.JUDGl\IENT No. 2867 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION UPON A COMI~LAINT FILED AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL
FlJND FOR AGRICULTURAL I>EVELOPMENT
(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)
Complainant's Statement
1. Introduction
l. Ms. Ana Teresa Saez Garcia (the cnmplainant) filed a complaint in the Administrative Tribunal
of the International Labour Organization against the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD, the Fund or the defendant) challenging the decision not to renew her contract.
The decision was taken by the supervisor of her unit, the Managing 'oirector of the Global
Mechanism in the Office of the President of IFAD. She appealed against the decision to the Joint
Appeals Board of IFAD, which found that the decision was taken without authority and
recommended her reinstatei:Dent and the payment oflost earnings (Complainant's Document A.l).
The President of IFAD rejected the recommcndation of the Board, explicitly finding that the non
renewal of the contract was in accordance with IFAD's Human Resources Procedures Manual
(Complainanf s Document A.2). It was the President' s decision that the complainant impugned
hefore the Tribunal.
2. The defendant argued that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain two of the
complainant's pleas conceming abuse of authority by the Managing Director of the Global
Mechanism. In simplest terms, it argued that the cornplainant was not a staff member of the Fund
and that the decision she challenged was not the act of the Fund.
3. The Tribumil made two principal rulings on its jurisdiction to hear the complaint. lt found that
the Global Mechanism was "assimilated to the various administrative units of the Fund for ali
administrative purposes" so that ••administrative decisions taken hy the Managing Director in
relation totatT in the Global Mechanism are, in law, decisions of the Fund." On this basis it
rejected arguments that the Tribunal could not examine the decisîon-making of the Global
Mechanism and that the acts of the Managing Dîrector were not attributable to the Fund. The
second ruling was that the complainant was a staff member of the Fund, so that administrative
decisions. affecting her"may be the subject of a complaint to this Tribunal inthe same way and on
the same grounds as decisions relating to other staff members."
4. Before addressing the specifie questions that the defendant has put to this Court, the
complainant \:illsetout her views on the legalcharacter of the Global Mechanism, on the role of
Managing Director of the Global Mechanism, on the complainant's status as a staffmernber of
Ihe Fund and on the Tribunal's jurisdîction.
The Global Mechanism
5. The Global Mechanism was established by article 21(4) of the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Severe Drought and/or Desertification,
Particuiarly in Africa(UNCCD). The Mechanism is to operate under the authorityofthe
the Convention. operations, article 21 mandates that an
rvîechanisrn. TheConference of Partiesisto appropriate
organizalion ir has identified to the Global Mechanism for the
administrative"operations of such ~1echan .ism 6. As the Tribunal found, the Global Mechanism lacks legal personality.ltis not explicitly granted
any legalpowers hy the Convention. Jtis designed ta be housed in an organization, which would
normally have appropriate powers.Significantly, the Mechanism is placed in ParIll(3)of the
Convention, "Supporting ~'1eas andrnoetin'PartIV, "Institutions··.
7. A ~lemorand ofuUmnderstanding "Regarding the Modalities and Administrative Operations of
the Global t\lechanism'· was entered into by the Conference of Parties and the Fund1999
(lFAD's Document V(5)).The !v1cmorandum provides, '"\Vhile the Global Mechanism will haw a
separate identity within the Funitwill be an organic part of the structure of the Fund diryct!
under the President of the Fund." The f'vfanagingDirector is appointed by the President of the Fund
and "'indischarging his or her responsibilities will report directly to the PresiIFnAD.··Ali
moneys of the Global Mechanism are to be received and disbursed by the Fund. ·
o. In 2009 the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations reviewed the mandate, status and legal
capacity of the Global Mechanism on the request of the Joint Inspection Unit. On the basis of the
Memorandum of Understanding and decisions of the Conference of Parties, the Office concluded
·'that the Global Mechanism has not been entrusted with the legal personality to enter into.legally
binding agreements. Moreover, pursuant to the MOU, it is IFAD, as the housing institution, which
has been tasked to provide services to thebal Mechanism in order to carry out its mandated
activities including managing its budget, contracting on its behalf, administering its personnel, for
example employment contracts etc. Accordingly, the relevant administrative and financirules and
regulations of IFAD apply to the Global Mechanism." (Complainant's Docwnent B, p.5.)
Y. Against this background itis hardly surprising that the Tribunal concluded that the Global
l\lechanism lacked legal personality.
Tht• Managing Director
10. The Managing Director of the Global Mechanism is a staff member of the Fund. At the time of
the facts of this case, his predecessor, Mr. Per Ryden, was included in the list of staff for whom the
Fund claimed the benefitof articleVI and VIII of the Convention on the Privileges and lmmunities
of the Specialized Agencies (Complainant' s Document C). Later versions of this list no doubt exisL
but they have not been located.
11. The Managing Director' sterms of referencearedear: "Under the direction of the President of
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) ...the primary responsibility of the
iv1anaging Director ... wilbe ...to promo te the mobilizationof resources'' (IFAD's Document
V(9}J. The specifie tasks listed below this heading are typical of a staff member. They do not
include hiring or firing of staff.
' the Administrative Tribunal the defendant arguedthatthe Managing Director was not a staff
member of the Fund (defendant's reply para. 39, IFAD's Document VHOJ The best evidence of
status wouid be his contract of empioyrnent, but the defendant has not heen able to prodire
iseeComplainant" s Document D).
13.cfhe ~\Ianag .Dnigrect rolt~ns \-viththe C,Jnference
Fund, He reports to Conference of Parties on
rev1ews the Programme of Work Budget before itis transmitted to
of the Convention. lnshort the Managmg Director has no indepen(knt
the Global ~,.~techanism 14. The Office of Legal Affairs noted thal the Managing Director possessed "certain delegated
authority by the President on administrative issues.''It considered that actions taken on the strength
of the delegated authority would depend on the delegation and the rules of the Fund (Complainanfs
Document B. p. 5).
15. ln a similar vein the Tribunal concluded that ·'administrative decisions taken by the !v1anaging
Director in relation to staff in the Global Mechanism are, in law, decisions of the Fund."
The Complainant
16. The complainant was a staff member of the Fund. She accepted the offer of 1 March 2000 from
the Ftmd, offering her'"afixed-term appointment for a period of two years with the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)'' (Complainant's Document E.l). It referred to ··your
entry on duty with IFAD". lt provided that during the probationary period the appointment could
'·beterminated by IFAD". If the cornplainant wished to resign during this period, she was "required
to give written notice ... to IFAD". The letter was signed by the Director of IFAD's Personnel
Division. The subsequent offers that the complainant accepted in 2002 and 2004 were similarly
\Vritten on the letterhead oIFAD and offered her the extension of her "appointment with the
International Fund for Agricultural Development" {Complainant's Documents E.2, E.3). It would
be hard for the defendant to be clearer in offering employment with the Fund.
17. The complainant was not only a staff member of the Fund, she was subject to ali the Fund's
staff rules upon which she based her complaint. The letter offering ber initial appointment stated,
"The appointment will be made in accordance with the general provisions of the IFAD Personnel
Policies Manual.'' The renewal offers stated, "Y our appointment will continue to be govemed by
thePersonnel Policies Manual, together with the provisions of the Human Resources Handbook
regarding the application of the Manual." The Manual has since been replaced by the Human
Resources Procedures Manual.
18.Presîdent's Bulletin PB/04/01 (IFAD's Document V(S)) states ·'Asa matter of principle and
where thcre isan absence of a specifie provision to the contrary, as specified below, the Global
Mechanism shaH be subject to ali provisions oflF AD's Persona! Policies Manual (PPM) and
Human Resources Handbook (HRH), as they may be amended." The only relevant exception
·'specified below" is that staff assigned to the Global Mechanism are not eligible for continuing
contracts: they are limited to renewable two-year contracts.
1 The defendant bas argued that the single exception to the Human ResourŒs Procedures Manual
means that the Manual is not generally applicable to the complainanL It stated in its reply in
2867 that "only those rules that have been dedared applicable to the complainant can
Tribunal" (para. 28).
argument contradicts the quoted statement of the President's Bulletin ("aH provisions") and
Œrms of the compiainant's appointment lt is also not borne out by the practiŒ of IFAD. The
Officer of the Joint Appea!s Board submitted the Board·s report "in line with Section
the Human Resources Procedures Manuai" (Complainant's Document A.l ). One of the
·s findings'>V ta.t"due process" was not foHowedin accordance 'vith Manual sections
CJ-l2on job redundancy. The President did not the section numbers, but he was evident1;.
to the same provisions in finding that due had been fo!lowed. And he
L21 of Manual in upholdîng the non-renewal of the complainant' s contract
iC<.mîplainant's Document AI) 21. Among the provisions of the Manual that were not specified as exceptions in the President's
Bulletin is the following for appeals to the lLO Administrative Tribunal:
10.40.1 Staff members have the right to Appeal to the ILOAT, under the procedures
prescribed in its Statute and Rules, against: (a) final decisions takcn hy the President: and (b)
after the expiration of the period prescribed in para 10.39.2 above, the failure of the
President to take a final decision.
The complainant submits that if such a fundamental legal right were to be withheld from the staff
assigned to the Global Mechanism, it would have to be stated explicitly.
22. In order not to burden the Court with a massive document, the complainant willlimit herseIf to
poinling out that the Manual contains 207 pages plus annexes. Ali of it applies to the complainant
except for the following two paragraphs:
1.22 CONVERSION TO CONTINUOUS CONTRACT
1.22.1 At the end of a total of seven years of uninterrupted service, subject to availability of
funds, good conduct and performance, a staff member may be considered upon the
recommendation of the supervisor concerned, for a continuous appointment contract to be
approved by the Assistant President and Director, FH or by the President for Special
Advisors or assistant staff reporting to her/him.
1.22.2 Where there are issues of performance, then conversion to continuous contract will
not he automatic and is subject to the procedures provided for in Chapter 5 on Performance
Evaluation.
23. Finally, it is relevant to note that the defendant treated the complainant as a staff member
throughout her employrnent and the process of appeal, from March 2000 until it submitted its reply
to her complaint on 12 September 2008. She was included in the list of staff of IFAD for the
purposes of privileges and immunities (Complainant's Document C},she was offered IFAD
contracts, and she was allowed to go through the two-year internai facilitation and appeals process
as a staff member.
.Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
24. Under Article II (5) of its Statute, the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
Organization "shall also be competent to hear compiaints alleging non-observance, in substance or
in forrn, of the terms of appoîntment of officiais and of provisions of the Staff Regulations of any
other international organization" meeting certain requirements, of which the IFAD is one. TI1etwo
questions proper to jurisdiction are therefore, was the complainant a staff member of IFAD? and did
,'-'''"""'liege non-observance, in substance or in form, of her terms of appointme:nt or
""''"'"'"o'f the Staff Regulations of IFAD? ·
. The discussion in paragraphs 16-23 above demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
cornplainant was a staff member of IFAD.
This Court has a!ready had occasion in the lJnesco advisory proceedings to examine the
grounds of a complaint to the Tribunal. The Unesco opinion stated. "The Court cannat
any so as the officia! should express!y
compl..nt the term or ol-vision on which he intends to reiv..." l.Jhat must be
according to Article paragraph 5, is non-obser1ance. , sorne act or omiSSHHi un
the Administration." Rep. 1456. p. 77 at 88.) 27.In the present ca..;;ethe compJainant invoked the refusa] to renew her contract. This was an
action taken in the first place by the Managing Director. a fellow staff memher of IFAD. who could
only have acted in matters of personnel upon delegation by the President of IFAD. The President of
IFAD confirmed this decision in his decision of 4 April 2008, in which he found that non-renewal
ofthe contract was in accordance with the Human Resources Procedures Manual (Complainant"s
Document A.2). Itwas the President's decision that was impugned hefore the Tribunal.
28. In its reply to the complaint, the defendant made an argument based on the indispensable
parties rule, even going so far as to append the entire judgment of this Court in theEast Timor case
(lCJ Rep. 1995, p. 90). Since this argument applies to more than one of the questions below, it ..-ill
be dcalt with here.
29. ln theUnesco opinion the Court made a dear distinction between controversies bdween States
and those between an organization and one of its officiais. ''The arguments deduced from the
sovereignty of States, which might have been invoked in favour of a restrictive interpretation of
provisions governing the jurisdiction of a tribunal adjudicating between States are not relevant to a
situation inwhich a tribunal is called upon to adjudicate upon a complaint of an official against an
international organization." (ICJ Rep. 1956, p.77 at 97.)
30. An international organization is required to apply many decisions of externat actors, from the
General Assembly, to the International Civil Service Commission to governrnents and donors. The
Tribunal has consistently ruled that,even where an external decision may normally bind an
organization, the organization has a duty to itsstaff members to evaluate the legality of that
decision, and if it is not legal, it must not apply it. A recent ruling on this issue is Judgment No.
2420 (Complainant's Document F).
31. The reason for this lineof precedent is dear: the staff member has the possibility of legal
rccourse only against his employing organization. He or she cannot bring a complaint against other
international organizations.A corollary of the rather hermetic system of justice within each
organization and within international organizations as a group is the responsibility of each
nrganization for its staff members. This was the defendant's duty in the present case ifit had any
Joubts about îts own primary·responsibility for the decision not to renew the complainant's
con tract. ln tàct thewas no sign of such doubt until the defendanf s response to the complaint in
Judginent No. 2867.
Conclusion
The complainant submits thal the Tribunal correctly detennined that ithad jurisdiction to hear
complaint in Judgment No. 2867. The complainant was a staff member of the Fund and the
theFund applied to herwiththe exception noted above. The Managing Dîrector the Global
~"1echa ;n:i·snmofficerof the Fund and actions which the complainant chaHenged were, in
, thactions of the defendant.
Il. Questions Submitted by IFAD
The Fu nd hasasked nine questions in an effort to overturn a much [esser number of ru!ing:-;nn
·uri"dictionby the Tribunal. Ithas appended to questions Il-VIII asort of sub-quesrion ;.'once
ndamental fau!t in the procedure The complainant will respond individuë.ll:w
on junsdicrion. but she\ViH limit herseIf a general comment on the quèsliun' ~'
fault in thprocedure folimved'". FundamentaJ Fault in Procedure
3-1-. his Court has dealt with the question of what constitutes a fundamental fault in procedure in
the Advisory Opinion on the Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, ICJ Rep. 1973, p. 166. In ils discussion it pointed out that the language of
the UN Administrative Tribunal Statute (''fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a
failure of justice'') was adapted from the \vords of the lLO Administrative Tribunal Statute and
carried the same meaning (id. at 208-09).
35. The court considered that a fundamental error was such as to deprive the party of the right to a
fair hearing. It set out a non-exclusive list of the elements of a fair hearing: "the right to an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law; the right to have the case heard and
dctermined within a reasonable time; the right to a reasonable opportunity to present the case to the
tribunal and to comment upon the opponent's case; the right to equality in the proceeding vis-à-vis
the opponent: the right to a reasoned decision." (Id. at 209.)
36. The court expanded on the last element, a reasoned decision, noting that "it is of the essence of
judicial decisions that they be reasoned". That requirement is satisfied if the decision "indicate[ s] in
a general way the reasoning upon which the judgment is based; butit need not enter meticulously
into cvery daim and contention on either side." (Id. at 210.)
37. The complainant submits that on any fair reading Judgment No. 2867 fulfills the requirements
of a fair hearing. Both sides were heard on conditions of equality, the pleas of the defendant were
beard and considered and the conclusions were supported by adequate reasoning. The defendant has
not specified in what respects the elements of its questions could constitute fundamental faults in
procedure. Until it does so, further comment is unnecessary .
.Jurisdiction
3S. ln regard to jurisdiction, the complainant would like to recall the words of the Court in the
r·nesco opinion, where it suggested clear limits to questions onjurisdiction. First it said "A
challenge oî a decision confinning jurisdiction cannot properly be transformed into a procedure
against the manner in which jurisdiction has been exercised or against the substance of the
decision.''(ICJ Rep. 1956, p.77 at 98-99.) It added, "A request for an Advisory Opinion ... cannot .
. . be extended to an allegation that the Tribunal 'went beyond the bounds of its competence in its
consideration of the disputes'. Any such allegation, even if it were weB-founded, could not lead to
theconclusion that the Tribunal was not competent to hear the complaint." (Id. at 100.)
very number of jurisdictional questions that the defendani has raised that it is
going beyond thejurisdictional rulings of the Tribunal to question eirher manner
the Tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction or the breadth of its consideratjons hearing the
complainL
-Hl The complainant will confine herself to essential comments on the questions hy the
Fund. She submits that 'theforegoing should be sufficient for a determination of the propriety of the
·Tribunal's findîng that ithad jurisdiction to hear the compiaint and aH pJeas submüted to the Question 1
Was the ILOAT competent, under Article JIof its Statute, to hear the complaint introduced
agaînst the InternationalFund for Agricultural Development (herehy the Fund) on 8 July
2008 by Ms A.T.S.G., an individual who was a member of the staff of the Global
Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification. Particularly in Africa (hereby the
Convention) for which the Fund acts merely as housing organization?
41. The complainant objects to the formulation of the question in two respects. She was a member
of rhe staff of the Fund, as demonstrated in paragraphs 16-23 above. And the statement that ''the
Fund acts merely as housing organization" does not re11ectthe responsibilities of the Fund for the
administration of the Global Mechanism.
42. For the substance of the question, the complainant respectfully directs the attention of the Court
to the discussion in partabove.
Question II
Given that the record shows that the parties to the dispute underlying the ILOAT's Judgment
No. 286ï were in agreement that the Fund and the Global Mechanism are separate legal
entilies andthat"the Complainant was a member of the staff of the Global Mechanism, and
considering ali therelevant documents, rules and principles, was the ILOAT's statement,
made in support of its decision confirming its jurisdiction, that 'the Global Mechanism is to
be assimilated to the various administrative units of the Fund for ail administrative purposes'
and that the 'effect of this is that administrative decisions taken by the Managing Director in
relation tostaff in the Global Mechanism are, in law, decisions of the Fund' outside its
jurisdiction and/or diditconstitute a fundamental fault in lhe procedure followed by the
ILOAT?
43. The record shows that the complainant stated in her rejoinder, "The complainant has no reason
todispute the separateness of IFAD and the Global Mechanism.'' This was a statement offact, since
the complainant argued on the basis of the Tribunal's case law that the Fundwa<;oblîgated to
ascertain the legality of measures it applied to its staff even if they emanated from externat entities.
44. ln the remainder of her pleadings, the complainant set out at length the facts conceming the
powers of the Managing Director, based upon the Memorandum of Understanding and his terms of
reference. It was obvious from the pleadings that the complainant did not agree that the Global
rviechanismand its Managing Director were separa te from IF ft.D in relation to the issues of the
corn plaint
45. set out above, the Global Mechanism was created by the Convention on Desertification. It
was therefore a creature of UNCCD and nor IFAD. But the Global Mechanism lacked legal
personaiity. lt is for this reason that the UNCCD was obliged to use the legal powers of IFAD to
operate the l\techanism.
Only the
funds and. indt:ed.
Global Mechanism. The Tribunal made a
··;Jssimilatedto the various administrative units of the Fund purposes··.!fit
not heen, there wou idhave been no administration of th t.o~al Mechanism. 47. The powers of the Managing Director were a function of the Jackof legal powers of the Global
Mechanism. His powers were, as the UN Oftïce of Legal Affairs reported (Complainant's
Document B, p. 5), those that had been delegated to hirn by the President of IFAD. They were not
conferrcd by the Conference of Parties or the Global Mechanism itself.
48. The defendant's legal responsibility for the actions of the Managing Director rest on a second
foundation as weil. He was a staff member of IFAD, and he exercised the powers of an IFAD
supervisor. He was indeed authorized by IFAD to do so "under the direction of the President ... or
hisdesignate'' (IFAD's Document V(9)).
49. Even if the defendant coulù show that another entity should have been responsible for the
Managing Director, which it has not. the fact rernains that the defendant placed him in the position
where he appeared to bear the authority of IFAD. This alone makes the defendant responsible for
the actionsof the Managing Director.
Question III
Was the ILOAT's general statement, made in support of its decision confirming its
jurisdiction, that 'the personnel of the Global Mechanisrn are staffmernbers of the Fund'
outside its jurisdiction and/or did it constitute a fundamental fault in the procedure followed
by the ILOAT?
50. The President's Bulletin cited above (IFAD's Document V(8)) would appear to answer this
question. In any case, the complainant, by virtue of her contract, was undeniably a staff member of
the Fund, as was the Managing Director. The status of other staff members is irrelevant to the
decision of the Tribunal.
Question IV
Was the ILOAT's decision confirming itsjurisdiction to entertain the Complainant's plea
alleging an abuse of authority by the Global Mechanism's Managing Director outside its
jurisdiction andior diditconstitute a fundamental fault in the procedure followed by the
ILOAT?
51, The complainant refers to Part I above. She considers that this disposes of the following
question 5 as weiL
Question V
decision confirming jurisdiction to entertain the Complainant's
Managing Director's decision not to renew the Complainant's contract
constituted an error .of law outside its jurisdiction and/oritconstitute a fundamental
fault in the procedure followedby the ILOAT?
Question VI
Was the IIDAT's decision confirming îts jurisdiction to interpret the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Conference of the Parties to the United Nalions Convention
to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa and [FAD (hereby thMoU). the Convention, and
Esrablishing IFAD beyond its jurisdiction and/or did it constitute a
tault in the procedure foilmved by t~ eLOAT? 5.2This question appcars to be an example of straying beyond the proper purpose of a question on
jurisdiction. The Memorandum of Understanding is an agreement entered into by IF AD providing
for its assumption of administrative responsibilities for the Global Mechanism. If the Tribunal was
competent to receive the complaint ofthe complainant as an IFAD staff member, there does not
seem to be any reason for it not to be competent to interpret the Memorandum of Understanding
and the other relevant documents.
Question VU
\Vas the ILOAT"s decision confirming its jurisdiction to detennine that by discharging
an intermediary and supporting role under the MoU, the President was acting on behalf
of IFAD outside its jurisdiction and/or did it constitute a fundamental fault in the
procedure followed by the ILOAT?
53. The Tribunal did not make any explicit finding concerning its jurisdiction over the President of
IFAD. lt probably did not consider worthy of comment the argument that the President was not
acting as the President of IFAD in matters conceming the Global Mechanism, an argument which
was buried in a paragraph of the defendant's surrejoinder conceming the Managing Director
(IFAD's Document VII(l5) para. 11).
54. lFAD has offered no evidence that its President was acting in any capacity other than that of
President in matters conceming the Global Mechanism. He signed the Memorandum of
Understanding on behalf of IFAD, not of himself. The Memorandum of Understanding specifies
certain functions to be carried out by the President, but it also specifies functions to be carried out
hy IFAD. See, for exarnple, "The Fund and the Secretariat of the Convention will cooperate" (Part
IV .B.l )''the Fund will work out with the Secretariat of the Convention appropriate arrangements
f\1rliaison and cooperation betwcen the Secretariat and the Global Mechanism" (Part IV.B.2); "The
Fund willmake appropriate arrangements to obtain supporting services" (PartV).
55. Governing Council Resolution 108;XXI authorizing the President to sign the Memorandum of
Understanding also requires him "to report periodically to the Executive Board on the
administrative arrangements for the housing of the said Global Mechanism in IFAD and on such
activities as IFAD may undertake in support of the Global Mechanism, while also keeping the
Executive Board infonned ofthe activities of the Global Mechanism." (IFAD's Documents V(6).)
Tilisappears to reflect the expectation ofADF that its President aasPresident.
56. The President of IFAD was also acting asPresident when he (or non-Global Mechanism IFAD
officiais on his behalf) offered the complainant a series of appoîntments '"witAD". He also acted
President of IFAD when hemade the impugned decision rejecting therecommendation of ·
Joint Appeals Board.
Ouestion VIII
ILOAT's decision confirming its jurisdiction to substitute the discretionary
decision of the ~v-iaD n iectoionfgthe Global Mechanism with itsown ·outsîde its
jurisdiction and/or did constitutea fundamenta1 fauH in the procedure foHowed by the
ILOAT!
notappear to be ajurisdictionaor even procedural question. The Tribunal did not
thedeçision of thetvtanagingDirector with its own. It on iegaiity of
dc.:cis!O..vhichis whatltisestablished to do. Question IX
What is the validity of the decision given by the ILOAT in its Judgment No. 2867?
58. The Court is respectfully requested to confïrm the validity of Judgment 2867.
Ill. Conclusion
59. The Court is respectfully requested to answer questions 1-VII in the negative. It is requested to
refuse to answer question Vlll, or alternatively to answer it in the negative. It .is requc:sted to
confirm the validitygment 2867 in response to question IX.
20 October 2010
~~a'\_~-ç
Œ9.ce Christy
Member of the New York Bar
Counsel to Ms. Saez
Written Statement of the of the complainant