Preliminary Objections of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNINGLEGALITYOF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v. NETHERLANDS)

PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS
OF THE
KINGDOMOF THE NETHERLANDS

5JULY 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4

3. THE FRYIS NOT ENTITLEDTO APPEARBEFORETHE COURT 11

4. ARTICLE 36, PARAGRAPH2, OF THESTATUTEOF THE COURT
DOES NOTPROVIDEA BASIS FORJURlSDlCTlON OF THE COURT 26

5. ARTICLE IX OF THE GENOCIDECONVENTIONDOESNOT PROVIDE
A BASIS FORJURlSDlCTlON OF THE COURT 31

6. THE 1931TREATY OF JUDlClAL SETTLEMENT,ARBITRATION

AND CONCILIATIONDOESNOTPROVIDEA BASIS FOR
JURlSDlCTlON OF THE COURT 39

7. THE CLAIMS PRESENTEDBY THEFRY AREINADMISSIBLE 51

7.1 THE CLAIMS OF THE FRYARE INADMISSIBLEBECAUSETHE
APPLICANT HAS NOTPRODUCEDEVENA BEGlNNlNG OF
EVIDENCETHAT THEALLEGED BREACHES HAVEBEEN
COMMITTEDBY THENETHERLANDS 51

7.2 THE CLAIMS OF THE FRYARE INADMISSIBLE ASA JUDGMENT

IN RESPECTOF THE NETHERLANDSNECESSARILYINVOLVESA
DECISIONIN A DISPUTEBETWEENTHE FRY AND OTHERENTITIES
OR STATESNOT BEFORETHE COURTANDIORWOULD IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUCH ENTITIESOR STATESNOTALLOW THE COURT
TO ARRIVE AT A WARRANTEDJUDGMENT 53

7.3 THE CLAlM OF THE FRY BASEDON ALLEGED BREACHESOF
OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHEDBY SC RES.1244AND BY THE 1948
GENOCIDECONVENTION RELATEDTO KILLINGS, WOUNDINGAND
EXPULSIONOF SERBS AND OTHERNON-ALBANIAN GROUPSIN
KOSOVO AND METOHIJAAFTER 10JUNE 1999IS INADMISSIBLE,

BECAUSEIT IS A NEWCLAlM CHANGINGTHE SUBJECT OF THE
DISPUTEORlGlNALLY SUBMITTEDTO THECOURT IN THE
APPLICATION 63

8. CONCLUDINGSUBMlSSlONS 671. INTRODUCTION

1.1 On 29 April 1999the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia(hereinafter referredto as

"the FRY")filed an Application in the Registryof the Court instituting proceedings

against the Kingdomof the Netherlands(hereinafterreferred to as "the Netherlands")
"for violationof the obligationsnot to useforce". lmmediatelyafterfiling its Application,

the FRY alsosubmitted a requestfor the indicationof provisional measures pursuant

to Article 73 of the Rulesof the Court. In itsApplication the FRY invokedArticle36,

paragraph2, of the Statuteof the Court as well asArticle IX of the 1948 Conventionon
the Preventionand Punishmentof the Crimeof Genocide (hereinafterreferredto as

"the GenocideConvention")as a basisfor jurisdiction of the Court. The FRY purported

to establishjurisdiction of theCourt onthe basisof Article 36, paragraph2, of the

Statuteof the Court on the basisof a declaration recognizingthe compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court pursuantto that provision,whichwas deposited withthe

Secretary-Generalof the UnitedNationsonlythree days earlier, i.e. 26 April 1999.In a

letter of 12May 1999the agentof the FRYsubmittedto the Court a "Supplementto
the Application"of the FRY inwhich itinvokedan additionalgroundfor the Court, viz.

Article 4 of the Treaty of Judicial Settlement,Arbitrationand Conciliation betweenthe

Kingdomof Yugoslavia andthe Kingdomof the Netherlands,signedat The Hagueon

1 1 March 1931.

1.2 Duringthe public hearingsheld bythe Courton 10-12May 1999on the

request of the FRYfor the indicationof provisionalmeasures,the Netherlands

successfullydisputed thatthe Court hadprima faciejurisdiction on either of the three
grounds invoked by the FRYand askedthe Courtto reject the request of theFRYto

indicate provisionalmeasures.The Court decidedthat the declarations madebythe

Parties underArticle 36, paragraph2, of the Statutedid not constitute a basisonwhich

thejurisdictionof the Court couldprima faciebefounded inthis case. Neither couldthe
jurisdiction ofthe Courtprima faciebe foundedon Article IX of the Genocide

Conventionas the Court wasunableto find at that stage of the proceedingsthatthe

acts imputedbythe FRYto the Netherlandswere capableof coming within the

provisionsof the GenocideConvention. Due tothe fact that the FRY had invoked
Article4 of the above-mentioned Treaty of 1931as an additional basisfor jurisdiction

onlyduringthe second round of the oral argumentwithoutgiving any explanationof itsreasonsfor invokingthis groundat that latestage of the proceedings,the Court,

havingtaken note of the Netherlandsargumentsagainst the use of this alleged ground
ofjurisdiction,felt unable"for the purposeof decidingwhetherit may or may not

indicate provisionalmeasures inthe presentcase"to take account of the additional

basisofjurisdiction invokedbythe FRY. In its Orderof 2 June 1999theCourt, by

elevenvotesto four, rejected the requestfor the indicationof provisionalmeasures
submittedbythe FRY,and, byfourteenvotesto one, reservedthe subsequent

procedurefor further decision.

1.3 By itsOrderdated 30June 1999the Court determined theorder of filing of
mernorialsandthe time-limits within whichthey mustbefiled, i.e. 5 January 2000for

the Memorialof the FRYand 5 July 2000for the Counter-Memorialof the Netherlands.

The FRYfiled its Memorialon 5 January 2000.

1.4 Accordingto Article 79, paragraph1,of the Rulesof the Court "Anyobjection

bythe respondentto thejurisdiction of theCourtor to the admissibilityof the

application,or other objectionto thedecisionuponwhich is requested beforeany

further proceedingsonthe merits,shall be madeinwriting withinthe time-limit fixedfor
the deliveryof the Counter-Memorial...". Accordingto Article 79, paragraph 3,"Upon

receiptbythe Registryof a preliminaryobjection,the proceedingson the merits shall

be suspended."

1.5 The Netherlandswishesto avail itself ofthe opportunityto raise inthe present

Memorialpreliminaryobjectionsto the jurisdiction ofthe Court andto the admissibility

of the claimsfiled bythe FRYin itsApplicationand its Memorial.As will be set forth

morefully inthe following chapters,the Netherlandspersistsin itsview already
expressed duringthe proceedingsonthe requestof the FRYfor the indicationof

provisionalmeasuresthat:

(1) The FRYis not entitledto appearbeforethe Court (Chapter 3);
(2) Article36, paragraph2, of the Statuteof the Courtdoes not providea basisfor

jurisdiction ofthe Court (Chapter4);

(3) Article IX of the Genocide Conventiondoes not providea basisfor jurisdictionof

the Court (Chapter5);
(4) The 1931Treatyof Judicial Settlement,Arbitration and Conciliation does notprovidea basisfor jurisdiction ofthe Court (Chapter6);

(5) The claimspresentedbythe FRYare inadmissiblebecause:

(a)the Applicanthas not producedeven a beginningof evidence that the alleged
breaches have been committedby the Netherlands;

(b) ajudgment in respectof the Netherlandsnecessarilyinvolvesa decisionin a

dispute betweentheFRY andotherentitiesor Statesnot beforethe Court andlor

would in the absenceof suchentitiesor Statesnot allowthe Courtto arrive at a
warrantedjudgment;andlor

(c) the claimof the FRYbasedon allegedbreachesof obligations establishedby SC

Res. 1244and bythe 1948Genocide Conventionrelatedto killings,woundingand

expulsionof Serbs and othernon-Albaniangroupsinthe area designated bythe FRY
as "Kosovoand Metohija" (hereinafter:Kosovo andMetohija) after10June 1999is a

newclaimchangingthe subjectof the disputeoriginally submittedto the Court inthe

Application.

Henceforth,the Netherlandsinits concludingsubmissionsrequeststhe Courtto

adjudge anddeclarethat the FRYis not entitledto appearbeforethe Court, that the
Court has nojurisdiction overthe claims brought againstthe Netherlands andlor the

claimsbrought bythe FRY areinadmissible.

1.6 The Netherlandshastaken note ofthe accountof facts advancedbythe FRY
in itsApplication andits Memorial.Inview ofthe fact that preliminary objectionshave

been raised againstthejurisdictionof the Courtandthe admissibility ofthe claims,the

Netherlandswill henceforthaddressfactual mattersinthis Memorialonly in so far as is

necessaryinthe contextof these preliminaryobjections.It shouldtherefore be put on
recordthat unlessthe contraryis explicitly indicatedbythe Netherlandsin this

Memorial,the Netherlandsmaynot bedeemed to have accepted the description otfhe

eventsset out in the FRYApplicationand Memorial,whether theyrelateto events

beforeor after 10June 1999.2. FACTUALBACKGROUND

2.1 Inthis Chapterthe Netherlandsintendsto providea brief survey ofthe factual
backgroundof the case beforethe Court.Thesurveydescribesthe efforts madeto

persuadethe FRYauthoritiesto ceaseviolatingon a massive scalethe human rights

of the civilian populationof Kosovo and, whenthese efforts failed, the inevitable

necessityfor the NATOto start bombingattackson the territory ofthe FRY in orderto
prevent a humanitariancatastrophein Kosovo. The Netherlandswould liketo

emphasize againthat this survey by no meansis to be construed as a recognitionthat

the Court hasjurisdictionto entertainthe merits of the Application ofthe FRY.The sole
purposeof this survey isto placethe Memorialof the Netherlandswhich is aimedat

demonstratingthe lackofjurisdiction of the Court andthe inadmissibility of theclaims

of the FRY in a properfactual context.

2.2 In1989 the authoritiesof the Republicof Serbia (whichformed part of the

then Socialist Federal RepublicofYugoslavia (SFRY)and later became part of the

Federal Republicof Yugoslavia (FRY) deprived Kosovoof the status of autonomous

territorywhich it had enjoyedundert1974 Constitutionof the SFRY.lnitiallythe
populationof Kosovo whichwas predominantlyof ethnicAlbanian origin, offered

exclusively peaceful resistanceto this measure andits attendant consequences.As of

1996 the KosovoLiberationArmy, UCK, conducted armed resistance actions.The
situation escalated in the spri1998fwhenthe UCKactionswere retaliatedbythe

Serbian policeand paramilitaryunitsin cooperationwith units ofthe Yugoslav army. In

carryingoutthese retaliationactionsexcessiveviolencewas used also against

civilians.As a result of this violenceby Septemberan estimated600-70 0ivilians
had been killed inthe fighting in Kosovosince Marchandthe number of refugeesand

internallydisplaced perçons hadreachedalevelo230,00 0Report of the Secretary

General, UN Doc. Sl1998183 para.7).

2.3 The internationalcommunitytriedto stem the tide byexercisingpolitical

pressure,mainlyinthe framework of the Contact Group (consisting ofthe United

Kingdom,the UnitedStates, France,Germany,Italy,RussianFederationand the EU
Presidency),the Security Council and the Organizationfor Security and Cooperationin

Europe (OSCE).2.4 On 31 March 1998the SecurityCounciladopted Resolution 1160(Annex2.1)

whichcondemned,inter alia,the use ofexcessiveforce by Serbianpolice forces
againstcivilians andpeacefuldemonstratorsin Kosovoaswell as al1acts of terrorism

bythe KosovoLiberationArmy.The Council,acting underChapterVI1of the UN

Charter,inter alia, called upon theFRY immediatelyto take the further necessary

stepsto achievea political solutionto the issueof Kosovothrough dialogue. The
Council underlinedthat the wayto defeatviolenceand terrorismin Kosovowasfor the

authoritiesin Belgradoto offer the KosovarAlbaniancommunitya genuine political

process.

2.5 On 24 August 1998the Presidentof the Security Council made a statement

(SIPRSTl1998125)(Annex 2.2)on behalfof the Councilwhichshowedthat the Council

remainedgravelyconcernedaboutthe fighting inKosovo which hadhad a devastating

impacton the civilian populationand hadgreatlyincreasedthe number of refugees
anddisplaced persons.The Council calledforan immediatecease-fire.

2.6 In its Resolution 1199of 23September 1998the SecurityCouncilexpressed

its grave concernat, interlia,the excessiveand indiscriminateuseof force by
Serbiansecurity forcesandthe YugoslavArmywhich had resultedin numerouscivilian

casualties(Annex 2.3).The Councilexpressedits deepconcernat the rapid

deteriorationinthe humanitariansituationthroughout Kosovoand,again acting under

ChapterVI1of the Charter, madea numberof demandsfrom al1parties concernedand
expressly demandedthatthe FRYimplementa numberof concrete measurestowards

achieving apoliticalsolutionto the situation inKosovo.The demanded measures (such

as cessationof al1actionby the security forces affectingthe civilianpopulation) had

alreadybeenlaid downin a statementof the Contact Groupof 12June 1998andwere
explicitly enumeratedinthe SecurityCouncilresolution.

2.7 On 16October1998the FRYauthoritiesandthe OSCEreachedan

agreementprovidingfor the OSCEto establish a verification missionin Kosovo.The
previousdaythe FRY militaryauthoritiesand NATOhadconcludedan agreement

providingfor the establishment ofan air verification missionover Kosovo,

complementingthe OSCEVerificationMission.The purposeof the OSCE Missionwas
to verifythe compliancey the FRYand al1othersconcerned in Kosovowith therequirementsof SC Res. 1199. TheSecurityCouncilin its Resolution1203(Annex

2.4) adoptedon 24October 1998 andacting underChapterVI1of the Charter,
endorsed both agreementsand demandedthe FRYas well as the KosovoAlbanian

leadershipand al1otherelementsof the KosovoAlbaniancommunityto complyfully

with Resolutions1160and 1199andto cooperatefullywith the OSCE Mission.

2.8 Againstthe backgroundof the threat of NATOairstrikeswhich had been

decidedupon in principlebythe NATOCouncilin October1998,the American Special

Envoywhoacted on behalfof the Contact Groupsucceededin reachingan agreement
with the President ofthe FRYon compliancewith Resolution1199.

2.9 Despitethis agreement violencecontinued andculminatedin a massacreof

KosovoAlbanians inthe villageof Racak on15January 1999.Accordingto the OSCE
Verification Mission,which reportedthe incident,the victims wereciviliansandthe

responsibilitylaywith FRY security forces. The SecurityCouncilthrough a statement of

its Presidentof 19January 1999 (S/PRST/1999/2)(Annex 2.5)stronglycondemned

this massacre.
The refugeesituationdeteriorated.Ina briefinggivento the SecurityCouncilon 5 May

1999the UN HighCommissionerfor Refugeesstated that, before24 March,the date

of the startof the NATO aircampaign,there hadalreadybeennearlyhalf a million

peoplewho wereinternallydisplacedperçonsor refugeesin neighbouring States.
(UNHCRwebsitehttp://srchl.un.org)(Annex2.6). The report ofthe human rights

findings of the OSCE KosovoVerification Mission(website http://www.osce.org/

kosovo/reports/HR/partl/lndex.HTM (T)heexecutivesummaryreproduced asAnnex

2.7)whichwas publishedin December 1999,but covers the periodsincethe creation
of the Missionon 16 October1998 until its dissolutionon 9 June 1999, lists crimes

perpetratedby Yugoslavand Serb forcessuch as arbitrarykillingsof civilians,arbitrary

arrests and detention, torture andill-treatment,rapeand otherforms of sexual

violence, violationof the rightto a fair trial, humanshieldsandforced expulsion.

2.10 Underthe auspices of theContactGroup alast attemptwas madeto find a

political solutionto theblem.The two partiesto the conflictwere invitedto take part

in negotiations aimedat reachinga politicalsettlementand establishinga framework
and timetablefor that purpose.The SecurityCouncilwelcomedand supportedthisinitiative (Statementbythe Presidentof the Security Councilof 29January 1999;

SIPRSTI199915)(Annex2.8).

2.11 Two roundsof talks were held,one in February 1999at Rambouilletand

anotherfrom 15until 19 March1999in Paris.The negotiationsat Rambouillet resulted

inthe so-calledRambouilletAccords, a draftagreementcontainingan interim
arrangementwhich providedfor far reachingself-governmentin Kosovowhile

recognizingtheterritorialintegrityof the FRY.Inthe secondround oftalks, in Paris,

the FRYdelegationrefusedto signthe agreementbecauseit opposedthe envisaged

deploymentof a NATO-ledforce to monitorcompliance withthe agreement.The
Kosovodelegation, although initially insistingon a referenceinthe text to a referendum

onthe final status of Kosovoafter theexpiryof the envisaged interim period, finally

agreedto sign. However,in view ofthe positionofthe FRYdelegationthe Contact

Groupsaw no other solutionthanto suspendthe negotiations.

2.12 Evenduringthe negotiationsat Rambouilletand in Paristhe Yugoslavmilitary

and policeforces were preparingto intensify their operationsagainstethnicAlbanians
in Kosovo.Afterone final attemptby USSpecialEnvoy,Richard Holbrooke,to

convincePresidentMilosevicto reversehis policies, NATO Secretary-GeneralSolana

gavethe orderto commence air strikes (OperationAllied Force). (See:Kosovo One

Year On. Achievement andChallenge,by Lord Robertson,Secretary-Generalof
NATO;websitehttp:llwww.nato.intlkosovo/repo2000/index.htm))O . perationAllied

Force started at24 March 1999.Inthe Security Councilwhichdiscussedthe issuethe

sameday at the requestof the RussianFederation,the permanentrepresentativeof

the Netherlandsstated inter alia:

"We haveparticipatedin and assumed responsibilityfor the NorthAtlantic
TreatyOrganization(NATO) decisionbecausetherewas no other solution.As

for the Netherlands,thisdecisionwas nottaken lightly;it was taken with
conviction.Responsibilityfor the NATO action liessquarely with President
Milosevic. Heis responsiblefor the large-scaleviolations ofthe October
agreementswiththe Organizationfor Securityand Cooperationin Europe
(OSCE)and NATO.It is PresidentMilosevic'srecourseto violencein Kosovo
that hasfinally convincedusthat the impendinghumanitarian catastrophe,at
whichthe Council expressedits alarmin its resolutionsof Septemberand

October,could not be avertedby peacefulmeans. [Tlhe presentstate of affairs shouldconvinceevery delegation that with
regardto the problemof Kosovo,the diplomaticmeansof finding a solution
are now exhausted.As statedbythe Secretary-General,diplomacyhasfailed,
butthere aretimeswhenthe useof force maybe legitimate inthe pursuitof
peace. The Netherlandsfeels that thisissucha time." (UN Doc.SIPV3988,

p. 8)(Annex2.9)

2.13 At its next meetingon 26 March 1999the Security Council discussed a draft

resolutionsubmittedby Belarusandthe RussianFederationand CO-sponsored by

India.Inthe draft itwas proposedthatthe SecurityCouncil, actingunderChaptersVI1

andVlll of the Charter,demandan immediatecessationof the use of force againstthe
FRYand urgent resumptionof negotiations.

The draft resolutionwas rejectedbytwelvevotes (Argentina,Bahrain,Brazil,Canada,

France, Gabon, Gambia,Malaysia,the Netherlands,Slovenia, United Kingdom,and

UnitedStates of America)to three (China,the RussianFederationand Namibia)(UN
Doc.SIPV3989, p. 6) (Annex2.10).

2.14 The NATO phased aircampaign was conductedfrom 24 March until 10June.

NATO madeeveryeffort to limitcollateraldamageandto observethe rulesof
internationalhumanitarianlaw. It is in this connectionimportantto note that thePublic

Prosecutorofthe InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia has

decidednotto open a criminalinvestigationintoanyaspectof the air campaign.

Although some mistakeswere madeby NATO,the Prosecutorwas satisfied thatthere
was no deliberate targetingof civiliansor unlawfulmilitarytargetsby NATOduringthe

campaign (UN Doc.SlPVl4150p. 3 (Annex2.11)and ICTY Press Release

PWP.I.S.1510-eof 13June 2000).

Comparedto other NATOMembers, the contributionofthe Netherlandsto the air
campaignwas relativelysmall. Netherlandsaircraftcarriedout approximately5percent

of the total numberof air sorties. Responsibilityfor the conductof the Operationed

Forcerestedwith NATO.Inthe implementationof the operation, operationalcontrol

over the participating Netherlandsunitswastransferredto NATOcommanders.

2.15 While the NATO air campaigncontinued,theG8 on 6 May 1999adopted a

set of general principleson a political solutionto the Kosovocrisis.These principles
were reflectedin a paper presentedby the EUSpecial Envoy andthe RussianEnvoyand acceptedbythe FRYauthoritieson 3 June 1999.This paper provided,inter alia,

for an immediateand verifiableend of violence andrepressionin Kosovo anda
verifiable withdrawalfrom Kosovoof al1military, policeand paramilitaryforces

accordingto a rapidtimetable. On9 June 1999NATOestablishedthe Kosovo Peace

lmplementation Force(KFOR).Followingthe conclusionthesameday of a Military

TechnicalAgreementbetweenthe FRY ArmyChief of Staff andthe KFOR commander
the withdrawalof FRYand Serbiansecurity forces beganon 10June 1999.NATOair

strikeswere suspendedthesameday.

2.16 The SecurityCouncilin its Resolution 1244of 10June 1999(Annex 2.12)

while welcomingthe FRY'Sagreement tothe paper presentedby the EUSpecial
Envoyandthe RussianEnvoyand actingunderChapterVI1of the Charter,inter alia,

affirmedthe needfor the rapidearly deploymentof effective international civiland

security presencesto Kosovo and demandedthat the parties cooperatefully intheir

deployment.The Councildecidedthat the responsibilitiesofthe internationalsecurity
presenceto be deployedincludedeterring renewed hostilities, establishing asecure

environment for returningrefugeesand displaced perçonsand ensuringpublic safety

and order.The responsibilitiesofthe internationalcivil presence included performing

basic civilianadministrativefunctions, thedevelopmentof provisionalinstitutions,
maintainingcivil law andorder,supportingthe reconstructionof key infrastructureand

othereconomicreconstruction,protectinghumanrights and supporting humanitarian

and disasterrelief aid. Theinternationalsecuritypresence,i.e. KFOR, wasdeployed

on 12 June 1999.On the samedatethe UNSecretary-Generalpresenteda
preliminaryconceptfor the United NationslnterimAdministration Missionin Kosovo

(UNMIK) whichwas to constitutethe internationalcivil presence.An advanceteam of

UNMIKwasdeployed inKosovowithin subsequent days.

2.17 As appearsfromthe variousreports ofthe Secretary-General(SI19991767,

SI19991779,SI1999/982,SI19991987,SI199911 062, SI199911185,SI199911 250,

SI199911266,S12000150S , l20001152,Sl20001177,Sl20001235,Sl20001318,

Sl20001538)releasedsincethe establishmentof the internationalcivil presence
(UNMIK) andthe internationalsecurity presence(KFOR), attacksagainstethnic

minorities remaina majorsecurity concern. However, KFOR in close cooperationwith

UNMIKcontinuesto address theseand other issuesin orderto maintainpeaceandstabilityin Kosovo.The latest report of the Secretary-Generalon UNMlK(S120001538)

whichcoversthe period March-June2000 notesthat UNMlK consolidatedthe central
and municipalstructures throughwhich the peopleof Kosovoparticipatein the interim

administrationof the province.With the participationof bothethnicAlbanianand non-

Albaniancommunitiesin Kosovo,the compositionofthese structures becamemore
reflective of the populationin the province.

The Netherlandstook partin KFORsincethe date of its deploymentin Kosovo until 1

June 2000. The Netherlandscontributionconsistedos f everalunits,totaling

approximately1500men.The Netherlandsparticipationin UNMlK isfocussed onthe
OSCE"pillar" which headsthe institution-buildingcomponent.The Netherlands

contributes substantiallyto the UNMlK Trust Fund.3. THE FRY IS NOT ENTITLEDTO APPEARBEFORETHE COURT

3.1 The Netherlandssubmits,as will be morefully set forth below,thatthe FRYis

notentitledto appear beforetheCourtas the FRYis not a member of the United

Nationsandtherefore not an ipso facto partyto the Statuteof the Court, has not

becomea partyto the Statutein any otherway and hasnot accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court by makinga declarationpursuantto SC Res. 9 (1946). The unilateral

declarationof the FRYacceptingthe jurisdictionof the Court is invalidand does in any

event not establishjurisdictionof the Court onthe basisof Article 36, paragraph2, of

the Statutevis-à-visthe Netherlands.

3.2 The Netherlandsmaintainsits submission madeat the stage ofthe

proceedingsrelatingto the Applicant'srequestfor the indication of provisional

measuresthatthe FRY as oneof the successorStatesof the former SFRYis at
present not a member of the UnitedNations andis thereforenot a partyto the Statute

of the InternationalCourtof Justicebyvirtueof Article 93, paragraph 1,of the UN

Charterwhich providesthat al1membersof the United Nationsare ipso facto partiesto

the Statute.

3.3 The claim of the FRYto be a memberof the United Nations (Applicant's
Memorial,para.3.1) is basedonthe wrong premisethatthe FRY automatically

continuesthe membershipofthe SFRYinthe United Nations.That the FRY indeed

proceededfrom this wrong premisemay beinferredfromthe following declaration

issuedat the date of the proclamationof the newState (27April 1992) and repeatedin
a letterthe FRY authorities addressedto the Secretary-Generalofthe UnitedNations:

"The Federal Republicof Yugoslavia,continuingthe State, international legal
and politicalpersonalityof the SocialistFederal Republic ofYugoslavia,shall
strictlyabideby al1the commitmentsthat the SFRof Yugoslavia assumed
internationally"(A146191, 7 May 1992,AnnexII, para.1) (Annex 3.1)

As noted bythe Security Council inits Resolution 757(1992) of 30May 1992,"the

claimbythe FRY toautomaticallycontinuethe membershipofthe SFRY in the United

Nationsis not generallyacceptedn(Annex 3.2). Thenon-acceptanceofthe FRY'S
claimis further illustrated by the legalopinionsof the Arbitration Commissionwhichwas established inthe framework of the Conferencefor Peace in Yugoslavia inwhich

participatedthe EuropeanCommunityand its member States and the six republicsof

the former SFRY.All six republicsof the former SFRY, includingthe Republic of Serbia
and the Republicof Montenegro,which later becamethe FRY, have acceptedthe

arrangements relating to the establishmentof the Commission.When the FRY

challengedthe Commission'scompetence to give anopinion on a number of questions

submittedto it by the Chairmanof the Conference,concerning, inter alia,the status of
the FRY,the Commission in an interlocutory decision of 4 July 1992(31 ILM 1992)

(Annex 3.3)established its competence to give the requested opinion.

3.4 After having issuedthe interlocutorydecision concerning its own competence
the Commission in its Opinion no. 8 of 4 July 1992(31 ILM 1992) (Annex 3.4)held

that:

"the process of dissolutionof the SFRY referredto in Opinion no. 1 of 29
November 1991 is now complete andthat the SFRY no longer exists";

in its Opinion no. 9 (31 ILM 1992) (Annex 3.5)of the same datethat:

" the SFRY's membershipof internationalorganizations must be terminated
accordingto their statutes andthat noneof the successor States may
thereupon claim for itselflonethe membershiprights previouslyenjoyed by

the former SFRY"

and in its Opinion no. 10, likewiseof the same date (31 ILM 1992)(Annex 3.6), that:

"the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)is a new State which cannot be considered

the sole successorto the SFRY".

Also the EuropeanUnion regardsthe FRY as one ofthe successor States to the

SFRY. On 20 July 1992a common statement wasissuedwhich, inter alia, comprised
the following phrase:

"The Communityand its MemberStateswelcome the advice of the Arbitration
Commissionof the Conferenceon Yugoslavia,chaired by Mr Badinter. It is for
Serbia and Montenegroto decidewhether they wish to form a new
Federation.But this new Federationcannot be accepted as the sole

successorto the former Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia. Inthe light
of this, the Community andits MemberStates will oppose the participationof Yugoslavia in internationalbodies."(Bulletinof the European Communities
7/8-1992,p.108 (Annex 3.7)

3.5 Furtherto itsabove mentionedResolution757 (1992) of 30 May 1992the

Security Council,in its Resolution777 (1992)of 19September1992(Annex 3.8)

consideredthat:

"the State formerlyknownas the Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslaviahas
ceasedto exist",

andthat:

"the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia(Serbiaand Montenegro) cannot continue
automaticallythe membershipof the former SocialistFederalRepublicof
Yugoslavia inthe UnitedNations"

andtherefore recommendedto the GeneralAssembly:

"that it decidethat the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia(Serbia and

Montenegro)shouldapplyfor membershipinthe United Nations .......".

3.6 Acting uponthis recommendationthe GeneralAssemblyin Resolution4711
(1992) of 22 September1992(Annex 3.9) considered:

"thatthe FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia(Serbia and Montenegro) cannot
continue automaticallythemembershipof the former Socialist Federal
Republicof Yugoslaviainthe United Nations"

andtherefore decided':

"that the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia(Serbia and Montenegro) should

applyfor membershipinthe UnitedNationsandthat it shall not participate in
the work of the GeneralAssembly".

The resolutionwas adoptedwith an overwhelmingmajority,only sixStates including

"Yugoslavia" itself voting against the resolutiongiving effectto the Security Council
recommendation,whilefour permanentmembersof the Security Council votedin

favour and China abstained(see:UnitedNations Yearbook1992,p. 139). Duringthe

GeneralAssemblydebate on thedraft resolutionwhichwasfinally adoptedas

AccordingtoArticle4, paragraph2, ofthe UN Charter,arecommendofthe Security Counciils
requiredforaecisionofthe GeneralAssemblytoadmita Statetomembershipinthe United Nations.
13Resolution4711(1992)the then PrimeMinisterof the FRYmade a statementinwhich

he"formallyrequestedmembershipin the United Nationsof the newYugoslavia ...UN

Doc.A47lPV. 7, p. 149)(Annex3.10),butthe UnitedNationsneverreceivedany
written documentas a follow-upto that statement.Boththe decisionof the General

Assembly andthe lack of an adequate responseof the FRYauthorities confirm the

view ofthe Netherlands that theFRYis at presentnot a memberof the UnitedNations

and, consequently,thatthe Applicant cannotbe consideredto be ipso factoa partyto
the Statuteof the Court byvirtue of Article 93, paragraph1,of the UN Charter.

3.7 Although the Security Council had concluded that the SFRY had ceased to

exist, in the view of the Netherlands thisoes not mean that the membership of the
SFRY in the United Nations was formallyterminated. The Charterdoes not contain

provisions for termination of membership in the United Nations as a result of

dissolutionof a State and neither theSecurityCouncilnor the GeneralAssembly have

taken a formal decisionto terminate the membershipof the SFRY. Hencethe UN and
its organs should base themselves formally on the continued membership of the

SFRY.

3.8 The Netherlandsfurthersubmitsthat the Applicanthas not become a partyto

the Statuteof the Court in anyotherway, in particularnot on the basis of a General

Assemblyresolution upon recommendationof the Security Council as envisaged in

Article 93, paragraph2, of the UN Charter.In anyevent the FRYis not mentionedas a
partyto the Statuteof the Court onthat basisin Yearbook1996-1997of the

InternationalCourt of Justice,pp. 68-70. Thereferenceinthe Yearbookto "Yugoslavia

...OriginalMember"amongthe "States Membersof the United Nations"entitledto

appearbeforethe Courtpursuantto Article35, paragraph1,of the Statute (ICJ
Yearbook 1996-1997, p. 68), is a referenceto the SFRY,whose membershipof the

United Nations, aswe have alreadynoted,was neverformally terminated.

3.9 The Netherlandsisaware thata Statewhich is not a partyto the Statuteof
the InternationalCourtof Justice,as isthe casewiththe Applicant, mayundercertain

conditions providedfor in SC Res.9 (1946)of 15October 1946 (Annex3.11) adopted

bythe Security Councilbyvirtue of powersconferredon it byArticle 35, paragraph 2,
of the Statute,acceptthejurisdictionof the Court (seeICJYearbook 1996-1997, pp.3.10 The Netherlandssubmitsthat the 1999declarationof the Applicant accepting

thejurisdictionof the Court sirnplyrefersto Article 36, paragraph, of the Statuteof
the Court,as if the Applicant werea partyto the Statuteand does not referto SC Res.

9 (1946)of 15October 1946as the basisfor itsentitlementto appear beforethe Court

andthat the Applicantdoes not inanyway provideevidencethat it has acceptedthe

conditionsfor such appearancementionedinthe said SecurityCouncil resolution.Also
in its Memorialthe Applicantrestricts itselfto repeating its 1999declarationwithout

makingany referenceto SC Res. 9 (1946). The Netherlandshenceforthsubmitsthat

as the 1999declarationof the Applicant acceptingthejurisdiction of the Court isnot

basedon SC Res.9 (1946)and does not meetthe crucial conditions mentionedinthat
resolution,it must beconsidered invalid.

3.11 The Netherlandsfurther submits that,even if the 1999declaration ofthe

Applicantwere to be consideredvalid,the acceptanceof thejurisdiction of the Court,
in accordancewith Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute,as compulsoryipso facto

andwithout specialagreement cannotbe reliedon vis-à-visthe Netherlandswhich isa

partyto the Statuteand has madethe declarationin conforrnitywith Article36,

paragraph2, of the Statute,as the Netherlandshas not explicitlyagreedto the
acceptanceof thejurisdiction of the Court onthat basisby theApplicantin respectof

itself, as is clearly requiredby SC Res.9 (1946)for the Courtto havejurisdiction

rationepersonaeon that basis.

3.12 The above mentionedsubmissionshave alreadyto a largeextent been

presentedat the stageof proceedingsrelatedto the Applicant's requestfor the

indicationof provisionalrneasures.Inthe followingparagraphswhile brieflydiscussing

the Court Order of 2 June 2000and moreextensivelythe Applicant's Memorialof5
January 2000the Netherlandswill further elaborateits propositionthat theFRYis not

entitledto appearbeforethe Court.

3.13 In its Order of 2 June 1999relatingto the Applicant's requestfor the indication
of provisionalmeasuresthe Court stated (para.33)that inview of its finding with

regardto the limitationationetemporiscontainedin the Applicant's declarationofacceptanceof the Court's jurisdiction it did not needto considerthe issue of

membershipof the FRY in the United Nationsfor the purposeof deciding whether or

not it could indicate provisionalmeasuresin the present case.In her separate opinion

Judge Higgins observedthat the question of the FRY'Sstatus was a matter of the
greatest complexity andimportance(para. 21). Judge Odain his separate opiniontook

the view (para.4) that the FRY, not being a member of the United Nations and thus

not a partyto the Statute of the Court had no standing beforethe Court as an applicant

State. Judge Kooijmans in his separate opinionexpresseddoubt as to whether the
FRY was a full-fledged, fully qualified member of the United Nations and as such

capable of acceptingthe compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court as a partyto the Statute

(para. 25). Judge Kooijmansadded:

"that means that there is a probability,which is far from negligible, that the

Court after a thorough analysis ofthe legal issues involvedwill find that it is
withoutjurisdictionbecauseof the invalidityof Yugoslavia'sdeclaration of
acceptance".

3.14 In its Memorialthe Applicant submitsthat SC Res. 777 (1992) "did not

includean intentionto terminatethe membershipof the FR of Yugoslavia in the United

Nations"(Memorial,Part Three, paragraph3.1.1). In citing statements of the

permanentrepresentativesof two members of the Security Councilthe Applicant
submitsthat the aim ofthe resolutionwas to reach a compromise in that the FRY

should not participate in the work ofthe GeneralAssembly, butthat the resolution did

not meanthe exclusion of the FRYfrom the UnitedNations. It should be noted,

however,that the permanentrepresentativeof China commentedthat "the resolution
just adopteddoes not meanthe expulsion of Yugoslaviafrom the United Nationsn.

(emphasisadded by Respondent)(UN Doc.S/PV. 3116of 19September 1992)

(Annex 3.12)

The Netherlandswishes to contestthe interpretationgiven by the Applicantto
3.15
the outcome of the debate in the Security Council.First of al1it is a flaw inthe

reasoningof the Applicant to state that the Security Council resolutiondealt with the

issue of terminating the membershipof the FRY in the United Nations.The FRY has

never been a memberof the United Nations.The sole issuewas whether the FRY was
entitled to claim continuationof the membershipof the dissolvedSFRY. Furthermore,therewas noquestionof a compromise,even thoughsome members of the Council

mayhave perceivedthe textof the adopted resolutionas a compromise.In light of the
SecurityCouncil's considerationthat theFRYcould not automatically continuethe

membershipof the former SFRY,the only logical consequencefor the Councilwasto

recommendthatthe FRYas one ofthe successorStates of the former SFRYshould

applyfor membershipand that pendingthe procedureof admissionto membershipit
shall not participatein the work of the GeneralAssembly.If therewas any

compromise,the compromisesolutionwas ratherthe invitation extendedto the

Governmentof the FRYto remedyat its earliest conveniencethe situation that had

arisenas a result ofthe dissolutionof the formerSFRY byapplyingfor membershipin
accordance withthe procedureset out inArticle 4of the UNCharter. The fourother

successorStates of theSFRYdid formallyapplyfor membership.As the positionof

the FRY isnotdifferent fromthat of the othersuccessorStates,the FRYshouldfollow

their example.Furthermorethe claimof the FRYto automatically continuethe
membershipof theSFRYin the United Nationsmustbe seen in the overallcontextof a

claimto automaticallycontinuethe legalpersonalityof the former SFRY. The

Netherlandsfindsit difficultto acceptsucha claimcomingfrom a Statewhoseterritory

and populationconstitute a portionof the territoryand population ofthe predecessor
State. Moreover,underits Constitutionthe constituent parts ofthe SFRY hadequal

status.The legal position of theRepublicof Serbiaandthe Republicof Montenegro

was by no meanssuperiorto that of the otherRepublicswhich after the dissolutionof
the SFRYappliedfor membershipin the United Nations.

3.16 The sameconclusion,ie. that the FRYis not a member ofthe UnitedNations,

can be inferredfrom the adoption by the GeneralAssembly of Resolution 4711(1992)
inwhich theAssemblyacteduponthe recommendationof the Council. The non-

participationof the FRYinthe work of the GeneralAssembly(andfor that matterinthe

Economicand SocialCouncil,aswas decidedbythe Assemblyin its Resolution

471229(1993)of 28 April 1993(Annex3.13) is a logicalcorollaryof the Assembly's
decisionthat the FRY shouldapplyfor membershipinthe United Nations.The useof

the subjunctivemood "should" isapparentlydictated bythe needto leaveit to the

discretion of theFRYauthoritieswhetheror notto applyfor membership, butit is clear

that inthe situationinwhich the FRYfound itself,formal applicationwas andstill is a
conditiosinequa nonfor obtainingmembershipin the United Nations.Any conclusionthat the FRYwouldalreadybe a memberof the United Nationswould be untenable.

The GeneralAssemblyhasdecidedthat the FRYshallnot participateinthe work of

the GeneralAssembly andthe Economic and SocialCouncil. However,the sole
ground for suspendingamemberStatefrom the exerciseof the rights and privilegesof

membership,such as participationin thework of the mentioned organsand subsidiary

bodiesthereof, is containedinArticle 5 of the Charter,which is ciearlynot applicablein

the presentcase. Therefore,the Assembly'sdecisionthat the FRYshall notparticipate
inthe work of the GeneralAssemblycan only be interpretedasan additionex

abundanticautelato its decisionthat the FRYis not a UN memberand, hence,thatthe

FRY should applyfor membershipinthe United Nations.

3.17 With regardto the abovementionedGA Res.471229(1993) inwhich the

GeneralAssemblyuponrecommendationof the Security Council(SC Res.821 (1993)

of the samedate (Annex 3.14)decidedthat theFRYshall not participatein the work of
the Economicand SocialCouncil,the Applicantstates that"If Yugoslavia's

membershipin the Organizationwasterminatedor suspendedby resolution4711,

therewould be no needfor a newresolutionexcludingYugoslaviafrom the work of the

Economic andSocial Council".(Memorial,para.3.1.5). Inthe viewof the Netherlands
GA Res.471229(1993) (andforthat matterSC Res.821 (1993)) was indeed

redundant,but it goestoo far to cal1into question the basisfor the adoption of this

resolution,i.e.the impossibilityfor the FRYto automaticallycontinuethe membership

of the former SFRY,whichwas explicitlyreaffirmedin SC Res. 821(1993).

3.18 In its Memorial(para. 3.1.7)the Applicantstates thatthe GeneralAssembly

confirmed byits Resolution52121 5 (1997) of 22 December1997(Annex3.15) thatthe

FRY is a member State ofthe United Nations.This resolution establishesthe scaleof
assessmentsfor the apportionmentof the contributionsof memberStatesto the

regular budget of the UnitedNations overa threeyear period.Thelist of member

Statesannexedto the resolutionincludes "Yugoslavia".The Netherlands,however,

cannotconcurwith theview of the Applicant.As already pointedout above (para.3.7)
although theSFRYhadceasedto exist, this does not meanthat the membershipof

the SFRY has beenformallyterminated.Inthe apparent expectationthatthe FRY

would make everyeffort to remedyits lack of legalstatus vis-à-visthe UnitedNations
by presenting aformalwritten applicationfor membership,the GeneralAssemblyinResolution4711(1993) has not taken a forma1decisionto terminate the membershipof

the SFRY. Resolution52121 5 (1997) (andfor thatmatter GA Res.49119 (1994) of 23

December 1994establishingthe scale of assessmentsfor the previousthree year
period) (Annex 3.16)must be seen as a consequencethereof. The reference to

"Yugoslavia" in the Annex to this resolutioncan only be interpreted as a referenceto

the SFRY and not to the FRY. Uponrecommendationof the Cornmitteeon

Contributions (UN Doc.A 47111,paras.63 and 64) (Annex 3.17)the General
Assembly had alreadyat its 47th session, in December 1992,decidedthat the rates of

assessment of Bosniaand Herzegovina, Croatiaand Slovenia, being new membersof

the United Nations, should be deducted fromthat of "Yugoslavia" (GA Decision471456

of 23 December 1992) (Annex3.18). A similar decisionwas taken at its48th session

(23 December 1993)with regardto the new member "The former Yugoslav Republicof
Macedonia"(GA Res. 481223Aof 23 December 1993) (Annex3.19). In the view of the

Netherlandsthis is correct, as it would havebeen unjustifiableto determine the rate of

assessrnentof the SFRY, as if the territory of the SFRY had not been considerably

reduceddue to the separation of a nurnberof successor States who had become
members of the United Nations intheir own right and mustaccordingly be assessed

separately.

3.19 In support of thesame argument, namelythe continuationof its membership

in the United Nations,the Applicant in its Memorial (para.3.1.8 et seq.) cites a number

of letters on the part of the Secretary-Generaland certain UN practiceswith regardto
the legal status of "Yugoslavia":

(1) Inthe first placethe Applicant cites numerousletters remindingthe authorities of

the FRY of its arrears inthe paymentof its contributionsto the Organisation as well as

the Note of the Secretary-Generalof 8 January 1993 informingthe FRY authorities of

the assessment of the Yugoslavcontributionto the financing of the United Nations
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEMII). Boththe Note and the letters are

reproducedin the Annexes 169until inclusive 174to the Applicant's Memorial.

(2) Furthermore reference is madeto a letterof the UN Legal Counsel of 29

September 1992,addressedto the PermanentRepresentativesof Bosnia and
Herzegovinaand Croatia and a letterof the Acting Director of the Office of the Legal

Counsel of 15 December 1997 (reproducedin Annex 167to the Applicant's Memorial),

both dealing,interalia,with the practicalconsequencesof the adoption by the General

19Assemblyof Resolution4711(1992)suchas the continued arrangement ofseat and

nameplateof"Yugoslavia"in GeneralAssemblybodies,the continued displayof the
flag of the former SFRYin front of the United Nationsheadquarters andthe continued

functioning ofthe Yugoslav Permanent Mission to the UnitedNations.

(3)Finally,the Applicant refersto the listing of "Yugoslavia"as "an originalMember" of

the United Nationsinthe annualreports of the Secretary-Generalpublishedafter1992
on thestatusof multilateraltreaties depositedwithim.

3.20 The Netherlandssubmitsthat the letters citedbythe Applicant in theAnnexes

169untilinclusive174to its Memorial andrelatingto arrears inthe paymentof
contributionsto the regularUN budget andto the financing ofother activitiesinthe

frameworkof the United Nationsshouldhavebeenin conformity with thedecisionof

the competent organsof the UnitedNationsnotto terminatethe membershipofthe

former SFRYand notto recognisetheclaim ofthe FRYto automatically continuethe
membershipofthe SFRYin the UnitedNations.In other words,the fact thatthese

lettershave been mistakenlyand in anyeventunjustifiably addressedby or on behalf

of theSecretary-Generalto the PermanentRepresentativeorChargéd'Affairesa.i of
the Federal RepublicofYugoslavia cannotleadto the conclusion thatthe FRYhas

become amemberof the UnitedNations. Underthe Charterit is the exclusive

responsibilityof the GeneralAssembly to admit newmembers orto expel members

uponthe recommendationof the Security Council.Therefore inthe view of the
Netherlandsit is the exclusivecompetenceof theseorgansto determinewhichStates

are memberStates ofthe UnitedNations.

3.21 The practiceof keepingthe attributesof sovereigntyuch asthe nameplate
"Yugoslavia"andflag relateto the formerSFRYand notto the FRY.This is confirmed

inthe abovementioned letters of the LegalCounsel andActing Directorof the Officeof

the LegalCounselcited bythe Applicant.Inthe absenceof a formal decisionbythe

GeneralAssemblyto terminate themembershipof the SFRYboththe LegalCounsel
and the ActingDirectorof the Officeof the LegalCounselbasedthemselvesuponthe

continued membershipofthe SFRYinthe United Nations.They pointoutthat

Resolution4711(1992) ofthe GeneralAssemblyneitherterminatednorsuspended

"Yugoslavia's"membershipintheOrganizationand they make a careful distinction
betweenthe Federal Republicof Yugoslavia onthe one handand "Yugoslavia"toutcourtonthe other.

llluminating isalsothe practiceinthe Security Council,wheneverthe issueof the
situationin Yugoslaviais onthe agenda,to invitethe Permanent Representativeof the

FRYor the Chargéd'Affairesa.i in hispersonalcapacity,"to be seatedat the sideof

the Council Chamber",without referenceto Rule37 ofthe Council's ProvisionalRules

of Procedure(whichrefersto "Any Memberof the United Nationswhich isnot a
memberof the Security Council") andwithoutreferenceto hisrepresentinganyState

(seee.g.the OfficialCommuniquéof the 4102ndmeetingof the Security Councilheld

in privatein the SecurityCouncilChamberat Headquarterson 16 February2000, UN

Doc.SlPV.4102of 16 February 2000) (Annex 3.20).

3.22 The relevant practicesin the Security Counciland in GeneralAssembly

bodiesaswell asthe referencesto "Yugoslavia"in the abovementionedlettersof the

Legal Counselandthe Acting Directorof the Office of theLegalCounsel and inthe
annualreportsof the Secretary-Generalon thestatusof multilateraltreaties also

explainwhythe Registrarof the InternationalCourtof Justice continuesto list

"Yugoslavia"as an "originalmember"among theStates, membersof the United
Nations,entitledto appear beforethe Court pursuantto Article 35,paragraph 1,of the

StatuteandArticle 93, paragraph1,of the Charter.It is obvious that "Yugoslavia"

refersto the SFRY.

Similarly,the latestwebsite of the InternationalCourtof Justice lists "Yugoslavia"as an
"original member" amongthe States,membersof the United Nations,entitledto

appearbeforethe Court.The Netherlandsobjectsto the fact that the declarationof

the FRYof 26April 1999underArticle 36, paragraph2, of the Statute has beenplaced

nextto the name"Yugoslavia".However,thiswebsiteis preparedbythe Registryand
in noway involvesthe responsibilityof the Courtitself.

3.23 At thelatestsessionof the GeneralAssemblyinitialsteps haven beentaken

to find a solutionto the anomalyof maintainingthe attributesof the former SFRY,buta
decisioncould not be reached.This failureto set therecord straightdoes not affectthe

validityof GA Res. 4711(1992),in whichthe GeneralAssemblywith the backingand

uponthe recommendationofthe Security Councilin unequivocalterrnsdeniesthe FRY
the rightto automatically continuethemembershipof the SFRYin the UnitedNations.3.24 In hisletterof 15December1997,citedinthe Annexesto the Applicant's

Memorial,the Acting Directorof the Officeof the Legal Counselrefersto GA Res.
48/88 (1993)of 20 December 1993 (Annex3.21),inwhichthe GeneralAssembly,inter

alia,reaffirmsits Resolution4711(1992)and urges memberStatesandthe Secretariat

infulfillingthe spirit of that resolutionto end the de factoworking status ofthe FRY.

Fromthe context ofthe Applicant'sMemorial itmaybe inferredthat the Applicant takes
the positionthat the quoted paragraphof GA Res.48/88 (1993)constitutesan

argumentin supportof itsthesisthat the FRYis a memberof the United Nations.The

Netherlands does not agree with thisview. Firstof all,the GeneralAssembly qualifies

the "working status"of the FRYas a "de factoworkingstatus", notas a "dejure
workingstatus". However,inthe view of the Netherlandsthis cal1of the General

Assemblyto put an endto the currentuncertainty withregardto the status of the FRY

vis-à-visthe United Nations Organisationcanonlybe seen as an invitationto the FRY

to formallyapplyfor membershipinthe UnitedNationsin accordancewith Article 4of
the Charter.

3.25 Finally, inorderto supportits claimthat the FRYis a partyto the Statuteof
the InternationalCourt of Justice,the Applicantrefersto a numberof proceedings

beforethe Court itself(Memorial,para. 3.1.18et seg.)

Inthe first placereferenceis madeto the Applicationfiled bythe Government of the

Republicof Croatiaon 2 July 1999(para.28), inwhich Croatia states "thatthe Court
hasjurisdictionin this casepursuantto Article36, paragraph1,of its Statute".

Secondly,the Applicant refersto the Memorialof the Governmentof the Republicof

Bosnia andHerzegovina(Memorial,15April 1994,p. 170)inthe Case concerningthe

Applicationof the Conventionon the Prevention and Punishrnent otfhe Crimeof
Genocide(Bosnia andHerzegovinav. Yugoslavia),PreliminaryObjections,Judgrnent

of 11July 1996,1.C.J. Reports 1996 (hereinafter:Genocide 1996Case), in which

Bosniaand Herzegovinaconfirmedthat "Yugoslavia isa Partyto the Court'sStatuten.

Thirdly,the Applicant states thatby applyingthe rulesof the Statutein the Genocide
1996Casethe Court confirmedthat theFRYis a State partyto the Statute. Inthe view

of the Applicantthe Statuteof the Courtis an internationaltreaty which isin force only

amongState parties(Memorial, paras. 3.1.19,3.1.20and 3.1.21).3.26 The Netherlandsholdsthe view thatthe referencesto the above-mentioned
Applicationof the Republicof Croatia andMemorialof the Republicof Bosnia and

Herzegovinado not provideany evidence thatthe FRY is a partyto the Statuteof the

Court. It is the exclusivecompetenceof the GeneralAssembly andthe Security

Counciland not of individualUN member States todeterminewhether a particular
State is a memberof the UnitedNationsandthus ipso facto a partyto the Statute.

BothCroatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina hada politicalinterest in instituting

proceedingsbeforethe Court againstthe FRYandtherefore in persuadingthe Court

that it hadjurisdictionto entertaintheir respectiveApplications. Fromtheir perspective
it would clearly have been counterproductiveto denythat the FRYis a partyto the

Statuteof Court. The fact that Croatiaand Bosnia andHerzegovinaapparently

believed(or had an interestto believe)that the FRYis entitledto appear beforethe

Court is in stark contrast with the position bothStatesadoptedon 28 May 1999when
they senta communicationto the Secretary-Generalin his capacity as depositaryof

multilateraltreaties in which they challengedthe validityof the declarationof the FRY

acceptingthe jurisdiction of the CourtnderArticle 36, paragraph2, of the Statute,on

the groundsthat the FRY is not a memberof the United Nationsand not a partyto the
Statute(Traités Multilatérauxdéposés auprès du SecrétaireGénéral;Etat au 31

Décembre 1999,UN Doc. STlLEGlSER.El8 (Vol. 10,pp. 32-33)(Annex3.22).

3.27 The Netherlandsdoes not sharetheview ofthe FRYthat "by applicationof
rulesof the Statute in the [Genocide 19961Case, the InternationalCourt ofJustice

confirmedthatthe FR of Yugoslaviais a State Partyto the Statute"(Memorial,para.

3.1.21).

At the provisionalmeasuresstage of thisCasethe Court stated that at that stageof
theproceedingsthere was no needto determinedefinitivelythe questionwhetheror

notYugoslaviawas a memberof the UnitedNationsand as such a partyto the Statute

of the Court (Order of 8 April 1993,I.C.J. Reports1993,para. 18).The Netherlands
further notesthat theCourt did not returnto the issue, neitherin its subsequentOrder

on the occasion of further requestsof Bosniaand Herzegovinafor the indicationof

provisionalmeasures (13September 1993) norin its Judgmentat the preliminary

objectionsstage ofthe case (11 July 1996).It shouldbe stressedagainthat this may
be explainedbythe fact that neither of thetwo Partiesinvolved,the Applicant: Bosniaand Herzegovinaand the Respondent:the FRY, had apoliticalinterestin pressingthe

issue.

Onthe basis ofArticle 35, paragraph2, ofthe Statute,the Court consideredin its

Orderof 8April 1993(para.19)that proceedingsmayvalidlybe institutedby a State
against a Statewhich is a partyto a special provisionin a treaty inforce (suchas the

compromissoryclauseinthe GenocideConvention)but isnot a partyto the Statute,

and independentlyof theconditionslaid downin SC Res.9 (1946);and that a

cornprornissoryclause ina rnultilateralconvention,suchasArticle IX of the Genocide
Conventioncouldbe regardedprima facieas a special provision containedin a treaty

inforce andthat, if Bosniaand HerzegovinaandYugoslavia areboth partiesto the

Genocide Convention,disputesto which ArticleIX applies arein any eventprima facie

withinthejurisdictionrationepersonaeof the Court.
Inthis contextthe Netherlandswould liketo referto the following analysis of Article35,

paragraph2, of the Statuteby Rosenne (TheLawand Practiceof the International

Court, 1920-1996,Vol. II, p. 629):

"The expressionin paragraph2 ofthe Statuteof the PermanentCourt subject

to thespecialprovisionsof treatiesin forceapparentlywas intendedto referto
the PeaceTreaties afterthe FirstWorldWar. Theycontainedseveral
provisionsgivingthe PermanentCourtjurisdictionoverdisputes arisingfrom
them, andthey wereinforce beforethat Statutewas adopted.Article35,
paragraph2, madeit possible forlitigationto take place with the former
enemyPowersdespitethe fact that at the time the Protocolof Signaturewas

adopted,theywere not qualifiedto becomepartiesto that instrument.
Accordingly, "inforce" meantthat the treatyhadto be in force on the date of
entryintoforce of the Statuteof the Permanent Court(takenas 1 September
1921)"

The Netherlandssubmitsthat this restrictive interpretationof the phrase"subjectto the

special provisionsof treatiesinforce" is the correctone.A broaderinterpretationwould

place partiesto suchtreaties which arenot partiesto the Statutein a privileged
positionas they wouldhaveaccessto the Court withoutassumingthe obligations

requiredfrom Stateswhich acceptthe jurisdictionof the Court. Moreover,the above

mentionedfinding of theCourtthat it hadprima faciejurisdiction in the provisional

measures phase of theGenocide 1996Casewas not challengedby the Respondent
(the FRY). Finally, asRosennerightlyobserves(p. 630) : "Thatprovisionalfinding is

not conclusiveofthe matter".3.28 Insummary,the Netherlandsholdsthe viewthat on the groundsset forth

aboveit mustbe concluded thatthe FRYis not a member ofthe United Nations and

therefore notipso factoa party tothe Statute;that the FRY hasnot become a partyto
the Statutein accordancewith the procedure laiddown inArticle 93, paragraph2, of

the Charter; norhas it acceptedthe jurisdictionof the Court by makinga declaration

pursuantto SC Res.9 (1946).

3.29 The unilateral declarationof the FRYacceptingthe jurisdiction of the Court is

invalidanddoes in anyevent not establishjurisdictionof the Courtonthe basis of

Article 36, paragraph2, of the Statuteof the Court vis-à-visthe Netherlands.In

conclusiontheFRY is not entitledto appearbeforethe Court.4. ARTICLE36, PARAGRAPH2, OF THE STATUTEOF THE COURTDOES
NOT PROVIDEA BASISFORJURlSDlCTlONOF THE COURT

4.1 The Netherlandssubrnitsthat theCourt lacksjurisdictioninthe presentcase

onthe basis ofArticle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statuteof the Court. It pointsout that the
unilateraldeclarationof the FRYacceptingon thatbasis the jurisdictionof the Court

(Annex1 .l, for the Netherlandsunilateraldeclaration,see Annex1.2),the validityof

which andlor applicabilityvis-à-visthe Netherlandsis disputed (see thisMernorial,

para.3.1l), in any eventlirnitsrationetemporisits acceptanceof the cornpulsory
jurisdictionof the Courtto "disputesarising orwhichrnayarise afier the signatureof

the present Declaration,with regardto the situationsor facts subsequentto this

signature".The Netherlandsrnaintainsthat the dispute betweentheFRYandthe

Netherlandsclearlyarosebeforethe dateof signatureof the Yugoslavdeclarationand

thereforefalls outsidethe scopeof thejurisdiction of the Court.

4.2 Inthis connectiontheNetherlandswouldliketo quote paras. 27-29of the

Orderof the Court of 2 June 1999concerningYugoslavia'srequestfor the indicationof

provisionalrneasuresinthe caseconcerningLegalityof Useof Force (Yugoslaviav.
Netherlands):

"27.WhereasYugoslavia'sApplicationis entitled"Application ofthe Federal
Republicof Yugoslaviaagainstthe Kingdomof the Netherlandsfor Violation
of the ObligationNotto Use Force";whereasin the Applicationthe "subjectof
the dispute"(ernphasis added)is describedin generalterms [see para. 1(of
the Order) above];butwhereasit can be seen bothfrom the statement of

"facts uponwhichthe claimis based"andfrorn the rnannerinwhichthe
"clairns"thernselvesareformulated(seeparas.3 and 4 of the Order above)
that the Application is directed,in essence,againstthe "bornbingof the
territory ofthe FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia",to which the Courtis askedto
put an end;

28. Whereasit is an establishedfact that the bornbingsin question beganon
24 March 1999andhavebeen conductedcontinuouslyover a period
extendingbeyond25April 1999;and whereasthe Court hasno doubt, inthe
light,inter alia,of the discussionsat the SecurityCouncilmeetings of24 and
26 March 1999 (SIPV.3988 and3989)'that a "legaldispute"(East Timor

(Portugalv. Australia),I.C.J.~eporfs 1995,p. 100, para.22) "arose" between
Yugoslaviaandthe Respondent,as it did alsowiththe other NATOrnernber
States,well before 25April 1999concerningthe legalityof those bornbingsas
such,taken as a whole; 29.Whereas the fact that the bombingshave continuedafter 25April 1999
and that the disputeconcerning them haspersistedsincethat date is notsuch
as to alter the dateon which thedisputearose; whereaseach individualair
attackcould not have givenriseto a separatesubsequent dispute;and
whereas,at this stage of the proceedings,Yugoslaviahas not establishedthat

newdisputes, distinctfrom the initialone, have arisen betweenthe Parties
since25 April 1999in respectof subsequentsituationsor facts attributableto
the Netherlands;"

4.3 What is it one mayinferfrom this?

(1) That a "legal dispute" "arose"betweenYugoslaviaandthe Netherlands,a fact not
disputedbyeither of the Parties andconfirmedby the Court.

(2)Thatthe "subject of the dispute"as describedbythe FRYin itsApplicationis

as follows:

"The subject-matterof the dispute are actsof the Kingdomof the Netherlands
bywhich it hasviolatedits internationalobligation banningthe useof force
against anotherState, theobligationnotto interveneinthe interna1affairs of
another State, the obligationnotto violatethe sovereigntyof anotherState,
the obligationto protectthe civilian populationandcivilianobjects inwartime,

the obligationto protecttheenvironment,the obligationrelatingto free
navigationon internationalrivers,the obligation regardingfundamentalhuman
rightsandfreedoms,the obligationnotto use prohibitedweapons,the
obligationnotto deliberatelyinflict conditionsof life calculatedto causethe
physicaldestruction of a nationalgroup;"

(3)That accordingto the Court it couldbe seen both fromthe statementof "facts upon

whichthe claim is based" andfrom the mannerinwhichthe "claims"themselveswere

formulated thatthe Applicationwasdirected, inessence,against "the bombingof the
territory ofthe FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia",to whichthe Courtwas askedto put an

end.

(4) That, accordingto the Court,the fact thatthe bombings have continued after25

April 1999andthat the disputeconcerning them haspersistedsincethat date is not

such as to alter the dateonwhichthe disputearose, i.e.well before25April 1999, and
that each individual air attack couldnot havegivenrise to a separatesubsequent

dispute.

(5)That, accordingto the Court,"atthis stageof the proceedings"Yugoslavia

had not establishedthatnewdisputes,distinct fromthe initialone had arisenbetween
the Partiessince 25April 1999in respectof subsequentsituations or facts attributable

to the Netherlands. In its Memorialthe FRY now maintains that"since the Orders of the Court,
4.4
dated 2 June 1999,the dispute aggravated and extended.It got new elements

concerningfailures of the Respondentsto fulfil their obligations established by Security

Council resolution 1244and bythe 1948Convention onthe Preventionand
Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide. Negatingthe alleged humanitarian motivesof

the Respondents,the new elements areof crucial importancefor the substance of the

dispute". (Memorial, Introduction,para. 12;see also para. 3.2.11et seq.) and that "Due

to the fact that the dispute matured,through the newelements, the Applicant considers
that the circumstancesrelatedto thejurisdiction of the Court have changed so that the

Court has the jurisdiction to resolvethe dispute." (Memorial, Introduction,para.16).

4.5 The Netherlandsdisputesthat by simplyadding some "[disputed] new
[disputed]elements", called "constituentelements of the dispute" by the Applicant

(Memorial, para. 3.2.14),the originaldispute which,accordingto the Court, arose

before25 April 1999,now suddenly hasbeentransformed into one which has arisen

afterthat date. The Netherlands submitsthat the "[disputed] new [disputed] elements"
must be considered as a continuationandextensionof the original dispute or a

reasonablyto expect follow-uporconsequencebe regarded as part of the aggravated

andlor extended original dispute and notas a newand separate dispute. As will be set

forth below (para. 7.3)the Netherlandssubmits, inthe alternative,that the claim of the
FRY relatingto the "[disputed] new [disputed]elements"must be deemed inadmissible

because it constitutes a new claimchangingthe subject of the dispute originally

submittedto the Court inthe Application.

4.6 According to the Netherlands,it is out of the question that the "new elements

concerningfailures of the Respondentsto fulfil their obligations established by Security

Council resolution1244and bythe 1948Convention onthe Preventionand

Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide" nowsuddenlyhave createdjurisdiction for the
Court on the basis of Article6, paragraph2, of the Statute of the Court,on disputed

matterswhere it did not have suchjurisdiction, accordingto the Court, in its Order of 2

June 1999.4.7 The Netherlandsdoes not believethat bysimplyadding a newdisputed

element tothe already existingonesand earmarkingit as a constituent elementof the
dispute, mattersin disputewhicharose beforethe criticaldate of 25April 1999can be

carriedoverthat date, a fortiorinotwhen the Court has alreadydecided thatsuch

mattersarosebeforethe criticaldate.

4.8 Bysuggesting that thenewelementconsisting inthe allegedfailure of the

Netherlandsto fulfil its obligationsestablishedbythe SC Res. 1244andbythe 1948

GenocideConvention constitutesa constituentelementof the disputebetweenthe

Netherlandsandthe FRY, whichdisputecouldonlyarisewhen al1 its constituent
elements have come intoexistence,theFRYin fact nowseemsto claim that al1the

disputed matters raisedbythe FRYin itsApplicationof 29April 1999did not andcould

not amountto a dispute.

4.9 Sucha claimed situation is, ofcourse,whollyat variance with Yugoslavia's

ownApplication statingthe subject-matterof the dispute as quotedabove (para.4.3 of

this Memorial),its ownconduct duringthe proceedingsbeforethe Courton

Yugoslavia'srequestfor the indicationof provisionalmeasuresandthe conclusionof
the Court in para.28 ofits Orderof 2 June 1999"that a"legaldispute" .."arose"

betweenYugoslaviaandthe Respondent,as it did alsowith the other NATOmember

States,well before25April 1999".

4.10 The suggestion impliedbythe FRYin its Memorialthatthe disputed matters

describedin itsApplication of29April 1999 cannotor no longerbe considered asa

dispute betweentheFRYandthe Netherlandsisat variance with whatthe FRYstates

in its ownMemorial.E.g., in para.3.2.11of its Memorialit states:"After the Ordersof
the Court,dated 2 June 1999,the dispute aggravatedand extended.It got new

elements..."(emphasisaddedby Respondent),whichclearly suggests that therewas

alreadyquestion of apreviouslyexistingdispute;or in para. 3.2.12: "no doubt that
these newdisputed elementsrelatedto the bombingof the territory of theApplicant

are pari andparcel of the dispute"emphasis added);or in para. 3.2.14: "thedispute

whichstartedto arise before 25April 1999"(emphasisadded);or in para. 3.2.16.:"The

dispute arose in the discussionsat the Security Councilmeetingsof 24 and 26 March
1999 between Yugoslaviaandthe Respondentsbefore25 April1999 concerningthelegalityof those bombingsas such,taken as a whole" (emphasisadded).

It is clearthat even accordingto the FRY'Sownstatementsthe alleged "eventsor

breachesafter IOJune 1999" mustbe regardedasan aggravationandextensionof an

existing disputewhich hadalreadyarisen before 25 April 1999and not as a newand
separatedispute.

4.11 Inthis connectionthe Netherlandsalso submitsthat the referencemadeby

the FRYin its Memorial (para. 3.2.13)to the pronouncementsof the Courtinthe case
concerningRight of Passageover lndian Territos/,Merits,Judgment of 12April1960,

1.C.J Reports 1960,pp. 33, 34) on the questionwhen a disputearisesis not convincing

inthe presentcase.

4.12 Inthat case the Courtapparently baseditself onthe fact that the various

elementsof the dispute presentedtogetherby Portugalto the Court constituted

constituent elementswhich must al1havecomeinto existencebeforethe dispute could

be deemedto have at al1arisen. Thatis a completelydifferent situationfrom the one at
present beforethe Court. Newelementswhich aggravateand extendan already

existing dispute andwhichtheoretically couldgiveriseto a disputein itselfwhen

occurring alonecannotbe regardedas constituent elementsof a disputewithout

which the dispute couldnot havearisenat all.

4.13 The Netherlandsconcludesthateventaking into accountthe "[disputed]new

[disputed] elementsnaddedbythe FRYto thedisputein its Memorial,the disputemust

still be regardedas one which has arisen before25 April 1999.Accordingly theCourt

must be deemedto have nojurisdictionin respectof the disputeonthe basisof Article
36, paragraph2, of the Statuteof the Court.5. ARTICLEIX OF THE GENOCIDECONVENTIONDOES NOT PROVIDEA

BASISFORJURlSDlCTlONOF THE COURT

5.1 Inthe Memorialof the FRYtwo separatesubmissionsare presented,

requestingtheCourtto adjudgeanddeclarethat the Netherlands is responsiblefor

violationsof its obligationsunderthe 1948GenocideConvention(Annex5.1).
The first submissionrelatesto the bombingof the territoryof the FRY,the causingof

enormousenvironmentaldamageandthe useof depleted uranium.This submissionis

identicalto the one,submittedbythe FRY to the Courtin its Requestfor the indication

of ProvisionalMeasuresof 29 April 1999.
The second submissionrelatesto a failureto preventkilling,woundingand ethnic

cleansing ofSerbs andother non-Albaniangroupsin Kosovoand Metohija andthereby

to preventgenocide andotheracts enumeratedin ArticleIII of the Genocide

Convention.This submissiondid not form partof the Applicationfiled bythe FRYon 29
April 1999.

5.2 As has been setforth elsewhereinthis Memorial(para.7.3)this second

submissionmust,accordingto the Netherlands,be either consideredto bewholly
inadmissiblebecauseit involvesa newclaim andsubmissionchangingthe subjectof

the dispute originally submittedto the Court inthe Application orelse be consideredas

a continuationandextensionof the originaldisputeor a reasonablyto expectfollow-up

or consequenceof the original disputewhich shouldbe regardedas part of the
aggravated andlorextended originaldispute(para.4.5 etseq.)and hence partof a

disputewhich hadalreadyarisen before25April 1999in respect of which theCourt will

not havejurisdictiononthe basisof Article 36, paragraph2, of the Statute.

5.3 Inthe following paragraphs,the Netherlandswill further commenotnthe

submissionsof the FRYasto the responsibilityof the Netherlands underthe Genocide

Convention.Beforeenteringinto this discussion, however,the Netherlandswouldlike
to stress inthe first place,that thesubmissionsof the FRY in this respectare largely

basedon unsubstantiatedand oftenvaguelyformulated"facts".As indicatedbefore

(para. 1.6)the Netherlandswouldliketo reiteratethatal1these "facts"are considered

merelyas allegations,to whichthe Netherlands, unlessexplicitly indicatedotherwise,
does not agree. Furthermore,the Netherlandswill inits commentsin relationto theallegationsunderthe GenocideConventionmake a distinction between the arguments

as theyare relatedto the Applicationof the FRYof 29 April 1999and the arguments

relatingto the newelements arising after10June 1999.
Finally,the Netherlandswould liketo stresshere,that from themerefact that the

Netherlands providesa reactionto the allegationsfromthe FRYin relationto the

GenocideConvention,it maynot be concludedin itselfthat a disputeexists between

the FRYandthe Netherlandswithin themeaningof Article IX of the Genocide
Convention.The reaction ofthe Netherlandshereservesexclusivelyto showthat the

allegationsfromthe FRY inthis respect aretotally unsubstantiatedand thatno sucha

disputecan reasonably beinferredfrom the Memorialof the FRYandthe reaction

theretofrom the Netherlands.

5.4 The first submissionof the FRYon responsibilityunderthe Genocide

Conventionrelatesto the obligation"notto imposedeliberatelyon a national group

conditionsof life calculatedto bringaboutthe physicaldestructionof the group"
(Memorial,Introduction, para.4).

This obligation is violated,so the argumentgoes,becauseof the fact that the

Netherlandshastaken part in,interalia,the bombingof the territory of theFRY,the

destruction of monuments,oil refineries,etc. and "inparticularby causingenormous
environmentaldamageand by using depleted uranium"(Memorial,Introduction,para.

5). The Memorial,however,fails to provideanyevidencefor this allegation.It merely

sometimesrefersto a genocidal intent, but neversubstantiatessuch allegations.

5.5 As to the bombing, the Memorialprovidesan extensiveoverview of"facts",

which are allegedly theresultof the bombingon Yugoslavterritory.Thesefacts,

however,fail to provideeven a beginningofproofof a genocidalintentfrom the parties

involvedin the conflict,let alonein particularthe Netherlands.As to the causing of
environmental damage,the Memorialtriesto set up a genocidalintenttheory in

relationto the continued attacksonthe Pancevochemical industry plants,because

these plantswere installedwith western participationand becausethe attackswere

allegedly aimedat creating badenvironmentalconditionsfor the population.The
Memorial, however,merely suggeststhis intent,without substantiatingthis allegation

with anysort of evidence. Andas to the use of depleted uranium sheils,the Memorial

againfalls shortof providinganygenocidalintenttheory. It merelystates thatdepleteduraniumhas been used, butfails to indicatewhen,where and bywhorn.

5.6 The second submissionrelatingto the responsibilitiesof the Netherlands
underthe GenocideConventionrelatesto the "failureto preventkilling,woundingand

ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other non-Albaniangroupsin Kosovo andMetohija".

Accordingto this submission,the Netherlandshas acted in breach of its obligation"to

preventgenocideand other acts enumeratedin article III of the Genocide Convention".
Inthe Memorial,mention is repeatedlymadeof the killing and woundingof Serbs and

other non-Albaniangroups "by Albanianterrorists".The facts are, however, regularly

unclearandthe Mernorial rnerelystatesthat such acts took place "in the area under

controlof KFOR".

5.7 Inorderto deterrninethe responsibilityof a State for violationof its obligations

underthe GenocideConvention,a nurnberof criteriahaveto be fulfilled:
(a) an intentto destroy;

(b) a destructioninwhole or in part of agroup;

(c) a group that is protectedunderthe GenocideConventionandwhich is the object

of the genocideas such;
(d) genocidal acts,as defined inArticle II,(a- (e), of the 1948Genocide Convention.

5.8 Accordingto the Court in itsOrderof 2 June 1999, "the essential

characteristic[of genocide] is the intendeddestruction of"a national, ethnical, racialor
religious group" (para. 40). Forthe questionof whetherthe Court has prima facie

jurisdiction over a dispute,falling underArticle IX of the Genocide Convention,the

Netherlandswill focus in particularon the elementsenunciatedunder (a) and (c)

above.

5.9 Ad (a): anintenttodestroy

This intentto destroy relatesto a "specificintent". This"specificintent" is as such

recognisedin the case-lawof the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the former
Yugoslavia(ICTY) and the International CriminalTribunalfor Rwanda(ICTR). For

example,accordingto boththe Akayesucase andthe Kambandacase, it isthe

"specific intent",which makesthe crime of genocide a special crime, a unique crime,

differentfrom other crimes. (ICTR,AkayesuJudgment, Case no.ICTR-96-4-T,2September 1998,para. 498 and ICTR,KambandaJudgment,Case no. ICTR-97-23-S,

4 September 1998, para. 16.Along similar lines: ICTR,JelisicJudgment, ICTYCase
no. IT-95-10, 14December 1999,at para. 66 et se9.Cf. along similarlinesthe

commentaryof the InternationalLawCommissiononArticle 17on Genocide in the

1996Draft Code of Crimesagainstthe Peace and Securityof Mankind, Crimeof

Genocide, para.5, ILC Report 1996,UN Doc.Al51110,pp. 85-88 (Annex 5.2).
The requirementof such a specificintent createsin practice a very high levelof

evidence(cf. ICTY,JelisicJudgment,para. 78 et seq.).Inthis case-law, as well as in

the Elementsof Crimes,as elaborated in draftbythe PreparatoryCommissiononthe

establishmentofthe InternationalCriminalCourt (ICC),it is recognisedthat the
perpetrator notonly committedspecificallyenumeratedcrimes, butthat such crimes

havebeen committedas part of a wider planto destroya group as such. (Cf. ICTY,

JelisicJudgment, para.66 and the draft Elementsof Crimes, UN Doc.
PCNICC/2000NVGECIRT.I,24 March2000) (Annex 5.3).

5.10 Ad (c):a group that is protectedunderthe GenocideConventionand whichis

the object of the genocideas such
The Genocide Conventioncontainsa limitative listof groups, protected underthat

convention. It relatesto national, ethnical,racial or religious groups.The word "as

such" meansthat the genocidalacts haveto be aimedat persons, becauseof the fact

that these persons belongedto such a group.This approachis confirmed by,inter alia,
the ILC in its Commentaryto Article 17on Genocideinthe Draft Code of Crimesof

1996,where it is statedthat "the intentionmust be to destroy agroup and not merely

one ormore individualswho are coincidentallymembersof a particular group. The

prohibitedact must be committedagainstan individual becauseof his membershipin a
particulargroup and as an incrementalstepinthe overall objective of destroying the

group." (ILC, Draft Codeof Crimes 1996,ILC Report 1996, UN Doc.A/51/10, p. 88).

5.11 Taking into accountthe criteria mentioned,the Netherlandsmakes the
following observationson the Memorialof the FRY,in relationto the alleged violations

of its obligationsnderthe GenocideConvention.It would liketo emphasize here

againthat, inthe light of the specialcharacter of the crime of genocide, avery high

level of evidence is requiredinorderevento establishprima faciejurisdiction for the
Court.The burdenof proof lies entirelywith the Applicant in the present case.5.12 Ad (a): an intentto destroy

The Memorialof the FRY merelystates that the Netherlandshad a genocidal intent,
butfails whatsoever tosubstantiatethis allegation.In relationto the participation of the

Netherlandsin the bombingof the territory of the FRY,the Court in its Order of 2 June

1999, alreadyindicated,that "the threat or use of force against a State cannot itself
constitute an act of genocide".The Memorialof the FRYdoes not provide any

additional information,comparedto the informationsubmittedto the Court in relationto

its request for the indicationof provisionalmeasures.The same appliesfor the alleged

responsibilityof the Netherlandsfor the attacks on the Pancevochemical industry
plants and for the alleged use of depleted uraniumbullets.

In relation tohese allegations,the Netherlandswouldliketo observethe following:

-the allegations in themselvesare insufficientlysubstantiatedin order to be considered
as facts, relevantfor the alleged dispute betweenthe FRY and the Netherlands;

-the Memorialof the FRY does not provideany relevant pieceof informationwhich

would relatethe Netherlandsto the allegationsenunciated;
- even if these allegationswould be correct,they do not amountto a beginning of proof

that the Netherlandswould have hada genocidal intentwhen participating in the

military actions againstthe FRY;
- the allegations confusethe law ofgenocide withthe law of armed conflict. The

allegations relateto possibleviolations of the norms relatingto collateral damage and

to norms protecting specific objects, laid down in, inter alia,Additional Protocol I of
1977to the Geneva Conventionsof 1949 (UN Doc.Al321144, 15August 1977). It goes

without sayingthat any alleged violations of such norms may notform the basis of

jurisdiction for the CourtnderArticle IX of the GenocideConvention;
- as far as the attacks on the Pancevo chemicalindustry plants are concerned, the

Netherlandslikesto observethat it is neitherstated nor proventhat the Netherlands

has participated in such attacks. Furthermore,from those attacks, no genocidal intent
can reasonably be inferred;

- as far as the alleged use of depleted uraniumbullets is concerned, again it is neither

stated nor proventhat the Netherlandshas made use of such bullets.The Netherlands
would liketo stress here, however,that the Netherlandsdoes not make use of such

ammunitionand has not madeuse of that ammunitionin any military action againstthe

FRY (Annex 5.4). Furthermore,also here,from the possible use of such bullets, norelationshipcan reasonablybe establishedbetweensuch useand a genocidalintent.
In relationto the participationof the Netherlandsinthe actions againstthe territory of

the FRY,the Memorialfailsthereforeto provideeven a beginningof proofof a

genocidal intent.

5.13 As far as the second submissionrelatingto the responsibilitiesofthe

Netherlandsunderthe GenocideConventionis concerned -the "failureto prevent

killing,wounding andethniccleansingof Serbsandother non-Albaniangroups in

Kosovoand Metohija" -the Memorialagain merelystatesthat a genocidalintent
existed,but fails to substantiatethis statement inwhateverway.The Memorial

mentionsthe killing andwoundingof Serbsandother non-Albaniangroups"by

Albanianterrorists" andsimply statesthat suchacts tookplace"in the area under
controlof KFOR".The Memorial, hereagain,completelyfailsto substantiatethese

allegationsand in particularfails to create a relationshipbetweenthese allegationsand

a genocidalintentof the Netherlandsor to createanother possiblegroundfor

responsibilityfor the Netherlandsunderthe GenocideConvention.The Netherlands
cannotavoid the impressionthatthis part of thesubmission is basedon a totally

erroneous interpretationof the obligationsfor the Netherlandsfollowingfrom Article I et

se9.of the GenocideConvention.

5.14 Ad (c): a groupthatis protectedunderthe Genocide Conventionandwhichis

theobjectof the genocideas such

The FRYargues thatthe acts wereaimedat "a nationalgroup".At the sametime,the
Memorialof theFRY normallydoes not provideany indication asto which national

groupthe alleged victimsbelonged.Ina numberof cases, it is even indicatedthat

personsthatwere attackeddid not belongto the nationalYugoslav group,but
belonged,for example,to Albanianrefugeesor refugeesfrom the RepublicofCroatia.

Also here,the Netherlandswould liketo observe,that the allegations ofthe FRY,

submittedin its Memorial,totally ignorethe fundamental difference between

obligationsunderinternationalhumanitarianlawand obligationsunderthe Genocide
Convention. Fromthe merefactthat FRYterritoryhas beenthe object of military

actions, onemayobviouslynot assumeanygenocidal intent. TheCourtalreadymade

this observation initsrderof 2 June 1999 (para. 40).As becomesclearfrom its
Memorial,the FRYhas abstainedfrom tryingto provideanyfurther informationwhichcould form a basisfor proofof sucha genocidal intent.

5.15 Also in relationto the othercriteria, applicableto the crime of genoci-a

destructionin whole or in part of a groupand specificallyenumeratedgenocidalacts -

the Netherlandsneedsto observe,that the FRYhasfailed to providea substantiation
to anyof the allegations includedin its Memorial.Forexample,no clear numbersof

persons killedare submitted,no indicationsare givenas to the part ofthe population

whichhas been allegedlyvictimised bythe actions,no indicationsare givenas to the
possibleeffects of, for example,the depleteduraniumbullets (apartfromthe fact that

the Netherlandshas not even used such bullets)and no indicationsare given asto

howspecific military actions and actionsby "Albanianterrorists"may beattributedto
the Netherlandsor KFOR.

5.16 Byway ofconclusion,the Netherlandswould liketo statethe following.

Alreadyin its Order of 2 June 1999onthe Requestfor the Indicationof Provisional
Measures,para. 40, theCourt observedthat "itdoes not appearat the presentstage

of the proceedingsthat thebombings ...indeedentailthe elementof intent,towards a

group as such" requiredbythe GenocideConvention.And in para.41 of its Orderthe
Courtcontinued:

"Whereasthe Court istherefore notin a positionto find, at this stageof the
proceedings,thatthe acts imputedbyYugoslavia to theRespondentare
capableof comingwithinthe provisionsof the GenocideConvention; and
whereasArticle IX of the Convention,invokedbyYugoslavia,cannot,
accordingly constitute a basisonwhichthe jurisdictionof the Court could
prima facie befoundedinthis case;"

The Netherlandsobservesthat the Memorialof the FRY presentsa largeamountof

facts that are allegedly the resultof the militaryactionsagainstthe FRYandfacts that

have allegedlybeen committed "underthe authorityof KFOR. The Memorial,
however,does not provideany substantiationof a genocidalintentby either NATOor

the Netherlandsinits participationinhose militaryactions or inthe Netherlands

contributionto KFOR.Neitherdoes it provideanybeginningof proofthat such a
genocidal intentexisted with the Netherlandsin relationto actsagainstSerbsand

other non-Albaniansin Kosovo andMetohija,undertakenbywhat is called"Albanian

terrorists".5.17 The Netherlands likesto recallpara.38 of the Order of the Court of 2 June
1999,in whichthe Court statedthat "in orderto determine, even prima facie,whethera

disputewithinthe meaningof Article IX of the Genocide Conventionexists,the Court

cannot limititselfto notingthat one ofthe Partiesmaintainsthatthe Convention

applies, whilethe otherdenies if'. More substantiatedinformationis needed "to
ascertainwhether the breachesof the Conventionallegedby Yugoslaviaare capable

of falling withinthe provisionsof that instrumentand whether, as a consequence,the

dispute is one which the Court hasjurisdictionrationemateriaeto entertain pursuantto

Article lx." Like in its Requestforthe Indicationof ProvisionalMeasures,the FRY,in
its Memorial,clearlyfails to meetthis test. It simply allegesthat a genocidal intent

exists, butfails to substantiatesuch allegations.It alsofails to providea basisfor the

assessmentof al1other criteria mentioned andtherebyfails to present an arguable

case underArticle IX of the Genocide Convention. TheMemorialfurther seemsto blur
the distinction between internationalhumanitarianlawandthe law of genocide. It is

obvious that such an approachdoes not createjurisdiction forthe Court underArticle

IX of the Genocide Convention.
The Netherlandsmust therefore concludethat Article IX of the Genocide Convention

can not constitutea basis on whichthejurisdiction ofthe Court could be founded.6. THE 1931TREATY OFJUDlClALSETTLEMENT,ARBITRATIONAND

CONCILIATION DOESNOT PROVIDEA BASlSFOR JURlSDlCTlONOF
THE COURT

6.1 In aletter of 12 May 1999the Agent of the FRY submittedto the Court a
"Supplementto the Applicationnof his Government,inwhich the FRY invoked as an

additional basisfor thejurisdiction of the Court,Article 4 of the Treaty of Judicial

Settlement,Arbitration and Conciliationbetweenthe Kingdom of the Netherlandsand

the Kingdomof Yugoslavia, whichwas signed at The Hague on 11March 1931and
entered intoforce on 2 April 1932(hereinafter referredto as "the 1931Treaty") (Annex

6.1).

6.2 In itsrder of 2 June 1999(para.44) the Court stated that it could not take
into considerationthis newtitle ofjurisdiction, as the invocation at such a late state of

the proceedingsseriouslyjeopardised theprinciple of procedural fairnessand the

sound administrationofjustice. The Netherlandswill nowfurther elaborate and add to

the arguments alreadyput forward duringthe proceedingson the request of the FRY
for the indication of provisionalmeasures.

6.3 The FRY basesthe allegedjurisdiction on Article 4 of the 1931Treaty which

reads as follows:

Article 4
Si, dans le cas d'un des litiges visésl'article2, les deux Parties, n'ont paseu
recours à la Commissionpermanente deconciliation ou si celle-ci n 'a pas

réussi à concilier les Parties, le litigesera soumisd'un commun accord par
voie de compromis soit à la Courpermanentede Justice internationalequi
statuera dans les conditionset suivant laprocédure prévues par sonstatut,
soit à un Tribunal arbitral qui statuera dans lesconditions et suivant la
procédureprévuespar la Convention deLa Hayedu 18 octobre 1907pour le
règlement pacifiquedes conflits internationaux.A défaut d'accord entreles

Parties sur le choix de lajuridiction, sur lestermes du compromis ou, encas
de procédurearbitrale, surla désignationdes arbitres,l'uneou l'autre d'entre
elles, après un préavisd'un mois, aura la facultéde porter directement, par
voie de requête,le litige devant laCour permanentede Justice internationale.Article 2to which reference ismade inArticle 4 reads in part:

Article 2
Tous les litiges,de quelquenature qu'ils soient,ayant pourobjet un droit
allégué par une des Hautes Parties contractanteset contesté par l'autre,et

qui n'auraient pu être régléà l'amiable par les procédésdiplomatiques
ordinaires, serontsoumis pourjugement soità la Cour permanentede Justice
internationale,soit à un Tribunal arbitral, ainsiqu'il est prévu ci-a...s.

6.4 Accordingto the Netherlands,the 1931Treaty cannot, however, providean

adequatebasisfor jurisdiction of the Court.
First,the 1931Treaty must bedeemed notto be in force after the successionof the

FRYto the SFRY,sothat the FRYcannot validlyrely on the 1931Treaty as aground

for jurisdiction.

Moreover,the FRYcannotclaimjurisdictionon the basisof the 1931Treaty, as
accordingto Article 37 ofthe Statuteof the Court, a treaty or conventionin force

referringto the Permanent Courtof InternationalJusticemay only be deemedto refer

to the InternationalCourt of Justiceas betweenpartiesto the present Statute.

Further,evenif the 1931Treaty could be invokedbythe FRY,the FRY shouldhave
observedthe procedureexplicitly described inArticle 4 of that treaty, before bringinga

case beforethe Court. We will nowfurther elaborateonthese submissions.

6.5 Byinvokingthe 1931Treaty as abasisfor jurisdiction, the FRY impliesthat

the 1931Treaty, concludedbetweenthe Kingdomof the Netherlandsandthe Kingdom

of Yugoslaviaand subsequentlyinforce betweenthe Kingdomof the Netherlandsand

the SFRY, isstill inforce betweenthe Kingdomof the Netherlandsandthe FRY.

6.6 The Netherlandsdoes not recognisethe FRY asthe continuationof the

SFRY, so that there can be no questionof simplecontinuityof treaties betweenthe

FRYandthe Netherlands.Neithercan the FRYclaim ipsojure continuity as a
successorState of the SFRY.

6.7 The Netherlandsis not a partyto the Vienna Conventionon Successionof

States in respect of Treaties of23 August 1978,in force only as of 6November1996
(hereinafterreferredto as "theVienna Convention") (Annex 6.2), so that Article 34,paragraph 1(a), of this conventiondoes not apply behveenthe Netherlands and the

FRY. Nor can, in the view of the Netherlands,Article 34, paragraph 1(a), be deemed to
incorporatea generally accepted rule or principleof general international law.Article

34, paragraph 1(a), of the conventionreads in part:

"When a part or parts of the territory of a Stateparate to form one or more

States,whether or not the predecessorState continues to exist:
anytreaty inforce at the date of the successionof States in respect of the
entire territory of the predecessor Statecontinues in force in respect of each
successor State so formed;"

6.8 The Vienna Conventionmakes a distinction betweentreaty continuitywith

regard to, on the one hand, State successionof "newlyindependent States" (States
emerging from former colonies) and, on the other hand,State succession of other

States. At the date of conclusionof the Vienna Convention,the overwhelming majority

of cases of State successionconcerned"newlyindependentStates".Article 16of the

Vienna Convention,based on State practiceamong "newlyindependent States",
formulates the general rulewith regardto State successionfor newly independent

States. It reads:

"A newly independentState is not bound to maintain in force, or to becomea

partyto, anytreaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of successionof
States the Treaty was in force in respectof the territory to which the
successionof States relates."

This principle is generally referredto as the "cleanslate rule"

6.9 Article 34 (draft Article 33) refersto cases of State succession otherhan

those concerning"newly independentStates". In its Commentary on the DraftArticles

on Succession of States in Respectto Treaties (ILC Commentary on the DraftArticles

on Succession of States in Respectof Treaties, adopted by the lnternational Law
Commissionat its 26th Session, Doc.AIConf.8014,hereinafter referredto as: "ILC

Commentary")(Annex6.3), the lnternationalLaw Commissiondiscussed fourteen

cases of State succession,otherthan those concerning"newly independent States".
Nine cases concern State succession where thepredecessor State continued to exist

(Belgium/Netherlands;CubaISpain;PanamaIColombia;FinlandIRussia;

CzechoslovakialAustro-HungarianEmpire;PolandlAustro-HungarianEmpire; IrishFreeStateIUnitedKingdom;Pakistanllndia;SingaporelMalaysia).In al1these cases,
the clean slate was appliedwith regardto bilateraltreaties concludedbythe

predecessorState.The five other casesrelate primarilyto the dissolution ofunions

(GreatColombia;NorwaylSweden;AustrialHungary;DenmarkIlceland;UnitedArab

Republic).Within this category,the ruleof ipsojure continuitywas, for instance,not
appliedbythe UnitedKingdominthe caseof the separationof Norwayand Sweden

(ILC Commentaryp. 89).The UnitedKingdomdeclaredthat:

"the separationundoubtedlyafforded[its Government]the rightto examine,
de novo,the treaty engagementsbywhichGreat Britainwas boundto the
Union".

6.10 Inthe case of the terminationof the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria, as one

of the secedingparts,was not preparedto accepttreaty continuity unlessit was
obligedto do so on the basisof peacetreaties(ILCCommentary,p. 88).

6.11 The Netherlandssubmitsthat the practice precedingthe conclusion of the
Vienna Convention does not support theviewthat Article34, paragraph1(a), of the

ViennaConvention containsa generallyacceptedrule or principle ofgeneral

internationallaw. It submits thatArticle 34, paragraph1(a), wasa matter of

progressivedevelopmentof internationallaw,rather than of codification, and that the
"clean slaterule",as embodiedinArticle 15ofthe ViennaConvention (see para.6.8)

containsthe generallyacceptedrule or principleof general international law.

6.12 While not implyingthat the FRYis a "newlyindependent State" as defined in
the Vienna Convention,the findingsand conclusionsof the International Law

Commission concerning"newlyindependent States"are, inthe opinion ofthe

Netherlands,relevant.

6.13 With respectto "newlyindependent States",the Vienna Convention

distinguishes betweenthe continuationof multilateraland bilateral treaties. Whereas a

successor Stateis entitledto consideritself aparty toits predecessor's multilateral

treaties (Article6of theVienna Convention),this is not the casein respect of bilateral
treaties. Article 24, paragraph1,embodiesthe ruleor principlewith respectto the

continuationof bilateraltreaties. reads: " A bilateraltreaty which, atthe date of a successionof States was in force in
respect of the territory to which the successionof States relates, is considered
as being inforce betweena newlyindependentState and the other State
party in conformitywith the provisionsof the treaty when:
(a) They expresslyso agree; or
(b) By reason of their conductthey are to be considered as having so

agreed."

In its comments onArticle 24 (draftArticle 23), the International Law
6.14
Commissionstated that:

"The evidence is plainthat a treaty in force with respectto a territory at the
date of a succession is frequently appliedafterwards as betweenthe newly
independentState and the otherparty or partiesto the treaty; and this
indicatesthat the former legal nexus betweenthe territory and the treaties of
the predecessorState has at any rate some legal implicationsfor the

subsequent relationsbetweenthe newlyindependentState and the other
parties to the treaties. If in the caseof many multilateraltreaties that legal
nexus appearsto generate an actual rightfor the newly independentState to
establish itself as a party or a contractingState, this does not appear to be so
in the case of bilateral treaties.(emphasisby Respondent)

The reasons are twofold. First,the personalequation-the identity of the
other contracting party - although an element also in multilateral treaties,
necessarily plays a moredominant role in bilateraltreaty relations;for the very
object of most bilateraltreaties isto regulatethe mutual rights and obligations
of the parties by referenceessentiallyto their own particular relations and
interests. Inconsequence,it is not possibleautomaticallyto infer from a
State's previousacceptanceof a bilateralTreaty as applicable in respect of a

territory itswillingnessto do so after a successionin relationto a wholly new
sovereign of the territory. Secondly,in the case of a bilateraltreaty there is no
question of the treaty's beingbrought intoforce between the newly
independent State and ifs predecessor, as happens inthe case of a
multilateraltreaty. True, in respectof the predecessorState's remaining
territory the treaty will continue in force bilaterallyas between it and the other

party to the treaty. But shouldthe treaty become applicableas betweenthat
other party andthe newly independentState, it will do so as a new and purely
bilateral relation between them whichis independentof the predecessor
State. (p.65)

The Commissionis therefore awarethat State practiceshows a tendency

towards continuity in the case of certaincategories of treaties. It does not
believe, however,that the practicejustifies the conclusionthat the continuity
derives from a customary legal rule ratherthan the will of the States
concerned (the newlyindependent Stateand the other Partyto its
predecessor'streaty).At any rate, practice does not seem to support the
existence of a unilateral right in a newly independentState to consider a
bilateraltreaty as continuingin force with respectto itsterritory after

43 independenceregardlessof the wishesof the otherparty to the treaty.This is
clearfrom some of the State practicealready setout in commentariesto
previous articles.hus, the numerous unilateraldeclarationsby newly
independentStates examinedin the commentaryto Article 9 have
unmistakablybeen basedon the assumptionthat, as a general rule, the
continuancein force of their predecessor'sbilateraltreatiesis a matter on
whichit would be necessaryto reach anaccordwith the otherparty to each
treaty.(emphasis addedby Respondent) TheCommission is aware that those

declarations envisagethat somecategories of treaties may continue in force
automatically under customary law. But apartfrom these possible exceptions
they clearly contemplatebilateraltreaties ascontinuingin force only by mutual
consent."(p.67) (emphasisadded by Respondent)

6.15 Onthe bases of what has been stated in paras. 6.8 to 6.14 above, the
Netherlandsrepeatsthat, at the time of the conclusionof the Vienna Treaty, the

"clean slaterule"was the generally accepted rule or principle of general international

law in respect of bilateraltreaties whether involving"newly independentStates1'or
other successor States (except in cases of treaties establishing boundaryor other

territorial regimes) and that henceforththe consentof the other party was requiredfor

the continuation of a bilateraltreaty. State practicefollowing the conclusion of the
Vienna Conventiongives further support tothis view, as will be elaborated upon in the

following paragraphs.

6.16.ln its Memorial in the Case concerningApplicationof the Conventionon the

Prevention and Punishmentof the Crimeof Genocide,Bosniaand Herzegovinav.

Yugoslavia,Preliminary ObjectionsJ ,une 1995,(p. 117et seq.) (Annex 6.4), the FRY
sets forth extensivelythat the "cleanslate principle"should be appliedto the Genocide

Conventionwith the object to provethat Bosnia andHerzegovinawas not a partyto

that convention.The argumentationof the FRYto that effect reads -for the relevant
part -as follows:

"B.1.3.1 -As the 1978Vienna Convention onthe Succession of States in
Respectof Treaties has not entered intoforce, the succession of Statesto
internationaltreaties is regulatedbythe customary rules of international law.

8.1.3.2. -As only a few states have ratifiedthe 1978Vienna Convention ...,
the treaty rules set forth inthe Convention havenot beentransformed into
rules of customary law. ...

B.1.4. -Relevantrules of customary internationallaw

B.1.4. Para. 4.2.1.44 ofthe Memorial[of Bosniaand Herzegovina](p. 151)
44says: "These specialfeatures strengthenthe general principle exposed in
Article 34 of the 1978Convention ...which, as seen above, purely codifies the
contemporarypractice of States. According to this provision:

"When a part or parts of the territory of a State separateto form one or more
States, whether or not the predecessorState continues to exist:
anytreaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the
entireterritory of the predecessorState continues inforce in respect of each
successor State so formed;".

Inthe preceding paragraphs of the Memorial(pp. 149-151) the Applicant has
mentionedsome of the opinions of the authorswhich do not corroboratethe
Applicants own claim. In any case, such opinions are held by a minorityof
international legal scholars ..The Applicant has not referredto the practice
codified by this Article. And it could not do so, becausethe case in point, i.e.
Art. 34, indicatesto the contrary.

Article 34 of the 1978Vienna Convention ... is not applicableas rule of

customary internationallaw. It has been introduced inthe Conventionnot as
the result of codification but as a result of progressive development.
(Statement by the Swiss representativeRitter at the United Nations
Conference on Successionof States in respect of Treaties, Vienna 31 July -
23August, 1978, pp. 52-55; Statementof the Spanish representativeat the
Vienna Conference, ibid. p.59; Statementof the U.K. representativeSir lan
Sinclair,ibid.pp. 59,60; Statement byTurkish representative Dogan, ibid.p.
66, Annex pp. 920-926).

8.1.4.3.- The new states establishedin the territory of the former USSR -
Azerbaijan, Estonia,Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan -havenot acted in
linewith the rule set out in Article 34 ofthe 1978Vienna Convention ...

8.1.4.6. -The new states which were created in the territory of the SFRY did
not act in line with theule set forth inArticle 34 of the 1978Vienna
Convention ..They acted in accordancewith the "clean slate" rule and chose

the treaties of the SFRYwhich they wishedto enter into. ...

8.1.4.7 - ..Clearly, in view of the aboveconsiderations,the notes on the
succession bythe Applicant State were no formal proof of the continuityof the
treaties, but an actual choice madeto enter intotreaties, which provesthat
the Applicant State considereditself free from al1treaties to which the SFRY
had been a party, i.e. that like al1other new States concerned it proceeded
from the "clean slate" rule. ...

B.1.4.10 - The "clean slate" rule has been and remains inforce as a rule of
customary internationallawfor new states. The new Statesfreely choose
which treaties of the predecessorstatethey will enter into,with the exception,
of course, of the treaties pertainingto borders and territorial regimes."6.17 The Netherlandscan confirm fromits own practice,thatseveralStates,
previouslyforming part of theUSSR,have not acted inlinewith Article 34, paragraph

1(a), of the Vienna Convention(Annex6.5).

6.18 It should benotedthat the FRY -onlyfour years ago -stated thatthe "clean

slate rule"shouldapplyto the multilateralGenocideConvention. It is clear thatinthe
view of the FRYa bilateralTreaty in the natureof the 1931Treaty would certainly not

automatically remain inforce for a successor State.

6.19 It is Netherlandspracticeto reservethe rightto negotiatethe continuityof

bilateraltreaties withsuccessorStates. Suchnegotiationsmayeventually resultin an

Exchangeof Notes betweenthe Governmentof the Kingdomof the Netherlandsand
the Governmentof thesuccessorState,whichestablishesthe agreementbetweenthe

two Stateson those treaties concludedwith thepredecessorStatewhichwill or will not

continueto be in force (seee.g.the Exchangeof Notes betweenthe Ministryof
ForeignAffairs of theKingdomof the Netherlandsandthe Embassyof the Republicof

Croatia( Annex 6.6).

6.20 Inthis connectionit should be notedthat this practice isalso acceptedand
followed bythe FRY.Infact, the FRY -after the Netherlandsrecognizedit as an

independent,sovereign Stateand as one of the successor Statesto the former SFRY -

proposed consultationson treaty continuationby Noteof 4 July 1996.This invitation
was extended notwithstandingthe claimof the FRYthat it is the continuationof the

SFRYand not one of its successor States(Annex6.7).The Netherlandsacceptedthe

invitationby Note of 15July 1996,indicatingthat this claim of theFRYwas not shared
(Annex 6.8).On 24 July 1996consultationstook place betweenlegalexperts of the

Ministries ofForeignAffairs of both countries,which willbefurther elaborated uponin

para. 6.22.

6.21 In its Memorial (para. 3.3.7)the FRYstated, apparentlyreferringto the

observationsmadebythe Netherlandsduringthe hearingsbeforethe Courton 12 May

1999,that: "The Netherlandsobserved ..that in contrastwith a numberof other bilateral
treaties concludedwith the former Socialist Federal Republicof ugoslavia,
no provisionalmutualagreement hasbeen reachedon thecontinuedvalidity

of the 1931Treaty."

This quotation creates a false impressionin that suggests thatalready an agreement

had been reachedbetweenthe Governmentof the Netherlandsandthe Government

of the FRYto the effect that certain treaties in force betweenthe Netherlandsandthe

SFRYwould continueto apply in the relation betweenthe Netherlandsand theFRY.

6.22 The Notereferredto inthe Memorialof the Applicant(para.3.3.10)and

annexed thereto (No.178, pp. 528-531)is merelya reportof the consultations,which

took placeon 24 July 1996 betweenlegal expertsof the Ministriesof ForeignAffairs of
the Netherlandsandthe FRY. Duringthese consultationstheYugoslavdelegation

assentedto the continuity ofsevenbilateraltreaties. Itwas furthermoreconcludedthat

the Yugoslavdelegationwould contactthe authorities concernedin Belgrade regarding

anothersix bilateral treaties,among whichthe 1931Treaty of Judicial Settlement,
Arbitration and Conciliationbetweenthe Kingdomof the Netherlandsandthe Kingdom

of Yugoslavia.This Notehas remained unanswered. As alreadynoted,it did not

containan agreementbetweenthe Governmentof the Kingdomof the Netherlands

andthe Governmentof the FRYto the extentthat the treaties representedtherein
wouldconstitutetreaties betweentheKingdomof the Netherlandsandthe FRY.

Neither canthe suddenand unexpectedinvocationbythe FRY ofthe 1931Treatyat

the end of the proceedingson its requestfor provisional measuresin May 1999 mean,

that there was agreement betweenthe Governmentof the Netherlandsandthe
Governmentof theFRYthat the 1931Treaty had remainedin force inthe bilateral

relation,as the FRY cannotunilaterallydecideon its remaininginforce. It should

moreover be keptin mindthatthe 1931 Treatyconstitutedonly one of a whole setof

agreementsonthe continued applicationof whichthe legalexpertsof the Netherlands

andthe FRYwere still in discussionand thatas yet nofinal agreementhas been
reached betweenthe Governmentof the Netherlandsandthe Governmentof the

Federal Republicof Yugoslaviaonwhich bilateral agreements should remaininforce.

There can be noquestionof singlingout certain agreements unilaterallyand assuming

their remainingin forcewithout a finalagreementbetweenthe two Governmentson
the statusof al1bilateralagreements.

476.23 The Netherlandsrefers in this respectto the fundamental principle often

recalledbythe Court (see, inter alia, the statementof the Court quoted hereafter (this
Memorial,para. 7.2.15)),that it cannotdecidea dispute between Stateswithout the

consentof those Statesto itsjurisdiction.

Inthe present case,the Netherlandsmaintainsthat the continuationof the 1931Treaty

afterthe disappearanceof the SFRYrequiredtheconsentof boththe Netherlandsand
the FRY. Since no agreement hasbeenreachedto that effect, the 1931Treatydoes

not providea basisforjurisdiction of the Court.

6.24 As alreadystated in para.6.4, the FRYcannot rely onArticle 37 of the Statute

in respectof a treatywhich is not inforcebetweenit andthe Netherlands.Moreover,

as has alreadybeenset forth extensivelyabove(this Memorial,para.3.1 et se9.), the

FRYis not a partyto the Statute.The Netherlandshenceforthsubmits that two

conditionsexplicitly statedin Article37 oftheStatute,ie. that the dispute shouldbe
between States which are parties to theStatuteand should relateto a treaty or

conventionin force are not fulfilled,so that the FRY cannotclaim the applicationof

Article 37 of the Statuteto the 1931Treaty.Alreadyon those groundsit can besaid

that the 1931Treatydoes not providea basisfor jurisdiction of the Court.

6.25 Evenif the 1931Treaty couldbe invokedbythe FRY,the FRYshouldhave

observedthe procedure explicitly prescribed inArticle4 of that treaty,beforebringinga

caseunilaterally before theCourt. On 6 August 1921the Netherlandssubmitted a
declarationacceptingcompulsoryjurisdictionunderArticle 36 ofthe Statuteof the

PermanentCourt of InternationalJustice,whichappliedonlyto disputesfor whichthe

parties had not agreedto have recourseto someother method ofpacificsettlement

(Annex6.9).The Kingdomof Yugoslaviasubmitted asimilardeclarationon 16May
1930 (Annex 6.10).When concludingthe1931Treaty, it was clearlythe intention of

the two States,that the 1931Treatywouldprevail.The difference betweenthe

jurisdiction basedonthe two declarationspursuantto Article 36 of the Statuteof the

PermanentCourtof International Justice onthe one hand, andthe 1931Treaty onthe
otherhand,lies in the fact that in the 1931Treatythe rightto take aatterto the Court

canonly be exercisedif certainconditions havebeenfulfilled.6.26 Article 2 of the 1931Treaty statesthat "Tousles litiges..seront soumispour
jugement soit à la Courpermanente de Justice internationale,soità un Tribunal

arbitral, ainsiqu'ilestprévu ci-après".ubsequently,Article 3refersto the (optional)

conciliation procedure.Article4 states that,if this procedurehas notbeen usedor has

failed.

"[Lle litigesera soumisd'un communaccordparvoie de compromissoit à la
Courpermanente de Justice internationale.. .., soit à un Tribunalarbitra...
A défautd'accordentre les Parties surle choix de lajuridiction,..l'uneou

l'autred'entreelles,aprèsunpréavis d'un mois aura lafacultéde porter
directement,parvoiede requêtel,e litigedevantla Court permanentede
Justice internationale."(emphasis addedby Respondent)

The Netherlandsclaims that the procedureof the 1931Treaty as summarised above
formedan essentialbasisfor the consentof the Netherlandsto be bound bythe 1931

Treaty andthat the FRYshouldnot beallowedto simplyignore this procedure,as it

did inthe present case.

6.27 Inthe Case concerningtheBarcelonaTraction,Lightand Power Company,

Limited, New Application: 1962,Belgiumv. Spain,PreliminaryObjections,Judgment of

24July 1964,I.C.J. Reports 1964p.38 (Annex6.1l), the Court, addressedits
jurisdictionquaforum as a result ofthe disappearance of the PermanentCourtof

lnternational Justice with regardto the Treatyof Conciliation,Judicial Settlementand

Arbitration between Belgiumand Spain,signed on19July 1927.This treaty containsin
Article 2andArticle 17,paragraph1,similar rightsand obligationsasArticles 2 and4

of the 1931Treaty. The Court concludesthat:

"[the PermanentCourtof lnternationalJustice] wasnever the substantive
"object"of the clause. Thesubstantiveobjectwas compulsor-yadjudication,
andthe PermanentCourtwas merelya meansfor achievingthat object."

(emphasisaddedby Respondent)

6.28 Inthe present caseit shouldlikewisebe concluded, that the object of the

1931Treatywas compulsoryadjudicationas such, and not compulsory adjudicationby

the PermanentCourtof lnternationalJusticeor its successor.ln other words, the

possible adjudicationby an arbitraltribunal forms partof the object andpurposeof the
1931Treaty.The fact that the FRYdid not endeavourto reach "uncommun accordpar voie de

compromisJJ should therefore be consideredas a material breach of the 1931Treaty.

6.29 The FRY has put its case beforethe Court without offering the Netherlands

the opportunityto choose, by common agreement (par voiede compromis) betweena
case beforethe Court or before an arbitraltribunal, as Article 2 in conjunctionwith

Article4 of the 1931Treaty explicitlyrequires.Moreover,the FRY has not observed

the period of one month's notice before bringing its case unilaterally before the Court.

6.30 The Netherlandsfurthermore stressesthat the FRY, after invokingthe 1931

Treaty as a basis ofjurisdiction on 12 May 1999, hasnot attempted to remedy its

breach of the 1931Treaty, and has in its Memorialnot in any way addressedthe fact
that it did not observethe 1931Treaty.

6.31 The Netherlandssubmitsthat havingregardto the requirement of

consultationson the choice of jurisdiction providedfor inthe 1931Treaty, the
equivalenceof the adjudicationby a Court or byan arbitral tribunal, and the one month

notice requirement - conditions in the 1931Treaty essential for the consent of the

Netherlands to be bound by the 1931Treaty - it is unacceptablethat the FRY directly
brought the presentcase beforethe InternationalCourt of Justice. Consequently,even

if the Court would upheldthat the 1931Treaty is inforce and that Article 37 of the

Statute of the Court applies betweenthe Netherlandsand the FRY, it should in the

view of the Netherlandsdeclinejurisdiction on the ground that essential procedural
requirementsof the 1931Treaty have not beenobserved by the FRY.7. THE CLAIMSPRESENTEDBYTHE FRYARE INADMISSIBLE

Inthe previous paragraphsthe Netherlandshassubmittedthatthe Court hasno

jurisdiction inthe present case.Shouldthe Court,however, cometo the conclusion

that it hasjurisdiction, the Netherlandssubmitsthat the claimspresentedbythe FRY

are inadmissibleon oneor moreof the followingthree grounds.
First,the claims ofthe FRYare inadmissiblebecausethe Applicanthas not produced

even a beginning of evidencethat the alleged breaches havebeen committedby the

Netherlands.

Second,the alleged breachesformedpart of a collectiveaction.A judgment in respect
of the Netherlands necessarilyinvolvesa decisionin a dispute betweentheFRY and

otherentitiesor Statesnot beforethe Courtandiorwould inthe absence of such

entitiesor States notallowthe Courtto arriveat a warrantedjudgment.

Third, in its Memorialof 5 January2000,the FRYhasintroduced a newclaim that did
not appearin its original Applicationas presentedto the Courton 29 April 1999and

wouldchangethe subject ofthe dispute.

Thesethree groundswill now be discussed more extensivelybelow.

7.1 The claims of the FRYare inadmissiblebecausethe Applicant has not
producedeven a beginningof evidencethat the alleged breacheshave
been committedby the Netherlands

7.1.1 Accordingto Article 38, paragraph2, of the Court'sRulesan application"shall

..specifythe precise nature ofthe claim, together with a succinct statementof the

facts and groundson whichthe claimis based".Accordingto Article49, paragraph1,

of the Rules"a Memorialshall containa statementof the relevantfacts, a statement of
law,and submissions".It is obviousthat therationaleof these requirementsis two-fold.

Onlyif these requirements arefulfilledit is possiblefor the Respondentto defenditself

adequately andfor the Courtto prepareitsjudgment.As has been observedby

Rosenne,one ofthe three fundamental principlesembodied inthe Statuteand the
practiceof the Court is the following: "beforetheCourttakes any decision, principalor

incidental,it is in possessionof what it regardsas sufficientinformationas to the

positionsof the parties" (S.Rosenne,The ~awand Practice ofthe InternationalCourt,
1920-1996, Vol. III, p. 1080).7.1.2 The Netherlandssubmitsthat althoughthe largest and mostdetailed partof the

FRYMemorial (paras.1.1 - 1.10.3)containsallegedfacts, this partlacksone
indispensableelement.Nowherethe Applicant givesanyspecificationas to where,

when, how and howlongany acts specificallyundertakenby the Netherlandshave

taken place. Consequently,the Netherlandsis preventedfrom knowingwhat is the gist
of the FRY complaint against the Netherlands,andthe Court is preventedfrom

possessingsufficient informationas to the positionsof the Parties.

7.1.3 This fundamental lack of specificationconcernsboththe originalelementsof
the complaintbythe FRY(the bombingof the territoryof the FRY)andthe new

elements relatedto the situation after10June 1999(whenKFORwas performingits

missionin Kosovo).As tothe original elementsof the complaintbythe FRY (the
bombing of the territory of the FRY),theFRYMemorialpresentsan extensive

chronologyof persons killedor injuredanddamagecausedbythe bombardments.But

nowhereinthis extensivechronologythe Netherlandsis saidto have committed

specificfacts.

7.1.4 The FRYMemorialhasa similarfundamental lack of specification with regard

to the situationafter 10June 1999(whenKFOR wasperformingits missionin
Kosovo).In Part One of its Memorialdealingwith "Facts"covering some300 pages,

the FRYhardly specifiesany alleged breachesof the responsibilitiesofthe

international security presence.It is only in para. 1.5 ofits Memorialcoveringsome80

pagesentitled"Facts relatedto killings,woundingandethniccleansingof Serbs and
other non-AlbanianGroups"that mentionis madeof two instanceswhereby4 Serbs

were allegedlykilled by KFORtroops (3 of whom bya Russianunit)and of some 13

instances inwhichKFORtroops areexplicitlyor implicitlyallegedto have been
negligentin providing adequate protectionto personsand property of Serbsand other

non-Albaniangroups.The FRY,however,has not providedanyevidencethat in these

exceptional instancesNATO hasviolatedits obligations.Moreover,nowheredoesthe

FRYspecificallyreferto the Netherlandsin this contextand claimthat the Netherlands
hasviolatedits obligations.

7.1.5 The FRY hassoughtto remedythis defectonly atthe end of its Memorial.At
one place (para.2.8) it is simplyassertedthatacts of NATOand acts of KFOR"areimputableto the Respondents".The Netherlandssubmits that thiscannot compensate

for the absenceof the fundamentallackof specificationinthe remainder of the
Memorial.The FRYessentiallysubmitsthat since no decisionby a NATO organcan

be taken withoutthe consentof each memberState, NATOacts are undertheir

politicaland military guidanceand controlandtherefore imputableto each and every

member State.The Netherlandssubmitsthat this view is erroneous.As will be
elaboratedin para.7.2, the actions complainedof bythe FRY are or have been

collective actions.The "imputabilityhesis"of the FRYwrongly ignoresthe collective

nature of NATOdecision-makingand the organic natureof NATOdecisions, involving

both Operation Allied Force and KFOR. NATO and KFOR actsare not simplydirectly
imputableto one orsome of the States involvedin their preparationand adoption.This

iswhat is presentlyclaimedbythe FRYafter it decided notto initiate proceedings

before the Court against al1NATO members andagainst al1States that participatein

KFOR,and following the Order of the Court of 2 June 1999in whichthe Court
removedthe Applications againstSpain andthe United States fromits General List.

7.1.6 The Netherlandsthereforesubmitsthat the claims ofthe FRY are inadmissible.

Although the allegedfacts are presentedin considerable detail bythe FRY,they lack
specificityon a fundamental point:it is not indicatedwhichacts areclaimed by the FRY

to have been undertakenby the Netherlandsin violation of its internationallegal

obligations.

7.2 The claims of the FRYare inadmissibleas ajudgment in respect of the
Netherlandsnecessarilyinvolvesa decisionin a dispute betweenthe

FRYand otherentities or States not beforethe Court andlorwould in the
absenceof such entities or Statesnot allow the Court to arriveat a
warrantedjudgment

7.2.1 The second ground on whichthe claimsof the FRY must be deemed

inadmissibleis relatedto the first. In a way it is the mirrorimage of the fundamental
lack of specificityas elaboratedbove.The main reasonwhy the claimsare not

specified is the fact thatthe alleged breachesformed partof a collectiveaction.

Consequentlyajudgment in respectof the Netherlandsnecessarily involvesa decision
in a dispute betweentheFRY andother entitiesor States not beforethe Court andlor

would in the absenceof such entitiesor States not allowthe Courtto arrive at a

warrantedjudgment. Thiswill be elaboratedbelowin some more detail. First (paras.7.2.2- 7.2.11)it will be demonstratedto whatextentthe allegedacts have been

collectiveacts.Nextthe implicationsmust be establishedof this vital element of the
presentcasebeforethe Court (paras.7.2.12 - 7.2.26).

7.2.2 The acts bythe Netherlandscomplainedof bythe FRY inthe present

proceedingsbeforethe Courtdo by no meansconstitutean individual,independent
actionbythe Netherlands,butformed part ofan actionby an internationalentity,viz.

NATOor, of ajoint and collectiveaction by a groupof States, viz.member Statesof

NATOor memberStatesof NATOand 20 otherStates inthe framework of KFOR,the

internationalsecurity presencein Kosovoauthorizedby SC Res. 1244(Annex7.1).

7.2.3 In itsrder of 2 June 1999the Courtdid not examinethe collective natureof

the acts complainedof bythe FRY.At that stageof the proceedings,dealing withthe
requestbythe FRYfor the indicationof provisionalmeasures,itwas not yet necessary

to examinethis question.As mentionedinthe Order,on sucha requestthe Court need

not

"finally satisfyitselfthat it hasjurisdictionon the merits of thecase,yet it
ought not to indicatesuchmeasuresunlessthe provisionsinvokedbythe
applicant appear,prima facie,to afford a basisonwhich the jurisdictionof the
Court might beestablished" (Yugoslavia v.Netherlands,Orderof 2 June
1999,para.21).

The Courtconcludedthatit manifestly lackedjurisdictionto entertain theFRY

Applications against Spainandthe UnitedStates and removed theseApplicationsfrom
its GeneralList. Inthe proceedingsagainstthe other 8 Respondentsthe Court

concludedthatit had noprima faciejurisdictionto entertain Yugoslavia'sApplication.It

recalledthatit cannotdecidea disputebetweenStates without theconsentof those

Statesto itsjurisdiction. Forthefirst time in its history,the Court refusedto indicate
provisionalmeasures becauseit had noprima faciejurisdiction.

7.2.4 However,at thepresentstage of the proceedingsthe Courtmust "finally
satisfy itself thatit hasjurisdictionon the merits of the case".The collective natureof

the actscomplained ofbythe FRYis oneof the central characteristicsof thiscase.

The Court must thereforepay dueregardto this central characteristic andto its

implicationsfor the admissibilityof the present case.Are the relevant NATOActivation
Ordersand other decisionsconcerning OperationAlliedForce and concerningKFORdecisions emanating from NATO?Are these decisionstaken by al1NATO member

States in some coordinatedway?Or are they decisions taken in some coordinatedway
by States that are NATO member States participatingin OperationAllied Forceand

by States participatingin KFOR?

7.2.5 In practice Operationllied Forcewas consideredto be a NATO operation.As
indicatedbelow, referencesto the relevantNATOActivation Orders andto other

decisions concerning OperationAllied Forceas well as referencesto this dispute,even

bythe FRYitself, generallymentionNATOas the authorof these decisions and

NATO as one of the partiesto the dispute.
For example,inthe meetingsof the UNSecurity Councilduring the periodin which

Operation Allied Forcewas carried out, referencewas usuallymadeto this Operation

as a NATOOperation.On 24 and 26 March 1999,the Security Council metat the
requestof the RussianFederationto discussthe "military actionof NATO" (UNDoc.

SI19991320(Annex7.2)).The draft resolutiontabled by Belarus, lndia andthe Russian

Federation(whichwas rejectedbythe Council)referredto "the use of force by NATO

(UN Doc.SI19991328(Annex7.3)). Duringthe Council meetingsof 24 and 26 March
1999,the referencesto the militaryaction undertakenusually wereto "NATO's

decisionto use force", "NATOstrikes", "NATO's objectives",etc. (UN Docs. SIPV.

3988 (Annex7.4) and SIPV. 3989 (Annex7.5)), and notto action by individualStates.

Duringsubsequent meetingsofthe SecurityCouncilaswell, the military actionwas
usuallyreferredto as "NATO action", "NATO airstrikes", etc. (UNDocs. SIPV. 4000

(Annex 7.6), SIPV.4003 (Annex7.7), SIPV. 4011 (Annex7.8)). The observationbythe

FRY in its Memorial (para. 1.9.1.14)thatduringthe Security Council meetings of24

and 26 March 1999,"the Respondentsconsideredthe acts of NATOas their acts" is
simplywrong, as appears even froma cursory reading of the reportsof these

meetings.

7.2.6 Also the FRY itself has recognizedthe fact that the acts mentioned are
collectiveacts by NATO.The collectivenatureof OperationAllied Forcefirst of al1

appearsfrom the fact that, "dueto substantiaalndtechnical reasons,the Applicant has

preparedan identicaltext of the Memorialin al1eight pending cases. Thesubstanceof

dispute inal1eight cases is identical"(Memorial,Introduction,para. 11;emphasis
added by Respondent).Furthermore,as far as PartOneof the FRYMemorial("Facts")is concerned,

referencesare almostexclusivelyto "NATO aviation","NATObombs","NATOair
strikes",etc., notto action undertakenbythe Netherlandsor byother Respondents.

Inaddition,as far as the FRYbasesits allegationson externalsourcesof information,

use is made almost exclusivelyof NATOPress Conferences (e.g. in its Memorial,

paras. 1.2.7and 1.4).

7.2.7 A similar conclusion mustbedrawnfor KFOR. KFORis a collective action, not

an actionby 39 individualStates.In practicethere isno disagreementwhatsoeverthat

KFORis a NATO operation, authorizedbythe UNSecurityCouncil,in which also a
numberof States participatethatare not membersof NATO.For example,the FRY

Memorialrepeatedlymentionsthat KFORhas been createdby NATO andis under

NATO's commandand control(Memorial,paras. 1.9.2.7 and2.8.1.2.1).

7.2.8 In addition,thefact that the Netherlandsactsare notto be seenas an

individual,independentactionwas clearlyalso recognized bythe Applicantin its

Application(p.10;see also Memorial,Introduction,para.3),where it states that the
claims submittedby it to the Court are based onthe following facts:

"The Governmentof theKingdomof the Netherlands,together with the
Governmentsof other MemberStatesof NATO, took part in the acts of useof
force against the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia... The Governmentof the
Kingdomof the Netherlandsis takingpart in the training,arming,financing,
equippingand supplyingthe so-called"Kosovo LiberationArmy"."(emphasis

addedby Respondent)

7.2.9 Moreoverinthe submissionssubmittedto the Court in itsApplication (pp. 8, 10;

see alsoMemorial, Introduction,para. 5)the FRYbegins each ofits submissionswith

the phrase"- by takingpart in ...,the Kingdomof the Netherlandshasacted against
the Federal Republicof Yugoslaviain breachof its obligation ..."(emphasisaddedby

Respondent).The fact that inthe submissionssubmittedto the Court in its Memorial

(Part Four)this phrase isno longerrepeateddoes not alter the nature ofthe acts

allegedlycommittedbythe Netherlands.

7.2.10 If the actions complainedofbythe FRYare analyzedin more detail, it is clear

thatthesequalificationsin practiceof OperationAllied Force and KFORare notmistaken.Theseoperationshave rightlybeenconsideredas collective actions.All core

decisions concerning OperationAllied Force weretaken by NATO. In 1998the NATO

Council decided that differentoptionsfor a possible militaryKosovooperation hadto
be developed.Ofthese optionsthe NATOCouncilchose anair campaign consistingof

five phases(phases O,1,2, 3 and 4)inwhich theintensity and geographicalscopeof

the militaryactionwould be graduallyincreased.This choicewas madeto put a

crescendoof pressureon the FRYto acceptfive NATO conditionsfor a political
solution ofthe Kosovo crisis.All decisionsto moveto the next phaseof the air

campaignwere taken bythe NATO Council.

On 27 March 1999,at the proposalof the SupremeAllied Commander Europe

(SACEUR)and supportedby NATO'sSecretary-General,the NATO Council decided

to moveto "phase2" of the operation.On 30 March1999the NATO Council decided
notto moveto "phase 3" (inwhichthe militaryauthoritieswouldhavethe exclusive

powerto carry outthe operation),butto expandthis phaseinto "phase2-plus".Inthis

"phase2-plusnthe implementationwas notfully leftto the military authorities; the

decisionto attack certain targets of"phas3" was delegatedto NATO'sSecretary-
General.

A distinction must bemade betweenthe mainpolitical decisionsandthe military

implementationof the operation.The mainpoliticaldecisions wereal1taken bythe

NATOCouncil. lmplementationcoveredthe decisions where,when andhowtargets
were attackedandwas leftto the NATO militaryauthorities.Inthe implementationof

the operation, commandand controloverthe participating Netherlands unitswas

transferredto NATOcommanders (Annex7.9).

7.2.11 As far as KFORis concerned, theauthorizationfor this operationwas given in

SC Res. 1244. TheSecurityCouncil hasauthorized"MemberStates and relevant

internationalorganizationsto establishthe internationalsecurity presencein Kosovoas

set out in point 4 ofAnnex 2 wital1necessarymeansto fulfil its responsibilitiesunder

paragraph 9below" (SC Res. 1244,para. 7). Point4of Annex 2 to SC Res.1244
providesthe following:

"The internationalsecurity presence withsubstantialNorthAtlantic Treaty
Organization participationmustbedeployed underunifiedcommandand
controland authorizedto establish asafeenvironmentfor al1peoplein Kosovo
andto facilitate the safereturnto their homesof al1displaced personsand

refugees."
57The internationalsecuritypresencewas only authorized bythe Security Council.The

implementationwas done by NATO. On9 June 1999the NorthAtlantic Council(NAC)

- NATO'smain policy-makingorgan -agreedto "OperationJOINT GUARDIAN".The
operation planfor "JOINTGUARDIANn containsthe basicrulesfor the functioning of

KFOR,including ruleson command andcontrol.Accordingto this plan,it is alsothe

NACthat will decidewhento authorize theredeploymentof KFORforces. KFORis a
NATO-ledinternationalforce.lt is underthe full politicaldirectionof the NAC,and

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has overall authority and

operationalcommandor controlof al1designatedforces, includingforces of nonNATO
memberStates.Therefore,operation "JOINTGUARDIAN"is clearly a collective

action,firmly anchoredin NATO.

7.2.12 Now ithas beenanalyzedin greaterdetailthat the relevant actionshave been
collective actions,it is necessaryto look at the legalimplication of thisfor the present

case.

7.2.13 The fact that the allegedacts of the Netherlandsformed part ofthe actionof an

international organization,viz.NATOor, of ajoint and collectiveactionof a groupof
states, viz.member Statesof NATOor member Statesof NATOtogether with20 other

Statesin the frameworkof KFORwill necessarily,unavoidablyand logicallyinvolvea

determinationbythe Courtof the alleged unlawfulnessof the actionof an international
organizationor ofStateswhich are notpresent beforethe Court.

7.2.14 It is clear that internationalorganizations cannotbe a partyin contentiouscases
beforethe Court (Article5, paragraph1,of the Statute)andthat the Court does not

havejurisdictionand may not, even if itcould possibly havejurisdictionin respectof

such organizations,exercisejurisdiction againsthem withouttheir consent.

In contentiouscasesnot involvinginternationalorganizations the situation isnot
different with regardto Statesin respectof which the Courtmay in principlehave

jurisdiction-whenthe Statesconcerned have not giventheir consentto that

jurisdiction.7.2.15 Thefollowing statementof the Courtinthe caseconcerningEast Timor,
Judgment, (Portugal v. Australia), 1.C.J. Reports 1995,p.15,para.26, maybe quoted

here:

" 26. The Court recalls inthis respectthat one of the fundamental principlesof
its Statuteis that it cannotdecidea disputebetweenStates without theconsent
of those Statesto itsjurisdiction.This principlewas reaffirmedin the Judgment
givenby the Court in the caseconcerningMonetary Gold Removed from Rome
in 1943 and confirmed inseveralof its subsequentdecisions(see Continental
Shelf (LibyanArab Jamahiriya/Malta),Application for Permission to Intervene,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 25,para. 40;Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction andAdmissibility,Judgment,1.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 431, para.88;
Frontier Dispute (BurkinaFaso/Republicof Mali),Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1986,p. 579, para.49; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras),Application to Intervene,Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1990,
pp. 114-116, paras.54-56,and p. 112,para.73; and CertainPhosphate Lands

in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), PreliminaryObjections,Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1992,pp. 259-262, paras.50-55)."

7.2.16 Accordingto the Court the principleevenapplieswith regardto States not a
partyto cases beforethe Court.E.g., in its Judgmentof 15June 1954inthe case

concerningthe Monetary GoldRemoved from Romein 1943,(Italy v. France, United

Kingdom, United States of America) (PreliminaryQuestion),1.C.J. Reports 1954,the

Court,notingthat only France, Italy,the UnitedKingdomandthe United Stateswere
partiesto the proceedings,found that:

"To adjudicate uponthe internationalresponsibilityofAlbaniawithout her
consentwould run counterto a well-estabiishedprincipleof internationallaw
embodiedin the Court'sStatute,namely,that the Court canonly exercise
jurisdiction over a Statewith its consent."(Ibid., p. 32.)

Notingthat Albaniahad chosennotto intervene,the Courtstated:

"ln the presentcase, Albania'slegalinterestswould not only be affectedby a
decision, butwouldform the very subject-matterof the decision.In sucha case,

the Statutecannotbe regarded,by implication,as authorizing proceedingsto
be continuedinthe absenceof Albania."(Ibid.)

7.2.17 It is clear thatinthe present casewhichconcernsthe Netherlands participation
in an action ofan internationalorganizationor ajoint or collective action of a groupofStates in which, accordingto the FRY, "the substanceof the dispute in al1eight cases

is identical"and "al1Respondents arein the same interest" (Memorial, Introduction,

para. 1l), the legal interests of al1States participatingin that action "would not only be
affected by a decision [of the Court], but would formthe very subject-matterof the

decision"(emphasis added by Respondent).

7.2.18 Fromthe proceedingsin the presentcase beforethe Court, whether in the

present stage of the case or in the earlier stage of the request of the FRYfor the

indicationof provisionalmeasures,it is abundantly clearthat none of the States called

beforethe Court by the Applicant hasrecognizedthat the Court hasjurisdiction in the
present case and wantedthe Court to dealwith the case. In the Order of the Court of 2

June 1999concerning the Request of the Federal Republicof Yugoslaviafor the

Indicationof ProvisionalMeasures,the Court, moreover,definitively recognizedthat it

had nojurisdiction with regardto Spain and the UnitedStates of America,while with
regardto the other States called beforethe Court,the Court concludedthat there was

no prima faciejurisdiction. One rnustfurther take into account, that the eight States

presentlybeforethe Court continueto disputethejurisdiction of the Court in the

presentcase.

7.2.19 In case the Court woulddecidethat it hasjurisdiction inthe present case with

regardto the Netherlands,but notto (most of)the other Respondents,and would

proceedto deal with the merits of the case, the Courtwould be clearlyfaced with a
situationwhere not onlythe legal interests of al1or most other States participatingin

the action would be affected by the decision, butwould form the very subject-matter of

the decision.

7.2.20 It would meanthat after having explicitly decidedthat the Court has no

jurisdiction in respect ofhose other States,which also explicitlyin proceedings before

the Courtexpressed their wish that theiraction would notbejudged by the Court,the

Court would neverthelessproceedto in fact decidetheir case.

7.2.21 The present situation differs materiallyfrom e.g.the situation inthe case

concerning Certain PhosphateLandsin Nauru,(Nauruv. Australia),Preliminary
Objections,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992 (hereinafter"Naurucase"), where NewZealandand theUnitedKingdomwere not calledbeforethe Court.

7.2.22 Fromthe point of viewof the Statesconcerneditwill makeno difference

whether the Courtdecided theircaseas aprerequisitefor a decisionagainst the

Netherlandsor as an unavoidableandlogicalconseguenceof the decisionagainst the

Netherlandsas a participantin an actioninwhichthey participatedas well. In both
situationstheywill not beformally boundbythe decisionagainstthe Netherlandsin

view ofArticle59 of the Statuteof the Court, butin both situationstheir case will have

been materiallydecidedbythe Courtin spiteof their expresswishes andin spiteof the

expressacknowledgementbythe Court in proceedingsbeforethe Courtto which they
were a partythat the Court has nojurisdictionvis-à-visthose States. A more striking

exampleof infact exercisingjurisdictionover Stateswithout theirconsentis hardly

imaginable.

7.2.23 The present case against the Netherlands may alsobe distinguished from the

situation inthe Nauru case referredto aboveinthis Memorial in another respect.Inthe

Naurucase, the Respondent,Australia,playeda dominantrole, and the roleof the

absentStateswas minoror incidental.TheAdministrator of theIslandwas at al1times
appointedbyAustralia,and was accordinglyunderthe instruction of that Government

(Naurucase, para.43). His "ordonnances,proclamationsand regulationsw " ere

subjectto confirmationor rejectionbythe Governor-Generalof Australia. The other

Governments (ofthe UnitedKingdomand New Zealand),in accordancewith the
Agreementof 2 July 1919 andamended on30 May 1923,receivedsuch decisionsfor

informationonly(Naurucase, para.43).The systemof administration appliedin Nauru

at the time of the Leagueof Nationswas maintainedin essencewhen theMandate

was replacedby a Trusteeship.Underthe régimethus established,the Agreementof 2
July 1919and30 May 1923remainedinforce andthe Administrator continuedto be

appointedbyAustralia. Moreover, underthe newAgreementof 26 November1965the

"administrationof the Territory"wasto bevestedin "anAdministrator appointedbythe
Governmentof the Commonwealthof Australia" (Article 3).It providedthatthe

Administrator,the Governor-Generalof Australiaandthe Parliamentof Australiawere

to have certainpowers.The agreementto establish these newarrangementswas

implementedby appropriate legislationand otherstepstaken byAustralia. The
arrangementscontinuedto applyuntil Nauruattained independence(Naurucase,paras. 45-46). Therewas reasonfor the Courtto concludethat amongthe three

States,i.e.the UnitedKingdom,NewZealandand Australia, "Australiaplayeda very
special role establishedbythe TrusteeshipAgreementof 1947,bythe Agreementsof

1919, 1923and 1965, andby practice"(Naurucase,para. 47).

7.2.24 TheNetherlandssubmitsthat the situationinthe present case differs
considerablyfrom the onedealtwith bythe Courtin the Naurucase, in that, far from

playing a dominant rolecontrary toAustraliainthe Naurucase,the Netherlandshas in

the present case taken only a relativelysmallshareinthe NATOaction,viz.only

approximately5 percentof al1the sorties undertakenduringOperationAllied Force
were carriedout by Netherlandsaircraft(Annex7.10). Probablymost,and in any event

the dominant, participantsin that operationwillnot be beforethe Court.

7.2.25 Hence,in conclusion,the Netherlandsbelievesthat the claimsand submissions
of the FRYare inadmissibleas ajudgment in the presentcasein respectof the

Netherlandswould necessarilyinvolvea decisionin a disputebehveenthe FRYand

otherentitiesor Statesnot beforethe Court.

7.2.26 There is anotheraspectto this situationto whichthe Court should giveserious

consideration.When most,and in anyevent the major, participantsin OperationAllied

Forceare not before theCourt,the Courtwill, dueto the lack of cooperationonthe

part of those participants, be confrontedwith great difficultiesin obtainingthe
necessarymaterial, evidenceand other informationin orderto allow it to arrive aa

warrantedjudicial conclusionas to what OperationAllied Force actually amountedto

andwhat its true objectivewas as well aswhatthe relative shareof the Netherlandsin
that actionwas. The Netherlandsin itsturn would alsobe undulyhandicappedin

defendingits case withoutthe presence beforethe Courtof most,and in any event

major, participantsin Operationllied Force.Mutatismutandisthe samearguments

must be deemedto applyto the activitieswithinthe framework of KFORandthe
Netherlandsparticipationtherein.7.3 The claim of the FRY basedon alleged breachesof obligations
establishedbySC Res. 1244and bythe 1948 Genocide Convention
relatedto killings,woundingand expulsion of Serbsand other non-
Albaniangroupsin Kosovoand Metohijaafter 10June 1999is
inadmissible,becauseit is a new claim changingthe subjectof the

dispute originallysubmittedto the Courtin the Application

7.3.1 The Netherlandswould liketo referto para.3.2.11 of the Yugoslav Memorial

which readsas follows:

"3.2.11After the Ordersof the Court, dated 2 June 1999,the dispute
aggravatedandextended.It got newelementsconcerningfailures of the

Respondentsto fulfill their obligationsestablishedby Security Council
resolution 1244and bythe 1948Conventionon the PreventionandPunishment
of the Crimeof Genocide.Newelements arerelatedto killings,woundingand
expulsionof Serbs andother non-Albaniangroupsin Kosovoand Metohija,
after 10June 1999."

andto the correspondingsubmissionof the FRYin Part Fourof its Memorialwhich

withthe introductory phrasereadsas follows:

"TheGovernmentof the FederalRepublicof Yugoslaviarequeststhe
InternationalCourtof Justiceto adjudgeand declare:
....

- byfailures to preventkilling,woundingandethnic cleansing of Serbs and
other non-Albaniangroupsin Kosovo andMetohija,the Respondent hasacted
againstthe FederalRepublicof Yugoslaviain breachof its obligationsto
ensurepublicsafety andorder in Kosovo andMetohija andto preventgenocide
and otheracts enumeratedin article III of the Genocide Convention;"

7.3.2 The Netherlandssubmitsthat the above-quotedclaim presentedbythe FRY
basedon alleged breachesbythe Netherlandsof obligations establishedby SC Res.

1244andby the 1948GenocideConventionrelatedto killings, wounding and

expulsion of Serbsandother non-Albaniangroupsin Kosovoand Metohijaafter 10

June 1999(hereinafter referredto as "theeventsor breaches after10June 1999")is
inadmissible.

7.3.3 It istrue that the FRYhas in itsApplicationreservedthe rightto amendthe
Application,but the Netherlandssubmits thatthis rights not unlimited.In particular,

the result ofuch an amendmentmay not besuchas to transformthe dispute broughtbefore the Court bythe Application into another dispute which is different in character.

This limitationwas reaffirmed bythe Court in no ambiguousterms in the case
concerning CertainPhosphateLandsin Nauru(Nauruv. Australia),Preliminary

Objections,Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1992, p.240, as follows:

"69. Article 40, paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court providesthat the
"subject of the dispute" must be indicatedin the Application; and Article 38,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court requires "the precise nature of the claim"to
be specified inthe Application.These provisionsare so essential from the point
of view oflegal security andthe good administration of justice that they were
already, in substance,part of the text of the Statute of the PermanentCourt of

InternationalJustice, adoptedin 1920(Art. 40, first paragraph), and of the text
of the firstulesof that Court,adopted in 1922 (Art. 35, second paragraph),
respectively.On several occasions the PermanentCourt had to indicatethe
precise significance of these texts. Thus, in its Order of 4 February 1933in the
case concerningthe Prince vonPlessAdministration (Preliminary Objection),it
stated that:

"underArticle 40 of the Statute, it is the Application which sets out the subject
of the dispute, andthe Case,though it may elucidatethe terms of the
Application, must not go beyondthe limits of the claim as set out therein ..."
(P.C.I.J., SeriesNB, No. 52, p. 14).

In the case concerningthe Sociétécommercialede Belgique t, e Permanent
Court stated:

"It is to be observedthat the liberty accordedto the parties to amend their
submissions upto the end of the oral proceedingsmust be construed
reasonablyandwithout infringingthe terms of Article 40 of the Statute and
Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Ruleswhich providethat the Application must
indicatethe subject of the dispute . . it is clear that the Court cannot, in
principle,allowa dispute brought before it by applicationto be transformed by

amendments in the submissionsinto another disputewhich is different in
character. A practiceof this kindwould be calculatedto prejudicethe interests
of third States to which,underArticle 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, al1
applications must be communicatedin order that they may be in a positionto
avail themselvesof the right of interventionprovidedfor in Articles 62 and 63 of
the Statute." (P.C.I.J.,SeriesNB, No. 78,p. 173;cf. Militaryand Paramilitary

Activities inand againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav. United States ofAmerica),
JurisdictionandAdmissibility,1.C.J. Reports1984,p. 427, para. 80.)

7.3.4 Inthe light of the foregoing the Court concludedthat the Nauruanclaim relating
to the overseas assetsof the British PhosphateCommissionerswas inadmissibleas it

constituted, both in form and in substance,a new claim and the subject of the dispute

originallysubmittedto the Court would betransformed if it entertainedthe claim.7.3.5 Relevantin this connectionisalsothe viewexpressedby the Court in para.67

of its Judgmentin the above-quotedcase concerningCertainPhosphateLands in
Nauru.

"67. The Court,however,is of the viewthat, for the claim relatingto the
overseasassetsof the BritishPhosphateCommissionersto be heldto have
been,as a matterof substance, includedin the original claim,it is not sufficient

that there should be linksbetween themof a general nature.An additional
claim must have beenimplicitinthe application (Templeof Preah Vihear,
Merits,1.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 36) or mustarise "directlyout of the question
whichis the subject-matterof that Application"(Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal
Republic of Germanyv. Iceland),Merits,1.C.J. Reports 1974,p. 203, para.72).11

7.3.6 It is clear that the"newelements" relatedto the alleged events or breaches

after 10 June 1999, introducedwithout forma1amendmentof the Applicationinthe
Yugoslav Memorial(para.3.2.11et seq. and inthe newlyadded submissionin Part

Fourof the Memorial),differ considerably fromthe dispute broughtbeforethe Courtin

theApplication. Whereasinthe Applicationthe Netherlandswas accused of "actsof

use of force against the Federal Republicof Yugoslaviabytaking part in bombing
targets in the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia",in the Memorialthe Netherlands is

accused - after the bombingscameto an end - as constituent part of KFORto have

after 10 June 1999"actedagainst the FederalRepublicof Yugoslaviain breach of its

obligations[underSC Res. 12441to ensurepublicsafetyand order in Kosovoand
Metohijaandto prevent genocideand otheractsenumeratedin article III of the

Genocide Convention1'.While the Applicationconcernsthe useof force against the

FRY,the newclaims relateto the allegedfailureto maintainlaw and order in Kosovo
afterthis useof force againstthe FRYhadcometo an end.

7.3.7 The Netherlandssubmitsthat the nature,basis and context ofthe claim and

therefore alsothe dispute describedinthe Applicationdiffer considerablyfrom the
nature, basis andcontextof the claimcontainedin the newlyadded submissioninthe

Yugoslav Memorialrelatedto the allegedeventsor breaches after 10June 1999.It is

difficultto see howthe newclaim could beheldto have been, as amatter of
substance, includedin the original claim (seethe criterionstated bythe Court in the

above-mentionedCertainPhosphateLandsin Nauru,Preliminafy Objectionscase),it

not being sufficient that thereshouldbe linksbetweenthose claims of a general

nature. Furtherit is difficultto see howthe additionalclaim couldhave been implicit inthe Application (a criterion also statedby the Court in the above-quoted Templeof

Preah Vihear,Meritscase), or could be deemedto arise directlyout of the question
which is the subject-matter of the Application (a criterion also stated by the Court inthe

above-mentionedFisheriesJurisdiction(F.R. of Germanyv. Iceland), Meritscase).

7.3.8 Henceforththe Netherlandsbelievesthat the claim of the FRY based on

alleged breaches of obligationsestablished by SC Res. 1244and by the 1948
Genocide Convention related to killings,wounding and expulsion of Serbs and other

non- Albanian groups in Kosovo andMetohijaafter 10 June 1999is inadmissible

because it is a new claim changingthe subject of the dispute originally submittedto the

Court inthe Application.8. CONCLUDING SUBMlSSlONS

For the reasons advanced,the Netherlands requeststhe Court to adjudge and declare

that:

- the FRY is not entitledto appear beforethe Court

the Court has nojurisdiction overthe clairnsbrought against the Netherlands

by theFRY
and1or

- the clairns brought againstthe NetherlandsbyFRYeare inadmissible.

Signed:

~ohd G. Lammérs
Agent of the Kingdomof the Netherlands

The Hague,3 July 2000