inci dent between the Greek
Army and the local Macedonian citizens which62appened yesterday in the
village of Zabrdeni, Lerin, Greece.” The Defence Minister of the
FYROM failed to use the actual Greek topographical names when he
63
made these statements. Just a few days earlier, on 2 October 2008, the
Cabinet of the Prime Minister of the FYROM expresse d concern “about
the situation of the Mace donians in the Northern Part of Greece, who are
protesting against the military exercises of the Greek army.” 64
4.18. On 14 October 2008, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman
responded:
“Yesterday’s statement from the Gruevski government is
yet another provocative attemp t at utter distortion of
reality. It is a new, unaccepta ble attempt to interfere in
Greece’s domestic affairsT . his conscious policy of
cultivating nationalism and into lerance is irresponsible at
the very least. Mr. Gruevski needs to accept the fact that
Greek citizens do not need self-appointed advocates;
advocates who in fact have an obvious motive […]”. 65
60 “PM Gruevski condemns detention of Macedonian journalists in Greece”,
available at the Official site of the Government of the FYROM:
61tp://www.vlada.mk/?q=book/export/html/1319, dated 14 October 2008: Annex 103.
“PM Gruevski raises question on incidents in northern Greece, says name row
presents main obstacle to NATO, EU membership”, dated 15 October 2008, available at
the Official site of the Government of the FYROM
:http://www.vlada.mk/?q=book/export/html/1338,: Annex 139.
62 “Konjanovski: We can cede Kr ivolak to the Greek Army”, A1TV, (14 October
2008), available at : http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=9818,: Annex
143.
63 Ibid.
64 “Prime Minister’s Cabinet concerned about the situation of the Macedonians in
the Northern Part of Greece,” Sector for Public Relations of the Government of the
65public of Macedonia , 2 October 2008: Annex 137.
Statement of the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. Koumoutsakos regarding
yesterday’s statement from the Gruevski Government, dated 14 October 2008,
available at the Official Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic;
394.19. The FYROM’s advocacy on behalf of “Macedonians” living in
neighbouring countries has been elevated to a “right and obligation”. On
21 December 2006, in a speech before Parliament, the FYROM’s then-
President Mr. Branko Črvenkovski stated: “looking after the status and
rights of the Macedonian national mi nority in neighbouring countries is
our natural right and obligation.” 66
67
4.20. By Verbal Note No. 140/G/AS 311, dated 24 February 2009, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic protested a statement
made by the FYROM’s Foreign Minister regarding a “Macedonian-
speaking minority” in Greece. The statement was made by Foreign
Minister Milošoski in the context of an interview to the German
newspaper Tageszeitung, published on 4 February 2009. The Verbal Note
described the allegation made by Mr. Milošoski as “a gross violation of
article 6(2) of the Interim Accord,” which “is not cons istent with the
fundamental principles of the United Nations which are enshrined in the
UN Charter.” Responding to the reply 68 of the FYROM’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs to the above Verbal Note, the Hellenic Republic Liaison 69
Office in Skopje, through Verbal Note No. 141.1.A/151/AS 741, dated 3
June 2009, further elaborated on the reasons why statements made by
officials of the FYROM “do not constitute an expression of genuine
interests in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms,” but “form
part of a long-standing and systematic policy of raising non-existent issues
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={A2A464F9-7D22-40AE-B2B8-0B92F85EDA25}: Annex 138.
66 Stenography notes from the 19 thsession of the Parliament of the Republic of
Macedonia held on 21 December 2006 at page 19/5: Annex 99. Besides the Foreign
Minister of the FYROM stated on 25 October 2006: “The Government’s program
foresees strengthened activities for improvi ng the position of the Macedonian national
minority, especially in the neighbouring countries, which is actually our constitutional
obligation”. (“Macedonia w ill strengthen its care of the minorities living in the
neighboring countries”, Makfaxonline, 25 October 2006: Annex 118). The Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affair s Zoran Petrov after asserting that ‘Macedonians’ in
neighbouring countries “are in total two million” answered a question about
“Macedonians” in Greece stating that: “They ar e in the most difficu lt situation from the
point of view of their rights and freedoms. They are engaged through ‘Rainbow’ and they
function very successfully at the international level. They are also successful in finding
their roots and in denying the Greek statem ents that they are some ‘slavophones’.”
(Christo Ivanovski, “Interview: Zoran Petrov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: “We
have an obligation towards two milli on Macedonians in the neighborhood”, Dnevnik, 15
67gust 2007: Annex 126).
68 Annex 67.
Verbal Note No. 32-2530/1, dated 19 March 2009:Annex 69.
69 Annex 75.
40aiming at promoting expansionist aspirations and irredentism against
Greece and its people” and contravene Article 6 of the Interim Accord.
4.21. During the summer of 2008, the FYROM’s Prime Minister
addressed a series of letters to the Pr ime Minister of Greece, as well as to
a large number of countries and representatives of the international 70
community, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The
letters raised claims about the ex istence of a “Macedonian” minority in
Greece. In his letter to the Prime Minister of Greece, dated 10 July 2008,
the Prime Minister of the FYROM made specific demands with regard to
the “status and the rights” of Greek citizens. 71Similar demands with
regard to the “status of persons belonging to the Macedonian ethnic
minority in Greece” were expressed in the letter from the FYROM’s
Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 72
4.22. In both letters, the Prime Minister of the FYROM raised the issue
of the “treatment of persons expelled during the Civil War in Greece and
their descendants regardless of whether they live in 73e Republic of
Macedonia or in other countries worldwide.” The first of the letters
stated:
“These people in the Republic of Macedonia are organized
in several citizen’s associations and during several
meetings with them, they as ked me to address you as a
Prime Minister of a neighbouring country, where they feel
discriminated [against].” 74
4.23. The FYROM’s authorities afford open and active support to
associations of so-called “refugees from the Aegean Macedonia”, many of
which promote irredentism. Accordi ng to the official website of the
FYROM’s Foreign Ministry, under the heading “Diaspora”:
“[T]he MFA has undertaken spec ific measures to afford
direct legal and material assistance for their [i.e.
70 Letter of the Prime Minister of the FY ROM addressed to the Secretary General
of the United Nations, dated 24 July 2008, forwarded through Verbal Note No 4/160 of
the Permanent Representative of the FYROM to the United Nations: Annex 64.
7. Letter of the Prime Minister of the FY ROM to the Prime Minister of Greece,
72ted 10 July 2008: Annex 62.
Letter of the Prime Minister of the FY ROM addressed to the Secretary General
of the United Nations, dated 24 July 2008, forwarded through Verbal Note No 4/160 of
73e Permanent Representative of the FYROM to the United Nations: Annex 64.
Letter of the Prime Minister of the FY ROM addressed to the Secretary General
of the United Nations, dated 24 July 2008: Annex 64.
74 Letter of the Prime Minister of thFYROM to the Prime Minister of Greece,
dated 10 July 2008 Annex 62.
41 ‘Macedonian non-governmental organisations’] activities
on issues involving an intern ational element. The best
examples are … the support for submitting an application
by the Association of Children-Refugees from the Aegean
Macedonia with the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg for return of their seized prope rties in the
75
Hellenic Republic.”
By mobilising persons who fled Gr eece after the Civil War and their
descendants and officially encouraging their claims of return of property
and restoration of their citizenship, the authorities of the FYROM attempt
to reopen issues dating back to the Civil War (1946-1949).
4.24. The same website 76 states that the FYRO M government offers
assistance to members of the “Mace donian diaspora.” Such assistance
includes “legal counseling … whic h facilitates encouragement of
capacities and self-sustained positi oning of the Diaspora vis-à-vis the
77
resident country.” A document located at the above-mentioned site
named “List of Macedonian language desks and organizations, orderly
registered abroad, and the number of the Macedonians in the Diaspora,”
asserts that the number of “Macedon ians” in Greece is “782.506 (1925
Census in Greece); MFA’s estimation: 700,000.” It is noteworthy that
the “‘Rainbow’ Political Party of th e Macedonians in Greece” which the
FYROM views as a major Macedonian association in Greece obtained
4,530 votes in the June 2009 election for the European Parliament,
meaning that supporters of that Party comprise a mere 0.09% of the voting
population. 79
75
Official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM,
http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=340, last visited on 20 November 2009:
Annex 110.
76 Official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM,
http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=340 , last visited on 20 November 2009:
Annex 110.
77 Ibid.
78 “List of Macedonian language desks and organizations, orderly registered
abroad and the number of the Macedonians in the Diaspora”, available at :
79tp://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=340 : Annex 110.
The ‘Rainbow’ which in the 2009 elections for the European Parliament formed
the political alliance ‘Eyropaiki Eleytheri Symmachia-Ouranio Toxo’ obtained in the
2004 elections for the European Parliament 6.176 votes. See European Elections 2009,
Official Results published on the webpage of the Greek Ministry of Interior on 12 June
2009, available at: http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/e2009/pages/index.html?lang=en
visited on 8 December2009: Annex 167.
424.25. Greek officials have restated Gr eece’s longstanding position that
the above allegations constitute an unl awful interference in the internal
affairs of the country. Thus, in his reply to the letter of the FYROM’s
Prime Minister, dated 17 July 2008, the Greek Prime Minister stressed
that the FYROM “aims at interfering in the domestic affairs of a
neighbouring co80try and deviates fr om the objectives of the ongoing
negotiations.”
4.26. Referring to a letter from the FYROM’s Foreign Minister dated 13
March 2009, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled that
“persistent interference in Greece’s do mestic affairs under the pretext of
alleged ‘minority issues’ […] clearly contravenes the provisions of the
Interim Accord and seriously undermines81ood neighbourly and friendly
relations between our two countries.”
III. THE FYROM’S HOSTILE ACTIVITIES
AND PROPAGANDA AGAINST GREECE
4.27. The FYROM has violated the co mmitments undertaken in the
Interim Accord by failing to take meas ures to prohibit hostile activities or
propaganda by its government agencies; on the contrary it has engaged in
active use of propaganda as part of it s official State policy. Moreover, the
FYROM has provided financing and ot her types of support to private
entities seeking to incite hostility against Greece. The FYROM has failed
to take any measures to prevent an d discourage hostile acts of vandalism
against the premises of the Greek Liaison Office in Skopje and its
personnel, despite numerous Verb al Notes of protest from Greece
regarding the matter.
A. Hostile Propaganda against Greece by Public Authorities and
State-controlled Agencies of the FYROM
4.28. The FYROM has continued to promote irredentist propaganda
through its activities, statements, and even the publication and distribution
of school textbooks. Such propaganda presents the territorial settlement of
the Treaty of Bucharest as an unj ustified partition of the “Macedonian
80 Letter of the Prime Minister of Greecto the Prime Minister of the FYROM,
dated 17 July 2008: Annex 63.
81 Letter of the Minister of Foreign A ffairs of Greece to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the FYROM, dated 24 March 2009 under Reference 1024, forwarded through
Verbal Note F.141.1/24/AS 378, dated 27 March 2009 of the Liaison Office of the
Hellenic Republic in Skopje: Annex 70, in reply to Letter of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the FYROM to the Minister oForeign Affairs of Greece, dated 13 March
2009 forwarded through Verbal Note No 01-64/09 dated 16 March 2009 of the Liaison
Office of the FYROM in Athens: Annex 68.
43Homeland” with the aim of generating public hostility towards Greece by
alleging the oppression of a so-called “Macedonian minority” within its
territory. This propaganda forms part of the FYROM’s systematic
attempts to generate support for a “Greater Macedonia.”
4.29. To achieve this aim, the an cient Kingdom of Macedonia is
deprived of its well known Greek charac ter, thus presenting today’s Slavs
who form the largest part of the82opulation of the FYROM as descendants
of the ancient Macedonians. A significant part of the history of ancient
Greece and its historical figures has been usurped so as to create a
distorted image of an ancestral “Greater Macedonia”. A fifth grade history
textbook states:
“[O]ur fatherland has a long a nd rich history. In ancient
times it was a powerful state. In the reign of Philip II,
Macedonia was the most powerful state in the Balkan
Peninsula. In the reign of his son, Alexander the Macedon,
it spread out over three continents, and was a world
power”. 83
4.30. The notion of an historic “Great er Macedonia” is also promoted
through maps in school textbooks which represent it as a distinct entity,
comprised of parts of the actual province of Greek Macedonia. 84 Several
maps distinguish the fatherland of “Greater Macedonia” from Greece, thus
82 See para. (c) of the Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in
Skopje No F. 141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15 April 2009 : “…it is amply known, and not only
to the scientific community, that the Slavs, who form the largest part of the population of
tth actual State of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoni a, settled in the area in the
6 century A.D., bearing no ethn ological or cultural relation whatsoever with ancient
Macedonians, who, as Hellenes, were speaking the ancient Greek language, as proved by
more that 5000 inscriptions, and shared a common cultural identity with the other
Hellenes”: Annex 71.
83 Kosta Atsievski, Darinka Petreska , Violeta Ackoska, Naum Dimovski and
Vanco Gjorgjiev, History Textbook, Grade V, Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, page 4 :
Annex 91.
84 Reference may be made to the map of Macedonia and the Balkans in prehistoric
times (Kosta Atsievski, Darinka Petreska, Violeta Ackoska, Naum Dimovski and Vanco
Gjorgjiev, History Textbook, Grade V , Skopje 2005, p. 20) as well as to the map of
Macedonia at the time of the Ilinden upri sing (Blaže Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo
Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade VII,
Skopje 2005, Reprinted Skopje 2008, p. 120 :Annex 93.
44implying that the latter ha s no historical title to the northern part of its
85
territory.
4.31. The 1913 Treaty of Bucharest is pr esented in school textbooks as
marking the partition of a previously-unified Macedonia. A seventh grade
history textbook states: “The Buchar est Peace Treaty had grave political,
ethnic and economic consequences for the Macedonian people. The treaty
meant that the territorial and ethnic unity of Macedonia was disrupted”. 86
87
In other textbooks, Greek Macedonia is labeled “Greek occupation” 88 or
“part of the region [of Macedonia] under Greek rule”, an expression
which fails to reflect Greek sovereignty over its northern territories. 89
Moreover, maps of school textbooks, besides indicating international
borders, purport to describe the boundaries of the “geographical and
ethnic borders of Macedonia”, which present an ethn ic Macedonia as
comprising significant portions of Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian
territory.90
85
See for instance the map of the Roma n Empire in Kosta Atsievski, Darinka
Petreska, Violeta Ackoska, Naum Dimovski and Vanco Gjorgjiev, History Textbook,
Grade V, Skopje 2005, p. 79: Annex 92.
86 Blaže Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinovski and
Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade VII , Skopje 2005, Reprinted Skopje 2008.
p. 131: Annex 94.
87 See Blaže Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Si mo Mladenovski, St ojan Kiselinovski
and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade VIII , Skopje 2005, Reprinted Skopje
2006, map of “partitioned Macedonia at the time of the First World War”, p. 14 : Annex
90.
88 Vlado Velkovski, Halid Sejdi, Arijan Aljademi, Dimka Risteska and Gjorgji
Pavlovski, , History Textbook, Grade VIII, Skopje 2005, map of “the partition of
Macedonia”, p. 54 :Annex 89.
89 See also p. 198 of the Milan Boshkoski, Nebi Dervishi, Dimko Popovski,
Jordan Iliovski, Natasha Kotlar, Silvana Sidorovski-Chupovska, , History textbook,
Grade II, Skopje 2006, where we read that “In the occupied parts of Macedonia [after the
Bucharest Peace Treaty], the occupation forces introduced a military regime”: Annex 97.
90 See for instance Blaže Ristovski, Shukr i Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan
Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade VII, Skopje 2005, Reprint
Skopje 2008, map of “Macedonia and her geographical and ethnic borders after partition
(1913)”, p. 131, where “state borders” are shown with a broken line and “geographical
and ethnic boundaries” with a continuous line (Annex 94), as well as Vlado Velkovski,
Halid Sejdi, Arijan Aljademi, Dimka Risteska and Gjorgji Pavlovski, History Textbook,
Grade VIII, Skopje 2005, map of “the partition of Macedonia”, p. 54, where “ethnic
borders” are marked with a yellow line, including in the fatherland, among others, even
the island of Thassos in the Aegean (Annex 89). See also Novica Veljanovski, Simo
Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselonovski and Svetozar Naumovski, History textbook Grade
VIII, Skopje 1998,at p. 38, the map of “Maced onia after the First World War” where
“geographical and ethnic bord ers of Macedonia” are shown with a continuous line, and
“state borders” are shown with a broken line (Annex 84).
454.32. Consistent with this policy, the Prime Minister of the FYROM, on
4 February 2008, placed a wreath on th e monument of the national hero
Goce Deltsef. Displayed on the monume nt is a map which purports to
show that “Macedonia” includes within its borders the province of Greek
91
Macedonia.
4.33. Such statements and actions put in to question the finality of the
territorial settlement achieved by the Bucharest Peace Treaty, despite the
fact that the Interim Accord qualifi es the border between Greece and the
FYROM as an “enduring” international border.
4.34. The irredentist propaganda of the FYROM’s State institutions
against Greece culminated in th e 2009 “Macedonian Encyclopaedia”,
edited by the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Science, the FYROM’s
highest cultural institution. An of ficial announcement made on 16
September 2009, available at the FYRO M’s official government website,
welcomed the launching of the Encycl opaedia, stressing also that “the
Macedonian Encyclopaedia was published this year with funds from the
Government.” Moreover, and according to the same announcement, Prime
Minister Nikola Gruevski gave his approval to the content of the edition:
“[…] it scans authentically Macedonia’s point of view about its cultural
and political past and present and stri ves to become an objective, integral
information about us and our country.” 92Under the heading “Aegean part
of Macedonia,” the “Macedonian Encyclopaedia” reads:
“[The Aegean] part of Macedonia is under the
administration of Greece. After the Peace treaty of
Bucharest (10 August 1913), Greece got 51% of
Macedonian territory. According to their mother tongue, in
the Aegean part of Macedonia were living the Macedonian
people as well as eth93c minorities (Turks, Jews, Greeks,
Vlachs and Roma).”
Under the heading “Macedonian ethnic minority in Greece”, the
Encyclopaedia states:
91 See photo of Prime Minister Gruevski on 4 February 2008 in Skopje:
Annex 159.
92 See “MANU promotes Macedonian Ency clopedia”, dated 16 September 2009,
available at the Official site of the Government of the FYROM
http://www.vlada.mk/?q=book/export/html/3978 last visited on 13 October 2009 :
Annex 142.
93 Blaze Ristovski (ed.)Macedonian Encyclopedia, Macedonian Academy of
Sciences and Arts, Skopje, 2009, vol. I, at p. 514: Annex 108.
46 “[T]he Aegean part of Macedonia comprises almost half of
the Macedonian ethnic territ ory. The frontiers of the
territory of the Aegean part of Macedonia until 1913 we94
also in their main part, ethnographical borders.”
4.35. The FYROM has also dissemina ted propaganda regarding the
oppression of an alleged “Macedonian minority” in Greece, and portrays
Greece as having carried out, after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of
Bucharest, “a policy of assimila tion and denationalization of the
Macedonian people.” 95
4.36. For example, a second grade geography textbook reads:
“according to some data, the total number of Macedonians living in the
neighbouring country is 250,000 in Greece,” 96while a first grade
geography textbook states: “the Macedoni ans are the biggest minority in
97
Greece and they are still fighting for their citizen’s rights.”
4.37. The FYROM’s propaganda regard ing the “Macedonian minority”
in northern Greece is not confined to school textbooks. In 2004, the
FYROM’s Parliament, in violation of Article 7(1) of the Interim Accord,
voted to celebrate the following a nniversaries of major events and
important persons:
- 60 Anniversary of the founding of the “Political
Committee of Macedonians in Greece;
th st
- 60 Anniversary of the founding of the 1 National
Liberation Strike brigade from Aegean Macedonia.” 98
94 Ibid. vol. II, at p. 891: Annex 109. Greece protested over certain passages
contained in the text of the Encyclopedia, through the Verbal Note of the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 141.1/144/AS 1531, dated 12 November 2009:
Annex 80.
95 Blaže Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinovski and
Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade VIII , p. 47. See also ibid., p. 46: “As a
result of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, Greece had territorial expansion
northwards (The Aegean Part of Macedonia and Western Thrace). Most of the population
was of non-Greek, and mainly Macedonian, origin. After the First World War, Greece
started to carry out a policy of expulsion of the Macedonian people and installation of a
non-Macedonian population.”: Annex 95.
96 Aleksandar Stojmilov, Geography Textbook, Grade II , Skopje 2002, p. 93:
Annex 85.
97 Gjorgii Pavlovski, Atse Milenkovski, Nikola Panov, Risto Mijalov, Geography
98xtbook, Grade VII, Skopje 2003, Reprint Skopje 2008, p. 42: Annex 102.
“Program for Celebration Anniversaries of Major Events and Important Persons
for the year 2004”, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No 6 (13 February
2004), p.4 : Annex 88.
47B. Activities by Private Entities and Persons Inciting Hostility against
Greece Financed and/or Supported by the FYROM
4.38. The FYROM’s authorities have al so energetically supported the
dissemination of irredentist propaganda by private entities.
4.39. For example, public authorities of the FYROM fund and actively
support the activities of the Uni99 of Societies of “Macedonians from the
Aegean Part of Macedonia”, as well as those of the Association of
“Macedonians from the Aegean Part of Macedonia”. 100 Both organisations
promote irredentist policies and di sseminate hostile propaganda against
Greece. Even the use of the term “Aegean Part of Macedonia” leaves no
doubt about the territorial intentions of those organisations and gatherings,
importing, as it does, an irredentist portion of a mythicised partitioned
fatherland. 101When Greece was hosting the Olympic Games in the
summer of 2004, the President of the Association of “Macedonians from
the Aegean Part of Macedonia”, Mr. Alexsandar Popovski, declared, at a
meeting of the Association in Trnovo:
“Greece is implementing aparth eid. There is an ethnical
genocide over the Macedonians. Greece destroyed and
keeps destroying the cultural an d historical heritage and
wealth of the Macedonians. With a decree and violence it
erased the topography, the hydrography and the entire
toponomy of the ethnical Mace donians. It erased the
Macedonian mother language and the Cyrillic alphabet.
Greece with its laws implements an ethnical, religious,
cultural and linguistic discri mination and such a country
102
can not organize Olympics.”
99
“Decision on Fund Distribution from the Budget of the Republic of Macedonia
for the year 2004 to finance Associations and Foundations”, Official Gazette of the
100ublic of Macedonia,No 41 (24 July 2004) p.12 : Annex 88.
101 Ibid., at p. 13.
This term is also used in school textbooks to describe the province of Greek
Macedonia, see for instance Bla že Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan
Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade VIII , Skopje 2005, at p.
151 ; Novica Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselonovski and Svetozar
Naumovski, History Textbook, Grade VIII, Skopje 1998, at p. 120: Annex 96.
102 See Mente Petkovski, “Greece does not deserve Olympics” Dnevnik, dated 26
July 2004 : Annex 113.
48The official website of the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
lists its support for the political part y “The Rainbow,” which it defines as
103
“the Political Party of the Macedonians in Greece (Lerin)”.
4.40. Along the same lines, the FYROM has sponsored the publication
of books that promote irredentist visi ons with respect to Greek territory.
For instance, the Ministry of Defence funded Van če Stojčev’s 2004 book
“Military History of Macedonia”. The book was al104edited by a public
agency, the “General Mihailo Apostolski”.
4.41. The conclusion of that book states:
“The Macedonian military hi story is 28 centuries long.
During this long period, the Macedonian military idea
advanced to the highest pos sible level and experienced
severe falls. The Macedonian state, the Macedonian army
and the Macedonian military idea developed
simultaneously. There were periods in the history when the
Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state reached the
peak of the fame. In the ancient period, especially during
the rule of Philip II and Al exander II of Macedonia from
359 to 323 B.C., the Macedonian army was the
strongest.” 105
4.42. The second volume of the book contains a map bearing the legend
“Macedonia occupied and divided am ong the Serbian the Bulgarian and
106
the Greek armies from October 1912 to June 1913”, and a map of
Macedonia named “the division of M acedonia based on the Peace Treaty
of Bucharest signed on August 10, 1913”, 107 which, besides international
borders, also marks the boundaries of the “geographical and ethnic
borders of Macedonia”. This map purpor ts to show ethni c Macedonia as
103
“Diaspora” available at : http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=340 :
104ex 110.
The top of the page containing information about the edition states, “Published
by the Military Academy “General Mihailo Apostolski”-Skopje”.The Preface at page 2
states that “this book is structured accoing to the syllabus for the subject Military
History and will be used as a basic textbook and additional literature at the Military
Academy…” Moreover, the page containing in formation about the edition states that
“The author would like to express his utmost gratitude to the Minister of Defense, Mr.
Vlado Bučkovski, PhD, for the financial support the Ministry of Defense the Republic of
Macedonia has extended for th e translation, map design and printing of this book.”
Vanče Stoj čev: Military History of Macedonia, volumes I and II, Published by the
105itary Academy “General Mihailo Apostolksi”,Jugoreklam, Skopje 2004: Annex 86.
106 Ibid., page 681.
Map no. 65: Annex 86.
107 Map no. 70: Annex 86.
49comprising significant portions of Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian
territory.108
4.43. The same distortion is to be f ound in the maps contained in the
book, “The borders of the Republic of Macedonia”, edited in 1998 and
funded by the FYROM’s Mili tary Academy as well as its Ministries of
109
Sciences and National Defence.
4.44. At the time of the publication of the above-mentioned books, the
law in force in the FYROM “on Scientific Research Activities”, which
was abrogated only in 2008, provided in its Article 16 that any research in
the field of “historical and cultural identity of the Macedonian people”
was reserved exclusively to public institutions. 110 Studies and research on
the historical and cultural identity of the “Macedonian people” were in
fact forbidden to any domestic or foreign legal entity or persons other than
those controlled and financed by the State. 111
108 See pages 65 and 70 of the second volum e. This is also the case of map No 75,
named “occupation zones in Macedonia (1941-1943), where again the “geographical and
ethnic borders of Macedonia” are marked (see page 75 of the second volume). In the
seventh preambular paragraph of Resolution 356(2007) of the United States House of
Representatives, as well as in the seventh preambular paragraph of Resolution 300(2007)
of the United States Senate, it is stated that “…some textbooks, including the Military
Academy textbook published in 2004 by the Military Academy “General Mihailo
Apostolski” in the FYROM capital city, c ontain maps showing that a “Greater
Macedonia” extends many miles south into Greece to Mount Olympus and miles east to
Mount Pirin in Bulgaria”. In the ninth preambular paragraph of both Resolutions, this
course of action, together with the renaming of Skopje’s international airport after
“Alexander the Great”, is qualified as “br each of FYROM’s intern ational obligations
deriving from the spirit of the United Nations Interim Accord, which provide that
FYROM should abstain from any form of «p ropaganda» against Greece’s historical or
cultural heritage”. H.Res356[110], May 1, 2007: Annex 156; SRes300[110], August 3,
2007 : Annex 157
109 Jove Dimitrija Talevski, Granicite na Republika Makedonije, Herakli Komerc,
Bitola, 1998. see in particular map number 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 at pp. 22-29: Annex 83.
110 See “Law on Scientific and Research Activities”, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Macedonia, No 13, 15 March 1996: Annex 82.
111
See par. (g) of the Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in
Skopje No F. 141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15 Ap ril 2009 : “It should be recalled in this
respect that for almost twelve years in a row, from 1996 until recently, scientific
historical research was prohibited by law in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The “Law on Scientific Research Activities” (Government Gazette, Vol. 13/96 and
29/02), which was abolished as late as 2008, stipulated, inter alia, that studies and
research on the historical and cultural identity of the “Maced onian people” were
forbidden to any domestic or foreign legal entity and physical person other than those
controlled and financed by the State. This piece of legislation contravened Article 10(1)
of the European Convention of Human Rights [“ Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
504.45. The State-orchestrated propaganda which has been reviewed in the
preceding paragraphs has fuelled the development of hostile and
112
irredentist feelings against Gr eece among the FYROM’s citizens. A
clear demonstration of such hatr ed was on display on 29 March 2008,
when the Greek flag was desecrated on several 113lboards in Skopje, its
cross being replaced with a swastika. The same type of propaganda
recurs in FORUM, a magazine owned by Mr. Slobodan Casule, who was
the FYROM’s Foreign Minister from 2001 until 2002. The magazine
published a photograph of the Greek Prime Minister wearing a nazi
uniform in the issue of 31 March 2008. 114
information and ideas without interference by a public authority and regardless of
frontiers”], and, in that sense, constituted a continuous material breach of Article 9(1) of
112 Interim Accord”: Annex 71.
See, for the same conclusion concer ning the effects of acts of propaganda
against Greece, the eleventh preambular pa ragraph of Resolution 356(2007) of the
United States House of Representatives: “Wher eas this information, like that exposed in
the media report and elsewhere, being used contrary to the United Nations Interim
Accord instills hostility and a rationale for i rredentism in portions of the population of
the FYROM toward Greece and the history of Greece”. See also the identical wording of
the eleventh preambular paragraph of Resolution 300(2007) of the United States Senate,
as well as the similar wording of the eighth preambular paragraph of Resolution
521(2005) of the United States House of Representatives,H.Res521[109], 27 October
2005 : Annex 154.
113 See Annex 160. On 30 March 2008, the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Greece, Mr. Koumoutsakos, answering to a journalist’s question stated, among
others, that “This unacceptable poster, whic h was circulated via a private initiative and
raised on Skopje’s streets, directly insults our country’s national symbol and our struggle
against fascism and Nazism. This incident demonstrates the huge mistake made by those
who invest in nationalism and bigotry. It also confirms, once again, the correctness of
Greece’s position that a necessary condition for the establishment of relations of
solidarity and allied relations is, in practice, respect of good-neighbourly relations
between countries and peoples. Greece’s amba ssador to the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Ms. A. Papadopoulou, has been instructed, within the day, to make a
strong demarche to the Foreign Ministry of the neighbouring country, requesting the
immediate removal of the offensive billboard” (Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Greece, Mr. Koumoutsakos, answerin g to a journalist’s question, “Answer of
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. G. Koumoutsakos regarding Skopje billboards
insulting to the Greek flag” , 30 March 2008 available at:
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={D0ACAF24-06AB-41A1-901D-34EFAD4487ED}: Annex 134).
114 The photo was published on page 76 of the 31 March 2008 issue, Annex:
161.Those acts have already been qualified as contravening the provisions of the Interim
Accord by the Greek Foreign Minister Ms. Do ra Bakoyannis, in a letter to the Foreign
Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, dated 24 March 2009, Letter
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
FYROM, dated 24 March 2009 under Reference 1024, forwarded through Verbal Note
51 C. Persistent Harassment against the Premises of the Greek Liaison
Office and its Personnel in Skopje
4.46. In this atmosphere of incitement, the premises of the Greek
Liaison Office in Skopje have not been spared. They have often been
damaged either by angry mobs during demonstrations or by unknown
persons. The cars and residences of Gr eek diplomatic staff, including the
Ambassador’s Residence, have also been attacked and vandalised. The
FYROM has not only failed to take adequate protective measures to
prevent such incidents from recurring, but, in most cases, has not even
responded to the Verbal Notes of th e Greek Liaison Office, ignoring the
obligation of the State of accreditation to guaran tee the security of
diplomatic missions.
4.47. Among other incidents, on the evening 27 May 2006, the front
115
license plate of the vehicle belonging to Mrs. Konstantina Gyftou,
Attaché at the Liaison Office, was stolen and the rear was vandalised. 116
The license plate was agai n stolen on 4 February 2007, 11728 August
118 119
2007, and on 14 January 2008.
4.48. On 10 February 2008 at 6:20 am, a group of young men threw
empty bottles and heavy stones in the parking space of the Liaison Office
and the cars of two Greek police offi cers, posted in the Liaison Office,
were seriously damaged. While the local Police recorded the incident and
managed to identify some of the culprits, the FYROM did not improve the
120
security despite requests from the Greek Liaison Office.
F.141.1/24/AS 378, dated 27 March 2009 of the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic
in Skopje: Annex 70.
115 The vehicle in question had the licence plate number 27-CD-001 . Verbal Note
of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F/050/KG/2/AS 673, dated 29 May
2006: Annex 41.
116 Ibid.
117
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F.
118/KG./1/AS 164, dated 5 February 2007: Annex 43.
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F.
050/KG/8/AS 1245, dated 28 August 2007: Annex 44.
119 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F.
050/KG/2/AS 40, dated 14 January 2008: Annex 45.
120 Verbal Note F. 010.GS/2/AS 218, dated 11 February 2008, Annex 46: The
Greek Liaison Office requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consider bolstering the
security measures around the premises of the Liaison Office, “taking into account the
fact that this incident is not an isolated cas e, but rather the latest and most grave of a
series of similar deliberate actions.” In th e same Verbal Note, the Liaison Office also
noted that its premises were often left unsupervised, since the security guard on duty was
repeatedly absent from his post.
524.49. The FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not reply to the
Verbal Note of 11 February 20 08 and supplemental measures of
protection requested therein have not been taken.
4.50. On 19 February 2008, a group of roughly one thousand
demonstrators gathered outside the Greek Liaison Office and attacked the
premises for over an hour, throwing stones and bottles at the building
while chanting anti-Greek slogans and insults. The police presence at the
Liaison Office was insufficient to protect the premises, despite the fact
that the Office’s Head had sent a wa rning to the Mini stry of Foreign
Affairs earlier that day about the po ssible danger from the anticipated
demonstration and had explicitly re quested extra police support. As a
result, damage was caused to the premises, to the official car, as well as to
two other cars belonging to the staf f of the Liaison Office. The Liaison
121
Office responded to those events in a Verbal Note on 20 February 2008,
asking for investigation of the events, compensation for damages and
reinforced protection in the future. To this date, the FYROM has not
responded to this Verbal Note.
4.51. Once again, in a Verbal Note dated 26 February 2008, 122the
Liaison Office requested increased protection of its premises and
personnel in preparation for another expected anti-Greek demonstration.
The FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign A ffairs, through its Verbal Note of
reply No. 117-543/3 dated 27 February 2008, promised special units and
measures to cope with that demonstration and other similar events, though
avoiding any reference to the incidents of 19 February 2008.
4.52. Yet on 29 February 2008, the vehicle of Mrs. Alexandra Anthis,
spouse of Mr. Alexandros Anthis, A ttaché at the Liaison Office, was
found vandalised. Two tires had been slashed and both doors had been
scratched. Although the Liais123Office communicated the incident to the
FYROM in a Verbal Note, just days later, on the morning of 24 March
2008, the rear license plate of another vehicle was stolen in front of the
residence of a member of the Greek diplomatic personnel at Skopje. 124
4.53. Since the NATO summit in Bu charest there has been a
considerable intensification of vandalism directed towards the Liaison
121 Verbal Note No F. 010.GS/7/AS 283: Annex 47.
122 Verbal Note, No F. 010.GS/14/AS 314 : Annex 48.
123 No F. 050.SA/2/AS 340 : Annex 49.
124 The stolen plate was from vehicle number 27-CD-001, belonging to the spouse
of Mrs Konstantina Gyftou, Attaché at the Liaison Office. See Verbal Note of the
Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 050/KG/5/AS 490, dated 24 March
2008: Annex 50.
53Office of the Hellenic Republic in S kopje, as well as the Ambassador’s
Residence and the cars and residences of the Greek diplomatic staff. But,
despite Verbal Notes of protest ad dressed by the Liaison Office to the
FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affair s, no measures of protection have
been taken, thus putting the security of the premises and of the staff in
increasing danger.
125
4.54. On 21 April 2008, the Ambassador’s Residence was attacked
and on 26 April 2008 the Residence of Mr. Markandreou, first Counsellor
126
for the Economic and Commer cial Office, was burgled. On 27 June
2008, a crowd of roughly 100 persons gathered outside the Liaison
Office’s premises and proceeded to harass and intimidate individuals
127
entering the Consular Office. In January 2009, the glass on the entrance
door of the Press Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje was
shattered, 128and on 29 May 2009 unidentified persons threw rocks at the
129
Ambassador’s residence. On 19 June 2009, a group of unknown
persons gathered at the gate of the Liaison Office, insulting and
threatening the staff, and throwing burning cardboard and pieces of timber
130
in the yard.
4.55. On 15 May 2008, 20 June 2008, and 9 July 2008, while in the
parking lot of the Liaison Office, cars of Greek diplomatic staff members
131
were vandalised by graffiti with ethnically motivated messages. On 18
June 2008, unidentified persons entered the courtyard in the residence of
125 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
010.GS/30/AS 672, dated 21 April 2008 : Annex 55.
126 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
127.AM/3/AS 691, dated 5 May 2008 : Annex 56.
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
128.GS/42/AS 1012, dated 27 June 2008 : Annex 60.
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
010.GS/2/AS 3, dated 2 January 2009 : Annex 65.
129 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
010.GS/23/AS 720, dated 1 June 2009 and Verbal Note No 93-1741/4 of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated 10 July 2009 in
130ly : Annex 73.
See the Verbal Note of the Hellenic Re public Liaison Office in Skopje No F.
010.GS/27/AS 837, dated 22 June 2009, the Verbal Note of the A3 Directorate of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic No 1178, dated 7 July 2009, and the
Verbal Note No 93-1923/4 in reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated 10 July 2009, whose presentation of the facts is
rather unconvincing: Annex 76.
131 See Verbal Notes of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
respectively No F. 050.EP/2/AS 784, dated 16 May 2008: Annex 57, No F.
010.GS/40/AS 990 dated 20 June 2008: Annex 59, and No F. 050.BM/1/AS 1082, dated
9 July 2008 : Annex 61.
54Mr. Markandreou, the first Counselor for the Economic and Commercial
Office, uprooted all the plants and threw mud and dirt on his vehicle. 132
On 29 May 2009, the vehicle of Mr. Georgios Mitropoulos, the Attaché at
133
the Liaison Office, was vandalised. On 10 October 2009, the right
window of the vehicle belonging to Mr . Theodoros Petsos, the Attaché at
the Liaison Office, was shattered. 134 Other similar acts of vandalism
135
against 136perty belonging to Greek diplomatic staff and to Greek
citizens have also been brought to the attention of the FYROM’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by means of Verbal Notes.
4.56. The depressing recurrence of these events, in spite of the Verbal
Notes of the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje describing
the facts, requesting investigations and demanding adequate measures of
protection of the premises and the staff, is proof of a systematic campaign
to intimidate and terrorise the Greek diplomatic staff in Skopje. The
public authorities not onl y failed to take the necessary measures of
protection required both by diplomatic law and by the obligation set forth
in Article 7 of the Interim Accord to “discourage acts by private entities
likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other,” but, with
very few exceptions mentioned above, did not even reply to the Verbal
Notes addressed to them, clearly im porting their contempt for the Greek
diplomatic representation in their country and their obligations under
conventional as well as customary international law.
IV. THE FYROM’S CONTINUED USE OF THE SUN OF
VERGINA
4.57. Although it has removed the Sun of Vergina from its official state
flag, the FYROM continues to use the symbol. Before the conclusion of
132 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
010.GS/40/AS 990, dated 20 June 2008 : Annex 59.
133 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
010.GS/24/AS 758, dated 2 June 2009 and Verbal Note No 93-1740/4 of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated 10 July 2009 in
reply, wherein it is accepted that the vehi cle of Mr. Mitropoulos has been damag:d
Annex 74.
134
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
135.GS/44/AS 1356, dated 12 October 2009 : Annex 79.
See Verbal Notes of the Hellenic Repu blic Liaison Office in Skopje, Nos F.
050/KG/7/AS 556, dated 7 April 2008: Annex 51 and F. 050/KG/15/AS 856, dated 30
136 2008 : Annex 58.
See Verbal Notes of the Hellenic Repu blic Liaison Office in Skopje, Nos F.
640/2/AS 557, dated 7 April 2008: Annex 52 and F. 640/5/AS 579, dated 10 April 2008:
Annex 53.
55the InterimAccord, Greece, by virtueof Article 6ter of the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, revised in
Stockholm on 14 July 1967, had deposited within the International Bureau
of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (hereinafter “WIPO”), the
137
Sun of Vergina in three forms, as State emblem. The FYROM, by a
Verbal Note addressed to WIPO dated 12 August 1995, objected to the
Sun of Vergina under its three forms being provided protection as State
emblem of Greece, “due to the fac138hat they are a copy of the state flag of
the Republic of Macedonia.”
4.58. Fourteen years after the conclusion and the entry into force of the
Interim Accord, the FYROM has not yet withdrawn its objection of 12
139
August 1995. Moreover, in the August 2004 issue of the official
magazine of the FYROM’s Ministry of Defence, a short article entitled
“The emblem of the Technical Regiment of the Army”, displayed a photo
140
of the Sun of Vergina. In 2007, during the offici al celebration of the
Ilinden Uprising in Krushevo, which was attended by Prime Minister
Gruevski, the program included the us e of flags displaying the Sun of
137 See letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Karolos Papoulias,
to the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization, dated 22
May 1995, and the letter of reply of the Director General of WIPO dated 3 July 1995,
together with Note C.5682-551 of WIPO, dated 3 July 1995, addressed to the States
138ties to the Paris Convention : Annex 2.
See Verbal Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM dated 12
August 1995, communicated through WIPO’s Note C-5704-551 dated 30 August 1995 :
Annex 2.
139 The objection still stands on the webpage of WIPO, see,
http://www.wipo.int/cgi-6te/guest/ifetch5?ENG+SIXTER+15-00+41276714-
KEY+256+0+-1+F-ENG+2+5+1+25+SEP-0/HITNUM,B+CC%2fGR+. The Permanent
Mission of Greece in Geneva requested the WIPO through a Verbal Note dated 23
November 2009 whether the objection raised by the FYROM under article 6ter of the
1883 Paris Convention has been withdrawn as of the date of that verbal note. The WIPO
informed the Mission of Greece in reply that the objecti on in question has not been
withdrawn. See Verbal Note of the Mission of Greece unde r Ref. 6778.6/18/AS 2610,
dated 23 November 2009, and Verbal Note of the WIPO dated 26 November 2009:
Annex 11.
140
See thge 33 of the official magazine “Defense” issue of August 2004: Annex
87. On the 8 of November 2004, the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje,
lodged a verbal demarche to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as a second one to
the Cabinet of the Minister of Defense of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
for the use of the Sun of Vergina in the issue of August 2004 and for publications with
irredentist content in the issues of August2004 and November 2004 of the official
magazine “Defense” of the Ministry of Defe nse. Greece stressed in this respect that the
use of the Sun of Vergina in the emblem of the Technical Regiment of the Army
constituted a continuing violation of the Interim Accord, see document of the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No 141.1A/87/AS 1414, dated 8 November 2004 :
Annex 152.
56Vergina. 141 In 2007 the Ministry of Sciences financed the edition of a
treatise entitled “Macedonian National Minori ties in Neighbouring
Countries” in the paper cover of whic h the Sun of Vergina is displayed
twice, one of which was in the background of a ma p of “Greater
142
Macedonia.”
4.59. On 11 July 2008, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevksi “welcomed […]
a high delegation led by Prince Ghazanfar Ali Khan and princess Rani
Atiqa of the Hunza people, who ar e 143f-proclaimed Macedonians and
descendants of Alexander the Great.” The visit was organised by the
Macedonian Institute for Strategic Research and the Sun of Vergina was
144
amply displayed during the welcome ceremony. In 2008, the Sun of
Vergina was used in a televised pr ogram bearing the title “Macedonia
Timeless”. 145 This spot has been carried on behalf of the FYROM’s
146
Government. Recently, the Sun of Vergina was displayed on the
pavement of the main square in the municipality of Gazi Baba. 147It was
141
See a copy of the Official Report released by the Prime Minister’s Office, dated
2 August 2007, at pp. 1 and 6 : Annex 101; See also photos in Monika Taleska, “The
persons who participated at the Ilinden uprising encouraged us to open a new Ilinden
page” Utrinski Vesnik , dated 3 August 2007, available at:
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=46822B95609A8B46B4F95BDD9…
18B, visited on 9 December 2009: Annex 125.
142 Frosina Tashevski-Remenski, Macedonian National Minorities in Neighbouring
143ntries. Current Situation, Skopje 2007, Editor “2 August C”: Annex 100.
The Hunza people are living in Paki stan. See “PM Gruevski, Prince Ghazanfar
Ali Khan agree on development of relatio ns between Macedonian and Hunza people”,
Macedonian Information Agency, dated 11 July 2008, available at
http://www.mia.mk/default.aspx?vId=52157858&1Id=2 : Annex 136.
144 Prince Ghazanfar Ali Khan declared that he was proud “for being greeted by the
army of our Alexander” (See “Hunza, sel f-proclaimed descendants of Alexander the
Great, visit Macedonia”, Macedonian Information Agency, dated 11 July 2008, available
at http://www.mia.mk/default.aspx?vId=52109499&1Id=2 ). The soldiers of the “army”
bore shields and flags displaying the Sun of Vergina, see photos taken on 11 July 2008 :
Annex 162.
145 The program was aired on both the CNN and the Euronews Channels, and is
available at www.macedonia-timeless.com : Annex 163.
146 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15 April 2009, par. (d) : Annex 71. Thethideo has been presented
by the Ministry of Culture of the FYROM on December 24 2008. Prime Minister
Nikola Gruevski said the video was an excellent start by an excellent master as part of a
larger project attempting to present Macedonia not only as a tourist destination, but also
as a brand, see “Macedonia-Timeless to be aired on CNN, other international channels as
of Thursday”, available at the Official Site of the Government of the FYROM :
http://www.vlada.mk/?=book/export/html/2019 , : Annex 140.
147
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Repu blic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
141.1/49/AS 489, dated 15 April 2009 and the Verbal Note in reply of the Ministry of
57also displayed on the website of th e State Agency of Youth and Sport, 148
and in a leaflet published and distributed by the FYROM’s Directorate of
149
Culture and Art of the Ministry of Culture.
4.60. The Sun of Vergina is constantly displayed on the shield of the
Statue of Alexander the Great built on 15 October 2006 at the city of
150
Prilep as well as on the pa vement surrounding the Statue. The Sun of
Vergina is also regularly displayed at the entrance of the Special Hospital
for surgical diseases “Philip II,” founded nine years ago and located at the
premises of the military151spital of Skopje as we ll as on the webpage of
the Special Hospital.
V. THE FYROM’S APPROPRIATION OF OTHER GREEK
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SYMBOLS
4.61. The FYROM continues to appropriate symbols and other elements
of the historical and cultural patrimony of Greece. In 2002, the FYROM’s
State Post Offices issued stamps b earing the images of Alexander the
Great and his father, Philip II. Statues of Alexander the Great and Philip II
have also been erected in several cities, such as Prilep, Stip, Bitola and
even Skopje, as a “tribute to the history of the country.” 152 In March 2007,
Foreign Affairs of the FYROM, No 32-4354/1, dated 1 June 2009, where the fact is not
denied : Annex 72.
148 See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Repu blic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
141.1/49/AS 489, dated 15 April 2009 and the Verbal Note in reply of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the FYROM No 32-4354/1, dated 1 June 2009, where the fact is not
denied : Annex 72. Recently, the FYROM’s Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs, through its
Verbal Note 32-4354/2, dated 26 August 2009, informed the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje that the Sun of Vergina has been removed both f rom the Gazi Baba square, as
149l as from the website of the State Agency of Youth and Sport : Annex 78.
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F.
141.1A/218/AS 1114, dated 25 August 2009 : Annex 77.
150 See photo available at the site http:/www.panoramio.com/photo/608434, where
it is mentioned that the photo was “uploaded on January 28, 2007”. See also photo taken
on 01 August 2009, available at :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Prilep_spomenik_Aleksandar_Makedonski).JPG :
151ex 155.
See a) photo of the Sun of Vergina at the entrance of the hospital, b) photo of
the building of the special hospital where the Sun of Vergina is also displayed available
at : http://www.cardiosurgery.com.mk/00_news_and_events.htm , visited on 26
November 2009 and c) the Sun of Vergina appearing as a logo of the “Special Hospital
FILIP VTORI” available at the site
http://www.cardiosurgery.com.mk/pdf/kako%20da%20zakazete%20usluga%20vo%…
152%20Vtori.pdf: Annex 111.
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No. F.
141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15 April 2009, par. (b) : Annex 71.
58an international competition was orga nised for the building in Skopje of
an equestrian sculpture of Alexander the Great. 153
4.62. In December 2006, the government decided to rename the
international airport of Skopje afte r “Alexander the Great,” despite
Greece’s protests, including in particular the official statement on 28
December 2006 by then Foreign Mini ster Bakoyannis qualifying the
FYROM’s conduct as “not consistent with the obligations concerning
good neighbourly relations that emanat154from the Interim Agreement and
Skopje's commitments to the EU.” In the same vein, during a speech to
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign
Affairs of the Greek Parliament, on 20 February 2007, Foreign Minister
Bakoyannis stated:
“the recent decision of the government of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to rename Skopje's
Petrovac airport ‘Alexander the Great’ is not an act of
good neighbourly relations. It was a breach of the 1995
Interim Agreement. An historically groundless and
politically counterproductive action. It rendered even
more difficult - as Mr. Nimetz himself stressed publicly
during his visit here – th e mission that has been
undertaken by the UN mediator.” 155
The FYROM’s decision to rename its airport after Alexander the Great
was also qualified as being “in direct contradiction” to the spirit of the
Interim Accord in Resolution 356 (2007) of the United States House of
Representatives as well as in Resolu tion 300 (2007) of the United States
Senate. 156
153
“Opening of the Procedure for the construction of the monument of Alexander the
Great”, Official Gazette of the Municipality of Skopje, No 10, 18 December 2006,
available at: http://opstinacentar.gov.mk/depo/glasnik_br_10_2006.pdfvisited on 7
December 2009: Annex 98.
154 See Statement of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis regarding
Skopje’s decision to rename its international airport, Athens, 28 December 2006,
available at : http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa .gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={EB4A0EB2-CBA2-4378-9E01-FC18367F5028}: Annex 119.
155
See Speech of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis to the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on National Defense and Fo reign Affairs, Athens, 20 February
2007, available at : http://www.mfa.gr/www .mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={C45FA976-9469-4954-B32F-8AC686D588D3}, visited on 24/09/2009 :
156ex 120.
“Whereas in direct contradiction of the spirit of the United Nations Interim
Accord’s section «A» entitled «Friendly Rela tions and Confidence Building Measures»
which attempts to eliminate challenges regarding «historic and cultural patrimony», the
594.63. The FYROM’s hostility towards Greece only intensified after the
Bucharest Summit, and with that hostility have come continued violations
of its international obligations. In December 2008, the new157uare of Gazi
Baba was renamed after “Philip II the Macedon”. On 29 December
2008, a decision was published in the Official Gazette, volume 164,
158
naming part of the Pan-European Corridor X after Alexander the Great.
It was also decided to name the main stadium of Skopje after “Philip II, the
Macedon”. 159
4.64. Greece protested those violations in Verbal Notes dated 15
160
January 2009 and 15 April 2009. However, the FYROM refused to take
any corrective action regarding the matter.
VI. THE FYROM’S BEHAVIOUR BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
4.65. In the Memorial of the FYROM, it is admitted that the latter “has
always used its constitu tional name in written and oral communications
with the United Nations.” 161Reference is also ma de to the signing of
multilateral agreements for which the United Nations is the depository:
“the practice of the Applicant is and has always been for
the person signing on its behalf to insert on the signature
page, above his or her signature and below the provisional
reference, the w162s: ‘on behalf of the Republic of
Macedonia’.”
4.66. This way of signing international agreements is rather disdainful
of its treaty obligation, taking into account that the name “The former
Government of the FYROM recently renamed the capital city’s international airport
“Alexander the Great” (eighth preambular para graph, H.Res.356[2007]) See also the
almost identical wording of the eighth preambular paragraph of US S. Res. 300 (2007).
H.Res356[110], 1 May 2007 : Annex 156; SRes300[110], 3 August 2007 : Annex 157.
157
Press Release of the Office of the Prime Minister, dated 17 December 2008
158ilable at: http://www.vlada.mk/?q=node/1916: Annex 129.
“Decision on the naming of the highway E-75 from border crossing Tabanovce
up to border crossing Bogorodica (Corridor X)”, Official Gazette of the “Republic of
Macedonia, No 164 (29 December 2008), p. 5: Annex 106.
159 “Decision on the renaming of the Stadium of Skopje”, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Macedonia,No 164 (29 December 2008), p. 7 : Annex 107.
160 No 141.1/48/AS 488. See Annex 66 as well as Anne x 71 respectively. See also
letters of the Permanent Representative of Greece to the Un ited Nations, doc. A/63/712-
S/2009/82 dated 10 February 2009: Annex 12 and doc. A/63/869-S/2009/285, dated 2
161e 2009: Annex 13.
162 Par. 2.20 (p. 29) of the Memorial.
Par. 2.20 (p. 30) of the Memorial.
60Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” is al ready printed above the signature
place. Thus, the representative of the FYROM, by inserting by hand,
between the printed name and its signature, the constitutional name, in
fact attempts to modify language al ready agreed on which figures on the
original text of the treaty. 163There is no other such precedent in
international practice, neither is it provided for in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties that a person signing an international agreement is
permitted to attempt to modify or question the content of the treaty, as
there is no doubt that the printed names of the States signing the treaty are
an integral part of its text.
4.67. The FYROM did not make use of the provisional name either in
the United Nations or in any other organisation or institution of which it is
a member or an associate. For in stance, in September 2007, during the
general debate of the 62 nd session of the United Nations General
Assembly, the President of the FYROM, Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, in his
statement to the Assembly used th e name “Republic of Macedonia” and
stated that “the name of my country is the Republic of Macedonia and will
be the Republic of Macedonia.” 164 That same day, the President of the
Assembly, Mr. Srgjan Kerim, a national of the FYROM, while
announcing the President of his country, Mr. Crvenkovski, referred to him
as the “President of the Republic of Macedonia” and repeatedly used the
same name for his country,165king advant age of his position as an official
of the United Nations. Moreover, in reply to Greece’s written reaction
163
See for instance the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism, New York 15 September 2000 where, between the printed
provisional name and the signature, it was added by hand “On behalf of the Government
of the Republic of Macedonia”, as well as the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, New York 15 November 2000 where, between the
printed provisional name and the signature, it was added by hand in capital letters, “On
the name of Republic of Macedonia”: Annex 151.
164 Statement made by President Crvenkovski in September 2007 before the
General Assembly,thnited Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty
165ond Session, 4 Plenary Meeting, doc. A/62/PV.4 at p. 29: Annend5.
The transaction, at the f ourth plenary meeting of the 62 General Assembly
session, is recorded as follows:
“The President: The Assembly will now hear an address by His Excellency Mr. Branko
Crvenkovski, President of the Republic of Macedonia.
Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, was escorted into the General Assembly Hall.
The President : On behalf of the General Assembly, I have the honour to
welcome to the United Nations His Excellency Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, President of the
Republic of Macedonia, and to invite him to address the Assembly.” th
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty Second Session, 4
Plenary Meeting, doc. A/62/PV.4 at p 27: Annex 5. For Greece’s oral and written protest,
61through the letter dated 4 October 2007 from the Perman166
Representative of Greece to the United Nations, the Chargé d’affaires
of the Permanent Mission of the FYROM to the United Nations addressed
a letter to the Secretary-General arguing, inter alia, that the “additional
condition for membership” imposed on its country by SC res 817 (1993)
(“that the State would be provisionally referred to as ‘the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia’ pending settle ment of the difference that had
arisen over the name”) “ran contra ry to th167dvisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice of May 1948.”
4.68. During the exchange of letter s for the conclusion of the
“Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the
conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part”, the Prime
Minister of the FYROM, Ljubco Georgievski, in his letter of acceptance
of the letter of the European Communities and its member States dated 9
April 2001, declared:
“the Republic of Macedonia does not accept the
denomination used for my country in the above-mentioned
documents having in view that the constitutional name of
my country is the Republic of Macedonia.”
The European Communities and it s Member States, through a second
letter dated 9 April 2001, acknowledged re ceipt of the letter of the Prime
Minister noting, however, that the exchange of letters “cannot be
interpreted as acceptance or recognition by the European Communities
and their Member States in whatever form or content of a denomina168n
other than the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”
4.69. More recently, Prime Minister Gruevski wrote a letter dated 27
April 2009 to H.E. Professor Rolf-Diete r Heuer, Director-General of the
see respectively United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty Second
th
Session, 4 Plenary Meeting, doc. A/62/PV.4 at p. 27(Annex 5) and Letter dated 4 Oct
2007 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, John
Mourikis, addressed to the Secretary-General, doc. A/62/470-S/2007/592, dated 5
166ober 2007: Annex 6.
167 See doc. A/62/470-S/2007/592, dated 5 Oct 2007 : Annex 6.
See letter dated 17 October 2007 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the United
Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, doc. A/62/497-S/2007/621, dated 19
October 2007: Annex 7.
168 For the text of the letters see Official Journal of the European Union 20 March
2004, respectively L 84/3, L/84/7 and L/84/9 : Annex 4.
62European Organisation for Nuclear Research (hereinafter “CERN”),
acknowledging CERN’s announcement of a cooperation agreement
between that organisation and the FYROM. In this letter, the Prime
Minister stated that “the Republ ic of Macedonia does not accept the
denomination used for my country in the above-mentioned Agreement,
having in view that the constitutional name of my country is the Republic
of Macedonia.” 169
4.70. As far as the NATO is concerne d, the FYROM expressed its wish
to participate in NATO’s Partners hip for Peace (hereinafter “PfP”)
through a letter of the Minister of Foreign Re lations, Stevo Crvenkovski,
dated 17 March 1994, using the cons titutional name “Republic of
Macedonia”. 170 This is also the case of the letter of the Ambassador of the
FYROM in Brussels, dated 15 April 1996, whereby the Secretary General
of NATO is informed that the Government of the “Republic of
Macedonia, according to the procla imed desire by the Macedonian
Parliament in 1993, for joining the No rth Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
intends to respond positively to the i nvitation for the initiation of the
individual dial171e with NATO on the basis of the Study on
Enlargement.” The FYROM also used its constitutional name in a letter
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Secretary General of
the Alliance, dated 7 April 1997, formally reaffirming “the interest and
willin172ss of the Republic of Macedonia for a full membership in NATO
[…].”
4.71. The FYROM was admitted to NATO’s PfP in November 1995
under its provisional name. Despite th is fact, the FYROM signed, on 30
May 1997, the “Agreement among the States Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for
Peace regarding the Status of their Forces” (hereinafter “PfP SOFA
Agreement”), as well as the “Additional Protocol to the Agreement among
the States Parties to the North A tlantic Treaty and the other States
Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their
169
Letter from Nikola Gruevski, Prime Minister, 27 April 2009, in response to
Letter from Rolf Heuer, Director-General of the European Organization for Nuclear
Research, 27 April 2009 : Annex 164.
170 See letter of Stevo Crvenkovski, Minister of Foreign Relations of the FYROM,
addressed to Mr. Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political
Affairs, dated 17 March 1994: Annex 147.
171 See letter of Jovan Tegovski, Ambassador of the FYROM to Brussels,
addressed to Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, N. 117-04 dated 15 April
1996 : Annex 149.
172 See letter, of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM Ljubomir Frckoski
to Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, dated 7 April 1997: Annex 150.
63Forces” (hereinafter “Additional Protoc ol to the PfP SOFA Agreement”),
under its constitutional name. In reactin g to this attitude of the FYROM,
the Permanent Representative of Greece to NATO, Ambassador George
Savvaides, lodged the following declar ation upon signing on behalf of
Greece on 9 October 1997 the PfP SOFA Agreement:
“Regarding the signing of this Agreement by the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedoni a, the Hellenic Republic
declares that its own signing of the said Agreement can in
no way be interpreted as an acceptance from its part, or as
recognition in any form and c ontent of a name other than
that of ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’
under which the Hellenic Republic has recognized the said
country and under which the latter has joined the NATO
‘Partnership for Peace’ Programme, where resolution
817/93 of the UN Security Council was taken into
consideration.” 173
A similar declaration was lodged by Ambassador George Savvaides, the
Permanent Representative of Greece to NATO, upon signing on 9 October
1997, on beha174of Greece, the Additio nal Protocol to the PfP SOFA
Agreement.
4.72. It is clear that the FYROM, even if not objecting to being admitted
to NATO under its provisional name , would, after admission, use its
constitutional name in the context of the Alliance. Moreover, given the
fact that NATO operates under the consensus rule, one cannot preclude
the possibility that the FYROM might attempt to block the adoption of
NATO decisions which use its provi sional name, thus paralysing the
Alliance’s decision making procedure.
173
See Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the
other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces:
174ex 16.
“Regarding the signing of this Protocol by the FYROM, the Hellenic Republic
declares that its own signing of the said Protocol can in no way be interpreted as an
acceptance from its part, or as recognition in any form and content of a name other than
that of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” under which the Hellenic Republic
has recognized the said country and under which the latter has joined the NATO
“Partnership for Peace” Programme, where resolution 817/93 of the UN Security Council
was taken into consideration” (See Additio nal Protocol to the Agreement among the
States Parties to the North Atlantic Treatand the other States participating in the
Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces : Annex 17).
64 VII. GREECE’S REACTIONS TO THE FYROM’S BEHAVIOUR
PRIOR TO THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT
4.73. The FYROM’s breaches of the Interim Accord have been
numerous, material and not limited to one or a few of the obligations this
State assumed by virtue of the Interim Accord. In practice, the FYROM
has disregarded, sometimes continuously as in the case of irredentist and
hostile propaganda, key obligations under the Interim Accord. The
violations are widely known. Resoluti on 486 (2009) of the United States
House of Representatives as well as Resolution 169 (2009) of the United
States Senate have “urged the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to
abstain from hostile activities and st op violating provisions of the United
Nations-brokered Interim Agreemen t between the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Greece regarding ‘hostile activities or
propaganda’.” 175
4.74. Greece has reacted to this attit ude both by reminding the FYROM
of its duties as well as by denouncing its actions as constituting breaches
of the Interim Accord, but to no avail.
4.75. In a letter to the FYROM’s then-Prime Minister Georgievski dated
22 January 1999, Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, Greece’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, expressed his surprise regarding his visit to Skopje:
“[T]wo issues, totally irrelevant both to the agenda of my
visit and to the overall framework of our relations, namely
the issue of an alleged ‘M acedonian minority in Greece’
and that of the restitution of property belonging to those
who fled the country during the Greek Civil war, were
raised by the Foreign Minister Dimitrov.”
Mr. Pangalos linked this event with the obligations assumed by the
FYROM, stressing in his letter to the Prime Minister:
“I welcome your assurance that our bilateral relations are
guided by the texts we have signed as well as your
commitment to comply with their provisions including in
175
See par. 2 of United States House of Representatives Resolution 486 (2009)
H.Res. 486[111], 21 May 2009 (Annex 165), as well as par. 2 of United States Senate
Resolution169 (2009) S.Res.169[111], 4 June 2009 (Annex 166).
65 particular those r176rred to in Articles 6 and 7 of the
Interim Accord.”
4.76. On 8 November 2004, the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic
in Skopje, lodged a verbal demarche to the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as well as a second one to the Cabinet of the Minister of Defence,
over the use of the Sun of Vergina and irredentist publications in the
issues of August 2004 and November 2004 of the official journal
“Defence” of the Ministry of Defence. It was stressed that the use of the
Sun of Vergina in the emblem of th e Technical Regiment of th177rmy
constituted a continuing violation of the Interim Accord.
4.77. Following a proposal for consultations between the two countries
contained in the Verbal Note No 0.1-586/1/05 dated 11 August 2005 of
the Liaison Office of the FYROM in Athens, its Head, Ambassador
Handziski, was invited to the A3 Directorate for Balkan Affairs of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Gree ce. Its Director, Ambassador Mallias,
handed over to Ambassador Handziski the Verbal Note in Reply of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No AS 1524 dated 22 August 2005. During
the meeting, held on 22 August 2005, Ambassador Mallias referred both
to the rejection by the FYROM of the set of ideas presented by the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General, as well as to the FYROM’s
continuous irredentist propaganda illu strated, and made clear that the
Interim Accord could not be applied unilaterally, i.e., only on the part of
Greece. 178
4.78. Greece protested against the FYROM’s decision to rename the
international airport of Skopje “Alexa nder the Great”, characterizing it as
a violation of the Interim Accord. In particular, the then Foreign Minister
Ms. Dora Bakoyannis made an offi cial statement on the 28 December
2006, describing this conduct as “not consistent with the obligations
concerning good neighbourly relations that eman179 from the Interim
Agreement and Skopje's commitments to the EU”. In the same vein, at a
176
See Letter form the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece to the Prime Minister
177the FYROM, dated 22 January 1999 : Annex 40.
See document of the Hellenic Repu blic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
178.1A/87/AS 1414, dated 8 November 2004: Annex 152.
See document of the A3 Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Hellenic Republic, No 140/G/AS 1529/142/ON, dated 22 August 2005 with attached
Verbal Notes: Annex 153.
179 See Statement of Foreign Minister of Greece, Ms. Bakoyannis regarding
Skopje’s decision to rename its international airport, Athens, 28 December 2006,
available at : http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa .gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={EB4A0EB2-CBA2-4378-9E01-FC18367F5028}: Annex 119. See also
66speech to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defence and
Foreign Affairs of the Greek Parliament, dated 20 February 2007, Foreign
Minister Bakoyannis stated:
“the recent decision of the government of the FYROM to
rename Skopje's Petrove č airport ‘Alexander the Great’ is
not an act of good neighbourly relations. It was a breach of
the 1995 Interim Agreement. An historically groundless
and politically counterproducti ve action. It rendered even
more difficult – as Mr. Nimetz himself stressed publicly
during his visit here – the mission that has been undertaken
180
by the UN mediator.”
4.79. On 4 May 2007, the Spokesman of the Ministry of the Foreign
Affairs of Greece, Mr. Koumoutsakos, an swering a journalist's question,
stated:
“[W]e are constructively pur suing a mutually acceptable
solution to the name issue, through the UN process and in
accordance with Security Council Resolution 817. We are
awaiting a similar response from the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, which presupposes that various
circles within and outside the Skopje Government abandon
the practice of aiming irre dentist propaganda against a
member state of NATO and the European Union – by using
symbols, maps, textbooks etc – and that they conduct
themselves in a manner that is consistent with the
European acquis.” 181
4.80. On 3 June 2007, the spokesman of the Ministry of the Foreign
Affairs of Greece, Mr. Koumoutsakos, stated that the FYROM, in order to
achieve “a smooth Euro-Atlantic course”, needed to “implement a policy
of good neighbourly relations, rectif y and abandon actions and policies
Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No. F. 141.1/48/AS 488,
dated 15 April 2009, par. (b) : Annex 71.
180 See Speech of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis to the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on National Defense and Fo reign Affairs, Athens, 20 February
2007, available at : http://www.mfa.gr/www .mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={C45FA976-9469-4954-B32F-8AC686D588D3}, visited on 24/09/2009 :
Annex 120.
181 See Answer of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. G. Koumoutsakos to a
journalist's question regarding the US House of Representatives resolution on former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia propaganda, Athens, 4 May 2007, available at :
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={C6F297C0-2199-4FEF-9089-355DB42EC026}: Annex 121.
67based on irredentist thinking toward s a member state of NATO and the
European Union, adopt a conciliatory and moderate spirit within the
framework of the consultations ta king place at the UN aimed at the
achievement of a mutually acceptable solution on the name issue, given
that the current name is temporary”, st ressing that “this is all provided for
in the Interim Agreement, which the current Skopje governme182is
unfortunately calling into question through many of its actions.”
4.81. On 13 September 2007, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis stated:
“[A] number of the Skopje government’s decisions and
actions have confirmed its persistence with regard to
historically groundless and provocative propaganda that
assails the principle of good neighbourly relations. They
have forgotten the obligations they have undertaken, and I
am referring to article 7 of the Interim Accord, which
explicitly prohibits direct or indirect actions of irredentist
propaganda.” 183
VIII. CONCLUSION
4.82. The FYROM has committed numerous and material breaches of
the Interim Accord and, in practice, has disregarded its obligations under
the Agreement. Greece has made multiple attempts, outlined above, to
encourage the FYROM to resume pe rformance of those obligations.
Unfortunately, Greece’s efforts have been to no avail.
182 See Statement of Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr. G. Koumoutsakos regarding
today's statements from the FYROM President Mr. Crvenkovski, Athens, 3 June 2007,
available at : http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa .gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={6BF87A42-F2F9-4644-9045-BA9D07041B4B}: Annex 122.
183 Statement of Foreign Minister of Gr eece Ms. Bakoyannis regarding statements
made by FYROM President Mr. Crvenkovski, 13 September 2007, available at
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&fo…
rticle=21578 (emphasis added by Greece): Annex 127.
68 CHAPTER 5: NATO’S DECISION ON THE FYROM’S
MEMBERSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION: NATO AS AN INTEGRATED
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
5.1. NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the
North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1 949. As a system of collective self-
defence, its Member States agree to mutual defence should there be an
armed attack by an outside party. The North Atlantic Treaty, which the
United Nations Treaty Database categorises as a closed multilateral treaty,
pledges the Member States “separ ately and jointly, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual ai d”, to “maintain and 184
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”
The Treaty prescribes that the Parties “will consult together whenever, in
the opinion of any of them, the territ orial integr185, political independence
or security of any of th e Parties is threatened.” Under Article 5, if an
armed attack has occurred against any Member State, it “shall be
considered an attack against them all,” and each Party undertakes to assist,
“by taking forthwith, indivi dually and in concert w ith the other Parties,
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” 186
5.2. Although the Member States of NATO and other highly
integrated organisations certainly do not constitute a State, 187diplomats
and writers have referred188 the Memb er States of such organisations as
“pooling sovereignty.” The expression nicely captures the mutual
dependence for security and, to that end, the importance within NATO of
coordinated decision-making and shared commitment to Alliance policy.
Defence – and particularly the main tenance and streng thening of peace
184
185 North Atlantic Treaty, Art 3: 34 UNTS 242, 246.
186 Ibid, Art 4.
187 Ibid, Art 5.
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion of 11 Apr 1949, ICJ Rep 1949 p. 174, 179. See aInterpretation of
the Agreement of March 25, 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt , Advisory Opinion of 20
Dec 1980, ICJ Reports 1980 p 73, Sep. Op. Judge Gros, p.103.
188 E.g., T. Pickering, “Southeastern Europe: An Endeavor Consistent with the
Transatlantic Vision and Indicative of the Changing International Environment” (2000)
94 ASIL Proc 234, 238.
69through preparedness and solidarity among the Member States – is the
primary reason for which NATO was created.
5.3. Towards implementation of the Alliance’s purpose as the
principal collective mechanism of defence in the North Atlantic area, the
Member States established its perm anent headquarters in Brussels in
1967. The headquarters is staffed by approximately 4,000 personnel, 189
including 1,200 International Staff and 500 International Military Staff.
NATO implements a large number of agreements and programmes to
integrate and standardise materiel, operating procedures, logistics and
190
other components of Alliance activity. NATO head191rters is a venue
for approximately 5,000 internal meetings per year.
5.4. According to Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the
principal political organ of the Alli ance is the North Atlantic Council
(hereinafter “NAC”), which contains representatives of each Party,
considers “matters concerning the impl ementation” of the Treaty and is
mandated to “set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary…”
According to NATO:
“The North Atlantic Council is the principal decision-
making body within NATO. It brings together high-level
representatives of each member country to discuss policy
or operational questions requi ring collective decisions. In
sum, it provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation
between members on all issues affecting their security”. 192
5.5. Decisions reached in the Council and its subsidiary bodies
193
belong broadly to the following categories:
(i) Political and military strategies, incorporated into
NATO documents such as the Alliance Strategic
Concept and Ministerial Guidance and decisions
concerning enlargement;
(ii) Militasructuared planning functions, covering
areas such as the NATO command and force
189
The remainder are personnel of the diplomatic missions of the individual
member States and partnership States:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49284.htm
190 For a list of NATO Standardiza tion Agreements (STANAGS), see
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/stanag.htm
191 Ibid.
192http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm
193 Leo G. Michel, “NATO Decision Making: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?”,
Strategic Forum, No 202/August 2002, 5.
70 structure, deployment of military resources, and
operational planning for contingencies related to
potential security needs;
(iii) Authorizing, monitoring and adjusting collective
defense and crisis management operations, such as
NATO-led operations in the Balkans and
Afghanistan;
(iv) Organisational an d management concerns,
including defining the responsibilities of and
overseeing the Internationa l Military Staff and the
various NATO subsidiary bodies; and
(v) Management of resources and budgeting.
5.6. The NAC’s competences cover fields of significant
complexity. The staff of the Alliance, serving in the various subsidiary
bodies within the headquarters’ bureaucracy, oversees the implementation
of Council decisions. This takes plac e across the considerable geographic
and substantive spheres in which the Alliance operates.
5.7. For the Alliance to retain its intended capacity to take
emergency action, as well as for it to maintain its on-going stabilisation
activities, it is indispensable that the foreign policies of its members be in
sufficient alignment such that bilateral differences within the Alliance not
interfere with organisational decision-making or with the implementation
of decisions reached. The mutual a lignment of the Member States is a
significant requirement of the Alliance in respect of its stability-building
function: NATO aims with its integrat ed structure to so lidify European
security and a high degree of solidar ity among its members is necessary
for the fulfilment of this goal.
II. NATO’S ACTIVITIES AS AN ALLIANCE
5.8. The Alliance, which conducts ongo ing activities in support of
regional peace and security, must have the capability to react rapidly to
any “armed attack against one or more of [the Member States] in Europe
or North America […].” 194The Alliance demonstrated this capability
when the NAC, on 12 September 2001, adopted a statement invoking
195
Article 5 of the Treaty less than twenty-four hours after an armed attack
on the territory of one of its Member States. The Alliance maintains a
194
195 North Atlantic Treaty, Art 5: 32 UNTS 242, 246.
NATO Press Release (2001)124, 12 Se pt 2001. See also Press Release
PR/CP(2001)122, 11 Sept 2001.
71major deployment in Afghanistan in the form of the International Security
Assistance Force (hereinafter “ISAF”), 196as well as a major deployment
in Kosovo in the form of the NATO Kosovo Force (hereinafter
197
“KFOR”). The North Atlantic Treaty also furnishes a basis for the
Alliance’s activity in political and economic fields: Article 2 provides that
the NATO Member States will “contribute toward the further
development of peaceful and frie ndly international relations by
strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded,
and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” Article 2
further provides that NATO Members “will seek to eliminate conflict in
their international economic policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of them.” 198 The Alliance has addressed
199
the international financial crisis and the development of science and
technology.
III. NATO’S CONSULTATION PROCESS
5.9. Consultation between Member States is a key part of the
decision-making process in NATO, a llowing Allies to exchange views
and information prior to reaching agreement and taking action. The
process is continuous and takes pla ce both on an informal and a formal
basis; it facilitates efficiency within the decision making process.
5.10. In NATO there is no provision for decision by majority vote.
Rather, decisions are taken by consensus, meaning “an agreement reached
by common consent and supported by each member country” and “action 200
[…] agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord.”
Where there are disagreements between allies, efforts will be made to
reconcile those differences to further facilitate the consensus process.
Once taken, any decision by NATO represents the common determination
of all Member States to implement it in full. 201
196http://www.nato.int/isaf/d ocu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
197http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf .
198 See also Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Membership Action Plan (MAP), dated
24 April 1999, Part I (“Political and Econom ic Issues”) and Part III (concerning, inter
199a, defense appropriations and budgeting): Annex 21.
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/ FinancialCrisis/PROTECTIONISM/EN/i
200x.htm.
NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO, 2006, at p. 33 and 35: Annex
22.
201Idem, pp. 33-34.
725.11. The main principles that gove rn consultation between Allies
are set in the Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non
202
Military Cooperation in NATO.
5.12. In particular, the Report recommends that Member States
should:
• Inform each other of any development which significantly
affects the Alliance;
• Raise for discussion within NATO any subject of common
interest;
• Seek prior consultation before making a firm policy
decision or pronouncement on a matter of major concern to
another Ally;
• Take the views and interests of their Allies into account
when developing their national policies and
• Follow any decision reached in the Alliance with firm
action in their national policies, or, if they cannot do so,
explain why.
5.13. According to Fredo Dannenbri ng, a former NATO Assistant
Secretary General for Political Affairs:
“[A]s to the substance and limitations of political
consultations it must first of all be borne in mind that the
decision making process in the Alliance is governed by the
rule of consensus. This means that policy making remains
the ultimate prerogative of sovereign member states.
Common policies and joint posi tions can therefore only be
developed when all of them agree. It is in recognition of
the importance of political cohesi on that the Allies have in
fact been able to agree on many elements of joint policy.
This is most visibly dem onstrated in Ministerial
Communiqués and Summit Declar ations all of which are
the result of a painstaking and sometimes difficult
consultative effort.”03
202
Approved by NAC in Brussels on 13 December 1956, text in NATO Handbook
203umentation, NATO Office of Information, 1999, p. 166: Annex 19.
Fredo Dannenbring: “Consultations: The political lifeblood of the AllNATOe”
Review, volume 33 / 6, 1985, p. 5, at p. 10: Annex 145.
735.14. The consensus rule does not imply that each Member State has
a veto power. As NATO’s Secretary General Scheffer declared in Cracow
on 19 February 2009:
“Q: Mr. Scheffer, what are NATO plans for Macedonia
since the name dispute won't be solved, it's likely in the
near future, according to the Madam Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Greece today: she to ld media in Greece that the
Greek government planned to put a veto on Macedonian
invitation one year before the Bucharest Summit.
DE HOOP SCHEFFER: That last remark I do not
understand and I'll not comment on. NATO does not know
the word veto. We operate by consensus and unfortunately
there was no consensus last year at the Summit in
Bucharest, but I'm not going to repeat what I've said many
times before.
On the accession question, I can only say that I do hope
that the name issue will be resolved as soon as possible and
you know that last year in Bucharest it was this issue which
prevented the consensus. And that in the meantime
NATO's cooperation with Skopje will go on. That's an
intensive cooperation in the framework of the Membership
Action Plan.” 204
5.15. In fact, the rationale of the c onsensus rule is not to provide
each Member State with the power to block organizational decisions, but
to induce Member States to reac h mutually agreed-upon solutions, 205
satisfactory to all of them, thereby ensuring the unity of the Alliance.
204
Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer after the
informal Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, with Invitees with non NATO ISAF
Contributing Nations, Cracow, Poland, dated 19 February 2009, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090219c.html Annex 33; See also the
Secretary-General’s observations to the same effect in Athens:
“NATO doesn’t know the word veto. NATO does know the word
consensus. And although some people might have been disappointed,
there was a consensus in Bucharest last year, and there was a consensus
again in Strasbourg/Kehl. So there is no veto. NATO doesn't know the
word veto, and no nation has ever vetoed anything in NATO.”
Statements of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis and NATO Secretary-General
Scheffer following their meeting, Athens, 14 May 2009, available at
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/140509_H1918.htm : Annex 141.
205“Le droit de veto est essentiellement négatif. Il confère à une puissance le pouvoir
formel de s’opposer à une décision sans même en justifier les raisons. La règle de
74 IV. THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
5.16. A central characteristic of NATO enlargement is that, for a
State to receive the invitation of NATO to accede to the North Atlantic
Treaty, that State must satisfy certai n prescribed criteri a. In part, the
criteria are set out in the Treaty; in pa rt they are specified by the Alliance
through decisions of the NAC and may be refined or augmented in respect
of particular States. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides as
follows:
“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any
other European State in a position to further the principles
of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited
may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its
instrument of accession with the Government of the United
States of America. The Government of the United States of
America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of
each such instrument of accession.”
5.17. Under Article 10, an aspirant St ate must meet the following
requirements: (i) it must be a State; (i i) it must be located in Europe; (iii)
it must be “in a position to further the principles” of the Treaty; and (iv) it
must be able to “contribute to the s ecurity” of the geographical area to
which the Treaty pertains. As the text of Article 10 of the Treaty makes
clear, the Member States retain the discretion to invite, or not to invite,
any other State meeting these criteria—they “may” do so, but they are not
obliged to invite any given State u nder the Treaty, even if it meets the
requisite qualifications. Member States are, however, at will to decline an
invitation to an aspirant State which does not satisfy the criteria specified.
5.18. NATO began with a relatively small group of original Member
States in 1949 and since then has undergone enlargement in stages.
Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952, 206 the
207 208
Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.
l’unanimité, à l’opposé, est une invitation pressante à la conciliation. Elle s’inspire du
souci d’assurer l’unité d’action en vue du but commun” ( OTAN, Documentation sur
l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord , Analyse du Traité, Publication OTAN,
Service de l’information, Paris, 1962, p. 18: Annex 15).
206 Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey of
17 Oct 1951, entry into force 15 Feb 1952: 126 UNTS 350.
207 Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic
of Germany of 23 Oct 1954, entry into force 5 May 1955: 243 UNTS 308.
208 Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain of 10 Dec 1981,
entry into force 29 May 1982: 1871 UNTS 426.
755.19. During the first years, the enlargement of the Alliance with the
accession of Greece and Turkey required the amendment of the North
209
Atlantic Treaty. In the subsequent enlargements the Accession
Protocols were considered as additiona l to the Treaty itself. In any event
these Protocols contained a standardis ed formulation in their Article 2
which provides that it [the Accession Protocol] “shall enter into for
ce
when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the
210
Government of the United States of its acceptance thereof.”
5.20. In other words, the requirement of Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty for a unanimous Agreement of the Member States of the
Alliance is fulfilled once all Member States notify the Depository of their
211
acceptance of the Accession Protocol. The Depository or the Secretary
General in more recent Accession Protocols is then mandated to
209
See Article 1 of the Protocol to the No rth Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece
210 Turkey, 126 UNTS 350.
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic;
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary,;
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland,;
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria,
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Estonia,
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Latvia, Protocol to the North
Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Lithuania, Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on
the Accession of Romania; Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the
Slovak Republic, Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Slovenia, all
available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/57772.htm.
211The acceptance of the Protocol as a form of consent of a given member State is
subject to the constitutional requirements of each mem ber state (Article 14.2 of the
Vienna Conven tion on the Law of Treaties). “C’est à la fois pour ne pas dénaturer l’objet
d’un traité de défense et pour ne pas a ugmenter sans leur accord les engagements des
signataires que l’adhésion de tout nouvel État à l’alliance est subordonnée au
consentement unanime des participants….quand le Pacte Atlantique vint devant
l’Assemblée Nationale française, la crainte de celle-ci d’y voir entrer l’Allemagne fit
stipulerdans la loi autorisant la ratificati on l’obligation d’un traité formel d’alliance,
donc un examen par le Parlement, pour que tout nouvel Etat y adhère. Une même
position fut prise, pour ces raisons et d’autres, par le Secrétaire d’État devant le Sénat
américain ” (Daniel Vignes, “La place des Pactes de défense dans la société
internationale actuelle”, AFDI 1959, p. 37-101, p. 72-73, note 2). (See also : Richard H.
Heindel, Thorsten Kalijarvi and Francis Wilcox: “The North Atlantic Treaty in the
United States Senate”, 43 American Journal of International Law 1949 p. 633, at p. 656.
Since members of the Senate were particularly interested in determining whether the
policy of the United States with respect to membership would be formulated by the
Executive Branch Secretary of State D. Acheson allayed Senate concern by the following
comment on article 10: “The President of the United States [says] that in his judgment
the accession of new members to this Treaty creates in regard to each member coming in
in effect a new treaty between the United States and that nation, and therefore the
President would consider it necessary to ask for advice and consent of the Senate before
himself agreeing to the admission of a new member” ).
76communicate to the invited State the invitation to accede to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
5.21. Αfter the end of the Cold War, twelve countries joined NATO.
In 1999 the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to
accede. Seven more States acceded to the Treaty in 2004: Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Albania and
Croatia acceded in 2009.
5.22. The Study on NATO Enlargement, which was adopted by the
Heads of State and Government part icipating at the NAC Meeting in
Brussels on 3 September 1995, 212stresses that the enlargement of the
Alliance213ll accord strictly with Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. In paragraph 7 it adds:
“Decisions on enlargement will be for NATO itself …
Ultimately Allies will decide by consensus whether to
invite each new member to join according to their
judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security
and stability in the North Atl antic area at the time such
decision is made … No country outside the Alliance should
be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and
decisions” (emphasis added).
5.23. The same study reiterates that the decision making process on
enlargement will be in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, 214and
continues by adding that “countries could be invited to join sequentially or
[…] simultaneously […] bearing in mind that all Allies will decide by
consensus on each invitation.” (emphasis added) 215
5.24. The Study also deals with the question of maintaining the
effectiven216 of the Alliance to pe rform its core functions and new
missions, stressing that “[t]he Allian ce may require, if appropriate,
specific political commitments in the course of accession negotiations.”
Upon joining the Alliance, new Member States must accept the full
obligations of the North Atlantic Tr eaty. This includes “participation in
the consultation process within the Alliance and the principle of decision
212NATO Handbook Documentation , NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999, p.
335: Annex 19.
213See idid, Principles of Enlargement, chapter 1, para. 4.
214Ibid, chapter 2, paras. 29, 30.
215Ibid, chapter 2, para. 30.
216Ibid, chapter 4, paras. 42 et seq. and chapter 2, para. 30 respectively.
77making by consensus, which require s a commitment to 217ld consensus
within the Alliance on all issues of concern to it.”
218
5.25. At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO launched
the Membership Action Plan (hereinafter “MAP”) to assist countries
wishing to join the Alliance by provid ing advice, assistance and practical
support. Aspirants are expected to demonstrate commitment to the rule of
law and should “settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes
including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good
219
neighbourly relations.” It bears noting that participation in the MAP
does not guarantee future accession to NATO. Decisions to invite
aspirants to start accession talks are taken by consensus among NATO
220
Member States and on a case by case basis.
5.26. There are in principle several rounds of MAP assessment
before NAC decides to extend an i nvitation to an aspirant State. The
FYROM underwent nine rounds of MAP assessment before the NAC
Summit in Bucharest. From this hist ory, it can be seen that NATO has
conceived itself from the start as accommodating its own enlargement but
only after careful collective consideration. The continuity of the Alliance
depends significantly on the manner in which it has regulated
enlargement. Each invitation to a new Member State has taken place by
means of particular processes and formalities, subject always to the
requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty itself.
5.27. NATO has thus controlled its membership process in view of
its character as a closed multilateral treaty and an integrated military
alliance. As noted above, NATO’s obj ective is to enhance and maintain
the military and political security of a particular region, and, pursuant to
that objective, it has enlarged its me mbership in stages. Each enlargement
has been carried out through a process which carefully evaluates potential
new Member States and, where neede d, guides them in reform. Not only
does NATO evaluate a potential new Me mber State, but it also actively
engages with the aspirant to assist it in adapting its laws, regulations, and
practices to meet Alliance requirements. The process is designed to
prepare the potential new Member for accession to the Treaty. In
217Ibid, chapter 4, para. 43.
218Press Release NAC-S (99)64, An Alliance for the 21Century. Washington Summit
Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.,24 April 1999: Annex 20.
219Press Release NAC-S(99)66, 24 April 1999, Chapter I, para. 2c: Annex 21.
220NATO Handbook, p. 189: Annex 22.
78preparing itself for a possible invitation to accede, the aspirant is expected
to make adjustments to its internal policies and practices in multiple
fields, including its foreign policy. Changes thus made by the potential
new Member are designed and implemented to assure that membership, if
it is achieved, will be conducive to the functioning of the Organisation.
5.28. NATO does not apply an identical accession process to every
candidate for membership. Instead, it sets out individually tailored
requirements in view of the particular conditions prevailing with respect
to a given aspirant. “The Alliance may require, if appropriate, specific 221
political commitments in the course of accession negotiations.”
According to the NATO Study on Enlargement, “[t]here is no fixed or
rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance.
Enlargement will be decided on a case by case basis […].” 222 The
following general outline contains steps that aspirant States have typically
followed in the accession process:
• The aspirant State expresses its interest in joining the
Alliance.
• The aspirant State is invited to engage in an intensified
dialogue with NATO about its membership aspirations and
reforms that will support accession.
• The aspirant State may then be invited to participate in the
Membership Action Plan (MAP), described below, to
prepare for potential invitation to membership.
• NATO may decide to extend an invitation to the aspirant
State to begin accession talks.
• Accession talks are conducted in Brussels, in two sessions,
between the aspirant State and a NATO team. The talks
result in a timetable for the completion of necessary
reforms. Reforms may continue after the State has acceded
to the Treaty.
• The Foreign Minister of the aspirant State addresses a letter
of intent to the NATO Secretary General, in which the
aspirant State provides confir mation of its acceptance of
221
See Study on NATO Enlargement, issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council , Brussels, 3 September 1995
(published in NATO Handbook Documentation, NATO Office of Information and Press,
2229 pp. 335-369), para 30: Annex 19.
Ibid, para 7.
79 the obligations and commitments entailed by membership.
The aspirant State joins the reform timetable in accordance
with this letter.
• Accession Protocols are signe d and then ratified by all
NATO Member States.
• The Secretary General of NATO invites the aspirant State
to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.
• The aspirant State, now an Invitee State, formally accedes
to the North Atlantic Treaty and becomes a Member State
upon deposit of its instrument of accession with the
Depository.
5.29. The MAP, if extended to an aspi rant State, is in no way an
assurance of a future invitation. According to the NATO statement setting
out the general MAP process:
“Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks
with the Alliance will be made on a case-by-case basis by
Allies in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Madrid
Summit Declaration, a nd the Washington Summit
Declaration. Participation in the Membership Action Plan,
which would be on the basis of self-differentiation, does
not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor any
guarantee of eventual membership. The programme cannot
be considered as a list of criteria for membership.”223
5.30. Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Su mmit Declaration reiterates
NATO’s commitment to an “open door” policy, under which the Alliance
maintains an “active relationship with those nations that have expresse
d
an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek
membership in the future.” It also indicates that “[n]o European
democratic country whose admission would fulfil the obj ectives of the
Treaty will be excluded from consideration.” 224 In short, the MAP, as an
implementing mechanism for Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
encourages an ongoing process of evaluation and engagement, while
preserving the discretion of the Member States under Article 10.
223
224 Press Release NAC-S(99)66, 24 Apr 1999, at para 3: Annex 21.
NATO Press Release M-1 (97) 81, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic
Security and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Governm8 July 1997,
para 8: Annex 18.
805.31. Under Article 10, the Member States retain substantial
discretion as to those aspirant States which satisfy the enlargement criteria
of the Alliance. The Member States “may” decide to invite such an
aspirant State, meaning that it is within their discretion to invite, or not to
invite, any State satisf ying the criteria. By contrast, the admissions
provision of the Treaty and the ad missions practice of NATO leave no
discretion to the Council as to an aspirant State wh ich fails to satisfy the
criteria. A State which does not meet the criteria for NATO enlargement
must be declined an invitation to accede.
5.32. The procedure for gaining membership in the Alliance requires
multiple stages of consensus-based approval from NATO Allies. At the
earliest stage, an aspirant State is invited for accession negotiations. For a
State to actually become a member there must be unanimity among all of
the NAC Member States, as well as the signature and ratification of the
Accession Protocol on the part of the aspirant.225
V. THE FYROM’S PARTICIPATION IN MAP
5.33. In 1999, the FYROM began its par ticipation in MAP. In the
various MAP Progress Reports on the FYROM, the Alliance stressed the
need for full compliance with the u ndertakings required for membership
in NATO, including “good neighbour ly relations” with all NATO
Members and the need to resolve any “outstanding issues.”
5.34. From the beginning of this proc ess, it was well known that the
FYROM’s disagreement with Greece over its name was one such
“outstanding issue” that would have to be resolved before the FYROM
would receive an invitation to begin accession.
5.35. In early 1999 the Prime Minister of the FYROM, Ljubco
Georgievski, after a meeting with th e Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Greece, Theodoros Pangalos, wrote to the Foreign Minister of Greece:
“During our meeting both priv ate and in the presence of
Delegations we noticed a coincidence of views on the
issues we discussed. As I had already the opportunity to
discuss with You dear Mr Pangalos this Government of the
Republic of Macedonia consid ers Greece as its strategic
partner in the region. We are fully aware that the upgrading
of our relations with the European Union and NATO
aiming at the integration of my country to both
225
On the distinction between “obligations not to do” and “obligations to do”
(obligations de faire) see G. Arangio-Ruiz, “Preliminary Report on the law of State
responsibility”, ILC, Yearbook 1988, volume II, part I, para 44, p.16.
81 organizations depends at a large extent on the support of
the Hellenic Republic and the solution of pending issues. I
can assure You that from my part, I will spare no efforts in
deploying the positive energy ne eded in order to reach
eventually by the end of this year a mutually acceptable
solution on our last difference.”226
5.36. Further on in the same letter the Prime Minister of the FYROM
continued by saying that, “[t]he only existing bilateral difference between
our countries is referred to Article 5 of the said Accord.” 227 Accordingly,
it appears that at that time when the FYROM was to begin its participation
in the MAP, the Prime Minister of the FYROM considered that the
resolution of the pending issues, namely the prior resolution of the
difference on the name was a necessary condition for the integration of the
FYROM in both NATO and the EU.
5.37. In its Final Communiqué at the end of the Ministerial Meeting
in Brussels on 7 December 2007, the NAC stated in relation to the
FYROM:
“In the Western Balkans, Euro -Atlantic integration, based
on solidarity and democratic va lues, remains necessary for
long-term stability. This involves promoting cooperation in
the region, good-neighbourly relations, and mutually
acceptable, timely solutions to outstanding issues […]. We
recognize the strong reform efforts being made by the three
countries engaged in the MAP – Albania, Croatia and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – and urge them
to intensify their respective efforts. At the Bucharest
Summit, our Heads of State and Government intend to
invite those counties who meet NATO’s performance-based
standards and are able and willing to contribute to Euro-
Atlantic security and stability.”228(Emphasis added).
5.38. The FYROM understood, and there could have been under no
misapprehension that, the “resolution of outstanding issues” as a condition
to join the Alliance included the reso lution of the name issue. During a
joint press conference with th e FYROM’s Prime Minister, Nikola
226Letter from the Prime Minister of the FYRO M to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Greece, dated 21 January1999: Annex 39.
227Ibid.
228NATO Press Release, (2007) 130, Final Communiqué. Ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters Brussels, 7 December 2007, paras.
14-15: Annex 25.
82Gruevski, Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer referred to
the language of the NAC’s Communiqué:
“Euro-Atlantic integration of course also demands and
requires good neighbourly relati ons and it is crystal clear
that there were a lot of pleas from around the table to find a
solution to the name issu e ... I would not give you a
complete report if I would not say referring to the
communiqué by the way of th e NATO Foreign Ministers
last December where there is this line on good neighbourly
relations and the name issue.”229
5.39. Based on these statements , there can be no doubt that
NATO considered the resolution of th e outstanding name issue to be a
“performance-based standard” in the context of good-neighbourliness,
which the FYROM would have to satisfy before being invited to join the
Alliance.
5.40. Prior to the Summit in Bucharest, the Permanent
Representatives of NATO discussed the most recent MAP Progress
Report with the Prime Minister of the FYROM. At that meeting, the
FYROM had the occasion to present to the NAC its progress in fulfilling
the MAP criteria.
5.41. The NAC reviewed the FYROM’s performance in such areas
as the rule of law, judicial reform , measures taken to combat organised
crime, implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, and compensation for
victims of the 2001 crisis. NATO Members then had the opportunity to
express their positions in relation to the Progress Report.
5.42. In that regard, the Permanent Representative of Greece
reiterated that every aspirant, including the FYROM, should fully comply
with the criteria required to r each good neighbourly relations with
Members of the Alliance, and stressed the need for timely solutions on the
outstanding issues, in particular the disagreement over the FYROM’s
name. The Permanent Representative of Greece also emphasized that it
would be willing to accept a composite name if the FYROM would take
the remaining steps towards a mutually acceptable solution.
5.43. Other delegations during that meeting also emphasised the
need for the FYROM to work towards resolving the name issue.
Specifically, according to the Press of the FYROM which reported on the
229
Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime
Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, 23 January
2008, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7381.htm26.
83meeting, the Prime Minister received “the non encouraging message from
half of the participants that a mutually agreed solution on the name issue
should be found”. 230
5.44. In short, several of the intervening delegations during the NAC
meeting of 23 January 2008 – the last meeting before the Bucharest
Summit – made reference to the necessity for the FYROM to resolve the
name issue before it would be invited to accede.
5.45. Prime Minister Gruevski himself admitted during his meeting
with the NAC Members, “the main issue that many of the Ambassadors
mentioned is potential risks and the issue that has to be solved is the na
me
issue with Greece where many of them said that it’s necessary to intensify
the discussions.” 231 This makes clear that the FYROM’s government
knew the resolution of the name issue would be a determining factor in its
potential accession to NATO and moreover that this was a requirement set
forth by many Member States.
5.46. In response to the concerns raised by NATO ambassadors,
Prime Minister Gruevski insisted that “we will do the best to solve as soon
as possible this 17-year problem [of the name issue]… anyway, we will
double the efforts and we’ll try to do the best for our country and for our
partners also in the Alliance .” 232Unfortunately no progress was made
towards resolving the name issue prior to the Bucharest Summit.
5.47. On 6 March 2008, the NAC met at the level of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs in Brussels and reviewed among other issues, which were
of interest to the Alliance, the prog ress of the three aspirants: Albania,
Croatia and the FYROM. The Secret ary General of the NATO in his
23 Slobodanka Jovanovska, “NATO is preparing invitation asking for a solution on the
name”, Utrinski Vesnik, dated 24 January 2008: Annex 130. See also Svetlana
Jovanovska, “NATO confirms the progress of Macedonia”,Dnevnik, dated 24 January
2008: Annex 131.
231Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime
Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, 23 January
2008, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7381.htmnex 26. On 26
February 2008 during a visit in Budapest after a meeting with the Hungarian Prime
Minister, the Prime Minister of FYROM said: “The bilateral problem about the name
with Greece, which is now imposed as a problem of the Alliance, is a precedent which
can harm not only Macedonia and the region, but also the Alliance itself” (“Gruevski:
The imposed problem with Greece is a precedent which is harming the Alliance”,
Macedonian Information Agency, dated 26 February 2008: Annex 132).
232Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime
Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, 23January
2008, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7381.htmnnex 26.
84opening remarks stated that the mee ting was also intended to examine
‘‘broader issues of Euro Atlantic integration, including how to deep233
[our] engagement with our Partners in Western Balkans.” In a
subsequent press Conference the Secr etary General of the Organisation
explained that during that meeting there was no decision on the FYROM’s
membership. In this respect, the Secr etary General added the wish of the
Alliance that Greece and the FYROM find a solution to the name
difference in the remaining period of time between that NAC Meeting and
the NATO Summit in Bucharest. He also stressed the importance of
consensus decision making within the Alliance. 234
VI. THE BUCHAREST DECISION
5.48. On 2-4 April 2008, NATO Member States met in Bucharest,
Romania. At that meeting, it was unanimously decided that the FYROM
would not yet be invited to begin the accession process. Rather than
closing the door to the possibility of the FYROM’s future membership in
the Alliance, NATO’s decision in Bucharest made clear that an invitation
“will be extended” to the FYROM once the name issue has been resolved,
and there is no longer an impediment to the FYROM’s ability to maintain
“good neighbourly relations” with all of NATO’s Member States.
5.49. The Bucharest Summit Declaration, in relevant part, provided:
“We recognise the hard work and the commitment
demonstrated by the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to NATO values and Alliance operations. We
commend them for their efforts to build a multi-ethnic
society. Within the framework of the UN, many actors
have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the
Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not
produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that
an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually
acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached .
We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without
233Opening Statement by NATO Secretary Genera l at the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, March 6, 2008, available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7550.htmnex 28.
234Press Conference by NATO Secretary Gene ral following the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council of 6 March 2008 available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7551.htmnex 29.
85 delay and 235ect them to be concluded as soon as
possible.” (Emphasis added).
5.50. The spokesman for NATO also stated:
“[… there is] a unanimous view within the Alliance that the
FYROM should as soon as possible be offered the
opportunity in accession talks […] But the general
consensus, and that includes the consensus of the Greek
government is they wish to see all three MAP countries
join the Alliance as quickly as possible once the necessary
conditions are in place. And in this case that means
236
resolution of the name issue.” (Emphasis added).
5.51. At its meeting in Brussels on 3 December 2008, the NAC
again discussed the possibility of ex tending an accession invitation to the
FYROM. 237Paragraph 17 of the Final Co mmuniqué of that meeting
provides:
“We reiterate the agreemen t of Heads of State and
Government in Bucharest Summit to extend an invitation
to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as soon as a
mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been
reached within the framework of the UN and urge
intensified efforts towards that goal. At the same time, we
will continue to support and assist reform efforts of the
Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.” (Emphasis added).
5.52. This position was also restat ed in the Strasbourg/Kehl
Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in
235
NATO Press Release (2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads
of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
236harest on 3 April 2008, paragraph 20 : Memorial, Annex 65.
Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman , James Appathurai available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403e.htmlAnnex 30. NATO Secretary
General presenting during a Press Confer ence following the NAC Summit meeting on
Apr.3, 2008, the text of the NAC decision in Bucharest which referred to FYROM
commented as follows: “That is the text on the nation whhas not yet been invited ”
(emphasis added). Text available at:
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403g.htmlAnnex 31.
237NATO Press Release (2008) 153, Final Communiqué. Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council at the level of Foreign Ministes held at NATO Headq uarters, Brussels, 3
December 2008: Annex 32.
86 238
the meeting of the NAC on 4 April 2009. Paragraph 22 of the
Declaration states:
“We reiterate our agreement at the Bucharest Summit to
extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the
name issue has been reached within the framework of the
UN [...]
In accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
NATO’s door will remain open to all European
democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which
are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and
obligations of membershi p, and whose inclusion can
contribute to common security and stability.” 239
5.53. In order to make out its case, the FYROM relies on certain
statements by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Greece stressing
Greek opposition to FYROM’s NATO membership, and claiming to have
240
vetoed an invitation to the FYROM to accede.
5.54. These statements were unilateral acts, not made in the context 241
of interstate negotiations and “not di rected at any particular recipient.”
They do not express any intention to be bound on the international plane.
Nor do they involve “unila teral declarations of St ates capable of creating
legal obligations,” in terms of the ILC’s “Guiding Principles” of 2006 on
that topic.242
5.55. The statements in question have no legal effect insofar as the
decision in Bucharest is concerned. They were directed to the media and
238NATO Press Release (2009) 044, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration. Issued by the
Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009 : Annex 35. See also NATO Press Release
(2009) 190 Final Statement-Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign
239isters held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, dated 4 December 2009: Annex 36.
NATO Press Release (2009) 044, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration. Issued by the
Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009, paragraph 21: Annex 35.
240 Memorial, paras 2.58-2.60.
241Cf. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986 p. 554
at 573-574 (paras. 38-40) for a discussion of relevant principles, aCase Concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Co ngo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005 , paras. 129-130, for their application to “a
242itical statement by the Ugandan High Command”. th
See International Law Commission, Report of the 58 Session, A/61/10, 2006,
ch IX.
87to public audiences, using general langua ge appropriate to those settings.
They were not an attempt accurately to describe Greece’s conduct in
terms of NATO processes, and they did not qualify that conduct in terms
of the Interim Accord. To refer to Greece’s conduct at Bucharest as a
“veto” is meaningless in the NATO lexicon; it does not correspond to any
provision of the North Atlantic Treaty, or to practice within NATO.
When the NATO Secretary-General observed that “NATO does not know
the word veto,” this was an accurate reference to the Treaty and the
Alliance’s consistent practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
5.56. The NATO Bucharest summit decision regarding the
deferment of the FYROM’s invitation to begin the accession process until
a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within
the framework of the UN was a unanimous decision taken by the Heads of
State and Government. In that decision the latter agreed by consensus that
the non resolution of the dispute over the name issue was a substantive
condition for the admission of the FYROM to the NATO according to the
requirements of the Treaty itself. This collective agreement of the
Alliance derives from the specific nature of the Organisation as a closed
multilateral treaty and an integrated military alliance whose primary
objective is to enhance and maintain the military and political security of a
particular region, through preparedne ss and solidarity among its Member
States. At the Bucharest Summit th e NATO’s Member States agreed
collectively that the resolution of the name issue was a basic condition
that had to be fulfilled for the accession of the FYROM to the NATO.
88 CHAPTER 6: THE COURT’S JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
6.1. The FYROM claims that it has suffer ed an injury as the result of
NATO’s unanimous decision at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 not t243
extend an accession invitation to the FYROM at that time, and that the
outcome of that meeting would have been in its favour but for Greece’s
alleged violation of Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord. 244 The FYROM
would locate this alleged violation in NATO’s collective consensus
decision, communicated in the Buchar est Summit Declaration of 3 April
2008, 245to postpone extending to the FYROM an invitation for NATO
membership. 246
6.2. As explained in the preceding chap ters of this Counter-Memorial,
Greece denies the factual allegations th at constitute the predicate of the
FYROM’s claim and maintains that it has not acted in any way in
violation of the Interim Accord.
6.3. Before turning to the merits of the case, the present chapter will
address issues of jurisdiction a nd admissibility. Specifically, Greece will
demonstrate that even if, arguendo, the FYROM’s factual allegations are
assumed to be true, quod non , the Court would not ha ve jurisdiction over
the FYROM’s claims and, accordingly, the case should be dismissed in
limine litis.
6.4. As Greece explained to the Court in its letter of 5 August 2009, it
has chosen to present its jurisdictional objections together with its rebuttal
of the substance of the FYROM’s claims, rather than requesting a
separate, preliminary hearing. This decision was ma de in the interest of a
more economical and consolidated pro cedure, in view of the fact that
many of the analyses are relevant both to the case’s jurisdiction and its
merits.
243
NATO Press Release (2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads
of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Bucharest on 3 April 2008, paragraph 20 : Memorial, Annex 65.
244Interim Accord between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 13
September 1995, U.N.T.S. 1891, I-32193 [hereinafter Interim Accord].
245NATO Press Release (2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads
of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Bucharest on 3 April 2008, paragraph 20 : Memorial, Annex 65.
246See Memorial, paras. 1.3 – 1.9.
89 II. THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction in Consent-based Adjudication
6.5. The law on this matter is now we ll-established. Before proceeding
to the merits of a dispute, the Cour t must find, at least provisionally, the
existence of a consensual basis for jurisdiction. 247In all international
adjudication and arbitration based upon consent, it is axiomatic that the
test at the jurisdictional threshold is whether the as-yet -unproved factual
allegations, if true, could constitute a violation of an international
obligation within the Court’s jurisdic tional title. If the answer to this
inquiry is in the affirmative, jurisdiction can be sustained and the Court
can proceed to a consideration of the merits. In that phase, the Claimant
State, which until that point in the process benefitted from the assumption
pro tempore that the facts, as alleged, were true, will then have the burden
of proving those facts as well as all other elements of its case. But if, at
the jurisdictional threshold, the answer to the question of whether the as-
yet-unproved factual allegations, even if assumed to be true, could not
constitute a violation of an international obligation within the Court’s
jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the claim.
248
6.6. In Oil Platforms , the question whether the parties had
consented to the Court’s jurisdictio n could not be answered by accepting
that the claimant’s interpretation of the treaty was merely “arguable.” The
Court could only accept jurisdiction if the claimant could demonstrate,
first, that the question of the legality of the parties’ actions fell within the
treaty (containing a clause conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the
Court) and, second, that th e requirements of that clause were definitively
met. The Court expressly rejected Iran’s argument that a disagreement
between the parties as to the applic ability of the tr eaty was enough to
constitute a dispute falling within the jurisdictional clause.
6.7. In order to examine the first issu e of whether the legality of the
parties’ actions fell within the trea ty’s domain, the Court interpreted the
substantive provisions of the treaty invoked by the claimant to determine
if the alleged facts could amount to a breach; if so, then the treaty, and its
jurisdiction clause, would apply. The point of emphasis here is that the
Court considered whether Iran’s allegations against the United States, if
true, could violate the treaty pursuant to which it brought that case, 249
247Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2003, p. 181.
248Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iranv. United States of America) Preliminary
Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 at p. 803.
249Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran,
8 U.S.T. 899, 284 U.N.T.S. 93.
90stating that its role at the jurisdictional stage is solely to “ascertain
whether the violations [. . .] pleaded do or do not fall within the provisions
of the Treaty and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one which th
e
Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae to entertain.” 250
6.8. Judge Higgins, concurring, elabor ated on how the Court should
make this assumption—perforce provisionally and in a manner that would
avoid prejudice to any subsequent adjudication of the merits. She wrote:
“The only way in which ... it can be determined whether
the claims of Iran are sufficiently plausibly based upon the
1955 Treaty is to accept pro tem the facts as alleged by Iran
to be true and in that light tointerpret Articles I, IV and X
for jurisdictional purposes—that is to say, to see if on the
basis of Iran’s claims of fact there could occur a violation
of one or more of them.
[I]n the Mavrommatis case the Permanent Court said it was
necessary, to establish its jurisdiction, to see if the Greek
claims “would” involve a breach of the provisions of the
article. This would seem to go too far. Only at the merits,
after the deployment of evi dence, and possible defences,
may “could” be converted to “would”. The Court should
thus see if, on the facts as alleged by Iran, the United
States act251s complained of might violate the Treaty
articles.”
6.9. Several observations may be made with respect to the procedure
which the Court prescribes. First, as to the scope of its inquiry, the
prescribed procedure does not “limit itself to noting that one of the Parties
maintains that such a dispute exists, and the other denies it.” 252 Such an
approach would merely have addresse d the question of whether a dispute
existed but would have ignored the mo re relevant issue of whether that
dispute fell within the “four walls” of the treaty upon which jurisdiction
depended. Rather, the question to be d ecided was whether “the violations
of the Treaty of 1955 pleaded by Iran did or did not fall within the
provisions of the Treaty,” thereby giving the Court, in that case,
jurisdiction ratione materiae. 253
250Oil Platforms, I.C.J. Reports 1996 at 810, para 16.
251Oil Platforms, I.C.J. Reports 1996 at 856, paras 32 and 33 (emphasis added).
252Ibid., at 810, para16.
253Ibid., at 810, para 16 (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 (II)).
916.10. Second, the Court’s posture in this phase was, as it explained,
more nuanced than would be a simple and automatic “acceptance”. There
was no such blanket acceptance; the Court itself exercised pro tempore
judgment as to the probability of the facts as alleged, basing its decision
on neither the high standard required for criminal conviction (proof
beyond a reasonable doubt) nor even upon the more lenient civil law
standard (preponderance of evidence). Ra ther it concluded that the claim
must be “sufficiently plausibly ba sed” upon the relevant treaty.
Conversely, the respondent n eed only show that the claim is not
“sufficiently plausibly based” on the relevant treaty.
6.11. Third, replacing the Permanent Court’s use in Mavrommatis of the
verb “would” with the verb “could,” further reduced the burd
en of proof
that had been previously required of the claimant. Thus the claimant need
not prove that if the facts it alle ged are assumed to be true, it will prevail
in the case; it need only prove that it “could” prevail. The approach taken
by the Court has been cited with approval and followed by many
international arbitral tribunals with comparable jurisdictional regimes. Of
course, the general approval of the Cour t’s approach to jurisdiction is not
surprising, as it recommends itself for the economising of judicial
resources as well as for its fairness to both parties.
6.12. In the present case, as will be seen, the facts with respect to
Greece’s behaviour as alleged by the FYROM cannot plausibly be
considered a violation of the Interim Accord – regardless of whether they
are proven to be true or not.
B. The Jurisdictional Regime in the Instant Case
6.13. Article 36(1) of the Statute grants the Court jurisdiction over, inter
alia, “all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in
force.”254 In this case, the treaty in question is the Interim Accord. As will
be shown, the jurisdiction “specially pr ovided for” in this instrument is
quite complex.
6.14. Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord states that:
“Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties
concerning the interpretation or implementation of this
Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the
254
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36.
92 International Court of Justice, except for the difference
255
referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.” (Emphasis added)
Article 5(1) of the Interim Accord, to which Article 21(2) refers, provides:
“The Parties agre e to continue ne gotiations under the
auspices of the Secretary-Ge neral of the United Nations
pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a
view to reaching agreement on the difference described in
that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817
(1993).” 256(Emphasis added).
1. Resolut 8on
6.15. The “difference” to which Article 5(1) of the Interim Accord refers
is described in the third considerandum of SC res 817 (1993) as:
“a difference … over the name of the State, which needs to
be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful
and good-neighbourly relations in the region […]”
6.16. Lest any reader of SC res 817 (1 993) infer from the use of the
apparently anodyne term “difference” that the Council thought it was
dealing with some sort of technical dispute of marginal importance, the
Resolution’s third considerandum explains that the resolution of that
“difference” is necessary “in the in terest of the main tenance of peaceful
and good-neighbourly relations in th e region.” The words “peaceful
relations” evoke a major purpose of th e United Nations and the primary
responsibility of th e Security Council. 257 Nor did the Security Council
exaggerate. As was shown in Chapte r 2 of this Counter-Memorial, the
issues to which the “difference” refers are indeed fundamental to the
peace and security of the region and are of central importance to Greece.
6.17. The provisional method for dealing with the “difference” is set out
in operative Paragraph 2 of SC res 817 (1993), in which the Council:
“Recommends to the General Assembly that the State
whose application is contained in document S/25147 be
admitted to membership in th e United Nations, this State
being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the
United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
255Interim Accord, art. 21(2). (emphasis added).
256Ibid., p. 132. (emphasis added).
257United Nations Charter, Article 1(1), Article 1(2).
93 Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has
arisen over the name of the State.”
6.18. The apparently recommendatory language in SC res 817 (1993)
should not mislead; it is a decision. Ar ticle 4(2) of the Charter prescribes
that admission of a State to the United Nations is “effected by a decision
of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.” The Council’s initiative is indispensable. As the Court said in
its second Admissions Opinion:
“The admission of a State to membership in the United
Nations, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the
Charter, cannot be effected by a decision of the General
Assembly when the Security Council has made no
recommendation for admission, by reason of the candidate
failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative
vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so to
recommend.” 258
If the Council declines to recommend, the Assembly cannot bypass the
Council and admit on its own. For the same reason, the Assembly cannot
admit on terms other than those set by the Council, for to do otherwise
would usurp the Charter-pr escribed role of the Council in the admissions
process.
6.19. Once a State has been admitted to the United Nations, it is subject
to all the obligations of membership. Article 2(2) of the Charter provides:
“All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.”
Article 2(2) emphasises that the good faith performance of the obligations
assumed by each member is not simply for the benefit of the Organisation
but also ensures the rights and benef its of the other members. In being
admitted to the United Nations under the terms prescribed in SC res 817
(1993), the FYROM assumed obligations , derived from that Resolution
and the Charter itself, to all members of the United Nations, including
Greece.
6.20. Regardless of how the “difference” over the name may ultimately
be settled, the FYROM is required to identify itself by that designated title
258
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950 p.4, at p. 10.
94“for all purposes” within the United Na tions, so long as the “difference”
exists. The fact that the provisional arrangement which was incorporated
into the Interim Accord was to surv ive it is indicative of the importance
the drafters of the instrument attributed to SC res 817 (1993).
2. Art1i1l1)
6.21. Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord also bears a closer analysis
than that offered by the FYROM in its Memorial. A more detailed
analysis will be provided in Chapter 7. For the moment it is sufficient to
note that it provides, in relevant part:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of
the First Part agrees not to object to the ap plication by or
the membership of the Party of the Second Part in
international, multilateral and regional organizations and
institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a
member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the
right to object to any membersh ip referred to above if and
to the extent the Party of the S econd Part is to be referred
to in such organization or institution differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution
259
817 (1993).”
6.22. The provision is comprised of two clauses whose linkage is
emphasized both by the qualifier “how ever,” which signals that what
follows will restrict what preceded, and by the fact that the two clauses are
separated only by a semi-colon rather than by the sharper caesura of a
period, or full stop.260 The first sentence imposes on Greece an obligation
not to object to the FYROM’s app lication for or membership in
international organisations in which Greece is a member.
6.23. The duty not to object in the first clause of Article 11(1) is subject
to two clearly defined reservations preserving Greece’s existing rights.
The first is set out in the second clause of Article 11(1), and the second in
Article 22. It is appropriate to char acterise them as “preserved” rights
because each is independent of and existed prior to the Interim Accord
and neither is changed by the Interim Accord. Both preservations of rights
259Ibid., at art. 11(1).
260It may be noted in passing that the FY ROM characterises each of the sentences of
Article 11(1) as a “clause.” The notion of cause implies that one of the clauses is
dominant, the other subordinate and the FYROM does, indeed, try to create that
impression as a way of reducing the force of the second sentence. As explained below, it
also misstates the language of the second sentence. The correct designation of the
components of Article 11(1) is as two sentences which are notionally linked.
95are relevant to the jurisdiction of the Court in the case at bar and, as they
are of different natures, each merits a separate analysis.
The Exception in Article 11(1)
6.24. The second sentence of Article 11( 1) contains a preservation of
rights which is specific to the obligation assumed in the first sentence:
Greece reserves the right to object to any membership of an organisation
or institution to which the first senten ce refers “if and to the extent the
Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organisation or
institution differently” than as the FYROM. The use of the verb
“reserves” should not mislead. Unlike a reservation in a bilateral treaty,
which is a unilateral claim whos e legal validity depends upon the
acquiescence of the other treaty party, 261what both parties confirmed in
the Interim Accord was that Greece retained a right to object; the FYROM
agreed to this right as an integral part of the treaty itself. By contrast to
other rights in the Interim Accord, the right in the second sentence of
Article 11(1) is unqualified and does not require any prior procedures,
formal notice or negotiation for its exer cise. This aspect of Article 11(1)
will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7 below.
The Exception in Article 22
6.25. An entirely separate preservation of rights with respect to the duty
not to object in the first sentence of Article 11(1) is to be found more
generally in Article 22. It provides, in relevant part:
“This Interim Accord . . . does not infringe on the rights
and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral
agreements already in force that the parties have concluded
with other States or international organizations.”
Article 22 appears in “Part F. Final Clauses” of the Interim Accord. By
virtue of its terms and its location within the treaty, it applies to every
right and duty in the Interim Accord. In effect, this part of Article 22 says,
“but note: no part of the Interim Accord is to be read in such a way as to
infringe any other rights and dutie s resulting from bilateral and
multilateral agreements already in force.”
6.26. Now, there is another critical jurisdictional element in Article 22.
Article 22 does not say something on the order of “in case of a conflict
between rights and obligations arising under the Interim Accord and rights
and obligations arising under any other bilateral or multilateral
agreements, the Court shall determine which of those rights and
261
Article 20, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
96obligations shall prevail.” The Inte rim Accord resolves any potential
conflicts by saying, in e xplicit and imperative terms, that “[t]he Interim
Accord [...] does not infringe [...].” In other words, in case of a conflict,
the Interim Accord explicitly supero rdinates the obligation in the other
bilateral or multilateral agreement over any obligation that Greece might
have assumed under the Interim Accord.
6.27. While it should be reiterated that Article 22 applies to every
provision in the Interim Accord, the issue in this part of Greece’s analysis
concerns the application of Article 22 to the duty not to object in the first
sentence of Article 11(1). For clarity in the discussion that follows, it will
be useful to join, with the inse rtion of a bracketed conjunction, the
relevant part of the specific provis ion of Article 11(1) to the general
exception in Article 22 in order better to ascertain the legal consequence.
Such a reconstruction would read as follows:
“[. . .] the Party of the First Pa rt agrees not to object to the
application by or the member ship of the Party of the
Second Part in international, multilateral and regional
organizations and institutions of which the Party of the
First Part is a member [. . . but] this Interim Accord . . .
does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from
bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that
the parties have conclude d with other States or
international organizations.”
6.28. Now, on the merits of this case and wholly apart from the second
clause of Article 11(1), Greece will show, in Chapter 8, that the stream of
actions of the FYROM which were re viewed in Chapter 4 above, carried
out in manifest and intentional viol ation of the Interim Accord, would
have constituted ample justification for Greece to take actions that might
otherwise have been inconsistent with the Interim Accord. (Greece denies
that it took such actio ns.) But because this section of the Counter-
Memorial is limited to issues of jurisdiction, Greece will address the
application of the relevant treaty pr ovisions to the facts as alleged. As
discussed above, and to pa raphrase Judge Higgins in Oil Platforms , “the
only way in which [...]it can be dete rmined whether the claims [...] are
sufficiently plausibly based upon the [...] Treaty is to accept pro tem the
262
facts as alleged [...] to be true.”
6.29. The jurisdictional regime of the Interim Accord is complex. The
apparent inclusiveness of the word s “[a]ny difference or dispute” is
262
Oil Platforms, I.C.J. Reports 1996 at 856, para 32.
97subject to two explicit exclusions. Fi rst, the Interim Accord excludes “the
difference referred to in Article 5(1)” such that, if Greece’s alleged actions
were taken as a result of the difference over the name, Article 21(2) of the
Interim Accord does not reach them; they are not admissible and the Court
does not have jurisdiction over them. Such actions would be inseverably
linked to the difference over the na me, which is excluded from the
jurisdiction of the court by Article 21(2).
6.30. Second, and just as critical, the Interim Accord’s jurisdictional
regime excludes actions by Greece whic h might otherwise be deemed to
have violated Article 11 of the Inte rim Accord but which were taken in
accordance with “rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral
agreements already in force that th e Parties have concluded with other
States or international organizati ons.” Significantly, this exception
immediately follows the jurisdictional clause. Greece’s duties as a
member of NATO with respect to its participation in organisational
decisions about membership applica tions clearly fall under Article 22 of
the Interim Accord.
6.31. Each of these two grounds is considered in more detail below.
III. THE DISPUTE CONCERNS THE DIFFERENCE REFERRED
TO IN ARTICLE 5(1) OF THE INTERIM ACCORD AND IS
ACCORDINGLY OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT
6.32. Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord establishes the jurisdiction of
the Court “except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.”
6.33. As will be recalled, Article 5(1) of the Interim Accord provides:
“The Parties agre e to continue ne gotiations under the
auspices of the Secretary-Ge neral of the United Nations
263
pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with
a view to reaching agreement on the difference described
in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817
(1993).”264
The “difference,” as discussed above, is defined in SC res 817 (1993) as
“a difference [...] over the name of the State [...].”
263
United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year,
264olutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1993(S/INF/49), p. 33.
Ibid., p. 132.
986.34. In an attempt to reduce its ow n obligations under the Interim
Accord and to minimize its violations of it, the FYROM has sought to
portray the “difference“ as if it we re a trivial matter – whether in the
Memorial or, mockingly, in statements made to the General Assembly of
the United Nations. As shown in Chapter 4, the FYROM has not respected
its obligation to find a resolution to th e name issue and even treats that
obligation lightly in its Memorial. One of the more blatant examples is to
be found in the FYROM’s correspondence in the instant case with the
Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and, as such,
plainly included in SC res 817 (1993); in its letter to the Registrar of 10
July 2009, the FYROM identified itself as the “Republic of
265
Macedonia”.
6.35. Now it is clear that the difference over the name of the FYROM
has not been resolved. Therefore, the rights and obligations with respect to
the provisional regime for “the difference” remain in force. The violations
which the FYROM alleges Greece to have committed relate to “the
difference referred to in Article 5(1)”. In view of the constant pattern of
conduct of the FYROM, Greece had reas onable grounds to conclude that
“the difference” was directly relevant to the FYROM’s application for
membership in NATO, and moreover that the FYROM’s prior actions
with regard to other, cognate international organisations with respect to
“the difference” were also relevant to its prospective application for
membership in NATO.
6.36. The FYROM contends that the “subject of this dispute does not
concern – either directly or indirectly – the difference referred to in
Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Interim Accord […].” 266 Assuming, as the
FYROM alleges, that Greece did “object” to the issuing of an invitation to
267
the FYROM for membership in NATO (overlooking, for purposes of
this hypothesis, the actual procedures for membership decisions in NATO
which were described in Chapter 5 of this Counter-Memorial), it is not
plausible, whether “su fficiently” or, indeed, by any measure of
plausibility, to contend that the unreso lved “difference” referred to in SC
res 817 (1993) would not ha ve been a central part of the objection whose
occurrence has been assumed for testing jurisdiction.
6.37. The text of the Bucharest Summit Declaration and public
statements that followed it, as well as the context of both the Interim
265Letter of Nikola Dimitrov, Co-Agent, to the Registrar of the Court, M. Philippe
Couvreur, 20 July 2009.
266Application, supra note 2, at para 10.
267Ibid., at p. 88.
99Accord and NATO membership, establ ish a direct connection between
accession to the organisation and resolution of the name dispute.
6.38. At the Bucharest Summit, the NATO Heads of State and
Government deliberated over whether to follow up on their Riga Summit
intention to “extend furt her invitation to those countries which meet
NATO’s performance based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-
Atlantic security and stability,”268including the FYROM.
6.39. In declining to extend the invitation to the FYROM at Bucharest,
the NATO Heads of State and Government indicated a direct link between
NATO membership and the resolution of the name issue, locating
responsibility for negotiations over the latter within the UN. While the
NATO Heads of State and Government “recognize[d] the hard work and
commitment” of the FYROM, they “agreed that an invitation to the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a
mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.” NATO
recognized that negotiations were on-going “[w]ithin the framework of
the UN”, but “noted with regret that these talks ha[d] not yet produced a
successful outcome.” 269
6.40. For the NAC, therefore, the FYROM’s prospective membership
was inseparably linked to the resolution of the name issue in Article 5 of
the Interim Accord. The relevance of the fact that the conduct of which
the FYROM complains is that of NATO and not of Greece will be
explained in Chapter 7 below. 270The point of emphasis here is that even if
Greece had objected to the FYROM’s membership application at the
Bucharest meeting, the documents issuing from the summit make clear
that the failure to resolve the diffe rence over the name would have been
the sole reason. Thus, the specific exception in Article 21(2) of the Interim
Accord applies and the jurisdiction of the Court can not extend to the
FYROM’s claims.
6.41. Because the FYROM cannot plausibly contend that the
“difference” was not the key element in Greece’s hypothesised objection,
it has strained to reinterpret Article 5(1) and Article 11(1) of the Interim
Accord to suit its own purposes. It is one thing to assert , as it does at
paragraph 5.8 of its Memorial, that “[t]here is no question that the
Respondent objected to the Applican t’s accession to NATO and that its
268NATO Press Release (2006)150, Riga Summit Declaration , Issued by the Heads of
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga
on 29 November 2006, at para 30 [hereinafter Riga Summit Declaration]: Annex 23.
269Bucharest Summit Declaration, at para 20.
270See infra, Part II, Chapter 7.
100objection ultimately served to prevent the Applicant from being invited to
join NATO.” It is quite another to explain why Greece would have
objected (assuming it had done so) if not because of the “difference.” In
fact, NATO’s Bucharest communiqué makes explicit that the “difference”
was critical to its collective decision.
6.42. As was explained in Chapter 3, the second sentence of Article
11(1) has two, cumulative conditions , the second of which — “to the
extent” — attaches to the FYROM’ s obligation with respect to the
provisional name the element of duration. In its Memorial, the FYROM
insists that “[t]his271se is about the legality of the Respondent’s objection,
no more no less.” With respect to jurisdiction, the FYROM proposes
that “the only matter that the two States declined to have resolved by the
Court was [...] the final resolution of the diffe rence concerning the
Applicant’s name.” 272Greece would draw attention to the adjective
“final” in the quotation. That word doe s not appear in Article 5(1), in
Article 11 or in Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord. Nor does it appear in
SC res 817 (1993).
6.43. The FYROM is proposing to the Court an unrealistically narrow
and self-serving vision both of the Interim Accord and of this case.
Reading the word “final” into Article 21(2) has the effect of transforming
what is a balanced jurisdictional clau se into one which would tilt heavily
in favour of the FYROM. If the on ly issue excluded from the Court’s
jurisdiction by the “except” section of Article 21(2) is “the final resolution
of the difference concerning the A pplicant’s name,” as the FYROM
contends, then the result is that the FYROM – having been admitted to the
United Nations by virtue of the Interim Accord – can proceed to violate its
commitment to conduct itself in good faith with respect to its United
Nations obligations by failing to use its provisional name, while any
responses by Greece will be unlawful per se and, moreover, actionable
before the Court under the Interim Accord. The FYROM also
conveniently interprets its obligation under Article 5(1) as o273 requiring
nominal, rather than good faith effort on its part. Its various
interpretations would enable it to flout its obligation with respect to the
provisional name (as it has done) and to be obdurate in negotiations (as it
has been) yet to use the jurisdiction available under Article 21(2) against
Greece for any number of reasons. But the word “final” does not appear in
the text and cannot be read into it. A proper reading of the term
271
272Ibid., at para 1.11.
273Ibid., at para 3.11.
Memorial at para 2.23.
101“difference” in this context must be wider and include matters and actions
inseparable from the name issue.
6.44. It is apposite to note that, in re ferring to the “difference” in its
communiqués after Bucharest, NATO was acting within its own
organisational mandate. The Interim A ccord itself was the product of UN
negotiations that clearly establishe d a connection betw een resolution of
the name dispute and regional security. Article 5 incorporates SC res 817
(1993), which, in turn, states that a “difference has arisen over the name of
the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of
peaceful and good neighbourly relations in the region.” 274On the basis of
the text of the Bucharest Summit Declaration and Article 5 of the Interim
Accord, it is clear that the name dispute was the primary reason for
deferring FYROM’s invitation for membership. Moreover, it was entirely
intra vires NATO to act on this basis. Indeed, it is difficult to see how
NATO, as a security organisation, could have avoided doing so.
6.45. The point of emphasis, however, is that because that dispute is
excluded by Article 21(2), the Court lack s jurisdiction to hear the case. It
is inescapable that the hypothesise d objection to NATO membership of
which the FYROM indicts Greece was centrally related to the
“difference” over the name. That simple fact is conclusive for purposes of
determining whether the Court has juri sdiction in the instant case. Article
21(2) of the Interim Accord establis hes the Court’s jurisdiction “except
for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.”
6.46. In paragraph 4.31 of its Memorial, the FYROM paraphrases the
first part of the second clause of Article 11(1) as “The Respondent’s right
to object may be exercised if – and only if – the Applicant”; the FYROM
then proceeds, this time in quotation marks, to accurately quote the rest of
the clause: “is to be referred to in such organization or institution
differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council
resolution 817 (1993).” Its paraphrase of the first part of the second clause
is a misrepresentation, and it is so im portant to the FYROM’s case that it
recurs in both Chapters 4 and 5 of the Memorial, in paragraphs 4.31 and
5.9.
6.47. In fact, the second sentence of Article 11(1) does not say “if and
only if;” it says “if and to the extent.” The words “to the extent” which the
FYROM tries to elide from the pr ovision introduce an element of
continuity and material scope. Those words enable Greece to examine the
FYROM’s behaviour in other international organisations over time as part
274
UN Security Council Resolution 817 (1) (1993).
102of exercising the right which is reserved to it in the second sentence of
Article 11(1).
6.48. In suppressing the actual language of this part of Article 11 and
inserting in its place language that is not to be found there, the FYROM
tries to defend actions in violation of the Interim Accord while clawing
back from Greece the right which the FYROM had allowed it to reserve –
without condition – in the second sentence of Article 11(1). The
FYROM’s obligation with respect to the “difference” then ceases to be an
obligation that continues until such time as the “di fference” is settled and
is reduced to a mere formality for securing entry into an organisation.
Thereupon, in the FYROM’s version, that obligation can simply be
ignored and the FYROM may use the name which it had promised Greece
it would refrain from using pending settlement of the “difference.”
6.49. Consider the FYROM’s conten tion at paragraph 2.20 of its
Memorial:
“Significantly, the Resolution [817] did not require the
Applicant to call itself ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’, and the Applicant never agreed to refer to
itself as such. Consequently, in accordance with resolution
817 and without raising any di fficulties with the United
Nations Secretariat, the Applicant has always used its
constitutional name in writt en and oral communications
275
with the United Nations, its members and officials.”
Or consider the FYROM’s line of argu ment in Chapter 5 of its Memorial.
In paragraph 5.65, the FYROM states:
“In accepting the terms of resolution 817, the Applicant
agreed “to be referred to” under the provisional designation
within the United Nations, but was not fettering its
sovereign right to call itself by its constitutional name, as
made clear by the Applicant during the negotiation process.
Consequently, in accordance with resolution 817, the
Applicant has continued to call itself by its constitutional
name in written and oral co mmunication with the United
Nations and its Member States.” 276
6.50. Greece would recall to the Court the key operative language of SC
res 817 (1993): “this State being provisionally refe rred to for all purposes
275
276Ibid., at p. 29. Italics in original.
Ibid., at p. 111. (Emphasis supplied).
103within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the
name of the State.” Greece would also recall the language of the second
sentence of Article 11(1) of the Inte rim Accord: “the Party of the First
Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if
and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such
organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United
Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”
6.51. As stated above, the mere fact that the hypothesised objection
inescapably relates to the “differen ce” in Article 21(2) of the Interim
Accord is conclusive as to the absence of jurisdiction over the FYROM’s
claim. But even if one were to acc ept the implication in the FYROM’s
argument that the unqualified reservati on of the right to object to any
membership “if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be
referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph
2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817(1993),” is actu
ally
subject to certain unspecified or implied qualifications, the FYROM’s
argument here would still fail. The FYROM’s prior actions with respect to
(i) its use of a name in the United Na tions other than that required by SC
res 817 (1993); (ii) its explicitly self -serving interpretation of the Interim
Accord; and (iii) its declaration of the future actions which it intends to
take with respect to the “differenc e” are all in clear violation of the
Interim Accord and reveal exactly how the FYROM would behave were it
admitted to NATO without the “difference” first being settled.
IV. THE DISPUTE IS EXCLUDED BY ARTICLE 22
OF THE INTERIM ACCORD
6.52. In its Memorial, the FYROM submits that “the only matter that the
two States declined to have resolved by the Court was the one issue that
they could not accept in the 1993 draft Treaty, namely the final resolution
277
of the difference concerning the Applicant’s name.” The FYROM
studiedly overlooks another critical provision with regard to jurisdiction:
Article 22. Indeed, the only two references to Article 22 in the entire text
of the Memorial are in its paragr aph 2.39, where it is clear from the
context that the FYROM is actually referring to Article 23(2), and in
paragraph 4.12 where the FYROM bl andly summarises the provision as
one concerning “the Accord’s effect on third states and international
organizations.” This purported summary simply skips that half of Article
22 which actually relates to and is dispositive of this case. The FYROM
277
Ibid., at para 3.11. As noted above, the word“final” does not appear in the provision.
104would prefer that Article 22 of the Interim Accord not exist. 278 But it does
exist and, moreover, is decisive with respect to the absence of jurisdiction
in this case. The relation between Article 11(1) and Article 22 has already
been noted. A more detailed consideration will be undertaken here.
6.53. Article 22 of the Interim Accord follows directly after the
jurisdictional clause. Although it has been set out above, it will be helpful
to restate it.
“This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State
or entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties
resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already
in force that the parties have concluded with other States or
international organizations.”
6.54. Article 22 establishes an important exception. It states that the
Accord will not “infringe on any rights and duties resulting from bilateral
and multilateral agreements already in force that the Parties have
concluded with other States or international organizations.” 279 Article 22
does not stand alone, for unlike the exception in the second sentence of
Article 11(1), which is specific to that provision, Article 22 applies to the
entire Interim Accord, so it is necessary to relate it to particular provisions
of the Interim Accord in order to assess its meaning.
6.55. The FYROM’s repeated insistence in its Memorial that the present
dispute concerns only one provi sion of the Interim Accord in abstracto
and that the entirety of that instrument can be virtually ignored is incorrect
as a matter of fact and a profound erro r as a matter of international law.
As was noted in Chapter 3, in interpreting the Interim Accord, as any
complex instrument, the Court has the task of reading the treaty as a
whole, rather than focusing only on a “solitary” clause in isolation from
the language that precedes and follow s it. Article 31(2) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs interpreters to read individual
provisions of a treaty in their “context,” which it explains as meaning, first
and foremost, the text, preamble and anne xes. This is especially pertinent
to a treaty which includes provisions like Article 22, which are manifestly
designed to apply to other provisions within the treaty.
6.56. By virtue of its general and unqualified language, Article 22
applies to any kind of treaties, including the constitutive acts of
international organisations. Now with respect to organisations, students of
international relations have long distinguished between organisations à
278
279See infra for discussion of Memorial para 1.8.
Ibid,. at art. 22.
105vocation universelle, on the one hand, and organisations fermées, on the
other. The former category is comp rised of organisations which may be
called “adhesive” international organisations, i.e., organisations in which
new members are simply “added on” by application and pro forma
approval. These organisations are usually of a “parliamentary” or
technical character and aspire to a wide if not universal membership. They
have general membership criteria with respect to which any state meeting
those criteria is generally expected to become a member. In international
organisations in this category, the addition of a new member does not
change the rights, obliga tions and reliances of members with respect to
each other and toward the collectiv e objectives of the organisation.
Because of such an organisational character, the participatory abilities and
prior and existing relationships of the putative new member are of
marginal importance.
6.57. The second category of international organisations is comprised of
organisations of a much more limited membership. In accordance with the
raison d’être of these internationa l organisations, membership involves
substantial mutual commitments and reliances, such that the admission of
each new member has the potential for significantly affecting the
commitments and obligations of the prior members. Hence criteria for
membership in such organisations are likely to be more stringent, for
admission procedures involve collectiv e policy judgments on the part of
existing members, all of whom carry a heavy responsibility.
6.58. A State’s admission to membership in international organisations
falling in the first category is usua lly accomplished without requiring
existing members to undertake any si gnificant role or new responsibility.
By contrast, admission to membership in international organisations in the
second category involves the active participation of the existing members;
therefore the constitutive instruments of such international organisations
often prescribe stringent criteria for states aspiring to membership which
are applied in complex admission processes. Examples may be found in
the basic treaties of the European Union or in the NATO Charter.
6.59. Thus, a state that is party to an international organisation in the
second category has international lega l responsibilities to both the other
members of the organisation and the organisation itself with respect to
discharge of its rights and duties in the membership process. To commit
itself in a subsequent bilateral treaty not to honour such obligations would
constitute a violation of the earlier treaty. Were a State-party to such a
treaty to have subsequently committed itself to an incompatible treaty
obligation, the question as to which of those contradictory obligations
should prevail (and, conversely, which should be violated) would present
106an interesting legal prob lem to an international tribunal with jurisdiction
over it. But such a problem does not ar ise in the present case because the
Interim Accord’s Article 22 anticipated the potential for inter-treaty
conflicts and established a general rule , by agreement of the Parties, that
would determine which of the comp eting obligations would always
prevail. Article 22 states, in relevant part, that the “[a]ccord [...] does not
infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral
agreements already in force that th e parties have concluded with other
States or international organizations.”
6.60. No bilateral agreement exists in a vacuum. Because each is
perforce inserted into a pre-existing web of other trea ties and general
international legal obligations, the prudent draftsman will anticipate and
provide for possible conflic ts with other instruments. Article 22 is this
type of provision. It is concerned with the consequences of the Accord f
or
third parties, including international or ganisations. It is comprised of two
distinct components. The first, the only component which the FYROM
acknowledges, is not relevant to the jurisdictional issue addressed here; it
is an assurance that the Interim Accord “is not directed against any other
State or entity.”
6.61. But the second component of Article 22 is of critical importance to
both the jurisdiction and me rits of the case at bar. In this provision, the
FYROM acknowledges and accepts the fact that Greece has prior rights
and obligations by operation of other bilateral and multilateral agreements
with other states or international organisations and that the Interim Accord
does not infringe them. Thus this provision super-ordinates the obligations
which either party to the Interim Accord may have under those other
treaties over the obligations in the Interim Accord.
6.62. Without mentioning Article 22, the FYROM is obviously
conscious of it and its implications for the present case. The FYROM
seeks to eliminate Article 22 by unsubstantiated assertion. Thus, it insists:
“The Respondent’s obligation wa s “not to object”: that
obligation applies irrespective of whether its objection
amounted to a veto and irre spective of the effect or
consequence of its objection. Thus, these proceedings are
not concerned in any way with the acts or omissions of any
third States, or with any provisions of the constituent
instrument of NATO or of any other international
organization or institution: the object and subject matter of
these proceedings are exclusivel y related to the actions of
107 the Respondent and their incompatibility with the Interim
280
Accord.”
6.63. Assuming, pro tem, that Greece did in fact object to the extension
of an invitation to the FYROM, quod non, the question for the Court is
whether NATO, through its Charter and other legal instruments, falls
within the category of international organisations to which Article 22
refers. The answer to that question is clear. Article 22 requires, inter alia ,
that there be in force a multilatera l agreement with other states or
international organisations; NATO is such an organisation. It requires that
the agreement accord rights and impose duties; Chapter 5 of the Counter-
Memorial has elaborated the rights a nd duties in the membership process
which obtain for all NATO members. If we assume for purposes of
argument that Greece, as a member of NATO, had concluded that it was
bound “to object” to the FYROM’s application because of the unresolved
“difference,” its judgment in this matter could not possibly constitute a
violation of the Interim Accord. Hence the FYROM’s claims are neither
admissible nor subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
V. THE DISPUTE CONCERNS CONDUCT ATTRIBUTABLE TO
NATO
6.64. Besides those discussed in the prev ious Sections, there is another
reason why the Court has no jurisd iction to decide on the FYROM’s
Application: given the obj ect of the Application, it is really directed
against NATO.
6.65. NATO is indeed not a party to this adjudication since it is not
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Yet it is not inapposite to note that, in
referring to the “difference” in its communiqués after Bucharest, NATO
was acting within it281wn organisati onal mandate and expressly referred
to the name issue. The Interim Accord itself was the product of UN
negotiations that clearly established that resolution of the name dispute
was critical to regional security. Article 5 incorporates SC res 817 (1993),
which, in turn, states that a “differe nce has arisen over the name of the
State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of
280Memorial at para 1.8.
281 NATO Press Release: (2009) 190, Final Statement, Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO He
adquarters,
Brussels 4 December 2009: Annex 36; see also NATO,
Press Release: (2009) 044, 4 April 2009 Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, Issued
by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009: Annex 35.
108 282
peaceful and good neighbourly relations in the region.” On the basis of
the text of the Bucharest Summit Declaration and Article 5 of the Interim
Accord, it is clear that the name dispute was the primary reason for
deferring FYROM’s invitation for membership. Moreover, it was entirely
in conformity with NATO’s raison d’être to act on this basis. Indeed, it is
difficult to see how NATO, as a security organisation, could have avoided
doing so.
6.66. The decision challenged by the FYROM was not taken by Greece
and the dispute (inseparable from the name issue) concerns conduct
attributable not to Greece, but to NATO (A). Consequently, the individual
member States of the Organisation, including Greece, cannot be held
accountable for this NATO’s decision – whatever its reason (B).
A. The Actions Taken in Bucharest with Respect to the FYROM are
Attributable to NATO
6.67. In its Submissions, the FYROM has targeted Greece’s “State
283
organs and agents.” This is the incorrect target: the decision not to
extend an invitation to join NATO has not been taken by Greek State
organs and agents; it is a collect ive decision taken by NATO and its
organs. 284
6.68. As pointed out by Greece’s Liaison Office in Skopje to the
FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“The decision to extend an invitation to the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join NATO as soon
as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has
been reached is a collective decision taken unanimously
by the Heads of State and Government of the NATO
member states at the Summit held in Bucharest on 3
April 2008. It is not a unilateral act of Greece falling
within the scope of article 11 of the Interim Accord […].
Any grievances against this NATO decision should
consequently be addressed to the competent authorities
of the Alliance, which represent legally the said
organization.” 285
282 Security Council Res. 817 (1) (1993) – italics added.
283 P. 123, (i).
284 For a description of NATO’s decision processes, see above paras 5.16-5.32.
285 Memorial, Annex 51, Verbal note da ted 15 May 2008 from Greece’s Liaison
Office in Skopje to the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1096.69. International organisations have a legal personality distinct from
the legal personality of their member States.
“What [that] means is that [the organisation] is a subject
of international law and capable of possessing
international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to
286
maintain its rights by bringing international claims.”
The counterpart of this “capacity to ma intain its rights” is that “[e]very
internationally wrongful act of an international organi zation entails the
international responsibility of the international organization.” 287 It is
therefore in order to determine whether NATO can be held responsible for
the decision challenged by the FYROM.
6.70. This would be the case if the adoption of this decision:
a) is attributable to the international organisation
under international law; and
b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation
of that international organisation. 288
This is not so since, while the decision is indisputably attributable to
NATO, (1) it does not constitute a breach of any international obligation
bearing upon the Organisation (2).
1. The Decision on the Deferral of the Invitation to the FYROM is
Attributable to NATO
6.71. There can be no doubt that NATO is an international organisation
vested with international legal person ality. In line with the reasoning of
the Court in the case concerning Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations , 289this is implicit in the North Atlantic
Treaty of 4 April 1949 by which the Organisation was established, which
creates organs, in particular th e NAC, its supreme body, through which
the Organisation acts, and has given it special tasks which require the
existence of legal personality. The distinction between the situation of the
Organisation and that of its member s is evidenced by the power of its
bodies, and, in particular the NAC, to issue recommendations to members
286 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations , Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 179.
287Report of the International Law Commission of its sixty-first session, A/64/10, Article
3 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations p.20.
288 Article 4, ibid.
289 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations , Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 179.
110 under Article 9 of the Treaty and to take decisions – such as the admission
of a new Member (Article 10). Moreover, numerous member States and
certain non-members have permanent representations to NATO, and the
Organisation has entered in treaties with its own Member States as well as
with third countries.
th
6.72. NATO summit meetings, such as the 20 NATO Summit held in
Bucharest on 2-4 April 2008, “provide periodic opportunities for Heads of
State and Government of member c ountries to evaluate and provide
strategic direction for alliance activities.”290 NATO summit meetings are
very important elements of its decisi on-making process, in particular for
decisions to introduce new policy, invite new Member States, launch
initiatives and build partnerships with non-NATO States. “NATO summit
meetings are effectively meetings of the NAC – the Alliance’s principal
political decision-m291ng body – at its highest level, that of Heads of State
and Government.” The decision to convene a NATO summit meeting is
approved by the NAC, as “NATO summ it meetings are centred on the
activities of the NAC.” 292 Decisions taken at the summit, such as the
Bucharest declaration, are decisions of the NAC, which will be
implemented by the NAC’s subordinate committees and NATO’s
command structure: “When persons or entities are characterised as organs
or agents by the rules of the or ganisation, there is no doubt that the
conduct of thos293ersons or entities has to be attributed, in principle, to the
organization.” Accordingly, since the NAC is the senior decision
making organ of the Organisation, its decision is attributable to NATO.
6.73. In the present case, as made very clear in the final Declaration of
the Bucharest Summit, the decision challenged by the FYROM has been
taken by “the heads of State and Government of the member countries of
the North Atlantic Alliance particip ating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008.” It reads as follows:
“Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as
NATO, “NATO summit meetings” available at
http://www.nato.int/issues/summits
/index.html Annex 37.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Report of the International Law Commission of its sixty-first session, A/64/10,
p. 60, para. 5 of the commentary of Article 5 of the Draft articles on responsibility of
international organisations.
111 soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue
has been reached.” 294
6.74. Greece is not mentioned one single time. The reason is simply that
Greece had no individual or autonomous role to play in NATO’s decision.
At the meeting of the NAC on 2-3 December 2008, NATO has reiterated
“the agreement of Heads of State and Government at the Bucharest
Summit to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia as soon as a mutually accep table solution to the name issue
has been reached” and that it will continue “to support and assist the
reform efforts of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.” 295NATO reaffirmed its position in the Strasbourg/Kehl
Summit Declaration of April 2009. 296 This confirms that NATO takes full
responsibility for the decision not to extend yet an invitation to the
FYROM. This was also made crysta l clear by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer,
Secretary General of NATO in a Press Conference on 19 February 2009, in
which he rejected the idea of a veto by Greece and stated that “NATO
does not know the word veto. We operate by consensus and unfortunately
there was no consensus last year at the summit in Bucharest [...].” 297This
294 Memorial, Annex 65, NATO Press Release (2008)049 dated 3 April 2008,
Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 ,
para. 20 (emphasis added).
295 NATO Press Release (2008) 153, Final Communiqué. Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
296ecember 2008: Annex 32 (emphasis added).
NATO Press Release: (2009) 044 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, Issued
by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009: Annex 35: “22. We reiterate our
agreement at the Bucharest Su mmit to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has
been reached within the framework of the UN, and urge intensified efforts towards that
goal. We will continue to support and assist the reform efforts of the Government of the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to increase its contribution to ISAF.” (emphasis
297ed).
Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after
the informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, with Invitees, with non
NATO ISAF
Contributing Nations, Cracow, Poland, dated 19 February 2009, available
at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090219c.html Annex 33. See also Statements
of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bak oyannis and NATO Secretary General Mr.
Scheffer following their meeting, dated 3 March 2008, available at
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/04032008_ALK1539.htm : Annex 133:
“This is a performance-based process, ther e is no automation in NATO enlargement.
NATO’s door is open but nations will have to perform. And it is also clear that
invitations will be issued when all 26 allies can agr ee because as you know NATO
operates on the basis and the principle of consensus. […] Any consensus can only be
reached if all 26 NATO allies agree.”
112statement clearly rules out any a ttempt to link NATO’s decision to
Greece. The President of the FYROM himself stated “[n]amely, NATO in
its final position indirectly verified the putting of the Interim Agreement
out of force and pointed out that the only method for our accession in the
298
Alliance is finding a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute.”
In other words, the decision to delay the FYROM’s accession to NATO is
the common decision of the Members States with which Greece agrees
but which is not the result of its opposition.
6.75. In this respect, it is of interest to note that a few months before the
Bucharest Summit, doubts were already expressed by NATO – by NATO,
not by Greece – about the FYROM’s admission to the Organisation:
“The discussion showed that efforts to join NATO are
being well noted by Allies. NATO Allies agreed that the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made
progress in implementing political, economic and military
reforms, but that more needs to be accomplished.” 299
No special role was attributed to Greece on this occasion either as the
300
FYROM itself acknowledges in its Memorial.
6.76. In its Application, the FYROM requests the Court:
“to order that the Responde nt immediatel y take all
necessary steps to comply with its obligations under
Article 11, paragraph 1 of th e Interim Accord, and to
cease and desist from objecting in any way whether
directly or indirectly, to the Applicant’s membership of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and/or of any
other ‘international, multilateral and regional
organizations and institutions’ of which the Respondent
is a member, in circumstances where the Applicant is to
be referred to in such organizations or institutions by the
298
Annual Address of Branko Crvenkovsth, President of the FYROM in
Parliament, Stenography Notes from the 37Session of the Parliament of the Republic of
299edonia, held on 18 December 2008: Annex 105 (emphasis added).
NATO, Press release, Prime Minister of former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia discusses membership aspirations with NATO allies, 23 January 2008,
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/01-january/e0123b.htmlAnnex 27
(emphasis added). See also: Joint Press Poin t with NATO Secretar y General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Nikola Gruevski, 23 January 2008 available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7381.htmAnnex 26.
300 Memorial, para. 1.11 p. 10, 1.4 p. 6.
113 designation provided for in paragraph 2 of United
301
Nations Security Council Resolution 817 (1993).”
6.77. Supposing, for the sake of discussion, that the Court were to
accede to the FYROM’s claim, it woul d mean, in fact, that Greece could
not honour its obligation towards th e Organisation, that it could not
protest against the FYROM’s violation of its commitment to be referred to
in conformity with SC res 817 (1993) after it has been admitted not only
in NATO, but also in any other “international, multilateral and regional
organisations and institutions.” But, above all, regardless of the position
of Greece, such a decision by the Court would have no effect on the
collective decision of NATO, which is the real object of the Application.
2. NATO Did not Breach any International Obligation
6.78. The Bucharest decision, which is exclusively attributable to
NATO, does not constitute “a b302ch of an international obligation of that
international organisation.” The NAC decision is obviously not capable
of engaging the interna tional responsibility of NATO since there is no
internationally wrongful act of NATO in setting a condition for admission
of the FYROM – in particular, a cond ition relating to the settlement of a
dispute with implications for international peace and security.
6.79. The Bucharest Summit did not decide to refuse the FYROM’s
admission. It only decided that “[…] an invitation to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable
solution to the name issue has been reached.” This is in full conformity
with the process of admission of a new State within the Organisation:
- The first step for a State to join NATO is to declare
its interest in joining the Alliance; then, NATO and the
candidate country engage in an Intensified Dialogue about
the State’s membership aspirations and related reforms;
- The second step for the as pirant country is to be
invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan
(MAP) “to prepare for potential membership and
demonstrate [its] ability to meet the obligations and
commitments of possible future membership” 303; the
301 Application, para. 23(ii).
302 ILC, Article 4(b) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International
Organisations, quoted above.
303 NATO, “NATO enlargement” available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm: Annex 38.
114 invitation to participate in the MAP does not guarantee 304
the future membership of the aspirant country, which have
to “demonstrate that they are in a position to further the
principles of the 1949 Washington Treaty and contribute to
305
security in the Euro-Atlantic area” ;
- The third step starts with an invitation to become a
Member of NATO; the invi tation, such as the ones
conveyed to Croatia and Alba nia in the Bucharest Summit
306
Declaration , is only the starting point of 307 accession
process on the way to formal membership.
6.80. The FYROM’s candidacy is now at the second stage of the process
of admission. 308 By a decision of 23 December 1993, the FYROM
309
resolved that “it should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” It
first joined the PfP programme in 1995 and then the MAP in 1999, which
was launched to help seven aspiring countries to join the Alliance (by
providing advice, assistance and pr actical support). The MAP set the
criteria that the FYROM and the othe r aspiring countries must fulfil to
receive an invitation. During the past 10 years, NATO and the FYROM 310
have worked on the FYROM’s accession, through visits and exchanges.
304 See NATO, Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Membership Action Plan (MAP),
dated 24 April 1999, para 3: Annex 21.
305
NATO, “NATO enlargement” available at:
306p://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm: Annex 38.
Memorial, Annex 65, NATO Press Release (2008)049 dated 3 April 2008,
Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 ,
para. 2.
307 The accession process for the aspirant/invitees country consists in: (1) accession
talks with a NATO team, (2) the invitees will send letters of intent along with timetables
for completion of reforms, (3 ) signature of the accession protocols by NATO countries,
(4) ratification of the accession protocols by NATO countries, (5) invitation of accession
by the Secretary General. The aspirant/i nvitees countries will finally become NATO
Members once theirs instruments of accession have been deposited with the US State
Department (after accession in accordance w ith their national procedures). See NATO,
“NATO enlargement” available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm
308nnex 38.
309 See above para. 5.33-5.47.
Memorial, Annex 21, “Decision on the Attainment of Membership by the
Republic of Macedonia of the North A tlantic Treaty Organization - NATO” (23
December 1993), Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 78, Year XLIX (27
December 1993), Article 1.
310 E.g. NATO, “Prime Minister of form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia visits
NATO”, 14 February 2007 available at :
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_7492.htm: Annex 24. NATO Secretary
115At the Bucharest meeting, the FYROM did not get an invitation but “was
assured that it will also be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a s
olution
to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece.” 311
6.81. It also goes without saying th at the NAC is not bound by the
Interim Accord of 1995 between Greece and the FYROM, which is res
inter alios acta for NATO and which, in any ca se, could not prevail over
the rules of the Organisation conc erning the admission of new Members
312
embodied in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The admission of a
new Member State is decided by a unanimous agreement of the NATO
Parties. An invitation can be extended to “any other European State in a
position to further the principles of [the North Atlantic] Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the No rth Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty.” 313
6.82. Absent any breach of an international obligation, NATO cannot be
held internationally responsible for the deferral of the admission of the
314
FYROM into the Organisation, of which the Claimant complains. In
any case, the Court has no jurisdiction vis-à-vis NATO.
B. The Individual Member States of NATO Cannot be Held
Responsible for the Alliance’s Decision
6.83. The ILC in its work on the topic of responsibility of international
organisations has proposed draft ar ticles on the relation between the
Member State and the international organisation. In particular, the ILC has
produced on first reading draft articles to define the situations in which
responsibility may attach to the Member State for conduct by the
315
organisation or for the conduct of the State within the organisation. In
its commentary to the draft articles addressing this part of the topic, the
General “praised these refo rm efforts, adding that still much remains to be done”.
(emphasis added).
311 NATO, “NATO enlargement” available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm: Annex 38. The same decision has
been reaffirmed at the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit; NATO Press Release: (2009) 044,
Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April
2009: Annex 35, and NATO Press Release: (2009) 190,Final Statement, Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters,
312ssels 4 December 2009: Annex 36.
313 See also below, para. 6.94.
314 Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Cf. Article 3 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International
Organisations: “Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization
entails the international responsibility of the international organization.”
315 Draft Articles 57-59.
116ILC is clear that responsibility will not attach “simply” because of the
State’s “participation in the decision-making process of the organization
according to the pertinent rules of the organization.” According to
paragraph (2) of the commentary to draft article 57,
“A State aiding or assisting an international organization
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act
may or may not be a member of that organisation.
Should the State be a member, the influence that may
amount to aid or assistance could not simply consist in
participation in the decision-making process of the
organization according to the pertinent rules of the
organization.” 316
6.84. NATO, as an international organisation, has its own legal
personality, which is distinct from those of its Members and it alone must
therefore face the responsibility for its acts. Consequently, the
Organisation acts as a veil preventing the Member States from being held
responsible for the conduc t of the Organisation (a). Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that the decision deferring the FYROM’s admission
to NATO could be attributed to Greece and entail its responsibility, the
Court could not decide on this poi nt without also deciding on the
responsibility of NATO or its ot her Members, over whom it has no
jurisdiction; therefore the Monetary Gold principle applies (b).
1. The “Veil Effect”
6.85. The “veil effect” is the direct consequence of the rec317ition of a
separate legal personality to international organisations. As a result the
acts of an international organisation, whether lawful or unlawful are not
attributable to the Member States and do not entail their responsibility.
6.86. This was very clearly explaine d by Advocate General Darmon in
the European Court of Justice case concerning the bankruptcy of the
International Tin Council:
“136. Consequently, it does appear that the
[International Tin Council] is an entity distinct from its
members vested with its ‘own decision-making power’.
Its conduct may not therefore be imputed to one of its
316
ILC, Report of the International Lw Commission of its sixty-first session,
A/64/10, p. 160, para. 2 of the commentary of Article 57 of the Draft articles on
317ponsibility of international organisations.
In particular by the ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 179.
117 members without ignoring the ‘individualization’ of the
organization in relation to the latter . In those
circumstances, the reference to solutions adopted in the
field of private law concerni ng the liability of persons
running commercial companies has no relevance
whatsoever. No guidance can be derived from the
judgment of the Internationa l Court of Justice in the
Barcelona Traction case, for instance. That court did
indeed consider that the c oncept of the lifting of the
‘corporate veil’ might apply in international law, but
there it was precisely a question which concerned
private commercial companies. As regards an
international organization, as has been shown, ‘it is
necessary to rule out any analogy -which could only be
wrong- with the mechanisms of commercial law.’
137. Although that reflection deals with the liability of
the members of the ITC for its debts, a fortiori it must
apply to the question of imputing the ITC’s conduct to
its members. The fact that it is impossible to impute the
conduct of an international organization to one of its
members ensues from its possession of separate legal
personality, even though it is thought by some that the
existence of that legal personality leaves open the
principle of liability for the debts of the legal person.” 318
6.87. The consequence of such a “veil effect” is that the decisions of an
organisation cannot be attributed to the Member States who have
319
participated in the decision process. Accordingly, when a State’s
representative fully participates in the adoption of a decision of the
318
ECJ, Maclaine Watson & Company Limited v. Council and Commission of the
European Communities, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Darmon delivered on 1 June
3199, E.C.J. Reports 1990-I, p. 818, paras 136-137 (emphasis added).
See above para. 6.83. See also J.J. Caicedo, La répartition de la responsabilité
internationale entre les organisations internationales et leurs Etats membres, Thèse pour
le doctorat en droit, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2005, p. 166, para. 207: “The
screen effect prevents the attribution tmember of a decision of the organisation to
which it has participated” (translation Greece - “L’effet d’écran empêche qu’une
décision de l’organisation à laquelle un membre a participé lui soit attribuable.”); or A.
Pellet, “Le droit international à l'aube du XXIème siècle (La société internationale
contemporaine - permanences et tendances nouvelles)”, Fundamental Course, in Bancaja
Euromediterranean Courses of International Law , vol. I, 1997, Aranzadi, Pamplona,
1998, p 80.
118organisation, he or she does not act as a representative of the State but as
member of the organisation. As explained by R. Higgins:
“[A]t the international level this leads one into the area
of ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’, the role of the members
not being as individual States but rather as members of
the relevant decision ma king organ […] where the
organization has a ‘volonté distincte’ the continuing role
of State members, qua organs should be regarded as
neutral as regards the issue of members320ability for the
acts of international organizations.”
Even if a State’s representative takes an active part in the decision process
through dialogue or debate, “a member State acting in its capacity as a
member of a governing body of an international or ganization with
separate pers321lity would be acting to commit the organization rather
than itself.”
6.88. NATO’s requirement of a consensus does not allow piercing the
Organisation’s veil. On the contrary, the fact that decisions within NATO
may be taken only by consensus ma kes it impossible to individualise
Member States’ responsibility. Far from permitting individualisation of
responsibility, this method of decisi on making demonstrates the cohesion
and solidarity between the Member States of the Organisation and
precludes extracting from it the single responsibility of one of the
Members.
6.89. A consensus-based decision process such as that of the NAC is
clearly not an international agreement falling un322 the ambit of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Such decision reflects the
will of the organisation and not the will of a given Member State.
Accordingly, this decision is attributable to the organisation and not to any
of its Member States. It would be ab surd to argue that those Members of
the UN Security Council who abstain on a decision 323 can be held
320
R. Higgins, “The Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-Fulfilment
by International Organizations of their Oblig ations Toward Third Parties, Preliminary
Exposé and Draft Questionnaire”, June 1989, Yearbook of the Institut de Droit
321ernational, Vol. 66-I, 1995, pp. 260-261.
Answer of Professor James Crawford, 26 January 1991, Yearbook of the Institut
de Droit International, Vol. 66-I, 1995, pp. 333-334.
322 See Article 3 of the Convention.
323 Indeed whatever the positions of the Members (permanent or not) of the
Security Council, the resolutions of this organ could entail the responsibility of the
United Nations, not of its Member States whatever their vote.
119responsible for the decisi on if it were unlawful. A fortiori even “if a
permanent member of the Security C ouncil persistently blocks the lifting
of sanctions that have proved to in fringe on some basic human rights, it
cannot be deemed to be abusing the legal personality of the organization
in the sense used in this Article and cannot accordingly be held jointly or
324
concurrently responsible of the persistent violations of human rights.”
6.90. In the event of a collective decision by NATO such as the NAC
decision in Bucharest, there is no room for the individual responsibility of
the Member States. The collective deci sion does not lie in the vote of the
Member States and consequently in the expression of their individual will.
It is therefore vain to speculate on (i) what was the legal effect of the
position taken by each and every Member State, (ii) which position each
member has taken during consultations in the NAC, and (iii) what is the
impact in legal terms of such position in framing the final result of
consensus. In other words, it is not po ssible and it is lega lly irrelevant, in
cases such as the present one, to try to search out and individualise the
(‘real’) author of the proposal on which the consensus is based. Such
decisions are, by definition, not attributable to any individual State, that is,
in the present case, not attributable to Greece.
6.91. Even if NATO had committed a wrongful act by refusing to
extend immediately an invitation to the FYROM, NATO solely and not
any of its members could be held responsible.
“[T]he autonomy of the in ternational organisation, and
the existence of its distinct will must prevent from
granting any role to State’ behaviours as organs [of the
organisation] for the determination of their
responsibility for the acts of the organisation […] in this
324 J. d’Aspremont, “Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations
and the Responsibility of Member States”, International Organizations Law Review ,
2007, p. 110. See ECHR, Decision on admissibility of 2 May 2007, Behrami v. France;
Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway , para. 149: “Since operations established by
UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are fundamen tal to the mission
of the UN to secure international peace a nd security and since they rely for their
effectiveness on support from member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a
manner which would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are
covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the
scrutiny of the Court. […] This reasoning equally applies to voluntary acts of the
respondent States such as the vote of a perm anent member of the UNSC in favour of the
relevant Chapter VII Resolution and the contribution of troops to the security mission:
such acts may not have amounted to obligations flowing from membership of the UN but
they remained crucial to the effective fulfilment by the UNSC of its Chapter VII mandate
and, consequently, by the UN of its imperative peace and security aim.”
120 area too, the fact th at international or ganisations have
their own legal personality plays an important role in the
attribution [of the responsibili325 to the organisation
rather than to its members.”
6.92. In sum, the decision taken at the Bucharest Summit on 3 April
2008 not to invite the FYROM to immediately join NATO is attributable
to NATO itself. This decision is not individually and autonomously
attributable to Greece or any other NATO Member State. The decision
was taken by a consensus for which NATO alone has responsibility. The
“veil effect” thus precludes the responsibility of Greece for the deferral of
the FYROM’s immediate invitation to NATO which cannot be imputed to
an autonomous act of the Greek Government.
6.93. It must also be specified that the NAC decision in Bucharest is not
a circumvention of the obligation of Greece towards the FYROM “not to
object” to its membership in intern ational organisations (according to
Article 11 of the Interim Accord). NATO has its own rules concerning the
admission of new Members 326 and, in the circumstances, they have simply
been implemented. Article 60 of th327LC Draft Articles on Responsibility
of International Organisations envisages the case of a State seeking “to
avoid complying with one of it s own international obligations” only in
case the international organisation “ha328ompetence in relation to the
subject-matter of that obligation.” In the present case, Greece has not
transferred to NATO any special co mpetence to decide on the FYROM
invitation to become a Member. NATO had no competence in relation
325 P. Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales, Bruylant,
Bruxelles, 1998, pp. 488-489; translated by Greece: “l’autonomie de l’organisation
internationale, et l’existence d’une volonté distincte dans son chef doivent conduire à
n’attribuer aucun rôle au comportement adopté par les Etats membres en leur qualité
d’organe pour la détermination de leur responsabilité pour les actes de l’organisation […]
dans ce domaine aussi, le fait que les organisations internationales soient dotées d’une
personnalité juridique propre dans l’ordre international joue donc un rôle déterminant
dans l’attribution à l’organisation, plutôt qu’à ses membres.”
326 See above, para. 6.81.
327 Text of Article 60:
“Responsibility of a member State seeking to avoid compliance
1. A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if it
seeks to avoid complying with one of its own international obligations by taking
advantage of the fact that the organisaton has competence in relation to the subject
matter of that obligation, thereby prompting the organization to commit an act that, if
committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether or not the act in question is internationally wrongful for
328 international organisation.”
ILC, Report of the International La w Commission of its sixty-first session,
A/64/10, p. 163.
121with Article 11 of the Interim Accord in that it could not have (and has
not) aided Greece not to comply with its own obligations. Once again, the
only thing NATO did was to apply its own rules, and it did so without any
consideration for the Interim Accord, which is not binding upon it.
6.94. Furthermore, Greece took part in the consultations in accordance
with its rights and obligations on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty, a
treaty which precedes in time the Interim Accord; which is not superseded
by the Accord; and which, as provided for in Article 22 of the Interim
Accord, prevails over obligations stemming from the Accord. 329 Greece
exercised within the NAC its rights a nd obligations as a member of the
Alliance on an equal footing with the other members of the Alliance in
relation to its consultation and consensus-based decision-making.
Accordingly, there was no competence (in particular on membership
questions) that was provided to the Orga nisation itself to decide on behalf
of Greece on the FYROM invitation in the Alliance. In acting differently,
Greece would have been in breach of its pre-existing obligations towards
NATO and its Members States.
2. The Monetary Gold Principle
6.95. Another reason for the Application’s inadmissibility can be found
in the “Monetary Gold principle”, according to which the Court’s decision
is precluded when the legal interests of a third party, not present in the
proceedings “would not only be affected by a decision [on the merits], but
330
would form the very subject-matter of the decision.” The Court applied
this principle in the East Timor case:
“[I]n this case, the effects of the judgment requested by
Portugal would amount to a determination that
Indonesia’s entry into and c ontinued presence in East
Timor are unlawful and that, as a consequence, it does
not have the treaty-making pow er in matters relating to
the continental shelf resources of East Timor.
Indonesia’s rights and obligations would thus constitute
the very-subject matter of such a judgment made in the
absence of that State’s consent. Such a judgment would
run directly counter to the “w ell-established principle of
international law embodied in the Court’s Statute,
namely, that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction
329
330 See above paras. 6.52-6.63.
ICJ, Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 15 June 1954, Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italyv.France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32.
122 over a State with its consent. ( Monetary Gold Removed
from Rome in 1943, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954 , p.
331
32).”
6.96. In the present case, the decision has been taken and confirmed on
numerous occasions by NATO and the332ganisation has accepted full
responsibility for that decision. Therefore, the Court could not decide
on the FYROM’s Application without necessarily deciding on the legality
of NATO’s decision since that Organisation is not a minor participant but
the most important actor in and the only author of the decision not to
invite the FYROM to join the Organisation.
6.97. Were the Court to assume jurisdiction in the present case, it would
take a decision that directly affect ed the other participants in NATO’s
decision who are not part of the present proceedings. Consequently and as
the Court’s jurisdiction is necessaril y consensual, if, contrary to the
argument presented in the previous Sections of the present Chapter, the
Court were to hold that it has jurisdiction, it w ould be precluded from
exercising it because that would require it first to rule on the rights and
interests of all the Members States of NATO who participated in the
decision challenged by the FYROM and of NATO itself, who are not
parties to the proceedings and, in the case of the la tter at least, cannot be
parties thereto.
6.98. Article 34(1) of the Statute confers locus standi in proceedings
before the Court on States alone and not on international organisations.
Therefore, the Court does not have contentious jurisdiction over the
present dispute.
VI. CONCLUSION
6.99. The FYROM’s claim does not fall w ithin the Court’s jurisdiction
on three grounds. First, it is implausible to conte nd that Greece’s alleged
actions, assuming they occurred, we re not directly related to the
“difference”. Secondly, Greece’s alleged actions, assuming they occurred,
would have been a consequence of Greece exercising its “rights and duties
resulting from bilateral and multilatera l agreements already in force that
the Parties have concluded with other States or international
organizations.” Finally, the disput e actually relates to the FYROM’s
dissatisfaction with the conduct of NATO and its Members, who are not
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.
331
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 105, para.
332
See above, para. 6.73.
123 CHAPTER 7: THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 11(1)
I. INTRODUCTION
7.1. Article 11(1) of the Interim A ccord of 13 September 1995 is the
subject of the FYROM’s Applica tion. The FYROM relies on that
333
provision as the sole basis for its claim.
7.2. Article 11(1) consists of two clauses: a clause which establishes a
special obligation upon Greece (hereafter the Non-Objection Clause), and
a second clause which preserves a pr e-existing right of Greece (hereafter
the Safeguard Clause). Article 11(1) reads in whole as follows:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of
the First Part agrees not to object to the ap plication by or
the membership of the Party of the Second Part in
international, multilateral and regional organizations and
institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a
member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the
right to object to any membersh ip referred to above if and
to the extent the Party of the S econd Part is to be referred
to in such organization or institution differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution
817 (1993).”
Thus the Non-Objection Clause establishes an obliga tion on Greece with
respect to the FYROM’s relations with certain international organisations;
the Safeguard Clause preserves th e right of Greece to object to
membership if the FYROM “is to be referred to in such organization or
institution differently” from the provisional designation established by SC
res 817 (1993).
7.3. As stressed in Chapter 3 of this Counter-Memorial, the Interim
Accord is a synallagmatic agreement. It could not, and indeed does not
purport to, bind third States or internat ional organisations. It establishes
mutual rights and obligations which, take n as a whole, are intended to
achieve the parties’ purpose—namely, to stabilise their relations during
the interim period, i.e., for so long as there is no definitive settlement of
the difference described in SC res 817 (1993). 334 Article 11(1) reflects
333
334 Memorial, para 1.1.
See supra, Chapter 3.
124this mutuality: as part of the overa ll scheme of the Interim Accord, it
balances the interests of the two part ies during the inte rim period. The
retained right of Greece under the Sa feguard Clause is the corrective
mechanism, available if the FYROM “is to be referred” to other than by
the provisional name in the organization in question.
7.4. The Applicant entirely disregards that balance. In its Memorial,
the FYROM denies that Article 11(1) imposes any obligation on it of any
335
kind: it is “directed to just one of the Parties…” In this unilateral mode,
Article 11(1) is put forward as a broad obligation, subject to a narro
wly-
construed exception relating only to the formal title by which the FYROM
is admitted to the organisation. 336 Thereafter the FYROM is free to
subvert the agreed basis of multilateral relations during the interim period.
337
In short, Article 11(1) is “directed only to [Greece],” and in terms
which are subversive of Greece’s long-held position.
7.5. Moreover in its interpretation of the Accord, the FYROM virtually
ignores Article 22 – a further exampl e of its strategy of ignoring legal
provisions which are inconvenient to the positions it takes. Article 22
provides:
“This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State
or entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties
resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements
already in force that the Parties have concluded with other
States or international organizations.” (Emphasis added)
As explained earlier in the Counter-Memorial, the placement of Article 22
in Part F of the Interim Accord, under the title of “Final Clauses”,
indicates that it applie s throughout the Interim Accord, including to
Article 11(1).
7.6. This Chapter discusses in turn each of these elements of the
Interim Accord and their application to the present dispute. In particular:
• Part II deals with the Non- Objection Clause, read in
conjunction with Article 22, and shows that at Bucharest
Greece did not breach that provision.
335 Memorial, para 4.19.
336 Thus while the Non-Objection Clause of Art. 11(1) is “unconditional”
(Memorial, para. 4.28) and “unlimited” ( ibid., paras. 4.17, 4.20), the Safeguard Clause is
“exceptional” (ibid., para. 4.28), and “solitary” (ibid., paras. 4.21 (twice), 4.29).
337 FYROM Memorial, para 4.19; cf ibid., para. 4.19 (“an obligation solely upon
the Respondent”).
125 • Part III shows that in any event Greece would have been
entitled, by virtue of the Safeguard Clause, to oppose the
FYROM’s NATO candidacy at Bucharest.
• Part IV summarises the conclusions reached.
II. THE NON-OBJECTION CLAUSE (READ IN LIGHT OF
ARTICLE 22) AND THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT
7.7. The Non-Objection Clause of Ar ticle 11(1) commits Greece “not
to object to the application by or th e membership of the Party of the
Second Part in international, multilat eral and regional organisations and
institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member […].” The
clause limits a right that Greece could otherwise freely exercise; i.e., the
right, subject to the terms of the constitutive instrument, to adopt whatever
position it wishes with respect to the relations of another State to an
international organization to which it belongs, including by objecting to
application or membership.
7.8. This Part:
• addresses the meaning of the Non-Objection Clause
and its relevance within th e particular processes of
NATO enlargement (Section IIA);
• discusses the implications of Article 22 for Article
11(1), with particular refere nce to the North Atlantic
Treaty (Section IIB);
• shows that Greece’s conduct at the Bucharest Summit
was not inconsistent with the Non-Objection Clause,
read in conjunction with Article 22 (Section IIC).
A. The Meaning of the Non-Objection Clause in the Context of NATO
Accession
7.9. Since it establishes Greece’s consent to forego the exercise of a
right, the Non-Objection Clause is to be interpreted as reaching only so far
as its text clearly indicates. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice stated in 1927, “restriction s upon the independence of States
cannot […] be presumed.” 338 Treaty provisions entered into by a State
must be interpreted “in accordance with the intentions of its authors as
338
“Lotus”, Judgment, No 9, 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, 18.
126reflected by the 339t of the treaty and the other relevant factors in terms of
interpretation.”
7.10. By contrast the FYROM, in desc ribing the Safeguard Clause in
Article 11(1), asserts that the “Parties have strictly limited the conditions
in which the grant of the Respondent’s right to object may be
340
exercised.” To refer to Greece’s pre-existing discretionary powers as a
“grant” conferred by the Interim Accord is misconceived; it mistakes the
character of the Non-Objection Clause. Under Article 11(1), the “grant,”
if any, is to the FYROM, and it is inapplicable when a situation obtains as
specified in the Safeguard Clause.
7.11. The meaning of the Non-Objection Clause is considered here, first,
in light of the ordinary meaning of the words “not to object”, a matter the
FYROM largely ignores. Second, Greece considers the drafting history of
the clause, not because the history discloses any intention to use the words
in a special or non-standard manne r, but, rather because the FYROM
makes only selective reference to it a nd wrongly asserts that it alters the
ordinary meaning of the language actually adopted. Third, the specificity
of international organisations and their internal pr ocedures is considered,
this being relevant to the implementation of the clause.
1. The Language of the Non-Objection Clause
7.12. Ratione materiae, the FYROM reads the Non-Objection Clause in
the most comprehensive terms:
“4.25. The obligation encompasses any implicit or explicit
act or expression of disapproval or opposition in word or
deed to the Applicant’s application to or membership of an
organization or institution. An act of objection may be
expressed in different forms, including in writing and
orally, by silence or in some other form.
339
Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), ICJ, Judgment of 13
July 2009, para 48. More generally, on numerous occasions the Court has held that
interpretation must be based above all on the text of the treSovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p 625,
645 (para 37); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1999,
p 1045, 1059 (para 18); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of’
America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, p 8, 12 (para 23);
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v
Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p 6, 18 (para 33);
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p 6,
21-22 (para 41).
340 Memorial, para 4.30 (emphasis added).
127 4.26. The formulation encompasses positive acts, such as
a vote, as well as a failure to act, such as the failure to
attend a meeting where particip ation is necessary in order
to express a required view.” 341
These are mere assertions. If the parties had intended that Greece was not
even implicitly to suggest, e.g. by fa iling to attend a meeting or by a nod
and a wink in the corridor, that it wa s less than fully enthusiastic about
FYROM’s membership of a given body, they would have used the simple
term “support”. By the same token Article 11(1), in no way obliges
Greece to “express a required view.” It is deliberately couched in the
negative – an obligation not to object.
7.13. Disputes over membership in in ternational organisations have a
long history and (quite apart from th e criteria for membership, a matter
addressed by Article 22), there are many gradations of position States may
take. The difference between active rejection of a proposed Security
Council resolution (i.e., by use of the veto) and abstention has been
342
discussed b343everal judges of the Court and extensively in the
literature. Applicant States have been admitted – for example – to the
United Nations with some or many Member States abstaining or even
absenting themselves; these have sometimes included Permanent
Members of the Security Council. 344 Against that ba ckground, “not to
object” means what it says, and nothing more.
341
Memorial, paras 4.25-4.26.
342 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 267 (1970),
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ICJ Reports 1971, p 16, 282 (para
94); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, Separate Opinion of Judge De Castro, ICJ Reports
1962 p 151, 185-6; Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bustamante, ICJ Reports 1962, p
151, 291.
343 See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-P eter Kaul “Article 27,” Part D, in
Bruno Simma ed, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 2 ndedn (2002) 493-
500; Paul Tavernier, “Article 27,” in Jean -Piere Cot, Math ias Forteau & Alain Pellet
eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: commentaire article par article, 3 rded (2005) 935-
344.
th Seth e.g., the abstentions of China and the USA with respect to Albania, SCOR
10 yr 705 mtg, 14 Dec 1955 para 29; Hungary, ibid para 33; Romania, ibid para 36;
and Bulgaria, ibid, para 37; and of the USSR with respect to Mauritania, SCOR 16 thyr
971 smtg, 25 Oct 1961 para 228. The admission of Mauritania was as against the
abstentions of twenty members of the General Assembly and the negative votes of
thirteen: GA res 1631 (XVI), 27 Oct 1961; GAOR 16 tsess 1043 plen mtg, 27 Oct 1961
para 195. Mongolia met with no fewer than nine rejections in the Security Council
between 1946 and 1961, and the Council’s ev entual recommendation to admit that State
1287.14. The Interim Accord contains no indication that the Parties
intended the phrase “to object” to mean anything other than a specific,
negative act by Greece in an intern ational organisation. Where the
concept of objection has been applied in international legal relations, it
has meant active conduct, not mere abstention or other withholding of
assent. For example, for a State to ob ject to another State’s reservation to
a treaty it must formulate its objecti on in writing and communicate it to
the con345cting States and other States entitled to become parties to the
treaty. In other situations, too, such as negotiations between two States,
“to object” entails a “formal complain t against… steps taken” by another
party. 346 Merely adducing reasons against some conduct, if not pressed to
the point of outright opposition, does not constitute an objection.
2. Drafting History of the Non-Objection Clause
7.15. The FYROM seeks to transform the obligation of Article 11(1)
into something positive and all-embracing. But the drafters deliberately
rejected an active formulation, acco rding to which Greece would have
been obliged to take affirmative steps—i.e. “to support”—the FYROM’s
applications for membership. The FYROM’s interpretation attempts to
revert to the earlier rejected language.
7.16. The FYROM refers selectively to the drafting history of the
Interim Accord. In particular, it says as follows:
“The replacement of the words ‘endeavour to support’ with
the obligation ‘not to object’ emphasizes the intention of
the drafters to impose a clear, unambiguous and unlimited
obligation on the Respondent in relation to the Applicant’s
membership of international, multilateral and regional
347
organizations and institutions.”
7.17. The change from “endeavour to su pport” to “not to object” took
place between the earliest draft (1 4 May 1993) and the adopted Accord
(13 September 1995). There are at least two deficiencies in the FYROM’s
wathadoptestas against the abstention of the USA and non-participation of China: SCOR
345 yr 971 mtg, 25 Oct 1961 para 70.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Tr eaties, Art. 23(1). See also ILC,
“Guidelines 2.8.4 of the draft guidelines on reservations to treaties provisionally adopted
so far by the Commission”, Report of the International Law Commission of its sixty-first
session, A/64/10, pp 240-241.
346 See, e.g., statement of the Ruler of Qatar, quoted in Case Concerning Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain),
ICJ Reports 2001, p. 40, 78 (para. 120).
347 Memorial, para 4.17.
129analysis of the change. First, the FYROM says that it widened the
obligation—i.e., the change made the obligation “unlimited”. The actual
effect of the change over the course of drafting was just the opposite—i.e.,
its effect was to narrow the obligation. An oblig ation to “endeavour to
support” is an obligation to take some affirmative steps. It necessarily
entails the obligation “not to object”; it would make no sense to require a
State to “endeavour to support” anothe r in the attainment of a stated
objective while permitting the State simultaneously “to object” to it. To
amend the text from “endeavour to support” to “not to object” is to
eliminate the active and affirmative element of the obligation, and to leave
only the passive and negative element. The obligation “not to object,” as
actually incorporated into the In terim Accord, is a purely negative
obligation, entailing refraining from one particular act.
7.18. Second, the FYROM gives only an incomplete account of the
drafting history. In addition to the Vance-Owen draft of 14 May 1993, no
fewer than nine further drafts were considered. 348 Before adoption of the
Interim Accord in 1995, the drafters proposed certain variants on the
language eventually incorporated into Article 11(1).
(a) A draft dated 13 April 1994 apparently contained
no provision at all obliging Greece with respect to
the relations of the FYROM to international
organizations, though this may have been an
incomplete draft.
(b) A draft dated the same month (17 April 1994)
proposed the words: “The Parties will not hamper
each other’s participation in international
organizations.” This would have been an explicitly
reciprocal obligation; a nd it would have been far-
reaching, if somewhat vague: “not [to] hamper”
could be a prohibition on a wide category of
conduct.
(c) A draft of 23 April 1994 included the “not hamper”
clause; it would also have obliged Greece to
“support the full participati on of [the FYROM] in
the CSCE and other European and international
organizations […].” An a lternative version of the
same provision in that dr aft would have obliged
348
For the successive texts see Annex 148. No other documentary record was kept
of the negotiations.
130 Greece to “positively consider supporting the
participation of [the FYROM] in the CSCE and
other European and international organizations.”
There was then a hiatus in the negotiations.
(d) A draft dated 15 March 1995 would have provided
that Greece “shall not im pede or object to [the
FYROM] being admitted to or undertaking
cooperative arrangements with those European and
other multilateral institutions of which [Greece] is a
member.” A further draft (of the same date)
retained this proposed language.
(e) Contrary to the FYROM’s account, the drafters of
the Interim Accord did not proceed from less
extensive to more extensive obligations under what
became Article 11(1). The 15 March 1995 drafts
would have established a more extensive obligation
on Greece: Greece would have been obliged not
only “not to object” but also “not to impede,” and
the obligation would have extended to “cooperative
arrangements,” not only to “applications” or
“memberships.”
(f) A draft dated 4 May 1995 took a somewhat
different form but also cast the obligation in
broader terms than Article 11(1) would eventually
do. In the 4 May 1995 draft, the article would have
read:
“[Greece] agrees (A) not raise any
objection to the application for
membership of [the FYROM] in the
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe; (B) not to
impede, and to remove any objection
to, [the FYROM] undertaking
cooperative arrangements with those
international, multilateral and
regional organizations and
institutions of which [Greece] is a
member; and (C) not to object to the
application for membership of [the
FYROM] in international,
131 multilateral and regional
organizations and institutions of
which [Greece] is a member, which
applications shall be governed by the
regular procedures of those
organizations and institutions.”
(g) A draft dated 23 May 1995 incorporated language
similar to the above and added an early version of
the Safeguard Clause. The Safeguard Clause, in the
23 May 1995 draft, would have applied to parts (A)
and (C), but not to part (B).
(h) A draft dated 21 July 1995 would have provided as
follows:
“Upon entry into force of this
Interim Accord, [Greece] agrees not
to object to the membership of [the
FYROM] in international,
multilateral and regional
organizations and institutions of
which Greece is a member; however,
[Greece] reserves the right to object
to any membership referred to above
if, and to the extent, the provisional
reference under which [the FYROM]
is to be admitted to such
organization or institution differs
from that in paragraph 2 of United
Nations Security Council Resolution
817 (1993).”
(i) A draft of 21 August 1995 changed “agrees not to
object to the membership of” to “agrees not to
object to the application by or the membership of.”
7.19. The drafting history does not su pport the FYROM’s conclusion
that a more extensive obligation was intended to be established under
Article 11(1) than at first proposed. There were variant formulations over
an extended period of drafting and ne gotiation, but in the end, phrases
such as “not hamper,” “support the full participation,” “positively
consider supporting,” “shall not impede or object to,” “not to impede, and
to remove any objection to” were ab andoned in favour of the simple and
limited phrase “agrees not to object.”
1323. Specificity of International Organisations and its Relevance to the
Non-Objection Clause
7.20. The existence of various types of international organisations is
relevant to the interpretation of the Interim Accord. The FYROM would
treat all organisations alike, arguing, as it does, that the Non-Objection
Clause “applies to all international, multilateral and regional organizations
and institutions…” 349 Thus the FYROM seeks to transfer, without textual
justification, the word “any” from the Safeguard Clause to the Non-
Objection Clause. The word “any” in the Safeguard Clause simply means
that Greece preserves its existing right to object in specified circumstances
to the FYROM’s membership in any of the organisations covered by the
Non-Objection Clause. This says nothing as to the scope of application of
the Non-Objection Clause, which does not contain the same unqualified
term.
7.21. More generally the drafting acknowledges the universe of
international organisations to which the Interim Accord would apply: all
350
international organisations and institutions are not alike. The special
obligation in Article 11(1) must be considered in light of the system of
international organisations.
7.22. Each international organisation is established and governed by its
own charter or other constitutive instrument; a central element is the
definition of the membership of the organisation. A constitutive
instrument may define the membership as a closed set of specified States.
Various conventions concerning the management of marine, river and lake
resources take this form. 351 The Treaties of 1960 establishing the
independence of Cyprus, for example, identified Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
and United Kingdom as participants in certain tripartite and quadrilateral
institutional arrangements. 352 If the FYROM sought to participate in such
organizations or institutions, it clearly would be no use to refer to Article
349 Memorial, para 4.24 (emphasis added).
350
351 See above para. 6.56 –6.58.
See, e.g., International Convention fothe High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, 9 May 1952, 205 UNTS 80, Art. II: establishing the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission (USA-Canada- Japan); Statute and Agreement of 22 May
1964: establishing the Lake Chad Basin Commission (originally Cameroon-Chad-Niger-
Nigeria), for which see Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v Nigeria) Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1998, p 275, 305 (para 64).
352 Treaty of Guarantee, London, 16 Aug 1960, UKTS 1961 No. 5; 382 UNTS 3
(Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and United Kingdom , establishing consultative arrangement);
Treaty of Alliance, Nicosia, 16 Aug 1960, 397 UNTS 287 (Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey,
establishing Tripartite Headquarters).
13311(1). FYROM is not eligible to ac cede to them, and Greece’s ob353ation
“not to object” in such cases is irrelevant and inapplicable.
7.23. Other organisations seek to include as members as many States as
seek to participate. A “universal” organisation may not at a given time
include all States, but its membersh ip provisions are open, and such
standards and criteria as the member ship provisions mig354contain the
organisation applies in open and liberal fashion. Admission to the
United Nations now is directed toward s maintaining that organisation as
the universal organisation of States. 355
7.24. International organisations also exist that are neither limited to
particular States designated in the constitutive instrument; nor open to all
States. Among these are certain relativ ely integrated organisations such
as military alliances. Such organisations typically have complex
processes for admission/accession. NATO is an example: an invitation to
accede to the Washington Treaty is subject to rules respecting both
substance and process. The rules de fine specific substantive criteria
which limit the States that NATO may invite to accede. The process is
one of consensus. NATO, and not any individual Member State, extends
or declines to extend an invitation.
7.25. In the interpretation and app lication of Article 11(1), the
differences between the various international organisations and
institutions must be taken into account. There is no evidence at all that
the Interim Accord intended to override the requirements for membership
laid down by the relevant constituent instrument – quite apart from the
point that a bilateral treaty could not in principle do so. And this
conclusion is powerfully reinforced by Article 22 of the Accord, as will
now be demonstrated.
B. The Relevance of Article 22
353
This is in accordance with Article 22 of the Interim Accord, which protects the
application of pre-existing rules, including the rules of such institutions. See above
354agraphs 6.52-6.63.
See definition in Art (1), Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in
Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, 14 March
1975, A/Conf.67/16: “the United Nations, its specialized agencies, the International
Atomic Energy Agency and any similar organization whose membership and
responsibilities are on a worldwide scale.”
355See Aerial Incident of July 25, 1955 (Israel v Bulgaria), Judgment, ICJ Reports
1959, p 127, Joint dissent of Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir
Percy Spender, p.177: “…a Charter laying down the foundations of a universal
community of States organized in the United Nations.”
1347.26. In Chapter 6 of this Counter-M emorial, Greece explained how
Article 22 of the Interim Accord affects the admissibility of the present
proceedings. For many of the same reasons, Article 22 is also decisive for
the merits of the case, should the Court reach them.
1. Article 11(1) Must be Read in Light of Article 22
7.27. The FYROM insists that its dispute concerns only one provision of
the Interim Accord, Article 11(1); in its view the rest of the Accord can be
virtually ignored. This is, as noted earlier, incorrect both factually and
legally. In interpreting and applying the Interim Accord, the Court must
read it as a whole; this is required by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties and is especially important for a treaty with a provision such as
Article 22, which by its terms applies to other provisions within the treaty.
7.28. As also noted in Chapter 6 above, the Parties understood that the
Interim Accord would not operate in a vacuum of rights and obligations.
Both Parties, but particularly Greece as a long-established State, already
participated in a significant number of bilateral and multilateral
instruments, and it was beyond the power of the FYROM and Greece
bilaterally to amend or abrogate le gal positions establ ished previously
with other parties. In acknowledg ment of this web of pre-existing
obligations, the FYROM and Greece ag reed that any obligations which
either of them accepted under the Inte rim Accord would be subordinated
to rights and obligations under each party’s existing bilateral and
multilateral commitments. Article 22 embodies this agreement. Yet,
with respect to Article 22, all that the FYROM has to say is that it
concerns “the Accord’s effect on third states and international
organizations.” 356
7.29. It will be recalled that in the discussion of jurisdiction and
admissibility, it was found to be useful to join, by means of a bracketed
conjunction, the relevant part of the specific provision of Article 11(1) to
the general exception in Article 22(1) in order to hi357ight the legal
consequences. The reconstruction was as follows:
“[…] the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the
application by or the member ship of the Party of the
Second Part in international, multilateral and regional
organizations and institutions of which the Party of the
First Part is a member [… but] this Interim Accord […]
does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from
356
357 See Memorial, para 4.12.
See above para. 6.27.
135 bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that
the parties have conclude d with other States or
international organizations.”
7.30. The implication of Article 22 for the present case is clear.
Because the obligation of Article 11(1) cannot “infringe on any rights and
duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force
that the Parties have concluded w ith other States or international
organizations,” any rights of Greece under NATO, and any obligations
owed to NATO or to the other NATO Member States must prevail in case
of a conflict with the Non-Objection Clause in Article 11(1).
7.31. The point to be emphasised is that a State which is party to an
international organisation, especially one of an integrative character such
as NATO, has responsibilities to the other members of the organisation,
and to the organisation itself. It is called on to exercise its rights and
discharge its duties with respect to decisions taken in the membership
process. For a member State to commit itself in a subsequent bilateral
treaty to disregard the membership arrangements under an existing
multilateral treaty would be a breach of the latter. Article 22 of the
Interim Accord anticipates the potential inter-treaty conflict and prescribes
which shall prevail: the “A ccord [...] does not infringe on the rights and
duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force
that the parties have concluded w ith other States or international
organizations.” There are no exceptions or qualifications to Article 22.
2. Greece’s Rights and Obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty
Prevail over Article 11(1)
7.32. As noted in Chapter 5, NATO is a multilateral, treaty-based
military alliance that operates by consensus. All NATO Member States
sit in the NAC, the supreme body cr eated specifically by the North
Atlantic Treaty and the primary political authority of the Organisation.
7.33. Within the Council, Member States are consulted on matters of
concern to their security and to th e functioning of the Organisation. All
NATO member countries have an equal right to expr ess their views at the
Council table, as well as a duty to engage actively and promptly in
discussions of concern to the Orga nisation. This consultation, and the
discussion that ensues, has been put in place and functions to ensure that
“member countries […] arrive at mu tually acceptable agreements on
collective decision or on action by the Alliance as a whole.” 358 Tothis
358
NATO. NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006, at pp. 38-39: Annex 22.
136end, decisions within NATO are ta ken on the basis of unanimity and
common accord; there is no voting or decision-making by majority.
7.34. This also applies to decisions on NATO enlargement, which are
governed by Arti359 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which has already
been analysed. Accessions are to be a pproved in accordance with a
strict reading of Article 10, by unani mous decision and on a case-by-case
basis.
7.35. Even if there were no general ex ception such as found in Article
22 of the Interim Accord, as a matter of general international law the
application of the Non-Objection Clause without reference to the terms of
the constituent instrument would be unthinkable in an organisation with
complex accession procedures like NATO. In addition to the criteria of
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance may require “specific
360
political commitments in the course of accession negotiations.” The
accession process is described in detail in Chapter 5. One must bear in
mind that even if participation in MA P ultimately leads to membership, it
is only one out of nine steps in the process of attaining NATO
membership.
7.36. Among the substantive accession crit eria established under the
MAP is the requirement that candidate States “settle ethnic disputes or
external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal
jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE
principles and [...] pursue good neighbourly relations.” 361 To have
required Greece to refrain from e xplaining that the FYROM does not
fulfill these criteria would infringe upon Greece’s rights and duties to the
other members and to the Organisation itself.
7.37. The FYROM is obviously conscious of the implications of Article
22 for its case; it seeks to avoid these by unsubstantiated assertion.
Thus,
without even mentioning Article 22, it insists:
“The Respondent’s obligation wa s ‘not to object’: that
obligation applies irrespective of whether its objection
amounted to a veto and irre spective of the effect or
consequence of its objection. Thus, these proceedings are
not concerned in any way with the acts or omissions of any
359The North Atlantic Treaty, art. 10, 4 April 1949.
360Study on NATO Enlargement in: NATO Handbook Documentation, NATO Office of
Information, 1999, para 30, p. 348: Annex 19
361Chapter I para 2 c. The MAP is contained in: Press Release NAC-S(99)66,
Membership Action Plan (MAP), dated 24 April 1999: Annex 21.
137 third States, or with any provisions of the constituent
instrument of NATO or of any other international
organization or institution: the object and subject matter of
these proceedings are exclusivel y related to the actions of
the Respo362nt and their incompatibility with the Interim
Accord.”
7.38. On the contrary – by reason of Article 22 and in any event – the
proceedings do precisely concern the North Atlantic Treaty and associated
legal instruments. Article 22 reserves, and thereby preserves, all the rights
and obligations Greece may have under that treaty and those instruments.
7.39. Thus, even if the Court were to conclude that it had jurisdiction
and that the FYROM’s claim was ad missible, the FYROM’s claim must
fail on the merits. The question for the Court would then be whether
NATO, through its constitutive treaty and associated instruments,
establishes rights and duties for Greece to which Article 22 refers. The
answer to that question is clear. Article 22 operates where there is in
force a multilateral agreement with othe r States or with an organisation;
the North Atlantic Treaty is such an agreement. It prevails over all other
provisions of the Interim Accord. If , Greece, as a member of NATO, had
concluded that it had to object to the FYROM’s application because of the
unresolved difference, its judgment in this matter could not constitute a
violation of the Interim Accord.
C. Greece Did not “Veto” the FYROM’s Accession to NATO
7.40. In fact, Greece did not veto the FYROM’s accession to NATO.
The decision that NATO made in Buch arest with regard to the FYROM’s
future membership was made in accor dance with NATO’s criteria for the
invitation of States to accede to th e North Atlantic Treaty. It was a
collective decision made on behalf of the Alliance as a whole. According
to NATO itself, there was no “Greek veto”, and as such, the Non-
Objection Clause of Article 11(1) cannot apply. This NATO position is
entitled to full deference from the Court. Moreover, as a matter of the law
of responsibility, the conduct of each member State under the
constitutional procedures of the alliance does not engage the member
State’s responsibility an d, so, even if NATO contained a mechanism of
individual veto or obje ction, Greece could not have been internationally
responsible for employing it. These points will be dealt with in turn.
1. The Sequence of Events Leading to NATO’s Bucharest Declaration
362
Memorial, para. 1.8 (emphasis added).
1387.41. The processes leading to NATO’s decisions in regard to new
members at Bucharest were outlined in Chapter 5. The following points
emerge from that account:
1. In the MAP Progress Reports on the FYROM
between 1999 and the Bucharest Summit, NATO
underscored that that State would have to satisfy the
criterion of good neighbourly relations and it would
have to resolve all outsta nding bilateral issues with
any Member State of the Alliance, before NATO
could start the accession process for the FYROM.
2. Fulfilment of all criteria for invitation to accede to
the North Atlantic Treaty is not a guarantee of an
invitation; the Member States are still obliged to
exercise judgment as to whether or not to invite an
aspirant State fulfilling the explicit criteria.
3. It was a general concern of NATO that the
difference concerning the name of the FYROM
persisted. Settlement of the difference concerning
the name was required to be on a “mutually
acceptable” basis.
4. The 9th MAP Progress Report identified the
difference concerning the name as an issue
affecting good neighbourly relations.
5. On 23 January 2008, at the last meeting of the NAC
before the Bucharest Summit, several Member
States stressed that a mutually agreed solution on
the name issue should be found.
6. As at the opening of the Bucharest Summit
meeting, the difference had not been settled.
7. NATO determined that the FYROM, in light of the
continued difference concer ning the name of that
State, had not fulfilled the criteria. This was the
decision, and the only decision, taken with regard to
the FYROM’s request to accede.
139 8. The consensus process which led to the Summit
Declaration at Buchar est entailed a common
accord, achieved through the consultative efforts of
all the Member States.
9. As in all decision-maki ng at the level of the NAC
on possible invitations to accession, there was no
voting or majority decisi on. As such, there was no
dissenting minority. Nor was there any veto by any
Member State in the Council.
10. The resultant Summit Declaration at Bucharest was
an act of NATO, not of a subset of its Members,
nor could it have been ot herwise: any such NATO
act is an act of the Alliance as a whole.
11. A Member State in NATO may adopt a reservation
to exclude itself from particular clauses of a
Declaration or Communiqué. The Bucharest
363
Summit Declaration contained no reservation.
Paragraph 20 of the Declaration reflects that the
decision concerning the accession aspirations of the
FYROM was reached by consensus.
12. The Declaration was clear in its message that the
FYROM is not precluded fr om invitation to accede
in the future, once the name issue has been
resolved.
7.42. In order to appreciate these facts from a legal point of view, it is
necessary to stress agai n the special character of NATO as an alliance.
NATO is an integrated international Organisation. The North Atlantic
Treaty constituted NATO as the chie f military organisation providing for
the defence of Western Europe and th e North Atlantic area. The Alliance
has, since its formation, existed to promote particular policies and to
perform particular functions, in the military, political, and economic
fields. It has determined its ow n processes by which other States,
committed to the promotion of its policies and contributing to the
performance of its functions, may be selectively invited to accede to the
North Atlantic Treaty and thereby become Alliance Members. The
363
In a footnote, the Communiqué simply recalls that Turkey has recognised the
FYROM under its constitutional name.
140specific character of NATO is to be understood especially in light of its
integrated structure, the activities th is structure is employed to carry out,
and the controls the Alliance exercises over its enlargement.
7.43. To summarise, as the FYROM itself observes, “[t]he process for
364
NATO accession is complex […].” The process is one of accession
following invitation, not admission following application. It entails
discussions between the Alliance and the aspirant State, which may
extend over time and may lead to various reform and integration
initiatives, as preparation for a po ssible future invitation. The Alliance
would decline an invitation to an y aspirant State not meeting the
requirements of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
7.44. The FYROM argues, in effect, that under the Interim Accord it is
entitled, as far as Greece is concerned, to accede to NATO. “Importantly,
the Interim Accord also provided for th e Applicant to join the family of
nations and to become an active member of the international
365
community.” But the two parties to the Interim Accord did not have the
power, jointly or severally, to dispense with the multilaterally-established
requirements for participation in international organisations. Article 22 of
the Interim Accord makes it clear that they understood and affirmed this.
The FYROM was no more entitled vi s-à-vis Greece to accede to NATO
than it was entitled to do so vis-à-vis NATO itself. But Greece was—and
remains—entitled to point out defi ciencies in the FYROM’s conduct
which, in its view, make it ineligible to be admitted to an organisation or,
in the case of the NATO Alliance, to receive an invitation to accede. It
was for the Member States, acting in accordance with the relevant
constituent instrument, to decide colle ctively whether to give effect to
these observations or not.
2. The Role of Greece in the NATO Enlargement Process
7.45. Specifically in terms of the Bucharest meeting, Article 11(1) of the
Interim Accord did not impair Greece’s right under Article 10 of the
North Atlantic Treaty to form a judgment as to the readiness of an aspirant
for invitation to the Alliance. It was (and is) Greece’s right and obligation
under the North Atlantic Treaty to do so. The judgment of Greece with
respect to the FYROM’s candidacy to NATO in 2008 was made clear: the
failure to achieve a negotiated settle ment of the difference concerning the
name indicated serious questions ab out the effects FYROM membership
would have on Alliance solidarity. Th is was not a judgment reached in
364
365 Memorial, para 5.50.
Memorial, para 4.13.
141isolation, still less one pressed to a vot e. It was a view shared by other
member States, and it was articulated by the Alliance as a whole.
7.46. Speaking of the Bucharest meeting, the then U.S. Secretary of
366
State noted that NATO is a “consensus organization […].” Likewise
the NATO Secretary-General stressed that “NATO does not know the
word veto.” 367 Secretary General Scheffer’s repeated observations to that
effect are entitled to great deferen ce as an authoritative reflection of
NATO practice.
7.47. NATO is free to establish such rules as its Members agree,
including rules controlling invitati on to membership, and these rules
establish rights and duties which, as made clear in Article 22 of the
Interim Accord, are legally unaffected by subsequent bilateral bargains.
NATO’s assertion of its autonomy is c onsistent with general international
law as it relates to organisation membership and it is expressly preserved,
through the medium of the rights and obligations of the Member States,
by Article 22 of the Interim Accord.
3. The Consensus Processes of NA TO at Bucharest Did not Engage
Greece’s International Responsibility
7.48. In its Summit Declaration adopted at Bucharest, NATO said as
follows:
“We recognise the hard work and the commitment
demonstrated by the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to NATO values and Alliance operations. We
commend them for their efforts to build a multi-ethnic
society. Within the framew ork of the UN, many actors
have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the
Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not
produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that
an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually
acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.
We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without
366 Memorial, para 2.55.
367 Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer after the
informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, with Invitees with non NATO ISAF
Contributing Nations, Cracow, Poland, dated 19 February 2009, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090219c.html: Annex 33, quoted in full in
paragraph 5.14 above.
142 delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as
possible.” 368
7.49. This is not conduct of Greece; it is a statement of NATO. The
Declaration, consistent with SC re s 817 (1993) and Article 5(1) of the
Interim Accord, identifies the bilatera l negotiating process as the proper
mechanism for achieving a final set tlement of the difference concerning
the name. It was the absence of “a mutually acceptable solution” to the
difference, as at April 2008, that led the Alliance, as an organisation, to
decide to remain seized of the candidacy of th e FYROM, rather than
move forward immediately to an invitation.
7.50. The FYROM argues that this NATO decision was caused by
Greece’s objection and that Greece’s objection was in breach of Article
11(1). It says that conduct of Gr eece “prevented the Applicant from
receiving an invitation to proc eed with membership of NATO.” 369 But
this fails to take into account th e following propositions, established in
this Counter-Memorial:
(a) NATO itself, through its S ecretary General, denies
that there was a Greek ve to (see above, paragraph
5.14). This is supported by the fact that there was a
decision, duly reached by consensus—370eit not the
decision the FYROM wished for.
(b) The reason given by NATO for the decision was
the absence of any resolution of the difference over
the applicant’s name (see above, paragraphs 5.38 –
5.47).
(c) That difference, and the failure to resolve it despite
extensive efforts, were (and remain) relevant to the
criteria for NATO membership. They are matters
which the NATO Members were entitled to take
into account in making their decision. As a military
368 NATO Press Release (2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the
Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
369ncil in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, paragraph 20 : Memorial, Annex 65.
370 Memorial, para 1.1.
By contrast, when a proposed Security Council resolution is vetoed, no decision
is reached or recorded; the draft resolution is simply not adopted. See e.g. tth 1975 draft
resolthion which would have recommended admission of South Korea, SCOR 30 yr
1834 mtg, 6 Aug 1975 p 2 para 5 (7-6:2); and, the same year, the draft resolution which
would have recommended admission of North Viet Nam, SCOR 30 thyr 1836 mtg, 11
Aug 1975 p 12 para 105 (13-1:1).
143 alliance, NATO could reasonably take the view that
it should not invite as a new Member a State with
which such a difference subsisted.
(d) Having regard in particular to Article 22 of the
Interim Accord, Greece was not debarred under
international law from drawing the attention of its
Alliance partners to the facts summarised above.
Greece having done so, it was for NATO as a
whole to appreciate the situation.
7.51. If Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord had required Greece to
support a FYROM application for NAT O membership irrespective of
whether FYROM was qualified for admission, then the FYROM could
have presented the following syllogism:
Premise 1. The FYROM applied for membership.
Premise 2. Greece did not support the application.
Ergo: Greece breached Article 11(1).
But as has been demonstrated, this is not what Article 11(1) says,
especially when read in the light of Article 22.
7.52. Instead the position as concerns NATO is far more complex. The
FYROM’s claim would have to be as reflected in the following syllogism:
Premise 1. The FYROM was in all respects qualified to
be invited to accede to NATO, despite the fact that the
difference over the name was not resolved.
Premise2. Greece nonetheless objected, and for that
reason the FYROM was not invited.
Ergo : Greece breached Article 11(1).
In short the FYROM has to establish that, despite the ongoing difference,
it was qualified to be invited, and that it was only because of Greece’s
obduracy that it was not invited. But th is raises fundamental difficulties,
legally as well as factually.
7.53. As to premise 1, there was no decision by NATO that the FYROM
was in all respects qualified to be invited to accede to NATO. On the
contrary, there was a decision that it was not yet qualified because of the
subsisting difference over the name. W ith great respect, the Court cannot
second-guess that decision, or construe it as (or as evidencing) a qui
te
different decision – that the FYROM was in truth qualified and that a
144Greek veto was the solitary impediment to an invitation. Moreover, in
order to appreciate the situation in t hose terms, the Court would be called
on to decide the rights and wrongs of the difference concerning the name
– a matter clearly non-justiciable under Article 21(2) of the Interim
Accord. Premise 1 is wrong in fact; in law it is doubly non-justiciable.
7.54. As to premise 2, much the same situation arises. Greece was
entitled under Article 22 of the Interim Accord to bring to the attention of
its Alliance partners any deficiency in the conduct of the FYROM which
was relevant to the latter’s qualifications to be invited to become a NATO
member. 371 In order to decide that Greece had done more – had objected
to an invitation notwithst anding the FYROM’s qualification to be invited
– similar decisions would have to be made by the Court. Was the
FYROM qualified? (This is for NATO as a collective to decide.) Did the
failure to invite result from a Greek veto? (The Secretary-General of
NATO has repeatedly denied it.) Premise 2 is wrong in fact and cannot be
established as a matter of law.
7.55. In an attempt to avoid these di fficulties, the FYROM’s argument
presents still further difficulties. The FYROM asserts that “the dispute
[…] is concerned exclusively with the meaning and effect of Article 11(1)
of the Interim Accord in respect of actions that are attributable to the
Respondent.” 372 It claims to be “concerned only with the international
responsibility of the Respondent, arising out of the actions attributable to
373
it in relation to its objection to th e Applicant’s membership of NATO.”
But, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the acts of a Member State taken
within and under the internal d ecision-making procedures of an
international organization are not capa374 of establishing the international
responsibility of the Member State.
7.56. To conclude, the process of evaluating States for possible
invitation to NATO is part of the “decision-making process of the
organization according to [its] pertinent rules.” 375 Participation in that
process cannot attract the international responsibility of Greece.
371See above, paragraphs 6.52-6.63.
372 Memorial, para. 3.12. See also ibid., para 6.6: “To be clear… the Applicant is
concerned only with the international responsibility of the Respondent, arising out of the
actions attributable to it in relation to its objection to the Applicant’s membership in
373O.”
374 Memorial, para. 6.6.
375 See above, paragraphs 6.83.-6.94.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, 2009,
commentary to Art 57, para. (2), in Report of the International Law Commission, 61st
Session, A/64/10, 2009, p. 160.
145 III. THE SAFEGUARD CLAUSE AND ITS POTENTIAL
APPLICATION AT BUCHAREST
7.57. It will be recalled that the “not to object” obligation which Greece
assumed in the first sentence of Arti cle 11(1) of the Interim Accord was
subject to two qualifications, one speci fic to Article 11(1) (the Safeguard
Clause) and one of general application to the entire Interim Accord
(Article 22). The Safeguard Clause preserves Greece’s “right to object to
any membership” in the following terms:
“[…] however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right
to object to any membership referred to above if and to the
extent the Party of the Second Pa rt is to be referred to in
such organization or institu tion differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution
817 (1993).”
For the reasons set out below, the Safe guard Clause serves as a complete
exoneration for Greece on the merits of this case, were it to be found that
Greece had “object[ed] to the applica tion by or the membership of” the
FYROM to NATO in a manner prima facie contrary to the Non-Objection
Clause.
7.58. This Part will deal with the Safeguard Clause under the following
rubrics:
● first, it will consider the ordinary meaning of the
Safeguard Clause, in light of its object and purpose
as a safeguard of the provisional regime of the
Interim Accord, its drafting history, and the lack of
procedural preconditions for its invocation (Section
IIIA);
● secondly, it will consider the FYROM’s contention
that its own unilateral practice has negated the
clause as a safeguard of Greece’s rights (Section
IIIB);
● thirdly, it will discuss the conduct of the FYROM
which has been in disregar d of SC res 817 (1993),
in disregard of its own agreement that the
difference concerning its name must be negotiated
with Greece, and in disr egard of the understanding
that it is to be referred to by the provisional name in
multilateral organisations until a mutually agreed
settlement is reached (Section IIIC).
146In consequence, Greece would have been entitled by virtue of the
Safeguard Clause to oppose th e FYROM’s NATO candidacy at
Bucharest.
A. Interpretation of the Safeguard Clause
1. The Language of the Safeguard Clause
7.59. According to the FYROM, the Safeguard Clause “specifies the
solitary, exceptional condition on which the Respondent may object
376
[…].” But apart from the grammatically erroneous assertion that the
Safeguard Clause is an exception as distinct from an independent
qualifier, the FYROM’s analysis of the Safeguard Clause is sparse. It is
helpful to address this deficiency by considering in tu rn the component
elements of the clause.
“if and to the extent that…”
7.60. This composite phrase “if and to the extent that” is significant.
Grammatically the word “if” would have been sufficient. The FYROM
implies that the Safeguard Clause has no application to events within an
organisation or institution which has admitted it under the provisional
name. 377 It studiously ignores the fact that, foll owing its admission to
certain organisations, the FYROM has sometimes been referred to other
than as set out in SC res 817 (1993). But there must be no practice of
referring to the FYROM differently, ev en to some extent; otherwise the
Safeguard Clause is triggered. To the extent that there is any defection
from the provisional name regime, as set out in SC res 817 (1993) and
incorporated into Article 11(1) by reference, the overall relations of the
parties are affected and the defection may be taken into account by Greece
in determining whether the Safeguard Clause applies to a new
membership application or request to accede.
“is to be referred to…”
7.61. Grammatically the phrase “is to be referred to” is significant in
two ways.
7.62. First, the phrase is in the passive voice; it does not specify by
whom the FYROM “is to be referred to […].” Especially when compared
to earlier formulations, this supports the interpretation that it is not only
the international organisation itself which is to refer to the FYROM under
that name but that the FYROM itself must do so.
376
377 Memorial, para 4.21.
See, e.g., Memorial, paras 4.32, 5.9.
1477.63. Secondly, the future tense (“is to be”) is used. This implies a
continuing situation, a position fully consistent with the idea of an interim
period during the whole of which the situation prescribed by SC res 817
(1993) is to obtain. The Interim Acco rd, as an instrument adopted to
stabilise relations for the duration of negotiations pending final settlement
of the difference over the name, protect s Greece’s interest in the process
by which that settlement is reached. If the FYROM “is to be referred to”
in the future differently, this is a concern to Greece, because such
reference would tend to establish as a fait accompli a new name without
Greece’s participation in an agreed bilateral settlement. Until that time,
Greece retains the right to object if the FYROM “is to be referred to”
other than as designated.
7.64. There is a further implication to be drawn from the use of the
future tense. It will only be after the FYROM’s admission to a given
organisation, and only as events unfold in that organisation, that it will be
clear by what name or designation the FYROM will be referred to, and to
what extent. Yet the Non-Objection Clause applies, by definition, before
admission or accession. Thus Greece will necessarily have to estimate,
based in particular on th e attitude of the FYROM, whether and to what
extent the condition comprised in the Sa feguard Clause is to be met. If
and to the extent that the FYROM proc laims its freedom to refer to itself
by its constitutional name in an organisation, and to require its officials to
do so even when occupying positions within the organisation, then the
Safeguard Clause will apply.
“in such organization or institution”
7.65. The words “…in such organiza tion or institution…” are also
significant. Just as the passive constr uction “is to be referred to” has the
effect of including the c onduct of all relevant acto rs, so the choice of the
proposition “in” has the effect of including all conduct taking place in
each relevant organization or instituti on. If the intent of the Safeguard
Clause had been to cover only the organization’s own conduct, it woul
d
have read “ by the organization”, not “ in the organization”. Indeed, an
earlier draft of the Safeguard Clause had been limited in precisely this
way, as will be seen. Moreover, if all that mattered had been the formal
designation by the organization, the qualifier “to the extent that” would
have been unnecessary.
“differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security
Council resolution 817 (1993)”
7.66. The final phrase incorporates by reference the language of
paragraph 2 of SC res 817 (1993). Th at paragraph – it will be recalled –
148reads as follows: “this State being provisionally referred to for all
purposes within the United Nations as […].” Three points stand out.
● First, the term used is not “by” the United Nations
but “within” the United Nations. Debates,
statements, etc take place within the United
Nations, whether or not the statements made or
designations employed are attributable to it. When
a delegate of another State refers to the Applicant
by its constitutional name in the General Assembly,
this is action “within” the United Nations, though
not “by” the United Nations.
● Second, the phrase “for all purposes” is as broad as
it could be. It associates the United Nations and its
Members (on whose behalf, under Article 25 of the
Charter, the Security Council acts) with the
principle of an interim period, and a provisional
arrangement agreed for that period. In this respect
it should be recalled that th e International Court of
Justice is the principal judi cial organ of the United
Nations: what happens before the Court happens
“within the United Nations.”
● Third, the incorporation by reference relates to
practice in any and all organisations to which
Article 11(1) is applicable, not just to the United
Nations system. This follows from the construction
of the Safeguard Clause and its grammatical
connection to the Non-Objection Clause.
7.67. To conclude, the FYROM in effect reads the Safeguard Clause as
follows: “with the solitary exception that [Greece] reserves the right to
object to any membership referred to above if [the FYROM] is to be
designated by such organisation diffe rently than by the designation in
paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”. This is –
evidently – not what the carefully ne gotiated clause says. Rather, Greece
retains the right to object to membership in an organisation if and to the
extent that that State is to be referred to for any purpose within the
organisation other than as the FYROM.
2. The Object and Purpose of the Safeguard Clause
7.68. This conclusion accords with the object and purpose of the
Safeguard Clause. SC res 817 (1993) re quires that the Applicant State be
149“provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations” as
the FYROM. The provisional designation of the FYROM under SC res
817 (1993) is central to the balancing arrangement of the Interim Accord.
It is incorporated by reference in Article 11(1) and applies to any
membership referred to in the N on-Objection Clause. The Interim
Accord, as explained in Chapter 3 above, was adopted to establish and
preserve a “holding operation” pending final settlement of the difference
concerning the name. Inherent in this, any new situation or event
prejudicial to the outcome of that settlement is inimical to the balance
struck. If Article 11(1) contained only the obligation of Greece “not to
object,” then Greece would have no means to respond to conduct in
international organisations which was inconsistent with the principle of an
interim period. The conduct of an international organisation, and of States
in an international organisation, can have significant effects on the
crystallisation of particul ar statuses or situatio ns. Faced with conduct
which suggests that the permanent na me of the FYROM has been settled
without regard to the bilateral settlement process, Greece’s right to react is
preserved. The Safeguard Clause is an essential protection, established so
that Greece is not prevented from taki ng steps to preserve the balance of
interests which it is the design of the Interim Accord as a whole to
preserve.
7.69. The grammatical structure of Artic le 11(1) reflects its object and
purpose. The reservation in Article 11(1) is formed by a second clause,
set off from the first by a semicolon and by the qualifier “however.” The
two clauses are grammatically of co-ordinate value. The Safeguard
Clauses is not formulated as an exception; it is not a subordinate clause
but a self-contained sentence of weight equal to the Non-Objection
Clause. Whatever the scope of orga nisations and institutions covered by
the Non-Objection Clause, the Safeguard Clause applies over the Non-
Objection Clause in its entirety. Th e obligation of Greece “not to object”
is directly correlated with the provision of SC res 817 (1993) by which is
specified the provisional designation of the FYROM “for all purposes.” If
the provisional designation is ignored, the overall scheme of the Interim
Accord is disrupted, and the Safeguard Clause applies.
3. The Drafting History of the Safeguard Clause
7.70. This interpretation is also confirmed by the drafting history. The
last two drafts show that the parties considered limiting the Safeguard
Clause to the situation where the organisation itself referred to the
FYROM differently. The contrast between the final text and these two
immediately preceding drafts supports the wider interpretation.
1507.71. Drafts of 21 July 1995 and 21 August 1995 would have phrased
the Safeguard Clause as follows:
“however, [Greece] reserves the right to object to any
membership referred to a bove if, and to the extent, the
provisional reference under wh ich [the FYROM] is to be
admitted to such organization or institution differs from
that in paragraph 2 of Unite d Nations Security Council
Resolution 817 (1993).” (Emphasis added)
The adopted text changes the final part of the clause to read as follows:
“…if and to the extent [the FYROM] is to be referred to in
such organization or institution differently […].”
(Emphasis added)
7.72. This is a material change. In the earlier versions (21 July/21
August 1995), the reservation app lied only where the “provisional
reference under which [the FYROM] is to be admitted” differs from the
Security Council designation. The phrase “provisional reference under
which [the FYROM] is to be admitted” denotes an official reference by
the international organization or institution. Only the organisation admits
a new Member State. So the expression “provisional reference” in those
drafts would have meant a referen ce adopted by the organisation—not a
reference by a Member State. The final language covers a considerably
wider set of situations. It adds a fu ture orientation (“…is to be referred
to…differently,” rather th an the present tense “differs”); and it expands
the text not only to include formal designations by the organisation or
institution but also to include the si tuation in which the FYROM is to be
referred to “in such organization or institution differently […].”
4. Non-Existence of Procedural Conditions for the Safeguard Clause to
Operate
7.73. Though the FYROM interprets the Safeguard Clause to cover very
little ratione materiae, it asserts that it contains a considerable procedural
element. In the FYROM’s interpretation, the Safeguard Clause operates
only if a formal statement is filed by Greece announcing that the relevant
condition exists, and this procedure is subject to a time-limit. That is to
say, according to the FYROM, Gr eece may act under the Safeguard
Clause only if it takes certain formal st eps to do so prior to objecting. In
the FYROM’s view, not only is the available ground for objection narrow
both as to its content and its timi ng, but the ground of action must be
151announced beforehand or it has no effect. 378 The FYROM’s interpretation
of the Safeguard Clause in both respects is incorrect.
The so-called critical date
7.74. The FYROM makes a great deal of the date 3 April 2008, the day
when NATO at the Bucharest Summit reached its decision on the
accession of Albania and Croatia. It even refers to 3 April 2008 as the
“critical date” for purposes of this dispute. Referring to Pulau Ligitan and
379
Pulau Sipadan, it argues that statements made by Greece after 3 April
2008 are not to be taken into consideration by the Court. But Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan involved – as many another case where the
critical date was in issue – an analysis of effectivités undertaken to
determine competing territorial clai ms. The dispute here concerns a
clause of a bilateral treaty which of its own force preserves certain
situations from an obligation “not to object.” The Safeguard Clause sets
as its condition that the FYROM “is to be referred to” differently from its
SC res 817 (1993) designation. Hist orical questions entailed by a
territorial dispute are fundamentally different from the question whether
the Safeguard Clause under Article 11(1) applies. The former concern
evidence of a pre-existing legal title, not the exercise of a reserved right
which, under the treaty, is not subject to any procedural condition.
Putative requirement of formal notice
7.75. The FYROM says that there was no instance of Greece “formally
alleging” th380the FYROM is in breach of the Interim Accord before 3
April 2008. According to the FYROM: “At no time did the Respondent
seek to justify its objection on the ground that the Applicant would be
referred to in NATO differently than in paragraph 2 of the United Nations
381
Security Council resolution 817 (1993)[…].” As is shown in Chapter 4,
in truth Greece did make claims be fore 3 April 2008 relevant to the
Safeguard Clause of Article 11(1). But in any event the absence of a prior
claim is irrelevant.
7.76. In principle, whether a State can exercise a right reserved to it
under international law or a treat y, and not subject to any express
procedural precondition, depends onl y on whether the right actually
exists, and not on considerations of form. A legal right exists independent
378 See, e.g., Memorial, paras 5.11-5.12.
379 Memorial, para 1.9, quoting Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia v Malaysia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p 682 (para 135).
380 Memorial, para 1.10.
381 Memorial, para 1.5. See also ibid., paras 1.7; 2.60, 2.68.
152of any express recital at the time of its exercise. In Nicaragua, a bilateral
treaty could be relied on even though not mentioned in the Application or
in the prior communications between the parties. 382 In Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros, countermeasures were first pl eaded as a defence by Slovakia
in the second round of the written pl eadings, yet the Court considered the
defence. 383 The present case is a fortiori, concerning as it does a right
expressly reserved.
7.77. Article 11(1) may be contrasted in this respect with Article 7(3).
Under Article 7(3): “[i]f either Pa rty believes one or more symbols
constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the
other Part, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party
[…].” This is a relatively simple treaty mechanism, but it nevertheless
establishes that one Party must give notice in order to trigger the other
Party’s obligation to respond. 384 No such notice requirement is contained
385
in Article 11(1). At the point in time when Greece exercises the
reserved right, either the condition for invoking the Safeguard Clause is
satisfied (in which case Greece can object) or it is not.
B. Subsequent Practice of the Pa rties and the Application of the
Safeguard Clause
7.78. The FYROM argues that the subsequent practice of the parties to
the Interim Accord establishes a diffe rent and narrower interpretation of
the Safeguard Clause of Article 11(1). Specifically, it argues that:
(i) the FYROM “has joined a significant number of
organizations… having applied using its constitutional
386
name…”;
382
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States of America), Judgment of 28 Nov 1984, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ
Reports 1984, p 392, 428 (para 83). See also ibidJudgment of 27 June 1986 (Merits),
ICJ Reports 1986, p 14, 31 (para 43); Counter-Memorial of the United States of America
(Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 17 Aug 1984, p 51 (para 169).
383 Gabčíkovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment , ICJ Reports
1997, p 7, 55 (para 82); Counter-Memorial of Slovakia, 5 Dec 1994, pp 347-53 (paras
11.54-11.74).
384
The FYROM refers to “specific proced ures” under Article 7, paragraph 3:
Memorial, para 2.32. Article 7, paragraph 3 “prescribes a remedial process…”:
385orial, para 5.16.
The FYROM notes that other provisions of the Interim Accord establish no
formal requirements to the exer cise of rights under its terms: “The Interim Accord does
not impose any procedural requirements to be followed by the Applicant before the
exercise of its right of recourse to the Court under its Article 21…” Memorial, para 3.15.
386 Memorial, para 4.32.
153 (ii) after admission to these organisations, the FYROM
has “thereafter [been] provisionally referred to in the
manner set out in resolution 817”; 387
(iii) besides during its app lications to international
organisations, the FYROM “has continued to refer to itself
by its constitutional name […], ” in388ding in its relations
with international organisations.
It concludes that “[i]n short, there is no question that, in the context of
NATO, the Applicant’s process towards membership was fully in
accordance with the requirements of resolution 817.” 389
7.79. In its Memorial, the FYROM acknowledges that it has no intention
of complying with the actu al terms of SC res 817 ( 1993). It justifies this
position in the following way:
“Significantly, the Resolution [817] did not require the
Applicant to call itself ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’, and the Applicant never agreed to refer to
itself as such. Consequently, in accordance with resolution
817 and without raising any di fficulties with the United
Nations Secretariat, the Applicant has always used its
constitutional name in writt en and oral communications
390
with the United Nations, its members and officials.
In accepting the terms of resolution 817, the Applicant
agreed “to be referred to” under the provisional designation
within the United Nations, but was not fettering its
sovereign right to call itself by its constitutional name, as
made clear by the Applicant during the negotiation process.
Consequently, in accordance with resolution 817, the
Applicant has continued to call itself by its constitutional
name in written and oral co mmunication with the United
391
Nations and its Member States.”
7.80. An initial comment is that the A pplicant is much concerned not to
fetter its own sovereign ri ghts, but it shows no equi valent concern for the
sovereign rights of Greece, expressly preserved in the Safeguard Clause
and by Article 22.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
389 Memorial, para 4.32.
390 Ibid., para 2.20 (emphasis in original).
391 Ibid., para 5.65 (emphasis added).
1547.81. That being said, the argument seem s to be that since Greece has
tolerated the FYROM referring to itself by its constitutional name in the
United Nations, and under the two Memoranda of 13 September 1995, 392
this constitutes practice of the parties supportive of a restrictive
interpretation of the Safeguard Clause. To this argument there are at least
three answers.
1. The Requirements for Subsequent Practice
7.82. An initial point is linguistic: if the FYROM applies to international
organisations under its constitutional name, it is at that point by definition
not “in” or “within” the or ganisation. It is only after admission that the
requirement to use the provisional designation applies, as the phrase “is to
be referred to” in Article 11(1), indicates. In fact, the FYROM in all
instances has been admitted under th e provisional designation, not under
its constitutional name.
7.83. Turning to the post-admission practice in international
organisations, the FYROM argues that it “has continued to refer to itself
by its constitutional name […],” including in its relations with
international organisations, 393and that this practice has to be taken into
account in the interpretation of Article 11(1).
7.84. Under international law, the Interim Accord, like any treaty, is to
be “interpreted in good faith in acco rdance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.” 394 The “context” for the purpose of the interpretation
of a treaty includes, inter alia, “any agreement relating to the treaty which
was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the
treaty…” 395 These provisions were adopted by the ILC in 1966 and
incorporated into the Vienna Convention without substantial
396
amendment. Itisalsopartofthege neral rule of interpretation of
treaties that there shall be taken into account “any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
397
regarding its interpretation.”
392
393 Memorial, para 2.36; for the Memoranda, see Memorial Annexes 3 & 4.
394 Memorial, para 4.32.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art
3951).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31(2)(a).
396 Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1966 Vol. II p 217.
397 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31 (3)(b).
1557.85. The FYROM suggests that its use of its constitutional name in
applying to various organisations, and its continued insistence on the use
of the constitutional name within t hose organisations, act to curtail the
scope of the Safeguard Clause. 398 According to this theory, the FYROM’s
subsequent unilateral practice governs the interpretation of the Interim
399
Accord. Moreover, notwithstanding the drafting history and text, the
FYROM says that the Safeguard Clause covers only the situation in which
the organisation itself refers to the FYROM other than by the SC res 817
(1993) designation. The FYROM asse rts that the FYROM would have
been properly designated “in” NATO; and concludes from this that the
Safeguard Clause did not apply with respect to the FYROM’s NATO
candidacy. 400
7.86. In support of this theory, th e FYROM relies heavily on the
practical arrangements for bilatera l communications and relations,
referred to in Article 12 of the Interim Accord and elaborated in ancillary
agreements (i.e., the Memorandum on ‘Practical Measures’ a401the
Memorandum Related to the Interim Agreement). Under the two
Memoranda, the FYROM has referred to itself under its constitutional
name, while Greece has used the SC res 817 (1993) name. But the
question is not how the FYROM refers to itself in bilateral relations, or
whether the Interim Accord permits the FYROM to refer to itself by its
constitutional name, for purposes other than those of Article 11. The
Interim Accord made separate and distinct arrangements for (a) bilateral
or inter se relations of the parties and (b ) the relations of FYROM with
international, multilateral and regional institutions. It is obviously invalid
to draw inferences from the former as regard the latter. A practical
accommodation by Greece in the form of measures concerning
nameplates, letterhead, and forms of address is not the same thing as
relinquishing a retained right under the Safeguard Clause of Article 11(1).
Moreover, no-one reading the Memo randa of 1995 would infer Greek
acquiescence in any definitive use of the constitutional name.
2. Practice in International Organizations
7.87. Turning to practice specifically related to Article 11(1), Article
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention re quires that the subsequent practice
has to be such as to “establish[] the agreement of the parties regarding
[the] interpretation” of the treaty provision in question. Unilateral
398 See, e.g., Memorial, para 4.32.
399 See paras 7.73-7.75 above.
400 Memorial, para 1.8.
401 Memorial, paras 2.36, 4.32, and 5.67.
156practice by one party to a bilateral treaty does not establish any
agreement, even if accompanied by silence from the other party.
Agreements are not made by silence, and this is particularly the case
where there is no duty to respond. The Safeguard Clause is a preservation
of rights: if it is triggered Greece may object, but it is not obliged to do so.
FYROM’s argument based on an alleged agreement is tantamount to an
argument that Greece has tacitly relinqui shed the right expressly reserved
in Article 11(1). There has obviously been no such relinquishment.
7.88. Moreover practice under an interim agreement has particular
characteristics. States enter into interim agreements in order to facilitate a
final settlement and to avoid aggravating the dispute pending such
settlement. The interim agreement ha ving been concluded, the need for a
continued blizzard of protest notes should abate. The long-term positions
of both sides are re served; their legal relations during the interim period
are as defined in the interim agreem ent. In the absence of a final
settlement there must be a strong presumption against a modification of
the interim regime. The FYROM asserts, without producing the slightest
documentary evidence in support, that it has “never agreed to call itself”
by that designation in international, multilateral and regional institutions,
and that it remains f402 to dispen se with the Security Council’s
designation at will. In effect, it argues that its silence in 1995 implied a
reservation of rights on its part. By contrast Greece, which insisted on an
express safeguard clause in the broad terms already analysed, is treated as
having forfeited the right to act by its silence on sundry occasions. This is
typical of the unilateral and unsupported assertions of the FYROM in the
present case. It would be surprising if, for purposes of Article 11, Greece
alone must be taken to have made definitive concessions.
3. Greece has in Fact Given Notice that the FYROM’s Conduct is not
in Accordance with the Interim Accord
7.89. Further, it should be stressed that Greece has objected to uses of a
name other than the provisional designation mandated by SC res 817
(1993). As noted already, it did so, for example, in 2007 when a FYROM
national, serving as Pr esident of the UN General Assembly, in that
capacity referred to the FYROM’s President as “the President of the
403
Repub404 of Macedonia.” That prov405d a Greek protest from the
floor and subsequently in writing. Other examples of protest are
402 Ibid., para 2.20.
403 The President (Mr Kerim): United Nations, Official Records of the General
Assembly, Sixty Second Session, 4Plenary Meeting, doc. A/62/PV.4 at p 27: Annex 5.
404 Mr Mourikis (Greece): ibid. at p 27.
157 406
annexed. Even if there may have been occasions when Greece
refrained from protesting, its position on the name issue has from the first
been well known, and silence on so me occasions does not entail an
abandonment of rights.
4. Conclusion on Subsequent Practice
7.90. As set out in this Counter-Mem orial, the FYROM’s conduct since
adoption of the Interim Accord has contained notable instances of non-
performance. The sum of this conduct would suggest that the FYROM
seeks to ignore and put an end to the “holding operation” which it is a
principal object and purpose of the In terim Accord to maintain pending
final settlement – in effect, to intrude a permanent settlement by stealth
under cover of an interim agreement. Greece has never accepted any such
position. The ILC, in recognising th e significance of the subsequent
practice of the parties as part of th e general rule of interpretation of
treaties, was clear that each party “should have407cepted the practic
e” if
any interpretative consequence was to flow. Greece, like any party to a
bilateral treaty, does not waive its rights, clearly established by treaty,
except by expressing its intention unambiguously to do so. 408
C. Greece was Entitled to Rely on the Safeguard Clause
7.91. As already demonstrated, the FYROM’s allegation of a Greek
objection in Bucharest is based on both a misunderstanding of NATO
membership procedures and an erroneous account of what actually
occurred at the Bucharest meeting. But even if th e Court were to
conclude that Greece had objected to the FYROM’s application for
membership in Bucharest, it is clear that the reason for the deferral of
FYROM’s membership application was the difference over the name.
Specifically, Greece had ample gr ounds for concluding from the
FYROM’s behaviour in the United Nations and in every international
405
Letter dated 4 Oct 2007 from the Perm anent Representative of Greece to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General: A/62/470-S/2007/592, 5 Oct 2007;
Annex 6. See also Verbal Note, 15 May 20 08, from the Liaison Office of the Hellenic
Republic in Skopje to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM (Memorial Annex
51). As to the FYROM’s position on this statement, see above para 4.67.
406 See, for another example, United Nations, Official Records of the General
Assembly, Sixty Second session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/62/SR.42, 28 January
2008, p. 7 para. 49: Annex 8.
407 Commentary to draft article 27, para (15)Yearbook of the International Law
Commisison, 1966 Vol II p 222.
408 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1992, p 240, 247 (para 13).
158organisation in which the FYROM woul d later secure membership that it
would then insist (SC res 817 (1993) notwithstanding) on denominating
itself by a name other than the one it used for purposes of securing
membership. For the FYROM there is no interim period: there is only a
vista of freedom to pursue irredentist names and claims in all the
“international, multilateral and regiona l organizations and institutions” to
which it may be admitted pursuant to the Interim Accord. 409
7.92. In fact the highest officials of the FYROM have, in violation of its
obligations under SC res 817 (1993) a nd the Interim Accord, openly used
the name, “Republic of Macedonia,” as recalled in Chapter 4 above. The
President of the FYROM took the fl oor of the United Nations General
Assembly in September 2007 using the title of “Republic of Macedonia”
and stated before the General Assembly that “the name of my country is
410
the Republic of Macedonia and will be the Republic of Macedonia.”
The President of the Assembly, his countryman, repeatedly used the same
411
expression in his capacity as an official of the United Nations.412 The
FYROM passes over these events in an embarrassed footnote.
7.93. Even before this Court there is for the FYROM no interim period.
The very Application to the Court is brought in th e name of the Republic
of Macedonia. “The Republic of Macedonia […] (‘the Applicant’) brings
this Application against Greece.” 413 In the circumstances Greece was
409
410 Cf. Memorial, paras 5.66-5.67.
Statement made by President Crvenkovski in September 2007 before the
General Assembly in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty
Second Session, 4thPlenary Meeting, doc. A/62/PV.4, at p. 29: Annex 5.
411 The transaction, at the four th plenary meeting of the 62ndGeneral Assembly
session, is recorded as follows:
“The President: The Assembly will now hear an address by His
Excellency Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, President of the Republic of
Macedonia.
Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, President of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, was escorted into the General Assembly Hall.
The President : On behalf of the General Assembly, I have the
honour to welcome to the United Nations His Excellency Mr. Branko
Crvenkovski, President of the Republic of Macedonia, and to invite
him to address the Assembly.” th
Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty Second Session, 4 Plenary Meeting ,
doc. A/62/PV.4 at p 27 : Annex 5. It should be understood that the President of the
General Assembly was a member of the FYROM delegation. For Greece’s
contemporaneous protest, see Letter dated 4 Oct 2007 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Natio ns addressed to the Secretary-General:
A/62/470-S/2007/592, 5 Oct 2007: Annex 6
412
413 Memorial, para 5.67 fn 218.
Application, para 1.
159entitled to conclude that the FYROM would be referred to within NATO,
at least to some extent, differently than in paragraph 2 of SC res 817
(1993). Under that Resolution, the FYROM was to be referred to “for all
purposes” by its provisional designation (emphasis added). Greece was
entitled to conclude that this would not be the case in fact. It follows that
on any view of the interpretation and a pplication of Article 11(1) Greece
having reserved the right to object to the membership would have been
entitled to do so.
D. Conclusions as to the Safeguard Clause
7.94. The purpose in establishing the pr ovisional name of the FYROM
was to commit the settlement of th e difference concerning the FYROM’s
name to a bilateral proce ss. The name finally adopted is to be agreed
between Greece and the FYROM; it is not to be imposed unilaterally
without Greece’s consent. The aspect of consent is central to the process.
Greece, by entering into the Interim A ccord, agreed to limit its own pre-
existing rights in certain respects—i.e., not to object in accordance with
Article 11(1). The Interim Accord affirmed, in return, that Greece has the
right, together with the FYROM, to achieve a negotiated settlement of the
difference concerning the FYROM’s na me. The Safeguard Clause of
Article 11(1) serves as a counterpoise, to assure that this arrangement is
respected.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
7.95. Like any treaty provision, Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord is to
be interpreted so as to give effect to the plain meaning of its terms in light
of its object and purpose. The Inte rim Accord was adopted in order to
stabilise the bilateral relations of Greece and the FYROM, and to allow
the FYROM access to international inst itutions, but without prejudice to
the eventual resolution of the difference over the name by the two parties.
In the framework of the Interim A ccord as a whole, Article 11(1)
preserves both parties’ interest in that eventual settlement. Steps by, or in,
any international organisation, whether taken by the orga nisation itself or
by a Member State, constitute part of general international practice; as
such they can have the effect of changing a given status quo. Greece
agreed, under Article 11(1), that, where it otherwise would possess the
discretionary right not to object to an application of the FYROM to an
international organisation, it would not object. But, consistent with
principles of third party legal relations, and as recognised under Article 22
of the Interim Accord, Greece did not—and could not have—agreed to
breach its existing commitments, incl uding those assumed as a member
160State of international organisations . Nor did it abandon its rights under
existing treaties, including rights to object.
7.96. Further to maintaining the interim arrangement, Article 11(1)
reserves to Greece the right to object, where the FYROM is to be referred
to in an organisation other than by its provisi onal designation. The
reservation fits logically into the balancing mechanism of the Interim
Accord: the manner in which States and organisations actually refer to the
FYROM will have an effect on the out come of the difference concerning
the name. The Security Council, by SC res 817 (1993), and the parties, by
the Interim Accord, have decided that the outcome of the difference is to
be achieved through one modality and through that modality only. If the
conduct of States or organisations is tending to settle the difference in any
other way—for example, by way of unilateral imposition of a name,
independent of consultation with and agreement by Greece—then Greece
retains its right to object.
7.97. The FYROM’s interpretation of Article 11(1) is entirely selective
and unilateral. The FYROM ignores the relevance of Article 22, which
preserves existing rights and ob ligations, including those under the
constitutive instruments of internatio nal organisations. Under Article 10
of the North Atlantic Treaty, no Member State of NATO may endorse the
admission of a non-member which it knows to fail the criteria of
membership. Yet the FYROM interprets Article 11(1) as if other
international obligations did not exist; and as if Article 22 of the Interim
Accord itself had no effect.
7.98. Further, the FYROM would have th e Safeguard Clause of Article
11(1) pertain only to the conduct by an international organisation. The
parties, however, rejected any su ch limitation. The Safeguard Clause
applies whenever, and to whatever ex tent, the FYROM is “to be referred
to in” an international organisation other than by the provisional
designation adopted by the Security Council, and referred to for any
purpose. The provisional designation is the centrepiece of the interim
arrangement pending a bilateral agreed settlement.
7.99. Just as the FYROM would exclude from application certain
elements of Article 11(1), so would its interpretation add terms to that
provision in excess of the meaning of its plain text.
7.100. First, the FYROM gives a very expansive readi ng to the Non-
Objection Clause. According to th e FYROM, the clause not only would
prohibit objection; it also would obl ige affirmative conduct—this, despite
the parties’ rejection of earlier drafts that would have done just that.
1617.101. Second, the FYROM asserts that Gr eece needed to make a formal
démarche or other statement as a prerequisi te to exercising its retained
right under the Safeguard Clause. There is no textual basis in the Interim
Accord for this assertion.
7.102. Third, the FYROM relies on an alleged agreement by way of
subsequent practice. According to the FYROM, pursuant to this agreed
interpretation it is free, without rega rd to SC res 817 (1993), to use the
“constitutional” name within international organisations. The FYROM’s
position finds no support in general treaty law; and no support in the
relations of the parties under the In terim Accord. Unilateral practice does
not establish the agreement of the pa rties which Article 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention requires. Moreove r, the Interim Accord, in the
character of an interim arrangement, exists to define the legal relations of
its parties during the interim period. There is a strong presumption
against the abandonment of rights and claims expre ssly reserved by such
an arrangement.
7.103. To conclude, there was in fact no Greek veto at Bucharest; what
occurred was a consensus decision (in which Greece joined) not to invite
the FYROM to accede until the difference over the name is resolved by
the means agreed in Article 5 of the Interim Accord. The reaching of that
decision did not involve any breac h by Greece of the Non-Objection
Clause, but merely an exercise of its rights and a performance of its duties
under the North Atlantic Treaty. Th ese rights and duties are expressly
preserved by Article 22 and cannot gi ve rise to the responsibility of
Greece. There is correspondingly no basis for finding any breach of the
Non-Objection Clause.
7.104. But even if Greece had objected to an invitation, and even if its
right to object were not preserved by Article 22, there would have been no
breach of treaty. The conditions for the exercise of the right to object set
out in the Safeguard Clause were me t. In the circumstances of the
FYROM’s increasingly strident policy to refer to itself, and to be referred
to, other than as required by para graph 2 of SC res 817 (1993), Greece
was entitled to conclude that the FYROM would be referred to in NATO
by its constitutional name, at least to some extent. In those circumstances
the Safeguard Clause applied, and it applied without any procedural
prerequisite. That provides a further, and independent, ground for holding
that there was no breach of Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord in the
present case.
162 CHAPTER 8: THE EXCEPTION
OF NON-PERFORMANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
8.1. In an effort to anticipate poten tial Greek “defences,” the FYROM
alleges in some detail (i) that “[t]he Respondent’s non-performance
cannot be explained on the basis of a Suspension of Article 11(1) of the
414
Interim Accord for material breach” – thus basing itself on Article 60 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – and ( ii) that “[t]he
Respondent’s violation of Article 11 (1) cannot be excused as a lawful
countermeasure to a precedent wrongful act by the Applicant.” 415In
reality, Greece bases itself neither on one or the other ground.
8.2. In respect to its supposed argument that Greece could base itself
on Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, it must be noted that:
- Greece has never claimed a ny intent to suspend (let
alone to terminate) in whole or in part the operation of
the Interim Accord (even t hough it would be entitled to
do so).
- On the contrary, it has steadily and consistently
maintained that the Accord is in force and ought to be
fully respected; in particular , Greece has recently stated
that it “fully respects the provisions of the Interim
Accord, on the basis of the fundamental principle pacta
416
sunt servanda”
414 Memorial, Section III, pp. 94-100.
415 Memorial, Section IV, pp. 101-106.
416 Memorial, p. 42, para. 5.21, quoting Memorial, Annex 47, Letter dated 2 June
2009 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, John
Mourikis, to the United Nations Secretary General, UN doc. S/2009/285. See also
Memorial, Annex 44, Letter dated 27 November 2008 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nati ons, John Mourikis, to the United Nations
st
Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2008/746 (1 December 2008): “Greece’s commitment to
the continuation of the process of negotiations within the framework of the United
Nations with the aim of reaching a spee dy and mutually acceptable solution over the
name issue”; and Memorial, Annex 51, Verbal Note dated 15 May 2008 from the
Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje to the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: “Greece remains committed to the In terim Accord, as well as to the relevant
Security Council resolutions, and engaged in the negotiation process under the UN
auspices aimed at reaching a speedy solution to the name issue.”
163For its part, Greece remains fully attach ed to the Interim Accord and, far
from willing to suspend it, it inte nds having it fully respected by the
FYROM.
8.3. Counter-measures according to Article 22 of the ILC Articles on
State Responsibility, are a “circumstance precluding wrongfulness.” In the
present case, Greece does not rely on such a circumstance. Rather, it
invokes the more general principle of reciprocity according to which non
adimpleti non est adimpledum , which means that as long as the FYROM
does not comply with its obligatio ns under the 1995 Accord, Greece is
entitled not to comply with its own obligations under the same instrument.
Unlike counter-measures the purpose of which is, as explained in Article
49(1) of the ILC Articles on Stat e Responsibility, “to induce [a State
which is responsible for an internati onally wrongful act] to comply with
its obligations under Part Two” of said Articles relating to the “content” of
the responsibility – the exceptio is a defence which can be invoked at any
time in response to a claim by another State.
8.4. Greece wishes to make perfectly clear however, that the present
Chapter is only of a subsidiary character and does not imply any
recognition that it has breached Artic le 11 of the Interim Accord. The
purpose of this Chapter is only to show that Greece would, in any event,
have been entitled to object to the FYROM’s application by virtue of the
exception of non-performance. To repeat, Greece has not breached Article
11. This Chapter shows, in the alternative ( à titre subsidiaire ), that it
would have been entitled to do so in response to the FYROM’s numerous
and serious breaches of its own obligations under the 1995 Accord.
8.5. In the first Section of this Chapter, Greece will review the
conditions triggering recourse to the exceptio. In Section Two, it will
show that these conditions are met in the present case.
II. THE CONDITIONS TRIGGERING RECOURSE TO THE
EXCEPTIO NON ADIMPLETI CONTRACTUS
8.6. The exceptio inadimpleti contractus must not be confused with the
ground for suspension and termination of a treaty dealt with in Article 60
of the Vienna Convention or with countermeasures (even though the
conditions for recourse to countermeasur es are also met). It is merely a
defence against a claim of non-performance of a conventional obligation.
8.7. There is a common element to these three international law
institutions: all are lawful responses to unlawful conduct by another State.
In all, the obligation breached either can be derived from a treaty (in the
case of countermeasures) or is necessa rily so derived (in the cases of
164Article 60 of the Vienna Convention and of the exceptio). However, the
conditions triggering the exception of non-performance are different from
and less rigid than the conditions fo r suspending a treaty or precluding
wrongfulness by way of countermeasures and the reasons for this relate to
the very nature and pu rpose of the exception of non-performance (A)
which explain why, in what respect and to what extent the legal régime
of
the exceptio (B) differs from those of the suspension of a treaty or of
countermeasures.
A. The Character and Purpose of the Exceptio
8.8. The exceptio non adimpleti contractus has been defined as being
“[l]iterally: [the] ‘exception of a non-performed contract’.” An exception
that the injured Partie(s) can invoke because of the non-performance of a
conventional agreement by another cont ractual Party and which allows in
turn not to apply in turn the conv entional agreement in part or as a
417
whole.”
418
8.9. When Judge Anzilotti stated th e principle in memorable terms,
that too was a situation where the integrity of a treaty arrangement was
disrupted by one party’s non-performance. The Treaty of 12 May 1863
concerning the regime of diversion of water from the Meuse (Netherlands-
419
Belgium) may be compared to the Interi m Accord: failure of one party
to perform a fundamental provision of the envisaged regime frustrates the
system as a whole; the situation is then transformed into one of unilateral
obligation on the part of the other St ate. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Anzilotti insisted that the principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum “is
so just, so equitable, so universally recognised, that it must be applied in
international relations also. In any case, it is one of these ‘general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ which the Court applies
420
in virtue of Article 38 of its Statute.”
8.10. J. Nisot, described as follows the raison d’être of the exceptio: “In
an agreement creating reciprocal obligations, one Party cannot obtain
from the other the execution of its obligation, if it does not respect its own
417
J. Salmon, Dictionnaire de Droit International Public, Bruylant, Bruxelles,
2001, p. 471: “Littéralement : ‘exception de contrat non rempli’. Exception que peut
invoquer la ou les partie(s) lésées(s) en raison de la non-exécution d’un engagement
conventionnel par une autre partie contractante et qui l’autorise à ne pas appliquer à son
tour tout ou partie de cet engagement conventionnel.” (translated by Greece).
418 Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium) , Judgment of 28
June 1937, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, pp. 49-50.
419 Annex I to the Judgment (ibid., p. 81).
420 Diversion of Water from the Meu se (Netherlands v. Belgium), Judgment of 28
June 1937, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, p. 50.
165commitment. It is a generally accepted principle that the State Party to a
treaty is allowed to abstain from complying with it, when the other party
421
does not itself comply with it.” He emphasised the need to keep the
exceptio as a customary means of defence in the interest of the injured
422
Party and stressed that it was broader than the rule which has been
codified in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention and leads to the
suspension or termination of the treaty.
8.11. “In conventional law, reciprocity finds expression in the exceptio
non adimpleti contractus whereby a party has the right to stop performing
a contract if the other party does not apply it. However, the exceptio non
adimpleti contractus is not the same as suspension of the contract.” 423 It is
clear that these concepts have different consequences. The exceptio
suspends the execution of only the injured Party’s obligation, 424that is the
421
J. Nisot, “L’exception ‘ non adimpleti contractus ’ en droit international”,
RGDIP 1970, p. 668 (emphasis added by Greece ): “[d]ans une conv ention engendrant
des obligations réciproques, une Partie ne peut obtenir de l’autre l’exécution de ses
engagements, si, de son côté, elle ne respecte pas les siens. Il est de principe général que
l’État partie à un traité est fondé à s’abstenir de s’y conformer, lorsque son co-contractant
ne s’y conforme pas lui-m ême.” (translated by Greece).
422
Ibid. p. 672. See also C. Laly-Chevalier, La violation du traité, Bruylant, 2005,
pp. 418-419: “It is true that pursuant to Articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna Convention, the
Party which considers itself the victim of a material violation of the treaty cannot initiate
reprisals before the end of the long and insuff iciently efficient procedure. The interest of
the victims seems to be sacrificed to the benefit of treaties stability, this has been
criticized by some authors.” (“Il est vrai qu’aux termes des articles 65 et 66 CV, la partie
qui s’estime victime d’une violation substantielle du traité ne peut déclencher les ripostes
avant que la procédure, longue et d’une efficacité relativ e, ne soit menée à son terme.
L’intérêt des victimes parait sacrifié au prof it de la stabilité des traités, ce que n’a pas
423qué de critiquer une partie de la doctrine.”) (translated by Greece).
E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An analysis of Countermeasures ,
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1984, p. 15: “Indeed, a non-performed contract is still a
contract in force and compulsory between th e parties, whereas a suspended contract is
not. There is a clear distinction between no n-performance and suspension of a contract.
While suspension affects the existence of the contract in its legal aspects, reciprocity has
no such effect. While suspension involves a te mporary eclipse of the contract from legal
relations between the parties, reciprocity never does. During non-performance of a treaty,
each party remains bound de jure by its obligations under the treaty, whereas during
suspension they are released from complyin g with them.” See also, C. Laly-Chevalier,
La violation du traité, Bruylant, 2005, pp. 417-418.
424 C. Laly-Chevalier, La violation du traité , Bruylant, 2005, pp. 423: “Therefore,
in case of suspension of the application of the treaty, …. the Parties are symmetrically
released from the obligation to perform the treaty provision that has been violated, while,
in case of non-execu tion through the concept of reciprocity, only the injured Party is
exempted from the execution of the obligation.” (“Ainsi, dans le cas de la suspension de
l’application du traité, (…) les parties so nt symétriquement libérées de l’obligation
d’exécuter la disposition conventionnelle transgressée, alors que dans l’hypothèse de
166counterpart or the reciprocal engagement of the non-performed obligation.
Suspension under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention suspends the
execution of the obligations of the treaty for both parties (and termination
puts an end to them definitively). It would be paradoxical that the victim
of a treaty breach has no choice but to suspend or terminate it.
425
8.12. As stated above, Greece has always been committed to the full
and good faith implementation of the Interim Accord and has reasserted
on several occasions that the Accord is still in force and binds both
parties. Greece does not argue the su spension of the Accord but insists
upon its right not to perform its part of the Accord in view of the non-
performance by the FYROM of its own obligations under the Interim
Accord. 426 As aptly noted by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, “[a]ction on a
‘reciprocity’ basis is only possible and effective in certain kinds of cases.
It applies mainly in cases where the breach of treaty is negative in
character, i.e., involves a simple non-performance of some requirement of
the treaty.”427 This is precisely the case here.
8.13. The exceptio shares something with th e principle embodied in
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention which is sometimes described under
428
the same appellation. However, it is a different notion, rooted in the law
of State responsibility and not in the law of treaties. Concerning Counter-
measures, the ILC indicated in its commentary to Article 42 of its Articles
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:
“The definition in article 42 is closely modelled on
article 60 of the 1969 Vie nna Convention, although the
scope and purpose of the two provisions are different.
Article 42 is concerned with any breach of an
international obligation of wh atever character, whereas
article 60 is concerned with breach of treaties.
Moreover, article 60 is con cerned exclusively with the
right of a State party to a treaty to invoke a material
breach of that treaty by another party as grounds for its
non-exécution par mesure de réciprocité, seule la partie victime est exonérée de
l’exécution de l’obligation.”) (translated by Greece).
425 See above, para. 8.1.
426 As well as of its specific obligations under Article 11(1) itself – but this is
inherently part of the rule invoked by the FYROM; on this aspect, see above, Chapter 7.
427 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1959, vol. II, p. 67, para. 83.
428 M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach ,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, p. 115.
167 suspension or termination. It is not concerned with the
429
question of responsibility for breach of the treaty.”
8.14. Successive Special Rapporteurs of the I.L.C. on State
Responsibility clearly distinguished th e different types of suspension. In
his reports, W. Riphagen drafted three separate provisions on suspension.
First, he designed a specific article to refer to the suspension of reciprocal
obligations because of non performance.
Article 8
“Subject to articles 11 to 13, the injured State is entitled,
by way of reciprocity, to suspend the performance of its
obligations towards the State which has committed an
internationally wrongful act, if such obligations
correspond to, or are dire ctly connected with, the
430
obligation breached.”
Second, Riphagen drew a specific provision for the suspension as a way of
reprisal, which can be assimilated to the notion of countermeasures, and
which required proportionality.
Article 9
“1. Subject to articles 10 to 13, the injured State is
entitled, by way of reprisal, to suspend the performance
of its other obligations to wards the State which has
committed the internationally wrongful act.
2. The exercise of this right by the injured State shall
not, in its effects, be manifestly disproportional to the
seriousness of the intern ationally wrongful act
committed.” 431
Third, Riphagen specifically excluded from the Draft Articles the
suspension that can result in applica tion of the provisions of the Vienna
Convention.
Article 16
“The provisions of the present articles shall not prejudge
any question that may arise in regard to:
429 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 , vol. II, part two, p. 117,
para. 4 of the commentary of Article 42.
430 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1985 , vol. I, part one, p. 10
(emphasis added).
431 Ibid., p. 11.
168 (a) the invalidity, termination and suspension of the
operation of treaties;
(b) the rights of membership of an international
organization;
(c) belligerent reprisals.” 432
Special Rapporteur Riphagen’s draft articles have not been adopted as
such by the ILC. However, the dis tinction drawn by Riphagen was firmly
endorsed by the last Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the topic, J.
Crawford. 433 “In short, issues of performa nce are left to be dealt with
under the topic of state responsibility.” 434
8.15. The relationship between the ex ception of non-performance and
suspension of treaties can be desc ribed as a sequential or consecutive
relation. When facing the non-execution of a conventional agreement, the
injured party can forthwith have recourse to the exceptio. The treaty will
remain in force between the Parties but the injured Party will be able to
withhold the execution of its own oblig ations, which are synallagmatic to
the ones not performed by the othe r Party. If the use of the exceptio does
not lead the non-performing Party to resume executing its obligations
under the Treaty, the injured Party can e435cise “ ultimately [its] right […]
to suspend or terminate the contract” under the conditions prescribed by
the Vienna Convention. In any case, it is the free choice of the injured
State and there is no reason why that State would be compelled to resort to
the suspension of the treaty if, as is the case of Greece in the present case,
it remains committed to the full execution of the Treaty.
8.16. The exceptio must also be distinguis hed from countermeasures.
This was made very clear in the Th ird Report of J. Crawford on State
Responsibility:
“364. The first question is whether the exception of non-
performance is to be considered as a form of
countermeasure. It is cl ear that the exception only
432
433 Ibid., p. 15 (emphasis added).
J. Crawford, “Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law”, in
RCADI, vol. 319, p. 429. See also ILC, Third Report on State Responsibility by James
Crawford, Special Rapporteur f,ifty-second session of the ILC, U.N. Doc.
434N.4/507/Add.3, para. 366.
J. Crawford and S. Olleson, “The Exception of Non-Performance: Links
between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility”, 21 Australian YIL 59
(2001).
435 M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach ,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, p. xvii (emphasis added).
169 applies to synallagmatic obligations (prestations), where
one party’s performance is related to and contingent
upon the other’s. Normally this will involve
performance of the same or a closely related obligation.
But in the Special Rapporteur’s opinion it is clear that
the exception of non-performance is not to be identified
as a countermeasure in the sense of article 47 [finally
art. 52]. In cases where the exception applies, the reason
why State A is entitled not to perform is simply that, in
the absence of State B’s performance of the related
obligation, the time for Stat e A’s performance has not
yet come. It is true th at State A may withhold
performance in order to indu ce State B to perform. But
that is not the point of the exception, as it is of
countermeasures. State A’s motive is irrelevant; it may
simply have no interest in performance in the absence of
State B. Moreover there is no requirement of notice or
of any attempt to settle the dispute by diplomatic or
other means as a condition of continued application of
the exception. It is simply that, following an agreement,
for example, concerning the exchange of prisoners of
war or for the joint funding of some project, State A is
not obliged to release its prisoners of war to B or to
make its contribution unless B is in turn ready to
perform its part of the barg ain. Thus the exception of
non-performance is to be seen either as a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness in respect of a certa in class of
(synallagmatic) obligations, or as limited to an implied
term in certain treaties. By contrast, while the nexus
between the breach and non-performance is relevant to
the question of proportionality, there is and should be no
specific requirement436 a nexus in the law of
countermeasures.”
8.17. As the ILC made clear,
“Chapter V sets out the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness presently r ecognized under general
international law. Certain other candidates have been
436
ILC, Third Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford, Special
Rapporteur, fifty second session of the ILC, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.3, para 364. See
also J. Crawford and S. Olleson, “The Exception of Non-performance: Links between the
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility”, 21 Australian YIL 57 (2001).
170 excluded. For example, the exception of non-
performance (exceptio inadimpleti contractus ) is best
seen as a specific feature of certain mutual or
synallagmatic obligations and not a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness. The principle that a State may
not benefit from its own wrongful act is capable of
generating consequences in the field of State
responsibility but it is rather a general principle th437a
specific circumstance precluding wrongfulness.”
8.18. The suspension of the obligations deriving from the treaty as a
countermeasure, designed as a way of reprisal and which requires the
criterion of proportionality to be fulf illed, is a different concept than the
exceptio which is based on the notion of reciprocity (and not
proportionality). In fact, the criteria of proportionality is replaced by that
of reciprocity. In the cases of “termination or suspension under the
principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum, proportionality is replaced
by a more specific criterion, namely by the typically synallagmatic
principle of quid pro quo (corrispettivo).” 438
8.19. The exceptio is based on the concept of reciprocity. “It would
seem to be an important principle of equity that where two parties have
assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation , one party which is
engaged in a continuing non performance of that obligation should not be
permitted to take advantage of a similar non-performance of that
obligation by the other party.” 439 The importance of the concept of
reciprocity has been emphasised by Greece with regard to the Interim
Accord, which “cannot be implemented selectively and unilaterally, but as
a whole and reciprocally, on the basis of the reciprocal application of the
440
principle pacta sunt servanda.”
8.20. It was because the FYROM accepted
437 ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with commentaries, Yearbook 2001, vol. II, part two, p. 72.
438
M.L. Forlati Picchio, La sanzione nel diritto internazionale , Padoue, CEDAM
1974, quoted by Arangio-Ruiz, Third Report on the Law of State Responsibility ,
439rbook of the International Law Commission, 1991, vol. II, part one, p. 25, para. 78.
440 Individual opinion of Judge Hudson, ibid., p. 77 (emphasis added).
Memorial, Annex 51, Verbal Note dated 15 May 2008 from the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Skopje to the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also
Memorial, Annex 43, Letter dated 23 May 2008 from the Permanent Representative of
Greece to the United Nations, John Mourikis, to the United Nations Secretary-General,
UN doc. S/2008/346 (28 May 2008); and Memorial, Annex 129, Greece, Aide Memoire
[2007]: “the Interim Accord is binding for both Parties as a whole (Art. 5, 7 and 11) and
cannot be selectively implemented”.
171 - to reform its anta gonistic and irredentist
behaviour,
- to be referred to as the FYROM in international
organisaations,
- to negotiate in good faith,
that Greece accepted “not to object to the application by or the
membership of the [FYROM] in international, multilateral and441gional
organizations and institutions of which [it] is a Party.”
8.21. In view of this tight mutuality of all the obligations deriving from
the Interim Accord, the exceptio is of particular importance in the present
case.
B. The Legal Régime of the Exceptio
8.22. “Reciprocity as applied by the exceptio non adimpleti contractus is
442
merely a means of defence which results in a factual situation.”
Therefore, as aptly noted by the IC SID Tribunal in the Award of 21
October 1983 in the Klöckner v. Cameroon case:
“The exception [sic] non adimpleti contractus may be
invoked at any time, even during judicial or arbitral
proceedings, without giving prior notice of default to the
non-performing party.” 443
The Tribunal relied on various author s, in particular French civil law
scholars, as well as Judge Anzilo tti’s dissenting Opinion in the Meuse
444
case, to support its conclusion. Acco rding to Esmein, “the exception
based on non-performance may be invoked without either authorization
by the judge or prior notice of default.” 445Relying on case law, Alex
Weill and François Terré stated that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus
“requires neither a claim in court, not even a notice of default. It is
441
442 Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord.
E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An analysis of Countermeasures ,
443nsnational Publishers, inc., 1984, p. 15.
ICSID, Award of 21 October 1983, Klöckner v. Cameroon, International Law
Reports, vol. 114, p. 211.
444 See above, para. 8.9.
445 Esmein, in Planiol and Ripert, Traité pratique de droit civil franç, vol. VI
(1930), No. 455, p. 626: “L’exception d’inexécution n’a pas besoin pour être opposée ni
de l’autorisation du juge, ni d’une mise en demeure préalable.”
172sufficient that the excipiens invokes the exception against his pr446gonist
at such time as the latter demands satisfaction of his right.”
8.23. The exception is a defence, i.e. it is a response to a claim for
performance. It is a reac tion to such a claim and thus can only be raised
once such a claim is put forward. This is why it need not be raised at a
certain specified time or follow a certain procedure as if it were
procedurally an initial or self-standing claim.
8.24. The Klöckner award of 1983 447was annulled by a decision of 3
May 1985. However, the decision on annulment is not based on the
exceptio non adimpleti contractus . The ad hoc Committee analysed the
exceptio in a section entitled “Other Complaints of the Applicant for
Annulment.” It did not challenge the use of the exceptio assuchbut
criticised the insufficient reasoning of the Tribunal. It also concluded that
“the Tribunal 448 erred using the exceptio as a ground for extinguishing
obligations.” This is quite correct: the cons equences of recourse to the
exceptio is not the extinction of the obligations of the Parties but only a
staying of the performance until the ot her does its part – not of the treaty
itself but of the obligations resulting from the treaty which were the quid
pro quo for the obligations breached by the other Party. 449 The decision of
the Committee does not however condemn the procedural and conditional
application of the exceptio. There can therefore be no doubt that the
principles stated in the Klöckner Award of 1983 on the conditions of
application of the exceptio are still applicable in general and, in particular,
in the present case.
8.25. In this respect, an analogy can be drawn with Article 65, paragraph
5, of the Vienna Convention, according to which:
“[w]ithout prejudice to article 45, the fact that a State has
not previously made the notification prescribed in
paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such
notification in answer to another party claiming
performance of the treaty or alleging its violation.”
446 rd
A. Weill & F. Terré. Droit civil, Les obligations , 3ed., p. 547, No. 475:
L’exception non adimpleti contractus “n’est subordonnée ni à une demande en justice, ni
même à une mise en demeure. Il suffit que l’ excipiens oppose l’exception à son
protagoniste, lorsque celui-ci réclame l’exécution de sa créance.”
447 See above, para. 8.22.
448 Ch. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge U.P., 2009, p.
1049, para. 519.
449 See above, para. 8.11.
173The 1966 Commentary of the ILC Draf t Articles on the Law of Treaties
explains that this paragraph “reserve s the right of any party to make the
notification provided in paragraph 1 by way of answer to a demand for its
performance or to a complaint in regard to its violation, even though it
may not p450iously have initiate d the procedure laid down in the
article.” Although the exceptio clearly does not belong to the law of
treaties, it arises from a need for flexibility in respect of reciprocal
obligations: it must open the opportunity for the injured party to use the
defences offered in case of breaches of treaty obligations not only as an
immediate response to the wrongdoing, but also as a defence during
proceedings initiated by the wrongdoer.
8.26. The consequence of this characteristic of the exceptio is that it
does not have to be notified or proven beforehand. In the present case, the
FYROM cannot ask Greece to fulfil its obligation under Article 11(1) of
the Interim Accord as the FYROM has not itself fulfilled its own
obligations and Greece can raise the exceptio as a defence at the merits
stage.451 Contrary to suspension unde r Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention and countermeasures in the law of State responsibility, no rule
requiring a notification of the suspen sion exists for th e exception of non-
performance. There are simply no procedural requirements to the exercise
of the staying of the performance through the mechanism of the exceptio.
8.27. This being said, it must be noted that on multiple occasions,
Greece has complained that the FYROM had not complied with its
obligations under the Interim Accor d. “Greece had repeatedly denounced
this behaviour on the part of the Government of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia at both the bilateral and internationa l level, but to
no avail, since the latter has not cea452 so far its unlawful course of ac453n
or taken any corrective measures.” A few examples will suffice:
a. “[T]he recent decision of the government of the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to rename
Skopje’s Petroveč airport ‘Alexander the Great’ is not
450
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 , vol. II, p. 263, para. 8 of
451 Commentary of Article 62.
In the present case, Greece has decided to join its objections to the jurisdiction
of the Court with its defence on the merits of the case, for the sake of expediency – see
the letter of the Agents of Greece to the Registrar dated 5 August 2009: Annex 168.
452 Memorial, Annex 45, Letter dated 6 February 2009 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations to the United Nations Secretary-General,
U.N. doc A/63/712- S/2009/82 (10 February 2009).
453 The reactions of Greece to the FYROM’s behaviou r before the Bucharest
Summit have been described in Chapter 4 of this Counter-Memorial, see above, paras.
4.73-4.81.
174 an act of good neighbourly relations. It was a breach of
the 1995 Interim Agreement . An historically groundless
and politically counterproduc tive action. It rendered
even more difficult – as Mr. Nimetz himself stressed
publicly during his visit here – the mission that has been
454
undertaken by the UN mediator.”
b. “[W]e are constructivel y pursuing a mutually
acceptable solution to the name issue, through the UN
process and in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 817. We are awaiting a similar response
from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
which presupposes that various circles within and
outside the Skopje Government abandon the practice of
aiming irredentist propaganda against a member state of
NATO and the European Union – by using symbols,
maps, textbooks etc – and that they conduct themselves
in a manner that is consistent with the European
acquis.” 455
c. “The situation is very clear, and no one should waste
their energies on mere unavailing tactics. To achieve the
desired objective, which is: full normalisation of
bilateral relations, furthe r strengthening of regional
cooperation in an environment of stability, and a smooth
Euro-Atlantic course for our neighbouring country, the
Skopje leadership needs to: implement a policy of good
neighbourly relations, rectif y and abandon actions and
policies based on irredentist thinking towards a member
state of NATO and the European Union, adopt a
conciliatory and moderate spirit within the framework of
the consultations taking place at the UN aimed at the
achievement of a mutually acceptable solution on the
name issue, given that the current name is temporary.
454 See Speech of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis to the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs, Athens, 20 February
2007, available athttp://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={C45FA976-9469-4954-B32F-8AC686D588D3}: Annex 120 (emphasis
added).
455 See Answer of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. G. Koumoutsakos to a
journalist's question regarding the US House of Representatives resolution on former
Yugoslav's republic of Macedonia propaganda, Athe ns, 4 May 2007, available
at: http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={C6F297C0-2199-4FEF-9089-355DB42EC026}: Annex 121.
175 This is all provided for in the Interim Agreement, which
the currentSkopjegovernment is unfortunately calling
456
in to question through many of its actions.”
d. “A number of the Skopje government’s decisions and
actions have confirmed its persistence with regard to
historically groundless and provocative propaganda that
assails the principle of good neighbourly relations. They
have forgotten the obligations they have undertaken, and
I am referring to article 7 of the Interim Accord, which
explicitly prohibits direct or indirect actions of
457
irredentist propaganda.”
e. “We remain deeply concerned by the incident and the
actions of the current president of the General
Assembly, Srgjan Kerim, who in full contravention of
Security Council resolution 817 (1993), and General
Assembly resolution 47/225 of 8 April 1993 [...].” 458 ;
“Most important, such actions support the intransigent
position of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
in the ongoing negotiations [...]. This was clearly
manifested by the statement made by President
Crvenkovski on the same day before the General
Assembly, according to which ‘the name of my country
is the Republic of Macedonia and will be the Republic
459
of Macedonia’.”
456 See Statement of Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr. G. Koumoutsakos regarding
today’s statements from the Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia president Mr.
Crenkovski, Athens, 3 June 2007, available at
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={6BF87A42-F2F9-4644-9045-BA9D07041B4B}: Annex 122 (emphasis
added).
457 Statement of FM Ms. Bakoyannis regarding statements made by FYROM
President Mr. Crvenkovski, 13 September 2007, available at:
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&fo…
rticle=21578 : Annex 127 (emphasis added).
458 Letter dated 4 October 2007 from th e Permanent Represen tative of Greece to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, 5 October 2007, A/62/470-
S/2007/592: Annex 6 (emphasis added).
459
Ibid. See also Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM, dated 24 March 2009 under Reference
1024, forwarded through Verbal Note F.141.1/24/AS 378, dated 27 March 2009 of the
Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic inSkopje: Annex 70: “This statement clearly
reflects the totally inflexible stance that your country has taken in the ongoing
176 f. “In the course of the last 14 years that the Interim
Accord is in force, the Greek side has been witnessing
with great concern and regret that essential provisions of
the said Accord have been consistently materially
breached by the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.” 460
g. “Mr Milososki alleged, in his interview, that there is a
‘Macedonian-speaking minority’ in Greece which is not
allowed to use its mother tongue nor develop its cultural
identity. This allegation by a high official of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedoni a, who also happens to
be at the helm of the fore ign policy of this state,
constitutes a gross violation of article 6, para. 2 of the
Interim Accord.” 461
h. “Those acts constitute a flagrant violation of article 7,
par. 2 of the Interim Accord of 1995, which
categorically prohibits the use, in any way of this
symbol [the Sun of Vergina] by the former Yugoslav
462
Republic of Macedonia.”
8.28. Another important difference betw een the legal regime of the
exceptio compared with suspension under Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention is that it is not confin ed to “material” breach, however
defined, and can be used as a response to any breach of the wrongdoer’s
treaty obligations. As explained by J. Crawford, “[b]y contrast [to the law
of treaties], in the law of State resp onsibility a party may be entitled to
suspend its own performance vis-à-vis another State in breach (not limited
463
to material breach), by virtue of the exceptio inadimpleti contractus .”
negotiations under the aegis of the UN, contrary to the good faith that both parties should
demonstrate in the quest for a commonly agreed settlement”.
460 Memorial, Annex 52, Verbal Note dated 15 January 2009 from the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Skopje to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM
(emphasis added). See also Memorial, Annex 54, Note Verbale dated 27 February 2009
from the FYROM’s Liaison Office in Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
461 Memorial, Annex 53, Note Verbale dated 24 February 2009 from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Greece to the Liais on Office of the FYROM in Athens (emphasis
462ed).
Memorial, Annex 60, Verbal Note dated 15 April 2009 from the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Skopje to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM, No.
463141.1/49/AS 489 (emphasis added).
J. Crawford, “Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law”, in
RCADI, vol. 319, p. 429 – italics added. See also case concerning the Factory at
Chorzow (Jurisdiction), PCIJ, Series A, No. 9 (1927) 31; J. Crawford and S. Olleson,
177These views have been endorsed by the International Law Commission:
while “article 60 is restricted to ‘material’ breaches of treaties, [o]nly a
material breach justifies termination or suspension of the treaty, […] in
the context of State res ponsibility any breach464 a treaty gives rise to
responsibility irrespective of its gravity.”
C. Other Possible Defences
8.29. This being said, Greece maintains that, as will be shown in the
next Section of this Chapter, the FYROM’s violations of the Interim
Accord qualify as material breaches. As a consequence, if the allegations
of the FYROM concerning its breach of Article 11 were well founded –
quod non – then Greece could invoke count er-measures as a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness. However, since all the conditions for invoking
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus are met, there is no need for the
Respondent to expressly invoke counter-measures as a defence. And the
same position exists in respect to the mechanism offered by Article 60 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – with the crucial
difference that Greece does not aim at a suspension of the Interim Accord.
8.30. The same holds true regarding the clean hands doctrine according
to which “no action arises from wilful wrongdoing: ex dolo malo non
oritur actio. It is also reflected 465the maxim nullus commodum capere
potest de injuria sua propria.” Consequently, “a State which is guilty of
illegal conduct may be de prived of the necessary locus standi in judicio
for complaining of corresponding ill egalities on the part of other
466
States.” This was also the position of Judge Anzilotti in the case
concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland ,467, and of Judge
Schwebel 468 who both considered “that an ‘unlawful act cannot serve as
the basis of an action at law’.” In the present case, since the FYROM has
“The Exception of Non-Performance: Links between the Law of Treaties and the Law of
State Responsibility”, (2001) 21 Australian YIL 55.
464 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 , vol. II, part two, p. 117,
para. 4 of the commentary of Article 42.
465 ILC, Sixth Report on Diplomatic Protection by John Dugard, Special
Rapporteur, A/CN.4/546, para. 2.
466
G. Fitzmaurice, “The General Principles of International Law,” RCADI, vol. 92,
1957-II, p. 119. the also, P. Daillier, M. Forteau et A. Pellet, Droit international public,
467.D.J., Paris, 8ed., 2009, p. 874, para. 480.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland , Judgment, 5 April 1933, PCIJ, Series A/B,
46853, Dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti, p. 95.
Military and Paramilitary Activities inand against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America) , Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986 ,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, p. 393, para. 270.
178breached its obligations under the Interim Accord, it has no locus standi in
the present case.
III. THE CONDITIONS TRIGGERING RECOURSE TO THE
EXCEPTIO
ARE MET IN THE PRESENT CASE
8.31. As explained in the previous Section, the condition triggering the
defence based on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus is that the
Applicant State has breached its obligations resulting from the Treaty if
said provisions are the quid pro quo of the allegedly breached obligations
of the Respondent. In the present case,
(i) Greece committed itself to withhold its objections to
the FYROM’s participation to international
organisations of which Greece was a member in
exchange for the FYROM’s commitment:
- to cease its irredentist and other antagonizing
behaviour;
- to be referred to as the FYROM in international
organisations;
- and to negotiate in good faith. Moreover,
(ii) the FYROM has repeatedly breached its obligations,
as will be shown in the present Section.
8.32. In effect, as stated in the Verbal Note dated 15 May 2008:
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been
materially breaching the In terim Accord since its
conclusion, by asserting and s upporting territorial claims
against Greece (material breach of Articles 2, 3 and 4), by
promoting and condoning irredentism (material breach of
Article 6(2)), by allowing and not discouraging acts
inciting violence, hatred and hostility against Greece
(material breach of Article 7(1)), by continuing, without
any justification, the ina ppropriate use of symbols
pertaining to the historic and cultural patrimony of Greece
despite the protest of the latter (material breach of Article
7(3)) and by prohibiting histor ical research [...] which
constitutes a material breach of Article 8(1). There is
abundant and undisputable ev idence corroborating these
179 material breaches of the In terim 469ord by the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”
And, in close relation to the presen t case, the FYROM has promoted by
all means the circumvention of the Interim Accord by using its
constitutional name on multiple occasions and in multiple contexts.
8.33. The breaches of the Interim Accord by the FYROM have been
described in Chapter 4 of this Counter-Memorial. In this section, Greece
will draw attention only to the most egregious of those breaches: the
violations of Article 5 (A .), 6(2) (B.) and of Arti cle 7 (C.), (D.) and (E.).
The breaches concerning Article 11 have been analyzed in detail in
470
Chapter 7. They will be briefly restated below (F.).
A. Breach of Article 5: The FYROM’s Conduct Towards Negotiations
8.34. According to Article 5(1) of the Interim Accord:
“The Parties agree to con tinue negotiations under the
auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with
a view to reaching agreement on the difference
described in that resolution and in Security Council
resolution 817 (1993).”
SC res 845 (1993) “[u]rge[d] the parties to continue their efforts under the
auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the
remaining issues between them.” 471The commitment in Article 5(1) to
“continue negotiations” imports an oblig ation to act in good faith so that
the negotiations can reach a conclusi on, and necessarily entails from both
Parties a flexibility and openness, in particular, not to be intransigent with
regard to their initial positions.
8.35. The obligation to act in good faith appears in a number of ICJ
judgments, as well as in numerous awards of arbitral tribunals. In the Gulf
of Maine case, the Court referred to the “ duty to negotiate with a view to
reaching agreement, and to do so in good faith, with a genuine intention to
469 Memorial, Annex 51, Verbal Note dated 15 May 2008 from the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Sk opje to the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See
also, Memorial, Annex 43 Letter dated 23 May 2008 from the Permanent Representative
of Greece to the United Nations, John Mourikis, to th e United Nations Secretary-
General, UN doc. S/2008/346 (28 May 2008).
470 See above, paras. 7.91-7.93.
471 Memorial, Annex 22, United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)
(SC/RES/827) (7 April 1993).
180achieve a positive result.” 472 The same principle has been expressed by
473
several Judges of the ICJ in their opinions as well as by doctrinal
authorities. 474 The positive aspect of the obligation to negotiate entails
three more specific positive obligations, all of which are co-substantial
with the principle of good faith: (1) a State which adamantly persists in its
initial position throughout the negoti ation process does not negotiate in
475
good faith; (2) each party to the dispute must pay reasonable regard to
472
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada/US), Judgment of 12 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 292, para. 87
(emphasis added).
473 Dissenting Opinion of Ch. De Visscher, International Status of South West
Africa, Advisory Opinion o f 11 July 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.188; Separate Opinion
of Judge Dillard, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.159; Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Lachs, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969 , p. 219;
Separate Opinion of Nagendra Singh, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece/Turkey),
Judgment of 19 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p.47; Separate Opinion Judge Oda,
Interpretation of the agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, Advisory
Opinion of 20 December 1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.154; Separate Opinion Judge
Ruda, ibid, p. 124; Dissenting Opinion Judge Gros, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan
Arab Jamahirya), Judgment of 24 February 1982, I.C.J. Reports,1982, pp.144-145.
474 H. Thirlway, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
(1960-1989): General Principles and Sources of Law”, 60 BYIL 1989, p.25; R. Kolb, La
bonne foi en droit international thblic , Paris, PUF, 2000, p.588; H. W. Halleck,
International Law , Vol. 1, 4 ed., London, 1908, p.497; L. Oppenheim & H.
Lauterpacht, International Law, 8 thed., Vol. 1, London, p.1182; P. Daillier, M. Forteau
& A. Pellet, Droit international Public, 8 thed., Paris, 2009, pp. 924-927, para. 504; H.
Thierry, L’évolution du droit international , RCADI 1990-III, p.77; N. Kontou, The
Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary International Law ,
Oxford, 1994, pp.153-154; L. Caflisch, “The Law of International Waterways and Its
Sources”, in R. St. J.Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya,
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993, p.124; C. B. Bourne, “Procedure in the Development of
International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and to Negotiate”, 10 Canadian YIL
1972, p.224.
475
Claims arising out of decisions of the Mixed Graeco-German Arbitral Tribunal
set up under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles (Greece/Federal Republic
of Germany) , Award, 26 January 1972, UNRIAA, Vol. XIX, p.56: “[A] pactum de
negotiando is also not without legal consequences. It means that both sides would make
an effort, in good faith, to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution by way of a
compromise, even if that meant the relinquishment of strongly held positions earlier
taken. It implies a willingness for the purpos e of negotiation to abandon earlier positions
and to meet the other side part way”. See also, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal
Republic of Germany/Denmark) , Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969,
para.85: “[The Parties] are under an oblig ation so to conduct themselves that the
negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon
its own position without contemplating any modification of it”.
181the interests of the other party, in order to achieve an equitable solution; 476
and (3) the negotiations477all not merely consist of a formal process, but
shall be meaningful.
8.36. The general obligation to negotiate in good faith in international
law does not merely consist of the above three mentioned specific positive
obligations, but it further entails a se ries of obligations of abstention. In
particular, the principle prohibits de priving negotiations of their object
and purpose. T478Parties cannot di sregard the relevant negotiating
procedures; they must abstain from unilateral acts creating de facto
situations and abstain from acts, which could further aggravate the dispute
479
during the negotiation process.
476
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment of 25 July
1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, paras. 78-79: “… [t]he task [of the parties] will be to conduct
their negotiations on the basis that each must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the
legal right of the other… [the parties] are under mutual obligations to undertake
negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences concerning their
respective (fisheries) rights…”; see also Government of Kuwait v. American Independent
Oil Company (AMINOIL), Award of 24 March 1982, 66 ILR, p. 578 (emphasis added):
the general principle that ought to be observed in carrying out an obligation to negotiate
“is good faith as properly to be understood; sustained upkeep of the negotiations over a
period appropriate to the circumstances, awareness of the interests of the other party and
a persevering quest for an acceptable compromise”.
477 Claims arising out of decisions of the Mixed Graeco-German Arbitral Tribunal
set up under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles (Greece/Federal Republic
of Germany), Award, 26 January 1972, UNRIAA, Vol. XIX, p.64: “The negotiations to
be conducted must be guided by the following principles: (a) They shall be meaningful
and not merely consist of a formal process of negotiations. Meaningful negotiations
cannot be conducted if either party insists upon its own position without contemplating
any modification of it. (b) Both parties are under an obligation to act in such a way that
the principles of the Agreem ent are applied in order to achieve a satisfactory and
equitable result”. See also: Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland case, Advisory
Opinion of 15 October 1931, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 42 , p. 116; Interpretation of the
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt , Advisory Opinion of 20
December 1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 95; North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal
Republic of Germany/Denmark) , Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969,
para. 85; Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/US),
Judgment of 12 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 299; Legality of the threat or use
478Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 99.
Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne/France), Award, 16 November 1957, UNRIAA,
Vol. XII, p.307: “la réalité des obligations ainsi souscrites ne saurait être contestée et
peut être sanctionnée, par exemple, en cas de rupture injustifiée des entretiens, de délais
anormaux, de mépris des procédures prévues, de refus systématiques de prendre en
considération les propositions ou les intérêts adverses, plus généralement en cas
d'infraction aux règles de la bonne foi”(emphasis added).
479
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria) , Order of 5
December 1939, PCIJ, Series A./B., No. 79, p.199: “the principle universally accepted by
1828.37. Greece has participated in the several rounds of negotiations
organised by Special U.N. Representa tive Mathew Nimetz “with an open
480
mind, a spirit of good will, compromise and understanding.” It “has
always supported politically and ec onomically the Former Republic of
Macedonia aiming at the prosperity and st ability of this country as part of
481
our overall objective of prosperity and stability in the Balkans.” For the
settlement of the name issue, Greece has been prepared to make
compromises. In particular, it has “departed from [its] initial position and
has accepted the idea o482 compound name, which could also include the
term ‘Macedonia’.”
8.38. On sharp contrast, the FYROM has violated both its positive
obligations to act in good faith and it s obligations of abstention. The
following elements substantiate the violation of Article 5 of the Interim
Accord in relation to the two aspects of the general obligation to negotiate
in good faith.
8.39. As stated in Chapter 4, 483 the FYROM has refused to engage in
good faith negotiations. “[B]y adop ting a totally intransigent and
inflexible stance” 484 in the negotiations for the settlement of the name
issue, it has therefore violated Artic le 5(1) of the Accord. The FYROM
does not make any “efforts” to put an end to the name issue. That much is
international tribunals […] to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any
measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the
decision to be given and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which
might aggravate or extend the dispute”. See also Anglo-Iranian Co. (United
480gdom/Iran), Interim Protection, Order of 5 July 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 93.
Memorial, Annex 129, Greece, Aide Memoire [2007].
481 Ibid.
482 Memorial, Annex 43 Letter dated 23 May 2008 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nati ons, John Mourikis, to the United Nations
Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2008/346 (28 May 2008). See above paras. 4.10-4.11; see
also “Greece consider s Macedonia name”, BBC News , 8 April 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4425249.stm : Annex 114: “Greece has said the name
could be a basis for constructive negotiations. [...] Greek Foreign Minister Petros
Molyviatis told reports the suggestion did ‘n ot totally satisfy Greece, but it was a basis
for negotiations which Greece is ready to part ake in a positive and constructive spirit’.”;
and Letter sent by Prime Minister Karamanlis to the United Nations Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon, 14 April 2008: Annex 9: “In order to revitalize talks, in September 2007,
the Greek Government announced in Parliament that it was ready to accept a composite
name that could include ‘Macedonia’ as the basis for a mutually acceptable solution.
This represented a major unilateral change in our policy.”
483
484 See above, paras. 4.2-4.13.
Memorial, Annex 43 Letter dated 23 May 2008 from the Greek Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, John Mo urikis, to the United Nations Secretary-
General, UN doc. S/2008/346 (28 May 2008).
183patent from the words of the FYROM’s official authorities, be it President
Crvenkovski 485or Prime Minister Gruevski. 486 President Crvenkovski
even admitted that the FYROM’s insistence on the dual formula was used
as “a position for repealing the negotiations, or at least freezing them for a
long period.” 487 Accordingly, not only ha s the FYROM impaired the
negotiation process by adamantly persisting on its initial position, but it is
also knowingly sabotaging the negotiati ons and aggravating or extending
the dispute through its continuous use of its constitutional name as well as
488
through its violations of the Interim Accord.
8.40. It is true, as the FYROM notes, that “[t]hat Article imposes an
obligation of conduct, not of result.” 489 But an obligation of conduct is a
legal obligation 490 and it is obvious that it was for Greece an essential
condition for its willingness to c onclude the Inte rim Accord. The
inclusion of a provision about the pr ocess of negotiation to settle their
issue, as drafted in Article 5, resu lted from a disc ussion between both
Parties and is (or should be) of fundamental importance for both.
8.41. Such a breach can without doubt be defined as a material breach
given the global object and purpose of the Accord. Article 60 of the
Vienna Convention defines a material breach as being:
“(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the
present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a pr ovision essential to the
accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty.”
485 See above, para. 4.5 and 4.8.
486 See above, para. 4.6 and 4.9.
487 Stenography notes from the 7 sequel of the 27 session of the Parliament of the
Republic of Macedonia, held on 3 November 2008 : Annex 104.
488
489 See above, paras. 4.12-4.13.
490 Memorial, p. 67, para. 3.7.
North Sea Continental Shelf , Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports
1969, p. 47: the Parties “are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the
negotiations are meaningful”. See also ILC, Second Report on State Responsibility by J.
Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN doc. A/CN.4/498 at para. 53 (“In particular, ‘the
conditions in which an international obligation is breached vary according to whether the
obligation requires the State to take some particular action or only requires it to achieve a
certain result, while leaving it free to choose the means of doing so.’ The essential basis
of the distinction is that obligations of conduct, while they will have some purpose or
result in mind, determine with precision the means to be adopted; hence they are
sometimes called obligations of means. By contrast, obligations of result do not do so,
leaving it to the State party to determine the means to be used.”)
1848.42. The choice of the word “materia l” over the word “fundamental”
demonstrates that a material breach is not necessarily a breach of one of
the central provisions of the treaty. “[O]ther provisions considered by a
party to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty may have been
very material in inducing it to enter into the treaty at all, even though
these provisions may be of an ancillary character.” 491 The violation of
Article 5 of the Interim Accord qualifies as a material breach as one of the
raison d’être of the Accord is the settleme nt of the name issue through
negotiation. In fact, Security Council Res. 817 (1993) “urge[d] the parties
to continue to cooperate [...] in orde r to arrive at a speedy settlement of
their difference.”
8.43. Other provisions of the Accord such as Articles 2, 3, 4 and 7 are
also of central importance to the Respondent. Those are issues to which
Greece has been particularly sensitive before and during the negotiation of
the Accord. In particular, when the United Nations discussed the
FYROM’s accession to the Organisation, Greece pointed out the
“guarantees that the new state har bours no territorial claims against
Greece,” “the cessation of all h492ile propaganda” and the “termination of
the use of Greek symbols” as elements of concern and particular
interest for Greece. Any violation of those provisions by the FYROM are
necessarily to be considered as material breaches of the Interim Accord.
B. Breach of Article 6(2): Prohibit ion of Interference in Internal
Affairs
8.44. According to Article 6(2) of the Accord:
“The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares
that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in
Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as
constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party
of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of
another State in order to prot ect the status and rights of
any persons in other States who are not citizens of the
Party of the Second Part.”
491 ILC , Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 1966 , para. 9 of the commentary of Article 57 (now
Article 60).
492 Memorial, Annex 30, Letter dated 6 April 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations, Antonios Exarchos, to the President of
the Security Council, forwarding a letter dated 6 April 1993 to him from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Greece, Michael Papaconstantinou, UN doc. S/25543 (6 April 1993).
1858.45. Even though the FYROM has the oblig ation under Article 6(2) of
the Interim Accord and the 1992 amendment to its own Constitution 493 not
to interfere in Greece’s internal affairs, it 494 violated this obligation “by
promoting and condoning irredentism.” The interference in Greece’s
internal affairs is manifest in particular in the statements by the FYROM’s
officials about the existence of a “Macedonian minority” in Greece. 495
Another recent example is the statement, published on 4 February 2009 by
the German newspaper “ Tageszeitung,” of the FYROM’s Foreign
Minister, Mr. Milososki, regarding the existence of “a Macedonian-
speaking minority” in Greece “which is 496ot allowed to use its mother
tongue nor develop its cultural identity.” These kind of statements are
in gross violation of Article 6(2) of the Interim Accord. Similarly, the
assistance pr497ded by the FYROM to support associations promoting
irredentism is also in contravention of Article 6(2) of the Interim
Accord.
C. Breach of Article 7(1): Prohibition of Hostile Activities and
Propaganda
8.46. The same can be said in respect of Article 7(1):
“Each Party shall promptly take effective measures to
prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by State-
controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private
entities likely to incite viol ence, hatred or hostility
against each other.”
The concept of “propaganda” as presented in Article 7(1) encompasses
information intended to mislead and deceive the general public through
498
false and distorted presentations.
493
494 See above, para. 5 for the text of the Constitutional amendment.
Memorial, Annex 51, Verbal Note dated 15 May 2008 from the Greek Liaison
Office in Skopje to the FYROM’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
495 See examples of statements by Prim e Minister Butskovski, Prime Minister
Gruevski and Defense Minister Konjanovski, in Chapter 4, para 4.16-4.17 or 4.21.
496 Memorial, Annex 53, Note Verbale No. 140/G/AS 311, dated 24 February 2009
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republicto the FYROM’s Liaison
Office in Athens. See also above, para. 4.20.
497 See above, paras. 4.22-4.24.
498 See Encyclopedia of public international law, Published under the auspices of
the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Law under the Direction of
R. Bernhardt, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science B.V, 1997, volume III, pp. 1135 et seq. at p.
1135. For instance, the 1936 Geneva Convention concerning the use of broadcasting in
the case of peace includes, in its Article 3, an obligation to prevent broadcasts “likely to
harm good international understanding by statements the incorrectness of which is or
1868.47. The FYROM has violated Article 7( 1) of the Interim Accord e.g.,
on numerous occasions, by failing to pr otect: (i) the Greek Liaison Office
499
from outside demonstrations , (ii) the residence of the Head and the
Counsellor of the Greek Liaison Office 500, and (iii) the means of transport
of the Greek501aison Office and the Consular Mission as well as their
personnel.
8.48. Violations of Article 7(1) in clude the FYROM’s refusal to
intervene, invoking the freedom of expression, when citizens raised, on 29
March 2008, several outdoor billboards in the streets of Skopje 502ulting
the Greek flag by replacing the cross with a swastika. Another example
can be found in the publication of a photograph of the Greek Prime
ought to be known to the persons responsible for the broadcast.” This obligation may be
deemed customary international law or, at the very least, as an obligation of good
neighbourliness. The qualification of unlawful propaganda in international law concerns
incorrect or inaccurate presentations, inform ation or statements whose objective is
condemned by a given international legal norm. For instance, Article 4 of the
International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination provides
that “States Parties condemn all propaganda” wh ich attempts to promote or justify racial
discrimination. In customary international law, there is a growing tendency for
condemning propaganda likely to provoke or encourage any threat to peace, breach of
peace or act of aggression (see UN GA Resolution 110(II) adopted on 3 November 1947,
entitled ‘Measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war’). In the
same vein, UN GA Resolution 127(II), adopted on 15 November 1947, and UN GA
Resolution 634(VII), adopted on 16 December 1952, call upon UN Member States to
combat, within their constitutional limits, the diffusion of false or distorted reports likely
to injure friendly relations between States.
499
500 See above, para. 4.50-4.51 and 4.54.
501 See above, para. 4.53-4.55.
502 See above, paras. 4.52-4.53 and 4.55.
See above, para. 4.45. See also Answer of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. G.
Koumoutsakos regarding Skopje billboards insulting to the Greek flag, Athens, 30 March
2008 available at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/GoToPrintable.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&GUID={D0ACAF24-06AB-41A1-901D-34EFAD4487ED}: Annex 134: On March
30, 2008, the spokesman of the Minist ry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr.
Koumoutsakos, answering to a journalist’s question stated, among others, that “This
unacceptable poster, which was circulated via a private initiative and raised on Skopje’s
streets, directly insults our country’s natio nal symbol and our struggle against fascism
and Nazism. This incident demonstrates the huge mistake made by those who invest in
nationalism and bigotry. It also confirms, once again, the correctness of Greece’s
position that a necessary condition for the esta blishment of relations of solidarity and
allied relations is, in practice, respect of good-neighborly relations between countries and
peoples. Greece’s ambassador to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ms. A.
Papadopoulou, has been instructed, within the day, to make a strong demarche to the
Foreign Ministry of the neighboring country, requesting the immediate removal of the
offensive billboard”.
187Minister wearing a Nazi uniform in the March 2008 issue of FORUM, a
magazine owned by the FYROM’s former Foreign Minister, Mr.Casule. 503
8.49. Furthermore, since 2006, several verbal notes have been
exchanged on a consistent pattern of harassment including repeated
attacks perpetrated against the Gree k Liaison Office in S kopje. Greek
diplomatic staff have had their hom e and cars vandalised. Nevertheless,
the FYROM has failed to take any ad equate measures to prevent and
remedy such incidents. 504 In the same vein, following the manifestation of
19 February 2008 of up to one thousand demonstrators chanting anti-
Greek slogans and insults outside the Liaison Office, the Greek Liaison
Office stressed in a Verbal Note dated February 2008 “the obvious lack of
proper protection on behalf of the aut horities of the hos t country against
the latter’s obligation to guarantee th e accredited diplomatic missions the
necessary secure environment which will allow them to properly function
and discharge their duties.” 505
503
The photo was published on page 76 of the 31 March 2008 issue: Annex 161.
Those acts have been qualified as contravening the provisions of the Interim Accord by
the Greek Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis, in a Letter of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Hellenic Republic to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM, dated
24 March 2009 under Reference 1024, forwarded through Verbal Note F.141.1/24/AS
378, dated 27 March 2009 of the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje:
Annex 70.
504
See above, para. 4.56. See as examples : Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic
Liaison Office in Skopje No F/050/KG/2/AS 673, dated 29 May 2006: Annex 41; Verbal
Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 050/KG./1/AS 164, dated 5
February 2007: Annex 43; Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in
Skopje No F. 050/KG/2/AS 40, dated 14 January 2008: Annex 45; Verbal Note of the
Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 010.GS/2/AS 218, dated 11 February
2008: Annex 46; Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F.
050.SA/2/AS 340 dated 29 February 2008: Annex 49; Verbal Note of the Hellenic
Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 050/KG/5/AS 490, dated 24 March 2008:
Annex 50; Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No
F050/KG/7/AS 556, dated 7 April 2008: Annex 51; Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic
Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 010.GS/30/AS 672, dated 21 April 2008 : Annex 55;
Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F. 050.EP/2/AS 784,
dated 16 May 2008: Annex 57; Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in
Skopje No F 050/KG/15/AS 856, dated 30 May 2008: Annex 58; Verbal Note of the
Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje No F 010.GS/40/AS 990, dated 20 June
2008: Annex 59 (“The Liaison Office deeply re grets the fact that its premises are very
often left unsupervised and trusts that the competent authorities of the country will take
all adequate measures”); Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
505F. 050.BM/1/AS 1082, dated 9 July 2008: Annex 61.
See Verbal Note of the Hellenic Repu blic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F.
010.GS/7/AS 283, dated 20 February 2008: Annex 47; See also Verbal Note of the
1888.50. Not only has the FYROM not taken any measures to prevent the
attacks and hostile behaviour against Greek personnel, but it has also itself
engaged in, and tolerated, pro506 ganda. The propaganda has been 507
exercised in various ways, in particular at schools through textbooks.
Many of the textbooks attempt to inculcate a sense of injustice because of
508
the partition of Macedonia in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. The
FYROM’s propaganda is closely related to its irredentism and territorial
claims. History textbooks insist on the artificial construction of the
historic “Greater Macedonia” and present Greek historical figures as being
their ancestors. For example, stude nts can read in a Grade V history
textbook that “our fatherland has a long and rich history. In ancient times
it was a powerful state. In the reign of Philip II, Macedonia was the most
powerful state in the Balkan Peninsula. In the reign of his son, Alexander
of Macedonia, it spread out over three continents, and was a world
509
power.” The textbooks contain maps that wrongfully s ubstantiate the
existence of the “Greater Macedonia, ” which encompass a great part of
the actual province of Greek Macedonia. 510 Through historical
inaccuracies in the scho511textbooks and the “pro-minority” policy of the
FYROM authorities, people of the FYROM are induced in feeling the
injustice of living in a partitione d State and thus hatred for their
neighbours. This propaganda, dir ectly organised by the FYROM’s
authorities or indirectly through the funding of organisations or
festivities,512is a violation of Article 7(1) of the Interim Accord.
Furthermore, because the propaganda is closely related to the FYROM’s
Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje, No F 010.GSD/14/AS 314, dated 26
February 2008: Annex 48; see also above, para. 4.50-4.51.
506 See above, paras. 4.28-4.37.
507 See para. (e) of the Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in
Skopje No F. 141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15 April 2009: “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia has defied the territorial integrity of Greece, through a series of actions and
official statements, including the making, publication and promotion of maps, depicting
508ge areas of Greek territory as part of a distinct ‘Macedonian’ entity”: Annex 71.
See above, para. 4.31; see as an example: Blaze Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi,
Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook,
Grade VII, Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 131, Annex 94: “The Bucharest Peace
Treaty had grave political, ethnic and econ omic consequences for the Macedonian
people. The treaty meant that the territori al and ethnic unity of Macedonia was
disrupted”.
509 Kosta Atsievski, Darinka Petreska , Violeta Ackoska, Naum Dimovski and
Vanco Gjorgjiev, History Textbook, Grade V, Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 4: Annex
510
511 See above, para. 4.30.
512 See above, paras. 4.28-4.31 and 4.36.
See above, paras 4.38-4.45.
189irredentism, it is also in violat ion of the FYROM’s obligations under
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Interim Accord.
8.51. To insist that this is only an obligation of conduct bearing upon the
FYROM is to ignore that it is a legally binding513ligation, the breach of
which entails FYROM’s responsibility . And this too was a crucial
element which had induced Greece to sign the Interim Accord. Greece
raised its concern over the FYROM’s attitude of propaganda before and
during the negotiations of the Accord, in particular during the review of
the FYROM membership application to the United Nations.
“There are numerous indicati ons that the expansionist
propaganda aimed at the neighbouring Macedonian
province of Greece continues unabated. This is shown,
in particular, through the wide circulation within
F.Y.R.O.M. of maps portraying a greater Macedonia i.e.
incorporating parts of the territory of all its neighbouring
states, and of hostile literature usurping Greek symbols
and heritage.” 514
513
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its fifty-third
session, doc. A/56/10 (2001), Draft Articles on Responsibility of States on
Internationally Wrongful Acts, p. 145, para. 14 of the commentary of Article 14:
“Obligations of prevention are usually construed as best efforts obligations, requiring
States to take all reasonable or necessa ry measures to prevent a given event from
occurring, but without warranting that the event will not occur.” See also, ICJ, Judgment,
26 February 2007, Case concerning the application of the Convention on the prevention
and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro), para. 430: “the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of
result, in the sense that a State cannot bunder an obligation to succeed, whatever the
circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of State parties
is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them , so as to prevent genocide so
514 as possible” (emphasis added).
Memorial, Annex 26, Letter dated 25 January 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations, Antonios Exarchos, to the United
Nations Secretary-General, forwarding a letter and annex of the same date from the
Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michael Papaconstantinou, to the United Nations
Secretary- General, UN doc. S/25158 (25 January 1993). See also Memorial, Annex 30,
Letter dated 6 April 1993 from the Greek Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Antonios Exarchos, to the President of the Security Council, forwarding a letter
dated 6 April 1993 to him from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michael
Papaconstantinou, UN doc. S/25543 (6 Apr il 1993): “The cessation of all hostile
propaganda, particularly acts which could provoke public opinion and impede efforts
towards establishing good neighbourly relations” was one of the key elements for Greece
when considering the draft resolution for the admission of the FYROM to the United
Nations.
190Therefore, a breach by the FYROM of Article 7(1) clearly constitutes a
material breach within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention.
D. Breach of Article 7(2): Use of the “Sun of Vergina” by the FYROM
8.52. One additional violation of the Interim Accord is to be found in the 515
continued improper use by the FY ROM of the “Sun of Vergina.”
According to Article 7(2) of the Interim Accord:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party
of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the
symbol [i.e. the sun of Vergina] in all its forms
displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into
force.”
516
This provision was particularly important for Greece. In a draft
agreement of 14 May 1993 prepared by U.N. Mediators Cyrus Vance and
Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, it was mentioned in
draft Article 7(2) that “the Republic of Nova Makedonija agrees, as a 517
confidence building measure, not to use the Vergina Sun in any way.”
518
8.53. In a letter dated 3 July 1995, the World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO) informed Greece th at it had recorded its request to
have the Sun of Vergina recognised as a Greek State emblem, protected
under Article 6ter of the Paris Conventi on of the Protection of Industrial
Property. 519 In a Verbal Note dated 12 August 1995 addressed to the
WIPO, the FYROM objected to the protection of the Sun of Vergina
under its three forms as a State emblem of Greece, “due to the fact that
515
516 On the history of this symbol, see above, para. 2.19.
It was made clear that the symbol refe rred to in articl7(2) is the Sun of
Vergina in all its forms, in the letter of the Miniof Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr.
Karolos Papoulias, addressed to the Special Envoy of the UN Se cretary General , Mr.
Cyrus Vance, on 13 September 1995, which is the date of signing of the Interim Accord:
Annex 3.
517 Memorial, Annex 33, Letter dated 26 May 1994 from the United Nations
Secretary-General, Boutros B outros-Ghali, to the Presiden t of the Security Council,
forwarding the Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 817, UN
doc. S/25855 (28 May 1993) (emphasis added).
518 See letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Karolos Papoulias,
to the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, dated 22
May 1995, and the letter of reply of the Director General of WIPO dated 3 July 1995,
together with Note C.5682-551 of WIPO, dated 3 July 1995, addressed to the States
Parties to the Paris Convention: Annex 2.
519 Article 6 ter of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
191they are a copy of the state flag of the Republic of Macedonia.” 520 Despite
the conclusion of the Interim Accord in September 1995, the FYROM has
521
never withdrawn its objection.
8.54. As noted in Chapter 4 above, the FYROM continues to use the
“Sun of Vergina” as a symbol. For ex ample, in the August 2004 issue of
the official magazine of the FYROM’s Ministry of Defence, a short article
entitled “The emblem of the Technical Regiment of the Army,” displayed
a photo of the Sun of Vergina. 522In 2007, during the official celebration
of the Ilinden Uprising in Krushevo, which was attended by Prime
Minister Gruevski, the program included the use of flags displaying the
Sun of Vergina. 523 In 2007 the Ministry of Sciences financed the edition
of a treatise entitled “Macedonian National Minor ities in Neighbouring
Countries” in the paper cover of whic h the Sun of Vergina is displayed
twice, one of which was in the background of a ma p of “Greater
524
Macedonia”.
8.55. The Sun of Vergina is constantly displayed on the shield of the
Statue of Alexander the Great built on 15 October 2006 at the city of
525
Prilep as well as on the pa vement surrounding the Statue. The Sun of
Vergina is also regularly displayed at the entrance of the Special Hospital
for surgical diseases “Philip II,” founded nine years ago and located at the
premises of the militar526ospital of Skopje as we ll as on the webpage of
the Special Hospital.
8.56. In 2008, the Sun of Vergina was used in a televised program,
carried on behalf of the FYRO M’s government, bearing the title
527
“Macedonia Timeless.” Recently, the Sun of Vergina was displayed on
the pavement of the main square in the municipality of Gazi Baba. 528It
was also displayed on the website of the State Agency of Youth and Sport,
and in a leaflet, published and distributed by the FYROM’s Directorate of
Culture and Art of the Ministry of Culture. 529
520
521 See above, para 4.57.
522 See above, para 4.58.
See ibid.
523 See ibid.
524 See ibid.
525 See para 4.60.
526 See ibid.
527
528 See above para 4.59.
529See ibid.
See ibid.
1928.57. These acts are intentional violations by the FYROM of its
obligations under Article7(2) of the In terim Accord – use of the Sun of
Vergina on a national flag – and Article 7(3) – use of Greek symbols.
E. Breach of Article 7(3): Use of Historical and Cultural Symbols
8.58. Similarly, there is evidence that the FYROM has breached its
obligation under Article 7(3):
“If either Party believes one or more symbols
constituting part of its hist oric or cultural patrimony is
being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged
use to the attention of the other Party, and the other
Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate
why it does not consider it necessary to do so.”
The crux of this provisi on is that each party should abstain from using
symbols constituting part of the historic or cultural patrimony of the other
party, given the fact that such be haviour could undermine the objectives
of the Interim Accord, especially the establis hment of good neighbourly
relations and the avoidance of hatred or hostility against each other. The
drafters of the Interim Accord wanted to prevent the emergence of a
conflict between the two States over the use by one of the parties of a
historic or cultural symbol.
8.59. As shown in Chapter 4, the FY ROM obstinately uses Greece’s
historical and cultural symbols in clear breach of this provision. 530The
examples given thereof bear witness to the FYROM’s attempt to
appropriate Greece’s historic and cultural patrimony. The FYROM is
therefore in material breach of Arti cle 7(3) of the Interim Accord, as
recently noted again, in a Verbal Note dated 15 April 2009, concerning
“the decision to name the main stadium of Skopje after ‘Philip II, the
Macedon’” which “c531titute[s] a materi al breach of article 7 of the
Interim Accord.” Furthermore, those acts also constitute a violation of
Article 7(1) of the Interim Accord since they are acts of hostile
propaganda by the FYROM.
F. Breach of Article 11: Refere nce to the FYROM Under the U.N.
Name
530 See above, paras. 4.61-4.64.
531 Verbal Note from the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM, No. 141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15 April 2009:
Annex 71. See also “Decision on the renaming of the St adium of Skopje,” Official
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia,No 164 (29 December 2008), p. 7: Annex 107.
1938.60. Last – but certainly not least – the FYROM has breached Article
11(1) of the Interim Accord:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party
of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by
or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in
international, multilateral and regional organizations and
institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a
member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves
the right to object to any me mbership referred to above
if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be
referred to in such organization or institution differently
than in paragraph 2 of Unite d Nations Security Council
resolution 817 (1993).”
As shown above in th is Counter-Memorial, 532 the FYROM has breached
this obligation in many different oc casions, notably by insisting on using
its constitutional name in the U.N. One episode in particular is significant
in this respect: President Crven kovski’s address to the General
Assembly, 533while it stands out in its public and intentional violation of
534
the Interim Accord, it is part of a larger pattern.
8.61. A breach by the FYROM of its obligation not “to be referred to in
such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United
Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)” should be considered as
“material.” Moreover, such a breach lends itself particularly well to the
application of the exceptio since, as noted by the ILC:
“[…] the exception of non-performance ( exceptio
inadimpleti contractus) is best seen as a specific feature of
certain mutual or synallagmatic obligations and not a
circumstance precluding wrongfulness. The principle that a
State may not benefit from its own wrongful act is capable
of generating consequences in the field of State
responsibility but it is rather a general principle535an a
specific circumstance precluding wrongfulness.”
532 See above, paras. 7.91-7.93.
533 See above, para. 7.92.
534 See above, paras. 7.92-7.93.
535 ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 , vol. II,
part two, p. 72 (emphasis added). See also Judge Hudson’s Individual Opinion in the
case concerning the Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) : “It
194Since, in itself, the obligation be aring upon Greece by virtue of Article
11(1), is synallagmatic, the exception of non-performance fits well with
the principle.
8.62. Since the FYROM has grossly breach ed its part of the obligations
imposed upon the parties by Article 11( 1), this would have been a more
than sufficient basis for Greece not to comply with its own part of those
obligations. This being said, it must be repeated that, by no means, Greece
accepts the accusations by the FYROM that it has breached the obligation
in question. Simply, it results from the present Chapter that, had this been
the case, it would have been entitled to do so on the basis of the exceptio.
would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two parties have assumed
an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing non-
performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar
non-performance of that obligation by the other party. […]The exceptio non adimpleti
contractus required a claimant to prove that he had performed or offered to perform his
obligation (PCIJ, Series A/B No. 70, p. 77).
195 CHAPTER 9: REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
9.1. In its Submissions, the FYROM:
“Requests the Court:
(i) to adjudge and declare that the Respondent, through
its State organs and agents, has violated its obligations
under Article 11(1)of the Interim Accord; and
(ii) to order that the Re spondent immediately take all
necessary steps to comply with its obligations under
Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord, and to cease and
desist from objecting in any way, whether directly or
indirectly, to the Applicant’s membership of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisati on and/or of any other
“international, multilateral and regional organizations
and institutions” of which th e Respondent is a member,
in circumstances where the Applicant is to be referred to
in such organization or in stitution by the designation
provided for in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security
Council resolution 817 (1993).” 536
9.2. Greece will discuss successively each of these requests; it will also
briefly discuss the rather sibylline and inconsistent “Reservation of
Rights” made by the Applicant in paragraph 6.26 of its Memorial.
II. THE FYROM’S FIRST REQUEST
9.3. The first relief sought by the FY ROM is “a declaration that the
Respondent has acted illegally.” It does not call for extensive rebuttal. As
Greece has shown in this Counter-Memorial:
a. the Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of
the case brought by the FYROM;
b. even admitting the Court has jurisdiction, quod non,
Greece has not breached its obligation under Article 11
of the Interim Accord;
536
Memorial, p. 123.
196 c. even if Greece had breached its obligation, quod non,
it would have been entitled to do this, given the
numerous material breaches of the Accord attributable
to the FYROM.
9.4. This being said, if, against the evidence provided by Greece, the
Court were to find that it has jurisd iction and that the decision of the
NATO Summit of Bucharest – which is the only legal act the FYROM
can complain of – constituted an internationally wrongful act entailing the
responsibility of the Hellenic Republic , such a declaration by the Court
could have no effect and would be incompatible with the Court’s
exclusively judicial function. 537 The same would be true if the Court were
to accept the FYROM’s contentions of Greece’s alleged breach without,
at the same time, finding the numerous and serious violations of the 1995
Interim Accord by the FYROM.
9.5. Concerning the first point, it will be shown in the next section of
this Chapter that a hypothetical favourable finding for the FYROM could
have no effect at all since it is on ly NATO, which is absent from this
proceeding, which could give effect to the Court’s decision. As the Court
recalled in its 2004 Judgment in the case concerning Legality of Use of
Force:
“A decision of the Court s hould have, in the words of
the Judgment in the Northern Cameroons case, ‘some
practical consequence in the sense that it can affect
existing legal rights or obligations of the parties , thus
removing uncertainty from their legal relat538s’ ( I.C.J.
Reports 1963, p. 34; emphasis added).”
If only from this point of view, the circumstances of the present case are
very different from those prevailing in the Congo v. Uganda case which
has been invoked by the FYROM as a precedent. 539
9.6. As for the second point (a one-sided declaration failing to take the
FYROM’s breaches into account), it must be recalled that, as shown in
Chapters 4 and 8 of this Counter-M emorial, the FYROM has seriously
breached a number of its obligat ions under the 1995 Interim Accord.
Therefore, even if the C ourt were to find that it has jurisdiction, that
537 Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) , Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 37.
538 Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 295-296, para. 38.
539 See Memorial p. 114, para. 6.14.
197Greece had breached its obligation under Article 11(1) of the Accord, and
that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus cannot be invoked, it would be
unjust for the Court to make the d eclaration requested by the FYROM
without, at the same time, taking account of the material breaches
attributable to that State.
9.7. The FYROM has explained that “[t]he relief sought has been
narrowly crafted to meet the specific needs of the particular dispute that
has been referred to the Court by the Applicant, and does not require the
Court to express views on other matters that may divide the Parties but are
540
not in issue befo re the Court.” As narrow and se lf-serving as the
petition may be, the Applicant cannot deprive the Court of its jurisdiction
– which is “to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it” – by artificially redefining the scope of the dispute.
9.8. As the Court made clear in the Nuclear Tests cases:
“[T]he Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction enabling
it to take such acti on as may be required [...] to provide
for the orderly settlement of all matters in dispute
541
[...].
That mandate could not be achieved by a partial judgment limiting itself
to declaring that Greece would have breached its oblig ation under Article
11(1) of the Interim Accord, while ignoring the numerous breaches of that
same instrument by the FYROM. Once again, it must
“be emphasized that the Court possesses an inherent
jurisdiction enabling it to take such action as may be
required, on the one hand to en sure that the exercise of
its jurisdiction over the merits, if and when established,
shall not be frustrated, and on the other, to provide for
the orderly settlement of all matters in dispute, to ensure
the observance of the ‘inherent limitations on the
exercise of the judicial func tion’ of the Court, and to
‘maintain its judicial character’ ( Northern Cameroons,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, at p. 29). Such inherent
jurisdiction, on the basis of which the Court is fully
empowered to make whatever findings may be
necessary for the purposes just indicated, derives from
540
541 Memorial, p. 114, para. 6.2.
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 259,
para. 23; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 463,
para. 23 (emphasis added).
198 the mere existence of the Court as a judicial organ
established by the consent of States, and is conferred
upon it in order that its basic judicial functions may be
safeguarded.” 542
III. THE FYROM’S SECOND REQUEST
9.9. The second relief sought by the FYROM is “an order that the
Respondent take all necessary steps to restore the Applicant to the status
quo ante and to refrain from any action th at violates its obligation under
Article 11(1) in the future.” 543The FYROM links this relief with its
544
“continuing desire to receive an invitation to join NATO.”
9.10. In the first place, this does not correspond to the meaning of the
Safeguard Clause. The Safeguard Clause operates where the FYROM is to
be referred to in an or ganisation other than as designated in SC res 817
(1993). To prevent the clause from operating, it is not enough that the
FYROM “is to be referred to” – i.e., referred to once, or sporadically, or
less than “for all purposes.” As a consequence, the Court could not isolate
a single act from the set of obligations envisaged by Article 5 of the
Interim Accord, for that would amount to the Court’s endorsement, in
advance, of the types of violat ions which the FYROM h545been
committing and would continue to commit in the future.
9.11. It bears repeating that Greece does not have the power to decide
itself on the FYROM’s admission to NATO. Moreover, it is beyond the
power of the Court to order the FYROM’s admission to NATO.
Therefore, a decision by the Court granting the FYROM’s request would
be devoid of any effect, an outcome incompatible with the Court’s
inherent judicial function. 546
9.12. As the Court made clear in the Northern Cameroons case:
“it is not the function of a court merely to provide a
basis for political action if no question of actual legal
rights is involved. Whenever the Court adjudicates on
the merits of a dispute, one or the other party, or both
542
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment , I.C.J. Reports
1985, p. 23, para. 19.
543 Memorial, para. 6.1.
544 Memorial, para. 6.18.
545 See above, paras. 8.34-8.42.
546 See above, paras. 9.4-9.5. See also paras. 6.71-6.75.
199 parties, as a factual matter, are in a position to take some
retroactive or prospective action or avoidance of action,
which would constitute a compliance with the Court’s
judgment or a defiance thereof. That is not the situation
547
here.”
9.13. Nor is it the situation in the present case: the entity vested with the
competence to take the decision to invite the FYROM to join NATO –
which is the real objective of the Application – is not Greece but the
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty represented by the Heads of State and
Government of the Member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and
deciding “by unanimous agreement.” 548 The FYROM cannot evade this
reality by pretending that the purpose of its Application is only to seek
Greece’s compliance with Article 11(1), since precisely such a decision
by the Court could have – and would have – no effect.
9.14. The precedents invoked by the FYRO M in support of its request
are not in point for the present case. The FYROM relies on cases in which
the Court has ordered a State Party to a dispu549to “inform the authorities”
about the Court’s order and to enforce it. The decision of the Court had
to be applied by the State vis-à-vis its own authorities. The FYROM’s
logic would require Greece to have and exercise some sort of authority
within NATO which would compel that Organisation to change its
opinion about the FYROM’s admission. This is obviously an authority
that Greece does not possess.
9.15. Moreover, as for the FYROM’s requested remedies, the status quo
ante (re-establishing the situation existing before the Bucharest Summit)
550
was merely that of a MAP candidate. That same status continues to be
the status of the FYROM as of today. Therefore the remedy requested
from the Court would have and could have no effect.
9.16. In sum, if the Court were to satisfy the FYROM’s request it would
act beyond its judicial function since:
547
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) , Preliminary Objections,
548gment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38.
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty: “The Parties may, by unanimous
agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security othe North Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to th e Treaty by depositing its
instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The
Government of the United States of Ameri ca will inform each of the Parties of the
deposit of each such instrument of accession.”
549 Memorial, pp. 120-121, paras. 6.23-6.25.
550 See above, para. 5.33-5.47.
200 (a) the effect of such a finding would entirely depend
on an entity other than Greece – that is on NATO; and
(b) in any case, by so do ing, the Court would do no
more than state the obvious, i.e., that the Interim Accord
– which is a treaty – must be complied with in
accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
IV. THE FYROM’S “RESERVATION OF RIGHTS”
9.17. The FYROM’s prayer at the end of its Memorial for a “reservation
of rights” is also unfounded.
9.18. According to this single short paragraph:
“In its Application, the Appli cant reserved its right ‘to
modify and extend the terms of this Application, as well as
the grounds involved’. For th e avoidance of doubt, the
Applicant wishes to make clear that this reservation of
right extends to the relief sought , in the event that further
acts of the Respondent require any such additional relief to
be sought.” 551
9.19. It is difficult to discern in this sweeping and es sentially vacuous
assertion what rights the FYROM re fers to and how they would be
552
“reserved.”
9.20. Unless it is a routine precaution (and even then one of doubtful
utility), the “reservation” serves no obvious purpose. If it means that the
FYROM reserves its so-called “right” to “request the Court […] (ii) to
order that the Respondent immediately take all necessary steps to comply
with its obligations under Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord, and to
cease and desist from objecting in any way, whether directly or indirectly,
to the Applicant’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and/or of any other ‘international, multilateral and regional organizations
and institutions’ of which the Respondent is a member […]”:
(i) this has already been done in the Memorial, being a
word-for-word repetition of th e Submissions appearing at
553
the end of it;
551 Memorial, p. 122, para. 6.26.
552 “The Applicant reserves the right to modify and extend the terms of this
Application, as well as the grounds involved.” (Application, para. 25).
553 Memorial, p. 123, second request.
201 (ii) as for the FYROM’s other prayers, they encounter the
same hurdle – i.e., it is inappropriate and contrary to the
Court’s judicial function to simply re-state the obvious:
that the Interim Accord must be implemented (by both
States); 554
(iii) moreover, it runs against the mission of the Court
which is to “decide […] such disputes which are submitted
to it”: “the Court can exercise its jurisdiction in contentious
proceedings only when a dispute genuinely exists between
the parties”; 555no dispute, no jurisdic tion; it is therefore
not for the Court to anticipate hypothetical situations and to
decide upon them before they have arisen.
9.21. The “explanation” given by the Applicant for its unusual second
request explains nothing:
“The Order sought, which is c onsistent with the approach
reflected in Article 30 of the ILC Articles, is not, however,
limited to the issue of NATO membership. It also relates to
other ongoing or future appli cations on the part of the
Applicant for membership of ‘any other "international,
multilateral and regional organizations and institutions"’,
including any procedures related to the Applicant’s
application for membership of the European Union. This
aspect of the relief sought is motivated by the Applicant’s
serious concern that the Res pondent will adopt in relation
to the EU the unlawful appr oach that characterized its
action on 3 April 2008 in respect of NATO. An Order by
the Court to deal with present and future conduct is needed
to bring to an immediate end the conduct of the
Respondent that is wholly inconsistent with the
requirements of Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord.” 556
9.22. The FYROM gives no explanation for its “serious concern,” nor
does it recall that the admission pro cess within the EU is a long and
rigorous one and that the negotiations with the Counc il have yet even to
start. The FYROM applied to join the EU in March 2004. As the General
554 See ICJ, Judgment, 13 July 2009, Dispute regarding navigational and related
rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), paras. 148, 150 and 155.
555 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 271,
para. 57; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 477,
para. 60.
556 Memorial, pp. 119-120, para. 6.21 – footnote omitted; see also p. 114, para. 6.4.
202Affairs Council declared during its Brussels meeting on 7 and 8 December
2009:
“32. The Council notes that the Commission recommends
the opening of accession negotiations with the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and will return to the
matter during the next Presidency.
33. Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a
negotiated and mutually accep table solution on the name
issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential. The
Council is encouraged by recent positive developments
concerning the relations between Greece557d the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”
9.23. Moreover, the FYROM’s threat to implement its “reservation of
rights” would materially modify and extend the scope of the dispute as
clearly defined in the Memorial:
“To be clear, and as described in Chapter V, the Applicant
is concerned only with the international responsibility of
the Respondent, arising out of the actions attributable to it
in relation to its objection to the Applicant’s membership of
NATO.” 558
9.24. As recently noted by the Court in a case where the Applicant had
559
“reserved its ‘right to supplement or to amend’ the Application”:
“[t]here is no doubt that it is for the Applicant, in its
Application, to present to the Court the dispute with which
it wishes to seise the Court and to set out the claims which
it is submitting to it” ( Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.
Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 447, para. 29). Article 40, paragraph 1, of
the Statute of the Court requires moreover that the ‘subject
of the dispute’ be indicated in the Application; and Article
38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court requires ‘the precise
557 Conclusions of the 2984 thGeneral Affairs Council meeting on
enlargement/stabilization and association pr ocess, Brussels, 7 and 8 December 2009,
endorsed by the European Council, Conclusions, 10/11 December 2009, para. 39: Annex
14: “The European Council endorses the Coun cil conclusions of 8 December 2009 on
Enlargement and the Stabilisation and Association Process.”
558 Memorial, p. 115, para. 6.6 (emphasis added by Greece).
559 ICJ, Judgment of 8 October 2007, Case concerning territorial and maritime
dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, para. 104.
203 nature of the claim’ to be sp ecified in the Application. In a
number of instances in the past the Court has had occasion
to refer to these provisions. It has characterized them as
‘essential from the point of vi ew of legal security and the
good administration of justice’ and, on this basis, the Court
held inadmissible certain new claims, formulated during
the course of proceedings, which, if they had been
entertained, would have transformed the subject of the
dispute originally brought be fore it under the terms of the
Application (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 69; Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 447, para. 29; see also Prince von
Pless Administration, Order of 4 February 1933, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14, and Société Commerciale de
Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C. I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p.
173).560
9.25. Extending an Application expressl y limited to “the international
responsibility of the Respondent, arising out of the actions attributable to
it in relation to its objection to the Applicant’s membership of NATO ” to
the Respondent’s alleged responsibility for a future postulated objection to
the admission of the FYROM in ot her organisations would clearly
transform “the subject of the dispute originally brought before” the Court.
9.26. There can therefore be no doubt th at the “reservation of rights”
invoked by the FYROM is inadmissible and must be dismissed
straightaway.
560
Ibid., para. 108. See also ICJ, Judgment of 4 June 2Certain questions of
mutual assistance in criminal matters (Djibouti v. France), para. 87.
204 SUBMISSIONS
On the basis of the preceding evidence and legal arguments, the
Respondent, the Hellenic Republic, re quests the Court to adjudge and
declare:
(i) That the case brought by the FYROM before the Court does not
fall within the jurisdiction of the C ourt and that the FYROM’s claims are
inadmissible;
(ii) In the event that the Court finds that it has jurisdiction and that the
claims are admissible, that the FYROM’s claims are unfounded.
19 January 2010
___________________ ____________________
Georges Savvaides Maria Telalian
Agents of the Hellenic Republic
205206 CERTIFICATION
We certify that the annexes are true copies of the documents referred to
and that the translations provided are accurate.
__________________ __________________
Georges Savvaides Maria Telalian
Agents of the Hellenic Republic
207208 LIST OFANNEXES
VOLUME II
PART A
UNITED NATIONSAND OTHER INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS
DOCUMENTS
Annex 1 European Council in Lisbon, Conclusions of the Presidency,
doc. SN 3321/1/92 Lisbon 26/27 June 1992, available at:
http://www.europarl.eu/summits/lisbon/default_en.htm
Annex 2 Letter of the Minister of ForeignAffairs, Mr Karolos Papoulias,
to the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, dated 22 May 1995, Letter in reply of the
Director General of WIPO dated 3 July 1995, together with
Note C.5682-551, dated 3 July 1995, addressed to the States
Parties to the Paris Convention, and Verbal Note of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FYROM dated 12August
1995, communicated through WIPO’s Note C-5704-551,
dated 30August 1995.
Annex 3 Letter of the Minister of ForeignAffairs of Greece,
Mr. Karolos Papoulias, addressed to the Special Envoy of the
United Nations Secretary General Mr. Cyrus Vance, dated 13
September 1995 and Letter in reply, dated 13 September 1995,
available at : the United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1891, I-32193, p. 15-16
Annex 4 Official Journal of the European Union, 20 March 2004,
L 84/3, L/84/7 and L/84/9
Annex 5 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Sixty Second Session, 4th Plenary Meeting,
doc.A/62/PV.4, 25 September 2007
Annex 6 Letter dated 4 October 2007 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations, John Mourikis,
addressed to the Secretary-General, doc.A/62/470-S/2007/592,
dated 5 October 2007
209Annex 7 Letter dated 17 October 2007 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of the FYROM to the United Nations,
addressed to the Secretary-General, doc.A/62/497-S/2007/621,
dated 19 October 2007
Annex 8 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly
Sixty Second session, Third Committee, document
A/C.3/62/SR.42, 28 January 2008
Annex 9 Letter of the Prime Minister of Greece to the Secretary General
of the United Nations, dated 14April 2008, forwarded to the
United Nations Secretary General by Letter ofAmbassador
John Mourikis, Permanent Representative of Greece to the
United Nations under reference F.4608/434/AS1121
Annex 10 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the FYROM to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General,
UN doc.A/63/552-S/2008/718, dated 19 November 2008
Annex 11 Verbal Note of the Permanent Mission of Greece in Geneva
No 6778.6/18/AS 2610, dated 23 November 2009, Verbal Note
of the WIPO in reply, dated 26 November 2009 and relevant
web pages of WIPO
Annex 12 Letter of the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United
Nations, doc.A/63/712-S/2009/82, dated 10 February 2009
Annex 13 Letter of the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United
Nations, doc. A/63/869-S/2009/285, dated 3 June 2009
Annex 14 Conclusions of the European Council dated 10/11 December
2009 and Conclusions of the 2984th GeneralAffairs Council
meeting on enlargement/stabilization and association process,
Brussels, 7 and 8 December 2009
NATO DOCUMENTS, OFFICIALSTATEMENTSAND PRESS RELEASES
Annex 15 OTAN Documentation sur l’Organisation du Traité de
l’Atlantique Nord, Analyse du Traité, Publication OTAN,
Service de l’Information, Paris, 1962, p. 18
210 Annex 16 Agreement among the States Parties to the NorthAtlantic
Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for
Peace regarding the status of their forces, Brussels 19 June 1995
Annex 17 Additional Protocol to theAgreement among the States Parties
to the NorthAtlantic Treaty and the other States participating in
the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces,
Brussels 19 June 1995
Annex 18 NATO Press Release M-1 (97) 81, Madrid Declaration on
Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of
State and Government, 8 July 1997
Annex 19 NATO Handbook Documentation, NATO Office of Information
1999, pp. 166-193, 335-369
Annex 20 Press Release NAC-S (99)64, An Alliance for the 21st Century.
Washington Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State
and Government in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999
Annex 21 Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Membership Action Plan (MAP),
dated 24April 1999
Annex 22 NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006,
33-41,183-190 pp.
Annex 23 NATO Press Release (2006)150, Riga Summit Declaration,
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga
on 29 November 2006
Annex 24 NATO, “Prime Minister of former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia visits NATO”, 14 February 2007, available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_7492.htm
Annex 25 NATO Press Release, (2007) 130, Final Communiqué.
Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held
at NATO Headquarters Brussels, 7 December 2007
211 Annex 26 Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of the FYROM,
Nikola Gruevski, 23 January 2008, available at :
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7381.htm
Annex 27 NATO, Press release, Prime Minister of FYROM
discusses membership aspirations with NATO Allies,
23 January 2008, available at :
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/01-january/e0123b.html
Annex 28 Opening Statement by NATO Secretary General at the
Meeting of the NorthAtlantic Council, 6 March 2008, available
http://www.nato.iatt/:cps/en/natolive/opinions_7550.htm
Annex 29 Press Conference by NATO Secretary General following the
Meeting of the NorthAtlantic Council of 6 March, 2008,
at: available
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7551.htm
Annex 30 Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman, JamesAppathurai,
3April 2008, available at:
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403e.html
Annex 31 Press Conference by NATO Secretary General following the
NorthAtlantic Council Summit meeting, 3April 2008,
available at : http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403g.html
Annex 32 NATO Press Release (2008) 153, Final Communiqué. Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers
held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 3 December 2008
Annex 33 Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop
Scheffer after the informal Meeting of NATO Defence
Ministers, with Invitees with non NATO ISAF Contributing
Nations, Cracow, Poland, dated 19 February 2009, available at:
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090219c.html
Annex 34 NATO, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer at the International Conference “NATO Enlargement
Ten Years OnAchievement, Challenges, Prospects”,
dated 12 March 2009, available at :
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_51768.htm
212 Annex 35 NATO Press Release (2009) 044, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit
Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009
Annex 36 NATO Press Release (2009) 190 Final Statement-Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers
held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, dated 4 December 2009
Annex 37 NATO, “NATO summit meetings”, available at:
//www.nato.int/stp:s/summits/index.html
Annex 38 NATO, “NATO enlargement”, available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Annex 39 Letter from the Prime Minister of the FYROM to the Minister
of ForeignAffairs of Greece, dated 21 January 1999
Annex 40 Letter from the Minister of ForeignAffairs of Greece to the
Prime Minister of the FYROM, dated 22 January 1999
Annex 41 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F/050/KG/2/AS 673, dated 29 May 2006
Annex 42 Verbal note of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the FYROM,
No 32-4355/1, dated 1 June 2009
Annex 43 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 050/KG./1/AS 164, dated 5 February 2007
Annex 44 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 050/KG/8/AS 1245, dated 28August 2007
Annex 45 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 050/KG/2/AS 40, dated 14 January 2008
Annex 46 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
F. 010.GS/2/AS 218, dated 11 February 2008
213Annex 47 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 010.GS/7/AS 283 dated 20 February 2008
Annex 48 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 010.GS/14/AS 314, dated 26 February 2008
Annex 49 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 050.SA/2/AS 340, dated 29 February 2008
Annex 50 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 050/KG/5/AS 490, dated 24 March 2008
Annex 51 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 050/KG/7/AS 556, dated 7April 2008
Annex 52 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 640/2/AS 557, dated 7April 2008
Annex 53 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
NoF. 640/5/AS 579, dated 10April 2008
Annex 54 Letter ofAmbassador Mourikis Permanent Representative of
Greece to the United Nations to H.E.Ambassador Wang
Guangya Permanent Representative of China to the United
Nations, dated 14April 2008, Ref. F.4608/450/AS 1161
Annex 55 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/30/AS 672, dated 21April 2008
Annex 56 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 203.AM/3/AS 691, dated 5 May 2008
Annex 57 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 050.EP/2/AS 784, dated 16 May 2008
Annex 58 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
NoF. 050/KG/15/AS 856, dated 30 May 2008
Annex 59 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/40/AS 990, dated 20 June 2008
214Annex 60 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/42/AS 1012, dated 27 June 2008
Annex 61 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 050.BM/1/AS 1082 dated 9 July 2008
Annex 62 Letter of the Prime Minister of the FYROM to the Prime
Minister of Greece, dated 10 July 2008
Annex 63 Letter of the Prime Minister of Greece to the Prime Minister
of the FYROM, dated 17 July 2008
Annex 64 Letter of the Prime Minister of the FYROM addressed to the
Secretary General of the United Nations, dated 24 July 2008,
forwarded through Verbal Note No 4/160 of the Permanent
Representative of the FYROM to the United Nations
Annex 65 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/2/AS 3, dated 2 January 2009
Annex 66 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
dated 15 January 2009
Annex 67 Verbal Note of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Hellenic
Republic No. 140/G/AS 311, dated 24 February 2009
Annex 68 Letter of the Minister of ForeignAffairs of the FYROM
to the Minister of ForeignAffairs of Greece, dated 13 March
2009, forwarded through Verbal Note No 01-64/09 of the
Liaison Office of the FYROM inAthens, dated 16 March 2009
Annex 69 Verbal Note No. 32-2530/1 of the FYROM's Ministry of
ForeignAffairs, dated 19 March 2009
Annex 70 Letter of the Minister of ForeignAffairs of Greece to the
Minister of ForeignAffairs of the FYROM, dated 24 March
2009 under Reference 1024, forwarded through Verbal Note
F.141.1/24/AS 378, dated 27 March 2009 of the Liaison Office
of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje
215Annex 71 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 141.1/48/AS 488, dated 15April 2009
Annex 72 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No 141.1/49/AS 489, dated 15April 2009 and Verbal Note of
the Ministry of the FYROM No 32-4354/1 in reply
Annex 73 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/23/AS 720, dated 1 June 2009 and Verbal Note
No 93-1741/4 of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the
FYROM dated 10 July 2009 in reply
Annex 74 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/24/AS 758, dated 2 June 2009 and Verbal Note
No 93-1740/4 of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the
FYROM dated 10 July 2009 in reply
Annex 75 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No. 141.11A/151/AS 741, dated 3 June 2009
Annex 76 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 010.GS/27/AS 837, dated 22 June 2009, Verbal Note of
theA3 Directorate of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the
Hellenic Republic No 1178, dated 7 July 2009, and Verbal Note
No 93-1923/4 in reply of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the
FYROM dated 10 July 2009
Annex 77 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 141.1A/218/AS 1114, dated 25August 2009
Annex 78 Verbal Note of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the FYROM,
No 32-4354/2, dated 26August 2009
Annex 79 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje,
No F. 010.GS/44/AS 1356, dated 12 October 2009
Annex 80 Verbal Note of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No F. 141.1/144/AS 1531, dated 12 November 2009
216 VOLUME II
PART B
OFFICIALPUBLICATIONS
AND PUBLICATIONS FINANCED BYTHE FYROM
Annex 81 School Maps of the FYROM, Svetozar Naumovski, Novica
Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski and Stojan Kiselinovski,
History Textbook, Grade II, Skopje 1992 at p. 44, Blagoj
(ed.), Cukarski History Atlas for primary school, Skopje 1997
at p.p. 72 and 85
Annex 82 “Law on Scientific and ResearchActivities”, Official Gazette
of the Republic of Macedonia, No 13, 15 March 1996
Annex 83 Jove Dimitrija Talevski, The Borders of the Republic of
Macedonia/ Granicite na Republika Makedonije, Herakli
Komerc, Bitola, 1998, p.300, maps number 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7
at pp. 22-29
Annex 84 Novica Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselonovski
and Svetozar Naumovski, History Textbook, Grade VIII,
Skopje 1998, p. 38
Annex 85 Aleksandar Stojmilov, Geography Textbook, Grade II,
Skopje 2002, p. 93
Annex 86 Vance Stojcev, Military History of Macedonia, volumes I and
II, Published by the MilitaryAcademy “General Mihailo
Apostolski”, Jugoreklam, Skopje 2004
Annex 87 Defense, No 100,August 2004, Official magazine of the
Ministry of Defense of the FYROM, p. 33
Annex 88 “Program for CelebrationAnniversaries of Major Events and
Important Persons for the year 2004”, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Macedonia No 6, 13 February 2004, p.4 and
“Decision on Fund Distribution from the Budget of the
Republic of Macedonia for the year 2004 to Finance
Associations and Foundations”, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Macedonia No 41, 24 July 2004, pp. 12-13
217 Annex 89 Vlado Velkovski, Halid Sejdi,ArijanAljademi, Dimka Risteska
and Gjorgji Pavlovski, History Textbook, Grade VIII, Skopje
2005, map of “the partition of Macedonia”, p. 54
Annex 90 Map of “partitioned Macedonia at the time of the First World
War” in Blaze Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski,
Stojan Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook,
VIII Grade , Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2006, p. 14
Annex 91 KostaAtsievski, Darinka Petreska, VioletaAckoska, Naum
Dimovski and Vanco Gjorgjiev, History Textbook, Grade V,
Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 4
Annex 92 Map of the Roman Empire in KostaAtsievski, Darinka
Petreska, VioletaAckoska, Naum Dimovski and Vanco
Gjorgjiev, History Textbook, Grade V, Skopje 2005,
Reprinted 2008, p. 79
Annex 93 Map of Macedonia and the Balkans in prehistoric times in
KostaAtsievski, Darinka Petreska, VioletaAckoska, Naum
Dimovski and Vanco Gjorgjiev, History Textbook, Grade V,
Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 20 as well as map of
Macedonia at the time of the Ilinden uprising in Blaze
Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan
Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook,
VII Grade , Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 120
Annex 94 Blaze Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan
Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook, Grade
VII , Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 131
Annex 95 Blaze Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan
Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook,
VIII Grade , Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, pp.46,47
Annex 96 Use of the term "Aegean part of Macedonia" in Blaze
Ristovski, Shukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan
Kiselinovski and Todor Cepreganov, History Textbook,
VIII Grade , Skopje 2005, Reprinted 2008, p. 151 and Novica
Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselonovski and
Naumovski,Svetozar History Textbook, Grade VIII,
Skopje 1998, p. 120
218 Annex 97 Milan Boshkoski, Nebi Dervishi, Dimko Popovski, Jordan
Iliovski, Natasha Kotlar, Silvana Sidorovski-Chupovska,
History Textbook, Grade II, Skopje 2006, p. 198
Annex 98 “Opening of the Procedure for the construnction of the
monument ofAlexander the Great”, Official Gazette of the
Municipality of Skopje, No 10, 18 December 2006
Annex 99 Stenography notes from the 19th session of the Parliament of
the Republic of Macedonia, held on 21 December, 2006, p.19/5
Annex 100 Frosina Tashevski-Remenski, Macedonian National Minorities
in Neighbouring Countries. Current Situation, Skopje 2007,
Editor “2August C”, p. 382
Annex 101 Official Report released by the Office of the Prime Minister of
the FYROM, dated 2August 2007
Annex 102 Gjorgji Pavlovski, Nikola Panov,Ace Milenkovski and Risto
Mijalov, Geography Textbook, Grade VII, Skopje 2008, p. 42
Annex 103 “PM Gruevski condemns detention of Macedonian journalists
in Greece”, available at the Official site of the Government of
the FYROM: http://www.vlada.mk/?q=book/export/html/1319,
dated 14 October 2008
Annex 104 Stenography notes from the 7th sequel of the 27th session of
the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, held on 3
November 2008, p.p. 1, 10-17
Annex 105 AnnualAddress of Branko Crvenkovski, President of the
FYROM in Parliament, Stenography Notes from the 37th
Session of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia ,
held on 18 December 2008
Annex 106 “Decision on the naming of the highway E-75 from border
crossing Tabanovce up to border crossing Bogorodica
X)”, (Corridor Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia
No 164, 29 December 2008, p. 5
219 Annex 107 “Decision on the renaming of the Stadium of Skopje”, Official
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 164, 29 December
2008, p. 7
Annex 108 Blaze Ristovski (ed.), Macedonian Encyclopedia, Macedonian
Academy of Sciences andArts, Vol.1, Skopje 2009, p. 514
Annex 109 Blaze Ristovski (ed.), Macedonian Encyclopedia, Macedonian
Academy of Sciences andArts, Vol.2, Skopje 2009, p. 891
Annex 110 “Diaspora”, available at the Official website of the FYROM’s
Ministry of ForeignAffairs :
http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemId=340
Annex 111 a) Photo of the Sun of Vergina at the entrance of the Special
Hospital “Phillip II”, b) photo of the building of the Special
Hospital available at :
http://www.cardiosurgery.com.mk/00_news_and_events.htm,
c) the Sun of Vergina appearing as a logo of the “Special
VTORI” FILIP Hospital
available at the site http://www.cardiosurgery.com.mk
PRESS ARTICLES AND STATEMENTS
Annex 112 I. Bojadziski, “Ahumble celebration with non hidden
emotions”, Makedonija Denes, dated 14April 1999
Annex 113 Mente Petkovski, “Greece does not deserve Olympics”
Dnevnik, dated 26 July 2004
Annex 114 “Greece considers Macedonia name”, BBC News, 8April 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4425249.stm
Annex 115 Petse Stefanovski, “The pan-macedonian meeting in Trnovo”,
A1 Television, dated 31 July 2005
Annex 116 “ Prime Minister Butskovski at Brest village. European
Standards and Rights for the Children Refugees”, Dnevnik,
dated 25April 2006
220Annex 117 “The new government will solve the problem of the Expelled
Macedonians”, Utrinski Vesnik, dated 31 July 2006
Annex 118 Statement of the Minister of ForeignAffairs of the FYROM on
25 October 2006, “Macedonia will strengthen its care of the
minorities living in the neighboring countries” Makfaxonline,
dated 25 October 2006
Annex 119 Statement of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis
regarding Skopje’s decision to rename its international airport,
Athens, 28 December 2006
Annex 120 Speech of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis to the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense and
ForeignAffairs,Athens, 20 February 2007
Annex 121 Answer of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. G. Koumoutsakos
to a journalist's question regarding the US House of
Representatives resolution on former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia propaganda,Athens, 4 May 2007
Annex 122 Statement of Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr. G.Koumoutsakos
regarding today's statements from the FYROM President
Mr. Crvenkovski,Athens, 3 June 2007
Annex 123 Petse Stefanovski, “Border Meeting in Trnovo. The Borders
will fall down with the Unity of Macedonians”, Vreme, dated
30 July 2007
Annex 124 Zanetta Zdravkovska, “Gruevski at theAll Macedonian
Gathering in Trnovo. TheAegean Macedonians will realize
their rights after accession in the EU,” Dnevnik,
dated 30 July 2007
Annex 125 Photos of the Sun of Vergina in Monika Taleska,
“The persons who participated at the Ilinden uprising
encouraged us to open a new Ilinden page”, Utrinski Vesnik,
dated 3August 2007
221 Annex 126 Christo Ivanovski: “Interview : Zoran Petrov, Deputy Minister
of ForeignAffairs : “We have an obligation towards two
million Macedonians in the neighborhood”,Dnevnik,
2007 August 15
Annex 127 Statement of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Dora Bakoyannis
regarding statements made by FYROM President
Mr. Crvenkovski, 13 September 2007
Annex 128 “Prime Minister Gruevski’s statement on Nimetz’s draft-frame
work of understanding”, Macedonian Information Agency,
dated 2 November 2007 available at:
http://www.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?vId+29113595&lId=2
Annex 129 Press Release of the Office of the Prime Minister of the
FYROM, dated 17 December 2008, available at:
http://www.vlada.mk/?=node/1916
Annex 130 Slobodanka Jovanovska, “NATO is preparing invitation asking
for a solution on the name”, Utrinski Vesnik, dated 24 January
2008
Annex 131 Svetlana Jovanovska, “NATO confirms the progress of
Macedonia”, Dnvenik, dated 24 January 2008
Annex 132 “Gruevski: The imposed problem with Greece is a precedent
which is harming theAlliance”, Macedonian Information
Agency , dated 26 February 2008
Annex 133 Statements of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis
and NATO Secretary General Mr. Scheffer following their
meeting, dated 3 March 2008
Annex 134 Spokesman of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Greece,
Mr. Koumoutsakos regarding Skopje billboards insulting to
the Greek flag, 30 March 2008
Annex 135 “NATO Bucharest 2008-Milososki: No invitation for
Macedonia, defeat of NATO principles”, Macedonian
Agency Information , dated 3April 2008, available at
http://www.mia.mk/default.aspx?vId=40811596&lId=2
222 Annex 136 “PM Gruevski, Prince GhazanfarAli Khan agree on development
of relations between Macedonian and Hunza people”,
Macedonian Information Agency, dated 11 July 2008, available
http://www.mia.mka/tdefault.aspx?vId=52157858&1Id=2
Annex 137 “Prime Minister’s Cabinet concerned about the situation of the
Macedonians in the Northern Part of Greece”, Sector for Public
Relations of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia,
2 October 2008
Annex 138 Statement of the Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Mr. Koumoutsakos regarding yesterday’s statement from the
Gruevski Government, dated 14 October 2008
Annex 139 “PM Gruevski raises question on incidents in northern Greece,
says name row presents main obstacle to NATO, EU membership”,
dated 15 October 2008, available at the Official site of the
Government of the FYROM :
http://www.vlada.mk/?q=book/export/html/1338
Annex 140 “Macedonia-Timeless to be aired on CNN, other international
channels as of Thursday”, dated 24 December 2008, available
at the Official Site of the Government of the FYROM :
http://www.vlada.mk/?=book/export/html/2019
Annex 141 Statements of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms. Bakoyannis
and NATO Secretary General Scheffer following their meeting,
Athens, 14 May 2009
Annex 142 “MANU promotes Macedonian Encyclopedia”, dated 16
September 2009, available at the Official site of the
Government of the FYROM :
http://www.vlada.mk/?q=book/export/html/3978
Annex 143 “Konjanovski: We can cede Krivolak to the GreekArmy”,
A1TV, 14 October 2008, available at:
http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=9818
223 OTHER DOCUMENTS
Annex 144 Law 524/1914 “onAdministrative Division andAdministration
of the New Countries” , Government Gazette of the Kingdom
Greece of No 404(A), 31 December 1914
Annex 145 Fredo Dannenbring: “Consultations: The political lifeblood of
theAlliance”. NATO Review, volume 33 / 6, 1985, p. 5-11
Annex 146 Memorandum of the Minister of ForeignAffairs of Greece
Mr. Papakonstantinou, dated 25 January 1993
Annex 147 Letter of Stevo Crvenkovski, Minister of Foreign Relations of
the FYROM, addressed to Mr. Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO
Assistant Secretary General for PoliticalAffairs,
dated 17 March 1994
Annex 148 Drafts of the InterimAccord from the archives of the Ministry
of ForeignAffairs of Greece: a) Draft dated 13April 1994,
b) Draft dated 17April 1994, c) Draft dated 23April1994,
d) Draft of article 5 dated 26April 1994, e) Draft dated 15
March 1995, f) Draft dated 15 March 1995 (Rev.1), g) Draft
dated 4 May 1995 (Rev2), h) Draft containing proposals for
draft articles to the InterimAccord, dated 23 May 1995, i) Draft
containing proposals for draft articles to the InterimAccord,
dated 21 July 1995 - date as derived from relevant Reports of
the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Hellenic Republic
j) Draft containing proposals for draft articles to the Interim
Accord, dated 21August 1995 - date as derived from relevant
Reports of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Hellenic
Republic
Annex 149 Letter of Jovan Tegovski,Ambassador of the FYROM to
Brussels, addressed to Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of
NATO, N. 117-04, dated 15April 1996
Annex 150 Letter of the Minister of ForeignAffairs Ljubomir Frckoski
to Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, dated 7
1997 April
224Annex 151 International Convention for the Suppression ofActs of
Nuclear Terrorism, New York 15 September 2000 and Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea andAir,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, New York 15 November 2000
Annex 152 Document of the Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Skopje
No 141.1A/87/AS 1414 dated 8 November 2004
Annex 153 Document of theA3 Directorate of the Ministry of the Foreign
Affairs of the Hellenic Republic No 140/G/AS 1529/142/ON,
dated 22August 2005 with attached Verbal Notes
Annex 154 Resolution 521(2005) of the United States House of
Representatives
Annex 155 Photos of the statue ofAlexander the Great in Prilep
Annex 156 Resolution 356(2007) of the United States House of
Representatives
Annex 157 Resolution 300(2007) of the United States Senate
Annex 158 Letter of Slobodan Tasovski, Permanent Representative of the
FYROM to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-
General, dated 17 November 2008 with attached
Aide-Memoire, and Letter of John Mourikis, Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations, addressed to
the Secretary-General, dated 27 November 2008, in reply
Annex 159 Photo of Prime Minister Gruevski on 4 February 2008 in Skopje
Annex 160 Billboard raised in the streets of Skopje on 29 March 2008
Annex 161 Photograph of the Greek Prime Minister wearing a Nazi
uniform, Forum, 31 March 2008
Annex 162 “Hunza, self-proclaimed descendants ofAlexander the Great,
visit Macedonia”, Macedonian InformationAgency, dated 11
July 2008, available at
http://www.mia.mk/default.aspx?vId=52109499&1Id=2,
and related photos taken on 11 July 2008
225Annex 163 Photo from the program that was aired on both the CNN
and the Euronews Channels, and is available at :
www.macedonia-timeless.com
Annex 164 Letter from Nikola Gruevski, Prime Minister of the FYROM,
dated 27April 2009, in response to a Letter from Rolf Heuer,
Director-General of the European Organization for Nuclear
Research, dated 27April 2009
Annex 165 Resolution 486(2009) of the United States House of
Representatives
Annex 166 Resolution 169 (2009) of the United States Senate
Annex 167 European Elections 2009, Official Results published on the
webpage of the Greek Ministry of Interior on 12 June 2009
Annex 168 Letter of theAgents of the Hellenic Republic to the Court,
dated 5August 2009
226
Counter-Memorial of Greece