Further Written Explanations of Thailand

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17292
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Date of the Document
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE

1962 IN THE CASE CONCERNING THETEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

FURTHER WRITTEN EXPLANATIONS

OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND

21 JUNE 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. Cambodia’s Response to Thailand’s Written
Observations ................................... 1

1. The Critical Changes in Cambodia’s Position ...... 1
2. Cambodia’s Theory of Inseparable Reasons ........ 6

3. Thailand’sAlleged Resort to Unilateralism ........ 7

B. The Gaps in Cambodia’s Response ................. 11

1. Cambodia Ignores Thailand’sAnalysis of the
1962 Judgment ............................. 11
2. Cambodia Denies the Relevance of anAnalysis

of the Positions of the Parties before the Court
in 1962 ................................... 12
3. Cambodia Ignores Thailand’sAnalysis of

theAnnex I Maps ........................... 15
C. Misrepresentation, Distortion and Irrelevancy in

Cambodia’s Response ........................... 17
D. O utline of These Further Written Explanations .......32

CHAPTER II: THE DIFFERING SUBJECT
MATTERS OFTHE DISPUTES ........ 35

A. T he 1962 Dispute .............................. 36

1. The Dispute Placed before the Court in 1962 ......37
2. TheArguments of the Parties .................. 38

3. The Material before the Court in Light of Which
It Reached Its Decision ....................... 41

4. The Decision of the Court in 1962 .............. 53

B. The 2011 Dispute .............................. 59
C. The Lack of Coincidence between the 1962 and

the 2011 Disputes .............................. 64

iii CHAPTER III: JURISDICTION AND
ADMISSIBILITY ................... 73

A. No Dispute over the Meaning or Scope of the
Judgment ..................................... 76
1. Identifying the Res Judicata ................... 76

(a) Res Judicata Is Circumscribed by the Initial
Dispute and the Petitum ................... 77

(b) Res Judicata, Dispositif and Reasons ......... 82

(c) Res Judicata and the Proceedings on
Interpretation ............................ 88

2. TheAlleged Dispute over the Interpretation of
the Judgment ............................... 94
(a) General Remarks on Cambodia’sApproach

to Demonstrating Its Case .................. 95
(b) The Request to Interpret the Notion of “Territory”

in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Dispositif ........99
(c) The Request to Interpret the Notion of
“Vicinity” ............................. 103

(i) Cambodia’s Conflated Claims on
Boundary Delimitation and the Extent

of “Vicinity” ........................ 103
(ii) Cambodia’s Distortions of the Factual
Record ............................. 109

(iii)TheAlleged Dispute over the Meaning and
Scope of the Correlative Obligation to
Withdraw Thai Forces from the Temple and

Its Vicinity on Cambodian Territory
(Paragraph 2 of the Dispositif) .......... 123

(d) TheAlleged Dispute on the Recognition of the
Binding Force of theAnnex I Map as the
Boundary between the Parties in theArea of
the Temple ............................. 124

B. The Dismissal of Cambodia’s New Claims in
the Original Proceedings ........................ 126

iv 1. The Court’s Consideration in 1962 of Cambodia’s
New Claims in Respect of the Boundary and
theAnnex I Map ........................... 129

2. Legal Consequences of the Court’s Dismissal of
Cambodia’s New Claims ..................... 135

(a) Consequences in the Original Proceedings .... 136
(b) Consequences for the Present Proceedings .... 139

CHAPTER IV: THE CLEAR MEANING OFTHE
1962 JUDGMENT ................... 143

A. The Dispositif and Its Clear Meaning .............. 145

B. The Reasoning Which Led the Court to Determine
Sovereignty over the Temple .................... 148

1. The Treaty Text and Why the Court Considered
Other Reasons ............................. 151

2. The Missing Prince in Cambodia’s Response ..... 156
3. The Court’s Further Reasons ................. 157

4. What the Court Said about These Other Reasons .. 159

C. The Temple and Its Precincts as the Exclusive
Subject Matter of the Original Proceedings ......... 161

1. The Court’s Limiting Clause .................. 164
2. Clarity of the Temple’s Location on theAnnex I
Map ..................................... 166

3. The Watershed Line in the 1962 Proceedings ..... 167

(a) The Irrelevance of the True Course of the
Watershed to the Judgment ................ 169

(b) The Relevance of the Parties’Respective
Views about the Watershed ................ 173

4. Cambodia’s Admission That the Conflicting
Versions of theAnnex I Maps and Lines Do Not
Affect the 1962 Judgment .................... 193

D. Cambodia’s Groundless Interpretation ............. 196

v 1. Cambodia’s Oscillating Claim That theAnnex I
Map Line Is Res Judicata .................... 198

2. TheAnnex I Map LineAdds Nothing to the Clear
Meaning of the Dispositif .................... 203

E. The Proper Interpretation of the 1962 Judgment ....209

1. The Territorial Scope of the Dispositif .......210
2. The Instantaneous Character of the Obligation to

Withdraw ................................. 213

CHAPTER V: SOME CONCLUSIONS ............. 219

SUBMISSIONS ................................... 225

LIST OF ANNEXES ................................ 229

vi CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 These Further Written Explanations are filed by the
Kingdom of Thailand in accordance with the decision of the

Court, pursuant to Article 98(4) of the Rules of Court,

communicated to the Parties by letter of 24 November 2011.

They comment on the arguments made by the Kingdom of
Cambodia in its Response of 8 March 2012.

1.2 In these Explanations, Thailand will show that

Cambodia’s Request for interpretation cannot be entertained by
the Court and that even if it were to be entertained, it could not

be sustained. Interpretation under Article 60 of the Statute of

the Court is confined to determining the meaning or scope of the

res judicata of the judgment being interpreted. Cambodia’s

Request, by contrast, seeks an interpretation of what was not
part of the res judicata of the 1962 Judgment. It is an attempt

under the guise of interpretation to have the Court rule on a

present day boundary dispute between the Parties.

A. Cambodia’s Response to Thailand’s Written

Observations

1. TE CRITICAL CHANGES IN CAMBODIA S POSITION

1.3 Cambodia’s submission of 8 March 2012, purportedly a

response to Thailand’s Written Observations of 21 November

1 2011, responds only partially and spasmodically to Thailand’s

arguments, while distorting, misrepresenting or ignoring many
of them. But ultimately it turns out to be a modification of the

essence of Cambodia’s Request for interpretation.

1.4 In its Request for interpretation dated 28 April 2011,

Cambodia focused on paragraph 2 of the dispositif of the 1962

Judgment, and the obligation of Thailand to withdraw its troops

stationed “at the Temple or in its vicinity on Cambodian

territory” which Cambodia claimed resulted from “ the general

and continuing obligation to respect the integrity of the territory
of Cambodia” as defined by the Annex I map line 1. Now, the

focus has shifted. Perhaps lacking confidence in the coherence

of an argument that links paragraph 2 of the dispositif to the

Annex I map line, Cambodia now tries to find a dispute on the

basis of paragraph 1 of the dispositif.

1.5 The dispute between the Parties justifying the Request

for interpretation, Cambodia now claims, relates to both
paragraphs of the dispositif 2, and in particular to paragraph 1

over the meaning of the term “territory” and its link to the

Annex I map line as the boundary between the two Parties.

Thus, Cambodia seeks to link the two paragraphs in its Request

for interpretation, a link that has the objective of asking the

1 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 45.
2
Réponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 March 2012 (hereafter “Response”),
para. 5.9 (ii).

22011, responds only partially and spasmodically to Thailand’s

arguments, while distorting, misrepresenting or ignoring many
of them. But ultimately it turns out to be a modification of the

essence of Cambodia’s Request for interpretation.

1.4 In its Request for interpretation dated 28 April 2011,

Cambodia focused on paragraph 2 of the dispositif of the 1962

Judgment, and the obligation of Thailand to withdraw its troops

stationed “at the Temple or in its vicinity on Cambodian

territory” which Cambodia claimed resulted from “ the general

and continuing obligation to respect the integrity of the territory
of Cambodia” as defined by the Annex I map line 1. Now, the

focus has shifted. Perhaps lacking confidence in the coherence

of an argument that links paragraph 2 of the dispositif to the

Annex I map line, Cambodia now tries to find a dispute on the

basis of paragraph 1 of the dispositif.

1.5 The dispute between the Parties justifying the Request

for interpretation, Cambodia now claims, relates to both
paragraphs of the dispositif 2, and in particular to paragraph 1

over the meaning of the term “territory” and its link to the

Annex I map line as the boundary between the two Parties.

Thus, Cambodia seeks to link the two paragraphs in its Request

for interpretation, a link that has the objective of asking the

1 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 45.
2
Réponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 March 2012 (hereafter “Response”),
para. 5.9 (ii). the Annex I map line was determined by the Court in 1962 to be

the boundary. In its Response, Cambodia says:

“(…) le Cambodge ne demande aucunement que la Cour
prenne une décision concernant l’intégralité de la
frontière décrite par la carte de l ’annexe I dans la

région des Dangrek. Le Cambodge circonscrit sa 6
demande en interprétation à la zone en litige.”

This is a remarkable modification of the hitherto Cambodian

argument that the Court had accepted the Annex I map line as
the boundary between the two States. Yet Cambodia, struggling

to find support for its new argument on a truncated Annex I map

line (purportedly part of the res judicata of the 1962 Judgment),

points to references by the Court to the Annex I map line but

Cambodia does not exp lain why the Court would have given

status to a partial line . Nor, on the basis of Cambodia’s initial
Request and its arguments on the issue of provisional measures

did the Court understand Cambodia as referring to a truncated

portion of the Annex I map li ne. Referring to what it saw as a

potential dispute between the Parties, the Court said:

“this difference of opinion or views appears to relate,
finally, to the question of whether the Judgment did or
did not recognize with binding force the line shown on
the Annex I map as representing the frontier between the
two Parties;” 7

6 Ibid., para. 4.50.

7 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, para. 31.

4the Annex I map line was determined by the Court in 1962 to be

the boundary. In its Response, Cambodia says:

“(…) le Cambodge ne demande aucunement que la Cour
prenne une décision concernant l’intégralité de la
frontière décrite par la carte de l ’annexe I dans la

région des Dangrek. Le Cambodge circonscrit sa 6
demande en interprétation à la zone en litige.”

This is a remarkable modification of the hitherto Cambodian

argument that the Court had accepted the Annex I map line as
the boundary between the two States. Yet Cambodia, struggling

to find support for its new argument on a truncated Annex I map

line (purportedly part of the res judicata of the 1962 Judgment),

points to references by the Court to the Annex I map line but

Cambodia does not exp lain why the Court would have given

status to a partial line . Nor, on the basis of Cambodia’s initial
Request and its arguments on the issue of provisional measures

did the Court understand Cambodia as referring to a truncated

portion of the Annex I map li ne. Referring to what it saw as a

potential dispute between the Parties, the Court said:

“this difference of opinion or views appears to relate,
finally, to the question of whether the Judgment did or
did not recognize with binding force the line shown on
the Annex I map as representing the frontier between the
two Parties;” 7

6Ibid., para. 4.50.

7 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, para. 31. 2. CAMBODIA ’ST HEORY OF NSEPARABLE R EASONS

1.9 In order to justify its claim that the Court must look

beyond the dispositif itself in order to interpret the 1962
Judgment, Cambodia develops a novel, and completely

untenable, approach to the question of how reasons for the

decision of the Court are inseparable from the actual decision of

the Court as set out in the dispositif. Cambodia has to do this

because in this case it is not the dispositif but rather the reasons

that Cambodia wants the Court to interpret. From a lengthy,

although irrelevant, disquisition on the importance of reasons to
9
judicial decision -making , Cambodia jumps to the conclusion

that what Cambodia regards as the most important reason for a

decision must ipso facto be inseparable from the decision itself;
10
it is the “ motif décisoire” and automatically part of the res
judicata regardless of whether it is included in the dispositif 1.

Indeed, to give this fiction credibility, Cambodia invokes in aid

the concept of a “dispositif implicite ” . The “ motif décisoire”

becomes a form of “dispositif implicite” and in this way what is

no more than a reason for the decision magically becomes part

of the dispositif.

1.10 But saying something is so does not make it so. A

reason does not become part of the dispositif by calling it a

9
Ibid., paras. 4.5-4.16.
10Ibid., para. 4.23.

11Ibid., para. 4.18.
12
Ibid., para. 4.23.

6 2.C AMBODIA ’ST HEORY OF INSEPARABLE R EASONS

1.9 In order to justify its claim that the Court must look

beyond the dispositif itself in order to interpret the 1962
Judgment, Cambodia develops a novel, and completely

untenable, approach to the question of how reasons for the

decision of the Court are inseparable from the actual decision of

the Court as set out in the dispositif. Cambodia has to do this

because in this case it is not the dispositif but rather the reasons

that Cambodia wants the Court to interpret. From a lengthy,

although irrelevant, disquisition on the importance of reasons to
9
judicial decision -making , Cambodia jumps to the conclusion

that what Cambodia regards as the most important reason for a

decision must ipso facto be inseparable from the decision itself;
10
it is the “ motif décisoire” and automatically part of the res
judicata regardless of whether it is included in the dispositif 1.

Indeed, to give this fiction credibility, Cambodia invokes in aid

the concept of a “dispositif implicite ” . The “ motif décisoire”

becomes a form of “dispositif implicite” and in this way what is

no more than a reason for the decision magically becomes part

of the dispositif.

1.10 But saying something is so does not make it so. A

reason does not become part of the dispositif by calling it a

9
Ibid., paras. 4.5-4.16.
10Ibid., para. 4.23.

11Ibid., para. 4.18.
12
Ibid., para. 4.23. 16
Temple by legal means in the future , and that it erected a
17
barbed-wire fence indicating the limit of the Temple vicinity .

1.12 Yet in all of its fulminations against Thai

“unilateralism”, Cambodia overlooks the essential elements of

what happened following the 1962 Judgment. As Counsel for

Thailand pointed out in the oral hearings on provisional

measures, a State has to implement a judgment of the Court; it
does not have to accept it with enthusiasm 18. And Thailand did

implement the 1962 Judgment. It accepted that the Temple was

on Cambodian territory and it withdrew its troops.

1.13 As Thailand also pointed out in its Written

Observations , accepting the Judgment was a polit ically

unpopular move in Thailand, and in certain quarters still

remains so today. Nevertheless, it is important to put this in

context. It was not a case, as Cambodia claims, of Thailand

providing its own interpretation of the term “vicinity” in the

1962 Judgment and seeking to enforce it through resort to force.

Faced with a decision requiring it to withdraw troops stationed

“at the Temple or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory” the

Thai government had to decide itself the limits of troop

16Ibid., para. 2.32.

17Ibid., paras. 2.22-2.23, 2.39 and 2.42.
18
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (C ambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, 31 May 2011, CR 2011/16, p. 23, para.
22 (Mr. James Crawford).
19The Written Observations of the Kingdom of Thailand, 21 November 2011

(hereafter “WO”), para. 1.13.

8 16
Temple by legal means in the future , and that it erected a
17
barbed-wire fence indicating the limit of the Temple vicinity .

1.12 Yet in all of its fulminations against Thai

“unilateralism”, Cambodia overlooks the essential elements of

what happened following the 1962 Judgment. As Counsel for

Thailand pointed out in the oral hearings on provisional

measures, a State has to implement a judgment of the Court; it
does not have to accept it with enthusiasm 1. And Thailand did

implement the 1962 Judgment. It accepted that the Temple was

on Cambodian territory and it withdrew its troops.

1.13 As Thailand also pointed out in its Written

Observations , accepting the Judgment was a polit ically

unpopular move in Thailand, and in certain quarters still

remains so today. Nevertheless, it is important to put this in

context. It was not a case, as Cambodia claims, of Thailand

providing its own interpretation of the term “vicinity” in the

1962 Judgment and seeking to enforce it through resort to force.

Faced with a decision requiring it to withdraw troops stationed

“at the Temple or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory” the

Thai government had to decide itself the limits of troop

16Ibid., para. 2.32.

17Ibid., paras. 2.22-2.23, 2.39 and 2.42.
18
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (C ambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, 31 May 2011, CR 2011/16, p. 23, para.
22 (Mr. James Crawford).
19The Written Observations of the Kingdom of Thailand, 21 November 2011

(hereafter “WO”), para. 1.13. Secretary-General about regaining the Temple in the future by
24
legal means . Cambodian authorities regularly accused
25
Thailand of imaginary attempts to regain the Temple . The

withdrawal of the reservation, as well as the requirement that

Thailand declare that it recognized boundaries claimed by
26
Cambodia , were elevated by Cambodia into imperative

conditions for the resumption of diplomatic relations between
27
the two countries .

1.15 This paranoia about Thai land regaining the Temple

continues to be evident in Cambodia’s suggestion that Thailand

has never really accepted the 1962 Judgment. It draws a

distinction in its Response between Thailand accepting its

obligations under the U nited Nations Charter but not accepting

the Judgment of the Court 28. Yet, this is a distinction without a

difference, a false distinction. Judgments of the Court are

binding by virtue of Article 94 of the U nited Nations Charter.

24Response, paras. 2.39 and 2.57.
25
WO, paras. 4.52-4.55. In the same vein, the declarations made in 1968, on
the occasion of the annual celebration of the Judgment and of Prince
Sihanouk visit to the Temple: (French Embassy in Cambodia, Note to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, 17 June 1968 [Annex 11 to FWE]).
See also Annex 20 to Response, Vol. 2, p. 563.
26
It was one of the constant elements of Cambodia’s foreign policy in the
1960s to demand that States recognize Cambodia’s boundaries; for an
account of States having made these declarations, see United States Embassy
in Bangkok, Airgram to the Department of State, “Cambodian Chronology”,
No. A-363, 3 July 1969 [Annex 12 to FWE].
27
Interview with Prince Sihanouk, in The Christian Science Monitor , 28 July
1967, “Sihanouk jealous of borders”. [Annex 9 to FWE]. See also WO,
para. 4.56.
28
Response, para. 2.33.

10Secretary-General about regaining the Temple in the future by
24
legal means . Cambodian authorities regularly accused
25
Thailand of imaginary attempts to regain the Temple . The

withdrawal of the reservation, as well as the requirement that

Thailand declare that it recognized boundaries claimed by
26
Cambodia , were elevated by Cambodia into imperative

conditions for the resumption of diplomatic relations between
27
the two countries .

1.15 This paranoia about Thai land regaining the Temple

continues to be evident in Cambodia’s suggestion that Thailand

has never really accepted the 1962 Judgment. It draws a

distinction in its Response between Thailand accepting its

obligations under the U nited Nations Charter but not accepting

the Judgment of the Court 28. Yet, this is a distinction without a

difference, a false distinction. Judgments of the Court are

binding by virtue of Article 94 of the U nited Nations Charter.

24Response, paras. 2.39 and 2.57.
25
WO, paras. 4.52-4.55. In the same vein, the declarations made in 1968, on
the occasion of the annual celebration of the Judgment and of Prince
Sihanouk visit to the Temple: (French Embassy in Cambodia, Note to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, 17 June 1968 [Annex 11 to FWE]).
See also Annex 20 to Response, Vol. 2, p. 563.
26
It was one of the constant elements of Cambodia’s foreign policy in the
1960s to demand that States recognize Cambodia’s boundaries; for an
account of States having made these declarations, see United States Embassy
in Bangkok, Airgram to the Department of State, “Cambodian Chronology”,
No. A-363, 3 July 1969 [Annex 12 to FWE].
27
Interview with Prince Sihanouk, in The Christian Science Monitor , 28 July
1967, “Sihanouk jealous of borders”. [Annex 9 to FWE]. See also WO,
para. 4.56.
28
Response, para. 2.33. that analysis, asserting dismissively that Thailand is seeking a
30
revision of the Judgment . Thailand’s treatm ent of what the

term “vicinity” means in the context of the Judgment as a

whole, is met with the response that “le terme ‘environs’
possède plusieurs sens” 3. And while Cambodia asserts the

obvious, “[s]eul compte celui que la Cour a souhaité lui

donner,” 32 Cambodia fails to provide any basis whatsoever for

determining what the Court in fact meant. If the meaning of

paragraph 2 of the dispositif to the 1962 Judgment really is an

open question, then it does not suffice for Cambodia to say that

the term vicin ity “possède plusieurs sens” ; Cambodia must

instead be able to say by reference to the Judgment and in light

of the original proceedings, what the Court meant in fact. On

the basis of the Judgment and the pleadings of the Parties,

Thailand has demonstrated the ambit of what the Court decided.
Cambodia has not. Apart from an unsupported affirmation that

the Judgment encompassed the whole area to the south of the

Annex I map line, Cambodia simply has no argument on this

point.

2.C AMBODIA D ENIES THE RELEVANCE OF AN A NALYSIS OF THE

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES BEFORE THE C OURT IN 1962

1.18 One of the more astonishing aspects of Cambodia’s

Response is the denial that the arguments of the Parties in 1962

30Response, para. 4.55.

31Ibid., para. 4.57.
32
Ibid.

12that analysis, asserting dismissively that Thailand is seeking a
30
revision of the Judgment . Thailand’s treatm ent of what the

term “vicinity” means in the context of the Judgment as a

whole, is met with the response that “le terme ‘environs’
possède plusieurs sens” 31. And while Cambodia asserts the

obvious, “[s]eul compte celui que la Cour a souhaité lui

donner,” 32 Cambodia fails to provide any basis whatsoever for

determining what the Court in fact meant. If the meaning of

paragraph 2 of the dispositif to the 1962 Judgment really is an

open question, then it does not suffice for Cambodia to say that

the term vicin ity “possède plusieurs sens” ; Cambodia must

instead be able to say by reference to the Judgment and in light

of the original proceedings, what the Court meant in fact. On

the basis of the Judgment and the pleadings of the Parties,

Thailand has demonstrated the ambit of what the Court decided.
Cambodia has not. Apart from an unsupported affirmation that

the Judgment encompassed the whole area to the south of the

Annex I map line, Cambodia simply has no argument on this

point.

2.C AMBODIA D ENIES THE R ELEVANCE OF AN A NALYSIS OF THE

P OSITIONS OF THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT IN 1962

1.18 One of the more astonishing aspects of Cambodia’s

Response is the denial that the arguments of the Parties in 1962

30Response, para. 4.55.

31Ibid., para. 4.57.
32
Ibid. 36
termes et non pas par référence à des sources externes” it has
37
been essential to do so .

1.20 In fact, Cambodia’s arguments at this point border on the
incoherent. It argues that what has occurred before the

Judgment, in particular the pleadings of the Parties, is not

relevant to its interpretation 38. Then, it also says that facts

occurring after the J udgment are not relevant because invoking

them would alter the meaning and scope of the J udgment 39.

But, if what occurred before the J udgment is ir relevant to its

interpretation and what occurred after the J udgment is also

irrelevant, what is left? A judgment sitting in splendid isolation

with no guidance at all as to its interpretation?

1.21 In short, Cambodia’s argument that the 1962 Judgment
cannot be interpreted by reference to the arguments of the

Parties is completely without merit. An understanding of the

arguments of the Parties is indispensable to understanding what

has been decided and hence to an understanding of the res

judicata. Cambodia’s failure to engage with Thailand’s analysis

of the arguments of the Parties means that Thailand’s
40
arguments rest uncontradicted.

36Ibid., para. 1.12.
37
See paras. 3.7-3.15 below.
38Response, second paragraph 1.11 (p. 6), paras. 1.12 and 4.55- 4.56.

39Ibid., paras. 1.13-1.17 and 2.11-2.15.
40
WO, paras. 2.20-2.65.

14 36
termes et non pas par référence à des sources externes” it has
37
been essential to do so .

1.20 In fact, Cambodia’s arguments at this point border on the
incoherent. It argues that what has occurred before the

Judgment, in particular the pleadings of the Parties, is not

relevant to its interpretation 38. Then, it also says that facts

occurring after the J udgment are not relevant because invoking

them would alter the meaning and scope of the J udgment 39.

But, if what occurred before the J udgment is ir relevant to its

interpretation and what occurred after the J udgment is also

irrelevant, what is left? A judgment sitting in splendid isolation

with no guidance at all as to its interpretation?

1.21 In short, Cambodia’s argument that the 1962 Judgment
cannot be interpreted by reference to the arguments of the

Parties is completely without merit. An understanding of the

arguments of the Parties is indispensable to understanding what

has been decided and hence to an understanding of the res

judicata. Cambodia’s failure to engage with Thailand’s analysis

of the arguments of the Parties means that Thailand’s
40
arguments rest uncontradicted.

36Ibid., para. 1.12.
37
See paras. 3.7-3.15 below.
38Response, second paragraph 1.11 (p. 6), paras. 1.12 and 4.55- 4.56.

39Ibid., paras. 1.13-1.17 and 2.11-2.15.
40
WO, paras. 2.20-2.65. subsequently claims in its Response Thailand had not assented

to?

1.24 In any event this is not a case of a recently found map as
44
Cambodia would like to characterize the matter . T here have

always been different versions of the Annex I map. Hence
Cambodia’s argument about subsequent developments simply

misses the mark. The essential point is that if the dispute in

1962 had been a boundary dispute, the existence of different

versions of the Annex I map would have been a critical and

central issue. The case would have been pleaded differently.

That the existence of different versions of the Annex I map was
not seen as critical is evidenced by Cambodia’s filing in the

present proceedings of a version of the map which has on it a

line that is substantially different from the line on the Annex I

map filed by Cambodia in the original proceedings and referred

to in the 1962 Judgment. Cambodia’s own actions confirm that
the 1962 Judgment was not about a boundary. The point has

nothing to do with developments subsequent to the Judgment.

1.25 Moreover, silence on the Annex I maps also means that

Cambodia has simply not provided any response to the

argument that the impossibility of transposing the line on any of
the versions of the Annex I map onto the ground is a further

indication that the Court was not giving authoritative status to

the map line as a definitive boundary. Cambodia’s implicit

44Ibid., para. 2.15.

16subsequently claims in its Response Thailand had not assented

to?

1.24 In any event this is not a case of a recently found map as
44
Cambodia would like to characterize the matter . T here have

always been different versions of the Annex I map. Hence
Cambodia’s argument about subsequent developments simply

misses the mark. The essential point is that if the dispute in

1962 had been a boundary dispute, the existence of different

versions of the Annex I map would have been a critical and

central issue. The case would have been pleaded differently.

That the existence of different versions of the Annex I map was
not seen as critical is evidenced by Cambodia’s filing in the

present proceedings of a version of the map which has on it a

line that is substantially different from the line on the Annex I

map filed by Cambodia in the original proceedings and referred

to in the 1962 Judgment. Cambodia’s own actions confirm that
the 1962 Judgment was not about a boundary. The point has

nothing to do with developments subsequent to the Judgment.

1.25 Moreover, silence on the Annex I maps also means that

Cambodia has simply not provided any response to the

argument that the impossibility of transposing the line on any of
the versions of the Annex I map onto the ground is a further

indication that the Court was not giving authoritative status to

the map line as a definitive boundary. Cambodia’s implicit

44Ibid., para. 2.15. in the records suggests that this is true. The “ruins of the
Temple” was the way in which France and then Cambodia

described the feature over which sovereignty was disputed.

Equally the claim that the Court’s rejection in 1962 of the

Cambodian requests to give authoritative status to the Annex I
47
map line was si mply a matter of form or procedure is a

proposition of Alice -in-Wonderland-like proportions.

Essentially, Cambodia is saying that the Court found it
unnecessary to include a decision on the Annex I map line in the

dispositif, because it had already decid ed the matter in its

reasons. But, if matters can be decided with the force of res

judicata in the reasons for judgment, what is the point of having

a dispositif at all? Simply to state the Cambodian hypothesis is

to highlight its absurdity. Reasons can be referred to in

interpreting a judgment in order to understand what was decided
in the dispositif , not because they are independently binding

decisions of the Court. Moreover, the reasons also provide an

important opportunity for a court to indicate what it is not

deciding. Cambodia’s proposition that reasons are part of the

res judicata would deny the Court this important tool of the

judicial process.

1.28 Cambodia’s repeated assertions that Thailand is seeking

a revision or reconsideration of the 1962 Judgment 48 ignores

that it was Cambodia that brought this case before the Court.

Thailand is seeking nothing other than a determination that

47Response, para. 3.23.
48
Ibid., paras. 1.23, 4.55-4.56 and 5.1-5.7.

18in the records suggests that this is true. The “ruins of the
Temple” was the way in which France and then Cambodia

described the feature over which sovereignty was disputed.

Equally the claim that the Court’s rejection in 1962 of the

Cambodian requests to give authoritative status to the Annex I
47
map line was si mply a matter of form or procedure is a

proposition of Alice -in-Wonderland-like proportions.

Essentially, Cambodia is saying that the Court found it
unnecessary to include a decision on the Annex I map line in the

dispositif, because it had already decid ed the matter in its

reasons. But, if matters can be decided with the force of res

judicata in the reasons for judgment, what is the point of having

a dispositif at all? Simply to state the Cambodian hypothesis is

to highlight its absurdity. Reasons can be referred to in

interpreting a judgment in order to understand what was decided
in the dispositif , not because they are independently binding

decisions of the Court. Moreover, the reasons also provide an

important opportunity for a court to indicate what it is not

deciding. Cambodia’s proposition that reasons are part of the

res judicata would deny the Court this important tool of the

judicial process.

1.28 Cambodia’s repeated assertions that Thailand is seeking

a revision or reconsideration of the 1962 Judgment 48 ignores

that it was Cambodia that brought this case before the Court.

Thailand is seeking nothing other than a determination that

47Response, para. 3.23.
48
Ibid., paras. 1.23, 4.55-4.56 and 5.1-5.7. that indicated that the Court would not have made a decision

covering more than had been requested because this would

violate the non ultra petita principle. The point in each instance

was that it was not logical to assume that a Court would expand

the scope of its decision in contravention of the non ultra petita

principle. Since the link between the two paragraphs where the

argument is made is obvious and the grammatical structure of

the two arguments is not complicated, the only conclusion to be

drawn is that this was a deliberate misreading of Thailand’s

Written Observations by Cambodia in order to make a rather

distasteful allegation of impropriety.

1.31 Cambodia also seeks to gain rhetorical advantage from

referring to what it describes as the “sec ret map” allegedly
52
disclosed for the first time during UNESCO discussions .

Counsel for Cambodia first mentioned this in the oral

proceedings in the provisional measures application. Referring

to a line that Cambodia had drawn on a map it submitted as
Annex 5 to its Annexes cartographiques, counsel for Cambodia

said that it was a line tabled by Thailand before the World

Heritage Committee in 2007 and that the line had stamped on it

the word “SECRET” 53. Then, in its Response, Cambodia

claimed that in 2007 Thailand published a new map that was

52Ibid., para. 1.3 (iii).

53Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, 30 May 2011, CR 2011/13, p. 27,
para. 6 (Sir Franklin Berman).

20that indicated that the Court would not have made a decision

covering more than had been requested because this would

violate the non ultra petita principle. The point in each instance

was that it was not logical to assume that a Court would expand

the scope of its decision in contravention of the non ultra petita

principle. Since the link between the two paragraphs where the

argument is made is obvious and the grammatical structure of

the two arguments is not complicated, the only conclusion to be

drawn is that this was a deliberate misreading of Thailand’s

Written Observations by Cambodia in order to make a rather

distasteful allegation of impropriety.

1.31 Cambodia also seeks to gain rhetorical advantage from

referring to what it describes as the “sec ret map” allegedly
52
disclosed for the first time during UNESCO discussions .

Counsel for Cambodia first mentioned this in the oral

proceedings in the provisional measures application. Referring

to a line that Cambodia had drawn on a map it submitted as
Annex 5 to its Annexes cartographiques, counsel for Cambodia

said that it was a line tabled by Thailand before the World

Heritage Committee in 2007 and that the line had stamped on it

the word “SECRET” 53. Then, in its Response, Cambodia

claimed that in 2007 Thailand published a new map that was

52Ibid., para. 1.3 (iii).

53Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, 30 May 2011, CR 2011/13, p. 27,
para. 6 (Sir Franklin Berman). 58
Annex 94 t o Thailand’s Written Observations . Furthermore,

the line that appears on Map Series L 7017 is a line that has

been known to Cambodia since 1962. It follows the barbed-

wire fence of 1962 implementing the Cabinet line. So surprise
and outrage by Cambodia are completely contrived. At one

level, Cambodia’s claim is nothing but a hullabaloo of no

consequence. At another level it is part of the distortion and

misrepresentation by Cambodia that is endemic in this case.

1.34 Equally Cambodia seeks to make much of an alleged

attempt by Thailand to avoid producing the resolution of the

Council of Ministers in 1962 leading to the withdrawal of Thai

troops from the Temple and the erection of the barbed- wire
59 60
fence . But as the record of the resolution shows the formal

recitation of the Council of Ministers resolution that Cambodia
so badly wanted to see simply adds nothing to understanding

what occurred. Producing the record of the resolution of the

Council of Ministers has added no further insight and

Cambodia’s obsession with it has been a pointless diversion.

1.35 Further, while Cambodia is evidently reluctant to

respond to Thailand’s arguments about the Annex I map, it has

58 Minister of Foreign Af fairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Note to Advisor
to the Royal Government of Cambodia in Charge of State Border Affairs and
Co-Chairman of the Cambodia -Thailand Joint Boundary Commission,
No. 0803/192, 8 March 2005 [Annex 94 to WO].

59Response, paras. 1.3 (iii) and 2.20.
60
See Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Thailand of
10 July 1962 [Annex 5 to FWE]

22 58
Annex 94 t o Thailand’s Written Observations . Furthermore,

the line that appears on Map Series L 7017 is a line that has

been known to Cambodia since 1962. It follows the barbed-

wire fence of 1962 implementing the Cabinet line. So surprise
and outrage by Cambodia are completely contrived. At one

level, Cambodia’s claim is nothing but a hullabaloo of no

consequence. At another level it is part of the distortion and

misrepresentation by Cambodia that is endemic in this case.

1.34 Equally Cambodia seeks to make much of an alleged

attempt by Thailand to avoid producing the resolution of the

Council of Ministers in 1962 leading to the withdrawal of Thai

troops from the Temple and the erection of the barbed- wire
59 60
fence . But as the record of the resolution shows the formal

recitation of the Council of Ministers resolution that Cambodia
so badly wanted to see simply adds nothing to understanding

what occurred. Producing the record of the resolution of the

Council of Ministers has added no further insight and

Cambodia’s obsession with it has been a pointless diversion.

1.35 Further, while Cambodia is evidently reluctant to

respond to Thailand’s arguments about the Annex I map, it has

58Minister of Foreign Af fairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Note to Advisor
to the Royal Government of Cambodia in Charge of State Border Affairs and
Co-Chairman of the Cambodia -Thailand Joint Boundary Commission,
No. 0803/192, 8 March 2005 [Annex 94 to WO].

59Response, paras. 1.3 (iii) and 2.20.
60
See Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Thailand of
10 July 1962 [Annex 5 to FWE] as “the enlargement of ‘Annex I map’”. In fact, what Cambodia

attached to both letters was Map Sheet 3 of Annex 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial in the original proceedings. This

was a map prepared by the International Training Centre for

Aerial Survey in Delft (I.T.C.) 64 and was an enlarg ement to a

scale of 1:50,000, not of the Annex I map itself but part of the

Annex I map representing an area of 4 cm × 6 cm of the

original. In fact, rather than being the map “used by the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) to adjudicate the conflict”

over the Temple, Map Sheet 3 was hardly referred to in the oral

pleadings of the Parties and not at all by the Court in its
Judgment. It was not a map that was either annexed to the

Judgment or adopted by the Court.

1.38 Moreover, what Cambodia presented to th e Security

Council was not the m ap sheet that was actually filed with the

Court in the 1962 proceedings; it was a map on which

Cambodia had made some additions. The words, “Thailand”

and “Cambodia” and the words “Boundary Line” were added.
And there was a further notation added “Pagoda occupied by

Thai army” with a line to a dot apparently meant to represent the

pagoda. None of these appeared on the original Map Sheet 3,

64 In the original proceedings, Thailand hired experts, Professor W.
Schermerhorn, Director of the Consulting Department and Dean of the
International Training Centre (I.T.C.) and Professor Schermerhorn’s

assistant, Mr. F.E. Ackermann to determine the location of the watershed in
the Kao Phra Viharn area. After an investig ation on the ground, the experts
produced a report entitle“Report by Professor W. Schermerhorn, 1961”,
which was filed as Annex 49 to Counter -Memorial of the Royal Government
of Thailand (hereafter “Thailand’s Counter -Memorial”). Four map sheets
were annexed to this report.

24as “the enlargement of ‘Annex I map’”. In fact, what Cambodia

attached to both letters was Map Sheet 3 of Annex 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial in the original proceedings. This

was a map prepared by the International Training Centre for

Aerial Survey in Delft (I.T.C.) 64 and was an enlarg ement to a

scale of 1:50,000, not of the Annex I map itself but part of the

Annex I map representing an area of 4 cm × 6 cm of the

original. In fact, rather than being the map “used by the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) to adjudicate the conflict”

over the Temple, Map Sheet 3 was hardly referred to in the oral

pleadings of the Parties and not at all by the Court in its
Judgment. It was not a map that was either annexed to the

Judgment or adopted by the Court.

1.38 Moreover, what Cambodia presented to th e Security

Council was not the m ap sheet that was actually filed with the

Court in the 1962 proceedings; it was a map on which

Cambodia had made some additions. The words, “Thailand”

and “Cambodia” and the words “Boundary Line” were added.
And there was a further notation added “Pagoda occupied by

Thai army” with a line to a dot apparently meant to represent the

pagoda. None of these appeared on the original Map Sheet 3,

64 In the original proceedings, Thailand hired experts, Professor W.
Schermerhorn, Director of the Consulting Department and Dean of the
International Training Centre (I.T.C.) and Professor Schermerhorn’s

assistant, Mr. F.E. Ackermann to determine the location of the watershed in
the Kao Phra Viharn area. After an investig ation on the ground, the experts
produced a report entitle“Report by Professor W. Schermerhorn, 1961”,
which was filed as Annex 49 to Counter -Memorial of the Royal Government
of Thailand (hereafter “Thailand’s Counter -Memorial”). Four map sheets
were annexed to this report. Cour” as Cambodia would have this Court believe 68and it was

never “adopted” by the Court in 1962.

1.40 Map Sheet 3 reappears in Cambo dia’s Response on the

page immediately preceding page 24. But perhaps chastened by

Thailand drawing attention in its Written Observations to
Cambodia’s corruption of the map Cambodia modifies Map

Sheet 3 once more. Gone is the reference to the map as hav ing

been adopted by the Court, gone is the reference to the

“International Boundary Line”, the symbol for the Temple is

reduced to its original size, and the map is described as Map

Sheet 3 from Annex 49. The map, Cambodia says, is “ tirée du
contre-mémoire thaï landais dans l’affaire principale ”, and

“[c]ette carte avait été préparée par l'expert thaïlandais” .69

1.41 But, what Cambodia provides in its Response is still not

Map Sheet 3 as it was presented to the Court in 1962 in Annex
49. It is still a doc tored version of that map. The words

“Phnum Trap” still appear on the map, but this time spelt

“Phnom Traop”. The word “Pagoda”, this time spelt “Pagode”,

and the spot apparently marking the pagoda are still there. None

of these appeared in the original.

68Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 5 (2).

69Response, para. 2.36.

26Cour” as Cambodia would have this Court believe 68and it was

never “adopted” by the Court in 1962.

1.40 Map Sheet 3 reappears in Cambo dia’s Response on the

page immediately preceding page 24. But perhaps chastened by

Thailand drawing attention in its Written Observations to
Cambodia’s corruption of the map Cambodia modifies Map

Sheet 3 once more. Gone is the reference to the map as hav ing

been adopted by the Court, gone is the reference to the

“International Boundary Line”, the symbol for the Temple is

reduced to its original size, and the map is described as Map

Sheet 3 from Annex 49. The map, Cambodia says, is “ tirée du
contre-mémoire thaï landais dans l’affaire principale ”, and

“[c]ette carte avait été préparée par l'expert thaïlandais” .69

1.41 But, what Cambodia provides in its Response is still not

Map Sheet 3 as it was presented to the Court in 1962 in Annex
49. It is still a doc tored version of that map. The words

“Phnum Trap” still appear on the map, but this time spelt

“Phnom Traop”. The word “Pagoda”, this time spelt “Pagode”,

and the spot apparently marking the pagoda are still there. None

of these appeared in the original.

68Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 5 (2).

69Response, para. 2.36. 1.44 Such cartographic manipulation is easily exposed. It
demonstrates the lengths to which Cambodia has to go in its

attempt to portray the 1962 proceedin gs as dealing with

something that they were not.

1.45 This is not the end of Cambodia’s cartographical

deception. On the page immediately preceding page 77 of the

Response Cambodia reproduces a map which purports to

illustrate “une comparaison effectuée par le Dr. Schermerhorn
71
après superposition des deux cartes ” . The Response explains
that the green line on the map represents the Annex I map line

and the red line represents the watershed line, and that the lines

overlap to both the east and west of the Temple. The

Cambodian Response then states,

“Cependant, dans la partie centrale, il y a une zone
délimitée où les deux lignes divergent. Cela correspond
aux 4,6 km qui étaient au centre du litige dans l’affaire
72
initiale et qui demeurent litigieux aujourd’hui.”

The impression is clear. Cambodia has produced a map

purportedly drawn by Professor Schermerhorn showing a 4.6
sq km area in dispute. This, Cambodia claims, was the area in

dispute before the Court in 1962 and it remains the area in

dispute today.

71Response, para. 4.65.
72
Ibid.

281.44 Such cartographic manipulation is easily exposed. It
demonstrates the lengths to which Cambodia has to go in its

attempt to portray the 1962 proceedin gs as dealing with

something that they were not.

1.45 This is not the end of Cambodia’s cartographical

deception. On the page immediately preceding page 77 of the

Response Cambodia reproduces a map which purports to

illustrate “une comparaison effectuée par le Dr. Schermerhorn
71
après superposition des deux cartes ” . The Response explains
that the green line on the map represents the Annex I map line

and the red line represents the watershed line, and that the lines

overlap to both the east and west of the Temple. The

Cambodian Response then states,

“Cependant, dans la partie centrale, il y a une zone
délimitée où les deux lignes divergent. Cela correspond
aux 4,6 km qui étaient au centre du litige dans l’affaire
72
initiale et qui demeurent litigieux aujourd’hui.”

The impression is clear. Cambodia has produced a map

purportedly drawn by Professor Schermerhorn showing a 4.6
sq km area in dispute. This, Cambodia claims, was the area in

dispute before the Court in 1962 and it remains the area in

dispute today.

71Response, para. 4.65.
72
Ibid. And although Cambodia may claim that it is just doing what

Professor Schermerhorn said could be done, that also would not

be true. Certainly Cambodia has taken Map Sheet 3 and

superimposed it over Map Sheet 4. But, in doing so Cambodia
has ignored the registration points on Map Sheet 3 which were

to be aligned with the corners on Map Sheet 4, instead using the

Temple as a common point on each map. And then Cambodia

has added colour and shading to its new map, characteristics of
neither of Professor Schermerhorn’s maps. Minor, harmless

changes Cambodia might claim. B ut they have two important

consequences. First, they give the impression that the 4.6 sq km

area there displayed was what the Court was focusing on, and
second, they move the Annex I map line towards Thailand.

Cambodia has not produced a map that is the result of doing

what Professor Schermerhorn said should be done, and it cannot

claim that this was Professor Schermerhorn’s map.

1.48 So the claim that the map on the page immediately

preceding page 77 of Cambodia’s Response illustrates “ une

comparaison effectuée par le Dr . Schermerhorn après
76
superposition des deux cartes ” is simply untrue. It is a
corruption of what Professor Schermerhorn said could be done

and it is used by Cambodia to do something that Professor

Schermerhorn did not do. Professor Schermerhorn did not draw

the attention of the Court to a zone created by the overlap of the
Annex I map line and the watershed line. He did not identify a

76Response, para. 4.65.

30And although Cambodia may claim that it is just doing what

Professor Schermerhorn said could be done, that also would not

be true. Certainly Cambodia has taken Map Sheet 3 and

superimposed it over Map Sheet 4. But, in doing so Cambodia
has ignored the registration points on Map Sheet 3 which were

to be aligned with the corners on Map Sheet 4, instead using the

Temple as a common point on each map. And then Cambodia

has added colour and shading to its new map, characteristics of
neither of Professor Schermerhorn’s maps. Minor, harmless

changes Cambodia might claim. B ut they have two important

consequences. First, they give the impression that the 4.6 sq km

area there displayed was what the Court was focusing on, and
second, they move the Annex I map line towards Thailand.

Cambodia has not produced a map that is the result of doing

what Professor Schermerhorn said should be done, and it cannot

claim that this was Professor Schermerhorn’s map.

1.48 So the claim that the map on the page immediately

preceding page 77 of Cambodia’s Response illustrates “ une

comparaison effectuée par le Dr . Schermerhorn après
76
superposition des deux cartes ” is simply untrue. It is a
corruption of what Professor Schermerhorn said could be done

and it is used by Cambodia to do something that Professor

Schermerhorn did not do. Professor Schermerhorn did not draw

the attention of the Court to a zone created by the overlap of the
Annex I map line and the watershed line. He did not identify a

76Response, para. 4.65. D. Outline of These Further Written Explanations

1.50 In Chapter II, Thailand will show that the subject matter

of the dispute in 1962 is different from the subject matter of the

dispute that is the basis for Cambodia’s Request for

interpretation. In 1962 the dispute was about sovereignty over
the Temple and the ground on which it stood – the Temple area.

The dispute that Cambodia brought to the Court in 2011 under

the guise of interpretation is about the boundary between the
Parties and the status of the Annex I map line, which Cambodia

claims to be the boundary. The fact that the subject matters of

the two disputes differ means that there is no question of
interpretation for the Court.

1.51 In Chapter III , Thailand will respond to Cambodia’s

arguments in support of the Court having jurisdiction to
interpret the 1962 Judgment. Thailand will show that there is no

dispute over the meaning or scope of the Judgment and that

Cambodia has confused the reasons for the Judgment and what
has been decided with the force of res judicata. The request

made to the Court to determine that the Annex I map line is the

boundary between the Parties cannot be brought within the

framework of an Article 60 interpretation. The Parties are in
dispute over the location of the boundary between them, but that

dispute does not arise out of the 1962 Judgment a nd cannot be

resolved through an interpretation of what the Court actually
decided in that Judgment.

32 D. Outline of These Further Written Explanations

1.50 In Chapter II, Thailand will show that the subject matter

of the dispute in 1962 is different from the subject matter of the

dispute that is the basis for Cambodia’s Request for

interpretation. In 1962 the dispute was about sovereignty over
the Temple and the ground on which it stood – the Temple area.

The dispute that Cambodia brought to the Court in 2011 under

the guise of interpretation is about the boundary between the
Parties and the status of the Annex I map line, which Cambodia

claims to be the boundary. The fact that the subject matters of

the two disputes differ means that there is no question of
interpretation for the Court.

1.51 In Chapter III , Thailand will respond to Cambodia’s

arguments in support of the Court having jurisdiction to
interpret the 1962 Judgment. Thailand will show that there is no

dispute over the meaning or scope of the Judgment and that

Cambodia has confused the reasons for the Judgment and what
has been decided with the force of res judicata. The request

made to the Court to determine that the Annex I map line is the

boundary between the Parties cannot be brought within the

framework of an Article 60 interpretation. The Parties are in
dispute over the location of the boundary between them, but that

dispute does not arise out of the 1962 Judgment a nd cannot be

resolved through an interpretation of what the Court actually
decided in that Judgment.34 CHAPTER II

THE DIFFERING SUBJECT MATTERS OF THE

DISPUTES

2.1 The essence of Cambodia’s position is that the Court

should interpret the 1962 Judgment to mean that the Court then
was making a definitive determination that the Annex I map line

is the boundary between the Parties 78. But whether it can obtain

such an interpretation depends initially on whether the question

put is in fact a question of interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

In other words, the subject matter of the Request for

interpretation has to be within the bounds of the subject matter
of the dispute that resulted in the Judgment that Cambodia now

seeks to have interpreted.

2.2 However, an analysis of the subject matter of the dispute

in 1962 and the subject matter of the dispute that Cambodia has
now brought before the Court by means of a request for

interpretation shows that they are not in fact the same.

Cambodia is seeking to use the 1962 decision as a vehicle for

achieving a determin ation on a quite different matter. On that

basis alone the Cambodian Request does not meet the

requirements of Article 60 for an interpretation by the Court.

78Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instit uting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 45.
See also Response, para. 5.9.

35 A. The 1962 Dispute

2.3 In its Written Observations of 21 November 2011,

Thailand reviewed the origins of the dispute before the Court in

1962, the pleadings of the Parties and what the Court decided.

From that review the nature and subject matter of the dispute

became clear. It is not proposed to repeat what was said in

those Written Observations, but rather to focus on the key
elements of that analysis in order to highlight what was before

the Court and what the Court actually decided.

2.4 Cambodia has failed to respond to Thailand’s analysis of

the 1962 dispute, preferring to take refuge behind a claim of

irrelevance, according to which nothing in the claims made by

the Parties in 1962 or their arguments in support of those claims
can be taken into account in order to understand what the Court

decided 79. The result of Cambodia’s silence is that it never

presents a clear picture of what the 1962 case was about, but

leaves a blurred and misleading impression that whatever else

the case was about, it was in reality about the boundary between

the two countries. But Cambodia does nothing to substant iate

this. All it does is to quote selectively extracts from the decision
of the Court isolating them from the broader context of the

decision and the subject matter of the dispute as set out in the

pleadings of the Parties and on which the decision is grounded.

79
Response, second paragraph 1.11 (p.6) and para. 1.12.

36 A. The 1962 Dispute

2.3 In its Written Observations of 21 November 2011,

Thailand reviewed the origins of the dispute before the Court in

1962, the pleadings of the Parties and what the Court decided.

From that review the nature and subject matter of the dispute

became clear. It is not proposed to repeat what was said in

those Written Observations, but rather to focus on the key
elements of that analysis in order to highlight what was before

the Court and what the Court actually decided.

2.4 Cambodia has failed to respond to Thailand’s analysis of

the 1962 dispute, preferring to take refuge behind a claim of

irrelevance, according to which nothing in the claims made by

the Parties in 1962 or their arguments in support of those claims
can be taken into account in order to understand what the Court

decided 79. The result of Cambodia’s silence is that it never

presents a clear picture of what the 1962 case was about, but

leaves a blurred and misleading impression that whatever else

the case was about, it was in reality about the boundary between

the two countries. But Cambodia does nothing to substant iate

this. All it does is to quote selectively extracts from the decision
of the Court isolating them from the broader context of the

decision and the subject matter of the dispute as set out in the

pleadings of the Parties and on which the decision is grounded.

79
Response, second paragraph 1.11 (p.6) and para. 1.12. 2.7 Thus, by the time the proceedings on the merits began,

there was little doubt that the subject matter of the dispute

before the Court was sovereignty over the Temple.

2. THE A RGUMENTS OF THE P ARTIES

2.8 The written pleadings of the Pa rties continued in the

same vein. Cambodia was requesting the Court to determine

sovereignty over the Temple 8. This was the focus of the

arguments of counsel in the first round of oral pleadings. The

central issue was the Temple (“ce que revendique le Cambodge,
84
c’est le temple”) and throughout their arguments counsel for

Cambodia insisted that it was sovereignty over the Temple that

was being claimed. These were the arguments to which counsel
for Thailand responded, and they too treated the dispute as over

the Temple.

2.9 Moreover, the Annex I map was used by Cambodia’s

counsel in their oral pleadings always in relation to the location

of the Temple . It, like the visit of Prince Damrong, was said

to be evidence of Thailand’s recognition that the Temple was
86
subject to the sovereignty of Cambodia . There was no

83
WO, paras. 2.26 and 2.30.
84Ibid., para. 2.40.

85Ibid., paras. 2.59-2.65.
86
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 30-31.

382.7 Thus, by the time the proceedings on the merits began,

there was little doubt that the subject matter of the dispute

before the Court was sovereignty over the Temple.

2.T HE A RGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

2.8 The written pleadings of the Pa rties continued in the

same vein. Cambodia was requesting the Court to determine

sovereignty over the Temple 83. This was the focus of the

arguments of counsel in the first round of oral pleadings. The

central issue was the Temple (“ce que revendique le Cambodge,
84
c’est le temple”) and throughout their arguments counsel for

Cambodia insisted that it was sovereignty over the Temple that

was being claimed. These were the arguments to which counsel
for Thailand responded, and they too treated the dispute as over

the Temple.

2.9 Moreover, the Annex I map was used by Cambodia’s

counsel in their oral pleadings always in relation to the location

of the Temple . It, like the visit of Prince Damrong, was said

to be evidence of Thailand’s recognition that the Temple was
86
subject to the sovereignty of Cambodia . There was no

83
WO, paras. 2.26 and 2.30.
84Ibid., para. 2.40.

85Ibid., paras. 2.59-2.65.
86
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 30-31. 2.11 Notwithstanding the new and broader claim put forward

by Cambodia at the end of the first round of oral pleadings, in

the second round of oral pleadings counsel for Cambodia did

not change their essential approach to the case. No new

arguments were introduced to support a boundary claim as

opposed to a sovereignty claim. T hey continued to argue the

case as if it were about sovereignty over the Temple and its
precincts. They focused on the Temple, on Thailand’s alleged

recognition of Cambodian sovereignty over the Temple, and

showed no real interest in defending the Annex I map line as a

boundary apart from the claim that Thailand had acquiesced in

it.

2.12 Because Cambodia has refused in its Response to engage
on the way the dispute was articulated in the pleadings of the

Parties in 1962, it is difficult to understand exactly how it would

characterize the subject matter of the 1962 dispute. Cambodia

does not provide any arguments to show why Thailand’s

analysis of the pleadings of the Parties is wrong – just that it is

irrelevant. Instead Cambodia takes statements from the

Judgment of the Court , isolates them from their context and
treats them as if they must be definitive of what the Court was

deciding .0

90
Response, para. 3.12.

402.11 Notwithstanding the new and broader claim put forward

by Cambodia at the end of the first round of oral pleadings, in

the second round of oral pleadings counsel for Cambodia did

not change their essential approach to the case. No new

arguments were introduced to support a boundary claim as

opposed to a sovereignty claim. T hey continued to argue the

case as if it were about sovereignty over the Temple and its
precincts. They focused on the Temple, on Thailand’s alleged

recognition of Cambodian sovereignty over the Temple, and

showed no real interest in defending the Annex I map line as a

boundary apart from the claim that Thailand had acquiesced in

it.

2.12 Because Cambodia has refused in its Response to engage
on the way the dispute was articulated in the pleadings of the

Parties in 1962, it is difficult to understand exactly how it would

characterize the subject matter of the 1962 dispute. Cambodia

does not provide any arguments to show why Thailand’s

analysis of the pleadings of the Parties is wrong – just that it is

irrelevant. Instead Cambodia takes statements from the

Judgment of the Court , isolates them from their context and
treats them as if they must be definitive of what the Court was

deciding .

90
Response, para. 3.12. cartographic material of the original proceedings 93 that a

meticulous presentation of it is now indispensable to reestablish

the true picture.

2.15 As recalled above , Thailand filed in Annex 49 to its

Counter-Memorial in the original proceedings four maps : Map

95 96
Sheets 1 and 2 were large-scale (1:10,000) maps prepared by

the I.T.C., providing detailed topographical information for a

segment of 4 cm × 6 cm of the Annex I map. The purpose of

this expert evidence was to identify the watershed for the areas

represented on that segment. Furthermore, I.T.C. was requested

to make a comparison of the topographical features appearing

on Map Sheets 1 and 2 and on the corresponding segment of the

Annex I map. As the I.T.C. Report explained, the two maps

differed so much in scale, that a direct comparison was hardly

possible. “Consequently one map was reduced and the other
97
one enlarged” . The enlargement of the segment of the Annex I
98
map was represented in Map Sheet 3 of Annex 49 . The

reduction of Map Sheets 1 and 2 is represented in Map Sheet 4
99
of Annex 49 , which was a transparent sheet that could be

93
See paras. 1.35-1.48 above. See also WO, para. 1.11.
94See para. 1.46 and footnotes 64 and 73 above.

95Map Sheet 1 reproduced as [Annex 47 to FWE].
96
Map Sheet 2 reproduced as [Annex 48 to FWE].
97
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, “Report by Professor W.
Schermerhorn, 1961” , Counter -Memorial of the Royal Government of
Thailand, Annex 49, Vol. I, p. 435.
98
Map Sheet 3 reproduced as [Annex 49 to FWE].
99Map Sheet 4 reproduced as [Annex 50 to FWE].

42cartographic material of the original proceedings 93 that a

meticulous presentation of it is now indispensable to reestablish

the true picture.

2.15 As recalled above , Thailand filed in Annex 49 to its

Counter-Memorial in the original proceedings four maps : Map

95 96
Sheets 1 and 2 were large-scale (1:10,000) maps prepared by

the I.T.C., providing detailed topographical information for a

segment of 4 cm × 6 cm of the Annex I map. The purpose of

this expert evidence was to identify the watershed for the areas

represented on that segment. Furthermore, I.T.C. was requested

to make a comparison of the topographical features appearing

on Map Sheets 1 and 2 and on the corresponding segment of the

Annex I map. As the I.T.C. Report explained, the two maps

differed so much in scale, that a direct comparison was hardly

possible. “Consequently one map was reduced and the other
97
one enlarged” . The enlargement of the segment of the Annex I
98
map was represented in Map Sheet 3 of Annex 49 . The

reduction of Map Sheets 1 and 2 is represented in Map Sheet 4
99
of Annex 49 , which was a transparent sheet that could be

93
See paras. 1.35-1.48 above. See also WO, para. 1.11.
94See para. 1.46 and footnotes 64 and 73 above.

95Map Sheet 1 reproduced as [Annex 47 to FWE].
96
Map Sheet 2 reproduced as [Annex 48 to FWE].
97
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, “Report by Professor W.
Schermerhorn, 1961” , Counter -Memorial of the Royal Government of
Thailand, Annex 49, Vol. I, p. 435.
98
Map Sheet 3 reproduced as [Annex 49 to FWE].
99Map Sheet 4 reproduced as [Annex 50 to FWE]. did not even consider it necessary to annex this sheet to the

published record of the pleadings 104.

2.17 The Court had indeed good reasons to deny Map Sheet 3

any relevance: first, t he experts’ intention in producing this

sheet was to identify, by comparison with Map Sheet 4, the

topographical inaccuracies appearing on the corresponding

segment of the Annex I Map. While Map Sheet 4 provided a

fairly accurate representation of the top ography of those areas,

Map Sheet 3 reproduced the significant errors appearing on

Annex I map. The purpose of the overlay of those sheets was
105
precisely to identify those errors . Needless to say the Court

had no reason to publish a map whose stated purpose was to

denounce topographical errors. And it did not do so. To the

contrary, it chose to publish Map Sheet 4, the topographical

accuracy of which was reliable. Of course, Cambodia conceals

all of this.

2.18 Moreover, Cambodia asserts that Map Sheet 3 is “an

enlargement of the area of the Temple” 106, thus implying that

this sheet covers the area in dispute in the original proceedings.

104The choice of the maps to be annexed to the published record of the

pleadings was not insignificant (see para. 2.25 below).
105And not to define the area in dispute, as Cambodia would now want the
Court to believe (see paras. 1.45 -1.48 above and 2.47- 2.49 below). See also
International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University , “A review of
maps presented in the per iod 1959-1962 and others prepared in 2012” , June

2012 (hereafter “IBRU Review”), paras. 6.1-6.6 [Annex 46 to FWE].
106Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 5 (2).

44did not even consider it necessary to annex this sheet to the

published record of the pleadings 104.

2.17 The Court had indeed good reasons to deny Map Sheet 3

any relevance: first, t he experts’ intention in producing this

sheet was to identify, by comparison with Map Sheet 4, the

topographical inaccuracies appearing on the corresponding

segment of the Annex I Map. While Map Sheet 4 provided a

fairly accurate representation of the top ography of those areas,

Map Sheet 3 reproduced the significant errors appearing on

Annex I map. The purpose of the overlay of those sheets was
105
precisely to identify those errors . Needless to say the Court

had no reason to publish a map whose stated purpose was to

denounce topographical errors. And it did not do so. To the

contrary, it chose to publish Map Sheet 4, the topographical

accuracy of which was reliable. Of course, Cambodia conceals

all of this.

2.18 Moreover, Cambodia asserts that Map Sheet 3 is “an

enlargement of the area of the Temple” 106, thus implying that

this sheet covers the area in dispute in the original proceedings.

104The choice of the maps to be annexed to the published record of the

pleadings was not insignificant (see para. 2.25 below).
105And not to define the area in dispute, as Cambodia would now want the
Court to believe (see paras. 1.45 -1.48 above and 2.47- 2.49 below). See also
International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University , “A review of
maps presented in the per iod 1959-1962 and others prepared in 2012” , June

2012 (hereafter “IBRU Review”), paras. 6.1-6.6 [Annex 46 to FWE].
106Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 5 (2). map” 110. There was hardly a word in the Reply about this map

and similarly, Map Sheet 3 was essentially ignored during the

hearings.

2.20 During the hearings , a map known as the “big map”

(sometimes referred to as the “large map”) was displayed in the

111
Court . This map was an optically made enlargement of Map
112
Sheets 1 and 2 of Annex 49 . The “big map” was introduced

into the oral hearings by Thailand’s counsel, James Hyde, and

was presumably intended to allow the Cour t to follow more
113
easily the arguments of counsel on both sides . The Court

ordered that a partial reproduction of this “big map” be made on

its original scale of 1: 2,000 and lodged in the back cover of the
114
pleadings .

2.21 This cartographic material before the Court provides

some indicia of what was meant by the term “Temple area”,

110Cambodia in fact produced several identical maps, which were numbered
differently (see IBRU Review, footnote 12 [Annex 46 to FWE]). A copy,
labelled “Annexe LXVI (c)” on the upper right hand corner, is reproduced as
[Annex 51 to FWE].

111Annex 85 d , Map on the scale of 1:2,000 prepared by the International
Training Centre for Aerial Survey (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear ,
Oral Arguments , Vol. II, p. 713); see also a photograph of the “big map”
taken at the International Court of Justice on 30 May 2012 [Annex 45 to

FWE].
112For explanations of the way the “big map” was p roduced, see IBRU
Review, paras. 5.1-5.3 [Annex 46 to FWE].

113 I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear , Oral Arguments , Vol. II,
pp. 273-274. See also IBRU Review, paras. 5.1-5.3 [Annex 46 to FWE].

114The partial reproduction in the cover pocket has the sa me annex number
as the “big map” (Annex 85 d ). This partial reproduction is an extract on the
same scale as the “big map” [Annex 52 to FWE].

46map” 110. There was hardly a word in the Reply about this map

and similarly, Map Sheet 3 was essentially ignored during the

hearings.

2.20 During the hearings , a map known as the “big map”

(sometimes referred to as the “large map”) was displayed in the

111
Court . This map was an optically made enlargement of Map
112
Sheets 1 and 2 of Annex 49 . The “big map” was introduced

into the oral hearings by Thailand’s counsel, James Hyde, and

was presumably intended to allow the Cour t to follow more
113
easily the arguments of counsel on both sides . The Court

ordered that a partial reproduction of this “big map” be made on

its original scale of 1: 2,000 and lodged in the back cover of the
114
pleadings .

2.21 This cartographic material before the Court provides

some indicia of what was meant by the term “Temple area”,

110Cambodia in fact produced several identical maps, which were numbered
differently (see IBRU Review, footnote 12 [Annex 46 to FWE]). A copy,
labelled “Annexe LXVI (c)” on the upper right hand corner, is reproduced as
[Annex 51 to FWE].

111Annex 85 d , Map on the scale of 1:2,000 prepared by the International
Training Centre for Aerial Survey (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear ,
Oral Arguments , Vol. II, p. 713); see also a photograph of the “big map”
taken at the International Court of Justice on 30 May 2012 [Annex 45 to

FWE].
112For explanations of the way the “big map” was p roduced, see IBRU
Review, paras. 5.1-5.3 [Annex 46 to FWE].

113 I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear , Oral Arguments , Vol. II,
pp. 273-274. See also IBRU Review, paras. 5.1-5.3 [Annex 46 to FWE].

114The partial reproduction in the cover pocket has the sa me annex number
as the “big map” (Annex 85 d ). This partial reproduction is an extract on the
same scale as the “big map” [Annex 52 to FWE]. 2.22 Now, it cannot even be said that the “Temple area” is the

area represented on Map Sheet 2 [reproduced on the page on the

right]. This sheet has in its centre the Phra Viharn promontory

and gives some topographical details for areas beyond. A quick
look to this sheet, however, makes clear that the Temple area

cannot be larger than the Phra Viharn promontory. It is in fact

smaller 118. And it clearly does not extend to the Pnom Trap

hilltop. On Map Sheet 2, the Pnom Trap hilltop is barely, and at

best only partially, visible, being relegated somewhere to the

extreme left margin. This cartographic detail further confirms

Thailand’s point made in its Written Observations on the basis

of an analysis of the pleadings – the Pnom Trap area was never
119
in contention . This exclusion of Pnom Trap from what was

being discussed in 1962 is of particular importance in the

present proceedings, since Cambodia repeatedly claims that the
Pnom Trap hilltop is part of the territory determined by the

Court in 1962 to be under its sovereignty 120.

2.23 The Court also shared this narrow conception of the

Temple area but adopted a more restricted understanding, since

118See paras. 2.23-2.24 below.
119
It is indeed this area that Mr. Acheson, Counsel for Cambodia, insisted
was not the “crucial area” in the case submitted to the Court ( I.C.J.
Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Oral Arguments , Vol. II, pp. 464- 465
(Mr. Dean Acheson, 22 March 1962). See also WO, paras. 2.44-2.45.
120
See para. 2.49 below.

482.22 Now, it cannot even be said that the “Temple area” is the

area represented on Map Sheet 2 [reproduced on the page on the

right]. This sheet has in its centre the Phra Viharn promontory

and gives some topographical details for areas beyond. A quick
look to this sheet, however, makes clear that the Temple area

cannot be larger than the Phra Viharn promontory. It is in fact

smaller 118. And it clearly does not extend to the Pnom Trap

hilltop. On Map Sheet 2, the Pnom Trap hilltop is barely, and at

best only partially, visible, being relegated somewhere to the

extreme left margin. This cartographic detail further confirms

Thailand’s point made in its Written Observations on the basis

of an analysis of the pleadings – the Pnom Trap area was never
119
in contention . This exclusion of Pnom Trap from what was

being discussed in 1962 is of particular importance in the

present proceedings, since Cambodia repeatedly claims that the
Pnom Trap hilltop is part of the territory determined by the

Court in 1962 to be under its sovereignty 120.

2.23 The Court also shared this narrow conception of the

Temple area but adopted a more restricted understanding, since

118See paras. 2.23-2.24 below.
119
It is indeed this area that Mr. Acheson, Counsel for Cambodia, insisted
was not the “crucial area” in the case submitted to the Court ( I.C.J.
Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Oral Arguments , Vol. II, pp. 464- 465
(Mr. Dean Acheson, 22 March 1962). See also WO, paras. 2.44-2.45.
120
See para. 2.49 below. the Judgment itself identifies the Temple area as being smaller

than the promontory, referring to: “[a map]…showing the whole

Preah Vihear promontory, with the Temple area ” 121. It follows

that, if for cartographers the Temple area roughly coincided

with the promontory on which the Temple stands, for the Court

the “Temple area ” was even more limited than that, being

something less than the promontory.

2.24 What the Court in fact meant by the “Temple area” is

found in the opening paragraphs of the Judgment:

“It will be apparent from the description just given that a
frontier line which ran along the edge of the escarpment,
or which at any rate ran to the south and east of the
Temple area, would leave this area in Thailand; whereas

a line running to the north, or to the north and west,
would place it in Cambodia.” 122

This is a description of the area situated between the watershed

lines as identified by the Parties 12, and it is the area that appears

in Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction) [on the page on the right]

which was published by the Court 124.

121
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21. (Emphasis
added). See also WO, paras. 3.52-3.54.
122
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p 15. (Emphasis
added).
123See also paras. 4.44-4.69 below.

124See Annex No. 85 d (Partial Reproduction), Map on the scale of 1:2,000,
prepared by the International Training Centre for Aerial Survey, 1962
[Annex 52 to FWE]. See also para. 2.20 above.

50the Judgment itself identifies the Temple area as being smaller

than the promontory, referring to: “[a map]…showing the whole

Preah Vihear promontory, with the Temple area ” 121. It follows

that, if for cartographers the Temple area roughly coincided

with the promontory on which the Temple stands, for the Court

the “Temple area ” was even more limited than that, being

something less than the promontory.

2.24 What the Court in fact meant by the “Temple area” is

found in the opening paragraphs of the Judgment:

“It will be apparent from the description just given that a
frontier line which ran along the edge of the escarpment,

or which at any rate ran to the south and east of the
Temple area, would leave this area in Thailand; whereas
a line running to the north, or to the north and west,
122
would place it in Cambodia.”

This is a description of the area situated between the watershed
123
lines as identified by the Parties , and it is the area that appears

in Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction) [on the page on the right]
124
which was published by the Court .

121
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21. (Emphasis
added). See also WO, paras. 3.52-3.54.
122
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p 15. (Emphasis
added).
123
See also paras. 4.44-4.69 below.
124See Annex No. 85 d (Partial Reproduction), Map on the scale of 1:2,000,
prepared by the International Training Centre for Aerial Survey, 1962
[Annex 52 to FWE]. See also para. 2.20 above. 2.25 It is clear, then, that Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction)

is a cartographical representation of what the Court understood

by the term “Temple area”. And this conclusion is reinforced

by at least two further important reasons.
- First, the Annex 85 d map is a partial reproduction,

published by the Court itself , of the “big map” w hich had been

displayed in the courtroom throughout the hearings. As pointed

out above, the “big map” represented a much larger area,

including to the west of Pnom Trap 125. To be more precise, this

partial reproduction covers 0.9 m × 0.6 m of a 3 m × 4.5 m map.

This is about 4 per cent of the “big map”. Since the “big map”

covers, on a much larger scale, an area correponding to that of
126
Map Sheet 3 , the selection by the Court of this tiny segment

of the “big map” to represent the “Temple area” squarely

contradicts Cambodia’s claim in the present proceedings that the
“Temple area” was the one it portrayed on its fabricated

versions of Map Sheet 3.

- Second, the Court considered it necessary to annex this

partial reproduction of the “big map” to the publi shed record of

the pleadings, whereas for most of the maps presented to the

Court it did not 12. It is important in this connection to recall the

Registry’s note that “[o]f the maps annexed to the pleadings,

125See IBRU Review, paras. 5.1-5.2. [Annex 46 to FWE]
126
Ibid., para. 5.1.
127Out of the 61 maps or sketches produced during the 1962 proceedings,
only 6 maps or sketches were published by the Court with the pleadings
(Annex I to the Application instituting proceedings, Annex 7 b , Annex 12 b

and Map Sheet 4 of Annex 49 to Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, Annex 74 to
the Rejoinder and Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction) submitted during the
hearings).

522.25 It is clear, then, that Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction)

is a cartographical representation of what the Court understood

by the term “Temple area”. And this conclusion is reinforced

by at least two further important reasons.
- First, the Annex 85 d map is a partial reproduction,

published by the Court itself , of the “big map” w hich had been

displayed in the courtroom throughout the hearings. As pointed

out above, the “big map” represented a much larger area,

including to the west of Pnom Trap 125. To be more precise, this

partial reproduction covers 0.9 m × 0.6 m of a 3 m × 4.5 m map.

This is about 4 per cent of the “big map”. Since the “big map”

covers, on a much larger scale, an area correponding to that of
126
Map Sheet 3 , the selection by the Court of this tiny segment

of the “big map” to represent the “Temple area” squarely

contradicts Cambodia’s claim in the present proceedings that the
“Temple area” was the one it portrayed on its fabricated

versions of Map Sheet 3.

- Second, the Court considered it necessary to annex this

partial reproduction of the “big map” to the publi shed record of

the pleadings, whereas for most of the maps presented to the

Court it did not 12. It is important in this connection to recall the

Registry’s note that “[o]f the maps annexed to the pleadings,

125See IBRU Review, paras. 5.1-5.2. [Annex 46 to FWE]
126
Ibid., para. 5.1.
127Out of the 61 maps or sketches produced during the 1962 proceedings,
only 6 maps or sketches were published by the Court with the pleadings
(Annex I to the Application instituting proceedings, Annex 7 b , Annex 12 b

and Map Sheet 4 of Annex 49 to Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, Annex 74 to
the Rejoinder and Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction) submitted during the
hearings). claims submitted to the Court by Cambodia and Thailand,
131
respectively, concerning sovereignty over Preah Vihear” –
precisely the subject matter of the dispute it had defined earlier.

2.27 At the same time, the Court had made very clear what it

was not deciding. It declined to make rulings on the first two of

Cambodia’s final submissions, which had been designed

specifically to have the Court rule on the status of the Annex I

map line as a boundary. And the reason for this was very clear.

The Court had said that to decide the question of territorial

sovereignty – which was territorial sovereignty in respect of the
Temple – it would “have regard to” – not “decide on” – the

frontier line between the two States in this sector 132. And for

this purpose it was considering the maps submitted to it, but

“only to such extent as it may find in them reasons for the

decision it has to give in order to settle the s ole dispute
133
submitted to it” . The “sole dispute”, the Court had made

clear, was the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Temple.

2.28 Indeed, the Court’s language here is revealing. The

“sole” dispute that it had to decide was sovereignty over the

Temple. It did not have to decide any other disputes. The first

and second final submissions of Cambodia were about other

disputes – whether the Annex I map was of treaty character, and

whether the line on the Annex I map constituted the frontier line

131
Ibid., p. 36.
132Ibid., p. 14.
133
Ibid.

54claims submitted to the Court by Cambodia and Thailand,
131
respectively, concerning sovereignty over Preah Vihear” –
precisely the subject matter of the dispute it had defined earlier.

2.27 At the same time, the Court had made very clear what it

was not deciding. It declined to make rulings on the first two of

Cambodia’s final submissions, which had been designed

specifically to have the Court rule on the status of the Annex I

map line as a boundary. And the reason for this was very clear.

The Court had said that to decide the question of territorial

sovereignty – which was territorial sovereignty in respect of the
Temple – it would “have regard to” – not “decide on” – the

frontier line between the two States in this sector 13. And for

this purpose it was considering the maps submitted to it, but

“only to such extent as it may find in them reasons for the

decision it has to give in order to settle the s ole dispute
133
submitted to it” . The “sole dispute”, the Court had made

clear, was the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Temple.

2.28 Indeed, the Court’s language here is revealing. The

“sole” dispute that it had to decide was sovereignty over the

Temple. It did not have to decide any other disputes. The first

and second final submissions of Cambodia were about other

disputes – whether the Annex I map was of treaty character, and

whether the line on the Annex I map constituted the frontier line

131
Ibid., p. 36.
132Ibid., p. 14.
133
Ibid. 2.30 And Cambodia’s approach of turning a territorial dispute
automatically into a boundary dispute i s even more devoid of

merit in a case where the portion of territory adjudicated by the

Court is so exiguous, as in the case of the Temple. Cambodia

states that exiguity in relation to a portion of territory is relative

and depends on how magnified a lens is focused on that portion

of territory:

“La Thaïlande note, dans le même sens, que le

Cambodge a souvent utilisé l'expression ‘parcelle de
territoire’ lors de l’affaire en 1959 -1962. Outre qu’il
serait vain une nouvelle fois de rechercher tous les sens
que l'on peut donner à cette expression, la logique

impose que la zone en litige est bien ‘une parcelle de
territoire’ au regard d'un Etat de plus de 180.000
km .” 137

This is pure sophism, since the 180,000 sq km territory was not

in dispute in 1962 and so it could not have been a reference

point for determining what was meant by a “ portion of

territory”. Moreover, it is a gratuitous sophism . Cambodia is

simply evading the task of defining the “parcelle de territoire”
in question. It postulates defining t he portion of territory as

“mission impossible”, instead of searching in the 1962

Judgment and pleadings for arguments or evidence supporting

its position or simply addressing Thailand’s arguments in the
138
Written Observations on this point . Of course, it does not do

so, because it cannot.

13Response, para. 4.72.
138
WO, paras. 2.23-2.25.

562.30 And Cambodia’s approach of turning a territorial dispute
automatically into a boundary dispute i s even more devoid of

merit in a case where the portion of territory adjudicated by the

Court is so exiguous, as in the case of the Temple. Cambodia

states that exiguity in relation to a portion of territory is relative

and depends on how magnified a lens is focused on that portion

of territory:

“La Thaïlande note, dans le même sens, que le

Cambodge a souvent utilisé l'expression ‘parcelle de
territoire’ lors de l’affaire en 1959 -1962. Outre qu’il
serait vain une nouvelle fois de rechercher tous les sens
que l'on peut donner à cette expression, la logique

impose que la zone en litige est bien ‘une parcelle de
territoire’ au regard d'un Etat de plus de 180.000
km .” 137

This is pure sophism, since the 180,000 sq km territory was not

in dispute in 1962 and so it could not have been a reference

point for determining what was meant by a “ portion of

territory”. Moreover, it is a gratuitous sophism . Cambodia is

simply evading the task of defining the “parcelle de territoire”
in question. It postulates defining t he portion of territory as

“mission impossible”, instead of searching in the 1962

Judgment and pleadings for arguments or evidence supporting

its position or simply addressing Thailand’s arguments in the
138
Written Observations on this point . Of course, it does not do

so, because it cannot.

137Response, para. 4.72.
138
WO, paras. 2.23-2.25. temple est situé ”). In s hort, what Judges Tanaka and Morelli
were saying supports the Thai, not the Cambodian, position.

2.33 The same view of the geographical scope of the dispute

submitted to the Court appears in Judge Moreno Quintana’s

dissenting opinion where he said: “The present case is

concerned with sovereignty over a portion of territory on which
141
are situated the ruins of a temple known as Preah Vihear .”
And then he went on to say “it is the question of the sovereignty

over the temple that is put to the Court, and no other” 142.

2.34 Thailand’s demonstration that the territory adjudicated in

1962 was very small and limited to the ground on which the

Temple stood thus stands unchallenged by Cambodia. It is

further confirmed by the cartographic material put before the
Court in 1962 143, by the significant choice made by the Court to

extract from the “big map” and publish only that part focusing

upon the Temple, and by the Court’s identification, in the

Judgment itself, of the Temple area as being that part of the

promontory c ontained between the Thai and Cambodian
144
watershed lines as they were presented to the Court . In

advancing its interpretation, Thailand simply relies on the text
of the Judgment and on what the Parties were arguing in the

14Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moreno Quintana, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 67. (Emphasis original).
142
Ibid., p. 73.
14See paras. 2.15-2.22 above.
144
See paras. 2.23-2.24 above.

58temple est situé ”). In s hort, what Judges Tanaka and Morelli
were saying supports the Thai, not the Cambodian, position.

2.33 The same view of the geographical scope of the dispute

submitted to the Court appears in Judge Moreno Quintana’s

dissenting opinion where he said: “The present case is

concerned with sovereignty over a portion of territory on which
141
are situated the ruins of a temple known as Preah Vihear .”
And then he went on to say “it is the question of the sovereignty

over the temple that is put to the Court, and no other” 142.

2.34 Thailand’s demonstration that the territory adjudicated in

1962 was very small and limited to the ground on which the

Temple stood thus stands unchallenged by Cambodia. It is

further confirmed by the cartographic material put before the
Court in 1962 143, by the significant choice made by the Court to

extract from the “big map” and publish only that part focusing

upon the Temple, and by the Court’s identification, in the

Judgment itself, of the Temple area as being that part of the

promontory c ontained between the Thai and Cambodian
144
watershed lines as they were presented to the Court . In

advancing its interpretation, Thailand simply relies on the text
of the Judgment and on what the Parties were arguing in the

141Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moreno Quintana, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 67. (Emphasis original).
142
Ibid., p. 73.
143See paras. 2.15-2.22 above.
144
See paras. 2.23-2.24 above. There seem, however, to be three alleged disputes here: a

dispute over the meaning of phrases in paragraph 1 of the

dispositif; a dispute over the obligation to withdraw troops; and

finally a dispute over whether the Annex I map line constitutes
the boundary.

2.36 Why does Cambodia have to obfuscate the subject

matter of the dispute before the Court in this way? The real
object of its Request to the Court, which reflects the subject

matter of the dispute for Cambodia, is to gain a determination

that the Annex I map line is the boundary between the Parties.

But Cambodia knows that if its Request were worded as clearly
and simply as that, then it would become all too clear that this is

not a matter involving the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

There is no reference to the Annex I map line in the dispositif,

and so Cambodia constructs its Request in the guise of a

question about something which the disposi tif did address, but
this only gets Cambodia into deeper confusion, because nothing

which the dispositif actually addressed is in dispute. The entire

ruse ultimately fails, because, in the end, Cambodia has no

choice but to unmask its real objective, whic h is to have the
Annex I map line declared the boundary.

2.37 A similar strategy is found in Cambodia’s formulation of

the question for interpretation in its application instituting these
proceedings. The subject matter of the case is seemingly found

in Cambodia’s Request to the Court to adjudge and declare that:

60There seem, however, to be three alleged disputes here: a

dispute over the meaning of phrases in paragraph 1 of the

dispositif; a dispute over the obligation to withdraw troops; and

finally a dispute over whether the Annex I map line constitutes
the boundary.

2.36 Why does Cambodia have to obfuscate the subject

matter of the dispute before the Court in this way? The real
object of its Request to the Court, which reflects the subject

matter of the dispute for Cambodia, is to gain a determination

that the Annex I map line is the boundary between the Parties.

But Cambodia knows that if its Request were worded as clearly
and simply as that, then it would become all too clear that this is

not a matter involving the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

There is no reference to the Annex I map line in the dispositif,

and so Cambodia constructs its Request in the guise of a

question about something which the disposi tif did address, but
this only gets Cambodia into deeper confusion, because nothing

which the dispositif actually addressed is in dispute. The entire

ruse ultimately fails, because, in the end, Cambodia has no

choice but to unmask its real objective, whic h is to have the
Annex I map line declared the boundary.

2.37 A similar strategy is found in Cambodia’s formulation of

the question for interpretation in its application instituting these
proceedings. The subject matter of the case is seemingly found

in Cambodia’s Request to the Court to adjudge and declare that: obligation to withdraw was based on a general and continuing

obligation to respect the sovereignty of Cambodia, or had some

other basis, is really irrelevant. Thailand had an obligation
under paragraph 2 to withdraw its troops and it did so. Thus, it

is difficult to see what the subject matter of a dispute in this

instance could be.

2.39 The second aspect of the Request for interpretation is the

statement that the Cambodian territory from which Thailand had

to withdraw its troops was defined by the Annex I map line
which constitutes the boundary between Cambodia and

Thailand. What this appears to be is a request to the Court to

determine that the area from which Thai troops had to withdraw

was defined by the Annex I map line. The difficulty with such a
request, of course, is that paragraph 2 does not stipulate the

withdrawal of Thai troops from Cambodian territory as defined

by the Annex I map line – it requires the withdrawal of troops

“stationed at the Temple and in its vicinity on Cambodian
territory.”

2.40 In order to try and finesse this fundamental flaw in its

Request for interpretation, Cambodia adds a preamble to its
Request,

“Etant donné ‘ (...) que le temple de Préah -Vihéar est
situé en territoire relevant de la souver aineté du
Cambodge’ (point 1 du dispositif), ce qui est la
conséquence juridique du fait que le Temple est situé du
côté cambodgien de la frontière telle qu'elle fut

62obligation to withdraw was based on a general and continuing

obligation to respect the sovereignty of Cambodia, or had some

other basis, is really irrelevant. Thailand had an obligation
under paragraph 2 to withdraw its troops and it did so. Thus, it

is difficult to see what the subject matter of a dispute in this

instance could be.

2.39 The second aspect of the Request for interpretation is the

statement that the Cambodian territory from which Thailand had

to withdraw its troops was defined by the Annex I map line
which constitutes the boundary between Cambodia and

Thailand. What this appears to be is a request to the Court to

determine that the area from which Thai troops had to withdraw

was defined by the Annex I map line. The difficulty with such a
request, of course, is that paragraph 2 does not stipulate the

withdrawal of Thai troops from Cambodian territory as defined

by the Annex I map line – it requires the withdrawal of troops

“stationed at the Temple and in its vicinity on Cambodian
territory.”

2.40 In order to try and finesse this fundamental flaw in its

Request for interpretation, Cambodia adds a preamble to its
Request,

“Etant donné ‘ (...) que le temple de Préah -Vihéar est
situé en territoire relevant de la souver aineté du
Cambodge’ (point 1 du dispositif), ce qui est la
conséquence juridique du fait que le Temple est situé du
côté cambodgien de la frontière telle qu'elle fut 2.43 Indeed, paragraph 5.9 of Cambodia’s Response contains

a litany of matters that it seeks the Court to decide. But behind

them all and revealed in sub -section (vii) is the real issue for

Cambodia:

“le paragraphe premier du dispositif doit être compris
comme determinant, avec force obligatoire, que toutes
les zones en litige se trouvant au côté cambodgien de la
ligne de la carte annexe I – y inclus donc le Temple de

Préah Vihéar lui -même – sont à regarder 149 comme
relevant de la souveraineté cambodgienne.”

The statement is revealing. It identifies precisely what

Cambodia sees as the subject matter of the present dispute. It is

a request for the Court to determine by way of interpretation that

the Annex I map line is the boundary between the Parties. The
Temple has become secondary – what is really at stake is the

Annex I map line boundary. And, the interpretation of

paragraph 2 is revealed simply as a device. It is a way of getting

the real issue concern ing Cambodia – the present day dispute

over the location of the boundary – before the Court.

C. The Lack of Coincidence between the 1962 and the 2011
Disputes

2.44 A question of interpretation can only arise if the matter

to be interpreted relates to what was decided by the Court with

149
Response, para. 5.9 (vii).

642.43 Indeed, paragraph 5.9 of Cambodia’s Response contains

a litany of matters that it seeks the Court to decide. But behind

them all and revealed in sub -section (vii) is the real issue for

Cambodia:

“le paragraphe premier du dispositif doit être compris
comme determinant, avec force obligatoire, que toutes
les zones en litige se trouvant au côté cambodgien de la
ligne de la carte annexe I – y inclus donc le Temple de

Préah Vihéar lui -même – sont à regarder 149 comme
relevant de la souveraineté cambodgienne.”

The statement is revealing. It identifies precisely what

Cambodia sees as the subject matter of the present dispute. It is

a request for the Court to determine by way of interpretation that

the Annex I map line is the boundary between the Parties. The
Temple has become secondary – what is really at stake is the

Annex I map line boundary. And, the interpretation of

paragraph 2 is revealed simply as a device. It is a way of getting

the real issue concern ing Cambodia – the present day dispute

over the location of the boundary – before the Court.

C. The Lack of Coincidence between the 1962 and the 2011
Disputes

2.44 A question of interpretation can only arise if the matter

to be interpreted relates to what was decided by the Court with

149
Response, para. 5.9 (vii). 2.46 It is easy to demonstrate that the area in dispute in 1962

and the area claimed by Cambodia to be so today are not

identical in their geographical extent. The only thing they seem

to have in common is that Cambodia considers them to be small:
153
it claimed they were so in 1962 ; it puts forward the same
154
argument today . But the small portion of territory of 1962

has somehow grown in the intervening 50 years, and who knows

whether it will stop there.

155
2.47 As shown earlier in these Explanations , Cambodia’s

Response defines the area it considers to be now in dispute as

amounting to 4.6 sq km. But such a 4.6 sq km area is the result

of a creative exercise in cartography. The map inserted in the

Response on the page immediately preceding page 7 7 is

Cambodia’s creation. This map did not exist in 1962 nor was

the area it depicts regarded as the disputed area in the original

proceedings. Not once did the so-called 4.6 sq km disputed area
appear in the 1962 pleadings. Cambodia goes so far as to

attribute to Thailand the creation of this “disputed area” 156, but

153
WO, para. 2.43.
154“ Ceci permet de souligner, qu’en l’espèce, la zone en litige concerne
également un territoire restreint d’environ 4,6 km (Response, para. 4.72.)
(Emphasis added). See also ibid., para. 4.62.

155See paras. 1.45-1.48 above.
156
“Dans sa Requête en Interprétation (para. 44), le Cambodge a souligné
que l'obligation pour la Thaïlande de retirer ses troupes et autres forces
armées des environs du Temple, en application du deuxième paragraphe du
dispositif, s'appliquait à l'ensemble du territoire cambodgien dans la zone du
Temple, y compris la zone revendiquée par la Thaïlande au sein d'un
périmètre représentant environ 4,6 km 2, qui fut unilatéralement et
arbitrairement déterminée par elle.” ( Response, para. 4.62). (Emphasis

added).

662.46 It is easy to demonstrate that the area in dispute in 1962

and the area claimed by Cambodia to be so today are not

identical in their geographical extent. The only thing they seem

to have in common is that Cambodia considers them to be small:
153
it claimed they were so in 1962 ; it puts forward the same
154
argument today . But the small portion of territory of 1962

has somehow grown in the intervening 50 years, and who knows

whether it will stop there.

155
2.47 As shown earlier in these Explanations , Cambodia’s

Response defines the area it considers to be now in dispute as

amounting to 4.6 sq km. But such a 4.6 sq km area is the result

of a creative exercise in cartography. The map inserted in the

Response on the page immediately preceding page 7 7 is

Cambodia’s creation. This map did not exist in 1962 nor was

the area it depicts regarded as the disputed area in the original

proceedings. Not once did the so-called 4.6 sq km disputed area
appear in the 1962 pleadings. Cambodia goes so far as to

attribute to Thailand the creation of this “disputed area” 156, but

153
WO, para. 2.43.
154“ Ceci permet de souligner, qu’en l’espèce, la zone en litige concerne
également un territoire restreint d’environ 4,6 km (Response, para. 4.72.)
(Emphasis added). See also ibid., para. 4.62.

155See paras. 1.45-1.48 above.
156
“Dans sa Requête en Interprétation (para. 44), le Cambodge a souligné
que l'obligation pour la Thaïlande de retirer ses troupes et autres forces
armées des environs du Temple, en application du deuxième paragraphe du
dispositif, s'appliquait à l'ensemble du territoire cambodgien dans la zone du
Temple, y compris la zone revendiquée par la Thaïlande au sein d'un
périmètre représentant environ 4,6 km , qui fut unilatéralement et
arbitrairement déterminée par elle.” ( Response, para. 4.62). (Emphasis

added). 159
Map Sheet 2 of Annex 49 to Thailand’s Counter-Memorial .

Cambodia’scorrupted2012 map covers both Map Sheets 1 and 2

of Annex 49, thus extending far west from the Temple area.

The lack of coincidence between the area upon which the Court
itself focused in 1962 and the area Cambodia is now claiming is

even more striking when comparing the territory represented in

the partial reproduction of Annex 85 d 160 and Cambodia’s 2012

map. The partial reproduction of Annex 85 d covers indeed an

area less than 2 cm × 2 cm in Cambodia’s map and only

4 per cent of the “big map”.

2.49 That the area claimed today is different from the one in

dispute in 1962 is further confirmed by the fact that the Pnom
161
Trap hilltop, repeatedly referred to in Cambodia’s Response

as being included in the 4.6 sq km area, was explicitly excluded
by Cambodia itself from the territory to be adjudicated in

1962 162. It is significant that Cambodia, lacking evidence in the

1962 pleadings supporting its claims in respect of the

geographical extent of the dispute, now has to fabricate it, by

adding both the emplacement of the pagoda and the name Pnom

Trap on the map it produced on the page immediately preceding

page 24 of the Response, a map allegedly “ tirée du contre -
163
mémoire thaïlandais dans l’affaire principale ” . It appears

159See paras. 2.21-2.25 above.
160
See paras. 2.24-2.25 above.
161Response, paras. 2.8, 2.23 and 2.67.

162WO, paras. 2.44-2.45. See also para. 2.22 above.
163
Response, para. 2.36.

68 159
Map Sheet 2 of Annex 49 to Thailand’s Counter-Memorial .

Cambodia’scorrupted2012 map covers both Map Sheets 1 and 2

of Annex 49, thus extending far west from the Temple area.

The lack of coincidence between the area upon which the Court
itself focused in 1962 and the area Cambodia is now claiming is

even more striking when comparing the territory represented in

the partial reproduction of Annex 85 d 160 and Cambodia’s 2012

map. The partial reproduction of Annex 85 d covers indeed an

area less than 2 cm × 2 cm in Cambodia’s map and only

4 per cent of the “big map”.

2.49 That the area claimed today is different from the one in

dispute in 1962 is further confirmed by the fact that the Pnom
161
Trap hilltop, repeatedly referred to in Cambodia’s Response

as being included in the 4.6 sq km area, was explicitly excluded
by Cambodia itself from the territory to be adjudicated in

1962 16. It is significant that Cambodia, lacking evidence in the

1962 pleadings supporting its claims in respect of the

geographical extent of the dispute, now has to fabricate it, by

adding both the emplacement of the pagoda and the name Pnom

Trap on the map it produced on the page immediately preceding

page 24 of the Response, a map allegedly “ tirée du contre -
163
mémoire thaïlandais dans l’affaire principale ” . It appears

159See paras. 2.21-2.25 above.
160
See paras. 2.24-2.25 above.
161Response, paras. 2.8, 2.23 and 2.67.

162WO, paras. 2.44-2.45. See also para. 2.22 above.
163
Response, para. 2.36. the dispute between the Parties 167, by which Cambodia means

both disputes.

2.52 And Cambodia can make this claim that there were
effectively two disputes because it has treated as irrelevant the

way the Parties, including Cambodia itself, had defined the

dispute before the Court in 1962, which shows definitively that

the dispute submitted to the Court and argued by counsel was
that of sovereignty over the Temple. But more than that,

Cambodia ignores the actual wording used by the Court in its

Judgment. When the Court refuses to rule on the question of

whether the Annex I map line is the frontier line because it is
not part of the “sole dispute” submitted to it how can Cambodia

claim that the Court did precisely what it said it was not doing?

Under Cambodia’s theory the Court having explicitly refused to

make a determinat ion that the Annex I map line was the

boundary between the Parties, somehow inadvertently did so in
its reasons. The dispositif implicite turns out to be a dispositif

par accident!

2.53 And because it ignores what the dispute before the Court
in 1962 was about in fact, Cambodia is able to extract from the

judgment words that in isolation are aimed at suggesting that the
168
Court was deciding on the boundary . But in light of the

express statements of the Court about what it was deciding –
that its statements about the Annex I map line were statements

167
Ibid., para. 4.48.
168Ibid., para. 3.12.

70the dispute between the Parties 167, by which Cambodia means

both disputes.

2.52 And Cambodia can make this claim that there were
effectively two disputes because it has treated as irrelevant the

way the Parties, including Cambodia itself, had defined the

dispute before the Court in 1962, which shows definitively that

the dispute submitted to the Court and argued by counsel was
that of sovereignty over the Temple. But more than that,

Cambodia ignores the actual wording used by the Court in its

Judgment. When the Court refuses to rule on the question of

whether the Annex I map line is the frontier line because it is
not part of the “sole dispute” submitted to it how can Cambodia

claim that the Court did precisely what it said it was not doing?

Under Cambodia’s theory the Court having explicitly refused to

make a determinat ion that the Annex I map line was the

boundary between the Parties, somehow inadvertently did so in
its reasons. The dispositif implicite turns out to be a dispositif

par accident!

2.53 And because it ignores what the dispute before the Court
in 1962 was about in fact, Cambodia is able to extract from the

judgment words that in isolation are aimed at suggesting that the
168
Court was deciding on the boundary . But in light of the

express statements of the Court about what it was deciding –
that its statements about the Annex I map line were statements

167
Ibid., para. 4.48.
168Ibid., para. 3.12.72 CHAPTER III

JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

3.1 Cambodia’s Response, in particular its Chapter 3, shows

that the Parties share a common approach to assessing the

conditions for the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction under
Article 60 of the Statute, the same jurisprudence being quoted

therein169 and in Thailand’s Written Observations 17. Both

States agree that two cumulative conditions must be met:

- a dispute must exist between the parties; and

- the subject matter of this dispute must solely bear on

the meaning or scope of a previous judgment.

3.2 Obviously, Thailand and Cambodia do not agree on the

effect of the application of these conditions to the case sub

judice. In particular, contrary to Cambodia’s views, Thailand

considers that the disputes existing today between Thailand and
Cambodia do not bear upon the meaning and scope of the 1962

Judgment. It is also of the view that Cambodia’s Request aims

at obtaining now what the Court declined to adjudge in 1962.

3.3 For its part, Cambodia glosses over a third condition

relating to admissibility, name ly that the request for
interpretation must not aim at obtaining answers to questions not

decided with binding force. The imperative words used by the

169Response, footnote 114.

170WO, para. 4.4.

73 Court underline that this condition is as “ universellement
171
admis” as the previous ones:

“The real pur pose of the request must be to obtain an
interpretation of the judgment. This signifies that its
object must be solely to obtain clarification of the

meaning and the scope of what the Court has decided
with binding force , and not to obtain an answer to
questions not so decided.” 172

3.4 Instead of demonstrating that its Request conforms to

this third requirement, Cambodia provides answers to arguments

on admissibility that Thailand has never put forward, namely

that the Applicant would be barred from introducing its request

on grounds of tardiness or a renunciation to its right to request

an interpretation of the Judgment 173. This is not Thailand’s case

and paragraph 4.29 of the Written Observations, on which

Cambodia fastens, could hardly be clearer 174. If Thaila nd

maintains that Cambodia’s Request for interpretation “ poses

major challenges to the integrity ” of proceedings under Article
175
60 , this is so not for procedural reasons such as tardiness

171
Response, para. 3.2.
172
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the
asylum case, Judgment of November 27th, 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402
(Emphasis added); quoted in Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11
June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections
(Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 36, para. 12.
173
Response, paras. 3.18-3.21.
174“The tardiness of the Request is not in itself a cause of inadmissibility,
and it is recognised that a dispute within the meaning of Article 60 of the
Statute can arise from facts subsequent to the delivery of a judgment; the
Court noted this in its 18 July Order.” (WO, para. 4.29).

175WO, para. 4.29.

74Court underline that this condition is as “ universellement
171
admis” as the previous ones:

“The real pur pose of the request must be to obtain an
interpretation of the judgment. This signifies that its
object must be solely to obtain clarification of the

meaning and the scope of what the Court has decided
with binding force , and not to obtain an answer to
questions not so decided.” 172

3.4 Instead of demonstrating that its Request conforms to

this third requirement, Cambodia provides answers to arguments

on admissibility that Thailand has never put forward, namely

that the Applicant would be barred from introducing its request

on grounds of tardiness or a renunciation to its right to request

an interpretation of the Judgment 173. This is not Thailand’s case

and paragraph 4.29 of the Written Observations, on which

Cambodia fastens, could hardly be clearer 17. If Thaila nd

maintains that Cambodia’s Request for interpretation “ poses

major challenges to the integrity ” of proceedings under Article
175
60 , this is so not for procedural reasons such as tardiness

171
Response, para. 3.2.
172
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the
asylum case, Judgment of November 27th, 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402
(Emphasis added); quoted in Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11
June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections
(Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 36, para. 12.
173
Response, paras. 3.18-3.21.
174“The tardiness of the Request is not in itself a cause of inadmissibility,
and it is recognised that a dispute within the meaning of Article 60 of the
Statute can arise from facts subsequent to the delivery of a judgment; the
Court noted this in its 18 July Order.” (WO, para. 4.29).

175WO, para. 4.29. A. No Dispute over the Meaning or Scope of the Judgment

3.6 Cambodia is well aware that the 1962 dispositif contains

no finding on the status of the Annex I map and on its boundary
with Thailand, and for good reason 17. Since the real purpose of

its Request is to have the Court decide now upon these

questions 180, Cambodia must engage in flights of imagination in

defining the so-called disputes over the meaning of the dispositif

(2.). In order to make a connection with the issues that lie at the

heart of its Request, Cambodia keeps repeating, as a mantra, that

the Annex I map and the boundary line drawn upon it constitute

the sole reason upon which the 1962 Court based its findings,

that they are consequently inseparable from the dispositif and,
181
then it further infers, that they enjoy res judicata status .

Cambodia unfolds a conception of the theory of inseparability
annihilating the distinction between the reasons and the

dispositif and disconnects completely the res judicata from the

claims of the Parties and the subject matter of the initial dispute.(.1

1. DENTIFYING THE RES J UDICATA

3.7 Cambodia alleges that the status of res judicata attaches

to the whole of the 1962 J udgment, reasons and dispositif

together: first, it states that the J udgment is founded on a single

179See paras. 3.91-3.101 below.

180Response, para. 3.16 (3). See also ibid ., second paragraph 1.18 (p. 9) and
para. 4.60. See also paras. 2.35-2.43 above.
181
Response, paras. 1.19-1.23, 4.2-4.4 and 4.10-4.27.

76 A. No Dispute over the Meaning or Scope of the Judgment

3.6 Cambodia is well aware that the 1962 dispositif contains

no finding on the status of the Annex I map and on its boundary
with Thailand, and for good reason 179. Since the real purpose of

its Request is to have the Court decide now upon these

questions 180, Cambodia must engage in flights of imagination in

defining the so-called disputes over the meaning of the dispositif

(2.). In order to make a connection with the issues that lie at the

heart of its Request, Cambodia keeps repeating, as a mantra, that

the Annex I map and the boundary line drawn upon it constitute

the sole reason upon which the 1962 Court based its findings,

that they are consequently inseparable from the dispositif and,
181
then it further infers, that they enjoy res judicata status .

Cambodia unfolds a conception of the theory of inseparability
annihilating the distinction between the reasons and the

dispositif and disconnects completely the res judicata from the

claims of the Parties and the subject matter of the initial dispute.(.1

1. IDENTIFYING THE R ES JUDICATA

3.7 Cambodia alleges that the status of res judicata attaches

to the whole of the 1962 J udgment, reasons and dispositif

together: first, it states that the J udgment is founded on a single

179See paras. 3.91-3.101 below.

180Response, para. 3.16 (3). See also ibid ., second paragraph 1.18 (p. 9) and
para. 4.60. See also paras. 2.35-2.43 above.
181
Response, paras. 1.19-1.23, 4.2-4.4 and 4.10-4.27. - the arguments of the parties to the reasons of the

judgment;

- the response of the Court to the dispositif.

3.9 The determination of the scope of res judicata in the

context of a request for interpretation under Article 60 of the

Statute rests on the interplay between these elements. It is

admitted in judicial decisions and in the writings o f the most

highly qualified publicists, that res judicata results in general

from the conjunction of three elements, which must be identical

in the two proceedings submitted before the Court: same parties,
186
same causa petendi, same petitum . The identity of parties is

not contested in the present case.

3.10 While it is not always easy to distinguish between the

petitum and the causa petendi, mostly because the parties’ petita
187
mix up real claims and arguments , it is generally admitted

that:

186
M. Anzilotti, Dissenting Opinion, Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and8
(The Chorzów Factory), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p.
23; S. Rosenne, “ Res judicata: Some Recent Decisions of the International
Court of Justice”, Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. , vol. 28, 1951, p. 366; C. Santulli, Droit
du contentieux international, Montchrestien, 2005, p. 474, para. 819.
187
Cambodia’s claims on pp. 90- 91 of the Response are a particularly
striking example. For the Court criticizing the confusion often introduced by
the Parties, see Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdictionthe
Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 449, para. 32 (quoted at para. 3.100
below); see also Fisheries, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 126; Minquiers
and Ecrehos, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 52; Nottebohm, Second
Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 16; or Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 262, para. 29.

78 - the arguments of the parties to the reasons of the

judgment;

- the response of the Court to the dispositif.

3.9 The determination of the scope of res judicata in the

context of a request for interpretation under Article 60 of the

Statute rests on the interplay between these elements. It is

admitted in judicial decisions and in the writings o f the most

highly qualified publicists, that res judicata results in general

from the conjunction of three elements, which must be identical

in the two proceedings submitted before the Court: same parties,
186
same causa petendi, same petitum . The identity of parties is

not contested in the present case.

3.10 While it is not always easy to distinguish between the

petitum and the causa petendi, mostly because the parties’ petita
187
mix up real claims and arguments , it is generally admitted

that:

186
M. Anzilotti, Dissenting Opinion, Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and8
(The Chorzów Factory), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p.
23; S. Rosenne, “ Res judicata: Some Recent Decisions of the International
Court of Justice”, Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. , vol. 28, 1951, p. 366; C. Santulli, Droit
du contentieux international, Montchrestien, 2005, p. 474, para. 819.
187
Cambodia’s claims on pp. 90- 91 of the Response are a particularly
striking example. For the Court criticizing the confusion often introduced by
the Parties, see Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdictionthe
Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 449, para. 32 (quoted at para. 3.100
below); see also Fisheries, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 126; Minquiers
and Ecrehos, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 52; Nottebohm, Second
Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 16; or Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 262, para. 29. conformément à ce qui est précisé par la demande des

parties. C’est à la demande que l’on doit se référer pour
déterminer les limites objectives de la chose jugée.” 192

“L’objet de la chose jugée ne saurait être plus large que
celui du différend soumis à la Cour, tel qu’il est désigné
par les conclusions des parties et, le cas échéant, par le
193
compromis.”

3.13 Cambodia is obviously uncomfortable with the chapter

in Thailand’s Written Observations dealing with the pleadings

in the original proceedings. It complains of their length and

alleges their lack of relevance to the present proceedings,

putting forward various implausible arguments such as that a

judgment is a self -standing document 194, that the pleadings of

the parties are “sources externes” 195 and that “l’argument d’une

ou de l’autre partie avant un jugement devient subsumé par

l’arrêt de la Cour ” 196, without explaining the ins and outs of

this “subsumption” theory. Cambodia feigns wondering what

Thailand’s purpose behind these developments may be,

suggesting a concealed attempt by Thail and to appeal against

the 1962 Judgment on grounds that it would be ultra petita 197.

192L. Brant, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit international public ,

L.G.D.J. Paris, 2003, p. 124.
193 E. Griesel, “ Res judicata : l’autorité de la chose jugée en droit
international”, in Mélanges Georges Perrin, Payot, Lausanne, 1984, p. 148.

194Response, para. 1.12.
195
Ibid.
196
Ibid., para. 5.3.
197Ibid., second paragraph 1.11 (p. 6) and para. 1.12.

80 conformément à ce qui est précisé par la demande des

parties. C’est à la demande que l’on doit se référer pour 192
déterminer les limites objectives de la chose jugée.”

“L’objet de la chose jugée ne saurait être plus large que
celui du différend soumis à la Cour, tel qu’il est désigné
par les conclusions des parties et, le cas échéant, par le
193
compromis.”

3.13 Cambodia is obviously uncomfortable with the chapter

in Thailand’s Written Observations dealing with the pleadings

in the original proceedings. It complains of their length and

alleges their lack of relevance to the present proceedings,

putting forward various implausible arguments such as that a
194
judgment is a self -standing document , that the pleadings of
195
the parties are “sources externes” and that “l’argument d’une

ou de l’autre partie avant un jugement devient subsumé par
196
l’arrêt de la Cour ” , without explaining the ins and outs of

this “subsumption” theory. Cambodia feigns wondering what

Thailand’s purpose behind these developments may be,

suggesting a concealed attempt by Thail and to appeal against
197
the 1962 Judgment on grounds that it would be ultra petita .

192
L. Brant, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit international public ,
L.G.D.J. Paris, 2003, p. 124.
193 E. Griesel, “ Res judicata : l’autorité de la chose jugée en droit

international”, in Mélanges Georges Perrin, Payot, Lausanne, 1984, p. 148.
194Response, para. 1.12.

195Ibid.
196
Ibid., para. 5.3.
197Ibid., second paragraph 1.11 (p. 6) and para. 1.12. 3.15 There is no hidden purpose on the part of Thailand. The

review of the subject matter of the initial dispute – sovereignty

over the Temple – and the assessment of its limited

geographical scope makes all too obvious the discrepancy
between the scope of the initial di spute and the matter now

before the Court , particularly in light of the extended area
201
Cambodia now asks the Court to adjudge . This lack of

identity between the two disputes is indeed fatal to Cambodia’s

Request for interpretation, since it evidences how much,
conceptually and geographically, this Request attempts to obtain

answers to questions deliberately not decided with binding force

by the Court in 1962.

(b) Res Judicata,Dispositif and Reasons

3.16 It is in the dispositif that the Court responds to the final

petita, at least those which it has found to be admissible, that is

those formulated within the limits of the subject matter of the
dispute as initially submitted to it. By responding this way, the

Court settles, with binding force, the dispute subm itted to it. It

follows that, in essence, the res judicata of a judgment, and

therefore the scope of the parties’ obligations to implement, are
202
to be found in the dispositif .

201
See paras. 2.44-2.55 above.
202See para. 3.42 below.

823.15 There is no hidden purpose on the part of Thailand. The

review of the subject matter of the initial dispute – sovereignty

over the Temple – and the assessment of its limited

geographical scope makes all too obvious the discrepancy
between the scope of the initial di spute and the matter now

before the Court , particularly in light of the extended area
201
Cambodia now asks the Court to adjudge . This lack of

identity between the two disputes is indeed fatal to Cambodia’s

Request for interpretation, since it evidences how much,
conceptually and geographically, this Request attempts to obtain

answers to questions deliberately not decided with binding force

by the Court in 1962.

(b) Res Judicata,Dispositif and Reasons

3.16 It is in the dispositif that the Court responds to the final

petita, at least those which it has found to be admissible, that is

those formulated within the limits of the subject matter of the
dispute as initially submitted to it. By responding this way, the

Court settles, with binding force, the dispute subm itted to it. It

follows that, in essence, the res judicata of a judgment, and

therefore the scope of the parties’ obligations to implement, are
202
to be found in the dispositif .

201
See paras. 2.44-2.55 above.
202See para. 3.42 below. judicial settlement of disputes is conditioned by States’ consent.

As the Permanent Court of International Justice explained:

“[T]he object of Articl e 59 [of the Statute] is simply to
prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a
particular case from being binding also upon other States
204
or in other disputes.”

3.20 Hence the basic principle, affirmed by the Permanent

Court of International Justice and confirmed by the International

Court of Justice , that the res judicata does not extend to the

reasons for a judgment:

“[I]t is certain that the reasons contained in a decision, at
least in so far as they go beyond the scope of the
operative part, have no binding force as between the
Parties concerned. (…) [T]he Court is unable to see any

ground for extending the binding force attaching to the
declaratory judgment on the point decided to reasons
which were only intended to explain the declaration

contained in the operative portion of this judgment and
all the more so if these reasons relate to points of law on
which the High Commissioner was not asked to give a
decision.” 205

3.21 Cambodia is loath to accept this basic proposition. The

fact that, in its Respons e, it calls in aid novel categories of

judicial reasoning, unknown to the classical literature on

204
Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory),
Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13 , p. 21. (Emphasis added).
See also South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966,
p. 37, para. 59.
205 Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925, P.C.I.J.

Series B, No. 11, pp. 29-30.

84judicial settlement of disputes is conditioned by States’ consent.

As the Permanent Court of International Justice explained:

“[T]he object of Articl e 59 [of the Statute] is simply to
prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a
particular case from being binding also upon other States
204
or in other disputes.”

3.20 Hence the basic principle, affirmed by the Permanent

Court of International Justice and confirmed by the International

Court of Justice , that the res judicata does not extend to the

reasons for a judgment:

“[I]t is certain that the reasons contained in a decision, at
least in so far as they go beyond the scope of the
operative part, have no binding force as between the
Parties concerned. (…) [T]he Court is unable to see any

ground for extending the binding force attaching to the
declaratory judgment on the point decided to reasons
which were only intended to explain the declaration

contained in the operative portion of this judgment and
all the more so if these reasons relate to points of law on
which the High Commissioner was not asked to give a
decision.” 205

3.21 Cambodia is loath to accept this basic proposition. The

fact that, in its Respons e, it calls in aid novel categories of

judicial reasoning, unknown to the classical literature on

204
Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory),
Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13 , p. 21. (Emphasis added).
See also South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966,
p. 37, para. 59.
205 Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925, P.C.I.J.

Series B, No. 11, pp. 29-30. la chose decidée, since otherwise the dispositif of the judgment

would presumably become arbitrary 208. This statement is

questionable on several grounds: first, judgments are not

endowed with any “ autorité de la chose decid ée”, a court’s

mission being to apply existing law, and not unilaterally to

create new law. Moreover, it directly contradicts the axiom that
the legal principles identified and applied by the Court to a

particular dispute are not binding for the settlement of other

disputes, even between the same parties 20.

- Third, it equates autorité de la chose décidée and

autorité de la chose jugée , in the hope that this substitution

would give Cambodia access to the proceedings under Article 6,0
for which the autorité de la chose jugée is a sine qua non

condition.

3.23 Three other arguments support the conclusion that the

reasons do not, per se , enjoy res judicata effect. The first, to
which Cambodia makes reference without nonetheless

perceiving or clarifying the consequences 210, is linked to the

principle of freedom of the judges to choose the reasons upon

which they base their decision. The existence of this freedom

cannot be questioned. It explains why the Court may, at times,

208
“Pour le moins, cette reconnaissance de la valeur obligatoire de la carte
de l’annexe I entre les Parties possède l’autorité de chose décidée. A défaut,
le dispositif serait purement arbitraire.” (ibid.)
20See para. 3.19 above.

21Response, footnote 6 and para. 4.14. Cambodia’s analysis, in particular on
second paragraph 1.11 (p. 6) and para. 1.12 of the Response, denotes
confusion between arguments and submissions.

86la chose decidée, since otherwise the dispositif of the judgment

would presumably become arbitrary 208. This statement is

questionable on several grounds: first, judgments are not

endowed with any “ autorité de la chose decid ée”, a court’s

mission being to apply existing law, and not unilaterally to

create new law. Moreover, it directly contradicts the axiom that
the legal principles identified and applied by the Court to a

particular dispute are not binding for the settlement of other

disputes, even between the same parties 209.

- Third, it equates autorité de la chose décidée and

autorité de la chose jugée , in the hope that this substitution

would give Cambodia access to the proceedings under Article 6,0
for which the autorité de la chose jugée is a sine qua non

condition.

3.23 Three other arguments support the conclusion that the

reasons do not, per se , enjoy res judicata effect. The first, to
which Cambodia makes reference without nonetheless

perceiving or clarifying the consequences 210, is linked to the

principle of freedom of the judges to choose the reasons upon

which they base their decision. The existence of this freedom

cannot be questioned. It explains why the Court may, at times,

208
“Pour le moins, cette reconnaissance de la valeur obligatoire de la carte
de l’annexe I entre les Parties possède l’autorité de chose décidée. A défaut,
le dispositif serait purement arbitraire.” (ibid.)
209See para. 3.19 above.

210Response, footnote 6 and para. 4.14. Cambodia’s analysis, in particular on
second paragraph 1.11 (p. 6) and para. 1.12 of the Response, denotes
confusion between arguments and submissions. (c) Res Judicata and the Proceedings on Interpretation

3.26 These considerations are fully valid when it comes to
establishing the scope of the res judicata for the purpose s of

proceedings on the interpretation of a judgment 211. They are

indeed reflected in the jurisprudence on the admissibility of

requests for interpretation:

“[A] request for interpretation must relate to a dispute
between the parties relating to the meani ng or scope of

the operative part of the judgment and cannot concern
the reasons for the judgment except in so far as these are
inseparable from the operative part.” 212

3.27 The authorities on which Cambodia relies are clear that

the interpretive value of reasoning, such as it is, does not extend

beyond the scope of the judgment. The Permanent Court in

Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Chorzów Factory)

said as follows:

“The interpretation adds nothing to the decision, which
has acquired the force of res judicata, and can only have

21See also WO, paras. 4.79-4.84.

212Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case
concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323, para. 47. (Emphasis
added). See also Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzów
Factory), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No., p. 11; Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning

the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1999 (I), p. 35, para. 10.

88 (c) Res Judicata and the Proceedings on Interpretation

3.26 These considerations are fully valid when it comes to
establishing the scope of the res judicata for the purpose s of

proceedings on the interpretation of a judgment 21. They are

indeed reflected in the jurisprudence on the admissibility of

requests for interpretation:

“[A] request for interpretation must relate to a dispute
between the parties relating to the meani ng or scope of

the operative part of the judgment and cannot concern
the reasons for the judgment except in so far as these are
inseparable from the operative part.” 212

3.27 The authorities on which Cambodia relies are clear that

the interpretive value of reasoning, such as it is, does not extend

beyond the scope of the judgment. The Permanent Court in

Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Chorzów Factory)

said as follows:

“The interpretation adds nothing to the decision, which
has acquired the force of res judicata, and can only have

211See also WO, paras. 4.79-4.84.

212Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case
concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323, para. 47. (Emphasis
added). See also Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzów
Factory), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No., p. 11; Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning

the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1999 (I), p. 35, para. 10. Quoting the Permanent Court again, in the Polish Postal Service

in Danzig case, Cambodia writes:

“Certains motifs sont en effet susceptibles d’être pris en
compte. Dans son avis sur le Service postal polonais à
Dantzig, la Cour permanente s’est attachée à mettre en
exergue les liens qui unissent les motifs au disposi tif.

Elle a de la sorte précisé que les motifs contenus dans
une décision qui ‘dépassent la portée du dispositif, n’ont
pas force obligatoire entre les Parties intéressées.’ A
contrario, le constat est que les motifs qui ne dépassent
pas la portée du dispositif peuvent revêtir ce caractère
216
obligatoire.”

3.30 So, as Cambodia would have it, there are two positions:
there are reasons which exceed the scope of the dispositif and

thus cannot have obligatory force; and there are reasons which

“[a] contrario” do not exceed the dispositif and which thus can

be vested with binding character. But Cambodia here
mischaracterizes the Permanent Court’s view. The way the

Permanent Court saw it, the potential function of motifs was not

a simple matter of two positions, one t he exact opposite of the

other. The Permanent Court was clear that even a reason which

falls within the scope of the judgment does not necessarily do so
in its totality. A court may adduce certain evidence, or set out

certain reasons, which support the operative part, and to the

extent that they fall within the scope of the operative part, they

might have obligatory force; but not to the extent that they fall

beyond that scope. The Permanent Court, in fact, said as
follows:

216Response, para. 4.32.

90Quoting the Permanent Court again, in the Polish Postal Service

in Danzig case, Cambodia writes:

“Certains motifs sont en effet susceptibles d’être pris en
compte. Dans son avis sur le Service postal polonais à
Dantzig, la Cour permanente s’est attachée à mettre en
exergue les liens qui unissent les motifs au disposi tif.

Elle a de la sorte précisé que les motifs contenus dans
une décision qui ‘dépassent la portée du dispositif, n’ont
pas force obligatoire entre les Parties intéressées.’ A
contrario, le constat est que les motifs qui ne dépassent
pas la portée du dispositif peuvent revêtir ce caractère
216
obligatoire.”

3.30 So, as Cambodia would have it, there are two positions:
there are reasons which exceed the scope of the dispositif and

thus cannot have obligatory force; and there are reasons which

“[a] contrario” do not exceed the dispositif and which thus can

be vested with binding character. But Cambodia here
mischaracterizes the Permanent Court’s view. The way the

Permanent Court saw it, the potential function of motifs was not

a simple matter of two positions, one t he exact opposite of the

other. The Permanent Court was clear that even a reason which

falls within the scope of the judgment does not necessarily do so
in its totality. A court may adduce certain evidence, or set out

certain reasons, which support the operative part, and to the

extent that they fall within the scope of the operative part, they

might have obligatory force; but not to the extent that they fall

beyond that scope. The Permanent Court, in fact, said as
follows:

216Response, para. 4.32. Even if the other considerations which equally supported the

Judgment were ignored, and the Annex I map had been the sole

consideration, then the value of the map for interpreting the

Judgment is still limited by this principle. It could be used to

interpret the J udgment within the scope of the dispositif – but

not beyond.

3.33 Cambodia sets out extensive quotations from various

courts and tribunals to show that elements of the reasoning of a
218
decision may constitute part of the res judicata of the case .

But this is a basic proposition. It is not controversial and hardly

needs extensive proof. What is needed is an explanation of how
the Court, in interpreting a judgment under Article 60, is to

identify that which is obligatory from that which is not.

Cambodia pays little attention to this problem. Instead,

Cambodia conf uses the distinction between the explanatory

value of certain elements of the reasoning in a judgment and the
obligatory force of the dispositi f. That a reason holds

explanatory value does not mean that it is binding. C onfusion

between these two concepts leads Cambodia to insist that the

Annex I map is itself subject to interpretation when, at most, the

map might, in principle, hold explanatory value in respect of the

operative part.

3.34 But Cambodia does not show what that explanatory

value would be. The o perative part is clear: the territory on

21Response, paras. 4.38-4.45.

92Even if the other considerations which equally supported the

Judgment were ignored, and the Annex I map had been the sole

consideration, then the value of the map for interpreting the

Judgment is still limited by this principle. It could be used to

interpret the J udgment within the scope of the dispositif – but

not beyond.

3.33 Cambodia sets out extensive quotations from various

courts and tribunals to show that elements of the reasoning of a
218
decision may constitute part of the res judicata of the case .

But this is a basic proposition. It is not controversial and hardly

needs extensive proof. What is needed is an explanation of how
the Court, in interpreting a judgment under Article 60, is to

identify that which is obligatory from that which is not.

Cambodia pays little attention to this problem. Instead,

Cambodia conf uses the distinction between the explanatory

value of certain elements of the reasoning in a judgment and the
obligatory force of the dispositi f. That a reason holds

explanatory value does not mean that it is binding. C onfusion

between these two concepts leads Cambodia to insist that the

Annex I map is itself subject to interpretation when, at most, the

map might, in principle, hold explanatory value in respect of the

operative part.

3.34 But Cambodia does not show what that explanatory

value would be. The o perative part is clear: the territory on

218Response, paras. 4.38-4.45. establishment of the dispositif, but for its interpretation and for
that purpose only and to that extent only. The inseparable

reasons are thus res judicata when and because they alone can

shed a light upon the uncertainties in the dispositif and only for

that purpose. But they cannot constitute by themselves, and

independently of any dispute over the dispositif , the subject of a
222
request for interpretation .

3.37 In the present case, no such uncertainty exists. Not only

is the dispositif crystal clear223, but there is and has been no

dispute between Thailand and Cambodia as to its meaning or

scope.

2. THE A LLEGED D ISPUTE OVER THE NTERPRETATION OF THE

JUDGMENT

3.38 Cambodia’s definition of the dispute appears on page 48

of the Response:

“Le Cambodge soutient donc que les pièces de
procédure en la présente affaire démontrent sans aucune
ambiguïté que le Cambodge et la Thaïlande ont un

différend sur (1) le sens et la portée de la façon dont la
Cour a utilisé les expressions ‘en territoire relevant de la
souveraineté du Cambodge ’ dans le premier
paragraphe, et ‘ ses environs situés en territoire

222Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case
concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323, para. 47.
223
WO, paras. 3.5-3.10 and 4.16-4.25.

94establishment of the dispositif, but for its interpretation and for
that purpose only and to that extent only. The inseparable

reasons are thus res judicata when and because they alone can

shed a light upon the uncertainties in the dispositif and only for

that purpose. But they cannot constitute by themselves, and

independently of any dispute over the dispositif , the subject of a
222
request for interpretation .

3.37 In the present case, no such uncertainty exists. Not only

is the dispositif crystal clear223, but there is and has been no

dispute between Thailand and Cambodia as to its meaning or

scope.

2.T HE A LLEGED D ISPUTE OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE

JUDGMENT

3.38 Cambodia’s definition of the dispute appears on page 48

of the Response:

“Le Cambodge soutient donc que les pièces de
procédure en la présente affaire démontrent sans aucune
ambiguïté que le Cambodge et la Thaïlande ont un

différend sur (1) le sens et la portée de la façon dont la
Cour a utilisé les expressions ‘en territoire relevant de la
souveraineté du Cambodge ’ dans le premier
paragraphe, et ‘ ses environs situés en territoire

222Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case
concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323, para. 47.
223
WO, paras. 3.5-3.10 and 4.16-4.25. establishing the absence of a dispute over the meaning or scope
226
of the Judgment .

3.41 Still, the relevance of these facts is obv ious: it is
tautological to underline that if Cambodia did not dispute

implementation by Thailand, this means it agreed that Thailand

was in conformity with the Judgment 22. The inescapable

conclusion is that there was no dispute between the Parties over

its interpretation.

3.42 However, for its Request for interpretation to be

admissible it is for Cambodia to show that the Parties did have a

dispute over the interpretation of the dispositif before the

lodging of the dispute. And it is indeed axiomatic that the

obligation of implementation relates to the operative part of a
judgment and not to its reasons:

“The Court notes (…) that to implement a decision is to
228
apply its operative part.”

3.43 If Cambodia disputed Thailand’s implementation of the

Judgment and intended to put this alleged misapplication of the

Judgment forward in order to establish the existence of
disagreement over its scope, it must demonstrate that it disputed

226Ibid., paras. 1.13-1.17.
227
It must be recalled that a dispute as to the implementatof a judgment
differs from a dispute over the interpretation (WO, paras. 4.70-4.72).
228
Interhandel Case (Switzerland v . United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 28.

96establishing the absence of a dispute over the meaning or scope
226
of the Judgment .

3.41 Still, the relevance of these facts is obv ious: it is
tautological to underline that if Cambodia did not dispute

implementation by Thailand, this means it agreed that Thailand

was in conformity with the Judgment 227. The inescapable

conclusion is that there was no dispute between the Parties over

its interpretation.

3.42 However, for its Request for interpretation to be

admissible it is for Cambodia to show that the Parties did have a

dispute over the interpretation of the dispositif before the

lodging of the dispute. And it is indeed axiomatic that the

obligation of implementation relates to the operative part of a
judgment and not to its reasons:

“The Court notes (…) that to implement a decision is to
228
apply its operative part.”

3.43 If Cambodia disputed Thailand’s implementation of the

Judgment and intended to put this alleged misapplication of the

Judgment forward in order to establish the existence of
disagreement over its scope, it must demonstrate that it disputed

226Ibid., paras. 1.13-1.17.
227
It must be recalled that a dispute as to the implementatof a judgment
differs from a dispute over the interpretation (WO, paras. 4.70-4.72).
228
Interhandel Case (Switzerland v . United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 28. 232
a dispute exists! Furthermore, Cambodia relies on Thailand’s

Written Observations not only for establishing the existence of
a dispute, but also for expanding its scope. Thus it explains, in

Chapter 3 of its Response, that it

“démontrera, après une analyse détaillée de la position
juridique thaïlandaise révélée pour la première fois dans

les Observations, que le différend entre les deux Etats
sur l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962 est bien plus
significatif que cela avait été envisagé au stade de la
demande cambodgienne de mesures conservatoires.” 233

3.45 It was unclear in the Request which are the paragraphs
of the 1962 dispositif whose meaning is disputed between the

Parties and there has been no clarification since 234. Cambodia

now adds further confusion, in pointing to a so -called dispute

over the meaning of “territory” in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
235
dispositif .

3.46 Having made these general remarks, it is appropriate to

examine in some detail each of the three points which,
according to Cambodia, would constitute the s ubject matter of

the dispute.

232
Response, para. 3.3 (“… à la lumière des Observations thaïlandaises… ”);
para. 3.5 (“Sur la base de son étude des Observations de la Thaïla,…”);
para. 3.16 (“ Le Cambodge soutient donc que les pièces de procédure en la
présente affaire démontrent…”).
233
Ibid., para. 1.27. (Emphasis added). See also ibid., paras. 3.5 and 3.10.
234WO, paras. 4.12-4.14.
235
Response, para. 3.5.

98 232
a dispute exists! Furthermore, Cambodia relies on Thailand’s

Written Observations not only for establishing the existence of
a dispute, but also for expanding its scope. Thus it explains, in

Chapter 3 of its Response, that it

“démontrera, après une analyse détaillée de la position
juridique thaïlandaise révélée pour la première fois dans

les Observations, que le différend entre les deux Etats
sur l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962 est bien plus
significatif que cela avait été envisagé au stade de la
demande cambodgienne de mesures conservatoires.” 233

3.45 It was unclear in the Request which are the paragraphs
of the 1962 dispositif whose meaning is disputed between the

Parties and there has been no clarification since 234. Cambodia

now adds further confusion, in pointing to a so -called dispute

over the meaning of “territory” in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
235
dispositif .

3.46 Having made these general remarks, it is appropriate to

examine in some detail each of the three points which,
according to Cambodia, would constitute the s ubject matter of

the dispute.

232
Response, para. 3.3 (“… à la lumière des Observations thaïlandaises… ”);
para. 3.5 (“Sur la base de son étude des Observations de la Thaïla,…”);
para. 3.16 (“ Le Cambodge soutient donc que les pièces de procédure en la
présente affaire démontrent…”).
233
Ibid., para. 1.27. (Emphasis added). See also ibid., paras. 3.5 and 3.10.
234WO, paras. 4.12-4.14.
235
Response, para. 3.5. appliqué) les premier et second para238phes du
dispositif de l’arrêt de la Cour.”

3.49 The twining of both points is telling:

- there is no dispute between the Parties over the

meaning of paragraph 1 of the dispositif: Thailand does not
challenge that “the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in

territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia” and, of course,

Cambodia accepts this too;

- there is no dispute over the meaning of paragraph 2 of

the dispositif: Thailand ha s withdrawn her “military or police

forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the

Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”;
- there is no need to use paragraph 1 to interpret

paragraph 2 of the dispositif;

- nor is there any need to use paragraph 2 to interpret

paragraph 1 of the dispositif;

and yet, Cambodia artificially mixes up both paragraphs in order

to fabricate a dispute on the interpretation of “the dispositif”.

3.50 Moreover, instead of identifying a dispute with Thailand

over the meaning of paragraph 1 of the dispositif, Cambodia

uses the word “territory” as a pretext for incorporating the
239
reasoning into the dispositif and for claiming that the Court

238Response, para. 2.22.
239
Ibid., para. 3.13.

100 appliqué) les premier et second para238phes du
dispositif de l’arrêt de la Cour.”

3.49 The twining of both points is telling:

- there is no dispute between the Parties over the

meaning of paragraph 1 of the dispositif: Thailand does not
challenge that “the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in

territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia” and, of course,

Cambodia accepts this too;

- there is no dispute over the meaning of paragraph 2 of

the dispositif: Thailand ha s withdrawn her “military or police

forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the

Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”;
- there is no need to use paragraph 1 to interpret

paragraph 2 of the dispositif;

- nor is there any need to use paragraph 2 to interpret

paragraph 1 of the dispositif;

and yet, Cambodia artificially mixes up both paragraphs in order

to fabricate a dispute on the interpretation of “the dispositif”.

3.50 Moreover, instead of identifying a dispute with Thailand

over the meaning of paragraph 1 of the dispositif, Cambodia

uses the word “territory” as a pretext for incorporating the
239
reasoning into the dispositif and for claiming that the Court

238Response, para. 2.22.
239
Ibid., para. 3.13. 243
Cambodia’s embarrassment . Presumably, Cambodia was
244
expecting a geographical definition of this word , that is the

identification of its boundaries, and consequently its
245
delimitation . But this is not what the Court decided to do: it
adhered strictly to the question it was asked: to which of the

Parties did sovereignty over the Temple belong? And it drew

two consequences: the withdrawal of the Thai forces stationed

“at the Temple, or in its vicinity o n Cambodian territory”

(paragraph 2) and the restitution to Cambodia of the objects

which “may have been removed from the Temple or the Temple

area by the Thai authorities” since 1954 (paragraph 3).

3.53 Paragraph 3 is not at issue in the present proceedings.

As to paragraph 2, Thailand agrees with Cambodia that the

Court felt no need to define the geographical scope of the
vicinity of the Temple just as it did not define what constituted

Cambodian territory in paragraph 1. The Court considered that

this was not necessary in order to understand and implement the

Judgment 246. It follows that no such definition can be requested

243 “Concernant le premier différend sur la signification des termes
‘territoire’ et ‘environs’, il est indéniable que la Cour, après avoir choisi
d'utiliser les termes ‘en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge’

dans le premier paragraphe du dispositif, et les termes ‘dans le Temple ou
dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien’ dans le deuxième
paragraphe du dispositif, n'en a pas donné une définition précise. ”
(Response, para. 3.17).
244Cambodia had indeed asked for such a definition and seems unable to
accept the Court’s dismissal of this submission (WO, paras. 3.33, 4.78-
and 4.85-4.86. See also paras. 3.91-3.109 below).

24Response, para. 4.47.
246
See paras. 4.26-4.73 below.

102 243
Cambodia’s embarrassment . Presumably, Cambodia was
244
expecting a geographical definition of this word , that is the

identification of its boundaries, and consequently its
245
delimitation . But this is not what the Court decided to do: it
adhered strictly to the question it was asked: to which of the

Parties did sovereignty over the Temple belong? And it drew

two consequences: the withdrawal of the Thai forces stationed

“at the Temple, or in its vicinity o n Cambodian territory”

(paragraph 2) and the restitution to Cambodia of the objects

which “may have been removed from the Temple or the Temple

area by the Thai authorities” since 1954 (paragraph 3).

3.53 Paragraph 3 is not at issue in the present proceedings.

As to paragraph 2, Thailand agrees with Cambodia that the

Court felt no need to define the geographical scope of the
vicinity of the Temple just as it did not define what constituted

Cambodian territory in paragraph 1. The Court considered that

this was not necessary in order to understand and implement the

Judgment 24. It follows that no such definition can be requested

243 “Concernant le premier différend sur la signification des termes
‘territoire’ et ‘environs’, il est indéniable que la Cour, après avoir choisi
d'utiliser les termes ‘en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge’

dans le premier paragraphe du dispositif, et les termes ‘dans le Temple ou
dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien’ dans le deuxième
paragraphe du dispositif, n'en a pas donné une définition précise. ”
(Response, para. 3.17).
244Cambodia had indeed asked for such a definition and seems unable to
accept the Court’s dismissal of this submission (WO, paras. 3.33, 44.78
and 4.85-4.86. See also paras. 3.91-3.109 below).

245Response, para. 4.47.
246
See paras. 4.26-4.73 below. 249
north of the Annex I map line . Cambodia defines thus

“vicinity” in paragraph 2 of the dispositif in relation to the
Annex I map line, but this position is a non sequitur.

3.56 The non sequitur derives from the absence in the 1962

Judgement of any definition of “vicinity” in relation to the

Annex I map line. The lack of such definition in the 1962

Judgment renders Cambodia’s Request inadmissible, even in

the absence of the Court’s explicit r efusal to rule upon the

delimitation of the boundary and the status of the Annex I map,

in the region of the Temple or elsewhere in the Dangrek range
represented on the map 250.

3.57 The Court imposed upon Thailand the obligation to

withdraw “any military or police forces, or other guards or

keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on

Cambodian territory” in order for Cambodia to be able to enjoy

sovereignty the Court had recognized in paragraph 1. That was

the function of paragraph 2 of the di spositif. The Court did not
oblige Thailand to withdraw north of the Annex I map line 251.

Neither did the Court ask it to demarcate the boundary in

accordance with the Annex I map line. If the issue of

demarcation had been in question, the dispositif would have

been addressed to both Parties, and not just to Thailand, since it

249
Response, para. 2.41.
250See paras. 3.88-3.101 below.
251
See para. 2.39 above.

104 249
north of the Annex I map line . Cambodia defines thus

“vicinity” in paragraph 2 of the dispositif in relation to the
Annex I map line, but this position is a non sequitur.

3.56 The non sequitur derives from the absence in the 1962

Judgement of any definition of “vicinity” in relation to the

Annex I map line. The lack of such definition in the 1962

Judgment renders Cambodia’s Request inadmissible, even in

the absence of the Court’s explicit r efusal to rule upon the

delimitation of the boundary and the status of the Annex I map,

in the region of the Temple or elsewhere in the Dangrek range
represented on the map 250.

3.57 The Court imposed upon Thailand the obligation to

withdraw “any military or police forces, or other guards or

keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on

Cambodian territory” in order for Cambodia to be able to enjoy

sovereignty the Court had recognized in paragraph 1. That was

the function of paragraph 2 of the di spositif. The Court did not
oblige Thailand to withdraw north of the Annex I map line 251.

Neither did the Court ask it to demarcate the boundary in

accordance with the Annex I map line. If the issue of

demarcation had been in question, the dispositif would have

been addressed to both Parties, and not just to Thailand, since it

249
Response, para. 2.41.
250See paras. 3.88-3.101 below.
251
See para. 2.39 above. 3.60 This understanding is confirmed by the record of the

resolution of the Council of Ministers , asked for by Cambodia

so insistently:

“The meeting considered the matter and was of the view
that the determination of the vicinity of the Temple of
Phra Viharn, so as Cambodia will have sovereignty in
254
accordance with the Judgment of the World Court” .

3.61 Cambodia’s position moreover rests upon several

anachronisms: its claim is for the Court to recogn ize that the
northern limit of the “vicinity” in paragraph 2 of the dispositif is

identical with the boundary between the countries, and are both

determined by the Annex I map line. Cambodia must have

realized however that the “vicinity” of something cannot

indefinitely extend to the east and to the west. In order to

overcome this difficulty, Cambodia put forward the putative
4.6 sq km area, which as it happens essentially coincides with

the additional area it wishes to administer as part of the Temple

as a World Heritage site. One problem for Cambodia is

however that the 4.6 sq km area was never mentioned in the

1962 proceedings. This fact alone casts a doubt over

Cambodia’s claim that it was this putative 4.6 sq km area which

the Court had in mind whe n it referred to the “vicinity” of the
Temple in paragraph 2 of the dispositif. Cambodia’s claim is

wholly unsupported, since the area in dispute in 1962 was much

254
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Thailand of
10 July 1962, [Annex 5 to FWE].

1063.60 This understanding is confirmed by the record of the

resolution of the Council of Ministers , asked for by Cambodia

so insistently:

“The meeting considered the matter and was of the view
that the determination of the vicinity of the Temple of
Phra Viharn, so as Cambodia will have sovereignty in
254
accordance with the Judgment of the World Court” .

3.61 Cambodia’s position moreover rests upon several

anachronisms: its claim is for the Court to recogn ize that the
northern limit of the “vicinity” in paragraph 2 of the dispositif is

identical with the boundary between the countries, and are both

determined by the Annex I map line. Cambodia must have

realized however that the “vicinity” of something cannot

indefinitely extend to the east and to the west. In order to

overcome this difficulty, Cambodia put forward the putative
4.6 sq km area, which as it happens essentially coincides with

the additional area it wishes to administer as part of the Temple

as a World Heritage site. One problem for Cambodia is

however that the 4.6 sq km area was never mentioned in the

1962 proceedings. This fact alone casts a doubt over

Cambodia’s claim that it was this putative 4.6 sq km area which

the Court had in mind whe n it referred to the “vicinity” of the
Temple in paragraph 2 of the dispositif. Cambodia’s claim is

wholly unsupported, since the area in dispute in 1962 was much

254
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Thailand of
10 July 1962, [Annex 5 to FWE]. dispositif on the basis of a single document, which does not

even refer to the Judgment;

- Cambodia disconnects completely the term

“vicinity” from its context and the obligation on Thailand to

withdraw its troops in order to endow it with a new and

completely novel meaning 259.

3.63 Moreover, taken on its own merits, Cambodia’s

justification for treating this putative 4.6 sq km area as the

“vicinity” of the Temple is confused and confusing. For

instance, in Cambodia’s presentation, the area of the Keo Sikha

Kiri Svara Pagoda, while a few hundred metres from the

Temple, is situated “ à l’ouest des environs ” 260; whereas the

Pnom Trap hilltop, some kilometres further away, is included in

the vicinity of the Temple 261. A l’ouest des environs is outside

the “vicinity” of the Temple.

3.64 Thus it is clear that Cambodia’s assertion of a dispute

with Thailand over the concept of “vicinity” in paragraph 2 of

the dispositif is just a way of disguising its claim over the

delimitation of the boundary according to the Annex I map line,

259“[L]a Thaïlande a en fait bien considéré les environs du T emple comme
incluant toute la zone autour du Temple où les Cambodgiens vivaient et
travaillaient.” (Response, para. 2.79).

260 “En 1998, le Cambodge a construit un marché de vant l’escalier
historique et une pagode (la Pagode Keo Sikha KiriSvara) à l’ouest des
environs du Temple tout en étant présent dans la zone autour de la colline de
Phnom Trap.” (Response, para. 2.67).

261 “Le Cambodge administrait pacifiquement les environs du Temple, y
compris la zone du Phnom Trap, en construisant notamment une pagode et
en établissant des marchés.” (Response, para. 2.23).

108dispositif on the basis of a single document, which does not

even refer to the Judgment;

- Cambodia disconnects completely the term

“vicinity” from its context and the obligation on Thailand to

withdraw its troops in order to endow it with a new and

completely novel meaning 259.

3.63 Moreover, taken on its own merits, Cambodia’s

justification for treating this putative 4.6 sq km area as the

“vicinity” of the Temple is confused and confusing. For

instance, in Cambodia’s presentation, the area of the Keo Sikha

Kiri Svara Pagoda, while a few hundred metres from the

Temple, is situated “ à l’ouest des environs ” 260; whereas the

Pnom Trap hilltop, some kilometres further away, is included in

the vicinity of the Temple 261. A l’ouest des environs is outside

the “vicinity” of the Temple.

3.64 Thus it is clear that Cambodia’s assertion of a dispute

with Thailand over the concept of “vicinity” in paragraph 2 of

the dispositif is just a way of disguising its claim over the

delimitation of the boundary according to the Annex I map line,

259“[L]a Thaïlande a en fait bien considéré les environs du T emple comme
incluant toute la zone autour du Temple où les Cambodgiens vivaient et
travaillaient.” (Response, para. 2.79).

260 “En 1998, le Cambodge a construit un marché de vant l’escalier
historique et une pagode (la Pagode Keo Sikha KiriSvara) à l’ouest des
environs du Temple tout en étant présent dans la zone autour de la colline de
Phnom Trap.” (Response, para. 2.67).

261“Le Cambodge administrait pacifiquement les environs du Temple, y
compris la zone du Phnom Trap, en construisant notamment une pagode et
en établissant des marchés.” (Response, para. 2.23). 267 268
Annex I map line . In Cambodia’s own words , that is the

cause of the present day dispute.

3.66 This map had nothing in it that was secret to
269
Cambodia . It simply depicted the Cabinet line essentially

illustrated on the ground by the barbed-wire fence, with which

Cambodia had fully been acquainted since 1962. It was equally

the cartographic representation of the status quo in the area, in

the absence of an agreed delimitation and demarcation of the

boundary. As was shown in the Written Observations 270 and as

further developed below, this status quo lasted until around

2001-2003.

3.67 Cambodia’s sweeping attempts to modify the status quo

prompted Thailand’s reactions, as the following paragraphs

demonstrate. Cambodia’s assertions that Thailand has not
271
protested these modifications are not to be relied on.

3.68 In 1962, the Thai Council of Ministers decided that the

establishment of a barbed -wire fence and the erection of the

wooden signs indicating the limit of the vicinity of the Temple

267Ibid., para. 2.88.

268“En produisant une nouvelle carte en 2007, montrant une frontière autour
du Temple qui se basait sur la ligne définie par le Conseil des Ministres en
1962, et en abrogeant le Communiqué conjoint signé le 28 juin 2008, la

Thaïlande a fait renaître un différend oublié depuis plusieurs années . ”
(Response, para. 2.96.)
269A copy of the map was sent to Cambodia in 2005 (see para. 1.33 above).

270WO, paras. 4.60-4.69.

271Response, paras. 2.81, 2.88 and 2.95.

110 267 268
Annex I map line . In Cambodia’s own words , that is the

cause of the present day dispute.

3.66 This map had nothing in it that was secret to
269
Cambodia . It simply depicted the Cabinet line essentially

illustrated on the ground by the barbed-wire fence, with which

Cambodia had fully been acquainted since 1962. It was equally

the cartographic representation of the status quo in the area, in

the absence of an agreed delimitation and demarcation of the

boundary. As was shown in the Written Observations 270 and as

further developed below, this status quo lasted until around

2001-2003.

3.67 Cambodia’s sweeping attempts to modify the status quo

prompted Thailand’s reactions, as the following paragraphs

demonstrate. Cambodia’s assertions that Thailand has not
271
protested these modifications are not to be relied on.

3.68 In 1962, the Thai Council of Ministers decided that the

establishment of a barbed -wire fence and the erection of the

wooden signs indicating the limit of the vicinity of the Temple

267Ibid., para. 2.88.

268“En produisant une nouvelle carte en 2007, montrant une frontière autour
du Temple qui se basait sur la ligne définie par le Conseil des Ministres en
1962, et en abrogeant le Communiqué conjoint signé le 28 juin 2008, la

Thaïlande a fait renaître un différend oublié depuis plusieurs années . ”
(Response, para. 2.96.)
269A copy of the map was sent to Cambodia in 2005 (see para. 1.33 above).

270WO, paras. 4.60-4.69.

271Response, paras. 2.81, 2.88 and 2.95. reoccupying” it 27, Cambodian authorities never again

complained of any failure on the part of Thai forces to

withdraw. Even this 1966 episode demonstrates that Cambodia

considered at the time that Thailand had withdrawn from the

Temple, since the accusation was that Thailand had reoccupied

it. In 1968, Cambodia’s Prime Minister equally expressed

satisfaction in a declaration made on the occasion of a

celebration of the 1962 Judgment:

“Bien que l e gouvernement thaïlandais , contraint et

forcé par la décision du 15 juin 1962 de la Cour
Internationale de Justice ait, au demeurant de fort
mauvaise grâce, retiré ses forces de Preah Vihear , la
Thaïlande ne cesse pas pour autant de jeter son dévolu

sur ce temple que gardent et défendent avec un courage
digne d’admiration nos forces armées et guette qu’une
occasion favorable se présente pour s’en emparer à
278
nouveau.”

3.69 This is a clear recognition by the Cambodian Prime

Minister that – graciously or not, thi s is not the question –

Thailand did withdraw its forces from the Temple and its

vicinity.

3.70 After the resumption of diplomatic relations, Cambodia

even requested Thailand to give its assistance to defend the

277WO, para. 4.53.

278“Déclaration de M. Penn Nouth, Président du Conseil des Ministres ”,
reported in French Embassy in Cambodia, Note to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of France, 17 June 1968 [Annex 11 to FWE]. (Emphasis added).

112reoccupying” it 27, Cambodian authorities never again

complained of any failure on the part of Thai forces to

withdraw. Even this 1966 episode demonstrates that Cambodia

considered at the time that Thailand had withdrawn from the

Temple, since the accusation was that Thailand had reoccupied

it. In 1968, Cambodia’s Prime Minister equally expressed

satisfaction in a declaration made on the occasion of a

celebration of the 1962 Judgment:

“Bien que l e gouvernement thaïlandais , contraint et

forcé par la décision du 15 juin 1962 de la Cour
Internationale de Justice ait, au demeurant de fort
mauvaise grâce, retiré ses forces de Preah Vihear , la
Thaïlande ne cesse pas pour autant de jeter son dévolu

sur ce temple que gardent et défendent avec un courage
digne d’admiration nos forces armées et guette qu’une
occasion favorable se présente pour s’en emparer à
278
nouveau.”

3.69 This is a clear recognition by the Cambodian Prime

Minister that – graciously or not, thi s is not the question –

Thailand did withdraw its forces from the Temple and its

vicinity.

3.70 After the resumption of diplomatic relations, Cambodia

even requested Thailand to give its assistance to defend the

277WO, para. 4.53.

278“Déclaration de M. Penn Nouth, Président du Conseil des Ministres ”,
reported in French Embassy in Cambodia, Note to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of France, 17 June 1968 [Annex 11 to FWE]. (Emphasis added). was closed between 1993 and 1998, this was due again to the

internal conflict within Cambodia. In 1998, after the last Khmer
285
Rouge in the Temple surrendered , the Temple was again
286
opened to tourists following the modalities used for the 1990

opening, and access was g ranted to the Temple from the Thai

side across the iron bridge on the Takhop/Tani stream. It must

be recalled that this bridge is situated some 100 metres from the

northern staircase of the Temple 287. Despite this short distance

separating the bridge and the gate from the northern staircase of

the Temple, there was no challenge of Thai sovereignty over

that location for half a century after the Court’s Judgment. The

bridge and the iron gate with it had been built by the Thai

288
authorities and were regularly maintained by them. The signs

before the bridge and the gate were always written in the Thai
289
language only . Since 1991, the bridge and the gate had been

the principal access route through Thailand to and from the

285See Bangkok Post, 30 March 1998, “Historic temple said to be under govt
hold” [Annex 17 to FWE]; Bangkok Post , 1 April 1998, “Hun Sen troops

take Preah Vihear” [Annex 18 to FWE].
286Bangkok Post, 26 July 1998, “Ancient Khmer temple to reopen to visit ors

Aug 1” [Annex 19 to FWE].
287WO, para. 4.62. See also Royal Thai Survey Department, Sketch of 1991
arrangements for tourism, 17 November 2011 [Annex 99 to WO].

288 A Photograph of the Ceremony to mark the Trial Opening of the Phra
Viharn Promontory for Ar cheological Site Visits and Studies, 1 August 1998
[Annex 20 to FWE]. See also Affidavit of Lieutenant General Surapon

Rueksumran, 9 November 2011 [Annex 97 to WO].
289 See the photographs taken in 1998 ( A Photograph of the Ceremony to

mark the Trial Openin g of the Phra Viharn Promontory for Archeological
Site Visits and Studies, 1 August 1998 [Annex 20 to FWE] ) and in 2001
(Photographs of the Iron Gate and the Iron Bridge at Takhop/Tani stream,
taken on 17 December 2001 [Annex 25 to FWE] ).

114was closed between 1993 and 1998, this was due again to the

internal conflict within Cambodia. In 1998, after the last Khmer
285
Rouge in the Temple surrendered , the Temple was again
286
opened to tourists following the modalities used for the 1990

opening, and access was g ranted to the Temple from the Thai

side across the iron bridge on the Takhop/Tani stream. It must

be recalled that this bridge is situated some 100 metres from the

northern staircase of the Temple 287. Despite this short distance

separating the bridge and the gate from the northern staircase of

the Temple, there was no challenge of Thai sovereignty over

that location for half a century after the Court’s Judgment. The

bridge and the iron gate with it had been built by the Thai

288
authorities and were regularly maintained by them. The signs

before the bridge and the gate were always written in the Thai
289
language only . Since 1991, the bridge and the gate had been

the principal access route through Thailand to and from the

285See Bangkok Post, 30 March 1998, “Historic temple said to be under govt
hold” [Annex 17 to FWE]; Bangkok Post , 1 April 1998, “Hun Sen troops

take Preah Vihear” [Annex 18 to FWE].
286Bangkok Post, 26 July 1998, “Ancient Khmer temple to reopen to visit ors

Aug 1” [Annex 19 to FWE].
287WO, para. 4.62. See also Royal Thai Survey Department, Sketch of 1991
arrangements for tourism, 17 November 2011 [Annex 99 to WO].

288A Photograph of the Ceremony to mark the Trial Opening of the Phra
Viharn Promontory for Ar cheological Site Visits and Studies, 1 August 1998
[Annex 20 to FWE]. See also Affidavit of Lieutenant General Surapon

Rueksumran, 9 November 2011 [Annex 97 to WO].
289See the photographs taken in 1998 ( A Photograph of the Ceremony to

mark the Trial Openin g of the Phra Viharn Promontory for Archeological
Site Visits and Studies, 1 August 1998 [Annex 20 to FWE] ) and in 2001
(Photographs of the Iron Gate and the Iron Bridge at Takhop/Tani stream,
taken on 17 December 2001 [Annex 25 to FWE] ). modus vivendi which had lasted since 1991 was deemed by

Cambodia to be no longer suitable. Cambodia then initiated

intensive construction works for a road allowing access from the

plain below, a nd intensified the development of construction

near the Temple 293, while setting into motion the procedures for

the inscription of the Temple on the World Heritage List.

3.73 In December 2001, due to lack of cooperation from the

Cambodian side in addressing Th ailand’s concerns about the

pollution of the Takhop/Tani stream, as well as the extension at

an alarming rate of the settlement of the Cambodian population

in the area, the Thai authorities decided to temporarily close

access through the iron gate and brid ge over the Takhop/Tani
294
stream . Despite the efforts made by Thai central officials and

the local authorities from both countries to ensure clearance of

the area of landmines and a proposal for the development of

suitable sanitary structures, the reopenin g of the entrance from

293
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, T elegram to the Royal Thai
Embassy in Phnom Penh, 5 April B.E. 2545 (2002) [Annex 33 to FWE].
294
Si Sa Ket Province, Memorandum No. Sor Kor 0017.3/ : Closure of the
path leading up to the Temple of Phra Viharn, dated 20 December B.E. 2544
(2001) [Annex 26 t o FWE]; Kantharalak District Office, Note No. Sor Kor
0318/36 to the Governor of Si Sa Ket Province: Inquiry about the situation in
the area of Pha Mor I Dang, dated 5 February B.E. 2546 (2003) [Annex 38 to
FWE]; Bangkok Post , 23 December 2001, “Army close s stairway to old
temple” [Annex 27 t o FWE]; Bangkok Post , 24 December 2001, “Temple

still blocked as settlers stay” [Annex 28 to FWE ]; Bangkok Post, 14 January
2002, “Health concern leads to closure of temple” [Annex 29 to FWE];
Bangkok Post, 16 January 2002, “Vendors in clean-up drive at Khmer ruins”
[Annex 30 to FWE]; The Cambodia Daily , 30-31 March 2002, “Cambodia
Determined to Find Own Route to Development in Preah Vehear” [sic]
[Annex 32 to FWE].

116modus vivendi which had lasted since 1991 was deemed by

Cambodia to be no longer suitable. Cambodia then initiated

intensive construction works for a road allowing access from the

plain below, a nd intensified the development of construction

near the Temple 293, while setting into motion the procedures for

the inscription of the Temple on the World Heritage List.

3.73 In December 2001, due to lack of cooperation from the

Cambodian side in addressing Th ailand’s concerns about the

pollution of the Takhop/Tani stream, as well as the extension at

an alarming rate of the settlement of the Cambodian population

in the area, the Thai authorities decided to temporarily close

access through the iron gate and brid ge over the Takhop/Tani
294
stream . Despite the efforts made by Thai central officials and

the local authorities from both countries to ensure clearance of

the area of landmines and a proposal for the development of

suitable sanitary structures, the reopenin g of the entrance from

293
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, T elegram to the Royal Thai
Embassy in Phnom Penh, 5 April B.E. 2545 (2002) [Annex 33 to FWE].
294
Si Sa Ket Province, Memorandum No. Sor Kor 0017.3/ : Closure of the
path leading up to the Temple of Phra Viharn, dated 20 December B.E. 2544
(2001) [Annex 26 t o FWE]; Kantharalak District Office, Note No. Sor Kor
0318/36 to the Governor of Si Sa Ket Province: Inquiry about the situation in
the area of Pha Mor I Dang, dated 5 February B.E. 2546 (2003) [Annex 38 to
FWE]; Bangkok Post , 23 December 2001, “Army close s stairway to old
temple” [Annex 27 t o FWE]; Bangkok Post , 24 December 2001, “Temple

still blocked as settlers stay” [Annex 28 to FWE ]; Bangkok Post, 14 January
2002, “Health concern leads to closure of temple” [Annex 29 to FWE];
Bangkok Post, 16 January 2002, “Vendors in clean-up drive at Khmer ruins”
[Annex 30 to FWE]; The Cambodia Daily , 30-31 March 2002, “Cambodia
Determined to Find Own Route to Development in Preah Vehear” [sic]
[Annex 32 to FWE]. a pagoda 299, the extension of the market and the construction of

the road encroaching on Thai territory 300 rendered the situation

critical. It was thus reported in February 2003 that:

“The problem of alleged encroachment by Khmer

vendors certainly is more difficult to address than that of
ensuring waste treatment facilities on the Cambodian
side of the border. It underlines the need for the two

sides to clear up grey areas that exist at far too many
spots along the common border. Hence the demarc ation

committee must go about its business very carefully.
Proper demarcation will prevent the recurrence of
problems which inevitably strain relations at the local

level, weakening the foundation for further
communications. Improper demarcation will have the
reverse effect, harming both sides.” 301

The provincial authorities called upon the c entral authorities to

address the impact of Cambodian settlement on future

299
Cambodia is again distorting reality: what it emphatically calls a pagoda
is in fact no more than a small wat– a small structure, used as a p lace of
religious worship, containing a Buddha image and a very small living quarter
for monks (see Photographs of the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda, taken
during 2006-2010 [Annex 44 to FWE]. Moreover, Cambodia claims that the
Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda was built in 1998 (Response, paras. 2.8 and
2.67). Annex 24 to Cambodia’s Response encloses a ministerial decision,
dated 2 November 1998, authorizing its setting up, with no specification as to

its emplacement. The actual installment was later (see Ministrof Foreign
Affairs of Thailand, Telegram to the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh,
5 April B.E. 2545 (2002) [Annex 33 to FWE]; Bangkok Post, 22 February
2003, “Cambodians ‘encroach’ on Thai soil” [Annex 41 to FWE].
300
For protest by Thailand against the co nstruction of this road encroachi ng
upon Thai territory, see Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-
Chairman of the Thailand -Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission , Note to
Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia in Charge of State Border
Affairs and Co -Chairman of the Cambodia -Thailand Joint Boundary
Commission, No. 0803/192, 8 March 2005 [Annex 94 to WO].

301Bangkok Post, 20 February 2003, “Clear borders would help end temple
row” [Annex 40 to FWE]. See also Bangkok Post , 22 February 2003,
“Cambodians ‘encroach’ on Thai soil” [Annex 41 to FWE].

118a pagoda 299, the extension of the market and the construction of

the road encroaching on Thai territory 300 rendered the situation

critical. It was thus reported in February 2003 that:

“The problem of alleged encroachment by Khmer

vendors certainly is more difficult to address than that of
ensuring waste treatment facilities on the Cambodian
side of the border. It underlines the need for the two

sides to clear up grey areas that exist at far too many
spots along the common border. Hence the demarc ation

committee must go about its business very carefully.
Proper demarcation will prevent the recurrence of
problems which inevitably strain relations at the local

level, weakening the foundation for further
communications. Improper demarcation will have the
reverse effect, harming both sides.” 301

The provincial authorities called upon the c entral authorities to

address the impact of Cambodian settlement on future

299
Cambodia is again distorting reality: what it emphatically calls a pagoda
is in fact no more than a small wat– a small structure, used as a p lace of
religious worship, containing a Buddha image and a very small living quarter
for monks (see Photographs of the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda, taken
during 2006-2010 [Annex 44 to FWE]. Moreover, Cambodia claims that the
Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda was built in 1998 (Response, paras. 2.8 and
2.67). Annex 24 to Cambodia’s Response encloses a ministerial decision,
dated 2 November 1998, authorizing its setting up, with no specification as to

its emplacement. The actual installment was later (see Ministrof Foreign
Affairs of Thailand, Telegram to the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh,
5 April B.E. 2545 (2002) [Annex 33 to FWE]; Bangkok Post, 22 February
2003, “Cambodians ‘encroach’ on Thai soil” [Annex 41 to FWE].
300
For protest by Thailand against the co nstruction of this road encroachi ng
upon Thai territory, see Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-
Chairman of the Thailand -Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission , Note to
Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia in Charge of State Border
Affairs and Co -Chairman of the Cambodia -Thailand Joint Boundary
Commission, No. 0803/192, 8 March 2005 [Annex 94 to WO].

301Bangkok Post, 20 February 2003, “Clear borders would help end temple
row” [Annex 40 to FWE]. See also Bangkok Post , 22 February 2003,
“Cambodians ‘encroach’ on Thai soil” [Annex 41 to FWE]. that Thailand “ a commencé à montrer quelques signes
306
d’inquiétude sur ces activités ” or that “ jusqu’en 2006, la

Thaïlande n’a plus protesté à propos d’éventuelles violations de
307
la zone autour du Temple ” . The factual record is against

Cambodia’s assertions. Thailand provided consistent evidence

of its exercise of sovereignty in the areas Cambodia is now
308
claiming, situated north or west of the Cabinet line . For its

part, Cambodia has submitted no evidence of its having had
undisputed control over the areas it is now claiming. When

Cambodia’s activities encroached upon its territory, Thailand

promptly protested and called on Cambodia to resolve the issue

of boundary delimitati on and demarcation by means of

negotiations 309.

3.77 The truth is that the two States do indeed have a

boundary dispute that resurfaces now and then. But this dispute

has never been qualified as a dispute over the withdrawal of

Thai troops. Significantly, whil e Cambodia invoke s disputes

over the “vicinity” from which Thai troops had to withdraw, it

306Response, para. 2.76; see also ibid., paras. 2.8 and 2.23.
307
Ibid., para. 2.81.
308WO, paras. 4.60-4.69. See also paras. 3.68-3.75 above.
309
WO, paras. 1.26-1.27. See also Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Co-Chairman of the Thailand -Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission,
Note to Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia in Charge of State
Border Affairs and Co -Chairman of the Cambodia-Thailand Joint Boundary
Commission, No. 0803/1015, 25 November 2004 [Annex 93 to WO] and
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co- Chairman of the Thailand-
Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission, Note to Adviser to the Royal
Government of Cambodia in Charge of State Border Affairs and
Co-Chairman of the Cambodia -Thailand Joint Boundary Commission,

No. 0803/192, 8 March 2005[Annex 94 to WO].

120that Thailand “ a commencé à montrer quelques signes
306
d’inquiétude sur ces activités ” or that “ jusqu’en 2006, la

Thaïlande n’a plus protesté à propos d’éventuelles violations de
307
la zone autour du Temple ” . The factual record is against

Cambodia’s assertions. Thailand provided consistent evidence

of its exercise of sovereignty in the areas Cambodia is now
308
claiming, situated north or west of the Cabinet line . For its

part, Cambodia has submitted no evidence of its having had
undisputed control over the areas it is now claiming. When

Cambodia’s activities encroached upon its territory, Thailand

promptly protested and called on Cambodia to resolve the issue

of boundary delimitati on and demarcation by means of

negotiations 30.

3.77 The truth is that the two States do indeed have a

boundary dispute that resurfaces now and then. But this dispute

has never been qualified as a dispute over the withdrawal of

Thai troops. Significantly, whil e Cambodia invoke s disputes

over the “vicinity” from which Thai troops had to withdraw, it

306Response, para. 2.76; see also ibid., paras. 2.8 and 2.23.
307
Ibid., para. 2.81.
308WO, paras. 4.60-4.69. See also paras. 3.68-3.75 above.
309
WO, paras. 1.26-1.27. See also Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Co-Chairman of the Thailand -Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission,
Note to Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia in Charge of State
Border Affairs and Co -Chairman of the Cambodia-Thailand Joint Boundary
Commission, No. 0803/1015, 25 November 2004 [Annex 93 to WO] and
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co- Chairman of the Thailand-
Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission, Note to Adviser to the Royal
Government of Cambodia in Charge of State Border Affairs and
Co-Chairman of the Cambodia -Thailand Joint Boundary Commission,

No. 0803/192, 8 March 2005[Annex 94 to WO]. 3.79 Once again, Cambodia’s portrayal of the facts is

carefully tailored to meet its claim in this case. In the region of

the Temple, the dispute has several particularities: firs t,

Cambodia has been proclaiming, in the aftermath of the
Judgment, and sporadically ever since that the Court decided the

boundary between the two Parties. This is in blatant disregard

of the Court’s express refusal to do so. Thailand will revert to

this aspect of paramount importance for the present
proceedings 313. Second, Cambodia’s assessment of the location

of the boundary has undergone considerable change since the

1962 proceedings with Cambodia’s line migrating further and
314
further north . Thailand, by contrast, has maintained a
consistent territorial claim outside the Temple area since 1962

and has always shown readiness to engage in good faith

negotiations with Cambodia for the delimitation and

demarcation of the whole boundary. This is the true f actual

background.

3.80 The legal background is even clearer: Thailand has never

denied – and does not deny – the existence of disputes over

boundary delimitation, but it maintains that these are not eligible
for adjudication under Article 60 of the Statute.

313
See paras. 3.92-3.101 below. See also WO, paras. 4.96-4.103.
314See paras. 4.54-4.59 below.

1223.79 Once again, Cambodia’s portrayal of the facts is

carefully tailored to meet its claim in this case. In the region of

the Temple, the dispute has several particularities: firs t,

Cambodia has been proclaiming, in the aftermath of the
Judgment, and sporadically ever since that the Court decided the

boundary between the two Parties. This is in blatant disregard

of the Court’s express refusal to do so. Thailand will revert to

this aspect of paramount importance for the present
proceedings 31. Second, Cambodia’s assessment of the location

of the boundary has undergone considerable change since the

1962 proceedings with Cambodia’s line migrating further and
314
further north . Thailand, by contrast, has maintained a
consistent territorial claim outside the Temple area since 1962

and has always shown readiness to engage in good faith

negotiations with Cambodia for the delimitation and

demarcation of the whole boundary. This is the true f actual

background.

3.80 The legal background is even clearer: Thailand has never

denied – and does not deny – the existence of disputes over

boundary delimitation, but it maintains that these are not eligible
for adjudication under Article 60 of the Statute.

313
See paras. 3.92-3.101 below. See also WO, paras. 4.96-4.103.
314See paras. 4.54-4.59 below. identify a single document proving that the Parties held

opposing views on the question, prior to the seising of the Court.

It is significant that Chapter 3 of the Response, dealing with the

existence of a dispute, does not contain a single paragraph

purporting t o evidence any opposition of views between

Cambodia and Thailand on the instantaneous/continuous
character of the obligation to withdraw prior to the present

proceedings. Cambodia only analysed the nature of the

obligation to withdraw at the very end of i ts Response 315,

devoting five paragraphs to a rebuttal of Thailand’s analysis in

the Written Observations. The impossibility for Cambodia to

identify a single document, predating its seis ing of the Court, in
which the Parties held opposing views on the characterization of

the obligation of withdrawal shows beyond any doubt that no

such dispute existed.

(d) The Alleged Dispute on the Recognition of the Binding
Force of the Annex I Map as the Boundary between the Parties

in the Area of the Temple

3.83 Interestingly, Cambodia shows itself incapable of linking

the third element of the dispute between the Parties to any of the

three paragraphs of the 1962 Judgment:

315Response, paras. 4.84-4.86.

124identify a single document proving that the Parties held

opposing views on the question, prior to the seising of the Court.

It is significant that Chapter 3 of the Response, dealing with the

existence of a dispute, does not contain a single paragraph

purporting t o evidence any opposition of views between

Cambodia and Thailand on the instantaneous/continuous
character of the obligation to withdraw prior to the present

proceedings. Cambodia only analysed the nature of the

obligation to withdraw at the very end of i ts Response 315,

devoting five paragraphs to a rebuttal of Thailand’s analysis in

the Written Observations. The impossibility for Cambodia to

identify a single document, predating its seis ing of the Court, in
which the Parties held opposing views on the characterization of

the obligation of withdrawal shows beyond any doubt that no

such dispute existed.

(d) The Alleged Dispute on the Recognition of the Binding
Force of the Annex I Map as the Boundary between the Parties

in the Area of the Temple

3.83 Interestingly, Cambodia shows itself incapable of linking

the third element of the dispute between the Parties to any of the

three paragraphs of the 1962 Judgment:

315Response, paras. 4.84-4.86. 3.86 A straightforward reading of the 1962 Judgment makes

it obvious that the status of the map and the delimitation of the

boundary are outside what had been decided res judicata by the

Court in 1962. Contrary to Cambodia’s allegation 318, there is

not the slightest uncertainty as to whether or not these points

were decided with binding force – they were not. There is no

room for d oubt in this respect on a bona fide reading of the
Judgment. On the contrary, these questions were purposely left

outside. Cambodia is abusing its right to introduce a request for

interpretation of the Judgment in the sense that it uses it to call

into question the res judicata principle.

3.87 It is therefore apparent that, absent any dispute over the

interpretation of any of the three paragraphs of the dispositif of
the 1962 Judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction under Article

60 of its Statute to interpret this Judgment.

B. The Dismissal of Cambodia’s New Claims in the Original

Proceedings

3.88 This being said, Thailand has no difficulty accepting that
it has a dispute with Cambodia on several issues, including that

of the course of the boundary line between t he Parties. But that

line having not been decided by the Court in 1962 cannot be

adjudicated in 2012 or 2013 through a proceeding on

318
Response, paras. 2.25 and 4.4.

1263.86 A straightforward reading of the 1962 Judgment makes

it obvious that the status of the map and the delimitation of the

boundary are outside what had been decided res judicata by the

Court in 1962. Contrary to Cambodia’s allegation 31, there is

not the slightest uncertainty as to whether or not these points

were decided with binding force – they were not. There is no

room for d oubt in this respect on a bona fide reading of the
Judgment. On the contrary, these questions were purposely left

outside. Cambodia is abusing its right to introduce a request for

interpretation of the Judgment in the sense that it uses it to call

into question the res judicata principle.

3.87 It is therefore apparent that, absent any dispute over the

interpretation of any of the three paragraphs of the dispositif of
the 1962 Judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction under Article

60 of its Statute to interpret this Judgment.

B. The Dismissal of Cambodia’s New Claims in the Original

Proceedings

3.88 This being said, Thailand has no difficulty accepting that
it has a dispute with Cambodia on several issues, including that

of the course of the boundary line between t he Parties. But that

line having not been decided by the Court in 1962 cannot be

adjudicated in 2012 or 2013 through a proceeding on

318
Response, paras. 2.25 and 4.4. does not attempt to conceal it and makes clear that its so -called

question on the meaning of “territory” concerns in fact the

delimitation of the boundary between the Parties. Similarly, the

question relating to the “ vicinity of the Temple ” is equated by
Cambodia with that of the boundary, since it identifies t he said

“vicinity” as all the territory under Cambodian sovereignty

south of the Annex I map line 32. And Cambodia clearly

explains that the judgment it calls on the Court to give through

the “interpretation” of the 1962 Judgment will be implemented

following the process of the MoU, a treaty whose object

precisely is the survey and demarcation of the boundary
323
between Thailand and Cambodia . This question is obviously
324
inadmissible: as already explained above , the Court expressly

rejected this same Cambodian claim in 1962; its repetition does

not make it admissible now. Had Cambodia asked the Court
this very same question in 1963, the Court would have

undeniably considered it inadmissible. The f act that Cambodia

addresses it half a century later, when the factual situation on

the ground and the legal context between the Parties ha ve

changed considerably, does not make it any less inadmissible.

Cambodia’s new claims relating to the boundary and t he status

of the Annex I map having already been considered in 1962 (1.),

322Response, paras. 2.22, 2.41 and 2.64.
323
“Si la Cour accepte d’interpréter dans le sens que le Cambodge souhaite,
l’exécution de l’arrêt se fera selon des moyens pacifiques, sur la base d’un
accord commun qui existe déjà: le Memorandum oUnderstanding du 14
juin 2000 (ci -après MoU) sur la démarcation de la frontière entre les deux
États.” (Response, para. 1.10). For Thailand’s objections to this misuse of the
Court, see WO, paras. 4.111-4.115.
324
See paras. 3.85-3.86 above.

128does not attempt to conceal it and makes clear that its so -called

question on the meaning of “territory” concerns in fact the

delimitation of the boundary between the Parties. Similarly, the

question relating to the “ vicinity of the Temple ” is equated by
Cambodia with that of the boundary, since it identifies t he said

“vicinity” as all the territory under Cambodian sovereignty

south of the Annex I map line 322. And Cambodia clearly

explains that the judgment it calls on the Court to give through

the “interpretation” of the 1962 Judgment will be implemented

following the process of the MoU, a treaty whose object

precisely is the survey and demarcation of the boundary
323
between Thailand and Cambodia . This question is obviously
324
inadmissible: as already explained above , the Court expressly

rejected this same Cambodian claim in 1962; its repetition does

not make it admissible now. Had Cambodia asked the Court
this very same question in 1963, the Court would have

undeniably considered it inadmissible. The f act that Cambodia

addresses it half a century later, when the factual situation on

the ground and the legal context between the Parties ha ve

changed considerably, does not make it any less inadmissible.

Cambodia’s new claims relating to the boundary and t he status

of the Annex I map having already been considered in 1962 (1.),

322Response, paras. 2.22, 2.41 and 2.64.
323
“Si la Cour accepte d’interpréter dans le sens que le Cambodge souhaite,
l’exécution de l’arrêt se fera selon des moyens pacifiques, sur la base d’un
accord commun qui existe déjà: le Memorandum oUnderstanding du 14
juin 2000 (ci -après MoU) sur la démarcation de la frontière entre les deux
États.” (Response, para. 1.10). For Thailand’s objections to this misuse of the
Court, see WO, paras. 4.111-4.115.
324
See paras. 3.85-3.86 above. 328
them . The extension of the geographical scope of the initial

request was objectively evident to anyone; but there was also a
fundamental alteration of the nature of the dispute: i t would

have turned a dispute over sovereignty in respect of a well -

defined location, into a dispute on delimitation of this territory,

the extent of which would be impossible to determine. For

these reasons, Thailand asserted a fin de non -recevoir 329, a

position which was accepted by the Court.

3.93 It does not escape Cambodia’s notice that this is fatal to

its Request ; h ence, it now vacillates between open denial,
minimization and self-contradiction.

3.94 Paragraph 1.22 of the Response is an example (among

others) of the first posture, that of “open denial”: “ la Thaïlande

ne cherche pas non plus à expliquer pourquoi la carte de

l’annexe I n’est pas essentielle, ou pourquoi elle est séparée des
330
éléments du dispositif. ” It is as though Cambodia had not

noted that a very important part of the Written Observations is
devoted to explaining why the Annex I map is by no means

essential, nor indeed necessary, to explain the meaning and

scope of the three paragraphs contained in the dispositif of the

Judgment and the consequences flowing from this situation. In

328Ibid., paras. 2.66-2.79.

329I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Oral Arguments , Vol. II, p. 218
(Mr. Seni Pramoj, 7 March 1962); p. 271 (Mr. Henri Rolin, 9 March 1962);
pp. 566–568 (Mr. Henri Rolin, 28 March 1962); and p. 567 (Mr. Henri Rolin,
28 March 1962); see also WO, paras. 2.66-2.79.
330
Response, para. 1.22. See also paras. 1.24, 2.33 and 3.13.

130 328
them . The extension of the geographical scope of the initial

request was objectively evident to anyone; but there was also a
fundamental alteration of the nature of the dispute: i t would

have turned a dispute over sovereignty in respect of a well -

defined location, into a dispute on delimitation of this territory,

the extent of which would be impossible to determine. For

these reasons, Thailand asserted a fin de non -recevoir 329, a

position which was accepted by the Court.

3.93 It does not escape Cambodia’s notice that this is fatal to

its Request ; h ence, it now vacillates between open denial,
minimization and self-contradiction.

3.94 Paragraph 1.22 of the Response is an example (among

others) of the first posture, that of “open denial”: “ la Thaïlande

ne cherche pas non plus à expliquer pourquoi la carte de

l’annexe I n’est pas essentielle, ou pourquoi elle est séparée des
330
éléments du dispositif. ” It is as though Cambodia had not

noted that a very important part of the Written Observations is
devoted to explaining why the Annex I map is by no means

essential, nor indeed necessary, to explain the meaning and

scope of the three paragraphs contained in the dispositif of the

Judgment and the consequences flowing from this situation. In

328Ibid., paras. 2.66-2.79.

329I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Oral Arguments , Vol. II, p. 218
(Mr. Seni Pramoj, 7 March 1962); p. 271 (Mr. Henri Rolin, 9 March 1962);
pp. 566–568 (Mr. Henri Rolin, 28 March 1962); and p. 567 (Mr. Henri Rolin,
28 March 1962); see also WO, paras. 2.66-2.79.
330
Response, para. 1.22. See also paras. 1.24, 2.33 and 3.13. Cambodian claims in this respect were dismissed not because

they were formulated at a late stage, but because, submitted at a

late stage, they represented an impermissible extension of the

initial Application:

“the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court [as

defined in the judgment on the Cambodian preliminary
objections of 26 May 1961] is confined to a difference of
view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of
Preah Vihear. To decide this question of territorial

sovereignty, the Cour t must have regard to the frontier
line between the two States in this sector. Maps have
been submitted to it and various considerations have

been advanced in this connection. The Court will have
regard to each of these only to such extent as it may find
in them reasons for the decision it has to give in order to
settle the sole dispute submitted to it, the subject of
335
which has just been stated.”

In so doing the Court accepted Thailand’s claim according to

which:

“The Court is asked not to entertain thi s [Cambodia’s
new] claim, because it constitutes an enlargement of the
claim presented by the Government of Cambodia in the
Application instituting these proceedings and throughout
336
the written pleadings.”

3.97 Significantly, the Court dealt differently with these

requests on the one hand and those on return of objects allegedly

taken from the Temple on the other hand, although they were

335Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14.
336
Ibid.

132Cambodian claims in this respect were dismissed not because

they were formulated at a late stage, but because, submitted at a

late stage, they represented an impermissible extension of the

initial Application:

“the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court [as

defined in the judgment on the Cambodian preliminary
objections of 26 May 1961] is confined to a difference of
view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of
Preah Vihear. To decide this question of territorial

sovereignty, the Cour t must have regard to the frontier
line between the two States in this sector. Maps have
been submitted to it and various considerations have

been advanced in this connection. The Court will have
regard to each of these only to such extent as it may find
in them reasons for the decision it has to give in order to
settle the sole dispute submitted to it, the subject of
335
which has just been stated.”

In so doing the Court accepted Thailand’s claim according to

which:

“The Court is asked not to entertain thi s [Cambodia’s
new] claim, because it constitutes an enlargement of the
claim presented by the Government of Cambodia in the
Application instituting these proceedings and throughout
336
the written pleadings.”

3.97 Significantly, the Court dealt differently with these

requests on the one hand and those on return of objects allegedly

taken from the Temple on the other hand, although they were

335Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14.
336
Ibid. “Il apparaît également implicite que l’objection
procédurale sur cette soumission tardive soit basée sur
l’argument selon lequel les conséquences de ces

conclusions outrepassèrent le c341e du litige tel qu’initié
au départ par le Cambodge.”

3.99 This second explanation is the correct one – and is by no

means implicit: this is exactly what the Court said at page 14 of
342
the Judgment . And this is the only explanati on of the fact

that the Court decided to address them only in the non-operative

part of the Judgment. Contrary to Cambodia’s apparent opinion,

this position is not a whim on the part of the Court’s as to the
form it chose for adjudging those claims 34: the distinction

between reasons and dispositif is not merely formal and entails

consequences as far as the res judicataprinciple is concerned 344.

3.100 In particular, there is no such thing as a “dispositif

implicite”34. On the contrary, the distinction between reas ons

and dispositif is well established in the case law of the Court:

“… the Court will distinguish between the dispute itself
and arguments used by the parties to sustain their
respective submissions on the dispute:

34Response, para. 3.23, footnote 138.
342
Quoted in para. 3.96 above.
34Response, paras. 3.24 and 4.23.

34See paras. 3.16-3.25 above.
345
Response, para. 4.23.

134 “Il apparaît également implicite que l’objection
procédurale sur cette soumission tardive soit basée sur
l’argument selon lequel les conséquences de ces

conclusions outrepassèrent le c341e du litige tel qu’initié
au départ par le Cambodge.”

3.99 This second explanation is the correct one – and is by no

means implicit: this is exactly what the Court said at page 14 of
342
the Judgment . And this is the only explanati on of the fact

that the Court decided to address them only in the non-operative

part of the Judgment. Contrary to Cambodia’s apparent opinion,

this position is not a whim on the part of the Court’s as to the
form it chose for adjudging those claims 343: the distinction

between reasons and dispositif is not merely formal and entails

consequences as far as the res judicataprinciple is concerned 34.

3.100 In particular, there is no such thing as a “dispositif

implicite”345. On the contrary, the distinction between reas ons

and dispositif is well established in the case law of the Court:

“… the Court will distinguish between the dispute itself
and arguments used by the parties to sustain their
respective submissions on the dispute:

341Response, para. 3.23, footnote 138.
342
Quoted in para. 3.96 above.
343Response, paras. 3.24 and 4.23.

344See paras. 3.16-3.25 above.
345
Response, para. 4.23. (a) Consequences in the Original Proceedings

3.103 It is well established in the case law of the Court that

new claims formulated by the Parties in the course of the

proceedings are inadmissible if they change the character of the
dispute. Thus, in the case concerning the Société commerciale

de Belgique, the Permanent Court stated:

“The Court has not fail ed to consider the question
whether the Statute and Rules of Court authorize the
parties to transform the character of a case as profoundly
as the Belgian Government has done in this case.

It is to be observed that the liberty accorded to the
parties to amend their submissions up to the end of the
oral proceedings must be construed reasonably and
without infringing the terms of Article 40 of the Statute
and Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules which provide

that the Application must indicate the subject of the
dispute. The Court has not hitherto had occasion to
determine the limits of this liberty, but it is clear that the
Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought
before it by application to be transformed by

amendments in the submissions into347 nother dispute
which is different in character.”

3.104 This has also been the constant position of the present

Court. In the Arrest Warrant case, the Court noted:

“that, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, it
‘cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by

application to be transformed by amendments in the

347Société commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P. C. I. J., Series A/B,
No. 78, p. 173; see also: Prince von Pless Administration, Order of
4 February 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14.

136 (a) Consequences in the Original Proceedings

3.103 It is well established in the case law of the Court that

new claims formulated by the Parties in the course of the

proceedings are inadmissible if they change the character of the
dispute. Thus, in the case concerning the Société commerciale

de Belgique, the Permanent Court stated:

“The Court has not fail ed to consider the question
whether the Statute and Rules of Court authorize the
parties to transform the character of a case as profoundly
as the Belgian Government has done in this case.

It is to be observed that the liberty accorded to the
parties to amend their submissions up to the end of the
oral proceedings must be construed reasonably and
without infringing the terms of Article 40 of the Statute
and Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules which provide

that the Application must indicate the subject of the
dispute. The Court has not hitherto had occasion to
determine the limits of this liberty, but it is clear that the
Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought
before it by application to be transformed by

amendments in the submissions into347 nother dispute
which is different in character.”

3.104 This has also been the constant position of the present

Court. In the Arrest Warrant case, the Court noted:

“that, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, it
‘cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by

application to be transformed by amendments in the

347Société commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P. C. I. J., Series A/B,
No. 78, p. 173; see also: Prince von Pless Administration, Order of
4 February 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14. dispute originally brought before it under the terms of

the Application ( Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 69; Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the

Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 447, para. 29;
see also Prin ce von Pless Administration, Order of 4
February 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14, and
Société Commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173).

109. The Court observes that, from a formal point of
view, the claim relating to sovereignty over the islands in
the maritime area in dispute, as presented in the final
submissions of Nicaragua, is a new claim in relation to

the claims presented in the Application and in the written
pleadings.

110. However, the mere fact that a claim is new is not in

itself decisive for the issue of admissibility. In order to
determine whether a new claim introduced during the
course of the proceedings is admissible the Court will
need to consider whether,

‘although formally a new claim, t he claim in
question can be considered as included in the
original claim in substance’ ( Certain Phosphate
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Prelim nary

Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
pp. 265-266, para. 65).

For this purpose, to find that the new claim, as a matter
of substance, has been included in the original claim, it is

not sufficient that there should be links between them of
a general nature. Moreover,

“[a]n additional claim must have been implicit in
the application (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36) or must
arise ‘directly out of the question which is the
subject-matter of that Application’ ( Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v.

138dispute originally brought before it under the terms of

the Application ( Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 69; Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the

Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 447, para. 29;
see also Prin ce von Pless Administration, Order of 4 3.105 Such inadmissible claims, which change the very
February 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14, and
Société Commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, character of the case, cannot be considered to be part of the
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173).
matters decided with binding force regardless of what they are

109. The Court observes that, from a formal point of related to in the judgment
view, the claim relating to sovereignty over the islands in
the maritime area in dispute, as presented in the final ground, Cambodia’s new claims concerning the Annex I map
submissions of Nicaragua, is a new claim in relation to and the delimitation of the boundary between the Parties, the

the claims presented in the Application and in the written Court has excluded these claims from the res judicata.
pleadings.

110. However, the mere fact that a claim is new is not in

itself decisive for the issue of admissibility. In order to
determine whether a new claim introduced during the
course of the proceedings is admissible the Court will
need to consider whether, 3.106 Cambodia repeats in 2011-
relating to the status of the map and the delimitation of the

‘although formally a new claim, t he claim in boundary which it unsuccessfully made in 1962 and which were
question can be considered as included in the
original claim in substance’ ( Certain Phosphate declared inadmissible by the Court at the time. T he Court today
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Prelim nary
has no jurisdiction to enter into a
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
pp. 265-266, para. 65). through a request for interpretation, since, by

For this purpose, to find that the new claim, as a matter matters do not bear upon what has been decided with the effect
of substance, has been included in the original claim, it is
349
not sufficient that there should be links between them of Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
a general nature. Moreover, the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007,
pp. 695-696, paras. 108-110.
“[a]n additional claim must have been implicit in 350They are not what Prof. Jouannet calls “ motifs décisoires” (see footnote
the application (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, 206 above).

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36) or must 351Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
arise ‘directly out of the question which is the concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
subject-matter of that Application’ ( Fisheries v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, paras. 39,
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. 42 and 44; and Response, first and second paragraphs 1.18. of res judicata, precisely because the Court declined to decide
on the m. Indeed Cambodia’s attempt itself appears as a

détournement de procédure , since it uses the procedure of

interpretation in order to appeal the Court’s clear declaration of

inadmissibility of its late submission in 1962 – while it is fully

conscious that the Court today would have no jurisdiction to

decide on such a submission.

3.107 This is all the more striking since not only does the

dispositif of the 1962 Judgment contains no finding r elating to

the submissions in question, but also the Court took care to

refuse explicitly to adjudicate these inadmissible claims.

3.108 Subsequent to the Judgment, Cambodia was loath to

admit the Court’s clear-cut refusal to adjudicate its claims on the
status of the Annex I map and the delimitation of the boundary.

To the contrary, the official discourse, targeted towards national

as well as international public opinion, propagated the false

perception that the Court had decided the question of

boundaries. This is evident in numerous declarations made by

Cambodian officials at the rostrum of the General Assembly of

the United Nations, in their statements during the discussions
held in Phnom Penh with U nited Nations mediators or foreign

diplomats, or in the ar ticles published in national newspapers

considered to be the official voice of the Cambodian
352
Government . Most interestingly, Cambodian propaganda

352
See the documents referred to in WO, paras. 4.104-4.107.

140of res judicata, precisely because the Court declined to decide
on the m. Indeed Cambodia’s attempt itself appears as a

détournement de procédure , since it uses the procedure of

interpretation in order to appeal the Court’s clear declaration of

inadmissibility of its late submission in 1962 – while it is fully

conscious that the Court today would have no jurisdiction to

decide on such a submission.

3.107 This is all the more striking since not only does the

dispositif of the 1962 Judgment contains no finding r elating to

the submissions in question, but also the Court took care to

refuse explicitly to adjudicate these inadmissible claims.

3.108 Subsequent to the Judgment, Cambodia was loath to

admit the Court’s clear-cut refusal to adjudicate its claims on the
status of the Annex I map and the delimitation of the boundary.

To the contrary, the official discourse, targeted towards national

as well as international public opinion, propagated the false

perception that the Court had decided the question of

boundaries. This is evident in numerous declarations made by

Cambodian officials at the rostrum of the General Assembly of

the United Nations, in their statements during the discussions
held in Phnom Penh with U nited Nations mediators or foreign

diplomats, or in the ar ticles published in national newspapers

considered to be the official voice of the Cambodian
352
Government . Most interestingly, Cambodian propaganda

352
See the documents referred to in WO, paras. 4.104-4.107. 357
legend” . The Court has however now the opportunity to re -
establish the judicial truth in its own rig ht, by declaring

Cambodia’s Request for interpretation inadmissible on the

grounds that the 1962 Judgment did not determine the boundary

between the two States, but only sovereignty over the Temple.

357
Stefan Zweig, Amerigo. A Comedy of Errors in History , Ishy Press
International, 2010, p. 67.

142 357
legend” . The Court has however now the opportunity to re -
establish the judicial truth in its own rig ht, by declaring

Cambodia’s Request for interpretation inadmissible on the

grounds that the 1962 Judgment did not determine the boundary

between the two States, but only sovereignty over the Temple.

357
Stefan Zweig, Amerigo. A Comedy of Errors in History , Ishy Press
International, 2010, p. 67. res judicata of the case360. It is by referring to this one reason

that Cambodia insists that the Court today declare that the Court

in 1962 decided sovereignty over certain areas beyond the
promontory of Phra Viharn.

4.3 In the present Chapter, after recalling the plain meaning

of the dispositif (A.), Thailand will recall once more the reasons
which led the Court to reach the decision it did in 1962; and the

Court’s clear understanding that the Annex I map line was not

the essential or inseparable reason for its decision (B.). Even if
the Court’s consideration of the Annex I map line in 1962 were

to be examined in clinical isolation – i.e., even if the Court’s

consideration of other evidence of sovereignty were ignored and

the Court’s explanations of why it was considering the map line
were ignored – Cambodia’s interpretation faces a further, and

insuperable, problem: the map line does not support Cambodia’s

exorbitant interpretation of the geographic al parameters of the

area from which Thailand was obliged to withdraw. As
Thailand will recall below ( C.), though the map line is not the

only consideration which supported the conclusion that the

Temple is situated in Cambodia, that conclusion is the only

conclusion which the map line supported. Cambodia, however,
insists that the map line supports certain further conclusions;

Thailand will explain below (D.) why Cambodia’s assertion that

the 1962 Judgment used the map line to reach a general

determination as to Cambodian sovereignty, including over

36Ibid., paras. 4.10-4.27. See also ibid., first paragraph 1.18 (pp. 8-9).

144res judicata of the case360. It is by referring to this one reason

that Cambodia insists that the Court today declare that the Court

in 1962 decided sovereignty over certain areas beyond the
promontory of Phra Viharn.

4.3 In the present Chapter, after recalling the plain meaning

of the dispositif (A.), Thailand will recall once more the reasons
which led the Court to reach the decision it did in 1962; and the

Court’s clear understanding that the Annex I map line was not

the essential or inseparable reason for its decision (B.). Even if
the Court’s consideration of the Annex I map line in 1962 were

to be examined in clinical isolation – i.e., even if the Court’s

consideration of other evidence of sovereignty were ignored and

the Court’s explanations of why it was considering the map line
were ignored – Cambodia’s interpretation faces a further, and

insuperable, problem: the map line does not support Cambodia’s

exorbitant interpretation of the geographic al parameters of the

area from which Thailand was obliged to withdraw. As
Thailand will recall below ( C.), though the map line is not the

only consideration which supported the conclusion that the

Temple is situated in Cambodia, that conclusion is the only

conclusion which the map line supported. Cambodia, however,
insists that the map line supports certain further conclusions;

Thailand will explain below (D.) why Cambodia’s assertion that

the 1962 Judgment used the map line to reach a general

determination as to Cambodian sovereignty, including over

360Ibid., paras. 4.10-4.27. See also ibid., first paragraph 1.18 (pp. 8-9). have been removed from the Temple or the Temple area
361
by the Thai authorities.”

And in the French language:

“La Cour,
(…)

dit que le temple de Préah Vihéar e st situé en territoire
relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge;
dit en conséquence,
(…)
que la Thaïlande est tenue de retirer tous les éléments de

forces armées ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens
qu’elle a ins tallés dans le temple ou dans ses environs
situés en territoire cambodgien;
(…)

que la Thaïlande est tenue de restituer au Cambodge
tous objets des catégories spécifiées dans la cinquième
conclusion du Cambodge qui, depuis la date de
l’occupation du temple par la Thaïlande en 1954,
auraient pu être enlevés du temple ou de la zone du
362
temple par les autorités thaïlandaises.”

4.5 As Thailand has set out in Chapter III above, these
paragraphs present no question of interpretation. Cambodia had

instituted proceedings to obtain an answer to a question which,

though fiercely contested at the time, was perfectly

straightforward: which of the two States had sovereignty over

the Temple of Phra Viharn? Nobody at the time thought that the

question entailed an answer requiring fine gradations or nuances
of meaning. The Temple would be found to be in Cambodia; or

it would be found to be in Thailand. Those were the

361Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 36-37.

362Ibid.

146 have been removed from the Temple or the Temple area
361
by the Thai authorities.”

And in the French language:

“La Cour,
(…)

dit que le temple de Préah Vihéar e st situé en territoire
relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge;
dit en conséquence,
(…)
que la Thaïlande est tenue de retirer tous les éléments de

forces armées ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens
qu’elle a ins tallés dans le temple ou dans ses environs
situés en territoire cambodgien;
(…)

que la Thaïlande est tenue de restituer au Cambodge
tous objets des catégories spécifiées dans la cinquième
conclusion du Cambodge qui, depuis la date de
l’occupation du temple par la Thaïlande en 1954,
auraient pu être enlevés du temple ou de la zone du
362
temple par les autorités thaïlandaises.”

4.5 As Thailand has set out in Chapter III above, these
paragraphs present no question of interpretation. Cambodia had

instituted proceedings to obtain an answer to a question which,

though fiercely contested at the time, was perfectly

straightforward: which of the two States had sovereignty over

the Temple of Phra Viharn? Nobody at the time thought that the

question entailed an answer requiring fine gradations or nuances
of meaning. The Temple would be found to be in Cambodia; or

it would be found to be in Thailand. Those were the

361Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 36-37.

362Ibid. detail. As suggested by the plain text, the meaning of each
paragraph of the dispositif, though now contested by Cambodia,

is in truth clear.

B. The Reasoning Which Led the Court to Determine

Sovereignty over the Temple

4.8 Contrary to the way Cambodia claims to read the
Judgment, the meaning of the dispositif is no less clear when

one recalls the reasoning which led the Court to determine

sovereignty over the Temple. Central to Cambodia’s claim is

the assertion that the reasons for the Judgment have the effect of

considerably expanding the plain meaning of the dispositif.

Cambodia asserts that one reason in particular – the Annex I

map line – must be incorporated into the dispositif and thus, by
definition, to the binding part of the Judgment. Under

Cambodia’s view, the Judgment must be understood not just as

concerning territorial sovereignty over the Temple (though this

was the subject matter of the original dispute), but also as

concerning other places and other territorial differences. That

Cambodia in effect would have the Court adopt a new judgment

in respect of those places and differences is all the more
surprising, in light of the clear and limited definition of the

original dispute. This was the dispute which Cambodia itself

defined i n 1961 as concerning “ une parcelle du territoire

cambodgien, sise dans la province de Kompong -Thom, où se

trouvent les ruines d’un saint monastère, le temple de Préah

148detail. As suggested by the plain text, the meaning of each
paragraph of the dispositif, though now contested by Cambodia,

is in truth clear.

B. The Reasoning Which Led the Court to Determine

Sovereignty over the Temple

4.8 Contrary to the way Cambodia claims to read the
Judgment, the meaning of the dispositif is no less clear when

one recalls the reasoning which led the Court to determine

sovereignty over the Temple. Central to Cambodia’s claim is

the assertion that the reasons for the Judgment have the effect of

considerably expanding the plain meaning of the dispositif.

Cambodia asserts that one reason in particular – the Annex I

map line – must be incorporated into the dispositif and thus, by
definition, to the binding part of the Judgment. Under

Cambodia’s view, the Judgment must be understood not just as

concerning territorial sovereignty over the Temple (though this

was the subject matter of the original dispute), but also as

concerning other places and other territorial differences. That

Cambodia in effect would have the Court adopt a new judgment

in respect of those places and differences is all the more
surprising, in light of the clear and limited definition of the

original dispute. This was the dispute which Cambodia itself

defined i n 1961 as concerning “ une parcelle du territoire

cambodgien, sise dans la province de Kompong -Thom, où se

trouvent les ruines d’un saint monastère, le temple de Préah judgment. A question which must be answered when a Party

demands an interpretation of a reason, therefore, is whether the

reason addressed in that demand constitutes an essential or

inseparable reason; and, moreover, whether the requested

interpretation of the reason remains within the scope of the

dispositif.

4.10 Before recalling why the Annex I map l ine was not

essential to or inseparable from the dispositif, nor necessary to

clarify its meaning, it is important to correct a serious fault in

how Cambodia reads the Judgment. As noted in Chapter II

above, Cambodia takes isolated statements from the reasoning

of the Judgment and treats them as if they are all that is needed,
368
in order to know what the Court decided . A judgment is not
369
however a series of disconnected statements . There are two

aspects of the 1962 Judgment which Cambodia ignores but

which are important, globally, to the Court’s reasoning. First,

Thailand will recall ( 1.) that, in the 1962 Judgment, the Court
expressly indicated the reason why it had to entertain any

consideration besides the treaty text: the treaty text, in which all

territorial issues between the Parties were supposed to have been

36Response, para. 3.12.
369
A point Cambodia seems to accept when it relies on the Pious Fund case,
but fails to apply. The Tribun al in that case said: “[T]outes les parties d’un
jugement ou d’un arrêt concernant les points débattus au litige s’éclairent et
se complètent mutuellement et (…) servent toutes à préciser le sens et la
portée du dispositif, à déterminer les points sur lesquels il y.” chose jugée
(The Pious Fund of Carifornias (United States of America v. Mexico), arbitral
award of 24 Oct 1902, RIAA , Vol. IX, p. 12, quoted in Response, para. 4.37.
(Emphasis added)). To the same effect, see Danzig case, P.C.I.J., Series B,
No. 11, 1925, pp. 29-30.

150judgment. A question which must be answered when a Party

demands an interpretation of a reason, therefore, is whether the

reason addressed in that demand constitutes an essential or

inseparable reason; and, moreover, whether the requested

interpretation of the reason remains within the scope of the

dispositif.

4.10 Before recalling why the Annex I map l ine was not

essential to or inseparable from the dispositif, nor necessary to

clarify its meaning, it is important to correct a serious fault in

how Cambodia reads the Judgment. As noted in Chapter II

above, Cambodia takes isolated statements from the reasoning

of the Judgment and treats them as if they are all that is needed,
368
in order to know what the Court decided . A judgment is not
369
however a series of disconnected statements . There are two

aspects of the 1962 Judgment which Cambodia ignores but

which are important, globally, to the Court’s reasoning. First,

Thailand will recall ( 1.) that, in the 1962 Judgment, the Court
expressly indicated the reason why it had to entertain any

consideration besides the treaty text: the treaty text, in which all

territorial issues between the Parties were supposed to have been

368Response, para. 3.12.
369
A point Cambodia seems to accept when it relies on the Pious Fund case,
but fails to apply. The Tribun al in that case said: “[T]outes les parties d’un
jugement ou d’un arrêt concernant les points débattus au litige s’éclairent et
se complètent mutuellement et (…) servent toutes à préciser le sens et la
portée du dispositif, à déterminer les points sur lesquels il y .”chose jugée
(The Pious Fund of Carifornias (United States of America v. Mexico), arbitral
award of 24 Oct 1902, RIAA , Vol. IX, p. 12, quoted in Response, para. 4.37.
(Emphasis added)). To the same effect, see Danzig case, P.C.I.J., Series B,
No. 11, 1925, pp. 29-30. treaty provisions delimiting the eastern Dangrek sector. It was
the text of those provisions that the Court identified as the

starting point for its investigation. An express statement in the

Treaty would have settled the matter. Considering the treaty

text, however, the Court discovered that the Treaty had nothing

to say about the Temple: “these articles [Articles 1 and 3 of the
371
1904 Treaty] make no mention of [the Temple] as such” . The

Court then said that it was because of the absence of an explicit
answer to the question of sovereignty over the Temple in the

treaty text that it would examine evidence outside the treaty

text37. This explanation is important to understanding the

examination by the Court which followed. The Court was not

examining other evidence for its own sake, but, rather, to find an

answer to the specific question which the 1904 Treaty had not

given. The Treaty contained no reference to the disputed
Temple, and for this reason the Court undertook a wider

examination.

4.12 Of course, the Treaty did say, in terms, what the frontier

between the two States was. This was the delimitation

provision, which the Court quoted, and which identified the

“Article 3

There shall be a delimitation of the frontiers between the Kingdom of Siam
and the territories making up French Indo -China. This delimitation will be
carried out by Mixed Commissions composed of off icers appointed by the
two contracting countries. The work will relate to the frontier determined by
Articles 1 and 2, and the region lying between the Great Lake and the sea.”
(Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 16).
37Ibid.
372
Ibid., pp. 16-17.

152treaty provisions delimiting the eastern Dangrek sector. It was
the text of those provisions that the Court identified as the

starting point for its investigation. An express statement in the

Treaty would have settled the matter. Considering the treaty

text, however, the Court discovered that the Treaty had nothing

to say about the Temple: “these articles [Articles 1 and 3 of the
371
1904 Treaty] make no mention of [the Temple] as such” . The

Court then said that it was because of the absence of an explicit
answer to the question of sovereignty over the Temple in the

treaty text that it would examine evidence outside the treaty

text372. This explanation is important to understanding the

examination by the Court which followed. The Court was not

examining other evidence for its own sake, but, rather, to find an

answer to the specific question which the 1904 Treaty had not

given. The Treaty contained no reference to the disputed
Temple, and for this reason the Court undertook a wider

examination.

4.12 Of course, the Treaty did say, in terms, what the frontier

between the two States was. This was the delimitation

provision, which the Court quoted, and which identified the

“Article 3

There shall be a delimitation of the frontiers between the Kingdom of Siam
and the territories making up French Indo -China. This delimitation will be
carried out by Mixed Commissions composed of off icers appointed by the
two contracting countries. The work will relate to the frontier determined by
Articles 1 and 2, and the region lying between the Great Lake and the sea.”
(Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 16).
371Ibid.
372
Ibid., pp. 16-17. enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of
374
it” . Severing this statement from the Court’s explanation of
why it had to examine evidence beyond the treaty text,

Cambodia insists that the Court thus incorporated the boundary

depicted on the map into the 1904 Treaty . But incorporating a

general territorial settlement into the 19 04 Treaty was not the

effect that the Court was achieving: “under the 1904 Treaty

settlement, Thailand accepted a delimitation having the effect of
375
attributing the sovereignty over Preah Vihear to Cambodia” .

The Court’s sole purpose in finding that the P arties’ acceptance

had “caused the map to enter the treaty settlement” was the
purpose that the Court here identified. The Court had been asked

to decide which State held sovereignty over the Temple but, in

respect of that question, the text was silent; an d, so, the Court

needed to turn its consideration elsewhere. Cambodia’s

disjointed reading of the Judgment leads Cambodia to take

positions which contradict the Court’s explanations of its own

reasoning. Cambodia substitutes what it wishes the Court to

have done for what the Court itself explained it did.

4.15 The fallacy in Cambodia’s reading of the Judgment is

further exposed by considering a counter -factual hypothesis. If

the 1904 Treaty had stated, in terms, which State had

374Response, para 1.23. See also ibid ., paras. 3.12 and 4.20 and Request for
Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 J une 1962 in the Case concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Application Instituting Proceedings, 28 April 2011, para. 39.
375
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30. (Emphasis
added).

154enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of
374
it” . Severing this statement from the Court’s explanation of
why it had to examine evidence beyond the treaty text,

Cambodia insists that the Court thus incorporated the boundary

depicted on the map into the 1904 Treaty . But incorporating a

general territorial settlement into the 19 04 Treaty was not the

effect that the Court was achieving: “under the 1904 Treaty

settlement, Thailand accepted a delimitation having the effect of
375
attributing the sovereignty over Preah Vihear to Cambodia” .

The Court’s sole purpose in finding that the P arties’ acceptance

had “caused the map to enter the treaty settlement” was the
purpose that the Court here identified. The Court had been asked

to decide which State held sovereignty over the Temple but, in

respect of that question, the text was silent; an d, so, the Court

needed to turn its consideration elsewhere. Cambodia’s

disjointed reading of the Judgment leads Cambodia to take

positions which contradict the Court’s explanations of its own

reasoning. Cambodia substitutes what it wishes the Court to

have done for what the Court itself explained it did.

4.15 The fallacy in Cambodia’s reading of the Judgment is

further exposed by considering a counter -factual hypothesis. If

the 1904 Treaty had stated, in terms, which State had

374Response, para 1.23. See also ibid ., paras. 3.12 and 4.20 and Request for
Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 J une 1962 in the Case concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Application Instituting Proceedings, 28 April 2011, para. 39.
375
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30. (Emphasis
added). 2. THE M ISSING PRINCE IN CAMBODIA ’SR ESPONSE

4.17 While Cambodia acknowledges that Thailand has drawn

attention to the fact that the Court had other reasons for reaching

the conclusion that it did in the dispositif besides the Annex I

map line, Cambodia asserts that Thailand did so “ tout en ne
378
réussissant pas à les identifier ” . This is a difficult assertion

to understand – for Thailand did identify the other reasons. The
main example is a famous one; the Court called it “much the

most significant episode” 379. As Thailand in the Written

Observations has already set out the independent significance of

Prince Damrong’s visit 380 and did so as well in the oral

proceedings for provisional measures 381, it here simply

summarizes the main points and draws attention to Cambodia’s

failure to address the matter.

4.18 Prince Damrong of Siam, in 1930, was a visitor at the

Temple, and was received there by French officials. The latter

expressed the French claim to sovereignty in various ways. The

former did not object to France’s conduct or, evidently, to any

aspect of his reception. According to the Court,

37Response, para. 1.22.

37Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30.
380
WO, paras. 5.37-5.39.
38Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, 30 May 2011, CR 2011/14, pp. 35-36,

paras. 9-10 (Mr. James Crawford).

156 2.T HE M ISSING PRINCE IN C AMBODIA ’S RESPONSE

4.17 While Cambodia acknowledges that Thailand has drawn

attention to the fact that the Court had other reasons for reaching

the conclusion that it did in the dispositif besides the Annex I

map line, Cambodia asserts that Thailand did so “ tout en ne
378
réussissant pas à les identifier ” . This is a difficult assertion

to understand – for Thailand did identify the other reasons. The
main example is a famous one; the Court called it “much the

most significant episode” 37. As Thailand in the Written

Observations has already set out the independent significance of

Prince Damrong’s visit 380 and did so as well in the oral

proceedings for provisional measures 38, it here simply

summarizes the main points and draws attention to Cambodia’s

failure to address the matter.

4.18 Prince Damrong of Siam, in 1930, was a visitor at the

Temple, and was received there by French officials. The latter

expressed the French claim to sovereignty in various ways. The

former did not object to France’s conduct or, evidently, to any

aspect of his reception. According to the Court,

378Response, para. 1.22.

379Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30.
380
WO, paras. 5.37-5.39.
381Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, 30 May 2011, CR 2011/14, pp. 35-36,

paras. 9-10 (Mr. James Crawford). “In fact, although Thailand made complaints about the
frontier line in a considerable numbe r of regions, she
made none about Preah Vihear . She even (12 May

1947) filed with the Commission 384ap showing Preah
Vihear as lying in Cambodia.”

The Court observed in 1962 that Thailand in 1947 had had an

“outstanding opportunity” 385 to raise the matter of the Temple

but it had not. Far from protesting French claims, Thailand filed

a map with the Commission confirming those claims.

4.21 There had also been wartime statements of Thailand

concerning the Temple. The Court noted that Thailand had
386
reported that it had “retaken” the Temple in 1941 . But the

territorial changes of 1941 were reversed after the war. Thus,

on the basis of Thailand’s wartime statements, the Temple was a

place over which Thailand had “temporarily come into
possession” – and which before that had been French and after

that was French once more.

4.22 Finally, there was the chain of correspondence between

Thailand and France, and later Thailand and Cambodia, in

which the Temple was directly in issue and Thailand failed to

respond in any way to deny the other State’s claim to

sovereignty over that place. France transmitted notes

concerning the Temple to Thailand in 1949. According to the

Court, the last of these notes in particular “contained an

38Ibid, p. 28. (Emphasis added).

38Ibid.
386
Ibid.

158 “In fact, although Thailand made complaints about the
frontier line in a considerable numbe r of regions, she
made none about Preah Vihear . She even (12 May

1947) filed with the Commission384map showing Preah
Vihear as lying in Cambodia.”

The Court observed in 1962 that Thailand in 1947 had had an

“outstanding opportunity” 385to raise the matter of the Temple

but it had not. Far from protesting French claims, Thailand filed

a map with the Commission confirming those claims.

4.21 There had also been wartime statements of Thailand

concerning the Temple. The Court noted that Thailand had
386
reported that it had “retaken” the Temple in 1941 . But the

territorial changes of 1941 were reversed after the war. Thus,

on the basis of Thailand’s wartime statements, the Temple was a

place over which Thailand had “temporarily come into
possession” – and which before that had been French and after

that was French once more.

4.22 Finally, there was the chain of correspondence between

Thailand and France, and later Thailand and Cambodia, in

which the Temple was directly in issue and Thailand failed to

respond in any way to deny the other State’s claim to

sovereignty over that place. France transmitted notes

concerning the Temple to Thailand in 1949. According to the

Court, the last of these notes in particular “contained an

384Ibid, p. 28. (Emphasis added).

385Ibid.
386
Ibid. but not in respect of France’s exercise of sovereignty over the

Temple 392. The Court identified this practice as highly relevant.

Here are the exact terms the Court used to address the practice:

“But it is precisely the fact that Thailand had raised these
other questions, but not that of Preah Vihear, which
requires explanation; for, everything else apart, Thailand
was by this time well aware, from cer tain local
happenings in relation to the Temple, to be mentioned

presently, that France regarded Preah Vihear as being in
Cambodian territory – even if this had not already and
long since been obvious from the frontier line itself , as
mapped by the French authorities and communicated to
the Siamese Government in 1908.” 393

The Court thus was explicit that the other evidence was

independent and concl usive. “Everything else apart” – setting

aside, e.g., the Annex I map and its line – Thailand was on

notice as to the French claim to sovereignty over the Temple of
Phra Viharn. To leave no doubt as to its understanding on the

point, the Court further observed that France’s sovereignty was

clear even if the Annex I map itself “had not already and long

since [made it] obvious”. Take away the Annex I map, and the

same result is achieved: the Temple is in Cambodian territory.
The map line made this obvious – but “even if this had not”, and

even putting the map and everything else aside – the matter was

just as much settled.

392
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 29.
393Ibid. (Emphasis added).

160but not in respect of France’s exercise of sovereignty over the

Temple 392. The Court identified this practice as highly relevant.

Here are the exact terms the Court used to address the practice:

“But it is precisely the fact that Thailand had raised these
other questions, but not that of Preah Vihear, which
requires explanation; for, everything else apart, Thailand
was by this time well aware, from cer tain local
happenings in relation to the Temple, to be mentioned

presently, that France regarded Preah Vihear as being in
Cambodian territory – even if this had not already and
long since been obvious from the frontier line itself , as
mapped by the French authorities and communicated to
the Siamese Government in 1908.” 393

The Court thus was explicit that the other evidence was

independent and concl usive. “Everything else apart” – setting

aside, e.g., the Annex I map and its line – Thailand was on

notice as to the French claim to sovereignty over the Temple of
Phra Viharn. To leave no doubt as to its understanding on the

point, the Court further observed that France’s sovereignty was

clear even if the Annex I map itself “had not already and long

since [made it] obvious”. Take away the Annex I map, and the

same result is achieved: the Temple is in Cambodian territory.
The map line made this obvious – but “even if this had not”, and

even putting the map and everything else aside – the matter was

just as much settled.

392
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 29.
393Ibid. (Emphasis added). the Annex I map line – which was relevant to the only subject

matter in dispute in 1962 – and apply it to a different,

considerably wider, subject matter. As noted in Chapter III

above, a reason may be considered “in so far as” it is
inseparable from the dispositif, but it may not be used to go

further and impose solutions which were not part of the
394
dispositif . Sovereignty over the territory in which the Temple

is situated – not sovereignty over the terri tory in the wider
border region – was the subject matter of the dispute in 1962.

Accordingly, the Court’s reasoning was addressed to that

subject matter. Under a request for interpretation, the Court’s

reasoning might be used to elucidate that subject (assuming that
the dispositif was unclear about that subject, which in the 1962

Judgment it was not); but the reasoning cannot be used to create

a new decision with the effect of res judicata outside the bounds

of the original dispute. This is all the more so, when the ruling

which the requesting party seeks today the Court in 1962
expressly excluded from the dispositif. It is a flawed logic of

interpretation to use reasons in a judgment to arrive at new

conclusions in respect of another subject matter.

4.27 Several specific considerations serve as reminders that

the sole concern of the 1962 Judgment was the question of

sovereignty over the Temple and its precincts. First, as recalled

in Chapter II above, the Parties were interested only in the
Temple and , accordingly, examined the map as evidence of

394See paras. 3.18-3.19 and 3.28-3.32 above.

162the Annex I map line – which was relevant to the only subject

matter in dispute in 1962 – and apply it to a different,

considerably wider, subject matter. As noted in Chapter III

above, a reason may be considered “in so far as” it is
inseparable from the dispositif, but it may not be used to go

further and impose solutions which were not part of the
394
dispositif . Sovereignty over the territory in which the Temple

is situated – not sovereignty over the terri tory in the wider
border region – was the subject matter of the dispute in 1962.

Accordingly, the Court’s reasoning was addressed to that

subject matter. Under a request for interpretation, the Court’s

reasoning might be used to elucidate that subject (assuming that
the dispositif was unclear about that subject, which in the 1962

Judgment it was not); but the reasoning cannot be used to create

a new decision with the effect of res judicata outside the bounds

of the original dispute. This is all the more so, when the ruling

which the requesting party seeks today the Court in 1962
expressly excluded from the dispositif. It is a flawed logic of

interpretation to use reasons in a judgment to arrive at new

conclusions in respect of another subject matter.

4.27 Several specific considerations serve as reminders that

the sole concern of the 1962 Judgment was the question of

sovereignty over the Temple and its precincts. First, as recalled

in Chapter II above, the Parties were interested only in the
Temple and , accordingly, examined the map as evidence of

394See paras. 3.18-3.19 and 3.28-3.32 above. provided the Court with a solid basis for its decision in that

respect; and
(4.) Thailand has demonstrated in the present

proceedings that the various versions of the Annex I map

contain serious discrepancies which would make it impossible

to transpose the map line onto the ground objectively, and, thus,

the Annex I map line, though it provided evidence, in the

Court’s view opposable to Thailand, to show which Sta te had

sovereignty over the Temple, did not serve – and could not have

served – the purpose of defining the boundary.

1. THE COURT ’S LIMITING C LAUSE

4.29 Thailand drew attention in its Written Observations to

the passage where the Court explained that it woul d refer to

maps and other evidence for the limited purpose of deciding the
396
case as submitted . To recall, the Court said as follows:

“Maps have been submitted to it and various
considerations have been advanced in this connection.
The Court will have regard to each of these only to such
extent as it may find in them reasons for the decision it

has to g397 in order to settle the sole dispute submitted to
it, (...)”

396WO, para. 5.48.
397
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962p. 14. (Emphasis
added).

164provided the Court with a solid basis for its decision in that

respect; and
(4.) Thailand has demonstrated in the present

proceedings that the various versions of the Annex I map

contain serious discrepancies which would make it impossible

to transpose the map line onto the ground objectively, and, thus,

the Annex I map line, though it provided evidence, in the

Court’s view opposable to Thailand, to show which Sta te had

sovereignty over the Temple, did not serve – and could not have

served – the purpose of defining the boundary.

1.T HE C OURT ’SL IMITING CLAUSE

4.29 Thailand drew attention in its Written Observations to

the passage where the Court explained that it woul d refer to

maps and other evidence for the limited purpose of deciding the
396
case as submitted . To recall, the Court said as follows:

“Maps have been submitted to it and various
considerations have been advanced in this connection.
The Court will have regard to each of these only to such
extent as it may find in them reasons for the decision it

has to g397 in order to settle the sole dispute submitted to
it, (...)”

396WO, para. 5.48.
397
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962p. 14. (Emphasis
added). dispositif, and never an end in itself, Cambodia seems to

acknowledge the Court’s limiting clause. The Annex I map,
like all the other considerations identified by the Court, was

relevant “only to such extent” as it helped settle the qu estion of

sovereignty over the Temple.

2.C LARITY OF THE T EMPLE ’SL OCATION ON THE A NNEX IM AP

4.31 Thailand addressed in its Written Observations the

Court’s explanation as to why Siam’s reception of the Annex I
402
map (or of some version of it) was material to the question
which the Court had to answer 403. To repeat the main point:

“...the map marked Preah Vihear itself quite clearly as
lying on the Cambodian side of the line, using for the

Temple a symbol which seems to ind404te a rough plan
of the building and its stairways.”

This is why the map had probative value in the dispute. It

marked the Temple clearly, and it marked the Temple as in

Cambodian territory. Defects in the map – in particular the

question of whether it correctly depicted the watershed l ine

adopted by the Parties under the 1904 Treaty – did not reduce its
probative value. The Court’s reasoning on this point makes

402Multiple versions of the Annex I map exist, and Siam in 1908 did not
receive the version of the Annex I map which Cambodia submitted in the
1962 proceedings. Material differences exist between these two versions (see

WO, paras. 6.18-6.24).
403WO, para. 5.16.
404
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (CambodiaThailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 26.

166dispositif, and never an end in itself, Cambodia seems to

acknowledge the Court’s limiting clause. The Annex I map,
like all the other considerations identified by the Court, was

relevant “only to such extent” as it helped settle the qu estion of

sovereignty over the Temple.

2.C LARITY OF THE T EMPLE ’SL OCATION ON THE ANNEX IM AP

4.31 Thailand addressed in its Written Observations the

Court’s explanation as to why Siam’s reception of the Annex I
402
map (or of some version of it) was material to the question
which the Court had to answer 403. To repeat the main point:

“...the map marked Preah Vihear itself quite clearly as
lying on the Cambodian side of the line, using for the

Temple a symbol which seems to in404ate a rough plan
of the building and its stairways.”

This is why the map had probative value in the dispute. It

marked the Temple clearly, and it marked the Temple as in

Cambodian territory. Defects in the map – in particular the

question of whether it correctly depicted the watershed l ine

adopted by the Parties under the 1904 Treaty – did not reduce its
probative value. The Court’s reasoning on this point makes

402Multiple versions of the Annex I map exist, and Siam in 1908 did not
receive the version of the Annex I map which Cambodia submitted in the
1962 proceedings. Material differences exist between these two versions (see

WO, paras. 6.18-6.24).
40WO, para. 5.16.
404
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (CambodiaThailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 26. pleadings and the Court’s analysis also aligned closely with the

manner in which Thailand, after the Judgment, implemented its

terms on the ground.

406
4.34 As recalled above , Article 1 of the 1904 Treaty

stipulated the watershed to be the boundary between the Parties.
Both Parties in 1962 recognized that a clear determination as to

the location of the boundary at the Temple would settle the

matter of sovereignty in a single step. It is unsurprising,

therefore, that the Parties fell into sharp contention over the

location of the watershed.

4.35 As Thailand will recall ( (a)) 407, the Court concluded,

however, that whether or not the Annex I map line at the

Temple corresponded to the watershed did not need to be

decided – and, moreover, it was unnecessary for the Court to
408
determine the true watershed at all . That the Court did not
need to determine the watershed at the Temple provides yet

another indication that Thailand’s various acts and omissions

constituted, in the Court’s understanding, independent and

conclusive evidence that Thailand recognized French, and later

Cambodian, sovereignty over the Temple. It, moreover,

indicates again the specific and narrow focus of the Judgment
on the question of sovereignty.

406
See footnote 370 above.
407See paras. 4.37-4.41 below.

408Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35.

168pleadings and the Court’s analysis also aligned closely with the

manner in which Thailand, after the Judgment, implemented its

terms on the ground.

406
4.34 As recalled above , Article 1 of the 1904 Treaty

stipulated the watershed to be the boundary between the Parties.
Both Parties in 1962 recognized that a clear determination as to

the location of the boundary at the Temple would settle the

matter of sovereignty in a single step. It is unsurprising,

therefore, that the Parties fell into sharp contention over the

location of the watershed.

4.35 As Thailand will recall ( (a)) 40, the Court concluded,

however, that whether or not the Annex I map line at the

Temple corresponded to the watershed did not need to be

decided – and, moreover, it was unnecessary for the Court to
408
determine the true watershed at all . That the Court did not
need to determine the watershed at the Temple provides yet

another indication that Thailand’s various acts and omissions

constituted, in the Court’s understanding, independent and

conclusive evidence that Thailand recognized French, and later

Cambodian, sovereignty over the Temple. It, moreover,

indicates again the specific and narrow focus of the Judgment
on the question of sovereignty.

406
See footnote 370 above.
407See paras. 4.37-4.41 below.

408Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35. 410
or not the Annex I map line fol lowed the true watershed .
Cambodia in its Response fails to respond to what Thailand said

about the significance of this conclusion; and, moreover, in

alluding to the watershed in a very different connection 411,

Cambodia errs in reporting what the Court actually said.

4.38 To recall in summary, Article 1 of the 1904 Treaty
412
defines the frontier between the two States as the watershed .
The Court cannot be interpreted as having been indifferent as to

the Parties’ intentions when entering into a treaty. Therefor e,

recalling that the Court said it was unnecessary to consider the

true course of the watershed line, it is untenable to say that the

Court was examining the Annex I map as an expression of the

1904 Treaty – other than for the limited purpose of ascertaining

whether Thailand had recognized Cambodia’s sovereignty over
the Temple. Cambodia fails to address this point.

4.39 Cambodia also confuses what the Court concluded about

the watershed line. According to Cambodia, “ [l]a ligne de

partage des eaux soutenue par la Thaïlande fut jugée non
413
pertinente” . The Court however did not say that the

watershed line as “soutenue par la Thaïlande ” was not
pertinent. It is important to recall what the Court said:

410WO, paras. 5.18-5.21.
411
Response, para. 4.66.
412Quoted in footnote 370 above.
413
Response, para. 4.66. (Emphasis added).

170 410
or not the Annex I map line fol lowed the true watershed .
Cambodia in its Response fails to respond to what Thailand said

about the significance of this conclusion; and, moreover, in

alluding to the watershed in a very different connection 411,

Cambodia errs in reporting what the Court actually said.

4.38 To recall in summary, Article 1 of the 1904 Treaty
412
defines the frontier between the two States as the watershed .
The Court cannot be interpreted as having been indifferent as to

the Parties’ intentions when entering into a treaty. Therefor e,

recalling that the Court said it was unnecessary to consider the

true course of the watershed line, it is untenable to say that the

Court was examining the Annex I map as an expression of the

1904 Treaty – other than for the limited purpose of ascertaining

whether Thailand had recognized Cambodia’s sovereignty over
the Temple. Cambodia fails to address this point.

4.39 Cambodia also confuses what the Court concluded about

the watershed line. According to Cambodia, “ [l]a ligne de

partage des eaux soutenue par la Thaïlande fut jugée non
413
pertinente” . The Court however did not say that the

watershed line as “soutenue par la Thaïlande ” was not
pertinent. It is important to recall what the Court said:

410WO, paras. 5.18-5.21.
411
Response, para. 4.66.
412Quoted in footnote 370 above.
413
Response, para. 4.66. (Emphasis added). watershed; it was also unnecessary to determine “how the
416
watershed line in fact runs” . Under Cambodia’s

interpretation of the Judgment, this would be inexplicable.

According to Cambodia, the Court adopted a map line, which
417
purported to represent the watershed line , yet also said that it

was “unnecessary” to decide where the watershed line in fact

runs. What the Court in truth said was that “[g]iven the gr ounds

on which the Court bases its decision,” it became unnecessary to
pinpoint the watershed. The grounds on which the Court based

its decision were the various considerations, recalled above 418,

and those grounds, as the Court said, were sufficient to ans wer

the question of sovereignty, “ …even if this had not already and

long since been obvious from the frontier line itself ”419. The

several considerations, each of which itself was conclusive as to

the question of sovereignty, gave the answer to the sole question

in dispute. According to the Court, Thailand’s acts and

omissions made clear that Thailand recognized that sovereignty

over the Temple belonged to another State.

4.41 This was the answer given by the Court, in response to

the Parties’ respective views about the watershed, which they

had advanced, as they pertained to the dispute, in their

respective attempts to establish sovereignty over the Temple.

416Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),

Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35.
417See paras. 4.44-4.45 below.
418
See paras. 4.17-4.22 above.
419Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),

Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 29.

172watershed; it was also unnecessary to determine “how the
416
watershed line in fact runs” . Under Cambodia’s

interpretation of the Judgment, this would be inexplicable.

According to Cambodia, the Court adopted a map line, which
417
purported to represent the watershed line , yet also said that it

was “unnecessary” to decide where the watershed line in fact

runs. What the Court in truth said was that “[g]iven the gr ounds

on which the Court bases its decision,” it became unnecessary to
pinpoint the watershed. The grounds on which the Court based

its decision were the various considerations, recalled above 41,

and those grounds, as the Court said, were sufficient to ans wer

the question of sovereignty, “ …even if this had not already and

long since been obvious from the frontier line itself ”419. The

several considerations, each of which itself was conclusive as to

the question of sovereignty, gave the answer to the sole question

in dispute. According to the Court, Thailand’s acts and

omissions made clear that Thailand recognized that sovereignty

over the Temple belonged to another State.

4.41 This was the answer given by the Court, in response to

the Parties’ respective views about the watershed, which they

had advanced, as they pertained to the dispute, in their

respective attempts to establish sovereignty over the Temple.

416Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),

Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35.
417See paras. 4.44-4.45 below.
418
See paras. 4.17-4.22 above.
419Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),

Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 29. 422 423
the 1904 Treaty or with the Annex I map ; and whether the

boundary was in line with the geographic al, social and historic
424
realities on the ground .

4.43 On two considerations, it is clear that Cambodia’s thesis

lacks any validity whatsoever. First, as already addressed in

Chapter III above, the claim that the Court decided in 1962, with

force of res judicata, the boundary between T hailand and

Cambodia in the Dangrek range is untenable 425. Second, by

disconnecting the boundary line from the watershed, Cambodia

in the present proceedings completely contradicts the position it

put forward in the main case. The present section addresses the

contradiction between Cambodia’s present view about the

boundary and its position concerning the watershed in 1962.

422This intention is established by the text of Article 1 of the 1904 Treaty
(see footnote 370 above). It is confirmed by French records showing that
Colonel Bernard, the French Chairman of the Commission of delimitation

under the 1904 Tr eaty, when planning survey work in the Dangrek region,
intended to identify and record the watershed line that was to constitute the
boundary: “ Je me propose donc de lever au nord des Dang Reck un
cheminement aussi précis que possible, appuyé sur un grand nombre de
points déterminés astronomiquement. Je partirai des divers sommets de ce
cheminement pour aller au moyen de simples itinéraires, aussi courts que

possible, jusqu’à la ligne de partage des eaux que doit former la frontière. Je
déterminerai ainsi la ligne frontière par pointses cartes dont je dispose ne
me permettent pas de fixer d’une façon plus certaine le programme de nos
travaux.” (Emphasis original) (Commandant Bernard, Letter to the Consul of
France, 11 December 1904 [Annex 1 to FWE]).
423
The map as drawn indeed confirms that the intention of the cartographer
who produced it was to depict a boundary following the watershed
(International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, “Assessment
of the task of translating the Cambodia -Thailand boundary depicted on the
‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”, October 2011, para. 40. [Annex 96 to WO].

424Response, paras. 2.37, 2.88 and 4.13.

425See paras. 3.90-3.92 above.

174 422 423
the 1904 Treaty or with the Annex I map ; and whether the

boundary was in line with the geographic al, social and historic
424
realities on the ground .

4.43 On two considerations, it is clear that Cambodia’s thesis

lacks any validity whatsoever. First, as already addressed in

Chapter III above, the claim that the Court decided in 1962, with

force of res judicata, the boundary between T hailand and

Cambodia in the Dangrek range is untenable 425. Second, by

disconnecting the boundary line from the watershed, Cambodia

in the present proceedings completely contradicts the position it

put forward in the main case. The present section addresses the

contradiction between Cambodia’s present view about the

boundary and its position concerning the watershed in 1962.

422This intention is established by the text of Article 1 of the 1904 Treaty
(see footnote 370 above). It is confirmed by French records showing that
Colonel Bernard, the French Chairman of the Commission of delimitation

under the 1904 Tr eaty, when planning survey work in the Dangrek region,
intended to identify and record the watershed line that was to constitute the
boundary: “ Je me propose donc de lever au nord des Dang Reck un
cheminement aussi précis que possible, appuyé sur un grand nombre de
points déterminés astronomiquement. Je partirai des divers sommets de ce
cheminement pour aller au moyen de simples itinéraires, aussi courts que

possible, jusqu’à la ligne de partage des eaux que doit former la frontière. Je
déterminerai ainsi la ligne frontière par pointsLes cartes dont je dispose ne
me permettent pas de fixer d’une façon plus certaine le programme de nos
travaux.” (Emphasis original) (Commandant Bernard, Letter to the Consul of
France, 11 December 1904 [Annex 1 to FWE]).
423
The map as drawn indeed confirms that the intention of the cartographer
who produced it was to depict a boundary following the watershed
(International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, “Assessment
of the task of translating the Cambodia -Thailand boundary depicted on the
‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”, October 2011, para. 40. [Annex 96 to WO].

424Response, paras. 2.37, 2.88 and 4.13.

425See paras. 3.90-3.92 above. acknowledged that “the general character of the frontier

established by Article I was, along the Dangrek range, to be a
432
watershed line” .

4.45 In this respect, Thailand and Cambodia had no

difference of view during the 1961- 1962 proceedi ngs. The

Parties disagreed on the location of the watershed in the Temple

area, but not that the watershed was their boundary. Thailand

argued that the watershed in the Temple area was at the cliff

edge; Cambodia insisted that it was different; alternatively,

Cambodia argued that, if in 1961 the watershed indeed was at

the cliff edge, this had not been the case in 1904, when it was

situated somewhere north of the Temple. Thus, the challenge

became for the Parties to identify the topographical watershed,

not only as it was in 1962, but also as it had been in 1904-1907.

4.46 A reminder is in order here . During the 1962

proceedings, the Parties differed sharply as to the location of the

watershed but as to its location in the Temple area only . And it

must be recalled that the geographical scope of this Temple area

was limited to a portion of land comprising one part only of the
433
promontory on which the Temple stands . This was the area

in respect of which the Parties endeavoured to show that the

topographical watershed passed north or south of the Temple

ruins. Thus the area in dispute turned out to be the area

432Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) ,
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 17.
433
See paras. 2.22-2.25 above.

176acknowledged that “the general character of the frontier

established by Article I was, along the Dangrek range, to be a
432
watershed line” .

4.45 In this respect, Thailand and Cambodia had no

difference of view during the 1961- 1962 proceedi ngs. The

Parties disagreed on the location of the watershed in the Temple

area, but not that the watershed was their boundary. Thailand

argued that the watershed in the Temple area was at the cliff

edge; Cambodia insisted that it was different; alternatively,

Cambodia argued that, if in 1961 the watershed indeed was at

the cliff edge, this had not been the case in 1904, when it was

situated somewhere north of the Temple. Thus, the challenge

became for the Parties to identify the topographical watershed,

not only as it was in 1962, but also as it had been in 1904-1907.

4.46 A reminder is in order here . During the 1962

proceedings, the Parties differed sharply as to the location of the

watershed but as to its location in the Temple area only . And it

must be recalled that the geographical scope of this Temple area

was limited to a portion of land comprising one part only of the
433
promontory on which the Temple stands . This was the area

in respect of which the Parties endeavoured to show that the

topographical watershed passed north or south of the Temple

ruins. Thus the area in dispute turned out to be the area

432Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) ,
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 17.
433
See paras. 2.22-2.25 above. conceded again that the course of the stream O’Tasem was

erroneously depicted 438, but, affirming that the area of Pnom

Trap was not in dispute, dismissed the possibility that the error

had any consequence for Cambodia’s case 439. For Cambodia

now to claim that that ar ea was adjudicated in 1962 is to

contradict its own original understanding of the subject matter

of the dispute as well as of the geographical scope of the
440
disputed area .

4.49 The fact is, in the original proceedings, Ca mbodia’s

experts examined only Map S heet 2 of Annex 49 with any
441
special care . In sharp contrast to Cambodia’s dismissal at the

time of any detailed consideration of areas to the west as

irrelevant, Cambodia was very much interested in the area of

Map Sheet 2. On that map sheet, Cambodia’s ex perts made

some revisions. The result of the revisions, visible on the maps
442
lodged as Annexe LXVI c to Cambodia’s Reply , was roughly

consistent with the watershed identified by Thailand’s experts,

but with a notable difference at the Temple. Rather than

showing the proposed watershed line south of the Temple, the

438
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear , Oral Arguments, Vol. II, p. 464
(Mr. Dean Acheson, 22 March 1962).
439 “But this area, north -west of the Temple, is not the crucial area.”

(Emphasis added). ( I.C.J. Pleadings, Templ e of Preah Vihear , Oral
Arguments, Vol. II, p. 465) (Mr. Dean Acheson, 22 March 1962). See also
WO, para. 2.44.
440
See paras. 2.8-2.13 and 2.21-2.25. See also paras. 2.26-2.34 above.
441See Annex LXVI c to Cambodia’s Reply (reproduced as Annex 51 to
FWE). See also para. 2.19 above.

442 The technical accuracy of these revisions is questionable (see IBRU
Review, para. 4.10 [Annex 46 to FWE]).

178conceded again that the course of the stream O’Tasem was

erroneously depicted 438, but, affirming that the area of Pnom

Trap was not in dispute, dismissed the possibility that the error

had any consequence for Cambodia’s case 439. For Cambodia

now to claim that that ar ea was adjudicated in 1962 is to

contradict its own original understanding of the subject matter

of the dispute as well as of the geographical scope of the
440
disputed area .

4.49 The fact is, in the original proceedings, Ca mbodia’s

experts examined only Map S heet 2 of Annex 49 with any
441
special care . In sharp contrast to Cambodia’s dismissal at the

time of any detailed consideration of areas to the west as

irrelevant, Cambodia was very much interested in the area of

Map Sheet 2. On that map sheet, Cambodia’s ex perts made

some revisions. The result of the revisions, visible on the maps
442
lodged as Annexe LXVI c to Cambodia’s Reply , was roughly

consistent with the watershed identified by Thailand’s experts,

but with a notable difference at the Temple. Rather than

showing the proposed watershed line south of the Temple, the

438
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear , Oral Arguments, Vol. II, p. 464
(Mr. Dean Acheson, 22 March 1962).
439 “But this area, north -west of the Temple, is not the crucial area.”

(Emphasis added). ( I.C.J. Pleadings, Templ e of Preah Vihear , Oral
Arguments, Vol. II, p. 465) (Mr. Dean Acheson, 22 March 1962). See also
WO, para. 2.44.
440
See paras. 2.8-2.13 and 2.21-2.25. See also paras. 2.26-2.34 above.
441See Annex LXVI c to Cambodia’s Reply (reproduced as Annex 51 to
FWE). See also para. 2.19 above.

442The technical accuracy of these revisions is questionable (see IBRU
Review, para. 4.10 [Annex 46 to FWE]). French and Siamese sections of the Commission, as representing

it, duly made this journey and that in the course of it they visited

the Temple of Preah Vihear” 448. However, as the Court further

noted, “there is no record of any decision that they may have
449
taken” .

4.52 Documents recently found by Thailand in the Archives

of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only confirm the

fact that the Presidents of the Commission went to the Temple,

but they also give an idea of the decision they reached on that

occasion. The documents reported a test, in whi ch French

members of the Commission of Delimitation under the 1904
Treaty examined the way the water would drain in the Temple

area. This test of “water drainage” (“écoulement des eaux”) led

them to the conclusion that the Temple was on the French side

of the watershed and that the boundary ran a few metres north of

the Temple, a result which attributed the Temple to France. The
test and its result are mentioned in a 1930 letter from the French

Minister to Siam addressed to the French Ministry of Foreign

Affairs:

“Le traité de 1907 porte en effet que la frontière entre le
Siam et le Cambodge suivra la ligne de partage des eaux
de la Chaîne des Dangrek. La Commission chargée de
délimiter sur place la frontière déclara, après une

capitaine Tixier ”).” ( Case concerning the Temple of Pre ah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 17).
448Ibid., p. 18.

449Ibid.

180French and Siamese sections of the Commission, as representing

it, duly made this journey and that in the course of it they visited

the Temple of Preah Vihear” 44. However, as the Court further

noted, “there is no record of any decision that they may have
449
taken” .

4.52 Documents recently found by Thailand in the Archives

of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only confirm the

fact that the Presidents of the Commission went to the Temple,

but they also give an idea of the decision they reached on that

occasion. The documents reported a test, in whi ch French

members of the Commission of Delimitation under the 1904
Treaty examined the way the water would drain in the Temple

area. This test of “water drainage” (“écoulement des eaux”) led

them to the conclusion that the Temple was on the French side

of the watershed and that the boundary ran a few metres north of

the Temple, a result which attributed the Temple to France. The
test and its result are mentioned in a 1930 letter from the French

Minister to Siam addressed to the French Ministry of Foreign

Affairs:

“Le traité de 1907 porte en effet que la frontière entre le
Siam et le Cambodge suivra la ligne de partage des eaux
de la Chaîne des Dangrek. La Commission chargée de
délimiter sur place la frontière déclara, après une

capitaine Tixier ”).” ( Case concerning the Temple of Pre ah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 17).
448Ibid., p. 18.

449Ibid. flying the French flag some 20 metres from the northern
451
staircase of the Temple .

4.55 Cambodia perpetuated the understanding inherent in

France’s conduct. While preparing the case before the Court,

Cambodia’s Agent requested from the French authorities the

documents of the 1904 and 1907 Delimitation Commissions.

As an internal note of the Services des archives diplomatiques et

de la documentation sets out, France could not provide

Cambodia with all the documents relating to the work of the

Commissions since some of them were missing, including the
one relating to the “water drainage” test at the Temple . As the

French authorities commented in 1958:

“Ce fait est d’autant plus regrettable que la situation
géographique des ruines du temple a posé à la

‘Commission BERNARD’ un délicat problème de
délimitation. D’après le traité de 1904, la frontière
suivait la ligne de partage des eaux, qui ne se traduit pas
en l’occurrence sur le terrain par la ligne de faite [sic]

de la chaîne des Dangrek, si bien que le temple se trouve
du côté du Siam, au nord, dans une situation d’accès
facilitée par une montée lente du terrain, alors que du
côté sud il domine en abrupt de plusieurs centaines de

mètres la plaine cambodgienne. Pour convaincre les
Siamois, il avait été nécessaire à l’époque de se livrer à

451 I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, “Affidavit of M.C. Phun
Phitsamai Diskul, dated 9 June 1961”, Counter -Memorial of the Royal

Government of Thailand, Annex 39 f, Vol. I, p. 402. See also Photographs of
Prince Damrong’s visit to the Temple of Phra Viharn (1930), filed as Annex
VIIIbis of Cambodia’s 1959 Application [Annex 1 to WO]; and Royal Thai
Survey Department, Sketch showing the location of the French flag pole in
1930, 17 November 2011 [Annex 98 to WO]. For an additional photograph
taken at this event, see [Annex 3 to FWE].

182flying the French flag some 20 metres from the northern
451
staircase of the Temple .

4.55 Cambodia perpetuated the understanding inherent in

France’s conduct. While preparing the case before the Court,

Cambodia’s Agent requested from the French authorities the

documents of the 1904 and 1907 Delimitation Commissions.

As an internal note of the Services des archives diplomatiques et

de la documentation sets out, France could not provide

Cambodia with all the documents relating to the work of the

Commissions since some of them were missing, including the
one relating to the “water drainage” test at the Temple . As the

French authorities commented in 1958:

“Ce fait est d’autant plus regrettable que la situation
géographique des ruines du temple a posé à la

‘Commission BERNARD’ un délicat problème de
délimitation. D’après le traité de 1904, la frontière
suivait la ligne de partage des eaux, qui ne se traduit pas
en l’occurrence sur le terrain par la ligne de faite [sic]

de la chaîne des Dangrek, si bien que le temple se trouve
du côté du Siam, au nord, dans une situation d’accès
facilitée par une montée lente du terrain, alors que du
côté sud il domine en abrupt de plusieurs centaines de

mètres la plaine cambodgienne. Pour convaincre les
Siamois, il avait été nécessaire à l’époque de se livrer à

451I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, “Affidavit of M.C. Phun
Phitsamai Diskul, dated 9 June 1961”, Counter -Memorial of the Royal

Government of Thailand, Annex 39 f, Vol. I, p. 402. See also Photographs of
Prince Damrong’s visit to the Temple of Phra Viharn (1930), filed as Annex
VIIIbis of Cambodia’s 1959 Application [Annex 1 to WO]; and Royal Thai
Survey Department, Sketch showing the location of the French flag pole in
1930, 17 November 2011 [Annex 98 to WO]. For an additional photograph
taken at this event, see [Annex 3 to FWE]. planted the flag in 1930, when Prince Damrong visited the

Temple:

“On comprend que le drapeau français ait été hissé à la
frontière entre le Siam et le Cambodge, sans qu’il soit
nécessaire de tenter une autre explication de ce fait.” 454

The flag can be seen from the photographs taken on that

occasion, filed by Cambodia as Annex VIII bis of its 1959

Application. As can be seen, the flag pole was indeed some 20

metres from the staircase 45.

4.58 This was the reception of the Siamese Prince with the

“French flag flying” which the Court stressed was so significant

an assertion of sovereignty by France and recognition by
456
Siam . As a corollary, the same high significance would

attach to the French reception of the Prince, if it were to be

adduced as evidence of where the boundary is to be found at

that location: the choice of the place for the flag was not

arbitrary; the French intended to show the limits between

France’s and Siam’s sovereignties at the Temple, on the basis of
their belief that the Delimitation Commission had settled the

boundary a few metres north of the Temple. The purport of the

Prince’s reception was therefore to strengthen the French claim

45I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Réplique du Gouvernement du
Royaume du Cambodge, Vol. I, p. 465. (Emphasis added).
455
Photographs of Prince Damrong's visit to the Temple of Phra Viharn
(1930), filed as Annex VIIIbis of Cambodia’s 1959 Application [Annex 1 to
WO]. See also Annex 3 to FWE.
456
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30.

184planted the flag in 1930, when Prince Damrong visited the

Temple:

“On comprend que le drapeau français ait été hissé à la
frontière entre le Siam et le Cambodge, sans qu’il soit
nécessaire de tenter une autre explication de ce fait.” 454

The flag can be seen from the photographs taken on that

occasion, filed by Cambodia as Annex VIII bis of its 1959

Application. As can be seen, the flag pole was indeed some 20

metres from the staircase 455.

4.58 This was the reception of the Siamese Prince with the

“French flag flying” which the Court stressed was so significant

an assertion of sovereignty by France and recognition by
456
Siam . As a corollary, the same high significance would

attach to the French reception of the Prince, if it were to be

adduced as evidence of where the boundary is to be found at

that location: the choice of the place for the flag was not

arbitrary; the French intended to show the limits between

France’s and Siam’s sovereignties at the Temple, on the basis of
their belief that the Delimitation Commission had settled the

boundary a few metres north of the Temple. The purport of the

Prince’s reception was therefore to strengthen the French claim

454I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Réplique du Gouvernement du
Royaume du Cambodge, Vol. I, p. 465. (Emphasis added).
455
Photographs of Prince Damrong's visit to the Temple of Phra Viharn
(1930), filed as Annex VIIIbis of Cambodia’s 1959 Application [Annex 1 to
WO]. See also Annex 3 to FWE.
456
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30. Temple area, just as the Court found it was unnecessary to

determine whether there had really been a change in the

topographical watershed between 1907 and 1959. The Court’s

decision as to sovereignty over the Temple thus had to rest on

reasons other than the true c ourse of the watershed in the

Temple area, in regard to which experts and counsel from both

sides were so sharply in contention. As for the other areas in
460
which the topographical watershed did not coincide with the
Annex I map line 461, the Court simply did not consider those

areas.

4.61 In fact, Cambodia’s own conduct subsequent to the

Judgment showed that it continued to rely upon the watershed as

the boundary, and treated the boundary as running a few metres

north of the Temple. Complaining of the barbed- wire fence,

Cambodia’s Prime Minister declared in 1966 that , “the barbed

wire fence that the Thais had put up on its side of the temple

was not even halfway between the Temple and the border line
462
fixed by the International Court of Justice” . The fence to

460
Cambodia would call this in the present proceedings “ ligne de partage des
eaux soutenue par la Thaïlande”, forgetting that its own experts in the
original proceedings agreed on a considerable part of the areas represented
on Map Sheet 2 of Annex 49 [Annex 48 to FWE].
461The IBRU experts showed that this is the case for significant portions of
the Annex I map ( International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham

University, “Assessment of the task of translating thCambodia-Thailand
boundary depicted on the ‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”, October 2011,
pp. 12-17, paras. 24-35. [Annex 96 to WO]).
462Herbert de Ribbing, Note to the Secretary-General, “Report by the Special
Representative on his First Visit to Cambodia and Thailand and First Contact
with their High Authorities”, 13 September 1966, p. 6, para. 10. (Emphasis

added) [Annex 72 to WO].

186Temple area, just as the Court found it was unnecessary to

determine whether there had really been a change in the

topographical watershed between 1907 and 1959. The Court’s

decision as to sovereignty over the Temple thus had to rest on

reasons other than the true c ourse of the watershed in the

Temple area, in regard to which experts and counsel from both

sides were so sharply in contention. As for the other areas in
460
which the topographical watershed did not coincide with the
Annex I map line 46, the Court simply did not consider those

areas.

4.61 In fact, Cambodia’s own conduct subsequent to the

Judgment showed that it continued to rely upon the watershed as

the boundary, and treated the boundary as running a few metres

north of the Temple. Complaining of the barbed- wire fence,

Cambodia’s Prime Minister declared in 1966 that , “the barbed

wire fence that the Thais had put up on its side of the temple

was not even halfway between the Temple and the border line
462
fixed by the International Court of Justice” . The fence to

460
Cambodia would call this in the present proceedings “ ligne de partage des
eaux soutenue par la Thaïlande”, forgetting that its own experts in the
original proceedings agreed on a considerable part of the areas represented
on Map Sheet 2 of Annex 49 [Annex 48 to FWE].
461The IBRU experts showed that this is the case for significant portions of
the Annex I map ( International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham

University, “Assessment of the task of translating thCambodia-Thailand
boundary depicted on the ‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”, October 2011,
pp. 12-17, paras. 24-35. [Annex 96 to WO]).
462Herbert de Ribbing, Note to the Secretary-General, “Report by the Special
Representative on his First Visit to Cambodia and Thailand and First Contact
with their High Authorities”, 13 September 1966, p. 6, para. 10. (Emphasis

added) [Annex 72 to WO]. 465
area” was the one depicted on the “D .A.I. revised map” . In
presenting Cambodia’s position to the mediator appointed by

the Secretary-General to deal with issues between Cambodia

and Thailand 466, the Prime Minister was referring to the same

watershed as the one put by Cambodia before the Court which

ran some metres north and west of the location of the barbed -

wire fence.

4.63 The map on the right page illustrates the distance

between the Cambodian watershed line and the Thai Cabinet

line. As can be seen, the Cabinet line and the watershed as

understood by Cambodia are separated by only a very short

distance. The distance from the Cabinet line to the northern

staircase is indeed onlya few metres.

4.64 Prince Sihanouk’s observations about the barbed- wire

fence further confirm that any discrepancy between the

Cambodian-claimed border line and the Cabinet line was only a

matter of metres:

465See Carte annexée au Rapport de MM. Doeringsfeld, Amuedo et Ivey
(Annexe 2), filed as Annex LXVI c to Cambodia’s Reply, 23 October 1961
[Annex 51 to FWE]. See also footnote 109 above.
466
See WO, paras. 4.39, 4.42 and 4.56.

188 465
area” was the one depicted on the “D .A.I. revised map” . In
presenting Cambodia’s position to the mediator appointed by

the Secretary-General to deal with issues between Cambodia

and Thailand 466, the Prime Minister was referring to the same

watershed as the one put by Cambodia before the Court which

ran some metres north and west of the location of the barbed -

wire fence.

4.63 The map on the right page illustrates the distance

between the Cambodian watershed line and the Thai Cabinet

line. As can be seen, the Cabinet line and the watershed as

understood by Cambodia are separated by only a very short

distance. The distance from the Cabinet line to the northern

staircase is indeed onlya few metres.

4.64 Prince Sihanouk’s observations about the barbed- wire

fence further confirm that any discrepancy between the

Cambodian-claimed border line and the Cabinet line was only a

matter of metres:

465See Carte annexée au Rapport de MM. Doeringsfeld, Amuedo et Ivey
(Annexe 2), filed as Annex LXVI c to Cambodia’s Reply, 23 October 1961
[Annex 51 to FWE]. See also footnote 109 above.
466
See WO, paras. 4.39, 4.42 and 4.56. “When he mentio ned the Thai construction of the

barbed-wire area, he described it as Thai encroachment

by several meters on Cambodian territory awarded it by
467
the International Court of Justice.”

4.65 Prince Sihanouk did not say exactly how many met res

the barbed -wire fence differed from Cambodia’s claimed

boundary, but he was speaking in terms of a minor difference

only. Thus, depending on the mood and on the state of bilateral

relations with Thailand, he sometimes dismissed the matter,
468
saying that “these few meters were uni mportant” ; or he

sometimes demanded, it seems, that these few metres be

rectified:

“Tout autour de Pr éah Vih éar, les Thaï landais ont
conservé, en la bordant de fils de fer barbelés , la bande
de terrain qui s’étend entre les assises de temple et la
frontière qui passe à quelques mètres de là comme l’ont

voulu les traités confirmés par la décision de la Cour
internationale de justice. Il n’est pas question pour leur
être agréable et pour faciliter la reprise des relations
avec eux de leur accorder de nouveaux avantages.” 469

467United States Embassy in Phnom Penh, Airgram to Dep artment of State,
“Cambodian Official Reoccupation of Preah Vihear”, No. A -325, 10 January
1963, p. 5. (Emphasis added) [Annex 51 to WO]. See also the examples of
similar records in WO, paras. 4.45-4.49.
468
United States Embassy in Phnom Penh, Airgram to D epartment of State,
“Cambodian Official Reoccupation of Preah Vihear”, No. A -325, 10 January
1963 [Annex 51 to WO]. Cambodia is referring to this declaration , see
Response, para. 2.48. See also WO, paras. 4.45-4.49.
469
Compte-rendu de la conférence de pre sse du Prince Sihanouk du 22
octobre 1967. (Emphasis added) [Annex 19 to the Response ]. Quoted also in
the Response, para. 2.63.

190 “When he mentio ned the Thai construction of the

barbed-wire area, he described it as Thai encroachment

by several meters on Cambodian territory awarded it by
467
the International Court of Justice.”

4.65 Prince Sihanouk did not say exactly how many met res

the barbed -wire fence differed from Cambodia’s claimed

boundary, but he was speaking in terms of a minor difference

only. Thus, depending on the mood and on the state of bilateral

relations with Thailand, he sometimes dismissed the matter,
468
saying that “these few meters were uni mportant” ; or he

sometimes demanded, it seems, that these few metres be

rectified:

“Tout autour de Pr éah Vih éar, les Thaï landais ont
conservé, en la bordant de fils de fer barbelés , la bande
de terrain qui s’étend entre les assises de temple et la
frontière qui passe à quelques mètres de là comme l’ont

voulu les traités confirmés par la décision de la Cour
internationale de justice. Il n’est pas question pour leur
être agréable et pour faciliter la reprise des relations
avec eux de leur accorder de nouveaux avantages.” 469

467United States Embassy in Phnom Penh, Airgram to Dep artment of State,
“Cambodian Official Reoccupation of Preah Vihear”, No. A -325, 10 January
1963, p. 5. (Emphasis added) [Annex 51 to WO]. See also the examples of
similar records in WO, paras. 4.45-4.49.
468
United States Embassy in Phnom Penh, Airgram to D epartment of State,
“Cambodian Official Reoccupation of Preah Vihear”, No. A -325, 10 January
1963 [Annex 51 to WO]. Cambodia is referring to this declaration , see
Response, para. 2.48. See also WO, paras. 4.45-4.49.
469
Compte-rendu de la conférence de pre sse du Prince Sihanouk du 22
octobre 1967. (Emphasis added) [Annex 19 to the Response ]. Quoted also in
the Response, para. 2.63. 473
where the French flag had flown back in 1930 . This is where
474
a Thai control post and a ticketing office were installed .

Some 100 met res to the north, the bridge over the stream

crossed by Prince Damrong in 1930, the Takhop/Tani stream,
became a point of passage through Thailand for tourist access to

the Temple 475.

4.68 When Cambodia’s past positions are recalled – in which

Cambodia has accepted that the boundary follows the watershed

and is situated a few metr es north of the Temple – it becomes

clear why Cambodia is eager for the Court to confer a

benediction upon the Annex I map line, but not at all interested

in the Court considering where in fact on the terrain tha t line
476
might run . Cambodia’s present position is irreconcilable with

what it pleaded in the original proceedings and with the position
it took in the half-century following the Judgment. The Request

for interpretation is in truth an expansion of territorial claims.

4.69 If the Court were to consider Cambodia’s Request for

interpretation to be admissible, then the positions of the Parties

as expressed during the 1962 proceedings could not be ignored

when deciding the merits. These positions were clear:

473
See also para. 4.54 above.
474See Royal Thai Survey Department, Sketch of 1991 arrangements for
tourism, 17 November 2011 [Annex 99 to WO].
475
See para. 3.71 above.
476
“Il est indiscutable que la Cour n'avait pas à étudier et à démarquer le
‘tracé précis’ de la f rontière dans l'affaire à l'origine. Il n'y a aucune raison
qu'il en soit autrement dans l'instance en cours .” (Response, para. 2.72).

192 473
where the French flag had flown back in 1930 . This is where
474
a Thai control post and a ticketing office were installed .

Some 100 met res to the north, the bridge over the stream

crossed by Prince Damrong in 1930, the Takhop/Tani stream,
became a point of passage through Thailand for tourist access to

the Temple 475.

4.68 When Cambodia’s past positions are recalled – in which

Cambodia has accepted that the boundary follows the watershed

and is situated a few metr es north of the Temple – it becomes

clear why Cambodia is eager for the Court to confer a

benediction upon the Annex I map line, but not at all interested

in the Court considering where in fact on the terrain tha t line
476
might run . Cambodia’s present position is irreconcilable with

what it pleaded in the original proceedings and with the position
it took in the half-century following the Judgment. The Request

for interpretation is in truth an expansion of territorial claims.

4.69 If the Court were to consider Cambodia’s Request for

interpretation to be admissible, then the positions of the Parties

as expressed during the 1962 proceedings could not be ignored

when deciding the merits. These positions were clear:

473
See also para. 4.54 above.
474See Royal Thai Survey Department, Sketch of 1991 arrangements for
tourism, 17 November 2011 [Annex 99 to WO].
475
See para. 3.71 above.
476
“Il est indiscutable que la Cour n'avait pas à étudier et à démarquer le
‘tracé précis’ de la f rontière dans l'affaire à l'origine. Il n'y a aucune raison
qu'il en soit autrement dans l'instance en cours .” (Response, para. 2.72). meaning of the 1962 Judgment. The Judgment determined

sovereignty over the Temple, a matter elucidated by the relative

position of the Temple symbol and the Annex I map line; it did

not settle other territorial claims. To determine sovereignty over
the Temple, the relative position of the Temple and the line, as

Thailand noted earlier in this Chapt er 479, is all that the Court

needed to know. The Court did not need to determine the exact

course of a line, correlating to identifiable points on the terrain.
Indeed, its exact course “est sans importance”.

4.71 The discrepancies between the differing version s of the

Annex I maps and their lines (Cambodia does not deny the
discrepancies) make all the more clear, in retrospect, what the

Court expressed in the terms of the Judgment itself. The

interpretative value of the map (whichever version was utilised

in 1962) was restricted to the sole question actually decided by

the Court. The differing versions and their differing lines agree
that the Temple falls on the Cambodian side of the frontier; but

would have produced conflicting outcomes if they had been

used to fix the frontier along precise coordinates.

4.72 Cambodia must have realized the arbitrary character of

the invitation it addresses to the Court. It is for this reason that it

claims that the precise determination of the boundary would be

a matter for demar cation. Thailand submitted an expert report
underlining the technical difficulties and the political choices

479See paras. 4.31-4.32 above.

194meaning of the 1962 Judgment. The Judgment determined

sovereignty over the Temple, a matter elucidated by the relative

position of the Temple symbol and the Annex I map line; it did

not settle other territorial claims. To determine sovereignty over
the Temple, the relative position of the Temple and the line, as

Thailand noted earlier in this Chapt er 47, is all that the Court

needed to know. The Court did not need to determine the exact

course of a line, correlating to identifiable points on the terrain.
Indeed, its exact course “est sans importance”.

4.71 The discrepancies between the differing version s of the

Annex I maps and their lines (Cambodia does not deny the
discrepancies) make all the more clear, in retrospect, what the

Court expressed in the terms of the Judgment itself. The

interpretative value of the map (whichever version was utilised

in 1962) was restricted to the sole question actually decided by

the Court. The differing versions and their differing lines agree
that the Temple falls on the Cambodian side of the frontier; but

would have produced conflicting outcomes if they had been

used to fix the frontier along precise coordinates.

4.72 Cambodia must have realized the arbitrary character of

the invitation it addresses to the Court. It is for this reason that it

claims that the precise determination of the boundary would be

a matter for demar cation. Thailand submitted an expert report
underlining the technical difficulties and the political choices

479See paras. 4.31-4.32 above. D. Cambodia’s Groundless Interpretation

4.74 Cambodia in the present proceedings has ident ified no

question of interpretation subject to the Court’s jurisdiction

under Article 60 of its Statute. If, nevertheless, the Court were
481
to determine that a question of interpretation exists , then it

would be necessary to answer the question by referenc e to what

the Court in 1962 decided. The first step toward identifying the
proper interpretation is to respond to the interpretation which

Cambodia has requested. Independently of Cambodia’s failure

to identify any part of the res judicata of the Judgment which

requires interpretation, Cambodia’s requested interpretation is

manifestly flawed.

4.75 Cambodia asserts that an interpretation is needed of the
geographical scope of the obligations set out in paragraph 1 and

paragraph 2 of the dispositif. As noted i n Chapter I above,

Cambodia’s R equest for interpretation is now in a state of

disarray, which results in particular from the confused

presentation of claims in the Response in respect of the first two
482
paragraphs of the dispositif . Thailand, however, will address

Cambodia’s Request, as far as possible, on its own terms.

481See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011,
para. 31.
482
See para. 1.6 above.

196 D. Cambodia’s Groundless Interpretation

4.74 Cambodia in the present proceedings has ident ified no

question of interpretation subject to the Court’s jurisdiction

under Article 60 of its Statute. If, nevertheless, the Court were
481
to determine that a question of interpretation exists , then it

would be necessary to answer the question by referenc e to what

the Court in 1962 decided. The first step toward identifying the
proper interpretation is to respond to the interpretation which

Cambodia has requested. Independently of Cambodia’s failure

to identify any part of the res judicata of the Judgment which

requires interpretation, Cambodia’s requested interpretation is

manifestly flawed.

4.75 Cambodia asserts that an interpretation is needed of the
geographical scope of the obligations set out in paragraph 1 and

paragraph 2 of the dispositif. As noted i n Chapter I above,

Cambodia’s R equest for interpretation is now in a state of

disarray, which results in particular from the confused

presentation of claims in the Response in respect of the first two
482
paragraphs of the dispositif . Thailand, however, will address

Cambodia’s Request, as far as possible, on its own terms.

481See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011,
para. 31.
482
See para. 1.6 above. 4.77 Neither of these contentions is support able. The Court

did not adopt the Annex I map line and certainly not as a

comprehensive territorial settlement. Moreover, the Annex I

map line, in any event, does not define the perimeters of the

Temple area. Before turning to Cambodia’s contention that the

Annex I map line somehow defines the “ territoire sous la

souveraineté duquel se trouve le Temple ”, it is necessary to
address the interpretation by which Cambodia would treat the

Annex I map line as a judicially-adopted frontier.

1. CAMBODIA S O SCILLATING C LAIM T HAT THE ANNEX IM AP

L INE ISRES JUDICATA

4.78 Cambodia oscillates between affirming and denying that
it seeks an interpretation that the Court in 1962 adopted the

Annex I map line as part of the res judicata of the case. As

pointed out in Chapter II above, this renders obscure what

Cambodia is requesting for interpretation in respect of the

Annex I map line. Cambodia has good reason to avoid a clear

and consistent expression of its request. It is an exorbitant

request with no basis in the 1962 Judgment.

4.79 Cambodia suggests repeatedly that it does not ask for an

interpretation concerning the Annex I map line. For example,

Cambodia says:

1984.77 Neither of these contentions is support able. The Court

did not adopt the Annex I map line and certainly not as a

comprehensive territorial settlement. Moreover, the Annex I

map line, in any event, does not define the perimeters of the

Temple area. Before turning to Cambodia’s contention that the

Annex I map line somehow defines the “ territoire sous la

souveraineté duquel se trouve le Temple ”, it is necessary to
address the interpretation by which Cambodia would treat the

Annex I map line as a judicially-adopted frontier.

1.C AMBODIA ’SO SCILLATING C LAIM T HAT THE A NNEX IM AP

LINE ISR ESJUDICATA

4.78 Cambodia oscillates between affirming and denying that
it seeks an interpretation that the Court in 1962 adopted the

Annex I map line as part of the res judicata of the case. As

pointed out in Chapter II above, this renders obscure what

Cambodia is requesting for interpretation in respect of the

Annex I map line. Cambodia has good reason to avoid a clear

and consistent expression of its request. It is an exorbitant

request with no basis in the 1962 Judgment.

4.79 Cambodia suggests repeatedly that it does not ask for an

interpretation concerning the Annex I map line. For example,

Cambodia says: According to Cambodia, Thailand’s position that the Annex I

map line is not binding “ est la raison pour laquelle il existe un
489
différend (…) devant la Cour aujourd’hui ” . Cambodia

further says that:

“[L]e paragraphe premier du dispositif doit être compris

comme determinant, avec force obligatoire, que toutes
les zones en litige se trouvant au côté cambodgien de la
ligne de la carte annex e I – y inclus donc le Temple de
Préah Vihéar lui -même – sont à regarder comme
490
relevant de la souveraineté cambodgienne; (...)”

Apart from the Temple itself, the “zones en litige ” to which

Cambodia here refers are the ill -defined areas claimed by
491
Cambodia today but which, as Thailand has shown , had

nothing to do with the 1962 proceedings.

4.81 Cambodia refers to statements from the time of the 1962

Judgment, in which Cambodia expressed its view that the

Judgment “imposed” the map line on the Parties. For ex ample,

Cambodia quotes an aide-mémoire of its Foreign Ministry from

November 1962, saying that Thailand’s “ délimitation [around
the Temple] était en complet désaccord avec la décision de la

Cour de La Haye qui confirme la frontière portée sur la carte de

1907” 492. Another contemporary document, quoted in the

Response, accused Thailand of “ mépris du tracé frontalier

489
Ibid., para 1.23.
49Ibid., para. 5.9.

49See paras. 2.44-2.55 above.
492
Response, para. 2.45.

200According to Cambodia, Thailand’s position that the Annex I

map line is not binding “ est la raison pour laquelle il existe un
489
différend (…) devant la Cour aujourd’hui ” . Cambodia

further says that:

“[L]e paragraphe premier du dispositif doit être compris

comme determinant, avec force obligatoire, que toutes
les zones en litige se trouvant au côté cambodgien de la
ligne de la carte annex e I – y inclus donc le Temple de
Préah Vihéar lui -même – sont à regarder comme
490
relevant de la souveraineté cambodgienne; (...)”

Apart from the Temple itself, the “zones en litige ” to which

Cambodia here refers are the ill -defined areas claimed by
491
Cambodia today but which, as Thailand has shown , had

nothing to do with the 1962 proceedings.

4.81 Cambodia refers to statements from the time of the 1962

Judgment, in which Cambodia expressed its view that the

Judgment “imposed” the map line on the Parties. For ex ample,

Cambodia quotes an aide-mémoire of its Foreign Ministry from

November 1962, saying that Thailand’s “ délimitation [around
the Temple] était en complet désaccord avec la décision de la

Cour de La Haye qui confirme la frontière portée sur la carte de

1907” 492. Another contemporary document, quoted in the

Response, accused Thailand of “ mépris du tracé frontalier

489
Ibid., para 1.23.
490Ibid., para. 5.9.

491See paras. 2.44-2.55 above.
492
Response, para. 2.45. meaning of the MoU. To quote Cambodia’s paraphrase of

Thailand’s letter, Thailand in the letter observed, inter alia, that:

“[T]he boundary line ‘in the area adjacent to the Temple
of Preah Vihear’ is still to be determined; and (…) the

Joint Boundary Commission 497vided for by the MoU is
responsible for doing so.”

Cambodia goes on to contend, in the same paragraph of its

Request, “[o]n the contrary (...) the Court did indeed confirm

and validate that boundary” 498. Cambodia hereby instigated a

dispute over the interpretation of the MoU, which it now asks

the Court to settle.

4.83 In its Response, Cambodia again casts the interpretation

of the MoU in question. Cambodia accuses Thailand of

“insinuating” (“insinuer”) that “ le Cambodge a sacrifié le

bénéfice juridique de l’arrêt de la Cour en concluant le

MoU” 49. Thailand neither says nor insinuates any such thing.

The 1962 Judgment indicated that Cambodia has sovereignty

over the Temple. Thailand has been abundantly clear in the

present proceedings that nothing since 1962 has changed the

497Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia

v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 Apr il 2011, para. 16,
quoting and paraphrasing letter to the President of the Security Council from
the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United
Nations dated 21 July 2008, reprinted in Cambodia’s Request for
Interpretation, Annexes documentaires, Annexe no. 4, p. 3. (Emphasis added).
498
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 16.
499Response, second paragraph 1.18 (p. 9).

202meaning of the MoU. To quote Cambodia’s paraphrase of

Thailand’s letter, Thailand in the letter observed, inter alia, that:

“[T]he boundary line ‘in the area adjacent to the Temple
of Preah Vihear’ is still to be determined; and (…) the

Joint Boundary Commission 497vided for by the MoU is
responsible for doing so.”

Cambodia goes on to contend, in the same paragraph of its

Request, “[o]n the contrary (...) the Court did indeed confirm

and validate that boundary” 49. Cambodia hereby instigated a

dispute over the interpretation of the MoU, which it now asks

the Court to settle.

4.83 In its Response, Cambodia again casts the interpretation

of the MoU in question. Cambodia accuses Thailand of

“insinuating” (“insinuer”) that “ le Cambodge a sacrifié le

bénéfice juridique de l’arrêt de la Cour en concluant le

MoU” 499. Thailand neither says nor insinuates any such thing.

The 1962 Judgment indicated that Cambodia has sovereignty

over the Temple. Thailand has been abundantly clear in the

present proceedings that nothing since 1962 has changed the

497Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia

v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 Apr il 2011, para. 16,
quoting and paraphrasing letter to the President of the Security Council from
the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United
Nations dated 21 July 2008, reprinted in Cambodia’s Request for
Interpretation, Annexes documentaires, Annexe no. 4, p. 3. (Emphasis added).
498
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 16.
499Response, second paragraph 1.18 (p. 9). difference which Cambodia asserts has arisen. To base a
request for interpretation on a reason, rather than the dispositif,

the requesting party must identify something which needs to be

interpreted – and, more specifically, something which that

reason would enable the Court to interpret. As Thailand has

shown, there is nothing in the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment
503
which requires interpretation . As will be considered here,

moreover, the Annex I map line, which Cambodia insists be
imposed as the final expression of the frontier, provides nothing

to answer the question which Cambodia claims the dispositif left

unanswered.

4.86 Cambodia is emphatic that the Annex I map would

clarify the dispositif. Cambodia contends in particular that the

Court, purportedly adopting the Annex I map line, in so doing
fixed the specific area of the Temple. According to Cambodia,

this area was a “territoire qui ne peut correspondre qu’aux

limites fixées par la Cour dans ses motifs sur la base de la carte
504
de l’annexe I” ; and the Annex I map permitted the Court to

know “sur quel territoire se situe le Temple, et jusqu’où s’étend
505
ce territoire ” . With these convoluted f ormulations,

503
See paras. 4.4-4.7 above.
504Response, para. 4.50. (Emphasis added). See alsibid., para. 4.9: “une
valeur normative intrinsèque” and that the map is indispensable “ à la lecture
du dispositif (...) [et] à sa comprehension et à son interpretation” in respect
of “ce qu’il faut comprendre comme étant les ‘environs’ du Tempe”; and
para. 4.51: “ Là encore, aucune précision n’aurait été nécessaire s’il ne
s’était agi du territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge
correspondant à celui défini dans les motifs de l’arrêt ”.
505
Ibid., para. 4.22.

204difference which Cambodia asserts has arisen. To base a
request for interpretation on a reason, rather than the dispositif,

the requesting party must identify something which needs to be

interpreted – and, more specifically, something which that

reason would enable the Court to interpret. As Thailand has

shown, there is nothing in the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment
503
which requires interpretation . As will be considered here,

moreover, the Annex I map line, which Cambodia insists be
imposed as the final expression of the frontier, provides nothing

to answer the question which Cambodia claims the dispositif left

unanswered.

4.86 Cambodia is emphatic that the Annex I map would

clarify the dispositif. Cambodia contends in particular that the

Court, purportedly adopting the Annex I map line, in so doing
fixed the specific area of the Temple. According to Cambodia,

this area was a “territoire qui ne peut correspondre qu’aux

limites fixées par la Cour dans ses motifs sur la base de la carte
504
de l’annexe I” ; and the Annex I map permitted the Court to

know “sur quel territoire se situe le Temple, et jusqu’où s’étend
505
ce territoire ” . With these convoluted f ormulations,

503
See paras. 4.4-4.7 above.
504Response, para. 4.50. (Emphasis added). See alsoibid., para. 4.9: “une
valeur normative intrinsèque” and that the map is indispensable “ à la lecture
du dispositif (...) [et] à sa comprehension et à son interpretation” in respect
of “ce qu’il faut comprendre comme étant les ‘environs’ du Tempe”; and
para. 4.51: “ Là encore, aucune précision n’aurait été nécessaire s’il ne
s’était agi du territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge
correspondant à celui défini dans les motifs de l’arrêt ”.
505
Ibid., para. 4.22. est alors de savoir où se situe la frontière et non de
définir une zone qui appartiendrait au Cambodge ou à la
Thaïlande, même s’il est clair que le différend ne porte
507
que sur un périmètre restreint.”

In light of Cambodia’s contention today that it was part of the

res judicata of the 1962 Judgment that the Court defined a wider

zone, this is a striking admission. Cambodia admits that the

Court had no concern in 1962 with defining “ une zone qui
appartiendrait au Cambodge ou à la Thaïlande ”. To

acknowledge that sovereignty over the Temple was adjudicated

“en fonction de cette frontière ” is to a cknowledge the limited

purpose for which the Court considered the frontier. It was not

to “define a zone which belonged to” one State or the other that

the Court considered the frontier. Cambodia’s statement that
508
the Court was not concerned with defining a zone is

impossible to reconcile with Cambodia’s present request to

“définir une zone”.

4.89 Thailand has already pointed out above that the original

dispute concerning the Temple had nothing to do with a putative
4.6 sq km zone that consists mostly of terr itory somewhere to

the west of the promontory on part of which the Temple area is

situated. The putative zone is a recent construction 509.

Cambodia however insists that such a zone was already

explicitly the subject of dispute in 1962:

50Response, para. 4.60. (Emphasis original).

50Ibid.
509
See paras. 1.45-1.48 above.

206 est alors de savoir où se situe la frontière et non de
définir une zone qui appartiendrait au Cambodge ou à la
Thaïlande, même s’il est clair que le différend ne porte
507
que sur un périmètre restreint.”

In light of Cambodia’s contention today that it was part of the

res judicata of the 1962 Judgment that the Court defined a wider

zone, this is a striking admission. Cambodia admits that the

Court had no concern in 1962 with defining “ une zone qui
appartiendrait au Cambodge ou à la Thaïlande ”. To

acknowledge that sovereignty over the Temple was adjudicated

“en fonction de cette frontière ” is to a cknowledge the limited

purpose for which the Court considered the frontier. It was not

to “define a zone which belonged to” one State or the other that

the Court considered the frontier. Cambodia’s statement that
508
the Court was not concerned with defining a zone is

impossible to reconcile with Cambodia’s present request to

“définir une zone”.

4.89 Thailand has already pointed out above that the original

dispute concerning the Temple had nothing to do with a putative
4.6 sq km zone that consists mostly of terr itory somewhere to

the west of the promontory on part of which the Temple area is

situated. The putative zone is a recent construction 509.

Cambodia however insists that such a zone was already

explicitly the subject of dispute in 1962:

507Response, para. 4.60. (Emphasis original).

508Ibid.
509
See paras. 1.45-1.48 above. 514
4.90 Finally, to return to a point touched on briefly above ,

Thailand observes that Cambodia’s postulate of the Temple area
is circular. As noted above, Cambodia asserts at times that it is

not asking for “ une décision concernant l’intégralité de la

frontière décrite par la carte de l’annexe I dans la région des

Dangrek”; it is asking for a decision concerning only part of the

frontier 51. Likewise, Cambodia asserts that it is not asking for

an interpretation in respect of an unlimited zone in dispute, but,

rather, in respect only of a circumscribed zone: “ Le Cambodge
516
circonscrit sa demande en interprétation à la zone en litige ” .

But how does Cambodia propose to define the “ zone en litige”?
It is all very well for Cambodia to say that it circumscribes its

Request for interpretation by alluding to a putative zone, but,

unless such a zone can be given precise expression, by reference

to evidence, Cambodia’s request is not “circonscrite”. Thailand

has shown what zone was in truth the subject of the 1962

proceedings, and Thailand has done so by a careful examination

of the Judgment and of the pleadings of both the Parties in the
517
original proceedings . The most Cambodia can say to define a
putative zone is to assert that its request is circumscribed

because the Court recognized the Annex I map line as binding

and the map line defines the zone 518.

514See para. 4.79 above.

515Response, para. 4.50, see also paras. 1.7 and 4.79 above.
516
Ibid.
517See paras. 2.8-2.34 above.
518
Response, paras. 4.60 and 4.68.

208 514
4.90 Finally, to return to a point touched on briefly above ,

Thailand observes that Cambodia’s postulate of the Temple area
is circular. As noted above, Cambodia asserts at times that it is

not asking for “ une décision concernant l’intégralité de la

frontière décrite par la carte de l’annexe I dans la région des

Dangrek”; it is asking for a decision concerning only part of the

frontier515. Likewise, Cambodia asserts that it is not asking for

an interpretation in respect of an unlimited zone in dispute, but,

rather, in respect only of a circumscribed zone: “ Le Cambodge
516
circonscrit sa demande en interprétation à la zone en litige ” .

But how does Cambodia propose to define the “ zone en litige”?
It is all very well for Cambodia to say that it circumscribes its

Request for interpretation by alluding to a putative zone, but,

unless such a zone can be given precise expression, by reference

to evidence, Cambodia’s request is not “circonscrite”. Thailand

has shown what zone was in truth the subject of the 1962

proceedings, and Thailand has done so by a careful examination

of the Judgment and of the pleadings of both the Parties in the
517
original proceedings . The most Cambodia can say to define a
putative zone is to assert that its request is circumscribed

because the Court recognized the Annex I map line as binding

and the map line defines the zone 518.

514See para. 4.79 above.

515Response, para. 4.50, see also paras. 1.7 and 4.79 above.
516
Ibid.
517See paras. 2.8-2.34 above.
518
Response, paras. 4.60 and 4.68. identified by both Parties a number of times, and the Parties
largely concurred both in their affirmative and their negative

identifications. The subject matter which the Court finally

addressed in the dispositif thus needed no further elaboration. It

is an unusual request, and a difficult task fifty years later, to find

in the 1962 Judgment an answer to a question which Cambodia

alleges only recently has arisen and which, on extensive

evidence from the 1962 record, had already been answered by
the Parties themselves. With the difficulty in mind, and

preserving its objection to jurisdiction and admissibility,

Thailand now sets out its views as to the proper interpretation of

the Judgment.

1. THE T ERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE DISPOSITIF

4.93 Cambodia’s central claim is that the dispositif requires

interpretation in order to identify its territorial scope. Thailand

repeats that no such interpretation is needed. If , however, the

Court were to conclude that any ambiguity exists on that point,

then it is necessary that such ambiguity be resolved in

accordance with the 1962 Judgment. This takes us again to

paragraphs 1 and 2 of the disposit if – in particular to the
language in paragraphs 1 and 2 concerning territorial scope,

which is the language Cambodia insists must be interpreted.

The relevant language in paragraph 1 is that the Temple is

situated “in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia ”. The

relevant language in paragraph 2 is that the obligation was to

withdraw forces stationed “ at the Temple, or in its v icinity on

210identified by both Parties a number of times, and the Parties
largely concurred both in their affirmative and their negative

identifications. The subject matter which the Court finally

addressed in the dispositif thus needed no further elaboration. It

is an unusual request, and a difficult task fifty years later, to find

in the 1962 Judgment an answer to a question which Cambodia

alleges only recently has arisen and which, on extensive

evidence from the 1962 record, had already been answered by
the Parties themselves. With the difficulty in mind, and

preserving its objection to jurisdiction and admissibility,

Thailand now sets out its views as to the proper interpretation of

the Judgment.

1.T HE T ERRITORIAL S COPE OF THE D ISPOSITIF

4.93 Cambodia’s central claim is that the dispositif requires

interpretation in order to identify its territorial scope. Thailand

repeats that no such interpretation is needed. If , however, the

Court were to conclude that any ambiguity exists on that point,

then it is necessary that such ambiguity be resolved in

accordance with the 1962 Judgment. This takes us again to

paragraphs 1 and 2 of the disposit if – in particular to the
language in paragraphs 1 and 2 concerning territorial scope,

which is the language Cambodia insists must be interpreted.

The relevant language in paragraph 1 is that the Temple is

situated “in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia ”. The

relevant language in paragraph 2 is that the obligation was to

withdraw forces stationed “ at the Temple, or in its v icinity on ground, the Court in paragraph 2 identified more precisely the

geographical area subject to the obligation – “the Temple or

(…) its vicinity on Cambodian territory”. The limitations of the

case as pleaded, of course, apply as much to paragraph 2 as to
paragraph 1. So the “vicinity” to which paragraph 2 referred

could not go beyond what was argued in 1962, any more than

could the expression, as used in paragraph 1, “territory under the

sovereignty of Cambodia”.

4.96 The dispositif tells us another important thing about the

“vicinity”. The obligation under paragraph 2 to withdraw was

not an obligation to withdraw from the “vicinity” without
qualification. The Court was deliberate and specific about this.

The obligation to withdraw was an obligation to withdraw from

“the vicinity on Cambodian territory ”. The qualifying clause

“on Cambodian territory” in paragraph 2 would have been

meaningless, unless the vicinity, as understood by the Court in
1962, comprised territory of both States. There is a vicinity “on

Cambodian territory”; and there is a vicinity on Thai territory.

As the vicinity could not exceed the scope of the pleaded case,

and the pleaded case did not exceed the geographic al limit of
that part of the promontory on which the Temple is situated, it

follows that that area contains both Cambodian territory and

Thai territory. Of course, if one were referring to “territory

under the sovereignty of Cambodia” in general parlance – i.e., if
one extracted that expression from the dispositif and considered

it in isolation from the proceedings – then it could mean

something potentially much wider. It could mean any territory

212ground, the Court in paragraph 2 identified more precisely the

geographical area subject to the obligation – “the Temple or

(…) its vicinity on Cambodian territory”. The limitations of the

case as pleaded, of course, apply as much to paragraph 2 as to
paragraph 1. So the “vicinity” to which paragraph 2 referred

could not go beyond what was argued in 1962, any more than

could the expression, as used in paragraph 1, “territory under the

sovereignty of Cambodia”.

4.96 The dispositif tells us another important thing about the

“vicinity”. The obligation under paragraph 2 to withdraw was

not an obligation to withdraw from the “vicinity” without
qualification. The Court was deliberate and specific about this.

The obligation to withdraw was an obligation to withdraw from

“the vicinity on Cambodian territory ”. The qualifying clause

“on Cambodian territory” in paragraph 2 would have been

meaningless, unless the vicinity, as understood by the Court in
1962, comprised territory of both States. There is a vicinity “on

Cambodian territory”; and there is a vicinity on Thai territory.

As the vicinity could not exceed the scope of the pleaded case,

and the pleaded case did not exceed the geographic al limit of
that part of the promontory on which the Temple is situated, it

follows that that area contains both Cambodian territory and

Thai territory. Of course, if one were referring to “territory

under the sovereignty of Cambodia” in general parlance – i.e., if
one extracted that expression from the dispositif and considered

it in isolation from the proceedings – then it could mean

something potentially much wider. It could mean any territory further, that, because the two paragraphs both contain the word

“territory”, and because the first paragraph has a “force

juridique continue ”, the second paragraph, “ indéniablement”,
526
must also set out a continuing obligation . This is a non
sequitur. Even if two obligations are closely connected, this

says nothing at all as to their temporal aspect.

4.99 As for the putative connection which Cambodia says
now is an essential condition to understanding the meaning of

the dispositif as a whole, this introduces a mysterious element,

apparently existing in the interstices of paragraphs 1 and 2, but

adding no apparent meaning to the pl ain text. The Court was
clear about what it was deciding ; the Temple belonged to

Cambodia, and there followed from this an obligation on the

part of Thailand to withdraw personnel who had been stationed

there. Thailand withdrew, and the obligation set out in

paragraph 2 thus was discharged.

4.100 This poses a problem for Cambodia. It is true that the

obligation set out by the Court in 1962 implies that the Court

hoped that its Judgment would achieve a lasting result in respect
of the Temple and its precincts. An obligation to withdraw is

not an invitation to come back. But Cambodia needs a device to

rescue its Request from the limits of Article 60 jurisdiction.

Cambodia knows full well that Thailand withdrew from the
Temple and its vicinity on Cambodian ter ritory as the Parties

526Ibid.

214further, that, because the two paragraphs both contain the word

“territory”, and because the first paragraph has a “force

juridique continue ”, the second paragraph, “ indéniablement”,
526
must also set out a continuing obligation . This is a non
sequitur. Even if two obligations are closely connected, this

says nothing at all as to their temporal aspect.

4.99 As for the putative connection which Cambodia says
now is an essential condition to understanding the meaning of

the dispositif as a whole, this introduces a mysterious element,

apparently existing in the interstices of paragraphs 1 and 2, but

adding no apparent meaning to the pl ain text. The Court was
clear about what it was deciding ; the Temple belonged to

Cambodia, and there followed from this an obligation on the

part of Thailand to withdraw personnel who had been stationed

there. Thailand withdrew, and the obligation set out in

paragraph 2 thus was discharged.

4.100 This poses a problem for Cambodia. It is true that the

obligation set out by the Court in 1962 implies that the Court

hoped that its Judgment would achieve a lasting result in respect
of the Temple and its precincts. An obligation to withdraw is

not an invitation to come back. But Cambodia needs a device to

rescue its Request from the limits of Article 60 jurisdiction.

Cambodia knows full well that Thailand withdrew from the
Temple and its vicinity on Cambodian ter ritory as the Parties

526Ibid. embed itself within the Judgment of the Court so as to extend a

limited 1962 jurisdiction to a much wider category of disputes

along an indefinite time line. If it did so, then any dispute in
which a territorial entitlement was settled would c reate, as if by

judicial autogenesis, an authority both to supervise the

implementation of the entitlement and to adjudicate new

territorial disputes between the arties. That is not what Article60
says or means.

4.102 Thailand maintains its position, as set out in the Written
Observations, that the obligation to withdraw was an obligation

discharged instantaneously upon Thailand’s implementation of

the Judgment in 1962 52. Thailand notes in closing only that

Cambodia’s convoluted argument about the temporal character
of obligation is revealing: it is tantamount to an admission that

Thailand indeed withdrew in 1962 as required and that the

instantaneous obligation set out in paragraph 2 thus was

discharged in full at that time and in accordance with the
Court’s determination that sovereignty over the Temple

belonged to Cambodia.

* * *

4.103 The main points of Chapter IV above may be

summarized as follows:

528Ibid., paras. 5.50-5.56.

216embed itself within the Judgment of the Court so as to extend a

limited 1962 jurisdiction to a much wider category of disputes

along an indefinite time line. If it did so, then any dispute in
which a territorial entitlement was settled would c reate, as if by

judicial autogenesis, an authority both to supervise the

implementation of the entitlement and to adjudicate new

territorial disputes between the arties. That is not what Article60
says or means.

4.102 Thailand maintains its position, as set out in the Written
Observations, that the obligation to withdraw was an obligation

discharged instantaneously upon Thailand’s implementation of

the Judgment in 1962 52. Thailand notes in closing only that

Cambodia’s convoluted argument about the temporal character
of obligation is revealing: it is tantamount to an admission that

Thailand indeed withdrew in 1962 as required and that the

instantaneous obligation set out in paragraph 2 thus was

discharged in full at that time and in accordance with the
Court’s determination that sovereignty over the Temple

belonged to Cambodia.

* * *

4.103 The main points of Chapter IV above may be

summarized as follows:

528Ibid., paras. 5.50-5.56. (vi) The line drawn on the Annex I map:

(a) was not examined by the Court for purposes
of determining its accuracy as a representation of

a general delimitation;

(b) did not need to be examined in order for the
Court to reach the conclusions contained in the

operative part of its Judgment; and

(c) was expressly excluded from the operative
part.

(vii) For these reasons, the Annex I map line was not

part of the res judicata of the case and, a fortiori , is not

binding in respect of territorial questions outside the area
to which paragraphs 1 and 2 of the dispositif referred.

218(vi) The line drawn on the Annex I map:

5.1
(a) was not examined by the Court for purposes
of determining its accuracy as a representation of governing the present case.

a general delimitation;
5.2

of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of
(b) did not need to be examined in order for the
Court to reach the conclusions contained in the Cambodia”. This is clear; it does not call for any interpretation.

operative part of its Judgment; and And, “in consequence,” the Court also found “that Thailand is
under an obligation to withdraw any military or police forces, or

other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its
(c) was expressly excluded from the operative
part. vicinity on Cambodian territory”. This too is clear; this too does

not call for interpretation.

(vii) For these reasons, the Annex I map line was not
5.3
part of the res judicata of the case and, a fortiori , is not
submission which identifies in straightforward terms any
binding in respect of territorial questions outside the area
to which paragraphs 1 and 2 of the dispositif referred. coherent request for interpretation. As a result, Cambodia is
obliged to contrive a complicated and convoluted question:

529
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 2011, para. 45.
See also Response, para. 5.9. 5.4 There can be no doubt that:

(i) the second paragraph “is a particular consequence” of

the first paragraph (“in consequence, the Court (…) finds that

Thailand is under an obligation to withdraw”);

(ii) Thailand had an obligation to “withdraw any military
or police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at

the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”;

(iii) there is indeed a “general and continuing obligation

to respect the integrity of the territory of Cambodia”, but this

obligation exists totally independently of the 1962 Judgment;

(iv) by no means did the Judgment delimit the
“Cambodian territory (…) in the area of the Temple and its

vicinity”;

(v) a fortiori, it was not delimited “by the line on the

Annex I map”; the delimitation process is a matter for the

Parties as agreed in the MoU of 14 June 2000;
(vi) nor can it be said that “the Judgment of the Court is

based” on that map and;

(vii) even if it were – quod non –, this would be one of

the reasons for the dispositif, not something decided res judicata

by the Court;

(viii) nor can it be said that it is a n essential reason,
inseparable from the decision: it is one among other grounds

2205.4 There can be no doubt that:

(i) the second paragraph “is a particular consequence” of

the first paragraph (“in consequence, the Court (…) finds that

Thailand is under an obligation to withdraw”);

(ii) Thailand had an obligation to “withdraw any military
or police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at

the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”;

(iii) there is indeed a “general and continuing obligation

to respect the integrity of the territory of Cambodia”, but this

obligation exists totally independently of the 1962 Judgment;

(iv) by no means did the Judgment delimit the
“Cambodian territory (…) in the area of the Temple and its

vicinity”;

(v) a fortiori, it was not delimited “by the line on the

Annex I map”; the delimitation process is a matter for the

Parties as agreed in the MoU of 14 June 2000;
(vi) nor can it be said that “the Judgment of the Court is

based” on that map and;

(vii) even if it were – quod non –, this would be one of

the reasons for the dispositif, not something decided res judicata

by the Court;

(viii) nor can it be said that it is a n essential reason,
inseparable from the decision: it is one among other grounds question of territorial sovereignty, the Court must have
regard to the frontier line between the two States in this
sector.” 532

5.7 Indeed, the Court “had regard” to the Annex I map –
which is not the version of the map annexed by Cambodia to its

Request for interpretation 533 – in order to determine sovereignty

over the Temple, but by no means did the Court decide, in

addition, that the line on that map was the boundary between the

Parties. Moreover, the plain text of the Judgment shows that the

Court was concerned only with a very small parcel of territory

on which the Temple stands. The Parties were perfectly clear

about this: they had no doubt at the time about what was in

dispute.

5.8 A particular ly telling item of evidence of this very
limited territorial scope of the dispute submitted to the Court is

the partial reproduction in the published volume of the pleadings

of the “big map” which was at the centre of the debates of the

Parties before the Court 534. This partial reproduction depicts an

area that is fully compatible with the area defined by the Cabinet

532Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p. 14.
533
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 20Annexes
cartographiques, Carte annexée no. 1.
534See I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear , Oral Arguments, Vol. II,
pp. 273, 274, 277, 283, 357, 358, 360, 363, 391, 393, 401, 404,414, 420, 434,

437, 460, 469, 601 and 621. See also Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction),
Map on the scale of 1:2,000 prepared by the International Training Centre for
Aerial Survey, 1962 [Annex 52 to FWE].

222 question of territorial sovereignty, the Court must have
regard to the frontier line between the two States in this
sector.” 532

5.7 Indeed, the Court “had regard” to the Annex I map –
which is not the version of the map annexed by Cambodia to its

Request for interpretation 533 – in order to determine sovereignty

over the Temple, but by no means did the Court decide, in

addition, that the line on that map was the boundary between the

Parties. Moreover, the plain text of the Judgment shows that the

Court was concerned only with a very small parcel of territory

on which the Temple stands. The Parties were perfectly clear

about this: they had no doubt at the time about what was in

dispute.

5.8 A particular ly telling item of evidence of this very
limited territorial scope of the dispute submitted to the Court is

the partial reproduction in the published volume of the pleadings

of the “big map” which was at the centre of the debates of the

Parties before the Court 53. This partial reproduction depicts an

area that is fully compatible with the area defined by the Cabinet

532Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p. 14.
533
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v . Thailand) (Cambodia
v. Thailand), Application Instituting Proceedings , 28 April 20Annexes
cartographiques, Carte annexée no. 1.
534See I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear , Oral Arguments, Vol. II,
pp. 273, 274, 277, 283, 357, 358, 360, 363, 391, 393, 401, 404,414, 420, 434,

437, 460, 469, 601 and 621. See also Annex 85 d (Partial Reproduction),
Map on the scale of 1:2,000 prepared by the International Training Centre for
Aerial Survey, 1962 [Annex 52 to FWE].224 SUBMISSIONS

In view of the reasons given above and its Written Observations

of 21 November 2011, t he Kingdom of Thailand requests the

Court to adjudge and declare:

- that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking

the Court to interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case

concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
under Article 60 of the Statute of the Court does not satis fy the

conditions laid down in that Article and that, consequently, the

Court has no jurisdiction to respond to th at Request and/or that
the Request is inadmissible;

- in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant

Cambodia’s Request to construe the Judgment and that there is
no reason to interpret the Judgment of 1962; and

- to formally declare that the 1962 J udgment does not
determine that the line on the Annex I map is the boundary line

between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom of

Cambodia.

The Hague, 21 June B.E. 2555 (2012)

(Virachai Plasai)

Agent of the Kingdom of Thailand
before the International Court of Justice

225226 Certification

I hereby certify that the documents annexed to these

Further Written Explanations are true copies of and conform to

the original documents and that the translations provided by the

Kingdom of Thailand are accurate.

The Hague, 21 June B.E 2555 (2012)

(Virachai Plasai)
Agent of the Kingdom of Thailand
before the International Court of Justice

227228 LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex 1 Commandant Bernard, Letter to the Consul of
France, 11 December 1904

Annex 2 French Legation to Siam, Letter to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of France, 14 February 1930
Annex 3 A Photograph of Prince Damrong’s Visit t o the

Temple of Phra Viharn (circa 1930)
Annex 4 Service des archives diplomatiques et de la
documentation, No. 390 ARD/ar, Note pour le

Directeur général des affaires politiques ,
13 December 1958
Annex 5 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the
Kingdom of Thailand of 10 July 1962

(Declassified on 26 May 2011)
Annex 6 A Photograph of One of the Signs Indicating the
Limit of the Vicinity of the Temple of Phra

Viharn Taken from a Far Distance (circa 1962)
Annex 7 Narasimhan, Cable to the Secretary -General of
the United Nations, 10 August 1964

Annex 8 Intentionally blank

Annex 9 The Christian Science Monitor , 28 July 1967,
“Sihanouk jealous of borders”
Annex 10 T.C. White, “Report on a trip to the Temple of

Preah Vihear undertaken from 14- 18 April
1968”, 25 April 1968
Annex 11 French Embassy in Cambodia, Note to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of France , 17 June

1968
Annex 12 United States Embassy in Bangkok, Airgram to
the Department of State, “Cambodian

Chronology”, No. A-363, 3 July 1969
Annex 13 Washington Post , 11 July 1970, “Thai Troops
Reported Guarding Threatened Temple in
Cambodia”

229 Annex 14 The Guardian, 6 November 1974, “Cambodia’s
temple outpost”

Annex 15 New York Times , 23 May 1975, “Thais Report
Cambodian Reds Overrun a Cliff-Top Shrine”
Annex 16 French Embassy in Thailand, Note No. 88/AS to

the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France,
28 January 1977
Annex 17 Bangkok Post, 30 March 1998, “Historic temple

said to be under govt hold”
Annex 18 Bangkok Post , 1 April 1998, “Hun Sen troops
take Preah Vihear”

Annex 19 Bangkok Post , 26 July 1998, “Ancient Khmer
temple to reopen to visitors Aug 1”

Annex 20 A Photograph of the Ceremony to mark the Trial
Opening of the Phra Viharn Promontory for
Archeological Site Visits and Studies,
1 August 1998

Annex 21 Bangkok Post, 2 August 1998, “Tourists flock to
Preah Vihear”

Annex 22 Records of the Meeting on Cooperation on
Tourism Development of Khao Phra Viharn
between H.E. Mr. Somsak Thepsutin, Minister to
the Prime Minister’s Office and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Tourism Authority of
Thailand, and H.E. Mr. So Mara, Director
General, Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia,

1 June 2001
Annex 23 Bangkok Post , 25 July 2001, “Minister erases
proof of talks on temple’s ‘lease’”

Annex 24 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Thailand, Note
No. Kor Tor 0603/1165 to the Governor of Si Sa
Ket Province: Solving the Problems of Kiosks
Selling Goods and Wastewater Disposal in the

Area of the Temple of Phra Viharn, dated
11 December B.E. 2544 (2001) (Declassified on
12 June 2012)

230Annex 14 The Guardian, 6 November 1974, “Cambodia’s
temple outpost”

Annex 15 New York Times , 23 May 1975, “Thais Report
Cambodian Reds Overrun a Cliff-Top Shrine”
Annex 16 French Embassy in Thailand, Note No. 88/AS to

the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France,
28 January 1977
Annex 17 Bangkok Post, 30 March 1998, “Historic temple

said to be under govt hold”
Annex 18 Bangkok Post , 1 April 1998, “Hun Sen troops
take Preah Vihear”

Annex 19 Bangkok Post , 26 July 1998, “Ancient Khmer
temple to reopen to visitors Aug 1”

Annex 20 A Photograph of the Ceremony to mark the Trial
Opening of the Phra Viharn Promontory for
Archeological Site Visits and Studies,
1 August 1998

Annex 21 Bangkok Post, 2 August 1998, “Tourists flock to
Preah Vihear”

Annex 22 Records of the Meeting on Cooperation on
Tourism Development of Khao Phra Viharn
between H.E. Mr. Somsak Thepsutin, Minister to
the Prime Minister’s Office and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Tourism Authority of
Thailand, and H.E. Mr. So Mara, Director
General, Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia,

1 June 2001
Annex 23 Bangkok Post , 25 July 2001, “Minister erases
proof of talks on temple’s ‘lease’”

Annex 24 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Thailand, Note
No. Kor Tor 0603/1165 to the Governor of Si Sa
Ket Province: Solving the Problems of Kiosks
Selling Goods and Wastewater Disposal in the

Area of the Temple of Phra Viharn, dated
11 December B.E. 2544 (2001) (Declassified on
12 June 2012) I Dang , dated 5 February B.E. 2546 (2003)
(Declassified on 15 June 2012)

Annex 39 Bangkok Post, 18 February 2003, “Border Talks”
Annex 40 Bangkok Post, 20 February 2003, “Clear borders
would help end temple row”

Annex 41 Bangkok Post, 22 February 2003, “Cambodians
‘encroach’ on Thai soil”

Annex 42 Photographs of the Opening Ceremony of the
Phra Viharn P romontory Border Area Point of
Entry for the Purpose of Tourism, taken on
31 May 2003

Annex 43 Department of East Asian Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Thailand, The Thai -
Cambodian Joint Cabinet Retreat, 31 May –
1 June 2003, dated 4 June 2003

Annex 44 Photographs of the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda,
taken during 2006 – 2010

Annex 45 A Photograph Taken at the International Court of
Justice on 30 May 2012 of the Map on the Scale
of 1:2,000 Prepared by the International Training
Centre for Aerial Sur vey, exhibited in the Court
room and submitted to the Court as Annex

No. 85 d in 1962
Annex 46 International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham
University, A review of maps presented in the
period 1959 – 1962 and others prepared in 2012,

June 2012
Annex 47 Map sheet 1 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Annex 48 Map sheet 2 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Annex 49 Map sheet 3 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Annex 50 Map sheet 4 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

232 I Dang , dated 5 February B.E. 2546 (2003)
(Declassified on 15 June 2012)

Annex 39 Bangkok Post, 18 February 2003, “Border Talks”
Annex 40 Bangkok Post, 20 February 2003, “Clear borders
would help end temple row”

Annex 41 Bangkok Post, 22 February 2003, “Cambodians
‘encroach’ on Thai soil”

Annex 42 Photographs of the Opening Ceremony of the
Phra Viharn P romontory Border Area Point of
Entry for the Purpose of Tourism, taken on
31 May 2003

Annex 43 Department of East Asian Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Thailand, The Thai -
Cambodian Joint Cabinet Retreat, 31 May –
1 June 2003, dated 4 June 2003

Annex 44 Photographs of the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda,
taken during 2006 – 2010

Annex 45 A Photograph Taken at the International Court of
Justice on 30 May 2012 of the Map on the Scale
of 1:2,000 Prepared by the International Training
Centre for Aerial Sur vey, exhibited in the Court
room and submitted to the Court as Annex

No. 85 d in 1962
Annex 46 International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham
University, A review of maps presented in the
period 1959 – 1962 and others prepared in 2012,

June 2012
Annex 47 Map sheet 1 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Annex 48 Map sheet 2 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Annex 49 Map sheet 3 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Annex 50 Map sheet 4 attached to Annex No. 49 to
Thailand’s Counter-Memorial, 8 September 1961

Document file FR
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Document Long Title

Further Written Explanations of Thailand

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