Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) - Advisory Opinion of the Court

I.C.J. Communigué i~o .3.
Unofficial

The following information, emanating from the Registry of the
International Court of Justice, has been communicated to the Press:

The International Court of Justice to-day, May 28th, 1948, in a
public sitting, gave its advisory opinion on the conditions of admission

of aState to membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter).
This question was asked of the Court by the General Assembly of the
United Nations. The question is as follows (General Assembly's Resolution
of November l?th, 1947):

"Is a Member of the United Nations which is called
upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce
itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in
the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to

membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to'
make its consent to the admission dependent on-conditions
not expressly provided by paragraph l of the said Article?
In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the
conditions set forth in tha.t provision to be fulfilled by
the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the
additional condition that other States be admitted to
membership in the United Nations together with that State?"

The·Court answered this question in the negative by nine votes to six.
The six dissenting judges joined to it a statement of the reasons for:their
dissent. Twoother Members of the Court who agreed with the Opinion
added a further statement of their views.

The Opinion begins by giving an account of the procedure. The
request for an Opinion was notified to all signatories of the Charter,
i.e., to all Members of the United Nations, who were informed that the

Court was prepar.ed to receive information from them. Accordingly,
written statements were sent in on behalf of the Governments of the
following States: China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Canada,
U.S.A., Greece, Yugoslavia, Belgium, ·rraq, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Australia
and Siam. Oral statements were made by the representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and by representatives of the
French, Yugoslav, Belgian, Czechoslovak and Polish Governments.

The Court then makes a few prelimiΠry obser:va.tions on the
question itself. Although the Members are bound to conform to the
requirements of Article 4 in giving their votes, the question does not
relate to the actual vote, the reasons for which are a matter of individual
judgment and are clearly sub,iect to no control,' ·but to the statements made
by a Member concerning the vote it proposes to give. The Court is not
called upon to define the meaning and scope of the conditions in Article 4
of the Charter, on which admission is made dependent. It must merely
sta te whether the se conditions e..re exhaustive. If they are, a Hemter is
not legally entitled to lll8 .dmeission depend on c.0hdiditions not expressly
provided in the article. The meaning of a treaty provision has thus to
be determined, which is a problem of interpretation.

It was nevertheless contended that the question was not legal, but
political. The Court was unable to ·at tri bute ·apoli tical character to
a request which, framed in abstract tem1s, invites it to undertake an
essentially judicial task by entrusting it with the interpretation of a
treaty provision. It is not concerned with the motives which may have

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inspired the request, nor has it to deal '\.rith the ,views expressed in
the Security Council on the various cases with vrhich the Council dealt.
Consequently, the Court holds itself ta be competent even to interpret
Article 4 of the Charter; for nowhere is any provision to be found

forbidding it ta exerci ins~regard to this cl~us inea multilateral
treaty, an interpretative function which falls within the norrnel exercise
of its judicial powers.

The Court then analyses Article 4, pe.ragraph 1, of the Charter.
The conditions therein enumerated are five: a candidate must be
(1) a State; (2) peace-loving; (3) must accept the obligations of the
Charter; (4) must be able ta carry out these obligations; (5) must be
willing to do so, All the se conditions é~.r sebject to the judgment of

tht::: OrgMize.tion, i.e., of the Security Council ,ind of the General
Assembly and, in the last resort, of the Members of the Organization.
As the question relates, not to tho vote, but to the reasons whj,ch a
Hembur give:s bcfore voting, it is concer:ncd with the individual attitude
of e2.ch Hcmbcr cûl2d upon ta :?ronounce itseH' on the qucstion of adruissioQ..

Are these conditions exhaustive? The English and French texts of
the provision have the s&~e meaning: ta establish a legal rule which,
while it fixes the conditions of admission, determines also the reasons
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for which admission may be refused. The tcrm 11iembershiu in the United
Nations is open to all othr;;r peace-loving· States indica thtt ~ states
which fulfil the conditions stated have the qualifications requisite for
adrnission. The provision 1..ould lose its significan.ce if other con-
ditions could be demanded. These conditions 'ire exhaustive, and are not

merely s tated by W?..:Jf "information or exainple, They are not merely the
nece ssary con di ti ons, but al so the conditions "Whièhsuffie e.

It was argued that these conditions represented an indispensable
minimum in the sense that political considerations could be superimposed

on them, D.:..fo.rdman obstacle to admission. This interpretation is
inconsistent with pnragraph 2 of the Article, wiüch provides for 1the
admission of Bny suer; State. 11 It would lee.d to confe.rring on Members
an indefini te é'lld"()actically unlimi ted power to impose n;:;vrcandi tians;
such a power could not be reconciled· with the charactcr of a rule which

establishes a close connection between membt;;rship and the observance of
the principles and obliga.tions of the Charter, and thus cle;~rl coyn-
stitutes a legE.l regulat:j.on of the question of admission. If the
authors of the Charter hé'.dmeant to leave Members free ta irnport into

the .application of this provision considen:<.tions extraŒous to the
principles and obligations of the Charter, they would undoubtedly have
adopted a different wording. The Court considers the provision
sufficiently clear; cons~quen ittlfyo,llot~ hemconstrrnt practice of
the Permanent Co~rt of Internatione J~stice and holds that th8re is no

occasion to r esort ta prep;:.ratory work to ir:terpret its moaning.
Moreover, the interpretation given by the Court had already been adopted
by the Securi ty Council, as is shawn in Article 60 of the Council 1s
Rules of Procedure.

It does n(rlt;,, however, follow from the exhaustive charact.er of

Article 4 that e11 8.ppreciation is precluded of such circwnstances of
fact ~s would enable the existence of the requisite conditions to be
verified, The Article does not forbid the të.king into .'?..ccount of any
factor which it is possible re~sonabl and in good f~ith ta connect with
the conditions laid do~n. The tàking into account of such factors is
imnlied in the very wide and elastic nature ol' thl:i conditions. No

relevan·t politic<".l fé!.ctor, that is to scy, none connected with the con­
ditions of admission, is excluded.

The conditions· in Article 4 e.re 0xhe.usUve and no argwnent to
the contra. crn,yb~ dre.wn from pë.rë.gr;::ph 2 of the Article which is only

concerned with the procedure for arnnission. Nor can an argument be

drawn •••r

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dra'l"m from the political character of the organs of the United Nations
dealirg with admission. For this character cannat release them from
observance of the treaty provisions by which they are gpverned, when
these proYisions constitute limitations on their power; this shaNS

that there is no conflic t between the functions of the political organs
and the exhaustive character of the prescribed conditions.

The Court then passes to the second part of the question, namely,
whether aState, while it recognizes that the conditions set forth in
Article 4 are fulfilled by a candidate, can subordinate its affirmative

vote to the simultaneous ~dmissi~ nf other States.

Judgcd on the basis of the rule which the Court adopts in its
interpretation of Article 4, suc~ a demand constitutes a new condition;
for i t is entirüy unconnected 'lo:i tho se pre sc ri bed in Article 4. I t is

al$0 in an entirely different category; since it makes admission
dependent not on the conditions required of applicmts, but on extraneous
considerations concerning other States. It would, moreover, prevent
each application for admission from being examitJed and voted on
separately and on its own merits. This would be contrary ta the letter
and spirit of the Charter.

For these reasons, the Court answered the question put to it in
the negetive.
,

The Hague, 28th J.fuy, 1948.