Written Statement of the French Republic [translation]

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL
IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

30 January 2004

[Translation by the Registry] International Court of Justice

Request for Advisory Opinion

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Written Statement of the French Republic

Outline

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

I. Question of the compatibility of the construction of the wall following the chosen route
with various rules of international law

(a)Question of the rules to be applied in assessing the lawfulness of the construction

of the wall following the route chosen

(i) Applicability of the rules relating to belligerent occupation

(ii) Applicability of the rules of international human rights law

(iii)Relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions

(iv)Particular agreements binding the parties concerned

(b)Question as to the conformity to these rules of the construction of the wall
following the route chosen

(i) Legal problems raised by the prohibition on annexation and related questions

(ii) Breaches of other rules of international humanitarian law and of principles of
human rights law

II. Question of the proportionality to the threat s to Israel of the construction of the wall
following the route chosen

(a)Israel’s right to respond to the threats to its security

(b)Assessment of the proportionality issue

(i) Proportionality requirement

(ii) Assessment of proportionality

III. Question of the legal consequences of the construction of the wall following the route

chosen

(a)Obligation to put an end to the unlawful situation and to make reparation for the
injury caused by it

(i) Obligation to put an end to the unlawful situation - ii -

(ii)Obligation to make reparation for the damage caused by the unlawful situation

(iii)Need to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition

(b)Obligation not to recognize the lawfulness of the situation

(c)Obligation to resume performance of the violated obligations

CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. By means of resolution ES-10/14 of 8 December2003, the United Nations General
Assembly requested the Court to urgently render an advisory opinion on the following question:

“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall
being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem , as described in the report of the

Secretary-General [Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General
Assembly resolution ES-10/13, A/ES/10/248], considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant

Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?”

2. In its Order of 19December2003, the C ourt decided that the United Nations and its

Member States were “considered likely, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute,
to be able to furnish information on all aspects ra ised by the question submitted to the Court for
advisory opinion”. It fixed 30 January 2004 as the time-limit within which they could submit to the
Court written statements on the question. The pr esent observations are submitted pursuant to that

decision.

*

* *

3. Preliminarily, the French Republic wish es to recall that in the discussion preceding

adoption of resolution ES-10/14 it joined in the common position adopted by the Member States of
the European Union, as that position was set out by Italy’s representative speaking on behalf of the
15Member States, the ten countries to become members on 1 May2004 and six other European
1
States . It is to be seen from this statement that the States on whose behalf it was made:

 condemn in the strongest terms terrorist attacks against Israel;

 are gravely concerned by the construction of the wall built by Israel in part on the Palestinian
territory, which is not an appropriate response to these attacks, and they share the concerns
expressed on this subject in the Secretary-General’s Report;

 but consider that the request for advisory opi nion made by the General Assembly is not
conducive to relaunching the necessary political dialogue between the two parties.

4. Accordingly, France, like the other European Union members and the candidate countries,
abstained in the vote on resolution ES-10/14, which was adopted by a majority of 90 votes in

favour and 8 against, with 74 abstentions.

Statement by H.E. Mr.Marcello Spatafora, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United

Nations, 8 December 2003, A/ES-10/PV.23, pp. 14-16. - 2 -

5. The French Republic holds to the belief th at the opinion which the Court has been asked

to give is not conducive to facilitating the resu mption of the dialogue, one which by nature is
highly political, between Israel and Palestine. As the Security Council called upon them to do in
resolution1515(2003), it is for the two parties “to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap” 2

which they accepted on 4 June 2003 at the Aqab a meeting. It is through these efforts  supported
by the “Quartet” and the international community as a whole  that the “vision of a region where
3
two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders” may
finally be realized.

6. The French Republic further wishes to under score that this request for advisory opinion
could set a dangerous precedent, inciting States to seek a vote by the General Assembly to refer to
the Court disputes over which the Court would not have contentious jurisdiction.

7. As the Court has noted time and again: “The power of the Court to give an advisory

opinion is d4rived from Article65 of the Statut e. The power granted is of a discretionary
character.”

8. France leaves it to the Court to determin e in its wisdom whethe r it should exercise its
power of discretion in the present case by decidi ng not to provide the requested opinion. The
observations below are submitted for consideration in the event that the Court decides to respond

on the merits to the question posed by the General Assembly.

*

9. That question concerns solely the legal consequences of the construction of the disputed
wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (the term “wall” used in this statement is that employed
by the General Assembly in resolution ES-10/14). It is not about the conformity of the

construction of the wall with international law. Determining its lawfulness is however prerequisite
to responding to the question posed:

 first, the consequences of the construction of the wall along the chosen route are obviously
very different depending on whether or not the construction is deemed in compliance with
international law;

 secondly, in order to determine those conse quences, it is necessary to ascertain not only
whether the construction of the wall along the chosen route is lawful but also, if it is not, which

exact rules of international law have been violated.

2
19 November 2003, para. 2.
3Resolution 1397 (2002), 12 March 2002.

4Advisory Opinion of 20July 1962, Certain Expenses of the Unite d Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p.155; see
also, for example, the Advisory Opinions of 30 March 1950, Interpretation of Peace Treaties, First phase, I.C.J. Reports
1950, p. 72; 21 June 1971, Legal Consequences for States of the Conti nued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Counc il Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Reports 1971 , p.27, para.41;
16 October 1975, Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 21, para. 23, and 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 235. - 3 -

10. It should also be pointed out at the outset that the question submitted to the Court

expressly concerns the legal consequences of the construction of the “wall being built by Israel, the
occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”.
It would appear that some segments of the wall have been built on Israeli territory, next to the

“Green Line” defined by the Armistice Agr eement of 3April1949. According to the
Secretary-General’s Report, these segments would appear to be very limited: “[t]he part of the
barrier that roughly hews to the Green Line is along the northernmost part of the West Bank. A

1-2 km stretch west of Tulkarm appears to run on the Israeli side of the Green Line” (A/ES-10/248,
p. 4, para. 7). It therefore appears pointless to address the question whether a State can construct a
wall of this sort along its borders.

11. The construction of the wall along the chosen route appears, prima facie, incompatible
with certain well-established rul es of international law(I). Ho wever, in France’s view this

conclusion does not relieve the Court of the need to consider whether there are circumstances
which could preclude the wrongfulness of the constr uction of the wall; in particular, while there
can be no doubt that Israel is entitled to take the measures necessary to ensure its security, it should
be ascertained whether the construction of the wall, in the light of the route chosen, is proportionate

to the threats it is intended to meet (II). In so far as that is not the case, the construction of the wall
along the chosen route could be held to be wrongful.

12. In the numerous instances in which th e Court has been called upon to rule on the
commission of an internationally wrongful act, it has explained the nature and scope of the legal
consequences arising from such an act(III). Fi rst among those consequences are the obligations

placed as a result of unlawful conduct upon the party having so acted. Thus, it is first incumbent
upon that party to “[put] an end to an illegal situation” 5 if that situation is continuing, as in the
present case. Just as “clearly” , the responsible State is required to make good in full the injury

caused by the wrongful act. Thus, in the present case Israel must inter alia “stop and reverse the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Pales tinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem” , as the General Assembly has told it to do . Further, given the circumstances, in

particular the route chosen, it is also important that Israel offer appropriate assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition of the wrongful act.

13. Since it is internationally wrongful, the act of constructing the wall on the Occupied
Palestinian Territory also entails legal c onsequences for third States and international
organizations. Inter alia, they are under an obligation not to recognize as lawful the situation

created by the route taken by this wall.

14. Finally, it is important to point out that restoration of the legal relationship that has been

severely disturbed by the construction of the wall in the occupied territory cannot become effective
and complete until good-faith performance of the viol ated obligations has resumed. While this
duty falls first to the author of the wrongful act, it is not incumbent solely on that party. Under the

circumstances having led to the present request fo r advisory opinion, it would appear especially
necessary to remind all parties concerned of their international obligations.

5Judgment of 13 June 1951, Haya de La Torre, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 82.
6
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, Judgment of 24May1980, p.42,
para. 90.
7Resolution ES-10/13, 21 October 2003, para. 1. - 4 -

I. Question of the compatibility of the construction of the wall
following the chosen route with various rules of international law

15. Speaking through its presidency, the Eur opean Union has several times disputed the
lawfulness of the construction of the wall along the chosen route 8. The General Assembly

expressed the same view when it stated in r esolution ES-10/13 of 21October2003 that the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestin ian Territory was “in contradiction to relevant
provisions of international law”. The French Republic has already expressed its full agreement
9
with this conclusion . It will therefore confine itself here to setting out the legal reasons justifying
that conclusion. In so doing, France does not cons ider it its role to add to or dispute information
appearing in the Secretary-General’s Report and th e summaries of the legal positions of Israel and
10
Palestine annexed thereto. It will thus limit itself to setting out the legal considerations which in
France’s estimation follow from the facts set out therein.

(a) Question of the rules to be applied in assessing the lawfulness of the construction of the wall
following the route chosen

16. In resolution ES-10/14 the Court is asked to rule on the legal consequences of the
construction of the wall “considering .. . the Fourth Geneva Convention .. . and relevant Security

Council and General Assembly resolutions”. This language implies, first, that those legal
instruments are applicable in responding to the question posed and, second, that rules from other

sources might apply. Thus, consideration should be given to all of the principles according to
which the Court must respond to the question it has been asked.

(i) Applicability of the rules relating to belligerent occupation

17. The formulation itself of the question shows that the Court is to pay particular attention
to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The use in the resolution of the terms “ occupying
Power” and “Occupied Palestinian Territory” confirms this point.

18. As the Court has recognized, the Gene va Conventions “are in some respects a

development [of the fundamental general pr11ciples of humanitarian law] and in other respects no
more than the expression [of them]” . Thus, “these fundamental rules are to be observed by all
States whether or not they have ratified the conven tions that contain them, because they constitute
12
intransgressible principles of international customary law” . It also follows that, in accordance
with the fundamental principle laid down in the Martens Clause, first set out in the Hague
Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Cust oms of War on Land of 1899, of which the Court

has noted the continuing applicability in its mode rn version found in Article 1, paragraph 2, of
Additional ProtocolI of 1977 1, “civilians and combatants remain under the protection and

8
See the statements made in the Security Council by Italy’s Permanent Representative on 14October2003
(S/PV.4841, p. 42) and to the General Assembly on 8 December 2003 (A/ES-10/PV.23, p. 15).
9
See the statement made in the Security Council by France’s Permanent Representative on 14October2003
(S/PV.4841, pp. 17-18).
10
“Palestine” has been the term used since 1988 within the United Nations system.
11Judgment of 27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p.113, para.218; see also the Advisory Opinion of 8July1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ,

I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 256, para. 75.
12Ibid., p. 257, para. 79.

13See above-cited Opinion of 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 257, para. 78, and p. 260, para. 87. - 5 -

authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”.

19. Moreover, even if the Fourth Convention were not applicable per se because it has not
been ratified by Palestine, the other party to th e armed conflict, its provisions would nevertheless

apply, not as such but as a result of the fact, and to the extent, that they express general principles
of humanitarian law.

20. Further, more specifically in the present case,

 the armed conflict in 1967, the wellspring of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
territories, pitted Israel against Egypt, Syri a and Jordan, three States parties to the

1949 Conventions;

 Palestine, which has sought several times to b ecome a party to the Geneva Conventions, has

undertaken to apply these instruments unilatera lly and the Swiss Government, the depositary,
without “decid[ing] whether [the most recent of those communications, dated 21June1989,
should] be considered as an instrument of accessi on in the sense of the relevant provisions of

the Conventions and their Additional Protocols”, has taken the position that “[t]he unilateral
declaration of application of the four Geneva Conventions and of Additional ProtocolI made
14
on 7 June 1982 by the Palestine Liberation Organization remains valid” ;

 Israel initially recognized the applicability of th e Fourth Convention: according to Article 35

of Order No.1, issued by the occupying authorities on 7June1967, “[t]he Military Court...
must apply the provisions of the Geneva C onvention dated 12August1949, Relative to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War, with r espect to judicial procedures. In case of conflict
15
between this Order and said Convent ion, the Convention shall prevail” ; further, it should be
noted that in a decision dated 3 September 2002 16 the Supreme Court of Israel, hearing the case

of Palestinian civilians expelle d on orders of the Military Commander for Judea and Samaria
from those territories to Gaza, explicitly applied certain provisions of the Fourth Convention,
which it had previously avoided doing, even though it did apply them de facto ; 17

 finally, the competent organs of the United Nati ons have repeatedly affirmed the applicability
of the Fourth Convention 18.

21. As for the Hague Regulations of 1907, th eir provisions have taken on customary value,

which makes them binding on all States, whether or not parties.

14IRRC, 1990, pp. 64-65.

15Text in Proclamation, Orders and Appointments of the I sraeli Defence Forces in the West Bank Area ,
11 August 1967.

16See HCJ 7015/02 and 7019/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander, [2002] IsrLR, para. 13.
17
See HCJ 1361/91 Mesalem v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip, IsrSC 36 (4) 444, p. 456; HSJ 554/81 Beransa v.
Central Commander IsrSC 36 (4) 247, p. 250.
18
See inter alia General Assembly resolutions 2851(XXVI) of 20December1971, 3092A(XXVIII) of
7 December 1973, 3240 B (XXIV) of 29 November 1974, 3525B(XXX) of 15December1975 and 58/97 of
17 December 2003. On this point see also Security Counc il resolutions 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 446 (1979) of
22 March 1979, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 672 (1990) of 12October1990 and, r ecently, 1322(2000) of
7 October 2000 and 1435 (2002) of 24 September 2002. - 6 -

(ii) Applicability of the rules of international human rights law

22. Unlike the Fourth Convention of 1949, the human rights treaties to which Israel is a party
are not expressly cited as relevant instruments by resolutionES-10/14 seising the Court of the
question under consideration. In this connection, it appears that the Court should be guided by the

following two principles.

23. First, in accordance with Article2 of th e International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, each State party “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory

and subject to its jurisdiction ” the rights recognized therein. Even though there is no similar
provision in the International Covenant on Econom ic, Social and Cultural Rights, owing to the
nature of the rights set out therein, it must be c onstrued in the same spirit. It follows that the

Covenants are in principle applicable in the occupi ed territories to the extent that the individuals
there “are subject to the jurisdiction” of the occupying Power.

24. Secondly, however, due acc ount should be taken of Article 4 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which

 allows States parties to “take measures deroga ting from their obligations” thereunder “to the

extent strictly required by the exigencies of th e situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law . . .” (paragraph 1);

 yet prohibits any derogation from certain provisi ons (paragraph 2); none of these prohibitions
would appear relevant in the present instance.

(iii) Relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions

25. In its request for advisory opinion, the General Assembly underscored the need to take
into consideration relevant Secu rity Council and General Assembly resolutions. France thinks it

well to make the following points on this subject.

26. The term “relevant resolutions” should proba bly not be interpreted too narrowly. It may

be noted in this connection that the Security Council has not adopted any resolution dealing
directly with the question of the lawfulness of the construction of the wall or with its consequences.
As for the General Assembly, apart from resolutionES-10/14, it has, by resolutionES-10/13 of
21 October 2003, adopted on a vote of 144 in favour, 4 against, and 12 abstentions, demanded “that

Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
in and around East Jerusalem, which is in depart ure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in
contradiction to relevant provisions of interna tional law”. In resolutions58/98 and58/99 of
9 December 2003, it again expressed concern about the construction of the wall and its route and in

the former it again demanded that construction be stopped.

27. These few resolutions are not the only on es relevant for purposes of the request for

advisory opinion: much information appearing in Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions should also be taken into considerati on by the Court, notably information concerning
the applicable law , the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force and the condemnation of

attempts at annexing certain territories occupied by Israel and of the settlement policy being carried

19
See paragraph 21 above. - 7 -

20
out there . That is also true of other, more genera l, resolutions, such as resolutions1368(2001)
and 1373 (2001) concerning the fight against terrorism . 21

(iv) Particular agreements binding the parties concerned

28. Even though resolutionES-10/14 does not specifically mention any particular legal

instrument other than the Fourth Geneva Conven tion, its open-ended language is an inducement to
consider whether there might be rules binding the parties concerned, between themselves or even in
their relations with third parties, which would be relevant for purposes of the Court’s response to

the question posed to it by the General Assembly.

29. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (“Taba”) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
of 28September 1995, taking the place of the agreements signed in Washington on

13September1993 and in Cairo on 4May1994 and repeating and supplementin22the relevant
provisions of those agreements, could ha ve a certain bearing in this respect . ArticleXI of that
Agreement provides: “The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial

unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.” Further,
Articles XXIX and XXX, and VIII and IX of Anne xI, guarantee and make arrangements for free

passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and circulation within, from and towards those
territories.

30. In addition, the question arises as to the legal status of the “roadmap”, drawn up by the
“Quartet” consisting of representatives of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the

European Union and the United Nations, and appr oved in Security Council resolution 1515 (2003)
of 19 November 2003 . The document was presented to the Israeli Government and the

Palestinian Authority on 30April 2003 and, while Israel did make reservations concerning details
in the text, the two parties approved it in principle at the Aqaba conference on 4 June 2003.

31. It is not out of the question to consider these reciprocal undertakings to be an agreement
binding those having made them ; they can also be considered to be unilateral legal acts binding
25
as such . In any event, it should be noted that the “roadmap” is drafted in terms of obligations
borne by the parties 26 and that the “Quartet” took note in its statement of 22June2003 of the

20
See, inter alia, in respect of the annexation of East Jerusm: Security Council resolutions 298(1971) of
25 September 1971, 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980, 478 (1980) of 20August1980; and General Assembly resolutions:
36/120 E of 10 December 1981, 56/31 of 3 December 2001 and 58/22 of 3 December 2003. In respect of the settlements,
see Council resolutions 446(1979) of 22March1979, 452(1 979) of 20July1979, 465(1980) of 1March1980, and
Assembly resolutions 2253(ES-V) of 4July1967, 36/226 A of 17 December 1981, 38/58 C of 13 December 1983,

44/40A of 4December1989, 57/126 of 11December2002, ES- 10/6 of 9February1999, ES-10/13 of 21October2003
and 59/98 of 9 December 2003.
21See paragraph 49 below.

22Document A/51/889 and S/1997/357.

23Document S/2003/529.
24
The Court has stated that international law does not require an agreement to take a particular form (see the
Judgments of 19 December 1978, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports 1978 , p. 39, para. 96, and of 1 July 1994,
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 1994, pp. 120-121, para. 23.

25See paragraph 20 above.
26
See the introductory section, in fine: “In each phase, the parties are expected to perform tobligations in
parallel, unless otherwise indicated” (S/2003/529, Annex, p. 2). - 8 -

“commitments” made at the Aqaba Summit 2. Moreover, in resolution1515 (2003) of
19 November 2003, the Security Council called on “t he parties to fulfil their obligations under the

Road Map in co-operation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side by
side in peace and security”.

32. As for the substance, the “road map” cont ains elements relating very directly to the
question which the Court has been asked. In particular:

 in Phase I (in principle before May2003), “t he Palestinians immediately undertake an
unconditional cessation of violence” and “Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize
Palestinian life” and “freezes all settlement activity”;

 “GOI [the Government of Israel] takes no ac tions undermining trust, including deportations,
attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demo lition of Palestinian homes and property, as a
punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and

infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan”;

 further, “Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation”, including “easing
restrictions on movement of persons and goods”;

 in respect of Phase II (intended to last from June to December 2003), it is provided that, within
the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian nego tiating process aimed at creating an independent
Palestinian state with provisional borders, ther e will be “implementation of prior agreements,

to enhance maximum territorial contiguity”.

(b) Question as to the conformity to these rules of the construction of the wall following the

route chosen

33. After examining the nature of the releva nt rules, the French Republic will address the
question as to the conformity to those rules of the construction of the wall following the route

chosen. It would appear appropriate, for the sak e of convenience, to distinguish, on the one hand,
the problems raised by the prohibition on annexati on (i) and, on the other, breaches of other rules
of humanitarian law and breaches of the rules of human rights law (ii).

(i) Legal problems raised by the prohibition on annexation and related questions

34. There is no doubt that, if the construction of the wall were to be seen as the annexation of
part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, this would be inconsistent with the very essence of
military occupation, which corresponds to a de facto power (see Article42 of the Hague
Regulations) intended to be exercised only temporarily. It follows that annexation, de facto or

de jure, cannot deprive protected persons on the occupi ed territory of the benefit of the Fourth
Convention of 1949 (Article 47).

35. This rule is buttressed by the principle forb idding the acquisition of territory by force.
Deriving from Article2, paragraph4, of the Unite d Nations Charter, this principle is clearly

27
See the annex to the letter dated 25June2003 addrssed to the President of the Security Council by the
Secretary-General (S/2003/672). - 9 -

expressed in the Declaration on Principles of In ternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations . 28

36. The Security Council applied this principle in the case of the occupied Arab territories as
early as its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, in which it made clear “the inadmissibility

of the acquisition of territory by war” and asserted that “the establishment of a just and lasting
peace” must include the principle of the “wit hdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories

occupi29 in the recent conflict”. The Council has reaffirmed this principle on many occasions
since .

30
37. And, for its part, “Israel has repeatedly stated that the Barrier is a temporary measure” .
Thus, Israel’s Permanent Representative asserted in a statement on 8 December 2003 made before

the United Nations General Assembly that “the secur ity fence is a temporar31... measure... As
soon as the terror ends, the fence will no longer be necessary” . Decision 2077 of the Israeli
Cabinet, approving the first phase of construction of the “security barrier”, confirms moreover that
32
it “does not represent a political or other border” .

38. In the view of the French Republic, these st atements have legal impact. They lead the
French Republic to believe that Israel cannot, sole ly on the basis of the construction of the wall, be
held responsible for a violation of the fundamental principle of international law, applicable to the

occupied territories, forbidding any acquisition of territory by force, since this construction is
declared to be temporary and without effect on th e course of the definitive borders between Israel

and Palestine. The French Government does howe ver note that the General Assembly stated in
resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003:

“the route marked out for the wall under cons truction by Israel, the occupying Power,
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in cluding in and around East Jerusalem, could
prejudge future negotiations and make the two-State solution physically impossible to

implement and would cause further humanitarian hardship to the Palestinians”.

(ii)Breaches of other rules of international humanitarian law and of principles of
human rights law

39. The construction of the wall appears to infri nge other rules of international humanitarian
law or human rights rules binding on Israel. As France has stated above (Sections (a) (i) and (ii)),
the two bodies of rules apply in the present case and are mutually complementary. Thus, violations

of one or the other resulting from the construction of the wall should be examined together.

28Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

29See inter alia resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3July 1969, 298 (1971) of
25September1971, 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980, 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 and 681 (1990) of 20 December1990.
See also, inter alia, General Assembly resolutions 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971, 2949 (XXVII) of

8 December 1972, 31/61 of 9 December 1976, 32/20 of 25 November 1977, 37/123 A of 20 December 1982, 44/40 A of
4December1989, 52/52 of 9December 1997, 55/55 of 10 December 2000, 56/36 of 3December 2001 and 57/110 of
3 December 2002.
30
Report of the Secretary-General, A/ES-10/248, para. 29.
31Text available on the site www.Israel-UN.org.

32See the Report of the Secretary-General, para. 5. - 10 -

40. Apart from the aspects considered above (i), one of the most serious breaches of the rules

of international humanitarian law resulting from the construction of the wall along the chosen route
no doubt concerns, prima facie, the property destruction caused by it, which is referred to in the
Secretary-General’s Report . 33

41. On this subject international law calls fo r account to be taken of two considerations.
First, it requires compensation which effectiv ely makes good the entire injury suffered by the
owners of the property in questi on. Second, it allows for account to be taken of “necessities of

war”.

42. It is forbidden by Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations of 1907 “to destroy or seize the
enemy’s property, unless such destruction or sei zure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war”. Article 53 of the Fourth Convention of 1949 provides:

“Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to priv ate persons, or to the State, or to other
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”

In addition, under Article147 of the Convention, “grave breaches” include the “extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by mili tary necessity and carried out

unlawfully and wantonly”.

43. By their wording, these prohibitions ar e not absolute and are subject to military
34
necessity . It is important to note however that in these three provisions necessity is described in
particularly strict terms: it must be “imperative” or “absolutely necessary”. It will be for the Court
to make its own determination on this point.

44. There is a second domain in which the cons truction of the wall appears, prima facie, to
flout at least the rules for the protection of human rights if not the rules of international

humanitarian law. The construction in fact seriously infringes the liberty of movement of persons
guaranteed by Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Here
again, the very wording of the provision shows that this liberty is not absolute because paragraph 3
of the Article recognizes the possibility of “restrictions... which are provided by law, are

necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public) . . .”. In the view of the French
Republic, this possibility in the context of m ilitary occupation should not be construed too
restrictively. On the other hand, account should be taken of the extremely long duration of the

occupation in question, which makes much less acceptable restrictions which would be justifiable if
temporary and limited to the period immediately succeeding military operations.

II. Question of the proportionality to the threats to Israel of the
construction of the wall following the route chosen

45. While, according to Article1 of the In ternational Law Commission’s Draft Articles on

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in principle “[e]very internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State”, wrongfulness is
precluded in a number of circumstances described in Articles20 to 25 of the draft. Thus,

33
A/ES-10/248, para. 29. See also ibid., paras. 17, 18 and 25.
34
The legal impact of such necessity will be considered below (para. 53). - 11 -

consideration should be given to the question whet her the construction of the wall on the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, even though it is, prima facie, in breach of various international obligations

of Israel, can be justified by any of those circ umstances. In particular, it should be considered
whether this construction is proportionate (b) to the threats to which it is the response (a).

(a) Israel’s right to respond to the threats to its security

46. As stated in the Secretary-General’s Report, the construction of the wall is part of the
measures considered by the Government of Israel “to halt infiltration into Israel from the central
and northern West Bank” and was decided upon “[a]ft er a sharp rise in Palestinian terror attacks in
35
the spring of 2002” .

47. It cannot be denied that Israel is confr onted with grave threats to its security and these
must be brought to an end. That moreover is one of the concerns constantly reflected in the

“roadmap”, which states that “[a] two state solutio n to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be
achieved through an end to violence and terrorism” a nd calls insistently upon Palestinian leaders to
“[act] decisively against terror” . 36

48. These concerns were expressed in no un certain terms on 14October2003 by France’s

Permanent Representative during the debate with in the Security Council: “France recognizes
Israel’s inalienable right to security, its right to self-defence and its right to combat terrorist attacks,
37
which are totally condemnable, morally odious and which no cause can justify.” Duringt38
debates in the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly on 20 October 2003 and
then again on 8December2003 during the debate on draft resolutionES-10/14 39, Italy’s

Representative spoke to the same effect on beha lf of all European Union Member States and
reiterated their strong condemnation of the intens ification of suicide attacks and other acts of
violence, at the same time recognizing on behalf of the European Union “Israel’s right to protect its

citizens from terrorist attacks”.

49. Similarly, the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned “all acts of violence,
terrorism and destruction”, in particular suicide bombings 40, and has called upon the Palestinian

Authority41to arrest, disrupt and restrain indivi duals and groups conducting and planning violent
attacks” . For its part, the Security Council has “affirm[ed] a vision of a region where two States,
Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders”, in full accordance

with its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and has demanded “immediate cessation of all acts
of violence, including all acts of terror” 42. Further, in resolution1269, which is general in scope,
the Security Council “[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as

criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations,

35A/ES-10/248, para. 4.
36
Document S/2003/529, Annex.
37
See S/PV.4841, p. 18.
38See A/ES-10/PV.21, pp. 20-21.

39See A/ES-10/PV.23, p. 15.

40Resolution ES-10/13 of 21October2003; see also resolutions ES-10/2 of 25April1997, ES-10/8 of
20December2001, 57/110 of 3December2002, 57/127 of 11December2002, ES-10/12 of 19September2003 and
58/98 and 58/99 of 9 December 2003.

41Resolution ES-10/13.
42
Resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002; see also re solutions 1402 (2002) of 30 March 2002, 1435 (2002) of
24 September 2002 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003. - 12 -

wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which could threaten international peace
and security” . In resolution 1435, it “call[ed] on the Pal estinian Authority to meet its expressed
44
commitment to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts are brought to justice by it” .

50. These acts have no doubt created a situation entitling Israel to take measures to ensure its
security, whether this situation is to be characterized as one of self-defence, distress or necessity.

(b) Assessment of the proportionality issue

(iProportionality requirement

51. Apart from the specific conditions to which each of the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness may be subject, all of them require th at the acts in question be proportionate to the
45
danger to which they respond. Thus, in respect of self-defence, which Israel expressly invokes ,
the exercise is subject, pursuant to Article51 of the Charter and customary international law, to

strict conditions one of which being precisely the principle of proportionality; “the re46irements of
proportionality and of necessity [are] inherent in the notion of self-defence” .

52. The proportionality requirement also applies if the construction of the wall is considered
to be a countermeasure adopted and implemente d in response to the threats, indisputably
47
wrongful , against Israel. In addition to the fact that countermeasures “are limited to the
non-performance for the time being of internationa l obligations of the State taking the measures

towards the responsible State” and “shall, as far as possible, be tak48 in such a way as to permit the
resumption of performance of the obligations in question” and shall not affect “[o]bligations for
the protection of fundamental human rights” or “[o]bligations of a humanitarian character
49
prohibiting reprisals” , “[c]ountermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking
into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question” . 50

53. The fact that the wall is being built in the context of military occupation has no impact on

the fundamental proportionality requirement. The entire law of international armed conflict is
dominated by the attempt to balance the necessitie s of war and the humanization of war, which in
itself is an illustration of the principle of proporti onality. This is set out more specifically in the

particular provisions to be applied in the present case, whether Article23 (g) of the Hague
Regulations of 1907 or Articles53 or 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which are

43
Resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999, para. 1. See also resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001).
44Resolution 1435 (2002) of 24 September 2002, para. 4.

45Annex I to the Report of the Secretary-General, A/ES-10/248, para. 6.

46Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Se ssion, 2001, General Assemb ly, Official Records,
56thSession, Supplement No.10 (A/56/10), p.180, commentary to Article 21, para.6. See, inter alia, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua , I.C.J. Reports 1986 , p.94, para.176, or
p.103, para.194, Advisory Opinion, 8July1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , I.C.J. Reports

1996 (I), p. 245, para. 41, and Judgment of 6 November 2003, Oil Platforms, paras. 43, 51, 74 and 76.
47See (a) above.

48Article 49, paras. 2 and 3, of the above-cited ILC draft.

49Ibid., Article 50, paras. 1 (b) and (c).
50
Ibid., Article51. See Judgment of 25September1997, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, I.C.J. Reports 1997 ,
p. 56, para. 85. - 13 -

especially restrictive in limiting the possibility of invoking “military necessity” (see paras.42-43
above).

54. This is also true in respect of the fight against terrorism. Thus, while recognizing
“Israel’s inalienable right to security, its right to self-defence and its right to combat terrorist
attacks” (see para.48, above), France’s Perm anent Representative said in his statement on

14October2003 before the Security Council: “H owever, the struggle against terrorism cannot
justify everything and must be carried out with respect for the law.” 51

(ii)Assessmentofproportionality

55. If the Court chooses to comply with the request for advisory opi nion, it will need to
ascertain whether the conditions required for th e existence of a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness resulting from the construction of the wall are met and, in particular, whether the

fundamental requirement of proportionality has been respected.

56. In so doing, the Court will be required to take into consideration not only the immediate

circumstances surrounding the building of the wall bu t also the more general context in which this
is occurring.

57. In the case concerning Oil Platforms, the Court stated that it “cannot assess in isolation
the proportionality of [the action against the oil platforms] to the attack to which it was said to be a
52
response” . Here as well, it will have to take full account at one and the same time of: the gravity
of the threats to Israel’s security; the set of step s taken by the Government of Israel to deal with
them, the construction of the wall being only one of those steps; and the violations of Palestinian

rights caused by the construction of the wall.

58. In this connection the Court may wish to c onsider the fact that the wall, if completed, 53
will be a continuous barrier, punctuated by a sm all number of crossing points, stretching 720 km ,
creating a number of enclaves affecting more than half a million Palestinians 54 and de facto

dismembering the Occupied Palestinian Territory, a portion of which will be completely cut off
from any direct contact with a third State.

III. Question of the legal consequences of the construction of the wall
following the route chosen

(a) Obligation to put an end to the unlawful situ ation and to make reparation for the injury
caused by it

59. As the International Law Commission states in the commentary to the Articles it adopted
in 2001 on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, “[t]he question of cessation

51See S/PV.4841, p.18. See also the above-cited statements (notes 73, 74 and 75) by Italy’s Representative on
behalf of the European Union on 14 and 20 October 2003 and on 8 October 2003.
52
Judgment of 6 November 2003, para. 77, see also para. 68.
53
Report of the Secretary-General, A/ES-10/248, para. 6.
54Ibid., para. 8. - 14 -

55
often arises in close connection with that of reparation, and particularly restitution” . In effect, a
State cannot fully perform its duty, under the head of reparation, to eliminate the consequences of
56
its wrongful conduct until it has fulfilled the obligation to cease that conduct .

(i) Obligation to put an end to the unlawful situation

60. Two conditions must be met before a Stat e responsible for an internationally wrongful
act is placed under an obligation to cease that act. In the words of the Arbitral Tribunal in the

Rainbow Warrior case, the existence of the obligation of cessation presupposes both “that the 57
wrongful act has a continuing character and that the violated rule is still in force” at the time
when the legal consequences of that act are to be determined. There can be no doubt in the light of

these two requirements that, as a result of the constr uction of the wall in the occupied territory, the
first obligation borne by Israel is to cease its wrongful conduct.

61. The construction of the wall, following the route chosen by Israel, must first of all be
58
understood as the act giving rise to an “illegal situation” . That is the situation, seen in the light of
the violations it entails, which is continuing toda y in contravention of some of the most firmly

established rules of international law and which must cease. To that end, the first measure which
Israel must take to remedy the wrongfulness of its conduct is to stop the construction work it has
been carrying out in the Palestinian territories fo r more than 18months, as the General Assembly
59
has demanded that it do .

62. Although it has made no pronouncement on the problem of the wall built by Israel or on
its consequences, the Security Council has on ma ny occasions adopted similar language in respect

of other actions taken by Israel in the o ccupied Palestinian territories. Thus, in
resolution 452 (1979), it “[c]alls upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent
basis, the establishment, construction and planni ng of settlements in the Ar ab territories occupied
60
since 1967, including Jerusalem” . Similarly, at a time when Israel’s decision to build a “system
of fences, walls, ditches and barriers in the West Bank” 61was already known, the Council

demanded that the Government of that country “cease measures . . . [of] destruction of . . .
civilian . . . infrastructure” in certain parts of the occupied territories . 62

5Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session  General Assembly, Official Records,
Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No.10 (A/ 56/10) [hereinafter “ILC Report2001”], p.218, commentary to Article30,
para. 7.

5In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran for example, the Court held that
the first action Iran had to take to redress the situatiwas to “immediately terminate the unlawful detention” of the

American hostages (Judgment of 24 May 1980, p. 44, para. 95, point 3 (a)).
5Award of 30April1990, United Nations, Reports of Inte rnational Arbitral Awards, Vol.XX (1990), p.270,

para. 114; see also ILC Report 2001, p. 217, commentary to Article 30, para. 3.
5See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) ,

Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 54, para. 118.
5See resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003 and 58/98 of 9 December 2003.

6Resolution of 20 July 1979.

6Report of the Secretary-General, A/ES-10/248, para. 2.
62
Resolution 1435 (2002), 24 September 2002, para. 2. - 15 -

(ii) Obligation to make reparation for the damage caused by the unlawful situation

63. As the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in a famous passage: “The
essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of th e illegal act and reestablish the situation which
63
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”

64
64. Restitution is the prime means of reparation . Under Article35 of the ICL Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in this instance codifying a
65
rule grounded in straightforward logic a nd supported by well- settled jurisprudence , the
responsible State is required to make restitution “provided and to the extent that [it] is not

materially impossible”. Now, even though it w ould appear from the Secr etary-General’s Report 66
that the wall is a massive structure intended tangi bly to mark the Occupied Palestinian Territory ,
the destruction of that part of it situated on the territory and the restoration of the status quo ante do

not appear impossible.

65. First, while restitution often proves impossible where the prejudice arises from the
destruction of property, it would always seem possible if, as in the present case, the converse is true

and it is a question of demolishing an existing structure. The process can sometimes present
significant practical difficulties; they alone how ever are not sufficient to make restitution
materially impossible . Second, and most importantly, Israel has on a number of occasions
68
underscored the temporary nature of the structure it is building , insisting moreover that it be
called a “security fence”, not a “separation wall” intended to be permanent . 69

66. At the same time Israel has clearly expr essed its desire to condition any dismantling of

the wall, or a change in its route, on progress in th e negotiations on the final status of the occupied

63
Factory at Chorzów, Judgment No.13, 13 September1928, Series A, No. 17, p.47; see also ICJ, Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 31-32, para. 76.
64
In the Judgment concerning the Factory at Chorzów , the PCIJ underscored, immediately after the passage
quoted above, the primacy of restitution over the other forms of reparation (Series A, No. 17, pp.47-48; see also the
Award rendered by Mr.Dupuy, the sole arbitrator, in the Texaco-Calasiatic case (19January1977, text in J.D.I., 1977,
p. 350).
65
See inter alia the Judgment rendered by the PCIJ in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzów
(13 September 1928, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No.17 , p.48) and the cases cited by the ILC in the commentary to Article35
(ILC Report 2001, p. 239, footnote No. 526).

6A/ES-10/248, in particular paras. 9-14.
67
In a similar vein, it should be recalled that, after having found that “Israel’s . . . practices of settling parts of its
population and new immigrants” in the occupied Palestinian te rritories constituted a “flagrant violation” of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, the Security Council called upon the Government of Israel to “dismantle the existing settlements”
(resolution 465 (1980), 1 March 1980, paras. 5 and 6).

6See para. 37 above.
69
See the Report of the Secretary-General, A/ES-10/248, para. 2 (asterisk). - 16 -

70
Palestinian territories . This is incompatible with the very spirit of the reparation process, as
defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice in a famous dictum . 71

67. Finally, in order for the status quo ante to be restored as completely as possible, it is

important that the dismantling of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory be accompanied by
the annulment of the legal instrume nts having permitted its construction 72 and, if necessary, the

payment of appropriate compensation.

(iii) Need to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition

68. The need to offer assurances or guarantees of non-repetition of the wrongful act does not

automatically follow from the commission of the act but must be assessed on the basis of the
specific circumstances of the situation in question 73. To a great extent, it therefore results above all

from a discretionary determination as to their a ppropriateness, based essentially on the magnitude
of the breaches of law found and the probability that they may reoccur. On these two bases, the
offering of such assurances and guarantees would appear appropriate under the circumstances

underlying the request for advisory opinion.

(b) Obligation not to recognize the lawfulness of the situation

69. The obligation not to recognize an unlawful situation is often associated with the 74
violation of obligations of fundamental importance to the international community as a whole .

70. In the present case, during the debates on the construction of the wall held within the
Security Council and the General Assembly on 14 and 20October and 8December2003, the

Permanent Representatives of France and Italy to the United Nations  the latter speaking on
behalf of the members of the European Union  expressed concerns as to the consequences which
75
further construction work may have . As stated above, trust should however be placed in the
commitments made by Israel as to this point and, specifically, as to the fact that the wall does not
76
form a political border .

70See in particular the statement to the General Assemb ly by Israel’s Permanent Representative to the United

Nations during the debate on the adoption of resolution ES-10/14 (text available on the website www.Israel-UN.org; see
also press release AG/1463 of 8 December 2003).
71“It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation

in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is
no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itselfFactory at Chorzów (Jurisdiction) , 26 July 1927, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 9, p. 21).
72
The Security Council has time and again made similar demands in respect of measures to modify the status of
Jerusalem or to promote the establishment of settlements (see inter alia resolutions 446 (1979), 465 (1980) and
476 (1980) of 22 March 1979, 1 March and 30 June 1980, respectively).
73
In Article30 (b) of its Draft Articles on Responsibility of Stat es for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the ILC
makes provision for the obligation to offer such assurances and guarantees “if circumstances so require”.
74
In its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the ILC refers to the
obligation of non-recognition and non-assistance in case of “s erious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a
peremptory norm of general international law” (Article 40 (2) and Article 41 (2)).
75
See S/PV.4841, p.17, for the French statement to the Security Council on 14October2003; see
A/ES-10/PV.21, p. 21, for the statement to the General Assembly by the Italian Representative on behalf of the members
of the European Union on 20 October 2003.
76
Paras. 37 and 38 above. - 17 -

71. In any event, in explaining the reach of the obligation of non- recognition in the present

situation, it is not necessary to determine whet her these violations of law constitute serious
breaches of intransgressible obligations under interna tional law. Such a determination is required
when the responsible State seeks to induce the injured party to recognize the wrongful act and to
77
waive any challenge of its consequences . On the other hand, it would seem of no real relevance
as far as the conduct of third parties is concerned: either those third parties are unjustified in
pronouncing upon a legal relationship inter partes which is wholly foreign to them; or, conversely,

there exists a situation which is illegal as to th e world at large and is likely to have effects erga
omnes, and to this they cannot by definition remain indifferent 7. It is this second scenario, in
many respects analogous to the problem dealt with by the Court in 1971, which obtains here.

(c) Obligation to resume performance of the violated obligations

72. There are no legal grounds for thinking that the obligations which have been referred to
in this statement have become inapplicable as a result of Israel’s construction of the wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. Whether arising under general international law, humanitarian law,

the principles of international human rights law or individual agreements binding Israel and
Palestine, those obligations remain in force and the parties must perform them in good faith. Thus,
strictly in terms of the question submitted to the Court, the duty to resume performance of the

violated obligations no doubt does not figure among the legal consequences of the construction of
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

73. The French Republic does however believe that it could be useful for the Court to
consider stating, by way of juridical supererogation, the legal consequences which the construction

of the wall does not have, reminding in particular th e parties concerned, but also the international
community as a whole, to fulfil their internationa l obligations, notably the duty to negotiate with a
view to the pacific settlement of disputes .79

C ONCLUSION

74. The French Republic requests the Court, in the event that it deems it appropriate to
respond to the request for advisory opinion contai ned in General Assembly resolution ES-10/14, to
do so in the light of the foregoing observations.

Paris, 30 January 2004

(Signed) RonnyA BRAHAM .
Agent of the French Republic

___________

77
See the ILC Report 2001, commentary to Article 41, pp. 289-290, para. 9.
7On this “illegal situation”, see para. 61.

7The Court has done so a number of times; see inter alia United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, Judgment of 24May1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp.42-43, para.92; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment
of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p.81, para.154; Aerial Incident of 10August1999, Jurisdiction , Judgment
of 21 June 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000 , p.34, para.55 (concerning the obligation to settle international disputes
peacefully).