DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC GUILLAUME
[Translation]

D ISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE R OBINSON

1. I do not agree with the decision of the majority in paragraph 134 of the Judgment rejecting

the first basis advanced by Kenya for its first preliminary objection on the ground that the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) does not fall within the scope of the reservation to
Kenya’s optional clause declaration.

2. I also do not agree with the decision of the majority in the same paragraph rejecting the

J OINT DECLARATION OF J UDGES G AJA AND CRAWFORD

Jurisdiction  Article 36 (2) of Statute  Paragraph 6 of the MOU not affecting the
Court’s jurisdiction  Kenya’s reservation requires method of settlement that will resolve
dispute  Negotiation in good faith may not result in settlement  Paragraph 6 not caught by
Kenya’s reservation as neither pactum de contrahendo nor providing for an exclusive method.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE B ENNOUNA

Optional clause declaration  Reservation for disputes subject to another method of
settlement  Interpretation of paragraph 6 of the MOU  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties  Reversal of order of the general rule of interpretation  Ordinary meaning

of the terms as starting point  Erroneous analogy with Article 83 of UNCLOS  Existence of a
procedure for the settlement of the maritime dispute in paragraph 6.

D ECLARATION OF V ICE-PRESIDENT YUSUF

Agree with the Court’s decision and reasons  Somalia and Kenya neither negotiated nor
drafted the Memorandum of Understanding in dispute  Such direct negotiation would have
facilitated interpretation  States must actively participate in the creation of the obligations they
take on.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE

1. In the course of the handling of proceedings on reparations in the present case of Armed

Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R. Congo versus Uganda), I have been having
concerns,  as already expressed on the occasion of two previous Orders (of 01.07.2015
and 11.04.2016),  which I deem it fit again to lay on the records in today’s Order
(of 06.12.2016), in the present Separate Opinion in the cas d’espèce.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC KATEKA
1. I voted in favour of the dispositif although I find the provisional measure indicated to be
inadequate. Crucially, I do not agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 50, namely, that,
prima facie, a dispute capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and therefore concerning the interpretation
or the application of Article 4 of that Convention does not exist between the Parties. I shall explain

DECLARATION OF JUDGE GEVORGIAN
Clarification on paragraph 49 of the Order  Relation between Article 4 of the Palermo
Convention and the principles of international law referred to therein  Immunities
ratione personae derive from the principle of sovereign equality of States.
1. I concur with the conclusions and reasoning of the Order. At the same time, I find it
necessary to clarify my views on the relation between Article 4 of the Palermo Convention and the
principles of international law referred to therein.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE GAJA
Over the years the Court has increased the transparency of its deliberations. In its
judgments, the Court records in the operative part (dispositif) all the main decisions, whether it
accepts or rejects the requests of the Parties. Moreover, it gives the names of the judges who voted
in favour or against each decision. However, when it comes to orders on provisional measures,
transparency is still wanting. The Court states in the dispositif the decisions which grant, possibly

SEPARATE OPINION OF J UDGE AD HOC K ATEKA

1. I voted in favour of the dispositif although I find the provisional measure indicated to be
inadequate. Crucially, I do not agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 50, namely, that,
prima facie, a dispute capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention against