Dissenting Opinion by Judge Gros (translation)
DISSENTLNG OPLNION OF JUDGE GROS
Translation j
1. The two Judgments, as wii~be evident on reading them, are modelled
on each other, and the cases have been dealt with together throughout the
DISSENTLNG OPLNION OF JUDGE GROS
Translation j
1. The two Judgments, as wii~be evident on reading them, are modelled
on each other, and the cases have been dealt with together throughout the
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE WALDOCK
1. Iam in general agreement with both the operative part and the
reasoning of theJudgment of the Court. Ihave one reservation, however,
regarding subparagraph 5 of the operative partand there are some aspects
of the case which 1consider should have received more prominence in
the Judgment, and which 1 feel it incumbent on me to mention in this
separate opinion.
2.The Judgment refers to the Exchange of Notes of 19July 1961 and
SEPARATE OPMION OF JUDGE DE CASTRO
[Translation]
1voted with the majority, and I have explained the reasons for my vote
in my separate opinion in the case of Fisheries Jurisdiction (United
Kingdom v. Iceland), and these reasons apply mutatis mutandis to the
present case. 1would like however to add the following observations.
During the oral proceedings, the Government of the Federal Republic
JOINT SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES FORSTER,
BENGZON, JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA,
NAGENDRA SINGH AND RUDA
1. What has made it possible for us to concur in the reasoning of the
Courtand to subscribe to its decision is that, while the Judgment declares
hence 1 consider them of such importance as to be appropriately em-
phasized to convey the true significance of the Judgment-its extent as
well as its depth. These reasons, as well as those aspects of the Judgment
which have that importance from my viewpoint are briefiy stated as
follows :
They were committed pendente lite despite the obligations assumed by
Iceland in the Exchange of Notes of 1961which the Court had declared
Judge DILLARDmakes the following declaration:
Iconcur in the findings of the Court indicated inthe first four subpara-
graphs of the dispositif. My reasons for concurrence are set out in my
separate opinion in the companion case of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland. 1consider these reasons applicable
mutatis mutandis to the present case.
While 1concurred in the finding in the fifth subparagraph that the Court
206 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)
the fisheriesin theeas around her coasts for their livelihood and
economic development ;
(6) that by reason of its fishingactivities in the areas specifiedin sub-
paragraph 2, the Federal Republic of Germany also has estab-
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ODA
1.1regret that 1am unable to agree with any of the three points in the
operative part of the Judgrnent as 1 see the whole case from a different
viewpoint to that of the Court.
2. The crux of the case before us is simplein that, to use the expression
used by Libya in its Application, the United States "continues to adopt a
posture of pressuringLibya into surrenderingthe accused" and "is rather
intent on compelling the surrender of the accused".
DISSENTING OPINION OF PRESIDENT SCHWEBEL
1regret that 1am unable to agree with the Judgment of the Court. It is
arguable that the challenge of the Respondent to the jurisdiction of the
Court should not carry. But the reasons so terselystated by the Court are
conclusory rather than elucidatory, and, at most, are barely persuasive in
a subsidiary respect. In my view, the Court's conclusions on the admis-
sibilityof Libya'sApplication, and as to whether it has become moot, are
unpersuasive.