Non Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2010/21
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2010
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 21 octobre 2010, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
Requête du Honduras à fin d’intervention
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2010
Public sitting
held on Thursday 21 October 2010, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Application by Honduras for permission to intervene
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Crinçade
Yusuf
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
CotMM.
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presewtada
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Cot
Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S.Exc.M.CarlosJoséArgüelloGómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
S. Exc. M. Samuel Santos,
ministre des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua ;
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.PaulReichler, avocat au cabinetFoley Hoag LLP, WashingtonD.C., membre des barreaux de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils;
Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
Mme Carmen Martinez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public à l’Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M.EdgardoSobenesObregon, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseils adjoints. - 5 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Samuel Santos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua;
MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of Intern ational Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid;
Member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPh., CGEOL., F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Mr.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Ms Carmen Martínez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,
Madrid
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Assistant Counsel. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Université del Rosario de
Bogotá,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, président du comité juridique interaméricain, membre de
la Cour permanente d’arbitrage et ancien mini stre des affaires étrangères de la République de
Colombie,
comme coagent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.RodmanR.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
cabinet Eversheds LLP (Paris),
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
ministre d’Etat de la République de Colombie,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,
S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès de la
République du Honduras,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères de la République de Colombie,
Mme Victoria E. Pauwels T., ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République de Colombie,
M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de la Colombie aux
Pays-Bas,
MmeAndreaJiménezHerrera, conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Colombie,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Thomas Fogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseiller technique. - 7 -
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Chair of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, Member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Colombia,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institute of International Law, Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr.MarceloKohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva; associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Minister of
State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commission,
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of
Honduras,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Interna tional Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Colombia,
Ms Victoria E. Pauwels T., Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Colombia,
Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Thomas Fogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Adviser. - 8 -
Le Gouvernement du Honduras est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos López Contreras, ambassadeur, conseiller national au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
comme agent ;
SirMichaelWood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Genève,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Julio Rendón Barnica, ambassadeur, ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Miguel Tosta Appel, ambassadeur, président de la commission hondurienne de
démarcation au ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Sergio Acosta, chargé d’affaires a.i. à l’ambassade du Honduras au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Richard Meese, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris,
M. Makane Moïse Mbengue, docteur en droit, maître de conférences à l’Université de Genève,
Mlle Laurie Dimitrov, élève-avocat, barreau de Paris, cabinet Meese,
M. Eran Sthoeger, faculté de droit de la New York University,
comme conseils ;
M. Mario Licona, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseiller technique. - 9 -
The Government of Honduras is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos López Contreras, Ambassador, National Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Asgent;
SirMichaelWood, K.C.M.G., member of the E nglish Bar, member of the International Law
Commission,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Julio Rendón Barnica, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Miguel Tosta Appel, Ambassador, Chairman of the Honduran Demarcation Commission,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Sergio Acosta, Chargé d’affaires a.i. at the Embassy of Honduras in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Richard Meese, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris,
Dr. Makane Moïse Mbengue, Senior Lecturer at the University of Geneva,
Miss Laurie Dimitrov, pupil barrister, Paris Bar, Cabinet Meese,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, Faculty of Law, New York University,
Csounsel;
Mr. Mario Licona, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Technical Adviser. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
second round of oral argument of the Republic of Honduras. Before giving the floor to Honduras, I
note that Vice-President Tomka, for reasons which have been explained to me, will be unable to be
present at the sitting of the Court today and tomorrow. I shall now give the floor to
Sir Michael Wood to make his presentation.
Sir Michael WOOD:
H ONDURAS HAS SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERVENTION AS A PARTY
AND AS A NON -PARTY
1. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court, our purpose
today is to respond to what our colleagues from Ni caragua and Colombia said in the first round.
We shall not attempt to reply on all points, in par ticular not those we already covered in detail in
the first round. But we shall seek to identify point s of agreement, and then deal with some of the
more significant points that still appear to divide the Parties.
2. It cannot be overemphasized that we are at the permission stage. It is not the time for any
of us to get deep into the merits of Honduras’s intervention, still less the merits of the main
proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia.
3. The structure of our statements in this second round will be as follo
ws.
4. I shall address what Nicaragua and Colombia said about the three matters referred to in
Article 81 of the Rules of Court: the interest of a legal nature; the object of the intervention; and
jurisdiction.
5. Professor Boisson de Chazournes will then respond to what was said about the law and
practice of intervention, and the legal considerations that govern this institution.
6. Finally, the Agent will make some c oncluding remarks and read out our formal
submissions.
7. Mr.President, there does seem to be a degree of common ground among all three States
on some important points. - 11 -
8. First, there seems to be agreement that Article 62 of the Statute covers both intervention as
a party and intervention as a non-party. Nicaragua and Colombia have each been explicit on this
point 1.
9. Second, it does not seem to be questioned that, for each form of intervention, the key
requirement is that the intervening State considers that it has an interest or interests of a legal
2
nature that may be affected by the decision of the Court in the main case .
10. Third, the precise object of each of Honduras’s two separate requests to intervene, as a
party and as a non-party, seems to be well understood 3.
11. Fourth, it is clear that, there is a jurisdictional link among the three States under
Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá.
12. As we made clear during the first round, since Honduras has demonstrated that the
necessary conditions are met, the Court should permit intervention, and in the form chosen by the
State seeking to intervene. To refer to Article 62 as “discretionary intervention”, as some authors
4
do, is in our view misleading .
13. Mr.President, the first of the three matters referred to in Article81 of the Rules, the
interest of a legal nature, is the same both for intervention as a party, and for intervention as a
non-party. Yesterday Professor Crawford wonde red aloud whether there might be differences
depending on the form of intervention 5. We do not think there are. No distinction is made in
Article 62 of the Statute, or Article 81 of the Rules, or in the case law.
14. The second matter, the precise object of the intervention, by definition varies depending
on whether the State seeks to intervene as a party ⎯ or as a non-party.
15. And the third requirement, jurisdiction, is chiefly relevant to intervention as a party.
1
Written Observations of Nicaragua (WON), para. 32; CR 2010/19, p. 14, para. 5 (Pellet).
2
CR 2010/19, pp. 14-15, paras. 6-7 (Pellet); CR 2010/20, pp. 16-17, para. 9 (Bundy).
CR 2010/20, pp. 14-15, para. 3 (Bundy); CR 2010/19, p. 13, paras. 2-3 (Pellet).
See, for example, S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005, Vol. III, p. 1440.
CR 2010/20, p. 18, para. 43 (Crawford). - 12 -
(i) Interest of a legal nature
16. I turn then to the interest of a legal natu re. I set out on Monday the interests of a legal
nature that Honduras considers may be affected by the Court’s decision in the main case. In reply,
counsel for Nicaragua reverted, and at some length, to their res judicata Leitmotif. But he said
nothing particularly new 6. He did, however, introduce what is perhaps a new thought by
7
describing part of the reasoning of your Judgment as “ très res judicata” , “very res judicata”. I
must say, I am not convinced that there can be degrees of res judicata.
17. I need not really say much in response to ProfessorPellet, since he did not seek to
engage with our arguments. Ind eed, he avoided altogether dealing with the important points we
made concerning the actual wording of the dispositif, including the inclusion of the words “until it
8
reaches the area where” [“la zone”], dismissing it all as merely playing with words . I would recall
that the operative part ( dispositif) of your Judgment, at paragraph321(3), provides that “From
point F, [the boundary line] shall continue along the line having the azimuth of 70° 14' 41.25" until
it reaches the area where the rights of third States may be affected.” ( I.C.J. Reports 2007(II) ,
p.763.) Professor Pellet conveniently omitted to address the words “until it reaches the area
where”; just as he conveniently omitted to address the words “may be affected”.
18. In addition, Professor Pellet expressly re frained from examining in any detail the earlier
paragraphs of the Judgment on which Nicaragua re lied in its Written Observations. One can only
assume that this was because, as I explained on Monday, they do not say what Nicaragua says they
say. One thing he did do, however, was to have a go at redrafting paragraph 316 of the Judgment
to suit his argument, changing the te nse from the conditional to the present ⎯ “serait” to “est” 9,
“would do” to “does”. And we are grateful to him for reading out a passage from the
Anglo-French Continental Shelf decision 10, in which the Court of Arbitration considered “it to be
well settled that in internationa l proceedings the authority of res judicata, that is the binding force
6
CR 2010/19, pp. 15-17, paras. 8-33 (Pellet).
7
Ibid., p. 20, para. 17 (Pellet).
8Ibid., p. 18, para. 15 (Pellet).
9Ibid., p. 21, para. 19 (2) (Pellet).
10Ibid., p. 22, para. 21 (Pellet). - 13 -
of the decision, attaches in principle only to the provisions of its dispositif and not to its
reasoning” 11 It goes on, of course, to say:
“In the opinion of the Court, it is equally clear that, having regard to the close
links that exist between the reasoning of a decision and the provisions of its dispositif,
recourse may in principle be had to the r easoning in order to elucidate the meaning
and the scope of the dispositif.”
We would agree with that.
19. We heard yesterday in the clearest possi ble terms, from the representatives of Colombia,
that the azimuth “reaches the area wh ere the rights of third States may be affected” at the point
where it touches the 82nd parallel. After quoting the wording of the dispositif ⎯ “until it reaches
the area where the rights of third States may be affected” ⎯ the Agent of Colombia said
“Colombia is such a third State and does have ri ghts in the area situated immediately east of the
82nd meridian” 12.
20. Since it is a crucial issue, which has been contested by Nicaragua, I must explain again
what Honduras considers to be its interests of a lega l nature that may be affected by the decision in
the present case, and why indeed our intervention “actually relates to the subject-matter of the
13
pending proceedings” . In brief, we consider that, in so far as Nicaragua’s claimed “delimitation
area” overlaps the rectangle described in our Application 14, our rights in that area recognized under
the 1986 Treaty with Colombia may be affected. Since the “delimitation area” which Nicaragua is
inviting the Court to delimit includes a substantial pa rt of the rectangle, it is plain that Honduras
has interests of a legal nature that may be affected by the Court’s decision.
21. Mr.President, could I invite the Member s of the Court to look at the sketch-map
markedMW6, which I think should be at tab8 in your folders? It was handed in this morning.
This sketch-map shows, the area in pink — the “zona rosa ” —, which Nicaragua now considers to
be the area to be delimited in the present proceedings. This, of course, is the area shown in
15
Figure 3.1 in Nicaragua’s Reply , with which you are already well familiar.
11
Decision of 14March1978: UnitedNations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) , Vol.XVIII
p. 295, para. 28; emphasis added.
12
CR 2010/20, p. 11, para. 7 (Londoño); see, also, ibid., p. 21, para. 27 (Bundy).
13
Haya de la Torre (Colombia/Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76.
14Application for permission to intervene by the Government of Honduras, para. 17.
15Reply of Nicaragua (RN), 3.7, and Part II, Fig. 3.1 (reproduced at tab 4 in the folders). - 14 -
22. The map also shows, as a shaded recta ngle, the area which Honduras indicated, in its
Application, was the area in which its interests of a legal nature were at stake in the present
16
proceedings. As the Application made clear, and as counsel for Colombia rightly surmised , the
description of this rectangle in the Application was only approximate. It is certainly not our
intention to cast doubt on the 1986Treaty line. As you will see from the sketch-map, there is a
considerable area of overlap, some 17,700sq km in fact, between Nicaragua’s claimed
“delimitation area” and the rectangle described in our Application.
23. The map also shows Colombia’s latest me dian line claim, with an arrow touching the
southern limit of the shaded rectangle, the 15thparallel, which is of course the 1986Treaty line,
and which confirms Colombia’s interests in the area east of the 82nd meridian. It also shows, and I
hope ProfessorPellet is pleased with this, the deli mitation line determined by the Court in the
dispositif of the 2007 Judgment, which was illustrated on sketch-maps Nos. 7 and 8 ⎯ sketch-maps
included in the Judgment and “prepared for illu strative purposes only”. Counsel for Nicaragua
tried to score a point yesterday by referring to the fact that on Monday we only produced
17
sketch-map No.8, and not sketch-map No.7 . We could have produced either ⎯ they are of
course essentially the same ⎯ but we chose No. 8 since it is the one that includes an arrow. I note
in passing that Nicaragua itself saw fit to annex sketch-map No.7, twice, and not sketch-map
No.8, to its Written Observations 18. Apparently not satisfied with the Court’s sketch-map No.7,
yesterday Nicaragua sought to improve it by adding an arrow, a flashing arrow no less, at the
eastern end of the dotted line. But, Mr.Preside nt, I will avoid the temptation to quibble about
19
Nicaragua’s maps, as they sought to do at very considerable length about ours . I am confident
that Members of the Court will not be misled by the sketches that Nicaragua has prepared, even
though they were projected on large screens around the Great Hall of Justice. A last word on maps:
20
yesterday ProfessorPellet cited Napoleon , with evident enthusiasm. What in fact the Emperor
16CR 2010/20, p. 23, para. 32 (Bundy).
17CR 2010/19, p. 24, paras. 25-26 (Pellet).
18
WON, Anns. A and B.
19CR 2010.19, pp. 24-27, paras. 24-33 (Pellet).
20Ibid., p. 28, para. 38 (Pellet). - 15 -
actually seems to have said was perhaps even more apt— as far as I can tell he said “ Un bon
croquis vaut mieux qu’un long discours” — “A good sketch is better than a long speech.”
24. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I now turn to the 1986Treaty between Honduras
and Colombia, and its relevance to our interests of a legal nature in the present case. Nicaragua, in
its Written Observations and orally, claimed that the Treaty was amply discussed in the
21
2007 Judgment . But in reality, in its 2007Judgment, the Court did not find it necessary to
discuss the Treaty at length since it underscored that the Judgment would not prejudice the Treaty
in any way. Nor could it, as Colombia was not a party to the proceedings, and thus the Court
refrained from passing judgment on its treaty rights and obligations. Such an exercise would have
been futile, as the representatives of Colombia said yesterday, as the Judgment would not have any
22
binding force on Colombia, under Article 59 of the Statute .
25. Nicaragua further contends that the 2007 Judgment rendered the 1986 Treaty invalid, and
23
no longer in force . As I have just made clear, the Court did no such thing. It is Nicaragua ⎯ and
Nicaragua alone ⎯ that has purported unilaterally to strip the Treaty of its validity, as if the Treaty
were its own to dispose of as it likes. Colombia, on the other hand, has made clear that it respects
24
the 1986 Treaty, as does Honduras . The Treaty, as you will recall, allocates the area north of the
15thparallel, east of the 82ndmeridian, and west of the eastern arm of the 1986Treaty line to
Honduras, while providing for the cross-border exploitation of resource deposits. As we have seen,
some of the areas allocated to Honduras and Colo mbia under the Treaty fall within Nicaragua’s
claimed “delimitation area”.
26. Hence, for the Court to determine the a llocation of the “delimitation area” proposed by
Nicaragua, it would inevitably have to decide whether the 1986Treaty is in force and whether it
does or does not accord Colombia rights in the area in dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua. It
is in the present case that the status and substance of the 1986 Treaty are at stake. This point was
25
made by the representatives of Colombia yesterday . Yet, the Court could only determine the
21WON, para. 17.
22
CR 2010/20, p. 13, para. 17 (Londoño); ibid., p. 45, para. 29 (Crawford); ibid., p. 24, para. 35 (Bundy).
23
CR 2010/19, p. 31, para. 46 (Pellet).
24Written Observations of Colombia, sixth para.
25CR 2010/20, p. 11, para. 8 (Londoño); ibid., p. 24, para. 38 (Bundy). - 16 -
status and substance of the Treaty between Honduras and Colombia, relating to an area that the
Treaty allocates to Honduras, if Honduras were a party to the proceedings. It is thus clear that our
26
intervention “actually relates to the subject-matter of the pending proceedings” .
27. It is important to note that the Court may not be able to avoid determining the effect of
the 1986Treaty at the merits phase of the present case, as it was able to do in 2007. This is
because of an important difference between the two cases. In 2007, the area to be delimited was
27
not allocated under the 1986 Treaty to an absent third party . In the present case, however, part of
the delimitation area proposed by Nicaragua is allocated to a third party, to Honduras, which is
currently not a party to the case. As things sta nd, the Court would have to refrain from delimiting
the area covered by the Treaty in which the ri ghts of Honduras may be affected. Yet Honduras
wishes to intervene as a party, and is willing to accept the binding decision of the Court on the area
covered by the 1986 Treaty, to which ⎯ as was made clear yesterday ⎯ all three States claim title.
28. To this let me add, Mr. President, that even if Nicaragua were correct in asserting that the
Treaty cannot stand and is without force at present, it is the Court that must make such a decision,
not a State which is not even a party to the Treaty. For the Court to consider this question, both
Honduras and Colombia must be parties to the proceedings.
29. One final point on the 1986 Treaty, Mr.President. I cannot refrain from pointing out
that, although it claims that the 1986 Treaty is invalid and without force, Nicaragua has not
hesitated to rely upon it when it found the Treaty served its objectives. Thus, it relies on the Treaty
when it claims that the Treaty demonstrates th e absence of Colombian rights north of the
28
15th parallel . Nicaragua does so although it has consistently claimed that the Treaty is without
29
force, ever since its conclusion, back in 1986 . By doing so, Nicaragua is attempting to arrogate
to itself an area allocated to Honduras under the Treaty, claiming that Colombia has renounced its
rights to that area in the Treaty it self, even though Nicaragua at the same time asserts that the
Treaty is invalid.
26
Haya de la Torre, (Colombia/Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76.
27Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nica ragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 758-759, para. 316.
28Figs. 6-7 annexed to Nicaragua’s Reply in the present case.
29See, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Memorial of Nicaragua (MN), Vol. II, Ann. 70. - 17 -
30. Mr.President, I drew attention on Monday to important uncertainties for Honduras
arising from the present state of the proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. Among these
was puzzlement at just what Nicaragua now claims in respect of the water column. Professor Pellet
feigned annoyance that I had only partially quoted Mr. Reichler on the consequences for the water
column of the adoption by the Court of Nicaragua’s claimed continental shelf boundary, and I have
30
then asked “What does that mean?” He read more from Mr. Reichler . I still have to ask “What
does that mean?” I am none the wiser.
31. In this connection, Mr.President, I would recall that you heard much over these two
weeks about the “relative” or “relational” effect of agreements on maritime delimitation 31. It is, of
course, true that in principle a bilateral maritime delimitation treaty, like virtually all treaties, does
32
not, of itself, create rights and obligations for third States . But, at the end of the day, and absent
specific treaty provision, there can only be one coastal State with “title” 33 to any particular area of
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone.
32. It is uncertainties such as these that reinforce the concerns of Honduras, and reinforce the
importance we attach to being able to interven e, and to intervene as a party in the current
proceedings. In any event, granting permission to Honduras to intervene as a party would mean
that the Court could avoid grappling with difficult issues of “relativity”, since it would be able to
decide, with binding force, these matters for all the States concerned.
33. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I can deal much more briefly with the other two
matters that are required to be set out in an application to intervene, since our position on these
does not seem to have been contested by our colleagues.
(ii) Precise object of the intervention
34. As I said at the beginning, Mr.President, it is when we come to the object of the
intervention that we see the first of the two majo r differences between intervention as a party, and
30
CR 2010/19, pp. 25-26, para. 31 (Pellet).
31See, for example, CR 2010/16, p. 22, para. 15 (Reichler); CR 2010/20, pp. 26-27, para. 46 (Bundy).
32Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 34-38.
33
The term used by the Court in the Judgment of 3February2009, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), I.C.J. Reports 2009, p8.9 , para7.7 (available at http ://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
132/14987.pdf). - 18 -
intervention as a non-party. In seeking to inte rvene in the present proceedings, as a party,
Honduras’s purpose is a very practical one. We want the Court to decide, with binding force, on
the basis of international law, the course of the maritime boundary between Honduras and
Nicaragua, from the end of the line decided by the Court in 2007, which we say is the
82ndmeridian, to the tripoint between Honduras, Co lombia and Nicaragua. Only if the Court is
able to do so shall we achieve a final and bi nding determination of our sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in this area of the Caribbean, a determination based on international law.
35. As we are only at the permission stage, it would not be appropriate to go into more detail,
as that would take us deep into the merits. But I must say one thing: on Wednesday, counsel for
Nicaragua asserted that the Court could not in any event determine the whole line because of
Jamaica’s absence from the proceedings 34. That, in our view, is simply wrong. It is obvious from
a glance at the map we have produced today, MW6 at tab8, that fixing a tripoint between
Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua would in no way touch upon the interests of Jamaica.
36. Intervention as a non-party, which is only a subsidiary request in our Application, would
have a quite different object. It would be the familiar one of informing the Court of our interests of
a legal nature that may be affected by the decision in the case, and thereby protecting them.
(iii) Jurisdiction
37. The third matter referred to in Article81 of the Rules is the basis of jurisdiction. I
referred on Monday to ArticleXXXI of the 1948 Pact of Bogotá, to which Honduras, Nicaragua
and Colombia are all parties. This is the basis for jurisdiction in the current proceedings instituted
by Nicaragua against Colombia. Honduras is equally a party to the 1948 Treaty. The existence of
this basis of jurisdiction has not been contested, and so I think I need say no more about it.
38. Mr. President, in conclusion, one is left asking what the alternative would be if Honduras
were not permitted to intervene in this case as a party? An alternative course open to Honduras,
under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, would be to use that basis of jurisdiction to commence
new proceedings against Nicaragua and Colombia. Having done that, Honduras could seek to have
them joined to the current case, which the Court could also do proprio motu. But that would hardly
34
CR 2010/19, p. 30, para. 34 (Pellet). - 19 -
be an efficient way to proceed. For that reason the Statute and Rules of Court do provide for
intervention as a party, where the intervening State so wishes, and where there is a basis, or bases,
of jurisdiction linking all the States concerned.
39. Mr.President, Members of the Court, that concludes my statement, and I shall be
grateful if you would invite Professor Boisson de Chazournes to address you.
Mme BOISSON de CHAZOURNES :
1. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président. Ainsi que vient de l’exposer mon collègue
sir Michael Wood, il ne fait pas de doute que le Honduras a bel et bien un intérêt d’ordre juridique
susceptible d’être affecté dans l’instance pendante entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie. A ce titre, le
Honduras devrait être autorisé par la Cour à intervenir en tant que partie ou, à titre subsidiaire, en
tant que non-partie en vertu de l’article 62 du Statut.
2. En réponse aux exposés du Nicaragua lors du premier tour de plaidoiries, je souhaiterais
me concentrer sur deux points. Tout d’abord, je mettrai en relief les contradictions du Nicaragua
quant à l’admissibilité de la requête à fin d’intervention du Honduras. Puis, je mettrai l’accent sur
l’étendue du pouvoir d’appréciation de l’Etat qui so uhaite intervenir sur la base de l’article62 du
Statut.
I. Les contradictions du Nicaragua quant à l’admissibilité de la requête
à fin d’intervention du Honduras
3. Le professeurAlainPellet notait mercredi, avec le talent qu’on lui connaît, que les
«requêtes à fin d’intervention se suivent et ne se ressemblent pas» 35. Qu’il me soit permis d’en dire
tout autant de certains arguments du Nicaragua. Toutefois, en plus de se suivre sans se ressembler,
certains des arguments du Nicaragua ont pour caract éristique de s’entremêler, de se contredire,
voire de se neutraliser. Le Nicaragua a tout d’abord tenté de remettre en cause ⎯ sans y
parvenir ⎯ la «vraisemblance suffisante» 36des intérêts d’ordre juridique du Honduras en avançant
37
que la Cour a déterminé «toute la frontière» entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras. Autrement dit, le
Nicaragua a purement et simplement ⎯ je devrais dire radicalement ⎯ nié l’existence d’un intérêt
35
CR 2010/19, p. 13, par. 2 (Pellet).
36
Ibid., p. 15, par. 6 (Pellet).
37Ibid., p. 17, par. 14 (Pellet). - 20 -
d’ordre juridique in casu. Je cite le Nicaragua: «le Honduras ne peut faire valoir aucun intérêt
d’ordre juridique qui pourrait être affecté par l’arrêt à intervenir dans l’affaire entre le Nicaragua et
38
la Colombie» .
4. Mais cela était sans compter sur les volte-face auxquelles nous avait déjà habitués le
Nicaragua dans ses observations écrites jointes en réponse à la requête du Honduras. En effet,
soudainement, l’intérêt d’ordre juri dique du Honduras n’est plus un intérêt inexistant mais un
intérêt inopérant. Peut-être que des intérêts existent au nord du 15 eparallèle, selon l’aveu tacite du
Nicaragua, mais ils ne sont sûrement pas en cause dans l’instance pendante entre le Nicaragua et la
Colombie. Pourquoi? Selon mon aimable contra dicteur, car les prétentions du Nicaragua dans
ladite instance ne concerneraient que le sud de la frontière maritime entre le Nicaragua et le
39
Honduras , frontière imaginaire ⎯nous le savons ⎯ et ne reflétant point la res judicata du
jugement de 2007 40. Je précise au détour que le Nicaragua s’arroge le droit de donner des leçons
au Honduras sur ce qui est en jeu ou non dans l’ instance pendante avec la Colombie, alors que
comme nous le savons cet Etat n’a pas hésité à modifier les demandes contenues dans sa requête
introductive d’instance 41et n’hésite pas à admettre dans la présente procédure qu’il n’a pas
42
(encore ?) «formulé [de] conclusion» sur les limites horizontales de la zone qui figure en rose sur
le croquis n o 3.1 de la réplique du Nicaragua. Considérant qu’aucun intérêt du Honduras n’est «en
jeu» dans l’instance pendante, le Nicaragua en déduit que la Cour ne devrait pas autoriser le
Honduras à intervenir.
5. Je me permets de réitérer la question que j’avais posée au Nicaragua lors du premier tour
de plaidoiries dans la présente procédure et à laquelle aucune réponse précise n’a encore été
apportée: les intérêts du Honduras sont-ils existants ou inexistants? Ou alors sont-ils existants
mais inopérants? Ou encore, pour paraphraser notre contradicteur, sont-ils «vraisemblablement
suffisants» ou «vraisemblablement insuffisants» ? Le jeu de «miroirs dé formants» auquel se prête
le Nicaragua témoigne de la réalité des incertitudes juridiques dans la zone maritime concernée par
38CR 2010/19, p. 20, par. 18 (Pellet).
39
Ibid., p. 31, par. 48 (Pellet).
40
Voir la requête du Honduras à fin d’intervention, par. 5. Voir également CR 2010/20, p. 21, par. 25 (Bundy).
41CR 2010/20, p. 22, par. 29 (Bundy).
42CR 2010/19, p. 25, par. 31 (Pellet). - 21 -
la requête à fin d’intervention du Honduras et à propos desquelles mon collègue sir Michael Wood
est revenu il y a un instant.
6. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, bien que le professeur Pellet se soit gardé d’avoir de la
«sympathie pour Napoléon» 43, il n’y a pas plus napoléonienne que la stratégie du Nicaragua. Ce
dernier, non satisfait de se lancer à la conquête d’un espace maritime qui lui aurait été ⎯ quod
non ⎯ reconnu et attribué par le jugement de la Cour d’octobre2007, se lance maintenant à la
conquête du droit d’intervention des Etats tiers. Il soutient sans complexe et avec un regard
rétrospectif que la Colombie n’av ait pas besoin d’intervenir à l’époque dans le différend entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mesure où le Honduras avait «amplement informé la Cour [des
44
droits] de la Colombie» . Mieux, le Nicaragua considère sans ambages que ce n’est pas le
Honduras, «défenseur trop zélé des intérêts colombiens» 45, qui doit intervenir dans l’instance
pendante entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, mais la Jamaïque. En d’autres termes, seule la
Jamaïque serait un Etat tiers dont les intérêts ju ridiques seraient susceptibles d’être affectés par un
jugement de la Cour. Et, en outre, si la C our devait encore douter de l’esprit «conquérant» du
Nicaragua, je l’invite à méditer les paroles suiv antes du Nicaragua: «le Nicaragua entend que les
droits des tiers soient pleinement préservés dans la présente affaire» 46. Quel grand protecteur !
7. Les velléités napoléoniennes du Nicaragua poussent encore ce dernier à prétendre pouvoir
se substituer au Honduras et à d’autres Etats tiers pour décider de l’opportunité ou non d’exercer
leur droit d’intervention en vertu de l’article 62 du Statut, c’est-à-dire pour «estimer» si des intérêts
d’ordre juridique sont pour eux en cause dans l’instance entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie. Ce
n’est pas le Honduras qui a une appréciation subjective de l’article 62 mais bien le Nicaragua.
8. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, du fait de l’approche du Nicaragua consistant à ignorer
la lettre et l’esprit de l’article62 du Statut, voi re à réinterpréter ses conditions, je me propose de
faire quelques remarques et précisions sur l’étendue du pouvoir d’appréciation de l’Etat qui
souhaite intervenir sur la base de l’article 62 du Statut.
43CR 2010/18, p. 17, par. 13 (Wood).
44
CR 2010/19, p. 20, par. 18 (Pellet).
45Ibid., p. 21, par. 19 (Pellet).
46Ibid., p. 26, par. 31 (Pellet). - 22 -
II. L’étendue du pouvoir d’appréciation de l’Etat qui souhaite intervenir
en vertu de l’article 62 du Statut
9. L’article 62 du Statut prévoit que c’est à l’Etat qui estime qu’un intérêt d’ordre juridique
est pour lui en cause dans une instance pendante de décider «d’exercer [ou non son] droit à
intervention» ( Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun
c.Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1998, p.324, par.116.). Or, ce que le
Nicaragua a prôné tout au long de ses plaidoiries du premier tour mais aussi dans ses observations
écrites, c’est la possibilité pour les Etats parties à une instance pendante de se substituer à l’Etat qui
souhaite intervenir pour déterminer si ledit Etat a ou non un intérêt d’ordre juridique qui pourrait
être affecté par un jugement de la Cour. Monsieur le président, si la Cour elle-même ne peut se
47
substituer à l’Etat qui souhaite intervenir , comment des parties à une instance pendante
pourraient-elles s’arroger une telle prérogative ?
10. Se réfugiant derrière une interprétation fictive et téméraire de la res judicata du jugement
d’octobre2007, le Nicaragua cons idère que le principe de la res judicata annihilerait en l’espèce
toute possibilité pour le Honduras de recourir à l’ avenir à l’article62 du Statut. Cela, car la
48
réponse aux arguments du Honduras se trouve «entière, complète et limpide» dans l’arrêt de la
Cour d’octobre2007 ou encore parce que le Hondur as aurait «amplement informé la Cour de ses
49
propres droits et intérêts» .
11. Mais, Monsieur le président, «qui ne dit mot consent». Le Nicaragua n’a à aucun
moment réfuté que l’article62 du Statut n’ engendre pas une impossibilité pour le Honduras
d’intervenir dans une instance pendante devant la Cour au motif que le Honduras aurait déjà
informé la Cour de la nature de ses intérêts juridiques dans une autre instance, à savoir celle ayant
opposé le Nicaragua et le Honduras, qui a porté sur un autre différend et a impliqué d’autres
parties 50.
47
Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 118, par. 61.
48
CR 2010/19, p. 16, par. 11 (Pellet).
49Ibid., p. 20, par. 18 (Pellet).
50CR 2010/18, p. 24, par. 10 (Boisson de Chazournes). - 23 -
12. L’article62 prévoit qu’un Etat tiers est en mesure de décider où, quand et comment
exercer sa prérogative juridique tant qu’il se conf orme aux dispositions du Statut et du Règlement
de la Cour. C’est à l’Etat qui souhaite intervenir et à lui seul de décider de son exercice tant qu’il
se conforme aux dispositions du Statut et du Règlem ent de la Cour. La répétition ou insistance,
Monsieur le président, ne relève pas d’un acte inconscient, lequel peut jouer des tours, sauf bien sûr
au royaume de Zen.
13. Cette insistance vise à démontrer que le Honduras s’accorde avec le Nicaragua pour
considérer que l’article62 n’est pas entièrement «l aissé à l’appréciation subjective» de l’Etat qui
souhaite intervenir. Le Honduras a toujours considéré que c’est à la Cour d’autoriser une demande
d’intervention lorsqu’elle considère que les conditions objec tives, ou ce que le professeurPellet
51
appelle la «condition de l’article 62» , sont réunies. Il convient de faire la part du subjectif et celle
de l’objectif dans le contexte de l’article 62. En réalité, cette distinction est très simple à opérer à
l’aune de la construction de l’article 62 en deux paragraphes.
14. Le premier paragraphe de l’article 62 repose sur une appréciation subjective du titulaire
du droit. Les Etats parties à une instance pendante ne peuvent se substituer à l’Etat qui souhaite
intervenir. Le mot à mot de l’artic le62 est clair: «Lorsqu’un Etat estime que, dans un différend,
un intérêt d’ordre juridique est pour lui (on pourrait dire aussi pour elle) en cause, il peut adresser à
la Cour une requête, à fin d’intervention». Le pouv oir d’appréciation de l’Etat désirant intervenir
est double. Non seulement c’est à lui d’estimer si un de ses intérêts d’ordre juridique est en cause
dans un différend. C’est également à lui d’estimer s’il est bénéficiaire d’un tel intérêt d’ordre
juridique. C’est comme ça qu’il faut comprendre le membre de phrase «est pour lui en cause». La
version anglaise de l’article62 du Statut confir me une telle lecture puisqu’il est y dit «Should a
State consider that it has». La version anglaise ne dit pas «Should a State consider that an interest
of a legal nature».
15. La Cour décidera alors, sur la base du deuxi ème paragraphe de l’article 62, de la réalité
de l’intérêt d’ordre juridique que l’Etat qui dema nde à intervenir déclare avoir dans une instance
pendante. Si cet intérêt est réel, comme c’est le cas avec le Honduras, la Cour n’a pas de «pouvoir
51
CR 2010/19, p. 14, par. 5 (Pellet). - 24 -
discrétionnaire» (Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin
d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1981 , p. 12, par. 17) pour ne pas autoriser l’intervention.
16. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, derrièr e le langage de l’artic le 62 se dessine un souci
de protéger au maximum les Etats dont les intérêts d’ordre juridique sont susceptibles d’être
affectés par un jugement de la Cour. Il y a aussi un souci de garantir leur f aculté d’intervenir dans
une instance pendante 52. Cette protection s’avère d’autant plus nécessaire dans les cas de
délimitation maritime impliquant plusieurs Etats.
17. Toutes les parties dans la présente pr océdure s’accordent pour ne pas considérer que
l’article59 du Statut serait suffisant pour protég er les intérêts d’ordre juridique du Honduras
puisque ni le Nicaragua ni la Colombie ne l’ont invoqué. Cela prouve que tous les Etats ici
présents s’accordent pour reconnaître que la protection en vertu de l’article 62 est plus importante
et plus appropriée pour préserver les droits des Etats tiers en matière de délimitation maritime.
18. Ce qui rend la protection en vertu de l’ar ticle 62 appropriée, c’est que l’Etat intervenant
est en mesure d’informer la Cour sur l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique, cela afin de protéger
et sauvegarder cet intérêt ou de demander à la Co ur de déterminer ses droits et intérêts. Un
jugement rendu à la suite d’une intervention en ve rtu de l’article 62 prend alors nécessairement en
compte les intérêts d’ordre juridique de l’Etat intervenant et, dès lors, ce dernier est sûr qu’il
n’affectera pas ses intérêts. En d’autres termes, Monsieur le président, l’article 62 garantit toujours
et nécessairement que les intérêts d’ordre juridique d’un Etat tiers à une instance pendante seront
protégés, conservés et sauvegardés.
19. Mais se pose alors la question de savoir comment faire en sorte que l’article 62 du Statut
puisse avoir un effet utile et effectif. La réponse est la suivante: il s’agit de donner à l’Etat qui
demande à intervenir la possibilité d’«être entendu». La Chambre constitu ée pour connaître de la
requête à fin d’intervention du Nicaragua dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras, a déclaré que le
«but de l’intervention» consis te pour l’intervenant à «informe [r] la Cour de ce qu’il considère
52
CR 2010/18, p. 21, par. 5 (Boisson de Chazournes). - 25 -
comme ses droits et intérêts, afin de veiller à ce qu’aucun intérêt d’ordre juridique ne puisse être
«affecté» sans que l’intervenant ait été entendu » (Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et
maritime (ElSalvador/Honduras), re quête à fin d’intervention, arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 130,
par. 90 ; les italiques sont de nous).
20. In fine, ce qui compte c’est donc que l’Etat inte rvenant puisse bénéficier de la protection
en vertu de l’article 62 par le fait qu’il a pleinement et dûment été «entendu» par la Cour. A lui de
décider quelle forme il souhaiterait donner à son inte rvention. Et à la Cour d’autoriser ou non
l’intervention sous l’une de ses formes, en tant que partie ou en tant que non-partie.
21. Au stade de la procédure orale portant sur la demande en intervention, l’Etat qui
demande à intervenir n’est pas censé «complètement débatt [re]» (Ambatielos (Grèce
c. Royaume-Uni), exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 45) de toute la substance de
ses intérêts d’ordre juridique. C’est au stade du fond de l’instance pendante que l’Etat intervenant
à titre de partie ou en tant que non-partie pourra exposer toutes ses vues sur les points pour lesquels
il aura été autorisé par la Cour à intervenir. Ces aspects sont importants. La procédure
d’intervention, telle qu’elle a été conçue, a pour objet de sauvegarder les intérêts d’ordre juridique
d’un Etat tiers à une instance pendante devant la C our, en réservant la décision au fond jusqu’à ce
que la Cour ait pleinement entendu chacune des parties au différend ainsi que les Etats intervenants
sur les différents droits et intérêts en cause 53. C’est là la nature incidente de la procédure du « droit
54
de demander à intervenir» .
22. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, il apparaît clairement des plaidoiries du Nicaragua et
de la Colombie que la portée des intérêts d’ ordre juridique du Honduras et leur impact dans
l’instance pendante sont un pan important du diffé rend entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, du fait
notamment de la question du traité de 1986. Si la Cour en venait, comme le Nicaragua le souhaite,
à exclure dès à présent l’existen ce d’intérêts d’ordre juridique du Honduras sans que ce dernier ne
soit «entendu» au cours de la procédure au fond dans l’instance pendante, cela conduirait la Cour à
préjuger au stade d’une procédure incidente de certaines questions juridiques faisant l’objet du
différend entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie.
53
CR 2010/18, p. 25, par. 12 (Boisson de Chazournes).
54CR 2010/19, p. 14, par. 6 (Pellet). - 26 -
23. Je remercie la Cour de son attention et vous prie, Monsieur le président, de donner la
parole à l’agent du Honduras pour les conclusions du deuxième tour de plaidoiries du Honduras.
Le PRESIDENT : Je remercie Mme le prof esseur Laurence Boisson de Chazournes pour son
intervention. Now I invite H.E.Ambassador CarlosLópezContreras, the Agent of Honduras, to
give his concluding remarks.
Mr. LOPEZ CONTRERAS:
C ONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUBMISSIONS
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Me mbers of the Court, first of all, I would like
to express our appreciation to the Court for th e tribute that was paid to the memory of
Professor Luis Ignaçio Sánchez Rodríguez at the beginning of these proceedings. Our delegation is
deeply touched. I also wish to convey our sy mpathy to our Nicaraguan friends for the untimely
loss of Sir Ian Brownlie, who is much missed by all of us.
2. I shall now, Mr. President, conclude our oral presentation concerning the Application for
permission to intervene in the pending case betw een Nicaragua and Colombia, filed pursuant to
Article 62 of the Statute of the Court. The purpose of the Honduran Application was and continues
to be to enable the Court to settle definitivel y the overlapping maritime claims between Honduras,
Nicaragua and Colombia in the area of concern.
3. I wish to reiterate that Honduras has never challenged the authority of the res judicata of
an international decision as others might have done in the past. I reaffirm what I said on Monday
that “[w]e honour our commitment under the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court to
55
accept [the 2007] decision as binding and final” .
4. Should the Court accept Honduras’s Application to intervene, it would be in a position to
remove two major uncertainties resulting from the claims of these three States over sovereign rights
and jurisdiction within the maritime area in dis pute in the pending case. The first uncertainty
relates to the determination of sovereignty and ju risdiction over the area east of the 82nd meridian
and north of the 15thparallel. The second concerns the need to identify the tripoint between
55
CR 2010/18, p. 16, para. 12 . - 27 -
Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua, taking into co nsideration the 1986Treaty. These sovereign
rights and jurisdiction need to be determined by the Court with the participation of the three States.
5. The Honduran Application to intervene meets the requirements provided for in Article 62
of the Statute. Honduras has demonstrated that it has interests of a legal nature which may be
affected by the decision of the Court. The interests that Honduras seeks to protect concern the
maritime area east of the 82ndmeridian and nort h of the delimitation line of the 1986Treaty.
Should the Court not permit our intervention, Hondur as’s interests of a legal nature will inevitably
be affected. In that case, failing to accept Honduras’s intervention would lead the Court to
prejudge at an incidental stage of the proceedings some aspects of the merits of the dispute between
Nicaragua and Colombia.
6. In addition, Honduras has shown that it sa tisfies the condition of jurisdiction required for
intervention as a party, and has identified the precise object of its intervention, as laid down in
Article 81 (c) of the Rules of Court. The basis of juri sdiction existing among the three States is the
Pact of Bogotá.
7. Honduras, Mr. President, having satisfied the conditions, expects to be entitled to benefit
from the power conferred to the Court by the Statute to decide to permit the intervention, either as a
party or, in the alternative, as a non-party.
Mr.President, pursuant to Article60 of the Rules of Court, I shall now read the final
submissions of the Government of the Republic of Honduras.
Having regard to the Application and the oral pleadings,
May it please the Court to permit Honduras:
(1) to intervene as a party in respect of its interests of a legal nature in the area of concern in the
Caribbean Sea (paragraph 17 of the Application) which may be affected by the decision of the
Court; or
(2) in the alternative, to intervene as a non-party with respect of those interests.
A signed copy of the written text of our final submissions has been communicated to the
Court and transmitted to the other parties. - 28 -
To conclude our participation in this stage of the oral proceedings, on my behalf and that of
all the Honduran delegation, I wish to express our deepest appreciation to you, Mr. President, and
to each of the distinguished Judges, for the attention you have kindly given to our presentation. We
thank our friends from Colombia and Nicaragua for their courtesy during these proceedings.
May I also offer our thanks to the Court’s Registrar, his staff and the interpreters.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: I thank you YourExcellencyAmbassadorCarlos López Contreras, the
Agent of Honduras, for his statement. The Court will meet again tomorrow at 3 p.m. to hear the
second round of oral argument of Nicaragua and Colombia.
The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 3.50 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 21 October 2010, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) - Application by Honduras for permission to intervene