Volume IV - Annexes 52-105 | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Document Number

166-20180612-WRI-01-04-EN

Parent Document Number

166-20180612-WRI-01-00-EN

Case

166 - Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. R

Date of the Document

Tue, 06/12/2018 - 12:00

Document File

166-20180612-wri-01-04-en.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME IV OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 52 BBC News, Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia’s Crimea Takeover Plot (9 March
2015)
Annex 53 Vladimir Putin, Interview Given to the TV Channel “Rossiya” as Part of a
Documentary “Crimea: Path to the Homeland” (video)
Annex 54 Ukraine Report Under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Report (1 January 2014)
Annex 55 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-3823/0/6 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 16 May 2014
Annex 56 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.22-3829/0/6 to the
Russian First Deputy Head of the Border Service of FSB, dated 17 May 2014
Annex 57 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-4004/0/6 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 27 May 2014
Annex 58 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-4182/0/6 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 3 June 2014
Annex 59 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5220/0/6-14 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 2 July 2014
Annex 60 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5698/0/6-14 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 14 July 2014
Annex 61 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5980/0/6-14 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 21 July 2014
Annex 62 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 22 July 2014
Annex 63 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.28-6080/0/6-14 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 23 July 2014
Annex 64 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6058/0/6 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 23 July 2014
Annex 65 Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine Letter No. 63/32/233 (24 July 2014)
Annex 66 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6125/0/6-14 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 24 July 2014
Annex 67 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/2894 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 29 July 2014
- ii -
Annex 68 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6311/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 30 July 2014
Annex 69 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6400/0/6-14 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 31 July 2014
Annex 70 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3055 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 6 August 2014
Annex 71 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6741 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 10 August 2014
Annex 72 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6776/0/6 to the
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 11 August 2014
Annex 73 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3603 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 31 August 2014
Annex 74 Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers
(September 2014 to December 2015)
Annex 75 Expert Opinion No. 116/3, drafted by Research Institution for Special Purpose
Equipment and Forensic Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (2
September 2014)
Annex 76 Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3664 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB (4 September 2014)
Annex 77 Russian Border Guard Service of the FSB Letter No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 to the
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (11 October 2014)
Annex 78 Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 26-1209 to the Ukrainian
State Border Guard Service (7 November 2014)
Annex 79 Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 22017220000000060 (22 November
2014)
Annex 80 Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Letter No.
55/2208 (10 December 2014)
Annex 81 Record of Identification of Gennadiy Ruslanovych Shmoryvoz by Photograph
(17 December 2014)
Annex 82 Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015)
Annex 83 Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/78 (9 January 2015)
Annex 84 Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015)
- iii -
Annex 85 Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. G. Albot, Investigations Department
of the Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (13 January 2015)
Annex 86 Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/083 (13 January 2015)
Annex 87 Record of Review, drafted by Captain of Justice V. Romanenko, Senior
Investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the Investigations Department of
the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk Region (16
January 2015)
Annex 88 Expert Opinion No. 63, drafted by Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for
Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of
Ukraine (18 January 2015)
Annex 89 Map showing shell craters around the Buhas roadblock, which were marked by
investigators after inspecting the crime scene (dated 20 January 2015)
Annex 90 Record of crime scene inspection conducted by T.A. Belobokova, Lieutenant of
the Police and Senior Criminal Investigator with the Ordzhonikidze District
Office of the Mariupol City Department of the Central Directorate of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Annex 91 Donetsk Region Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, All Necessary Measures Being Taken to Deal with the Consequences
of Militants’ Shelling of Mariupol (25 January 2015)
Annex 92 Inspection Report, drafted by Mykhaylo Onyshchenko, Senior Special
Investigator at the Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine (25 January 2015)
Annex 93 Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015 09:00 a.m.).
Annex 94 Record of area inspection conducted by V.V. Romanenko, Captain of Justice
and Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast
Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
Annex 95 Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/0373 (11 February 2015 09:00 a.m.).
Annex 96 Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Martyniuk, Lieutenant
Colonel of Justice and Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the
Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
Annex 97 Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Starostenko, Senior
Lieutenant of Justice and Senior Criminal Investigator with the Investigative
Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
Annex 98 Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015)
- iv -
Annex 99 Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/78 (9 January 2015)
Annex 100 Scene Inspection Report, drafted by A. Sorokina, Police Captain, Kramatorsk
City Department (10 February 2015)
Annex 101 Scene Inspection Report, drafted by E. Abushov, Police Lieutenant,
Kramatorsk City Department (10 February 2015)
Annex 102 Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation Letter No. 1696 og (12 February
2015)
Annex 103 Incident Site Inspection Report of O.V. Kupriyanov, Police Lieutenant and
Investigator with the Investigations Department of the Kramatorsk Police
Department (12 February 2015)
Annex 104 Letter from the Mariupol City Council Healthcare Directorate of Donetsk
Region No. 01/133-08-0 to the Deputy Head of the SBU Directorate in Donetsk
Region (12 February 2015)
Annex 105 Record of Site Inspection Conducted by A.A. Kholin, Major of Justice and
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of
the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast (12 February 2015)

Annex 52
BBC News, Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia’s Crimea Takeover Plot (9 March 2015)

AD
9 March 2015
Ukraine crisis
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot
Home Video World US & Canada UK Business Tech Science
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In March, Russian TV produced a lavish film on the annexation of Crimea
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Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot - BBC News Page 1 of 18
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 5/3/2018
Vladimir Putin has admitted for the first time that
the plan to annex Crimea was ordered weeks
before the referendum on self-determination.
Crimea was formally absorbed into Russia on 18
March, to international condemnation, after
unidentified gunmen took over the peninsula.
Mr Putin said on TV he had ordered work on
"returning Crimea" to begin at an all-night meeting
on 22 February.
The meeting was called after Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovych was ousted.
Speaking last year, Mr Putin had said only that he
took his final decision about Crimea after secret,
undated opinion polls showed 80% of Crimeans
favoured joining Russia.
The findings of these polls were borne out by the outcome of the referendum on 16 March, he
told Russian state TV last April.
Ukraine crisis
Why are Russia-Ukraine
tensions high over Crimea?
12 August 2016
What is Russia's end game in
Crimea?
14 August 2016
Crimea tensions in Russia,
Ukraine media
12 August 2016
Daily reality of Ukraine's
'frozen war'
15 April 2016
AFP
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot - BBC News Page 2 of 18
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 5/3/2018
AP
GETTY IMAGES
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot - BBC News Page 3 of 18
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Speaking in a forthcoming Russian TV documentary, Mr Putin said a meeting with officials had
been held on 22-23 February to plan the rescue of Ukraine's deposed president.
"I invited the leaders of our special services and the defence ministry to the Kremlin and set
them the task of saving the life of the president of Ukraine, who would simply have been
liquidated," he said.
"We finished about seven in the morning. When we were parting, I told all my colleagues, 'We
are forced to begin the work to bring Crimea back into Russia'."
The trailer for The Path To The Motherland was broadcast on Sunday night with no release
date announced.
On 27 February, unidentified armed men seized the local parliament and local government
buildings in Crimea, raising the Russian flag.
AP
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot - BBC News Page 4 of 18
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 5/3/2018
Among them appeared to be regular soldiers without military insignia, who were dubbed the
"little green men".
Mr Putin subsequently admitted deploying troops on the peninsula to "stand behind Crimea's
self-defence forces".
Timeline: How Crimea was annexed
◾ 22 February, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych flees Kiev after violent protests
◾ 23 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to rescue Mr Yanukovych and annexe
Crimea
◾ 27 February, pro-Russian gunmen seize Crimea's parliament and other key buildings
◾ 28 February, unidentified soldiers in combat fatigues occupy two airports in Crimea
◾ 1 March, Russian parliament approves Mr Putin's request to use force in Ukraine
◾ 16 March, 97% of voters in Crimea agree to join Russia
◾ 18 March, Mr Putin signs a bill absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation
Ukraine crisis: Timeline
The formal annexation of Crimea sparked unrest in eastern Ukraine on 7 April, when pro-
Russian protesters occupied government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv
demanding independence.
A month later, pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence from
Ukraine after unrecognised referendums.
Ukraine responded by launching an "anti-terrorist operation" against them and the region
became engulfed in a conflict which has cost at least 6,000 lives and driven more than a
million people from their homes, according to the UN.
The Ukrainian government, Western leaders and Nato say there is clear evidence that Russia
is helping the separatists with heavy weapons and soldiers. Independent experts echo that
accusation.
Moscow denies it, insisting that any Russians serving with the rebels are "volunteers".
Full details of Mr Yanukovych's escape from Ukraine are unclear although Mr Putin spoke of
preparations to evacuate him from Donetsk.
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot - BBC News Page 5 of 18
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 5/3/2018
"Heavy machine guns were placed there, so as not to waste time talking," he added, with
preparations made by land, sea and air.
The documentary, which Russian TV says will be broadcast soon, was made by Andrei
Kondrashov, a journalist with state-run channel Rossiya-1.
Related Topics
Vladimir Putin Ukraine crisis Ukraine
Share this story About sharing
Why are Russia-Ukraine tensions high over Crimea?
12 August 2016
What is Russia's end game in Crimea?
14 August 2016
Crimea tensions in Russia, Ukraine media
12 August 2016
Daily reality of Ukraine's 'frozen war'
15 April 2016
UN: Impunity pervasive in east Ukraine
14 July 2016
Nato's Russia problem
11 August 2016
Background
Warm welcome for Ukraine's Savchenko
25 May 2016
Ukraine crisis
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot - BBC News Page 6 of 18
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Profile: Ukraine's Petro Poroshenko
7 June 2014
The politics of gay rights in Ukraine
12 June 2016
Trudeau's Ukrainian odyssey
11 July 2016
Putin shows who is boss in Crimea
19 August 2015
What happened in Kiev's Maidan square?
12 February 2015
How does Europe wean itself off Russian gas?
1 May 2014
Ukraine country profile
3 August 2017
Europe
No impunity for Eta, says Spanish PM
3 May 2018 Europe
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Annex 53
Vladimir Putin, Interview Given to the TV Channel “Rossiya” as Part of a
Documentary “Crimea: Path to the Homeland” (video)

Annex 54
Ukraine Report Under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Report (1
January 2014)

1
AGREEMENT ON
CONVENTIONAL
ARMED FORCES IN
EUROPE
Information on Ukrainian conventional
armed forces
as of January 1, 2014
UKRAINIAN CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
VERIFICATION CONTROL
KIEV
2
Table IIIA: LOCATION, NUMBERS INFORMATION
TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED UNDER SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN
UKRAINE
Current as of: January 1, 2014
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Center for Storage, Vakulenchuk 5 122 mm BM-21
Pre-Sale 49°56'30"N 028°17'40"E 1 220 mm 9P140
Preparation, and 1 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
1631st Artillery Shepetivka 30 122 mm BM-21
Armament Base 50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E 5 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
1827th Artillery Nizhyn 16 122 mm BM-21
Armament Base 51°01'40"N 031°52'40"E 2 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
3623rd Central Voznesensk 24 122 mm BM-21
Artillery 47°35'30"N 031°19'50"E 33 220 mm 9P140
Armament Base
3
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
8th Army Corps Zhytomyr 48 122 mm BM-21
50°15'10"N 028°40'10"E 57 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
36 152 mm 2S19
56 152 mm 2S3
18 152 mm 2S5
2 152 mm D-20
105 MLRS
48 122 mm BM-21
57 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
1st Separate Tank Goncharovskoye 18 122 mm BM-21
Brigade 51°18'10"N 030°54'50"E 2 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
30th Separate Novohrad-Volynskyi 17 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 50°35'30"N 027°39'10"E
Brigade
4
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
72nd Separate Bila Tserkva 12 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 49°48'50"N 030°05'50"E
Brigade
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
27th Rocket Sumy 1
122 mm BM-21
Artillery Regiment 50°52'50"N 034°47'20"E 55 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Armed Forces of Ukraine Kiev 148 122 mm BM-21
Army Forces 50°27'40"N 030°28'10"E 12 220 mm 9P140
Command 74 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
169th Separate Desna 8 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 50°55'40"N 030°45'30"E 2 220 mm 9P140
Brigade 1 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
5
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Academy of Lviv 7 122 mm BM-21
the Army 49°49'30"N 024°01'10"E 1 220 mm 9P140
1 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Academy of Lviv 2 122 mm BM-21
the Army-1 49°49'30"N 024°01'10"E 1 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
International Starychi 4
122 mm BM-21
Peacekeeping 49°58'50"N 023°34'10"E
and Security
Center
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
184th Educational Center Starychi 244 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
50°00'10"N 023°35'30"E
1 IFV
1 ARV-1 Wheeled
1 MLRS
1 122 mm BM-21
1 MTM-20
Military Academy Odessa 1
122 mm BM-21
(Odessa) 46°26'50"N 030°44'50"E 1 220 mm 9P140
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Military Training, Zaporizhia 1
122 mm BM-21
6
Department, 47°51'40"N 035°10'40"E
Zaporizhia NTU
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Operational Dnipropetrovsk 72 122 mm BM-21
Command “SOUTH” 48°27'50"N 035°00'40"E 36 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
17th Separate Kryvyi Rih 18 122 mm BM-21
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
28th Separate Chornomorske 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 46°35'10"N 030°56'30"E
Brigade
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
92nd Separate Chuhuiv 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 49°50'50"N 036°43'50"E
Brigade
7
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
93rd Separate Cherkasskoye 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 48°42'20"N 035°23'10"E
Brigade
27
107th Rocket Kremenchuk 400 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 0
Artillery Regiment 49°05'40"N 033°25'50"E
36 MLRS
36 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Operational Rivne 59 122 mm BM-21
Command 50°37'20"N 026°13'30"E 8 220 mm 9P140
“NORTH” 36 300 mm 9A52
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
24th Separate Yavoriv 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 49°55'30"N 023°23'30"E
Brigade
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
8
51st Separate Volodymyr-Volynskyi 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized 50°52'00"N 024°19'50"E
Brigade
12
15th Rocket Drohobych 403 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 0
Artillery Regiment 49°20'30"N 023°30'30"E
36 MLRS
36 300 mm 9A52
1 BTR-60 R-975 M1
233rd Educational Center Novaya Lyubomirka 2
122 mm BM-21
50°45'40"N 026°24'30"E
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
1448 Central Orzhiv 21 122 mm BM-21
Artillery 50°46'30"N 026°06'00"E 8 220 mm 9P140
Armament Base
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Armed Forces of Ukraine Sevastopol 18 122 mm BM-21
Naval Forces 44°35'20"N 033°30'30"E
Command
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
36st Separate Perevalne 6 122 mm BM-21
Coastal Defense Brigade 44°50'10"N 034°19'50"E
9
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
406th Separate Simferopol 12 122 mm BM-21
Coastal 44°57'00"N 034°05'20"E
Artillery
Group
Name of formation or
unit
Peacetime location Personnel
strength
BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC Type
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
SE “Shepetivka” Shepetivka 20 122 mm BM-21
Repair Plant 50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E 28 220 mm 9P140
6 300 mm 9A52
1 122 mm BM-21
Shepetivka
50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E
7 122 mm BM-21
Shepetivka
50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E
K006
Bila Tserkva
49°48'50"N 030°05'50"E
PVV 001 12 122 mm
BM-21
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
72nd Separate 12 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized Brigade
S173 OK# 2
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
10
K154
Vakulenchuk
49°56'30" N 028°17'40"E
PVV 001 5 122
mm
BM
1 22210 mm 9P140
1 300 mm 9A52
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
Center for Storage, 5 122 mm BM-21
Pre-Sale Preparation, 1 220 mm 9P140
and Utilization of WMP 1 300 mm 9A52
S824 OK# 7
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K026
Volodymyr-Volynskyi
50°52'00"N 024°19'50"E
PVV 002 18 122 mm
BM-21
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
51st Separate 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized Brigade
S365 OK# 12
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K029
Voznesensk
47°35'30"N 031°19'50"E
PVV 003 24 122 mm BM-
21
33 220 mm 9P140
11
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
3623rd Central 24 122 mm BM-21
Artillery 33 220 mm 9P140
Armament Base
S575 OK# 13
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K033
Goncharovskoye
51°18'10"N 030°54'50"E
PVV 001 18 122 mm
BM-21
2 220 mm 9P140
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
1st Separate Tank 18 122 mm BM-21
Brigade 2 220 mm 9P140
S178 OK# 15
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K035
Divychky
50°02'30"N 031°14'50"E
PVV 001 8 122 mm BM-
21
2 220 mm 9P140
1 300 mm 9A52
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
6th Artillery Division 8 122 mm BM-21
S133 OK# 16 2 220 mm 9P140
12
1 300 mm 9A52
15 K038
Drohobych
49°20'30"N 023°30'30"E
PVV 002
15th Rocket Artillery
Regiment S307 OK# 18
0
0
0
0
0
0
36
36
36
36
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
300 mm 9A52
300 mm 9A52
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K204
Kremenchuk
49°05'40"N 033°25'50"E
PVV 005
107th Rocket Artillery
Regiment S657 OK# 31
0
0
0
0
0
0
36
36
36
36
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
300 mm 9A52
300 mm 9A52
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K063
Kryvyi Rih
47°52'30"N 033°15'10"E
PVV 005 18 122
mm
BM-
21
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
17th Separate Tank 18 122 mm BM-21
Brigade
S678 OK# 32
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
13
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K210
Lviv
49°49'30"N 024°01'10"E
PVV 002 2 122
mm
BM
1 22210 mm 9P140
1 300 mm 9A52
Academy of 2 122 mm BM-21
the Army-1 1 220 mm 9P140
S194-1 OK# 34 1 300 mm 9A52
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K077
Nizhyn
51°01'40"N 031°52'40"E
PVV 001 16 122 mm
BM-21
2 220 mm 9P140
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
1827th Artillery 16 122 mm BM-21
Armament Base 2 220 mm 9P140
S081 OK# 40
K208
Novaya Lyubomirka
50°45'40"N 026°24'30"E
PVV 002 2 122
mm
BM-21
233rd Educational Center 2 122 mm BM-21
S921 OK# 47
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K084
Novohrad-Volynskyi
50°35'30"N 027°39'10"E
PVV 001 17 122 mm
BM-21
14
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
30th Separate 17 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized Brigade
S510 OK# 48
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K212
Odessa
46°26'50"N 030°44'50"E
PVV 003 1 122
mm
BM
-21
1 220 mm 9P140
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
Military Academy 1 122 mm BM-21
(Odessa) 1 220 mm 9P140
S741 OK# 50
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K153
Orzhiv
50°46'30"N 026°06'00"E
PVV 002 21 122
mm
BM-21
8 220 mm 9P140
15
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
1448 Central 21 122 mm BM-21
Artillery 8 220 mm 9P140
Armament Base
S077 OK# 53
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K092
Perevalne
44°50'10"N 034°19'50"E
PVV 004 6 122 mm
BM-21
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
36th Separate 6 122 mm BM-21
Coastal Defense Brigade
S638 OK# 54
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K144
Simferopol
44°57'00"N 034°05'20"E
PVV 004 12 122 mm BM-
21
406th Separate Coastal 12 122 mm BM-21
Artillery Group
S764 OK# 56
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K206
Starychi
49°58'50"N 023°34'10"E
PVV 002 4 122 mm
BM-21
16
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
International Peacekeeping 4 122 mm BM-21
and Security
Center
S809 OK# 57
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K109
Sumy
50°52'50"N 034°47'20"E
PVV 006 1 122 mm BM-
21
55 220 mm 9P140
27th Rocket 1 122 mm BM-21
Artillery Regiment 55 220 mm 9P140
S775 OK# 60
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K126
Cherkasskoye
48°42'20"N 035°23'10"E
PVV 005 18 122 mm
BM-21
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
93rd Separate 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized Brigade
S692 OK# 66
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K130
Chornomorske
46°35'10"N 030°56'30"E
PVV 003 18 122 mm
BM-21
17
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
28th Separate 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized Brigade
S606 OK# 71
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K128
Chuhuiv
49°50'50"N 036°43'50"E
PVV 006 18 122
mm
BM
-21
18 122 mm BM-21
18 152 mm 2S3
1 MTM-20
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
K134
Shepetivka
50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E
PVV 002 58 122 mm BM-
21
33 220 mm 9P140
6 300 mm 9A52
1631st Artillery 30 122 mm BM-21
Armament Base 5 220 mm 9P140
S268 OK# 74
20 122 mm BM-21
28 220 mm 9P140
6 300 mm 9A52
ANALYSIS 7 122 mm BM-21
EXPORT 1 122 mm BM-21
Declared Site Registration Number Point of
Entry/Exit
Monitored Item BT ACV APC,
IFV,
and
similar
Art. PTS UV CSP NFC BS PUBS UTS Type
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
18
K135
Yavoriv
49°55'30"N 023°23'30"E
PVV 002 18 122
mm
BM-
21
24th Separate 18 122 mm BM-21
Mechanized Brigade
S285 OK# 76
Annex 55
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-3823/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 16 May 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] Response -2- to fax from Dorokhin
[Handwriting:] May 16, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-3823/0/6-14 of May 16, 2014
Extremely urgent
Attn: First Deputy Director of the Border
Guard Service of the Federal Security
Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.M.
Dorokhin
Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],
In response to your letter of May 16, 2014, the Administration of the State Border Guard
Service of Ukraine would like to inform you as follows.
The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine does not possess information about any intentions
of unidentified citizens of Ukraine to proceed to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in the
Syvash and Azov directions). At the same time, it should be noted that we are constantly
registering attempts by individuals to infiltrate mainland Ukraine to engage in subversive and
sabotage activities from the temporarily occupied territory (Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII On the
Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Citizens in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine,
which took effect on May 15, 2014). We also record daily attempts to deliver means of terror,
weapons, ammunition, and cash intended to fund mercenaries.
The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine would also like to remark that,
unfortunately, we did not receive a single response to our letters between March 3 and May 16,
2014.
In light of the foregoing, please be informed that we prepared and forwarded to you a letter of
May 15, 2014, which will be handed over to you in person by Major-General O.I. Valkiv in the
immediate future.
We are counting on an appropriate evaluation of the information contained in the letter and
appropriate measures to be taken under the Protocol between the Administration of the State
Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
governing the procedure for exchanging information about the situation at the state border of
Ukraine and the Russian Federation dated September 26, 2008, and the Protocol between the
Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of
the Russian Federation on the activity of border guard representatives dated September 26,
2008.
Best regards,
First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Colonel-General
[Signature] P.A. Shisholin

Annex 56
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.22-3829/0/6 to the Russian First
Deputy Head of the Border Service of FSB, dated 17 May 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] -3-
[Handwriting:] May 17
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Attn: First Deputy Director of the
Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.M. Dorokhin
Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],
I would like to use this opportunity to express my respect for you and my confidence
in our continued fruitful cooperation.
In response to your letter of May 16, 2014, please be informed that the State Border
Guard Service of Ukraine continues to monitor the situation at the administrative
border of Kherson Oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The information
reported by the Russian side has not been confirmed as of May 17.
Meanwhile, the leadership of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine is extremely
concerned about the lack of a response from the Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia both at the central and regional levels in connection with
the situation unfolding in the Ukrainian-Russian sector of the state border.
In addition to the facts presented in Letter No. 0.42-3763/0/6-14 of May 15, 2014,
please be informed that at around 5:00 a.m. on May 17 a border patrol of the
Dyakovo border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment detected an
illegal crossing of the state border by a convoy of 6 trucks and 1 UAZ vehicle in the
direction of Nagorno-Tuzlovka (Russia) - Klunnikovo (Ukraine), which proceeded deep
into Ukrainian territory from the Russian Federation.
Meanwhile, the Russian side has thus far failed to take active steps to deter such
incidents.
In light of the foregoing, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine hopes the existing
agreements and international laws on cross-border issues will be honored in the
future.
First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.22-3829/0/6-14 of May 17, 2014

Annex 57
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-4004/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 27 May 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] May 27, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] May 27, 2014 No. 0.42-4092/0/6-14
Attn: First Deputy Director -
Chief of the Border Guard
Service of the Federal Security
Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Colonel-General,
Yesterday the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine informed the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia about a possible attempt by a large number of militants to
break through into Ukrainian territory (Letter No. 0.42-4048/0/6-14 of May 26, 2014 addressed
to Colonel-General V.M. Dorokhin). Meanwhile, no response or any steps to prevent the illegal
crossing of the common state border followed.
Moreover, one gets the impression that Russian border guards are facilitating the illegal
crossing of the common Ukrainian-Russian border by armed militants, thereby violating the
provisions of the August 3, 1994 Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on
Cooperation and Interaction in Border-Related Issues, the May 31, 1997 Agreement on
Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and the
requirements of the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation governing the procedure for
exchanging information about the situation at the state border of Ukraine and the Russian
Federation dated September 26, 2008, as well as laws of the Russian Federation governing
border-related issues.
From 10:30 p.m. on May 26 to 3:43 a.m. on May 27, Ukrainian border guards of the Biryukovo
border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment observed the movement of vehicle
convoys on the adjoining side (in the direction of Novoprokhorovka (Russia) - Novoborovitsy
(Ukraine) in the area of information post No. 68), which could not have passed unnoticed by
Russian border guards. Moreover, border guard representatives of the Luhansk and Donetsk
border guard detachments informed their Russian colleagues about the movement of these
vehicles through operative officers of the two sides, which was followed by a telephone
conversation between the chiefs of directorates.
2
The attempt to break through into Ukrainian territory began at 3:43 a.m. The militants open
effective fire in response to warning shots fired by Ukrainian border patrols. The armed
encounter ended at 4:22 a.m. Three passenger cars accompanying the convoy were detained,
six terrorists killed, one more wounded and taken prisoner as a result of the armed encounter.
The cars that were detained were found to contain automatic assault rifles, sniper rifles,
handheld grenade launchers, explosives and detonators.
Meanwhile, six trucks and three passenger cars managed to break through in the direction of
Ukraine under the cover of massive fire and considering the small number of border patrols.
The militants that broke through the border are now preparing to storm the Sverdlovsk and
Biryukovo border guard units of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment (as of 12:00 p.m. Kyiv
time).
The events of the past ten days, the lack of any response to our petitions, and the omission to
act on the part of Russian border guards can be viewed by us as deliberate actions by the
Russian side to undermine Ukraine’s efforts to deescalate the conflict in the region.
We believe that this position of the Russian side does not befit a partner but is rather a sign of
Russia’s enmity.
The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine finds it possible to publish our petitions in the mass
media, inform the border guard agencies of the CIS member states, the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as well as all international monitoring missions working in
Ukraine.
Blame for possible consequences in the Ukrainian and Russia cross-border region rests with the
Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
O.V. Derkach, 527-63-92
Annex 58
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-4182/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 3 June 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] June 3, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Colonel-General,
Based on information from reliable sources, please be informed that a large group of
800 armed individuals are planning to break through the joint Ukrainian-Russian state
border in the direction of Ukraine on or around June 3-4, 2014 within the strip of land
between Millerovo (Russia) - Dyakovo (Ukraine), Kuibyshevo (Russia) - Dmitrovka
(Ukraine).
It is not to be ruled out that this group of individuals might commit acts of extremism
on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and in other directions within Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts on their way to their final destinations – the cities of Donetsk and
Mariupol.
I urge you to react to this information and make every possible effort to deter and
prevent criminal activity on the Ukrainian-Russian state border.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
O.V. Derkach, 527-63-92
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-4298/0/6-14 of June 3, 2014
Olha Volodymyrivna Derkach
2
[Handwriting:] May 30, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Colonel-General,
I would like to yet again call your attention to the gross incidents in which armed
individuals illegally crossed the state border without any obstruction from the Russian
side.
Specifically, at 3:20 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. on May 30, 2014, in two separate incidents
border patrols of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment detained two Gazel vehicles
and individuals traveling in them after they crossed the state border from the Russian
side; they attempted to illegally move a large cache of weapons and ammo across the
state border (Kalashnikov machine guns, Kalashnikov assault rifles, Dragunov sniper
rifles, handheld grenade launchers).
Also, please be informed that on the night of May 29-30, 2014, the Stanichno-
Luganskoe border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment repelled
several armed attacks in which militants used both individual and team weapons.
Bearing in mind the lack of any response from the Russian side to information and
petitions from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine regarding attempts by armed
individuals to break through the state border and preparations to commit crimes the
Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine places the full extent of
responsibility for the events unfolding in this sector of the Ukrainian-Russian state
border on the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, and also
views this behavior as facilitation of terrorism in the territory of a sovereign country.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
S. Morozov, 527-63-92
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-4182/0/6-14 of May 30, 2014
Serhiy Oleksandrovych Morozov
Annex 59
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5220/0/6-14 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 2 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
URGENT
Attn: First Deputy Director of the
Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.M. Dorokhin
Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],
The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine offers condolences in
connection with the incidents involving the shelling of the frontier territory of the Russian
Federation on June 28, 2014, which you mentioned in Letter No. 3/85. Please be informed,
however, that the Border Guard Service of Ukraine has no information to indicate that units of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine were involved in these incidents.
Moreover, we have repeatedly called your attention to the possibility of provocative acts on the
part of the illegal paramilitary groups operating in the eastern regions of Ukraine, whose
leadership includes mercenaries and militants as well as representatives of Cossack military
units, citizens of the Russian Federation.
In turn, please be informed that 22 incidents involving trespassing of the state border of
Ukraine from the Russian Federation were recorded in April-June 2014 in the sector supervised
by the Eastern Regional Directorate of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
1. Fire from the territory of the Russian Federation (4 incidents).
Donetsk Border Guard detachment:
June 5: militants driving a KamAZ truck crossed the state border and stormed the Marinovka
border crossing point from the direction of the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by
the Dmitrovka Unit of the Border Guard Service;
After the attack of the militants was repelled, a container that used to store an IGLA shoulderfired
surface-to-air missile (9M39) and traces of its use were discovered at the scene of combat
during a sweep of the area around the Marinovka border crossing point.
The packing list found in the container indicates that that the missiles had been stored since
2001 at Military Unit No. 33859 of the Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces of the Russian Federation
(city of Eysk, Krasnodar Krai). The most recent packing list notations were made on April 12,
2014.
June 21: while militants were firing from the territory of Ukraine at the Uspenka border
crossing point in the sector supervised by the Amvrosievka Unit of the Border Guard Service,
the Ukrainian positions were also fired at from the territory of the Russian Federation.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-5220/0/6-14 of July 2, 2014
2
Luhansk Border Guard detachment:
June 20: in the sector supervised by the Krasnodon Unit of the Border Guard Service, the unit
came under fire from the territory of the Russian Federation during an armed attack by
militants at the Izvarino border crossing point from Ukrainian territory;
June 22: in the sector supervised by the Belovodsk Unit of the Border Guard Service, the
border guard detachment came under fire from the Russian territory (three short bursts of
automatic rifle fire).
2. Intrusion into the air space of Ukraine (8 incidents).
Donetsk Border Guard detachment:
April 2: a drone flying along the state border above the territory of Ukraine was detected in the
sector supervised by the Novoazovsk Unit of the Border Guard Service;
April 22: intrusions into the air space of Ukraine by drones were also detected in the sector
supervised by the Amvrosievka Unit of the Border Guard Service;
April 24: intrusions into the air space of Ukraine by a drone were detected in the sector
supervised by the Novoazovsk Unit of the Border Guard Service; the drone flew along the state
border of Ukraine;
May 23: drones were spotted flying over the territory of Ukraine along sectors supervised by
the Amvrosievka and Novoazovsk Units of the Border Guard Service;
May 29: Anti-Aircraft Defense units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shot down a drone
conducting aerial reconnaissance in the territory of Donetsk Oblast.
Luhansk Border Guard detachment:
June 10: intrusions into the air space by a KA-2 helicopter from Ukrainian territory in the
direction of the Russian Federation were detected in the sector supervised by the Krasnodon
Unit of the Border Guard Service;
June 28: intrusions into the air space by a drone were detected in the sector supervised by the
Stanichno-Luganskoe Unit of the Border Guard Service.
Sumy Border Guard detachment:
May 21: intrusions into the air space by a Mi-8 helicopter (it flew up to 1,500 meters into
Ukrainian territory and then flew back to Russia in the opposite direction) were detected in the
sector supervised by the Yunakovka Unit of the Border Guard Service.
3. Illegal crossing of the state border of Ukraine by illegal paramilitary groups and sabotage
and reconnaissance groups (2 incidents).
Luhansk Border Guard detachment:
May 3: a group of individuals (up to 6 people) illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine on
foot from the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe Unit of
the Border Guard Service;
June 22: a group of individuals (up to 15 people) illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine,
entering Ukraine and then returning back to Russia, in the sector supervised by the Belovodsk
Unit of the Border Guard Service.
4. Illegal crossing of the state border of Ukraine by vehicles (4 incidents).
Donetsk Border Guard detachment:
May 24: five KamAZ trucks illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine in the sector supervised
by the Dmitrovka Unit of the Border Guard Service (one machine gunner traveled in the back of
3
each truck, and one large-caliber machine gun was additionally mounted on the main KamAZ
truck).
Luhansk Border Guard detachment:
May 3: two trucks illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation in
the sector supervised by the Dyakovo Unit of the Border Guard Service;
May 8: two offroad vehicles illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine from the Russian
Federation in the sector supervised by the Biryukovo Unit of the Border Guard Service;
May 17: six KamAZ trucks and one UAZ truck illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine from
the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Dyakovo Unit of the Border Guard
Service.
May 21: three KamAZ trucks accompanied by a Niva offroad vehicle illegally crossed the state
border in the sector supervised by the Krasnodon Unit of the Border Guard Service. When the
border guard officers opened effective fire, the vehicles abruptly changed their course and
returned back toward the Russian Federation.
May 27: a convoy of 6 KamAZ trucks, 4 passenger cars, and 2 minivans illegally crossed the
state border in the sector supervised by the Biryukovo Unit of the Border Guard Service. A
border patrol fired at, destroyed and captured 3 vehicles, including with weapons, and arrested
one wounded militant.
May 30: in the sector supervised by the Dyakovo Unit of the Border Guard Service, 2 minivans
were stopped while attempting an illegal crossing of the state border of Ukraine. In these
vehicles, 4 citizens of Ukraine in military uniforms and a citizen of the Russian Federation (the
so-called “war bride” of I. Girkin) smuggled into Ukrainian territory 43 units of weapons (27 AK
automatic rifles, 4 PK machine guns, 5 Dragunov sniper rifles, 5 RPG-26 handheld anti-tank
grenade launcher, 2 Makarov pistols), 197 grenades (102 F-1, 95 RGD-5 grenades), 74 boxes
of ammo (7.62 mm - 34 boxes, 12.6 mm - 40 boxes), and foreign currency (USD 10,000).
Berdiansk Border Guard detachment:
May 25: in a joint effort with officers of the Federal Security Service of Ukraine, the Border
Guard Service thwarted an attempt to illegally smuggle a large cache of weapons across the
Sea of Azov in a boat (90 AK-74 automatic rifles, 5 RPK-74 machine guns, 3 PKM machine
guns, 24 RPG-22 handheld grenade launchers, 918 RGD grenades, and over 20,000 units of
ammo). Three citizens of Ukraine were detained.
In light of the foregoing, I call your attention to an extreme need to implement a set of
appropriate measures on the state border to stabilize the situation, prevent illegal crossing of
the state border by personnel carriers and militants, and delivery of weapons and ammo to the
state border line.
Best regards,
First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin
S.O. Morozov, 527-63-92

Annex 60
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5698/0/6-14 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 14 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 14, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
URGENT
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Colonel-General,
This is to inform you that the Ukrainian government is making every possible effort to
restore control over the sector of the Ukrainian-Russian border in Luhansk Oblast and
put an end to criminal activity on the part of members of illegal paramilitary groups in
the frontier regions of Ukraine, including their potential attacks targeting the state
border and the territory of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, we are forced to call the Russian side’s attention to the fact that the
armed encounter at the border in this case resulted from an attempt by a convoy of
about 100 trucks and armored vehicles to illegally cross the border from the Russian
Federation, which was accompanied by intense fire targeting the positions of units of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the state border line, of which you were informed
via Letter No. 0.42-5564/0/6-14 of July 13, 2014.
We believe that the events at the Ukrainian-Russian state border could have been
avoided if the Russian side had taken appropriate measures to prevent the illegal
crossing of the state border by armed individuals and vehicles, including at border
crossing points where crossing operations have been temporarily suspended by a
decision of the Ukrainian Government, of which you were informed via Letters Nos.
0.42-4495/0/6-14 and 0.42-4496/0/6-14 of June 10, 2014.
We also repeatedly informed you about a tactic used by militants whereby positions of
our units are fired at from the state border line or even from the territory of the
Russian Federation in order to provoke return fire in the direction of the Russian
Federation, which could result in civilian deaths.
2
According to available information, residents in frontier regions of both Ukraine and
Russia are also involved in illegal activities at the border. They help armed individuals
and military vehicles cross the border.
To prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future, we propose joining our efforts
to ensure the security of the common state border and bring to the attention of the
public in both countries, including via the mass media, the fact that any attempts to
cross the border illegally will be immediately deterred by the relevant authorities of
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
Annex 61
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5980/0/6-14 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 21 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 21, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] No. 0.42-5980/0/6-14 of July 21, 2014
URGENT
Attn: First Deputy Director of the
Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.M. Dorokhin
Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],
This is to inform you that today, July 21, 2014, between 11:20 a.m. and 12:10 p.m.,
unidentified individuals launched an artillery attack on units of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine in the vicinity of Marinovka, Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, from Russian territory.
Ukrainian military personnel have been wounded in the attack along with considerable
material damage.
At 4:30 p.m., we recorded an attack launched from the area of Dmitrovka and
Dyakovo, Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, into Russian territory in the direction of Dyakovo
- Kuibyshevo by militants of illegal paramilitary groups in order to provoke return fire
at units of the State Border Guard Service and Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine would like to inform you that, in
cooperation with units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, we are taking every possible
measure to neutralize the militants and deter their illegal activity at the state border,
which includes preventing attacks targeting the territory of the Russian Federation.
For our part, we would like to call attention to the increasingly more frequent attacks
on units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Russian territory and ask you to make
every effort needed to prevent such attacks.
Best regards,
First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin

Annex 62
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 22 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 22, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
URGENT
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
This is to inform you that from 11:50 p.m. on July 21, 2014 to 12:30 a.m. on July 22,
2014, unidentified individuals launched a mortar attacks (close to 40 shots) on units of
the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine from Russian territory in the direction of
Staraya Ilyinka (Russia) - Parkhomenkovo (Ukraine). Vehicles then retreated deep into
Russian territory.
From 3:00 a.m. to 3:40 a.m. on July 22, 2014, our units were yet again fired at in this
area from Russian territory using mortar launchers and GRAD multiple rocket
launchers, with a total of 7 salvos and 40 shots per salvo.
Ukrainian border guards suffered wounds and shell shock injuries. Material damage is
considerable.
Also on the night of July 21-22, 2014, some 14 military vehicles entered Ukrainian
territory from Russian territory in the direction of Shevchenkovo (Ukraine) -
Malokaterinovka (Russia), which fired a salvo in the direction of units of the State
Border Guard Service of Ukraine stationed near Solntsevo. The vehicles returned to
the Russian Federation after firing the shots. Traces of the attack have been found at
the site from which the shots were fired. We have documented them and will hand
them over in the prescribed manner to border guard representatives of the Russian
Federation during the meeting of border guard representatives.
Please note that attacks on units of the State Border Guard Service and Armed Forces
of Ukraine from Russian territory have become constant, and the Russian side is not
responding to our petitions and has failed to take any steps to prevent them.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6013/0/6-14 of July 22, 2014
Vitaliy Mykolayovych Dombrovsky
2
These acts constitute a gross violation of bilateral Ukrainian-Russian agreements on
border issues, considerably complicate the situation at the common state border, and
result in grave consequences, including casualties among our servicemen and civilians.
The Ukrainian side demands that you make every effort needed to prevent the
militants from using Russian territory to fire at Ukrainian territory and illegally cross
the state border in military vehicles.
Best regards,
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
Annex 63
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.28-6080/0/6-14 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 23 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

Annex 64
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6058/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 23 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 23, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
In follow-up to Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6-14 of July 22, 2014 from the Administration
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, this is to inform you about new incidents
in which frontier territories of Ukraine were fired at from Russian territory.
Specifically, at 10:10 p.m. on July 22, 2014, border patrols of Ukraine witnessed an
artillery attack targeting the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Amvrosievka
(Ukraine), and at 10:40 p.m. – volleys from GRAD multiple rocket launchers from
Russian territory in the direction of Gerasimovka (Ukraine). At 2:15 a.m. on July 23,
2014, an artillery attack on the Uspenka border crossing point came from Russian
territory.
In addition, on July 22, 2014, Russian drones intruded into the Ukrainian air space to
conduct aerial reconnaissance of the frontier regions of Ukraine, specifically at 2:50
a.m. (in the area of Kuznetsovo-Mikhaylovka) and at 8:15 a.m. (in the area of
Peremoga).
Also, on July 22, 2014, four incidents were reported between 10:20 p.m. and 11:35
p.m. in which helicopters flew up to 3 km into Ukrainian territory from Russian
territory.
The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine urges the Russian
side to take decisive and appropriate measures to prevent acts of provocation
designed to further escalate the situation in Ukraine’s eastern regions and assist illegal
paramilitary groups of bandits operating in frontier regions of Ukraine and the Russian
Federation.
Best regards,
Acting Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6058/0/6-14 of July 23, 2014
2
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
In follow-up to Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6-14 of July 22, 2014 from the Administration
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, this is to inform you about new incidents
in which frontier territories of Ukraine were fired at from Russian territory.
Specifically, at 10:10 p.m. on July 22, 2014, border patrols of Ukraine witnessed an
artillery attack targeting the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Amvrosievka
(Ukraine), and at 10:40 p.m. – volleys from GRAD multiple rocket launchers from
Russian territory in the direction of Gerasimovka (Ukraine). At 2:15 a.m. on July 23,
2014, an artillery attack on the Uspenka border crossing point came from Russian
territory.
In addition, on July 22, 2014, Russian drones intruded into the Ukrainian air space to
conduct aerial reconnaissance of the frontier regions of Ukraine, specifically at 2:50
a.m. (in the area of Kuznetsovo-Mikhaylovka) and at 8:15 a.m. (in the area of
Peremoga).
Also, on July 22, 2014, four incidents were reported between 10:20 p.m. and 11:35
p.m. in which helicopters flew up to 3 km into Ukrainian territory from Russian
territory.
The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine urges the Russian
side to take decisive and appropriate measures to prevent acts of provocation
designed to further escalate the situation in Ukraine’s eastern regions and assist illegal
paramilitary groups of bandits operating in frontier regions of Ukraine and the Russian
Federation.
Best regards,
Acting Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General P.A. Shisholin
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6058/0/6-14 of July 23, 2014
Annex 65
Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine Letter No. 63/32/233 (24 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting: Potapenko] [Illegible] 62
[Handwriting: V.M. Zamohylnyi
For your information, work-related
July 25, 2014] Copy No. 1
Attn: Deputy Chief
of the Investigative Department of the
Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine,
Lieutenant Colonel of Justice
V.M. Bondarenko
Re: Your Ref. No. 63/3/800 of July 5, 2014
Following a request from the investigator of Criminal Case No. 22014130000000089 involving an
alleged crime falling under Part 2 of Article 201 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Krasnodon
Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
ascertained that at around 6:00 a.m. on July 5, 2014 unidentified individuals, having conspired as
part of a group, illegally moved a convoy of military vehicles operated by unidentified individuals
across the customs border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation in the vicinity of the Severny
border crossing checkpoint of the Luhansk Boarder Guard Detachment stationed in Severny,
Krasnodon District, Luhansk Oblast. The convoy consisted of: four (4) Kamaz trucks carrying
automatic assault rifles and ammo for them, as well as one (1) truck carrying a GRAD multiple
rocket launcher. The trucks were without any number plates or insignia. The convoy proceeded
deeper into Ukrainian territory, specifically in the direction of Luhansk.
It was also established that these vehicles crossed the border in the immediate vicinity of the
Severny border crossing checkpoint of the Luhansk Boarder Guard Detachment, over which the
Ukrainian authorities do not have control.
The Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service
of Ukraine has conducted a number of investigative activities that did not make it possible to
determine the whereabouts of the above-mentioned military vehicles. Detective efforts are also
currently underway to locate witnesses of this illegal movement of the above-mentioned military
vehicles across the customs border of Ukraine.
We will notify you as soon as we receive any further vital information pertaining to the
investigation of Criminal Case No. 22014130000000089.
Chief of the Krasnodon Municipal District Office
of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant Colonel [Signature] O.V. Liakhov
July 24, 2014
Reg. No. 63/32/233
Typed by: E.V. Yehorov
[Handwriting: H.V. Potapenko
No. 089 [Signature]
July 26, 2014]
Ref. 472
July 25, 2014

Annex 66
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6125/0/6-14 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 24 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 24, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
July 24, 2014 No. 0.42-6125/0/6-14
URGENT!
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of
the Federal Security Service of
Russia, Colonel-General V.G.
Kulishov
Dear Colonel-General,
This is to inform you that at 5:30 p.m. and 7:40 p.m. on July 24, 2014, a massive
attack on the Marinovka border crossing point of the Donetsk border guard
detachment continued with the use of mortar launchers (more than 100 shots fired).
The attack wounded one person and damaged vehicles.
Yet again we urge you to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents on the
Ukrainian-Russian border.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytyvn

Annex 67
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/2894 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB, dated 29 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 29, 2014
Copy No. __
STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Eastern Regional Directorate
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82
July 29, 2014 No. 42/2894
Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko,
Acting Director of the Border Guard
Directorate of the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation in
Rostov Oblast
Russia, Rostov-on-Don
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],
This is to respectfully inform you that the Ukrainian side is alarmed by reports of attacks on
the territory of the Russian Federation, particularly the Gukovo vehicle border crossing
point.
In response to your Letter No. 26/ 832 of July 29, 2014 (received at 5:32 (Kyiv time)),
please be informed that the information you have provided has been referred to the
relevant authorities of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, I would like to yet again inform the Russian side that, unfortunately, the area
from which the terrorists are staging attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation is
currently not controlled by units of the State Border Guard Service or the Ukrainian military.
The Ukrainian defenders of homeland perform their military duty until the end. Today alone,
4 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and more than 10 wounded as a result of a series of
mortar and artillery attacks in this direction.
I would like to assure you that the Ukrainian side is taking exceptional measures to restore
control over sectors of the state border of Ukraine and eliminate the causes of attacks
targeting the territory of the Russian Federation (Letter No. 42/2831 of July 25, 2014).
Terrorists who kill peaceful civilians, shoot at border guards and servicemen of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, and launch artillery attacks on the territories of Ukraine and the Russian
Federation will be located and held accountable, and their crimes will be stopped.
In turn, the Ukrainian side urges the Russian side to step up security of the state border in
this direction, prevent militants from entering Ukraine, cut off the existing channels for
smuggling weapons and military vehicles that the terrorists use to launch attacks on the
territories of our countries and kill our citizens.
Best regards,
Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General [Signature] A.A. Kucherenko
2
FROM: 268 PHONE: 2879793 JULY 29, 2014 18:32 PAGE 2
Fax without follow-up mailing of the original
[Handwriting: illegible]
[Signature] July 29, 2014
FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BORDER DIRECTORATE OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF
RUSSIA IN ROSTOV OBLAST
July 29, 2014, No. 26/832
Rostov-on-Don, 344011
Attn: Chief of the Eastern Regional
Directorate of the State Board Guard
Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General A.A. Kucherenko
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv,
Ukraine, 61045
Dear Andrey Arkadyevich [Mr. Kucherenko],
This is to inform you that on the night of July 28 - 29, 2014, during the period of
armed encounters occurring in Luhansk Oblast, attacks were launched from
Ukrainian territory on the Russian Federation and the Gukovo vehicle border
crossing point (Russia). In this connection, crossings of individuals and vehicles
across the state border of the Russian Federation are temporarily suspended at the
Gukovo border crossing point.
The attack by the Ukrainian side damaged buildings and the utility infrastructure of
the Russian border crossing point, and shell hole were discovered at the sites of
explosions.
The Russian side demands that the Ukrainian side take steps to rule out the
possibility of attacks on Russian territory across the state border. The actions of the
Ukrainian side constitute a gross violation of Russia’s sovereignty.
The Russian side would like to call attention to the fact that the criminal and
provocative actions by the Ukrainian side cannot be left without attention and
appropriate evaluation.
Best regards,
Acting Chief of Directorate
Colonel [Signature] D.N. Nechepuren
Annex 68
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6311/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 30 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 30, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
Yet again please be informed that, despite repeated petitions from the Administration
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine calling for the attacks targeting the
territory of Ukraine from Russian territory to be stopped and decisive measures to be
taken by the Russian side to ensure border security, systemic illegal activity of a
provocative nature continues out of Russian territory.
Specifically, from 7:20 p.m. to 7:50 p.m. on July 29, 2014, a border patrol of the
State Border Guard Service of Ukraine witnessed artillery fire from Grad-P multiple
rocket launchers in the direction of Amvrosievka (Ukraine) from the direction of
Shramko (Russian Federation).
In addition, from 7:20 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. the Marinovka border crossing point came
under mortar fire from Russian territory, and from 7:30 p.m. to 7:40 p.m. artillery fire
from Grad-P multiple rocket launchers came from Russian territory in the direction of
Stepanovka (Ukraine).
Incidents involving attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine from Russian territory are
documented. Photo and video evidence will be presented to the Russian side during
the meeting at the level of border guard representatives.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6311/0/6-14 of July 30, 2014
2
We would like to call your attention to the urgent need for the Border Guard Service of
the Federal Security Service of Russia to take comprehensive measures toward
preventing the use of Russian territory to stage attacks targeting Ukrainian territory,
which threatens the lives and health of citizens of a sovereign state.
We also request that you expedite the process of releasing information from the
Russian Federation following the investigation of incidents involving attacks targeting
the territory of Ukraine with the use of Russian territory, information about which we
presented earlier on July 21-29, 2014.
Best regards,
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
Annex 69
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6400/0/6-14 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 31 July 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] July 31, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] 0.42-6400/0/6-14 of July 31, 2014
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
I am forced to state that omission to act on the part of border guard units of the
Russian Federation, systematic violations by the Russian side of the Agreement
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in
Border-Related Issues, as well as the Protocol between the Administration of the State
Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation on the activity of border guard representatives, have yet again resulted in
casualties among Ukrainian border guards.
Specifically, at 3:20 a.m. on July 31, 2014, a sabotage and reconnaissance group used
the latest models of Russian-made handheld grenade launchers to fire at the premises
of the Vasilyevka border guard service office of the Amvrosievka border guard service
unit of the Donetsk Border Guard detachment. As a result of this criminal act, 2
Ukrainian border guards were killed, 8 were wounded, while 2 more remain buried
under rubble.
In addition, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. today, a unit of the State Border Guard
Service of Ukraine in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe border guard
unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under fire from BM-21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers (7 volleys) and artillery fire from the territory of the Russian
Federation (up to 5,000 m from the state border line) from the area of Voykovo
(Russia) in the direction of Kolesnikov (Ukraine).
The Ukrainian side demands that you act immediately to restore the proper regime of
the state border of the Russian Federation, honor international laws and bilateral
agreements on the assurance of border security of the sovereign state.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
2
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] 0.42-6400/0/6-14 of July 31, 2014
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
I am forced to state that omission to act on the part of border guard units of the
Russian Federation, systematic violations by the Russian side of the Agreement
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in
Border-Related Issues, as well as the Protocol between the Administration of the State
Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation on the activity of border guard representatives, have yet again resulted in
casualties among Ukrainian border guards.
Specifically, at 3:20 a.m. on July 31, 2014, a sabotage and reconnaissance group used
the latest models of Russian-made handheld grenade launchers to fire at the premises
of the Vasilyevka border guard service office of the Amvrosievka border guard service
unit of the Donetsk Border Guard detachment. As a result of this criminal act, 2
Ukrainian border guards were killed, 8 were wounded, while 2 more remain buried
under rubble.
In addition, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. today, a unit of the State Border Guard
Service of Ukraine in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe border guard
unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under fire from BM-21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers (7 volleys) and artillery fire from the territory of the Russian
Federation (up to 5,000 m from the state border line) from the area of Voykovo
(Russia) in the direction of Kolesnikov (Ukraine).
The Ukrainian side demands that you act immediately to restore the proper regime of
the state border of the Russian Federation, honor international laws and bilateral
agreements on the assurance of border security of the sovereign state.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
Annex 70
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3055 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB, dated 6 August 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] August 6, 2014
Copy No. __
STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Eastern Regional Directorate
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82
August 6, 2014 No. 42/3055
[Handwriting:] O.O. Morozov, [illegible] [Signature]
Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko, Acting
Director of the Border Guard Directorate
of the Federal Security Service of the
Russian Federation in Rostov Oblast
Russia, Rostov-on-Don
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],
This is to inform you that my communication to you, sent via Letter No. 42/3031 of August 5,
2014, about the nighttime mortar and artillery attack on the Ukrainian border patrol in the
vicinity of the population centers of Krasnyi Derkul - Gerasimovka did not find an appropriate
response. The situation has not been contained. Instead, it has deteriorated further.
This morning, from 4:25 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. (Kyiv time), another border patrol on duty in the
vicinity of Krasnaya Talovka (Ukraine) came under howitzer fire from Russian territory from an
area in the vicinity of Novorusskiy (Russia).
Also, between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. in the direction of Voloshino (Russia) - Krasnaya
Talovka (Ukraine), the border patrol detected an intrusion into the Ukrainian air space from the
Russian Federation by a drone that flew up to 1,000 meters into Ukrainian territory directly
above the position of border patrols, which were subsequently targeted by the attack.
I would yet again like to remind the Russian side that on July 14 and 28, 2014, roadside bombs
and land mines were planted along routes traveled by Ukrainian border patrols near the state
border, and the border patrols came under mortar and assault rifle fire from the Russian side,
which wounded our personnel and damaged our vehicles;
On July 5, 14 and 28, Ukrainian border guards serving both in the “green sector” of the border
and at the border crossing point came under fire. The border crossing point came under fire
from shoulder-fired missile launchers from the Russian side. Some of the border guards were
severely wounded. The infrastructure and the watch tower of the border crossing point have
been destroyed.
2
While previously the Russian side would respond to all reports of the Ukrainian side about
attacks on Ukrainian border patrols from the Russian side by saying (most recent letter No.
26/929 of August 5, 2014) that the attacks did not come from Russian territory but instead
originated from the “opposing warring part” (or, in the words of the Ukrainian side, from
terrorists and bandits), in this case the distance between positions of border patrols that came
under attack and positions of terrorists is more than 50 km, and any fire could possibly come
only from Russian territory.
I would like to emphasize the total omission to act on the part of Russian border guards and
their failure to defend the state border on their side.
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko], I request that you admit the obvious fact: that
Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian border guards are being fired at from Russian territory.
In light of the foregoing, the Ukrainian side insists that the following information be provided:
What units are responsible for artillery fire targeting Ukrainian territory? Which grouping of
forces and hardware do they belong to? Who commands these units? Who gives orders to fire
and launch drones? Who delivers missiles and weapons to the firing emplacements in the
frontier region?
Please reply to my letter as soon as practicable.
Best regards,
Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General [Signature] A.A. Kucherenko
Annex 71
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6741 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB, dated 10 August 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting]: August 10, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] 0.42-6741 of August 10, 2014
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
This is to inform you that on August 9, 2014, the territory of Ukraine yet again
repeatedly came under artillery fire from the Russian side over the course of 24 hours.
In particular, artillery fire from Grad-P multiple rocket launchers came in the direction
of Petropavlovka (Ukraine) from the direction of Marfinka (Russian Federation)
between 1:00 p.m. and 1:10 p.m. When the attack ended, the Ukrainian border patrol
witnessed 4 units of heavy military vehicles retreating back into the Russian
Federation.
Also, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers staged a series of attacks from Russian
territory between 1:00 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. in the direction of Amvrosievka (Ukraine)
from the direction of Selezniovka (Russian Federation) and Marfinka (Russian
Federation).
The town of Diakovo (Ukraine) came under artillery fire (presumably from a tank) at
2:00 p.m. from the direction of Dibrovka (Russian Federation).
Subsequently at 5:05 p.m., a border patrol observed two Mi-24 Russian military
helicopters fly up to 2 km into Ukrainian territory in the direction of Rogalik (Russia) -
Blagoveshchenka (Ukraine).
2
A massive artillery attack began at 9:17 p.m. from Russian territory, targeting the
territory of Ukraine in the direction of Yuganovka (Ukraine) from the direction of
Manotskiy (Russian Federation).
Incidents involving attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine from Russian territory and
intrusions into the Ukrainian air space are documented. Photo and video evidence will
be presented to the Russian side during the meeting at the level of border guard
representatives.
Yet again we urge the border guard directorate of the Russian Federation to act
immediately to put an end to artillery and mortar attacks targeting the territory of
Ukraine and prevent recurring violations of international laws.
Best regards,
Acting Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin
Annex 72
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6776/0/6 to the Russian
Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 11 August 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] August 11, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
URGENT
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
The manifestations of cynicism by the Russian side as it turns a blind eye to the
obvious violations by the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of
Russia of international laws governing cross-border security at the Ukrainian-Russian
state border are further proof of our assumptions that the Russian border guard
service has a direct interest in the destabilization of the situation in Ukraine’s eastern
regions.
Incredulously, the Russian side continues to turn a blind eye to the massive daily
attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine, surgical artillery attacks on Ukrainian units,
including border guard patrols, coming from Russian territory remain.
Meanwhile, August 11, 2014 has been declared a day of mourning in Odesa and
Kirovohrad Oblasts for the border guard heroes who died in the artillery and mortar
attack against the unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment in the vicinity of
Stanichno-Luganskoe on August 10, 2014, which came from the area of Manotskiy,
Rostov Oblast, Russia. The attack that lasted from 8:25 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. killed four
and wounded ten servicemen of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
Also, between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. on August 10, 2014, an artillery attack
targeting an area in the vicinity of the Krasnaya Talovka border crossing point of the
Luhansk Border Guard detachment came from Russian territory from the area of
Derkul (Russia) in the direction of Krasnaya Talovka (Ukraine).
From 12:05 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. on August 11, 2014, an attack from a BM-21 GRAD
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6776/0/6-14 of July 11, 2014
2
multiple rocket launcher targeting a roadblock of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the
vicinity of Amvrosievka came from Russian territory from the area of Avilo-Fiodorovka
(Russia) in the direction of Uspenka (Ukraine).
I would also like to call your attention to the continuing systematic intrusions by
Russian reconnaissance drones that fly up to 4,000 m deep into Ukrainian territory
(Krasnaya Talovka and Melovoe border guard service units).
Yet again I urge you to act immediately to prevent the territory of the Russian
Federation from being used to stage attacks against Ukrainian territory, and ensure
observance of international laws and bilateral agreements aimed at maintaining an
appropriate stage border regime and preventing casualties among Ukrainian citizens.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
Annex 73
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3603 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB, dated 31 August 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] August 31, 2014
STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Eastern Regional Directorate
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82
August 31, 2014 No. 42/3603
[Handwriting: illegible] O.V. Derkach
[Signature]
Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko,
Acting Director of the Border Guard
Directorate of the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation in
Rostov Oblast
Russia, Rostov-on-Don
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],
Peaceful citizens of Ukraine, residents of the Belovodsk District of Luhansk Oblast, have
been killed or wounded, property, utilities, and residential buildings have been damaged as
a result of blatant aggression coming from Russian territory, specifically regular attacks
targeting the territory of Ukraine between 8:05 a.m. and 3:45 p.m. on August 30, 2014 in
the direction of Kalmykovka (Russia) - Nizhniaya Baranikovka.
You have ignored the proposal of the Ukrainian border guard representative in the Luhansk
Sector to hold a meeting of border guard representatives in connection with the abovementioned
cross-border incident, which constitutes a violation of international legal and
ethical norms as well as bilateral agreements.
Unfortunately, I am forced to conclude that this position of the Russian side only magnifies
the tragic consequences of illegal activities undertaken against the Ukrainian state, as
evidenced by another attack on the territory of Ukraine in the direction of
Nizhnemityakinskoe (Russia) – Kamyshnoe (Ukraine), which took place between 12:38 p.m.
and 1:00 p.m. on August 31, 2014. Preliminary observation results indicate that the attack
was launched using missiles from Russian territory, specifically from the direction of
Nizhnemityakinskoe (Russia) from a distance of 8-10 kilometers into Russian territory.
Articles 4 and 8, Clause (a) of Article 10 of the 2008 Cross-Agency Protocol on the Activity
of Border Guard Representatives, Article 8 of the 1994 Agreement between Ukraine and the
Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in Border-Related Issues, and
agreements reached at the meeting of chiefs of both sides’ border guard agencies on August
30, 2014, are currently in effect.
Please inform us about the measures taken and your decision as soon as practicable.
Best regards,
Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General [Signature] A.A. Kucherenko

Annex 74
Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers
(September 2014 to December 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
Combined data on verified facts of arms, military equipment, materiel, fuel and lubricants
supplied from the territory of the Russian Federation to the temporarily occupied territories in
Donetsk and Luhansk Regions and of border crossing by armed formations in the period from
June 1 until December 31, 2015
No Date
documented
Supply routes, destination
(crossing) points
Mode
(means) of
delivery
Amount of arms, military
equipment, materiel, fuel and
lubricants, personnel strength
Supporting
documents
2014
1. 06.07.14 to the territory of Ukraine 10 APC and 10 KAMAZ
trucks
2. 06.08.14 KUIBYSHEVE-DYAKOVE road 3 towed artillery systems
3. 06.19.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 20 D-20 type artillery
systems
4. 07.26.14 Through KHRUSTALNYLUTUGINE
road 3 tanks, 2 APC and 2
KAMAZ trucks
5. 07.26.14 to NOVOHANNIVKA road 4 tanks, 2 APC
6. 07.26.14 to KHRUSTALNY road 2 tanks, 5 infantry fighting
vehicles and 18 coaches
7. 08.10.14 to LUHANSK road 1 APC, 6 cars
8. 08.12.14 through IZVARYNE road
10 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 5 tanks, 4
KAMAZ trucks and 1
Tunguska anti-aircraft
weapon
9. 08.13-15.14
DONETSK (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation –
Sorokine)
road
14 tanks, 22 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 20
APCs, 6 self-propelled guns
(mounted on APC-80), 87
Ural and Kamaz trucks with
personnel and luggage), 15
tractor units 6 ambulance
cars and 3 refuelers
10. 08.24.14 BERESTOVE road 60 airborne infantry fighting
vehicles, 18 tanks
11. 08.26.14 NOVOAZOVSK road
12 tanks, 3 BMP-2 infantry
fighting vehicles, 3 KAMAZ
trucks
12. 09.01.14 YENAKIEVE road 4 tanks, 2 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers
13. 09.01.14 DMYTRIVKY road
1 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launcher, 1 refueler
and 2 Ural trucks with
personnel
14. 09.5.14 through DIBRIVKADMYTRIVKA
road
6 APCs, 9 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 13
Kamaz and 6 Ural trucks
15. 09.11.14 to SOROKINE road 13 KAMAZ trucks
16. 09.12.14 through IZVARYNE road 40 armored fighting vehicles
2
17. 09.14.14 through NOVOAZOVSKBEZIMENNE
road 15 tanks and 30 other fighting
vehicles
18. 09.14.14
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSKSOROKINE
road 15 tanks, 8 APCs and 11 white
Kamaz type vehicles
19. 10.9.14 through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK road
9 tanks, 3 APCs and 2 KAMAZ type
trucks with personnel and
ammunition
20. 10.9.14 Through DOVZHANSKY road 3 tanks and 10 trucks with
ammunition
21. 10.9.14
Through the NOVOAZOVSK
checkpoint, in
NOVOAZOVSK
road
7 9K58 Smerch multiple rocket
launchers, T-90 tanks, 50 armored
fighting vehicles and trucks
22. 10.11.14 through IZVARYNE road 1 APC and 3 D-30 howitzers
23. 10.18.14 through KUZNETSY road 10 KAMAZ vehicles, 3 refuelers
and 3 Tigr armored fighting vehicles
24. 10.19.14 through VOZNESENIVKAROVENKI
road 30 tanks
25. 10.25.14 through USPENKAILOVAYSK
road 2 APCs, 10 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers
26. 10.25.14 through DYAKOVE road 6 armored fighting vehicles, 4
KAMAZ trucks
27. 10.26.14 through DYAKOVE road 20 self-propelled guns and 60 trucks
28. 10.27.14 through DYAKOVE –
NIZHNIY NAGOLCHIK road 10 refuelers
29. 10.28.14 through GUKOVODOVZHANSK
road
10 tanks, 6 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 4 TOS-1 Buratino
heavy flame-thrower systems and
truckloads of ammunition
30. 10.30.14 through the NOVOAZOVSK
checkpoint road 10 trucks with personnel and
ammunition
31. 10.30.14 through IZVARYNE road 15 tanks, 30 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 100 Kamaz trucks
32. 10.30.14 through DIBRIVKY road 12 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 14 KAMAZ type trucks
33. 10.31.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK
road
2 tanks, 5 BDRM amphibious
armored patrol cars, 3 APCs, 6 D-30
howitzers, 50 trucks
34. 11.3.14 through IZVARYNE road
6 tanks, 5 infantry fighting vehicles,
1APC, 2 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft
autocannon, 8 trucks
35. 11.6.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 7 infantry fighting vehicles, 1APC
36. 11.6.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road
4 tanks, 6 infantry fighting vehicles,
5 BDRMs, 1 refueler, 1 NONA selfpropelled
gun, 1 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launcher, 1 antiaircraft
autocannon, 13 trucks
37. 11.6.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 5 truckloads of ammunition, 1
refueler
38. 11.6.14 Trough SEVERNYI -
LUTUGINE road 40 APCs
39. 11.6.14 Through BIRYUKOVE -
DOVZHANSK road 2 APCs, 3 tanks, 3 Ural trucks
3
40. 11.7.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
1 APC, 13 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 9 BMP-2 infantry
fighting vehicles, 21 trucks (7
KAMAZ type trucks with personnel,
2 with ammunition, 1 Ural-mounted
anti-aircraft autocannon)
41. 11.8.14 NOVOAZOVSK road
6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 4 Tigr armored fighting
vehicles, 8 tanks, 2 self-propelled
guns
42. 11.10.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 1 APC BTR-80, 1 Tigr armored
fighting vehicle, 3 trucks
43. 11.10.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road
2 infantry fighting vehicles, 10 trucks
(with personnel and ammunition), one
howitzer with trailer, 1 refueler
44. 11.10.14 through DYAKOVE –
NIZHNIY NAGOLCHIK road
17 KAMAZ type trucks (trailers
pulling: 3 towed artillery systems and
2 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft autocannon)
45. 11.11.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 4 tanks, 11 infantry fighting vehicles
46. 11.11.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 4 tanks, 5 infantry fighting vehicles
and 4 KAMAZ and Ural trucks
47. 11.13.14 through MARYNIVKASNIZHNE
road 20 T-72 tanks
48. 11.15.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 10 T-90 tanks, 2 infantry fighting
vehicles, 4 APCs, 41 trucks
49. 11.16.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
5 BDRM amphibious armored patrol
cars, 5 APCs and 5 KAMAZ and
KRAZ trucks
50. 11.21.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
6 tanks, 2 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 2 BDRMs and 10
trucks
51. 11.24.11 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 6 armored fighting vehicles and 80
trucks
52. 11.25.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road 2 amphibious armored patrol cars and
57 KAMAZ trucks
53. 11.26.14 through IZVARYNE –
SOROKINE - LUHANSK road 46 KAMAZ trucks, 3 tanks, 3 selfpropelled
guns, 5 civilian cars
54. 11.26.14 To DMYTRIVKA road
9 tanks, 29 KAMAZ trucks with
personnel and ammunition and 2
automatic cranes
55. 11.26.14 through USPENKAVASYLIVKA
road 6 tanks
56. 11.26.14 through USPENKA -
MOKROYELANCHIK road 10 tanks
57. 11.28.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
16 tanks, 17 Tigr armored fighting
vehicles, 87 trucks (including 8 with
personnel, the others with
ammunition), 6 kitchens, a radar with
a power station, 1 APC, 2 UAZ
trucks, 1 coach and 2 minivans
58. 11.30.14 Through DYAKOVE –
NIZHNIY NAGOLCHIK road 9 APCs
59. 11.30.14 To STAKHANOV road Borisoglebsk-2 electronic warfare
station
60. 12.02.14
NOVAYA NADEZHDA
(Russian Federation) -
DMYTRIVKA
road
18 tanks, 8 APCs, 8 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 4 KAMAZ
trucks with ammunition
4
61. 12.06.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK
road
7 Gvozdika 2S1 self-propelled guns,
1 APC, 11 refuelers, a coach with
personnel and 28 KAMAZ and Ural
trucks
62. 12.07.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
5 Gvozdika 2S1 self-propelled guns,
5 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 APC, 9
Bogdan minivans with personnel, 40
KAMAZ and Ural type trucks
63. 12.8.14 through DMYTRIVKA road
5 infantry fighting vehicles, 5
KAMAZ and Ural type trucks, 11
BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers and 6 white vehicles
64. 12.9.14 through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK road 6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers
65. 12.9.14 through IZVARYNE -
SOROKINE road
1 self-propelled gun, 1 T-72 tank, 1
BREM armored recovery vehicle, 1
BAT-2 armored tracklayer
66. 12.11.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
15 armored fighting vehicles, 38
KAMAZ trucks and 4 command staff
vehicles
67. 12.13.14 Through BIRYUKOVE -
DOVZHANSK road
26 tanks, 18 self-propelled guns, 24
armored fighting vehicles, 8 OSA
anti-aircraft missile systems, 25
trucks
68. 12.15.14 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 12 infantry fighting vehicles
69. 12.15.14 Through DOVZHANSKY -
DOVZHANSK road
5 tanks, 3 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 2 trucks with
ammunition
70. 12.18.14 In the direction of
DMYTRIVKA road 8 tanks, 3 Pion self-propelled guns
71. 12.19.14 VOZNESENIVKA -
DOVZHANSK road 2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 11 tanks and 1 APC
72. 12.21.14 Through IZVARYNE –
KRASNODON - LUHANSK road
12 armored fighting vehicles, 8
refuelers and 30 trucks with personnel
and ammunition
2015
73. 01.04.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 28 military refuelers
74. 01.06.15
CHEVONOPARTYZANSK -
SVERDLOVSK -
LUHANSK
road 5 tanks and 3 trucks
75. 01.06.15-
01.07.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
30 trucks with property and
ammunition (1 for ZU-23-2), 15
refuelers
76. 01.07.15 ILOVAYSK rail
10 tanks, 10 BMP-3 infantry fighting
vehicles, 21 artillery systems, 4
Strela-10 anti-aircraft missile
systems, 8 Ural trucks
77. 01.09.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 13 vehicles (with property and
ammunition)
78. 01.09.15-
01.10.15
GUDKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road
5 Ural trucks with towed artillery
vehicles mounted on them and one
BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher
5
79. 01.11.15-
01.12.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
3 tanks, 9 armored fighting vehicles
(tracked), 119 trucks (with property
and ammunition) 2 refuelers and 1
bus with personnel.
80. 01.13.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
1 APC, 64 trucks with property and
ammunition, including one with ZU-
23-2, 5 armored vehicles, 2 refuelers
81. 01.13.15 Through MARKINE road 16 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
82. 01.15.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 20 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
83. 01.16.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
19 refuelers, 2 armored fighting
vehicles, 42 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
84. 01.17.05
Through IZARYNE,
DOVZHANSKY
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
AND DMYTRIVKA
road
500 pieces of military equipment
(including 92 tanks, 65 armored
fighting vehicles and 2 TOS-1
Buratino systems
85. 01.19.05 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 29 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
86. 01.21.15-
01.22.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
4 Pantsir-S1 missile systems and 2
refueling vehicles for it, 1 Tor missile
system, 46 trucks with personnel,
property and ammunition (2 with ZU-
23-2)
87. 01.23-24.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
128 trucks (with property and
ammunition), 11 refuelers, 4 Pantsir
S-1 missile system, 1 ZRK Tor
missile system and 2 refueling cars
88. 01.26.15-
01.27.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
11 armored fighting vehicles, 6 BM-
21 Grad multiple rocket launchers
and 44 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
89. 01.29.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
6 tanks, 4 TOS-1 Buratino, 12 BM-21
Grad multiple rocket launchers, 4
refuelers and 26 trucks (with property
and ammunition)
90. 01.29.15-
01.30.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
7 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 7 self-propelled guns, 1
APC and 76 trucks
91. 01.29.15-
01.30.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 26 tanks and 14 trucks with personnel
92. 02.01.15-
02.02.15
GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road 12 KAMAZ type trucks with
ammunition
93. 02.01.15-
02.02.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
2 T-72 tanks, 7 infantry fighting
vehicles, 96 trucks (with personnel,
property and ammunition)
6
94. 02.01.15-
02.02.15
through DMYTRIVKASNIZHNE
road 10 Uragan multiple rocket launchers
95. 02.04.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road
3 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 7 trucks (with personnel
and ammunition)
96. 02.05.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
10 tanks, 2 infantry fighting vehicles
and 58 trucks with property and
ammunition
97. 02.05.15 through IZVARYNEROVENKI
road 10 tanks and 15 trucks
98. 02.05.15 through DMYTRIVKASNIZHNE
road 5 T-72 tanks, 10 refuelers
99. 02.08.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 5 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
100. 02.08.15 through DYAKOVEROVENKI
road
11 tanks, 10 armored fighting
vehicles, 8 KAMAZ type trucks (with
property and ammunition)
101. 02.08.15 ILOVAYSK rail 8 tanks, 6 armored fighting vehicles,
6 cars with ammunition
102. 02.10.15 Through USPENKAAMVROSIYIVKA
road 30 tanks, 20 infantry fighting vehicles
and 50 trucks (with ammunition)
103. 02.10.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 39 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
104. 02.10.15-
02.11.15
NOVOAZOVSKBEZIMENNE
road
3 T-64 tanks, 10 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 20 trucks
with personnel, ammunition and
towed artillery systems
105. 02.10.15-
02.11.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road
7 tanks, 2 APCs, 12 Pion selfpropelled
guns, 8 Ural trucks with
ammunition
106. 02.13.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 61 trucks (1 with ZU-23-2), 3
refuelers
107. 02.13.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 8 tanks, 3 Pantsir-S1 missile systems,
12 trucks (with ammunition)
108. 02.13.15 Through NOVOAZOVSK -
TELMANOVE road 18 tanks (T-64, T-72, T-90), 5
multiple rocket launchers
109. 02.14.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
20 trucks, 10 refuelers,15 trucks with
property and ammunition, a bus and
two cars with personnel
110. 02.14.15 MAKSYMIV -
NOVOAZOVSK road 20 tanks
111. 02.14.15 KUZNETSI - BEZIMENNE road 2 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 tanks,
10 self-propelled guns, 12 trucks
112. 02.14.15 ILOVAYSK rail 12 tanks, 20 cars with personnel
7
113. 02.15.15 GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road 20 KAMAZ trucks with ammunition
114. 02.16.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK
road
12 armored fighting vehicles, 2 BM-
21 Grad multiple rocket launchers,
104 trucks (with property and
ammunition)
115. 02.17.15 DIBRIVKA - DMYTRIVKA road 17 trucks, 1 TOS-1 Buratino, 1 220
mm Uragan multiple rocket launcher
116. 02.17.15 ILOVAYSK rail 60 122 mm Gvozdika self-propelled
guns
117. 02.18.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 8 trucks (with personnel, property and
ammunition)
118. 02.18.15 GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road 7 tanks, 11 APCs, 4 trucks with
ammunition
119. 02.21.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK
road 51 trucks with ammunition and towed
artillery systems
120. 02.22.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 7 tanks, 5 armored fighting vehicles,
8 trucks with ammunition
121. 02.24.15-
02.25.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK
road 2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 42 trucks, 7 refuelers
122. 02.24.15-
02.25.15
Through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK road 2 tanks, 4 trucks
123. 02.25.15-
02.26.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
10 152 mm Akatsiya self-propelled
guns, 14 trucks (1 with ZU-23-2 antiaircraft
autocannon)
124. 02.25.15-
02.26.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK
road
2 tanks, 2 Uragan multiple rocket
launchers, 7 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 6 refuelers
125. 02.25.15-
02.26.15 AMVROSIYIVKA rail train with firearms and ammunition
126. 02.27.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 12 trucks with ammunition
127. 02.28.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK
road 11 tanks and 7 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers
128. 02.28.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 20 trucks and five refuelers
129. 02.28.15-
03.01.15
Through DYAKOVE -
ANTRATSYT road 2 tanks, 25 Ural trucks
130. 02.28.15-
03.01.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 35 KAMAZ trucks (2 with ZU-23-2)
131. 03.01.15-
03.02.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 12 APCs, 9 trucks with personnel and
ammunition
132. 03.01.15-
03.02.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 8 trucks with personnel and
ammunition
8
133. 03.03.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road
12 BTR-80 APCs, 6 infantry fighting
vehicles BMP-2, 6 trucks with
ammunition
134. 03.03.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 13 trucks (1 with ZU-23-2)
135. 03.04.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 14 T-72 and 10 refuelers
136. 03.04.15 through IZVARYNE –
LUHANSK road
1 infantry fighting vehicle and 27
trucks with property and ammunition
(2 with ZU-23-2)
137. 03.05.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK road 5 tanks, 2 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers
138. 03.06.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
1 APC, 4 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers, 59 trucks (with
property and ammunition)
139. 03.08.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
7 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 104 trucks with
ammunition and personnel, 10 white
trucks
140. 03.08.15 through IZVARYNE -
KRASNODON road 5 minivans with field medical
supplies
141. 03.09.15 GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road 5 tanks, 2 infantry fighting vehicles
142. 03.09.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 30 trucks (with ammunition)
143. 03.10.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 2 infantry fighting vehicles and 4
trucks with personnel
144. 03.09.15-
03.11.15 AMVROSIYIVKA rail
3 trains with military equipment
(armored fighting vehicles, selfpropelled
guns, artillery systems and
ammunition)
145. 03.11.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 18 trucks with ammunition and
property, and 2 refuelers
146. 03.11.15 GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road 2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers
147. 03.11.15 TAGANROG -
STAROBESHEVE road 21 refuelers
148. 03.11.15 SUKHODOLSK rail 20 cars with ammunition and property
149. 03.11.15 ILOVAYSK rail
25 platforms with armored vehicles, 2
tankers with fuel and lubricants and 4
cars with ammunition
150 03.12.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 53 trucks
151 03.12.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK road
23 tanks, 5 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers and 8 trucks with
ammunition
9
152. 03.10.15-
03.13.15 DEBALTSEVE rail 7 trains with military equipment and
ammunition
153. 03.16.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
LUHANSK road 20 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers
154. 03.16.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 2 infantry fighting vehicles,
Krasukha-2 electronic warfare system
155. 03.17.15 SUKHODOLSK rail train with property and ammunition
156. 03.18.15 through IZVARYNE -
KRASNODON road 6 armored fighting vehicles, 2
refuelers
157. 03.21.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 10 trucks with property and
ammunition
158. 03.26.15 GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - SVERDLOVSK road
2 tankers, 3 infantry fighting vehicles,
and 3 Kamaz trucks with two towed
artillery systems attached to the trailer
159. 03.29.15 ILOVAYSK rail
Train with military equipment (4
tanks, 4 infantry fighting vehicles, 2
APCs)
160. 03.29.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 10 tractor units with T-72B tanks
161. 03.30.15 Through DMYTRIVKA -
STEPANIVKA road 3 Uragan multiple launchers, 2
Kamaz trucks with personnel
162 04.02.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK road 9 tanks, 3 BM-21 Grad multiple
rocket launchers
163. 04.04.17-
04.05.17
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 7 infantry fighting vehicles, 3 tanks, 2
trucks with personnel and property
164. 04.04.15-
04.05.15 AMVROSIYIVKA rail
17 cars with ammunition and military
equipment (4 command vehicles and
2 mobile radio stations mounted on
Kamaz trucks, 2 power stations
mounted on Ural trucks)
165. 04.14.15 Through DMYTRIVKA -
STEPANIVKA road 10 tanks, 40 trucks with property and
ammunition
166. 04.14.15 through DOVZHANSKY -
SVERDLOVSK road 25 tanks, 7 APCs, 3 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 9 trucks
167. 05.05.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road Buk missile system, 4 trucks
168. 05.05.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road 14 tanks, an infantry fighting vehicle,
7 trucks
169. 05.06.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 4 APCs, 7 MTLB auxiliary tracked
vehicles, 8 trucks
170. 05.10.15 Through DMYTRIVKA -
STEPANIVKA road 10 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers and 10 refuelers
171. 05.10.15 ILOVAYSK rail train with fuel and lubricants
10
172. 05.17.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- VOLODARSK
road 3 tanks, 2 trucks and buses carrying
personnel
173. 05.21.15 through IZVARYNE road 5 APCs and 32 trucks
174. 05.22.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 21 trucks with property and
ammunition
175. 05.24.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 7 trucks with property and
ammunition
176. 05.25.15 Through USPENKA -
DONETSK road 10 self-propelled guns, 23 trucks
177 05.28.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
20 T-72 and 10 tanks, 10 BMP-2
infantry fighting vehicles and trucks
with property and ammunition
178. 06.01.15 DEBALTSEVE rail 3 Zoopark-1M radar systems
179. 06.03.15 Through DMYTRIVKA
SNIZHNE road 3 TOS-1 Buratino, 11 trucks
180. 06.20.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 3 armored cars KAMAZ-43269
Vystrel
181. 06.22.15 ILOVAYSK rail 8 cars with ammunition and spare
parts for armored vehicles
182. 06.25.15-
06.27.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 13 trucks with ammunition and
refuelers
183. 06.29.15-
06.30.15 SUKHODOLSK rail Train with ammunition
184. 07.13.15 AMVROSIYIVKA rail 30 armored vehicles
185. 07.19.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
30 Ural trucks with personnel and
152 mm D20 howitzers attached to
the trailer
186. 07.22.15 GUKOVO (Russian
Federation) - LUHANSK road 15 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers
187. 08.12.15 FRUNZE rail train with ammunition and parts
188. 08.17.15 DONETSK rail 50 cars with artillery shells and 17
trucks
189. 08.22.15 DEBALTSEVE rail military train with tanks and
ammunition
190. 08.26.15 through IZVARYNE TO
KRANSNODON road
6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, 11 tanks (pulled by tractor
units), 5 Msta-S 152 mm selfpropelled
gun, 28 armored fighting
vehicles
191. 09.02.15 DEBALTSEVE rail 19 cars with ammunition
192. 09.14.15 ILOVAYSK rail train with ammunition for multiple
rocket launchers
193. 09.16.15 through IZVARYNE TO
KRANSNODON road 4 infantry fighting vehicle and 4
trucks with property and ammunition
194. 09.22.15 ILOVAYSK rail 6 T-72 tanks and 9 cars with property
and ammunition
195. 09.23.15 through MARKINE -
NOVOAZOVSK road 50 armored vehicles
196. 09.24.15. ILOVAYSK rail 6 T-72 tanks and 9 cars with property
and ammunition
11
197. 10.02.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
3 armored fighting vehicles, 4 BM-21
Grad multiple rocket launchers, 2
MTLB auxiliary tracked vehicles, 4
trucks
198. 10.03.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road
4 armored fighting vehicles, MTLB
auxiliary tracked vehicles and 20
trucks with personnel and
ammunition
199. 10.07.15 ILOVAYSK rail 9 cars with ammunition, 6 tanks
200. 10.10.15 through IZVARYNE -
SVERDLOVSK road 11 T-72 tanks
201. 10.30.15 through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 5 APCs, 50 trucks, 8 refuelers
202. 11.06.15 KHARTSYZK rail 10 cars with fuel and lubricants
203. 11.06.15 ILOVAYSK rail 4 cars with ammunition
204. 11.12.15 SUKHODOLSK rail 17 cars with ammunition
205. 11.13.15-
11.14.15
through IZVARYNE -
LUHANSK road 30 tanks
206. 11.16.15 ILOVAYSK rail 8 cars with ammunition, 4 tankers
with fuel and lubricants
207. 11.24.15 Through DMYTRIVKA -
STEPANIVKA road 20 T-72 tanks, 20 trucks, 5 refuelers
208. 11.26.15
through
CHERVONOPARTYZANSK
- SVERDLOVSK
road
122 mm Grad multiple rocket
launcher, two infantry fighting
vehicles and ammunition
209. 12.04.15 ROVENKI (oil exploration
base) rail 7 tankers with fuel and lubricants
210. 12.17.15-
12.18.15 ROVENKI rail 15 tankers with fuel and lubricants
211. 12.21.15-
12.24.15
through IZVARYNE -
SVERDLOVSK road 5 trucks, 2 tanks
212 12.28.15 KHARTSYZK rail 2 rail cars of ammunition

Annex 75
Expert Opinion No. 116/3, drafted by Research Institution for Special Purpose
Equipment and Forensic Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (2 September
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
1
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examinations
EXPERT OPINION
September 2, 2014 Kyiv No. 116/4
Copy No. 1
Experts with the 4th Center (Center for Forensic and Special-Purpose Expert
Examinations) of the Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and
Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine:
− Olha Volodymyrivna Veresenko, who has a higher philological education, is a
qualified forensic expert in examination of phonoscopic documents, and has been
working as an expert since 1996. She holds a phonoscopic expert’s certificate No.
272 of April 29, 2011, with a specialty in “Linguistic Study of Oral Speech” (valid
through April 29, 2016);
− Vitaliy Mykolayovych Mahera, who has a higher philological education, is a
qualified forensic expert in examination of phonoscopic documents, and has been
working as an expert since 1989. He holds a phonoscopic expert’s certificate No.
322 of April 16, 2008, with Specialty 7.2 “Study of the Speaker Based on Physical
Parameters of Oral Speech, Acoustic Signals, and Ambient Conditions” (valid
through March 13, 2018), and No. 323 of April 16, 2018, with Specialty 7.1
“Technical Examinations of Materials and Means of Video and Sound Recording”
(valid through March 13, 2018);
have conducted an expert examination of sound and video recordings pursuant to the
July 28, 2014 order for a phonoscopic forensic expert examination, issued by Lieutenant
Colonel of Justice S.M. Filipov, Senior Investigator with the 1st Operative Unit of the 1st
Office of the Pretrial Investigation Department at the Central Investigative Directorate of
the Security Service of Ukraine, in connection with a criminal case registered in the
Uniform Register of Pre-trial Investigations under No. 22014000000000232 on July 4,
2014 involving alleged criminal offenses falling under Part 2 of Article 110 and Article 436
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The experts acknowledge having been warned about criminal liability for issuing a
knowingly false expert opinion under Article 384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
2
The following questions have been posted to the experts (quoted from the order):
1. Are sound recordings on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No.
MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014 suitable for an expert
examination (the list of files is provided in the descriptive section of the order)?
2. Is the speech of the person heard speaking in the file “Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s
Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step” present between the following DVD player time
stamps: from 00:00:56 to 00:03:13, from 00:03:19 to 00:03:45, from 00:03:52 to 00:05:41,
from 00:05:45 to 00:06:16, from 00:06:27 to 00:08:30, from 00:08:38 to 00:09:47, from
00:10:16 to 00:12:28, from 00:12:31 to 00:13:14, from 00:13:39 to 00:15:53, from
00:16:21 to 00:19:40, from 00:19:47 to 00:19:58, from 00:20:10 to 00:20:49, and in the
following files:
"02_03_2014_15_01_10_18р1_(SBD)102949453_00";
"02_03_2014_15_53_57_18р1_(SBD)10295146_00";
"02_03_2014_15_53_57_18р1_(SBD)102948140_00";
"02_03_2014_15_53_57_18р1_(SBD)102952125_00";
"27_02_2014_10_36_50_18р1_(SBD)102710250_00";
"03_03_2014_12_59_51_23р1_(SBD)1031250_00";
"03_03_2014_12_59_51_23р1_(SBD)103124453_00";
"03_03_2014_16_56_30_23р1_(SBD)103125515_00";
"03_03_2014_16_56_37_23р1_(SBD)103123671_00";
"04_03_2014_15_52_23_26к1_(SBD)10244515_00";
"79859698761-2014.02.27-14.07.11-8";
"79859698761-2014.02.27-14.45.58-2_1";
"79859698761-2014.02.28-08.31.38-10";
"79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-01";
"79859698761-2014.03.01-13.54.54-0";
"79859698761-2014.03.01-17.42.1-1";
"79859698761-2014.03.01-17.58.59-2";
"79859698761-2014.03.01-18.38.50-3";
"79859698761-2014.03.02-13.45.50-6";
"79859698761-2014.03.04-20.37.15-7";
"03_03_2014_12_41_49_31р1_(SBD)103037250_00";
"03_03_2014_12_41_49_31р1_(SBD)103037781_00";
"28_02_2014_12_24_50_31p1_(SBD)102757187_00";
"28_02_2014_12_24_50_31р1_(SBD)102757656_00";
"79857687453-2014.02.27-17.30.43-25_1";
"79857687453-2014.02.27-19.59.9-26_1";
"79857687453-2014,02.27-23.39.44-27_1";
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
3
"79857687453-2014.02.28-07.52.47-35_1";
"79857687453-2014.02.28-08.34.48-36_1";
"79857687453-2014.02.28-09.09.59-3 7_1";
"79857687453-2014.02.28-14.10.59-31";
"79857687453-2014.02.28-14.57.19-32_1";
"79857687453-2014.03.02-07.37.6-19";
"79857687453-2014.03.02-12.25.28-15";
"79857687453-2014.03.02-12.29.50-16";
"79857687453-2014.03.02-15.01.5-17";
"79857687453-2014.03.02-20.23.18-18";
"01_03_2014_16_03_29_37k1_(SBD)102320125_00";
"01_03_2014_16_31_29_37k1_(SBD)102320906_00";
"01_03_2014_16_50_22_37k1_(SBD)102321156_00";
"01_03_2014_16_5 0_22_37k1_(SBD)102321531_00";
"01_03_2014_ 17_23_29_37k1_(SBD)1023 21906_00";
"06_03_2014_09_18_37_37k1_(SBD)1023226 87_00";
"74956064302-2014.03.01-16.03.26-0";
"74956064302-2014.03.01-16.50.19-1";
"74956064302-2014.03.03-11.55.10-3";
"74956064302-2014.03.03-17.34.31-4";
"01_03_2014_18_59_08_100р1_(SBD)102848390_00.wav";
"01_03_2014_18_59_08_100р1_(SBD)102849218_00.wav";
"74959212145-2014.03.01-18.35.49-4.wav";
"74959212145-2014.03.01-21.02.29-13.wav";
"74959212145-2014.03.01-22.00.56-14.wav";
"74959212145-2014.03.02-13.23.13-15.wav";
"01_03_2014_17_36_26_216k1_(SBD)101940171_00";
"01_03_2014_19_11 _54_216k1_(SBD)101940625_00";
"01 _03_2014_21 _02_32_216k1_(SBD)101941187_00";
"01_03_2014_21_02_32_216k1_(SBD)101941484_00"?
If so, which specific words and phrases belong to this person?
The experts are familiar with the circumstances of the proceedings to the extent of the
information provided in the order requesting the expert examination.
The pretrial investigation has found that during the period from late February to early
March 2014, Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, advisor to the Russian President, managed
unidentified individuals in Ukraine through telephone calls from Moscow. These
individuals then committed deliberate offenses in the cities of Luhansk, Zaporizhia,
Odesa and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea with the intention of changing the
boundaries of Ukrainian territory and violating the law and order established by the
Constitution of Ukraine.
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
4
The Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number
1528 of March 12, 2014, arrived from the Counterintelligence Department of the Security
Service of Ukraine on June 24, 2014. The disk contains recordings of conversations
which S.Yu. Glazyev had during the above-mentioned period with individuals as yet
unidentified by the investigation. Transcripts of the conversations are provided in the
examination record of July 16-23, 2014.
On July 15, 2014, a survey of the Internet revealed the October 29, 2013 interview of
S.Yu. Glazyev with the Russia 24 TV Channel on the YouTube website (file: “Sergey
Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step”).
Considering that specialist phonoscopy knowledge is required to ascertain the truth in this
case, and guided by Articles 110, 242, and 243 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, a forensic phonoscopic expert examination has been ordered. It has been
entrusted to experts with the Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment
and Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine.
The following materials were made available to the experts together with the order
requesting the expert examination:
− A Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration
number 1528 of March 12, 2014, with 57 files specified in the descriptive section of
this order;
− A Verbatim CD-R optical disk, serial No. 317259RC02336, storing the following
file: “Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4”;
− The July 16, 2014 record of examination of the files stored on the Verbatim DVD-R
optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March
12, 2014, on 108 pages.
EXAMINATION
1. VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR EXAMINATION:
1. A parchment-colored envelope arrived under the cover of Letter No. 6/9574 of July 28,
2014.
The envelope contains:
− A Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration
number 1528 of March 12, 2014, with 57 files;
− A Verbatim CD-R optical disk, serial No. 317259RC02336, storing the following
file: “Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4”;
− The July 16, 2014 record of examination of the files stored on the Verbatim DVD-R
optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QL16193911, registration number 1528 of March
16, 2014, on 108 pages.
Descriptions of materials made available for examination and their photos are provided in
the appendix to the Expert Opinion.
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
5
List of devices used in the examination:
1. Computer: Intel (R) Core (ТМ) 2Duo CPU Е8400 @ 3400 GHz 3.00 GHz, 2.00 GB
RAM, serial number: Е818739.
2. Sound card STC-H246, serial number: 0306/40053
3. AKG К501 headphones.
4. SIS 6.1 application, serial number: 40053.
5. Phonograph application.
6. Phonexi v.2.02 application (RF Patent No. 2107950, RF Certificate No.
2000611270 of official registration of a computer application).
7. Adobe Audition 1.5 application, serial number: 90051608.
8. Justiphone 2.8 application.
9. WinHex 12.9 SR-1З application.
10.Metal ruler, 30 cm long.
The following methods were used in conducting the expert examination:
1. Methods of Forensic Examination of Sound and Video Recording Materials and
Equipment, State Forensic Expert Research Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Kyiv, 1998, adopted in 2009; code in the Register of Forensic
Examination Methods: 7.1.03.
2. Methods of Identifying a Person Based on Russian-Language Sound Recordings
Using the Dialect Automated System, authors: N.F. Popov et al., edited by A.V.
Fisenko, Moscow, Military Unit 34435, 1996. Adopted in 2009; code in the Register
of Forensic Examination Methods: 7.0.03.
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
6
2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE OBJECTS OF EXAMINATION
The Verbatim DVD-R and Verbatim CD-R optical disks store sound and video recordings.
The details of the files stored on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No.
MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014, which are to be
examined, are provided in Table 1 of the Opinion.
The details of the file stored on the Verbatim CD-R optical disk No. 317259RC02336 with
the recording titled “Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided
Step.mp4”, which is to be examined, is provided in Table 2 of the Expert Opinion.
For greater convenience of further examination, each separate recording (file) has been
assigned a sequential number and name “examined sound recording” (abbreviated to
ESR with the corresponding number in Table 1) or the name “examined video and sound
recording” (abbreviated to EVSR with the corresponding number in Table 2).
Table 2
EVSR58
Location: \Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4
File name: Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4
File format: mp4 (MPEG-4)
File size: 57.91 MB
Duration: 21 minutes 9 seconds
Bit rate (all streams): 383 Kbps
Bit rate type (all streams): Variable
File created on: UTC 2013-10-31 03:15:56
Last modified on:
2014-07-15 17:49:05
Name: Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step
Stream type: video
Duration: 00:21:09
Codec: AVC
Codec / profile: [email protected]
Codec / ID: avcl
Image size: 480 х 360 (4:3)
Refresh rate: 25.000 fps
Refresh rate / mode: Constant
Stream size: 43.0 МiВ (74%)
Bit rate: 284 Kbps
Bit rate / max: 1,296 Kbps
Color space: YUV
Scan type: Progressive
Bits / (Pixel*Frame): 0.066
Pixel depth: 8 bits
Stream type: Sound #1
Duration: 00:21:09.342
Codec: ААС
Codec / ID: 40
Sampling rate: 44.1 KHz
Channels: 2 channels
Channels / position: Front: L R
Bit rate: 96.0 Kbps
Bit rate type: Variable
Stream size: 14.5 MB (25%)
Name: IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
7
[Page 12]
According to the questions posed in the order requesting the expert examination, the
experts need to study the speech of the speaker recorded in EVSR58 between the time
stamps shown in Table 3. Said time stamps were updated using specialist applications
(the update was required to account for instances in which the speaker’s speech ended
sooner or for instances in which the period between time stamps ended with both
speakers speaking at the same time).
Table 3
Time stamps between which the experts
need to study the speaker’s speech
recorded in EVSR58 according to the
order requesting the expert examination.
Time stamps between which the experts
need to study the speaker’s speech
recorded in EVSR58 after the time stamps
were updated by the experts.
00:00:56-00:03:13 00:00:54-00:03:13
00:03:19-00:03:45 00:03:19-00:03:44
00:03:52-00:05:41 00:03:52-00:05:41
00:05:45-00:06:16 00:05:45-00:06:15
00:06:27-00:08:30 00:06:27-00:08:30
00:08:38-00:09:47 00:08:38-00:09:47
00:10:16-00:12:28 00:10:16-00:12:27
00:12:31-00:13:14 00:12:31-00:13:14
00:13:39-00:15:53 00:13:39-00:15:53
00:16:21-00:19:40 00:16:21-00:19:40
00:19:47-00:19:58 00:19:47-00:19:58
00:20:10-00:20:49 00:20:10-00:20:49
In Table 3 mentioned above, the array of recordings is from a televised interview that
clearly shows the speaker giving the interview and stating his job title, last name, first
name, and patronymic. For this reason, the experts examined this array as a specimen of
this speaker’s speech and it was used in the examination as a single array.
Experts: [Signature] O.V. Veresenko
[Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
8
[Page 13]
3. TECHNICAL IDENTIFICATION STUDIES
3.1. Assessment of the Suitability of Available Materials for Further Identification
Studies
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
9
[Page 14]
3.2. Technical identification study of the speech of Speaker S1 recorded in ESRs
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13,14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56.
[Page 18]
3.3. Technical identification study of the speech of Speaker S1 recorded in ESRs
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,12,13,14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, and the speech of Speaker S2 recorded in EVSR 58.
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
10
[Page 19]
Therefore, based on the completed integral technical study it is POSSIBLE to
CONCLUDE that the speech marked with the index S1 in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13,
14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 and
the speech of Speaker S2 recorded in EVSR58 belongs to the same person.
It is possible to note the high similarity of the formant structure accurate down to the
differences in tempo and manner of speaking. Slight deviations are attributable to slight
differences in the speaker’s emotional state as well as the amplitude and frequency
characteristics of the transmission and reception channel.
Expert [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Page 20]
4. LINGUISTIC IDENTIFICATION STUDIES
4.1. Assessment of the Suitability of Available Materials for Further Linguistic
Studies
[Page 23]
4.2. Linguistic identification of the oral speech of Speaker S1 recorded in ESRs
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,12,13,14,15, 23, 24, 27,28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52,
53, 54, 55, 56, in ESR No. 51 and EVSR No. 58,
using linguistic methods
[Pages 31-32]
A separate and comparative study of speech marked with the index S1 in ESRs Nos. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54,
55, 56 and in ESR No. 54, and speech marked with the index S2 in EVSR No. 58 has
produced a match of attributes relevant to identification. The identified matching linguistic
attributes are stable; in terms of their volume and significance they form an individual
aggregate that is considered sufficient to make a decision to the effect that the objects
being compared are identical. This information is sufficient to draw a categorically positive
conclusion to the effect that speech marked with the index S1 in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56
and in ESR No. 51 and speech marked with the index S2 in EVSR No. 58 belongs to one
and the same person.
Expert [Signature] O.V. Veresenko
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
11
[Page 33]
5. LITERAL TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATIONS
[Page 34]
ESR No. 51 (File 79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0_1.wav)
Time
(hours:
minutes:
seconds)
Pers
on Speech
00:00:15 S1 Hello. Hello, I’m listening.
S Hello.
S1 Yes, I’m listening.
S Good morning. I apologize for bothering you so early.
S1 (Unintelligible)
S Is it safe to speak?
S1 Yes, of course.
S I am unable to understand what is going on there. What next? What further steps should
we take? What should we do? They already started taking over buildings. All roads are
blocked: the entrance to Kyiv, roads going to Kyiv. The military are all over the place...
What happens next? What should we expect?
S1 To the best of my understanding, all power is now in the hands of the Supreme Council
of Crimea. You have to act through the council. Am I right in thinking that none of your
people joined Aksenov’s government?
S People would have probably joined Aksenov’s government if it had been legitimate. So
far we have been able to keep the people from going to war using our methods. But if
the government still obeys the orders of Yanukovych after all the embezzlement, as
alleged by Aksenov, nobody will join it now. It’s like one hand is doing bad things while
the other one is pointing at it to expose them... How to make sense of it?
S1 (Unintelligible). This is the kind of situation there is. The government does not obey the
orders of Yanukovych and will not be obeying them, because Yanukovych is already
gone.
S But Aksenov keep declaring from the podium and everywhere else that he will be
working with Yanukovych. When we saw all of this... How can we send people there?
The same man oppressed us here yesterday. Now we (unintelligible) declared
Yanukovych. It’s been four years since we were made redundant, out of a job. They did
not keep anybody and did not say a single word. Our number one priority was to get rid
of Yanukovych. And now he says he will work with Yanukovych. How are we going to
send people there, would you tell me?
S1 Well, no...
S Things just do not stick together. I’m telling you: the people who are at the helm today,
they embarrass you despite everything that has been done, and done impeccably, no
questions asked. Everything that has been done turns to naught. If Crimea is going to be
an autonomy with its own powers, such things need to be presented nicely and not the
way it is being done now. I don’t understand it. There is so much disorder in the political
field. Somebody died. Let him come and see what is happening from an outsider’s
perspective. There is no need to interfere. Let him take an outsider’s view.
S1 I can say with certainty that this government does not obey the orders of Yanukovych
and never will. The legitimate aspect of everything that is happening is based on the fact
that the only legitimate public authority is the Supreme Council of Crimea. There are no
other authorities. We do not recognize that government in Kyiv and never will. That’s
why we will be doing everything in our power to get the Turchynov-Yatseniuk
government to resign and resume negotiations about forming a government of people’s
trust, the way it is stated in the memorandum under which Yanukovych surrendered his
power.
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
12
This is the most recent document signed by all the parties. It is our understanding that
Ukraine does not currently have any legitimate central government. Legitimate
government is left only in the regions. In our understanding, the Supreme Council of
Crimea and regional councils are the only representatives of legitimate government with
whom we will cooperate. That’s why, in our understanding, the Supreme Council of
Crimea is authorized to make all decisions. To be honest, here everybody was
disappointed to learn that none of you joined the government, because we had hopes...
S But it’s important to make the essential constituent documents somewhat more neatly.
There has to be an intermediary that would take care of this whole issue... You
formulated the first task: to avoid bloodshed. We bent over backwards but somehow
managed to do so. What next? They voted and got only 49 votes, with the rest inflated
artificially. Meanwhile, all those who voted stood next to us. Suppose one of the council
members did not show up for the voting, but the tally says that he voted. What do you
make of that? People see everything. There are a thousand wrong issues that would not
hold up in court. And we are currently panicking on the inside: What is this all about? We
can’t make sense of it all. Is thick a mockery or not? If this is normal, can’t we do say and
do things the normal way: what we want, what we get? Things are not happening
properly there, let me tell you.
S1 Well, everything is happening in a haphazard manner in Ukraine. I don’t know how the
voting took place. That is to say, we only received information here to the effect that out
of the 100 Supreme Council members, about 60 members participated in the voting. I did
not double-check the numbers specifically. This is all I can say on the subject
(unintelligible).
S People were in Kyiv on business, but their last names still appear among those who
voted. They printed out the names of those who voted. They only found after they started
getting calls while still in Kyiv. For that matter, there are very many issues like that
surrounding this situation. When you see all this you begin to doubt things. Today all of
our people read the report and begin sharing their misgivings. It’s very difficult to calm
them down afterwards. And how do you expect them to join the government together?
How does this work? These are the difficult questions we face. Now we need patience.
We have to keep quiet and wait to see what happens with the Ukrainian government.
They will start coming for negotiations here soon. How will they end? If they can’t do
anything, then we need to sit down to discuss and decide what we are going to do next.
And this takes time. Until then we need to sit down at a table and hold consultations. If we
start calling people names, we will not be able to bring them back later. Of course,
Russia has a lot of forces: you can shoot and kill everybody. This scenario is also
possible, and that’s where we are going to end up.
S1 No... You need to avoid this. We are doing everything we can to avoid this.
S Avoiding or not, it’s already beginning: the current Mejlis members did not show up
today. They are summoned one a time and told that they will have nothing if they don’t
show up. They pull them out one at a time and forcibly send them there. Such things are
also unacceptable. We need to sit down at a negotiating table quietly, address the
conflicting points and slowly polish off these issues. Although we also need such people
to work there at the local level. Still, this should not be managed by “ratty” people.
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
13
You should at least delegate intermediaries who would monitor the ethics. The ethics
have to be monitored. It would be very difficult to appease different sides with each
other inside Crimea. We should avoid the scenario of one ethnicity going against the
other. We don’t need rank-and-file people fighting with one another. This is where
time-proven authority comes into play. Clearly, they respect Putin and Russia. But the
things that are happening need to be handled correctly.
S1 (Unintelligible) I agree that negotiations have to be conducted calmly without any force
whatsoever, in a professional manner. But how can we delegate an intermediary? Since
the Supreme Council of Crimea is the only legitimate public authority, this means that
Konstantinov has to be that kind of intermediary. Ideally, he should negotiate the terms
with you, your requirements, take cognizance of them, so to speak, and bring you back
into the government. We will facilitate this process in every way possible. If you have
terms on which you are prepared to work...
S In principle, we need to answer these questions: How will events unfold next? What is
the future of Crimean Tatars in this situation? What steps await them? These are the
answers we are looking for. Neither Konstantinov nor anybody else can answer them.
We need to go into the masses to calm the people down. We need to show a new
beautiful leader. Ukraine has not given us anything for twenty years, while today with
Russia we can do this and that by following these steps, and that’s where we will
arrive... Our people are not stupid. They lost their homeland once and do not want to
lose it now again. That’s why everybody is thinking about it: both young and old and so
forth. How can we bring a message about what’s tomorrow will be like across to them?
S1 Fine. Who could be delegated from Russia? Let’s think. Who would you trust? Perhaps
somebody from Tatarstan?
S They came here and we worked with them. But so far we have not exposed ourselves to
them. They, too, are ashamed of coming forward and saying it as it is. If this scenario
materializes, they need to be here like peace keepers, intermediaries who care...
S1 (Unintelligible)
S You do not need to expose them too much. They are like a commiserating party. We will
be very quiet with them every day. They need to reveal one key for us every day and
show us: this is how it’s going to happen, this is what we’ll do. And we should calm our
people down gradually. This won’t work otherwise in a single bang. I hear people saying
we no longer have a homeland and wishing they died fighting here today... One says
this, the other says that... I have spent three days doing nothing but trying to calm
people down. Who am I after all, damn it? I could disappear tomorrow and be gone.
Others will lead the masses tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. It’s just that I have a
longer-term vision of where this is going. People don’t have a vision of what tomorrow
will bring or a future outlook, or want things to happen on slightly mutual terms. It's clear
that Russia will never do stupid things in the world. However, we need to break down
the steps being taken today to somehow demonstrate and shown what is going to
happen ten or twenty years down the road and what we will be arriving at. Surely it won’t
be the oppression we once experienced? It will be a completely different world seen
through completely different eyes. Things will be different. We must bring this...
S1 (Unintelligible) In my understanding, nobody knows what will happen in the future in this
situation, of course. But this is how I see it: either that Banderovite government leaves
and normal elections are held, with Ukraine becoming a federated state with an
independent Crimea inside of it.
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
14
So our position is that Ukraine is a divided country in the current situation. They
unleashed the war. They effectively divided the country, those Banderovites. Ukraine’s
southeast will never recognize them. All things considered, Ukraine can be a stable state
only as a federation where every region has a sufficient amount of independence.
Meanwhile, Crimea will have total independence. It will simply be located inside Ukraine,
formally, so to speak. This is one scenario based on which everybody can reach an
agreement. Another scenario will materialize when they fail to agree and a conflict
erupts. It seems to me that in this situation Crimea will be gravitating toward complete
independence. I will reiterate that Russia has no plans to annex Crimea. This will not
happen.
S I have already figured that part out. I understand. Now what happens with Crimean
Tatars? When we discuss language, ethnicity, and Crimean Tatar autonomy, will these
things crop up somewhere or not? Will things happen the same way they did in
Tatarstan? Or what are our further steps? What are the preconditions? How should I
calm down the elders, the old people and others if I begin to go into the masses now
slowly? What positive message should I bring? Do you understand? I have to begins
somewhere. I want...
S1 I believe you should formulate the conditions. Obviously, you have been sitting on them
for many years...
S Yes.
S1 And you have them. You have to formulate the conditions, the things you want. Perhaps
the referendum scheduled for the 25th should include some issues that concern you.
S There! There! You see. That’s why we need to throw such questions around. If we know
what's happening today and tomorrow, we have an understanding of the situation. One
way or another, Crimea will be separated from the mainland. That is to say, it will stay a
single whole with Ukraine in terms of territory, but in terms of the executive authorities,
the status of Crimea and its budget, its turnovers...
S1 Yes.
S And its independence will be separate [from Ukraine]. I already understand all that.
S1 Yes, precisely.
S Yes. What future should Crimean Tatars see for themselves in this situation? Will it
happen for them? That’s one question. What should we aspire to? What awaits us? We
need to embellish this. Against this background we need to promote peace and
friendship with everybody living here. Do you understand?
S1 Uh-huh.
S That's why we want to focus on this aspect. What are we promised? What will happen?
What are we heading towards together? What will be our tomorrow’s slogan for
ourselves, our children and grandchildren? These are the special kind of questions. So
far they leave an empty space. That niche has yet to be filled. It would be simple to just
run over there like boys and joy that government. We’ve been through this before. I
served in eight governments in a row. What’s the use of it? I went there to handle all of
the dirty work. Meanwhile, the places where people should govern and formulate
positions are empty. You give people heat and water and stay out of everything else. If
this keeps on happening every time, why do I need a government like that? I’ve had
enough. Nobody except me cares about people's lives there. Meanwhile, if the
government is (unintelligible) fully functional, you know what awaits your people. What
are the needs? What projects will we undertake? How will they be positioned? If we are
going to secure independence, there will be some major projects, and people will need to
join them.
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
15
S1 Uh-huh.
S Meanwhile, those cronies have their roles cut out for them: who will do what, who will steal
what. Surely this is not what Russia wants for us today? Russia sees (unintelligible) a
normal (unintelligible) Crimean autonomy.
S1 Of course (unintelligible).
S Whoever comes to power, whoever (unintelligible) is sitting there right now, whoever gets
appointed – all of them are thieves. I’ve known them from the very bottom, since childhood.
That’s why we need to sit down and (unintelligible) such things.
S1 I understand. I think that those who have come to power are still temporary. They...
S I understand that also. After the election on May 25th all of this can change. I understand this
applies to me.
S1 Uh-huh.
S (Unintelligible) not simple.
S1 So tell me. Of course, we are not interested absolutely. First, Yanukovych is not very... well,
he is the president formally, but he does not and will not control anything.
S I had the same thoughts yesterday. After listening to everything, I thought to myself: no this
person is temporary; he will make some noise while we things quiet down here.
S1 Yes.
S That’s it. He will leave at this point. A second point...
S1 His role is purely on paper.
S Yes. We should not say anywhere that today all Russia, or Putin himself... we should not
discuss any unclear issues. We must calm our people down to its roots. We need to calm
our people down so they would not say untoward things against the government and
leaders in the streets. We need to decide how to begin this conversation. I am looking for
this, do you understand? That’s why I need somebody to talk to from over there, with whom
we would bring our ideas to the attention of the upper circle, then the second circle before
moving all the way down. It doesn’t happen any other way.
S1 I understand. So let’s recap again that, first, Yanukovych will not return. I give you one
hundred percent. Second...
S That’s clear to me.
S1 Nobody will also obey Kyiv as it is now. That’s the second point.
S This is also understandable. This is also (unintelligible).
S1 Third, the Supreme Council of Crimea has all the power. This means that we absolutely do
not want the new government of Crimea to become a second edition of Yanukovych and the
Donetsk (unintelligible).
S That’s correct.
S1 We don’t need that. The more so that we intend to invest a great deal of money in Crimea.
Effectively, we are now beginning to fund Crimea, and we absolutely do not need thieves.
S That’s correct.
S1 We need people like you, who enjoy trust and so forth. This leaves us with the following
question. When it comes to Aksenov, it’s all clear. If you don't trust Konstantinov, I can
suggest... I can ask them to send Shamiev as an intermediary there so he could, so to
speak, influence the situation with his authority.
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
16
S I think that now... Look here: I will tell you about the best scenario that can work now.
Shamiev delegated his people for some mild-mannered talks. Whoever sent him, we need
this envoy from the Presidential Administration to simply stay here. So when I hold
negotiations about this very sensitive issue with one group or another in the evenings, we
simply need to sit down at a table for some drinks in a quiet setting.
S1 Uh-huh.
S The most critical issue that can influence the future course of this situation... when it comes
to people who have formulated a deep-rooted vision of our situation. As far as I understand,
Russia and Turkey have a very good economic relationship.
S1 Uh-huh.
S The attention and messages from Turkish leadership, the Prime Minister of Turkey, holds
weight and could possibly win over some of the leaders.
S1 Uh-huh.
S That's a trick.
S1 I see, I see.
S Do you understand me? From where...
S1 A minister is going to visit you soon. I think it’s their minister?
S Yes. I’ve been looking for you today for this reason.
S1 Uh-huh.
S The minister is coming. The minister should have a discussion beforehand with the Turkish
prime minister. We need to announce the agenda in such a way as to prevent the locals from
rocking the boat. There are no other ways. I already have a vision. I don’t have any problems
with it. I have a crystal clear vision and understanding of what will happen and how
(unintelligible). We need to awaken them in the right way. This is the kind of agenda I see.
S1 I understand. I will now try to arrange such negotiations. Fine.
S Fine. Stay in touch (unintelligible).
00:20:49 S1 Yes, let's keep in touch. Uh-huh. Thank you. (End of conversation)
Experts: [Signature] O.V. Veresenko
[Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
Expert Opinion No. 116/4 of September 2, 2014
17
CONCLUSIONS
1. The speech of Speaker S1 recorded in files on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial
No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014 in files listed in
Table 7 is suitable for identification studies.
Table 7
No. Folders and directories on the
optical disk
Files
ESR1 \37k1\ 01_03_2014_16_03_29_37k1_(SBD)102320125_00.wav
ESR2 \37k1\ 01_03_2014_16_31_29_37к1_(SBD)102320906_00.wav
ESR3 \37k1\ 01_03_2014_16_50_22_37к1_(SBD)102321156_00.wav
ESR4 \37k1\ 01_03_2014_16_50_22_37к1_(SBD)102321531_00.wav
ESR5 \37k1\ 01_03_2014_17_23_29_37к1_(SBD)102321906_00.wav
ESR12 \18р1\ 02_03_2014_15_01_10_18р1_(SBD)102949453_00.wav
ESR13 \18р1\ 02_03_2014_15_53_57_18р1_(SBD)10295146_00.wav
ESR14 \18p1\ 02_03_2014_15_53_57_18р1_(SBD)102948140_00.wav
ESR15 \18р1\ 02_03_2014_15_53_57_18р1_(SBD)102952125_00.wav
ESR23 \37k1\ 06_03_2014_09_18_37_37к1(SBD)102322687_00.wav
ESR24 \18р1\ 27_02_2014_10_36_50_18р1_(SBD)102710250_00.wav
ESR27 \37m1\ 74956064302-2014.03.01-16.03.26-0.wav
ESR28 \37m1\ 74956064302-2014.03.01-16.50.19-1.wav
ESRЗ5 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.02.27-17.30.43-25_1.wav
ESR36 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.02.27-19.59.9-26_1.wav
ESRЗ8 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.02.28-07.52.47-35_1.wav
ESRЗ9 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.02.28-08.34.48-36_1.wav
ESR40 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.02.2S-09.09.59-37_1.wav
ESR42 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.02.28-14.57.19-32_1.wav
ESR43 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.03.02-07.37.6-19.wav
ESR45 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.03.02-12.29.50-16.wav
ESR47 \33m1\ 79857687453-2014.03.02-20.23.18-18.wav
ESR48 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.02.27-14.07.11-8.wav
ESR50 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.02.28-08.31.38-10.wav
ESR51 \28m1\ 79S59698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0_1.wav
ESR52 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.03.01-13.54.54-0.wav
ESR53 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.03.01-17.42.1-1.wav
ESR54 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.03.01-17.58.59-2.wav
ESR55 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.03.01-18.38.50-3.wav
ESR56 \28m1\ 79859698761-2014.03.02-13.45.50-6.wav
18
2. Technical and linguistic identification methods have revealed that speech of the
speaker recorded on the Verbatim CD-R optical disk No. 317259RC02336 in the file
“Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine’s Accession to the US Is a Misguided Step.mp4” within the
updated time stamps shown in Table 3 and speech of the speaker recorded on the
Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528
of March 12, 2014 in files listed in Table 7 belong to the same person.
The words and phrases spoken by Speaker S1 in the files specified in Table 7 (other than
file “79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0_1.wav” - ESR51) appear in the July 16, 2014
record of examination under the index “M”.
The words and phrases spoken by Speaker S1 in the file “79859698761-
2014.03.01-06.33.1-0_1.wav” (ESR51) appear in Section 5 of the Expert Opinion under
the index “S1”.
Experts: [Signature] O.V. Veresenko
[Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]
[Signature]
[Illegible seal]
[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Ukraine]
[Stamp: Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic
Examinations. Outgoing Ref. No. 18/4-6152 of September 2, 2014. Primary sheets: 23.
Annex 76
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3664 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB (4 September 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting] September 4, 2014
[Handwriting] N. 299
Copy No. __
STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Eastern Regional Directorate
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82
September 4, 2014 No. 42/367
[Handwriting] for O.O. Morozov [Signature]
Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko,
Acting Director of the Border Guard
Directorate of the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation in
Rostov Oblast
Russia, Rostov-on-Don
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],
In follow-up to Fax No. 42/3664 of September 4, 2014, this is to inform you about
continued attempts to destroy the border infrastructure and armed attempts to push
Ukrainian border guards deep into Ukrainian territory. These attempts originate from the
Russian territory.
At 4:15-4:30 p.m. on September 4, 2014, in the direction of Derkul (Russia) - Krasnyi
Derkul, three armored personnel carriers in Russian territory fired at personnel of the State
Border Guard Service of Ukraine performing their duties to guard the state border and
territory of their country.
The nature of your answer to the above-mentioned communication and the time it took you
to prepare it (No. 42/3664 was transmitted to you at 10:20 a.m., and your response arrived
at 10:55 a.m.) are reason for us to call into question its objectivity and presume that you
are unwilling to conduct a thorough investigation of the facts reported by the Ukrainian side.
In light of this, the Ukrainian side continues to insist on receiving objective explanations of
the above-mentioned events and demands that immediate steps be taken to prevent a
recurrence of such incidents in the future.
Best regards,
Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General [Signature] A.A. Kucherenko
2
[Handwriting] September 4, 2014
[Handwriting]: N. 296
Copy No. __
STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Eastern Regional Directorate
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82
September 4, 2014 No. 42/366
[Handwriting:] for O.O. Morozov [Signature]
Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko,
Acting Director of the Border Guard
Directorate of the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation in
Rostov Oblast
Russia, Rostov-on-Don
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],
This is to inform you about new incidents in which the Ukrainian territory has been fired at
from the Russian territory, as well as intrusions into the Ukrainian air space by Russian
aviation. The Russian side has yet to respond to them appropriately.
At 7:15 p.m., 7:30 p.m., 8:30 p.m., 11:43 p.m. on September 3 and 2:27 a.m. on
September 4, border patrols of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine witnessed the
shelling of the Ukrainian territory in the direction of the village of Pobeda by rocketpropelled
missiles from an area that is up to 10 km away from the state border in the
direction of Ushakovka (Russia) - Shirokoe (Ukraine). A total of five salvos of 10 missiles
each were fired. The personnel of the border patrols reflected this in the relevant reports.
At 12:55 p.m. on September 3, 2014, a Mi-24 helicopter crossed the state border from the
Russian side and flew 300 meters into the Ukrainian territory in the Belovodsk state border
sector of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment in the direction of Titovka (Russia) -
Alexandrovka (Ukraine).
Between 9:40 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. on September 3, 2014, the Krasnaya Talovka state
border crossing point of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under artillery fire for
a second time after the July 28, 2014 incident (Letter No. 42/2862 of July 28, 2014) from
Russian territory. The attack damaged its infrastructure. The attack was accompanied by
photo and video surveillance with the use of a drone. At 10:00 p.m. the drone crossed the
state border from the Russian side in the vicinity of the Krasnaya Talovka border crossing
point and flew 3,000 meters into Ukrainian territory.
The Russian side’s explanations that attribute these incidents to the civil conflict in Ukraine
are baseless because the nearest positions of illegal paramilitary groups are more than 70
km away from the site of the artillery attack.
In light of this, the Ukrainian side insistently demands objective explanations and requires
that immediate steps be taken to prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future.
Best regards,
3
Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General [Signature] A.A. Kucherenko

Annex 77
Russian Border Guard Service of the FSB Letter No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 to the
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (11 October 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[Handwriting:] October 11, 2014
Federal Security Service
of the Russian Federation
[Handwriting:] Attn: V.O. Subotin, A.M. Zarytskyi. Please continue work
[Signature] October 13, 2014
Attn: Deputy Director
of the International Law Department
– Chief of the International
Cooperation Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine
Major-General A.M. Zaritskiy
[Handwriting: illegible] [Signature]
Re: No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 of October 7, 2014
Dear Anatoly Mikhaylovich [Mr. Zaritskiy],
The leadership of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia
has decided to conduct further legal due diligence at institutions of the Russian
Federation of the Ukrainian side’s proposals regarding joint border control at specific
border crossing points in Russian territory and coordinated (joint) monitoring of the
situation along the Russian-Ukrainian sector of the state border outside border
crossing points from Russian territory.
In light of this, until this activity has been completed, we believe that the meeting of
experts of border guard services of Russian and Ukraine scheduled for October 16,
2014 at the Nekhoteyevka-Goptovka border crossing point is premature.
We will inform you additionally about the new date and venue of the consultations.
First Deputy Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate
Major General [Signature] V.I. Ulyanov
October 11, 2014
No. 3/165
2
[Handwriting:] October 11, 2014
[Handwriting:] Attn: O.O. Morozov, for your consideration
[Signature]
Federal Security Service
of the Russian Federation
Attn: Deputy Director
of the International Law Department
– Chief of the International
Cooperation Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine
Major-General A.M. Zaritskiy
Re: No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 of October 7, 2014
Dear Anatoly Mikhaylovich [Mr. Zaritskiy],
The leadership of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia
has decided to conduct further legal due diligence at institutions of the Russian
Federation of the Ukrainian side’s proposals regarding joint border control at specific
border crossing points in Russian territory and coordinated (joint) monitoring of the
situation along the Russian-Ukrainian sector of the state border outside border
crossing points from Russian territory.
In light of this, until this activity has been completed, we believe that the meeting of
experts of border guard services of Russian and Ukraine scheduled for October 16,
2014 at the Nekhoteyevka-Goptovka border crossing point is premature.
We will inform you additionally about the new date and venue of the consultations.
First Deputy Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate
Major General [Signature] V.I. Ulyanov
October 11, 2014
No. 3/165
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Incoming Ref. No. 36588/0/3-14 of October 13, 2014
Received via email
on October 13, 2014 at 10 a.m.
O.H. Tumanyan [Signature]
Annex 78
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 26-1209 to the Ukrainian State
Border Guard Service (7 November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
Ruslan Koloskov <No subject> [Handwriting:] November 7, 2014
FROM: Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russian in Rostov Oblast
Phone: 88632679838 JULY 29, 2014 4:08 p.m. PAGE 1
Fax without follow-up original
FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BORDER DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIAN IN
ROSTOV OBLAST
November 7, 2014 No. 26/1209
Rostov-on-Don, 344011
Attn: Chief of the Eastern Regional
Directorate of the Border Guard Service of
Ukraine
Major-General A.A. Binkovskyi
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkov, 61045,
Ukraine
Re: No. 4765 of November 6, 2014
Dear Alexander Antolyevich [Mr. Binkovskiy],
This is to respectfully inform you that decisions to clear the passage of vehicles
transporting cargo for employees of state oversight agencies of Ukraine are outside
the scope of authority of the border representative of the Russian Federation and the
border directorate.
We propose initiating a resolution of this issue at the level of border agencies of the
two states parties.
Head of Directorate
Major-General [Signature] A.P. Ektov
[Scanned image info: Ectov to Binkovskyi-07-11-14.jpg. Download. Upload to cloud. 1
of 4. All attachments]

Annex 79
Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 22017220000000060 (22 November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
Extract from criminal proceedings No. 22017220000000060
No. 1
__________________________________________________________________________________
Date of statement or report received or discovery from another source: 11.22.2014
Claimant or victim: independent discovery of a criminal offense by the investigator, such as during
pre-trial investigation (code)
Date of entry into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations: 02.21.2017 2:55:28 PM
Outcome of investigation:
Legal qualification: (Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001) Article 28 Pt. 2, Article 263 Pt. 1
Description:
On 11.22.2014, a plastic bag was found and seized during the search of a building (outdoor kitchen) at
11 vul. Ulyanova, Bezruki village, Dergachi District, Kharkiv Region, which is being occupied by
citizen Igor Pavlovych Umanets. Inside the bag was an object that looked like an SPM (medium
limpet mine) marked SPM 15-6-90 MS OTK-9 with a screwed in fuze marked VZD – 1M, 583-2-85.
Person notified of a suspicion, investigation outcomes as regards this person and information on a
special pre-trial investigation as regards this person:
1) Boyko, Igor Vitaliyovych Date of birth: 03.25.1972
Legal entity subject to criminal proceedings and representative of legal entity:
[…]

Annex 80
Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Letter No. 55/2208 (10
December 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
(Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine)
26 Volodarska Street, Kyiv-601, 10601. Phone: (044) 235-11-00, fax: (044) 239-84-80, email: [email protected],
www.dpsu.gov.ua
December 10, 2014 55/2208 Foreign Ministry of Ukraine
Re: No. 72/36-994-73 DSK
This is to inform you that the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine is constantly making
every reasonable effort – within its terms of reference – to document instances of illegal
attempts to cross the state border of Ukraine from the direction of the Russian Federation.
Between June 2014 and now, we have submitted to the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine 19
written, photographic and video materials proving the involvement of the Russian Armed
Forces in the armed conflict in Ukraine’s east and the fact that they provided military
vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to illegal paramilitary formations operated within
Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.
The most telltale of them are as follows:
1. On May 30, 2014, border patrols of the State Border Guard Service detailed 11 citizens
of Ukraine and Russian citizen Olga Ivanovna Kulygina (d.o.b. September 14, 1972,
registered address of residence: 43 Leninskiy Prospect, apartment 17, Moscow) while
they were attempting an illegal crossing of the state border. These individuals are involved
in the contraband of weapons and ammunition to be handed over to terrorist groups
operating in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.
The following items were seized during the arrest: 27 AK-72 assault rifles,
2 Makarov pistols, 5 RPG-26 handheld anti-tang grenade launchers, 5
Korovin pistols, 5 Dragunov sniper rifles, 36 magazines for AK-74, 9
magazines for Dragunov sniper rifle, 2 anti-aircraft collimator sights, 95
RGD-5 grenades, 102 F1 grenades, 1 stun grenade, 2 bore-sighting tubes
for a Kalashnikov machine gun, 40 crates of large-caliber 12.7 mm
cartridges, 22 crates + 5 boxes of 7.62 cartridges, 12 crates + 5 boxes of
5.45 mm cartridges.
FOREIGN MINISTRY OF UKRAINE
DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL
SECRETARIAT
Incoming Ref. No. 110899
December 10, 2014
2
A search and screening also revealed mobile phones, a tablet PC, payment documents,
personal memos, and paperwork proving that these individuals were implicated in
separatist activities and had connections with intelligence services of the Russian
Federation. Some of the documents found prove that their owners served in units of the
special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The fact that a portrait of Stepan Bandera was among the items seized does not rule out
the possibility that they intended to stage provocations under the guise of Ukrainian
nationalists.
3
Attachment No. 1 (on a compact disk)
2. On June 6, 2014, after a successfully repelled attack by militants and the subsequent
sweep of the territory around the Marynivka border crossing point of the Dmytrivka border
guard service unit of the Donetsk Boarder Guard Detachment, a border patrol found a
container that used to store a 9M39 IGLA shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile
launcher and traces of its use at the site of combat.
The packing list contained in the container indicates that the missile launcher had been
stored since 2001 at Military Unit No. 33859 of the Russian Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces
(in the town of Eysk, Krasnodar Krai). The most recent packing notations are dated April
12, 2014.
Attachment No. 2 (on a compact disk)
3. At around 11:50 p.m. on July 15, 2014, a convoy of military vehicles comprised of five
GRAD multiple rocket launchers and two BTR armored personnel carriers (providing
cover) illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine in the direction of
ROZHDESTVENSKIY (Russia) – KOSHARNE (Ukraine). Sixty meters into Ukrainian
territory, they fired a salvo in the direction of the area where units of the Ukrainian Armed
Forces were stationed. An inspection of the state border line revealed the location where
they crossed the border with clear marks of military vehicle tires. Leftover caps of rocket
missiles and scorched earth were found at the position from which the fire came.
4
Also, on the morning of July 16, 2014, we discovered an attempt to erase traces of an
illegal border crossing from the direction of the Russian Federation using agricultural
machinery that harrowed the fields.
Attachment No. 3 (on a compact disk)
4. At around 3:00 a.m. on July 22, 2014, a convoy of military vehicles comprised of
fourteen GRAD multiple rocket launchers illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine in
the vicinity of the population center of Pobeda. After this they fired a salvo in the direction
of the population center of Amvrosiyivka.
Attachment No. 4 (on a compact disk)
5
Also please be informed that informational reference materials on the military and political
situation at the state border submitted to the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine in September-
October of this year were based on reports by border patrols, reconnaissance information,
and reports from local residents. For objective reasons, the facts presented in your letter
cannot be confirmed with evidentiary materials.
Attachment: 4 compact disks, for the specified recipient only.
First Deputy Chairman
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Major General [Signature] V.M. Servatiuk
I.M. Kryzhanivskyi
Phone: 527-63-70

Annex 81
Record of Identification of Gennadiy Ruslanovych Shmoryvoz by Photograph (17
December 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
RECORD
Of person identification from photographs
December 17, 2014
Kharkiv
Started at “15”hr “40”min
Finished at “16”hr “20”min
The special investigator of the investigations department at the Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine,
Captain of Justice I.O. Yena, in Room 21 of the investigations department, in connection with criminal proceedings No
22014220000000305, in the presence of witnesses:
1. Andriy Volodymyrovych Medintsev, DOB 12.29.1992, residing at Apartment 2/6, 43B vul. Gvardiytsiv-Shirokintsiv, Kharkiv
2. Yaroslav Oleksandrovych Kravchenko, DOB 02.21.1993, residing at Apartment 5/7 43B vul. Gvardiytsiv-Shirokintsiv, Kharkiv
and with the participation of victim Gennadiy Ruslanovych Shmoryvoz, DOB 09.13.1993, registered as living at 50 vul. Plekhanivska,
Kharkiv, pursuant to Articles 103-105, 107, 223, 228 and 231 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine, presented an addendum to this
record for identification: a photo spread on 1 side of an A4 showing black-and-white copies of male photographs numbered 1 – 4.
Prior to the start of this procedural action, the above individuals were advised about their right to make statements which are
subject to mandatory inclusion in the record, as well as their right to be present at all of the investigator’s actions. Pursuant to Article 66 pt 3
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, these individuals have been warned about their duty not to disclose the details of this procedural
action and for the criminal liability incurred by disclosing details of a pre-trial investigation (Article 387 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).
Prior to viewing the photographs, the victim was asked whether he would be able to recognize the man who was drinking coffee
next to him immediately before the explosion in the building of the Stena rock pub on 11.09.2014, whom he described in more detail in the
victim’s interrogation record of 12.17.2014, to which G.R. Shmoryvoz replied that he would be able to recognize the said man by his
external attributes.
Having viewed the photo spread presented to him, the victim said that he recognized the man on Photo 4 on page 1 as the one
who was at the Stena rock pub on 11.09.2014 before the explosion, drinking coffee for about 20 minutes.
The victim recognizes this person by his external attributes, namely: short receding hair and the shape of his ears and eyebrows.
The procedural action took place in daytime in artificial light. The persons listed in this record have read it independently. There
have been no comments or additions after the reading.
[signature] (H.R. Shmoryvoz)
Witnesses: [signature] (A.V. Medintsev)
[signature] (Y.O. Kravchenko)
Procedural action conducted,
Record compiled by:
Special investigator,
Investigations department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate,
Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] I.O. Yena
2
PHOTOSPREAD
to person identification record
Kharkiv “12” 17 2014
Photo No 1 Photo No 2
Photo No 3
[signature] (H.R. Shmoryvoz)
Witnesses:
1) [signature] (A.V. Medintsev) 2) [signature] (Y.O. Kravchenko)
Identification conducted, photo spread compiled by
Special investigator,
Investigations department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate,
Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] I.O. Yena
Photo No 4
3
NOTE
to person identification record
Photo No 4 of this photo spread shows Dmytro Mykhailovych Loginov, DOB
11.27.1978.
The other individuals whose photographs are shown on the photo spread bear no
relation to these criminal proceedings.
This note was printed after the photo spread was shown to the person performing the
identification.
Special investigator,
Investigations department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate,
Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] I.O. Yena

Annex 82
Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine for European
Integration Affairs
O.V. Zerkal
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
33 vul. Elektrykiv, Kyiv, 04176
Unified Register code 22990919
05/17/2018 No 222/ 4D/535
Dear Olena Volodymyrivna,
As part of the Ukrainian Side’s preparation for the hearings at the UN International
Court, we enclose available information which may be used to strengthen Ukraine’s evidential
base as the Court considers the case of the Russian Federation violating the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Enclosures: 1. Intelligence briefing from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry
of Defense of Ukraine (as of 9:00 a.m., January 2, 2015), on 3 sheets, one
copy, addressee only.
2. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of December 3, 2014, on 2 sheets, 1 copy, addressee
only.
3. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of January 8, 2015, 2 sheets, 1 copy, addressee only.
4. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of February 17, 2015, 2 sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
5. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of February 20, 2015, 2 sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
6. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of February 22, 2015, 2 sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
Sincerely,!
Acting Deputy Commander,
Military Unit No A0515,
Director of Department 4,
Colonel [signature] V.V. SKIBITSKY
Y.V. Yukhno 425 60 26
Zam. No 187-14
[stamp:] 0045053
[stamp:]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT
Red. No. 38184
05 “18” 2018
2
[redacted]
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
33 vul. Elektrykiv, Kyiv, 04176
Unified Register code 22990919
01/02/2015 No 222/ 3D/90/09
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
(on January 2, 2015, at 9:00 a.m.)
Operational situation.
1.1. Concentrations of troops, arms and military equipment (A and ME) of the Russian
Armed Forces in the temporarily occupied territories and Russian regions adjacent to the
Ukrainian border.
According to operational reports and space intelligence data, the following has been
confirmed:
[redacted]
concentrations of Russian Armed Forces arms and equipment in the following areas:
Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region) – the number of armored fighting vehicles has increased;
six 300-mm Smerch multiple rocket launchers and six mobile charging units are missing; also
missing are four 203-mm Pion self-propelled cannons (brought to the territory of Donetsk
Region on December 20, 2014);
Assessment: The change in the number of A and ME in Kuibyshevo area, in particular the
reduction in the number of artillery systems, is linked to their continued delivery to the Russian
Armed Forces and illegal military formations active in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions.
[redacted]
3
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 2
[redacted]
1.2. Reconnaissance by the Russian Armed Forces of sites in the territory of Ukraine.
Air reconnaissance involved the following:
Reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR (Marinovka) – in the air space (AS) of Volgograd and
Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov.
[redacted]
4
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 3
[redacted]
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 83
Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/78 (9 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 1
1
[redacted]
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176
USREOU [Unified State Register of Enterprises
and Organizations of Ukraine] code 22990919
01.12.2015 ref No 222/3D/901073
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
at 9:00 AM January 12, 2015
1. Operational situation.
1.1. Increase in the combat power of the Russian Armed Forces group and the illegal
armed formations in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
[redacted]
1.2. Concentration of enemy units in the key areas of the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine.
[redacted] has confirmed concentrations of enemy units, arms and equipment in the
following areas:
northeastern suburbs of Dokuchayevsk (Donetsk Region) – a tank company
(11 tanks), two artillery (13 self-propelled guns) and one rocket artillery (6 122 mm Grad
multiple rocket launchers) batteries with a total strength of 200 men;
Yasne (Donetsk Region) – a unit comprising four tanks, two self-propelled
guns and two 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers. It is possible to assume that the bulk
of forces are from the units of the tactical battalion group of the 5th Detached Tank Brigade
(Gusinoozersk) of the 36th Army of the Eastern Military District (MD).
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 2
2
Assessment: The enemy has formed a battle group and strengthened artillery
which will be used to strike against the positions of the ATO forces and carry out raids along
the Dokuchayevsk-Volnovakha route.
Kirovsk (Luhansk Region) – a mixed enemy artillery group comprising nine
cannons, four 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and one TOS-1 Buratino heavy
mortar.[
redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 3
3
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 4
4
[redacted]
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 85
Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. G. Albot, Investigations Department of the
Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (13 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
INCIDENT SITE
INSPECTION REPORT
City of Volnovakha 1/13/2015
Inspection commenced at 3:25 p.m.
Inspection completed at 10:30 pm
Investigator A.G. Albot with the Investigations Department of the Volnovakha District
Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on the basis of: notice of
dispatch center of the Volnovakha District Department
(indicate the ruling of the investigating judge if inspecting a house or other personal property;
indicate the details of the incident report or statement if inspecting the scene of an incident
before the start of criminal proceedings)
Pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine:
In the presence of witnesses:
1) Ruslan Anatolyevich Kovalenko
(full name, date of birth and place of residence)
city of Volnovakha
2) Nikolai Nikolaevich Riabchenko
(full name, date of birth and place of residence)
residing in the city of Mariupol, 62 Shevchenko Street
who were advised of their rights and obligations pursuant to Articles 11, 13, 15 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the victim:
(full name, date of birth and place of residence)
who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 56(1) and (2) and Article 57 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the suspect:
(full name, date of birth and place of residence)
who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 42(3), (5), (6) and (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine.
With the participation of the defense attorney:
(full name, date of birth and place of residence)
who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Articles 46 and 47 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the representative:
(full name, date of birth and place of residence)
who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 44(5), Article 58(4) and Article 59(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the specialist:
(full name)
who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 71(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the owner (user) of the premises or other property:
(full name and address)
Before the inspection commenced, the aforementioned persons were advised of their right to be present for all actions
performed in the process of the inspection and to make comments, which shall be entered into the report. The persons involved in
carrying the inspection also
[signature] [signature]
2
[text cut off] regarding the procedural action performed, as well as [text cut off] terms and procedures for their use:
Nikon coolpix camera, Sony video camera
(characteristics of recording devices and data storage media used in this procedural action, signatures of the parties)
The inspection established that:
(indicate address of home or other property)
the incident site is a checkpoint situated at a State Traffic Inspectorate post on the Donetsk-
Mariupol road for traffic moving in the direction of the city of Donetsk. At the said site there is a
yellow I-Van A07A TATA passenger bus with plate number AH 0985 AA, travelling from
Zlatoustovka to Donetsk (Yuzhnyi) via the towns of Volnovakha and Khlebodarovka. The said bus
is located at the site of the check point for checking passenger documents on the side of the
roadway at a distance of 7.40 meters from the left side of the roadway and at a distance of 25
meters from the first electricity tower in the direction of traffic towards the city of Donetsk. At the
said checkpoint, at a distance of 10 meters from the back axis of the bus concrete blocks have been
placed on the roadway. At a distance from the front axis of the bus along the left lane of traffic
heading toward the city of Donetsk concrete blocks have been placed on the roadway. The metal
barriers that divide traffic that goes in opposite directions are installed on the right side of the
roadway. The width of the roadway in the indicated location is 9 meters. On the right side of the
roadway toward the city of Donetsk there is a shoulder of 5 meters. At a distance of 12 meters
from the front axle of the bus lies a fallen tree, from the stump of which at a distance in the
direction of the village of Blizhnee [illegible] traces of irregular shape from an exploded shell of
the diameter of [illegible] 30 cm [illegible] 50 cm, and the depth of 50 cm is observed. There are
remnants of the tree and broken branches around the indicated trace. There are remains of
burning and black soil on the snow. This trace is located at a distance of 11.45 meters from the
rear axle of the bus. The inspection revealed that right near the rear door of the bus [illegible]
there is a stain of substance of brown color of irregular shape.
[signature] [signature]
3
The outside inspection revealed that the yellow bus has two entry and exit doors. At the time of
inspection, the front door is open. The windows on the right side are missing, there are fragments
of glass on the entire perimeter of metal windows frames. The body of the bus on the right side has
extensive damage from fragments of an exploded shell. The windshield of the bus is damaged in
the form of numerous cracks. On the left side of the bus there is no glass in the three windows on
the back. The left side of the bus does not show recent damages. There are fragments of glass on
the roadway near the bus. The curtains of the bus have mechanical damages that look like holes.
An inspection of the passenger section of the bus reveals that there are 6 female corpses and 4
male corpses in the bus, of which 3 corpses are located on the seats and 7 corpses are located in
the aisle between the seats. Around the corpses are bags with personal belongings. There are signs
of forceful death on the corpses. Photographs were taken. The corpses were examined separately.
Witnesses:
1) [signature] 2) [signature]
Inspection carried out by [signature] A.G. Albot
1
1
Layout sketch to the site inspection report dated 1/13/15
Layout sketch prepared by [signature] A. A[illegible]
STI POST
1. Power transmission tower
2. Bus
3. Felled tree
4. Shell landing site
Blocks
Blocks
Witnesses
[signature]
2
2
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS
CENTER
32 vul. Italiyska, Mariupol 87515
tel. 095-429-16-67
[email protected], [email protected]
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
To the incident site inspection report dated 1/13/2015
Illustration No. 1
3
3
Illustration No. 2
Illustration No. 3
4
4
Illustration No. 4
Illustration No. 5
5
5
Illustration No. 6
Illustration No. 7
6
6
Illustration No. 8
Illustration No. 9
7
7
Illustration No. 10
Illustration No. 11
8
8
Illustration No. 12
Illustration No. 13
9
9
Illustration No. 14
Illustration No. 15
Illustration No. 16
Donetsk NDEKTs [Scientific Research Expert Criminalistics Center]
10
10
Illustration No. 17
Illustration No. 18
Illustration No. 19
Donetsk NDEKTs [Scientific Research Expert Criminalistics Center]
Donetsk NDEKTs [Scientific Research Expert Criminalistics Center]
Donetsk NDEKTs [Scientific Research Expert Criminalistics Center]
11
11
Illustration No. 20
Illustration No. 21
12
12
Illustration No. 22
Illustration No. 23
13
13
Illustration No. 24
Illustration No. 25
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
14
14
MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS
CENTER
32 vul. Italiyska, Mariupol 87515
tel. 095-429-16-67
[email protected], [email protected]
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
To the incident site inspection report dated 1/[illegible]/2015
Illustration No. 1
15
15
Illustration No. 2
Illustration No. 3
16
16
Illustration No. 4
Illustration No. 5
17
17
Illustration No. 6
Illustration No. 7
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Illustration No. 8
Illustration No. 9
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19
Illustration No. 10
Illustration No. 11
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20
Illustration No. 12
Illustration No. 13
Donetsk NDEKTs [Scientific Research Expert Criminalistics Center]
21
21
Illustration No. 14
Illustration No. 15
22
22
Illustration No. 16
Illustration No. 17
23
23
Illustration No. 18
Donetsk NDEKTs [Scientific Research Expert Criminalistics Center]
24
24
Illustration No. 19
Illustration No. 20
Ukraine
Pension Fund of Ukraine
PENSION CARD
No. 2080801663
Last name: SHUDYKINA
First name: OLHA
Patronymic: MYKOLAYIVNA
Sex: FEMALE Date of birth: 12/20/1956
Personal account #: [illegible]
Type of pension: Old age
Valid until: INDEFINITELY
Date of issue: [illegible]
Issued by: Pension Fund of Ukraine
[signature]
[seal:] Pension Fund of Ukraine
Series AAZh No. [illegible]
Shudykina
Last name
Olga
First name
Mykolayivna
Patronymic
December 20, 1956
Date of birth
Chasiv Yar
Place of birth
Donetsk Region
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 21
25
25
PASSPORT OF A CITIZEN OF UKRAINE
Kornilova
Last name
Inna
First name
Oleksandrivna
Patronymic
November 18, 1994
Date of birth
Novotroyitske
Place of birth
Volnovakha District
Donetsk Region
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 22
Illustration No. 23
PASSPORT OF A CITIZEN OF UKRAINE
Kolomoyets
Last name
Roman
First name
Anatoliyovych
Patronymic
March 16, 1998
Date of birth
Kalinine
Place of birth
Volnovakha District
Donetsk Region
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 24
DEKA
Larisa Ivanovna
Starchak
Chief Accountant
[illegible]
26
26
UKRAINE DRIVER’S LICENSE
[illegible]
Morhasyuk
Last name
Tetyana
First name
Viktorivna
Patronymic
August 19, 1960
Date of birth
City of Donetsk
Place of birth
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 25
PASSPORT OF A CITIZEN OF UKRAINE
Karpus
Last name
Halyna
First name
Serhiyivna
Patronymic
October 5, 1939
Date of birth
Donetsk
Place of birth
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 26
27
27
Ukraine
Pension Fund of Ukraine
PENSION CARD
No. [illegible]
Last name: MORHASYUK
First name: OLEKSANDR
Patronymic: OLEKSANDROVYCH
Sex: MALE Date of birth: [illegible]
Personal account #: [illegible]
Type of pension: [illegible]
Valid until: INDEFINITELY
Date of issue: [illegible]
Issued by: Pension Fund of Ukraine
[signature]
[seal:] Pension Fund of Ukraine
Series [illegible] No. 282248
Morhasyuk
Last name
Oleksandr
First name
Oleksandrovych
Patronymic
October 15, 1957
Date of birth
Volnovakha
Place of birth
Donetsk Region
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 27
PASSPORT OF A CITIZEN OF UKRAINE
Polyakov
Last name
Vladyslav
First name
Oleksandrovych
Patronymic
[illegible] 28, 1986
Date of birth
Donetsk
Place of birth
Donetsk Region
Ukraine
[signature]
Passport holder’s signature
Illustration No. 28
Yu.V. Rishko
Forensic Expert [signature]
Annex 86
Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/083 (13 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
at 09:00 a.m. January 13, 2015
1. Operational situation.
1.1. Regrouping by Russian Armed Forces units in the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine and Russian districts adjacent to the Ukrainian border.
[redacted]
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176
USREOU [Unified State Register of
Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine]
code 22990919
01.13.2015 ref No 222/3D/90/083
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 2
2
[redacted]
On January 11-12 this year, four columns of military equipment were brought into
Ukraine via the town of Izvaryne (Luhansk Region) along the Krasnodon-Luhansk route.
They comprise: three tanks, nine armored fighting vehicles (mounted on a tracked base), 119
cargo trucks (with property and ammunition), two refuelers and a bus with personnel.
[redacted]
1.4 Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory
Ten tactical unmanned aerial vehicles were engaged in airborne reconnaissance in
these areas: Donetsk (two UAVs), Avdiyivka, Volnovakha, Kalchik and Novoselivka Druha
(two UAVs), Lebedinske-Mariupol (Donetsk Region), Nizhne, Vesela Gora – Shchastya
(Luhansk Region).
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 3
3
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 4
4
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 5
5
[redacted]
___________________________________________________________________________
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Annex 87
Record of Review, drafted by Captain of Justice V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator
at the Internal Affairs Agency of the Investigations Department of the Directorate of
the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk Region (16 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

2
129
RECORD
of review
Volnovakha of Donetsk region January 16, 2015
Review started at 2:40 PM 6th
Review ended at 5:05 PM
Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the investigations department of the
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Captain of Justice V.V. Romanenko,
having reviewed the materials of criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000021 under article 258, part 3
of the Criminal Code (CC) of Ukraine, in accordance with articles 104, 105, 106, 237, 223 of the
Criminal Procedural Code (CPC), involving:
Specialist –
1. Consultant-expert 6 of office 4 of the Institute of Special Technology and Judicial Expertise
(ICTE) of the Security Service of Ukraine Vitaliy Petrovych Stasiuk, born May 8, 1988, who
resides at the address 77 Heorhiyivska St., Donetsk region, Mariupol and who has been in service
since 2012, who in accordance with article 71 of the CPC of Ukraine was explained his rights
and obligations [signature] ,
2. Deputy chief of staff of the rocket launcher artillery battalion of military unit A2167 Serhiy
Volodymyrovych Dmitriyev, born September 30, 1981, who resides at the address Konovaltsya
St., Bila Tserkva, Kyiv region at military unit A2167, who has served in the military since 1999,
who in accordance with article 71 of the CPC of Ukraine was explained his rights and
obligations [signature] .
conducted a review – sections of land located near a checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
located on the territory of fixed post No. 5 of the Department of the State Automobile Inspection of
the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (UDAI GUMBS) in the Donetsk region
on highway H-20 connection Slov’yansk-Mariupol of the Donetsk region.
Before the start of a review, the individuals cited above were explained the content of article 63
of the Constitution of Ukraine on the fact that the individual does not bear responsibility under the
requirement to give testimony or explanations about himself, family members or close relatives, the
circle of which is determined by law.
1 [signature] 2 [signature]
Before the start of a review, the individuals cited above were explained their right to be present at
all actions conducted during the process of the examination, to make comments that must be entered
into the record. The individuals who take part in the conduct of the review were also explained the
requirements of article 66, part 3 of the CPC of Ukraine on their obligations to do disclose
information on the proceedings conducted as well as on the use of technical means of recording – on
the digital camera “Olympus SP-510UZ” on an “XD” memory card and the conditions for its use with
automatic settings.
1 [signature] 2 [signature]
3
130
Conduct of the review established:
The subject of the review is the section of the area located on the area of a checkpoint of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine located on the territory of fixed post No. 5 of the UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in
the Donetsk area on highway N-20 connecting Slov’yansk-Mariupol of the Donetsk region.
The specified section of the area is territorially located on the section of highway N-20 between
Buhas and Volnovakha of the Donetsk region.
The highway specified is divided down the middle equipped by metal guardrails.
Located on the side of this highway, on a section in the direction of traffic from Mariupol to
Donetsk at a distance of 12 m from the city, according to the record of the review of January 13, 2015,
was a “Tata A07A” bus, yellow in color, with license plate AN 0985 AA, with a crater, which is
designated in this record under No. 1.
No. 1
The subject of the review is a crater, designated in this record conditionally under number 1.
Using a GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK136165) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev
established that this crater No. 1 is located at coordinates x=052776445, y=073889600, the distance from
fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk area (its proximity in relation to the crater
part) is 65 meters in a southwestern direction.
Using GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK136165) specialist S.V.
Dmitriyev established that this fixed post No. 5 of UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region (its
center) is located at x=052776650, y=073889630.
During the review specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery
periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle
of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No.1, and established that this angle is
6-28 sections of the goniometer (37.68°).
In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil
(with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results
in this crater No. 1, and established that it is equivalent to 55 degrees, which corresponds, according to
Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the
USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell
as 19,000 meters from this crater.
Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of
ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50
transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as
131
4
a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 1 was actually fired from the area of
the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by
square 5291 7401.
No. 2
The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 2. Using
GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev
established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776786, y=073889821, the distance from
fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 300 meters in a northwestern
direction.
During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery
periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle
of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 2, and established that this angle is
6-32 sections of the goniometer (37.92°).
In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with
protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in
this crater No. 2, and established that it is equivalent to 52 degrees, which corresponds, according to
Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the
USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell
as 19,000 meters from this crater.
Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of
ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50
transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a
result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 2 was actually fired from the area of
the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by
square 5292 7401.
No. 3
The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 2.
Using GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev
established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776755, y=073889841, the distance from
fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 220 meters in a northwestern
direction.
During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery
periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle
of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 3, and established that this angle is
6-39 sections of the goniometer (38.34°).
In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil
(with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater,
5
132
measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 3, and established that it is
equivalent to 52 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly
explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of
meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.
Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of
ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50
transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a
result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 3 was actually fired from the area of
the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by
square 5292 7402.
No. 4
The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 4.
Using GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev
established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776642, y=073889254, the distance from
fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 370 meters in a northeastern
direction.
During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery
periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle
of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 4, and established that this angle is
6-55 sections of the goniometer (39.3°).
In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil
(with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results
in this crater No. 4, and established that it is equivalent to 53 degrees, which corresponds, according to
Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the
USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell
as 19,000 meters from this crater.
Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of
ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50
transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a
result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 4 was actually fired from the area of
the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by
square 5291 7401.
No. 5
The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 5.
Using GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev
established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776752, y=073889826, the distance from
6
133
fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 380 meters in a northwestern
direction.
During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery
periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle
of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 4, and established that this angle is
6-42 sections of the goniometer (38.52°).
In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil
(with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results
in this crater No. 5, and established that it is equivalent to 52 degrees, which corresponds, according to
Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the
USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell
as 19,000 meters from this crater.
Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of
ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50
transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a
result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 5 was actually fired from the area of
the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by
square 5292 7401.
No. 6
The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 5.
Using GPS navigator “GARMIN DAKOTA 10” (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev
established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776518, y=073889914, the distance from
fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 380 meters in a northwestern
direction.
During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery
periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle
of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 4, and established that this angle is
6-72 sections of the goniometer (40.32°).
In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil
(with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results
in this crater No. 5, and established that it is equivalent to 55 degrees, which corresponds, according to
Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the
USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell
as 19,000 meters from this crater.
Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of
ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50
transferred to the topographical map
7
134
(scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a result of which it was established that
the shell that made crater No. 6 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of
Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5291 7402.
Thus, with consideration of the aforementioned indicators received as a result of this investigative
action, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev stated that the shells were fired, which resulted in the crater around fixed
post No. 4 of the UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region, including crater No. 1 (which is
located at distance of 12 meters from the “Tata A07A” bus, yellow in color, license plate No. AN 0985
AA – according to the record of review of the scene dated January 13, 2015), actually from the area of the
northeastern outskirts of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, namely in boxes 5292 7401, 5292 7402,
5291 7401, 5291 7402 of the topographical map with a scale of 1:50,000.
The specified map of the area on which the specialist marked the trajectory of the flight of the
shells is attached to this record as an addendum.
During this investigative action photos were used which all participants of the investigative action
were notified of prior to its conduct. After the production of photos the latter will be attached to this
record in the form of a photo board.
All participations of the investigative action were notified on how to read the contents of the
record, namely – provision of the written record for personal reading.
1 [signature] 2 [signature]
All participants in the proceedings familiarized themselves with the record by personally reading
it, the applications, comments, additions: not [illegible]
Participants:
1 [signature] Stasiuk
2 [signature] S.V. Dmitriyev
Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the
investigations department of the Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region
Captain of Justice [signature] V. Romanenko
8
118
RECORD
of review
Donetsk January 16, 2015
Review started at: 11:25 AM January 16, 2015
Review ended at: 4:55 PM January 17, 2015
Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the investigations department of the
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Lt. Colonel Oleksiy
Volodymyrovych Martyniuk, having reviewed the materials of criminal proceedings No.
22015050000000021 entered into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations of January 13, 2015, on
the grounds of commission of crimes as stipulated by part 3, article 258 of the CC of Ukraine, in
accordance with articles 104, 105, 106, 237, 223 of the CPC of Ukraine, conducted a review of the scene
(territory) located around the checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on highway N-20 “Slov’yansk-
Mariupol,” located at the site of fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk area at the
exit from Volnovakha in the direction of Buhas of the Donetsk area in order to search for craters after an
attack on the checkpoint from a multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS) BM-21 “GRAD”, which took
place on January 13, 2015.
The review was conducted under daytime natural light using photos on a “Sony-Cyber-Shot”
camera with a 2 GB “Transcend” memory card with automatic settings.
The conduct of the review established:
The review started on the territory which is located to the right of the checkpoint (the eastern part
with respect to the “Slov’yansk-Mariupol” highway on the checkpoint site). In this case, the crater was
not reviewed that had been examined earlier and was closest to the checkpoint, near which on January 13,
2015 the shuttle bus “I-VAN A0718,” state license number AN0985AA, was hit by shrapnel on the road
from “Zlatoustivka to Donetsk,” killing 12 passengers and injuring 19. The crater is conditionally
designated as No. 1.
The following craters were also reviewed, (which were respectively numbered according to the
review schedule which is attached to the record):
No. 2: at a distance of 265 m from crater No. 1 along the “Slov’yansk-Mariupol” highway, along
the center divider (the crater reviewed with the removal of remnants of ammunitions according to the
review record of January 14, 2015);
No. 3: at a distance of 17 meters from crater No. 2 along the highway and 35 meters deep crater
found perpendicular to the road 25 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 4: at a distance of 29 meters from crater No. 3 in a direction perpendicular to the road a crater
was found that is 27 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal
scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 5: at a distance of 19 meters from crater No. 4 perpendicular to the road a crater was found
that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately
110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell,
apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 6: No. 4: at a distance of 47 meters from crater No. 5 in a direction towards the road at an
angle of approximately 20° to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards
9
119
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 25 x 27 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 7: at a distance of 144 meters from crater No. 6 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 45° to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a
crater was found that is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 8: at a distance of 78 meters from crater No. 7 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 40° to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater
was found that is 32 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal
scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 9: at a distance of 108 meters from crater No. 8 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 45° to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater
was found that is 35 x 40 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal
scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 10: at a distance of 100 meters from crater No. 9 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 30° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 22 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 11: at a distance of 67 meters from crater No. 10 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 60° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 23 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 100 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 12: at a distance of 83 meters from crater No. 11 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 40° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 28 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 13: at a distance of 36 meters from crater No. 12 in a direction along the road in the direction
of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 30 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along
the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the
probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 14: at a distance of 38 meters from crater No. 13 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 30° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 32 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 15: at a distance of 31 meters from crater No. 14 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 25° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
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Volnovakha a crater was found that is 25 x 27 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 16: at a distance of 38 meters from crater No. 15 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 15° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 17: at a distance of 56 meters from crater No. 16 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 55° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 22 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 18: at a distance of 104 meters from crater No. 17 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 35° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 19: at a distance of 25 meters from crater No. 18 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 45° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 23 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 20: at a distance of 125 meters from crater No. 19 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 30° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 21: at a distance of 75 meters from crater No. 20 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 45° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 22: at a distance of 82 meters from crater No. 21 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 50° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 23: at a distance of 115 meters from crater No. 22 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 15° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 55 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
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No. 24: at a distance of 145meters from crater No. 23 in a direction towards the road at an angle
of approximately 15° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane
towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner
part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis
of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 25: at a distance of 100 meters from crater No. 25 in a direction towards the road at an angle
of approximately 20° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane
towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 22 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the
inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the
probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 26: at a distance of 106 meters from crater No. 25 in a direction towards the road at an angle
of approximately 15° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 27 x 28 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 27: at a distance of 87 meters from crater No. 26 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 90° to the road, a crater was found that is 29 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection
along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards
the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 28: at a distance of 45 meters from crater No. 26 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 10° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 29: at a distance of 103 meters from crater No. 28 in a direction towards the road at an angle
of approximately 45° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 135 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 30: at a distance of 94 meters from crater No. 29 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 40° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 17 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 31: at a distance of 65 meters from crater No. 30 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 50° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 35 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction; In this case, it was established that the
distance from the specified conventional boundary perpendicular to the highway sign “177th km” along
the highway is 65 meters.
No. 32: at a distance of 90 meters from crater No. 31 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 20° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 32 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
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with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 33: at a distance of 100 meters from crater No. 32 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 30° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 35 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 34: at a distance of 107 meters from crater No. 33 in a direction towards the road at an angle
of approximately 35° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 28 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 35: at a distance of 12 meters from crater No. 34 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 40° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Buhas, at a distance of 2.5 m to a tree with a number of green branches, planted along the road, and 12.5
meters from the edge of the roadway part of the road, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide
(diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the
center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate
northeast direction. Also on the specified tree there are fresh ragged wounds to the bark, at a height of 25
cm from the ground from the northeast side.
No. 36: at a distance of 132 meters from crater No. 34 in a direction towards the road at an angle
of approximately 10° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 29 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 35 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction.
No. 37: at a distance of 30 meters from crater No. 34 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 30° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 23 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 38: at a distance of 80 meters from crater No. 36 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 45° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 112 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 30: at a distance of 43 meters from crater No. 38 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 20° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 22 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 40: at a distance of 23 meters from crater No. 40 in a direction towards the road at an angle of
approximately 40° to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards
Volnovakha a crater was found that is 28 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 155 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
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entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 41: at a distance of 15 meters along the conventional perpendicular to the road, an 67 meters
for the specified perpendicular in the direction from the checkpoint to the “DAI” “90” speed limit sign, a
crater was found that is 30 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 42: at a distance of 3 meters along the conventional boundary perpendicular to the roadway
part of the road, and 7 meters from the specified perpendicular in the direction from the checkpoint to
“DAI” “90” speed limit sign, a crater was found that is 30 x 40 cm wide (diameter at the intersection)
with a depth of approximately 20 cm.
The review is interrupted at 4:45 PM on January 16, 2016 and continued at 10:35 AM on
January 17, 2015.
The review continues from the territory which is located to the left of the checkpoint (western
part with respect to the “Slov’yansk-Mariupol” road on the site of the checkpoint). In this case, a crater
was found (with continuation of review numbering):
No. 43: at a distance of 630 meters along the road from the checkpoint in a direction from Buhas
and 2 meters from the roadside a crater was found that is 18 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection
along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 65 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the
probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 44: at a distance of 160 meters from crater No. 43 along the road from the checkpoint in a
direction from Buhas and 10 meters from the “177th km” road sign exactly in the center of the roadway
from the direction of Buhas-Volnovakha, a crater is found in the asphalt that is 50 x 40 cm (diameter at
the intersection) with a depth of approximately 3-5 cm, behind the crater (from the northeast) there are
many chips in the asphalt. The narrowed part of the plane of the crater also travels in the same direction.
No. 45: at a distance of 150 meters from crater No. 44 along the road from the checkpoint in a
direction from Buhas and 15 meters from the roadside in the forest right of way a crater was found that is
35 x 45 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 35 cm;
No. 46: at a distance of 35 meters from crater No. 44 along the road to the checkpoint from
Volnovakha and 124 meters along the perpendicular from the roadside in a deep field a crater was found
that is 25 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately
75 cm penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail,
apparent approximate northeast direction.
No. 47: at a distance of 5 meters from crater No. 43 along the road from the checkpoint in a
direction from Buhas and 55 meters along the perpendicular from the roadside in a deep field a crater was
found that is 27 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 100 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell,
a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction.
No. 48: at a distance of 10 meters from crater No. 47 in a direction from the road at an angle of
approximately 40° to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to
Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 90 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
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No. 49: at a distance of 70 meters from crater No. 43 along the road to the checkpoint in the
direction of Volnovakha and 15 meters along the perpendicular from the roadside, in a deep field, 4
meters from a separate strip of forest between the fields, a crater was found that is 45 x 50 cm wide
(diameter at the intersection), with a depth of approximately 20 cm;
No. 50: at a distance of 5 meters from crater No. 49 in a western direction (from the road) along a
separate strip of forest between the fields and 7 meters from the strip of forest in a deep field along the
conventional boundary perpendicular, in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha, a crater was
found that is 27 x 28 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell,
a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 51: at a distance of 87 meters from crater No. 50 in a western direction (from the road) along
a separate strip of forest between the fields and 2 meters from the strip of forest in a deep field along the
conventional boundary perpendicular, in the direction of the plan to Volnovakha, a crater was found that
is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110
cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail,
apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 52: at a distance of 340 meters from crater No. 51 in a western direction (from the road)
along a separate strip of forest between the fields and 48 meters from the strip of forest in a deep field
along the conventional boundary perpendicular, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was
found that is 27 x 32 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell,
a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 53: at a distance of 218 meters from crater No. 52 in the direction of the road from an angle
of 40° to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the
direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 25 x 26 cm wide (diameter at the
intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the
crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast
direction; No. 54: at a distance of 21 meters from crater 53 parallel to the road in the direction of the plane
to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 25 x 26 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner
part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis
of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 55: at a distance of 68 meters from crater No. 54 at an angle of 15° to the conventional
boundary, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 24 x
25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm,
penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent
approximate northeast direction;
No. 56: at a distance of 122 meters from crater No. 55 in the direction of the road at an angle of
25° to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction
of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 27 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along
the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the
probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 57: at a distance of 30 meters from crater No. 56 in the direction of the road at an angle of
30° to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction
of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 25 x 26 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along
the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the
probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
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No. 58: at a distance of 70 meters from crater No. 57 in the direction of the road at an angle of
30° to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction
of the plane to Volnovakha, as well as at a distance of 70 meters closer to the checkpoint of the strip of
forest, a was found that is 22 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 59: at a distance of 68 meters from crater No. 58 and 45 meters along the conventional
boundary perpendicular from the strip of forest, nearer to the checkpoint, in a deep field in the direction of
the plane to Buhas, a crater was found that is 26 x 27 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner
part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis
of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 60: at a distance of 60 meters from crater No. 56 in the direction of the road at an angle of
25° to the conventional boundary, perpendicular to the separate strip of forest, nearer to the checkpoint, in
a deep field in the direction of the plane to Buhas, a crater was found that is 23 x 25 cm wide (diameter at
the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 132 cm, penetrating the center of the
crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast
direction; No. 61: at a distance of 105 meters from crater No. 60 in the direction from the road at an angle
of 10° to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Buhas, and at a
distance of 39 meters from the strip of forest farthest from the checkpoint, a crater was found that is 23 x
21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm,
penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent
approximate northeast direction;
No. 62: at a distance of 135 meters from crater No. 61 in the direction to the road at an angle of
15° to the conventional boundary, parallel to the strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to
Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 19 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 100 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 63: at a distance of 36 meters from crater 62 in the direction to the road at an angle of 15° to
the conventional boundary, parallel to the strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a
crater was found that is 22 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 64: at a distance of 25 meters from crater No. 63 in a direction perpendicular to the road, a
crater was found that is 25 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 65: at a distance of 46 meters from crater No. 63 in a direction parallel to the road in the
direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the
intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the
crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast
direction; No. 66: at a distance of 20 meters from crater No. 65 in a direction perpendicular to the road, a
crater was found that is 22 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 55 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
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No. 67: at a distance of 94 meters from crater No. 66 in a direction to the road at an angle of 29°
to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater
was found that is 23 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell,
a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 68: at a distance of 95 meters from crater No. 67 in the direction from the road at an angle of
45° to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater
was found that is 21 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell,
a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 69: at a distance of 9 meters from crater No. 68 in a direction to the road at an angle of 30° to
the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, and at a
distance of 77 meters along the perpendicular to the strip of forest nearest to the checkpoint, a crater was
found that is 20 x 19 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell,
a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 70: at a distance of 29 meters from crater No. 68 in a direction to the road at an angle of 50°
to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Buhas, a crater was
found that is 20 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of
approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a
wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 71: at a distance of 25 meters from crater No. 70 in a direction to the road at an angle of 20°
to the conventional boundary, perpendicular to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a
crater was found that is 22 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 72: at a distance of 80 meters from crater No. 69 in the direction of the road and along a strip
of forest nearest to the checkpoint, in the direction of the road, at 2 meters to the specified strip of forest, a
crater was found that is 25 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 73: at a distance of 34 meters from the road and 7 meters along the road towards the
checkpoint to the “DAI 90” road sign, a crater was found that is 21 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the
intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the
crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast
direction; No. 74: at a distance of 12 meters from crater No. 73 parallel to the road in a direction from the
checkpoint, a crater was found that is 20 x 18 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of
entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 75: at a distance of 10 meters from the road and 9 meters along the road in a direction from
the checkpoint to the “DAI 90” road sign, a crater was found that is 19 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the
intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the
crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast
direction;
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No. 76: at a distance of 50 meters from crater No. 75 parallel to the road in the direction of the
checkpoint and 8 meters from the road, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 24 x
22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm,
penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent
approximate northeast direction;
No. 77: at a distance of 15 meters from crater No. 76 parallel to the road in the direction of the
checkpoint and 8 meters from the road, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 20 x
22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm,
penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent
approximate northeast direction;
No. 78: at a distance of 28 meters from crater No. 76 perpendicularly from the road and 63 meters
perpendicularly to a strip of forest nearest to the check point, a crater was found that is 19 x 20 cm wide
(diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the
center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate
northeast direction;
No. 79: at a distance of 200 meters along the road from crater No. 1, in a strip of forest along the
road, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a
depth of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of
the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 80: at a distance of 55 meters from crater No. 79 in a direction along the road in the direction
of the checkpoint, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 22 x 23 cm wide (diameter
at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of
the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast
direction;
Furthermore, the territory was examined which is located to the left of the checkpoint
(southwestern part with respect to the “Slov’yansk-Mariupol” road at the site of the checkpoint) behind a
strip of forest (in the direction of the review towards the checkpoint), which separates the field from the
craters found above, and in this case the craters found:
No. 81: at a distance of 110 meters from the checkpoint and 25 meters from the strip of forest, a
crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 82: at a distance of 20 meters from crater No. 81 in the direction from the checkpoint along
the strip of forest, under an electric power line, perpendicular to the strip of forest, a crater was found that
is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 135
cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail,
apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 83: at a distance of 50 meters from crater No. 82 in a direction from the road at an angle of
45° to the conventional boundary, perpendicular to the road, in a direction of the plain to Volnovakha, a
crater was found that is 21 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth
of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the
shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 84: at a distance of 82 meters from crater No. 83 and in a direction along an electric power
line, perpendicular to a strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that
is 20 x 18 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110
cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail,
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178
apparent approximate northeast direction;
No. 85: at a distance of 50 meters from crater No. 84 in a direction from the road at an angle of
60° to an electric power line, perpendicular to a strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to
Volnovakha, in a corn field, a crater was found that is 45 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along
the inner part), with a depth of approximately 40 cm;
No. 86: at a distance of 140 meters from a second electric power line in the direction of an
electric power line perpendicular to a strip of forest in a direction to the road, at an angle of 45° to an
electric power line in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 19 cm wide
(diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm;
No. 87: at a distance of 85 meters from crater No. 86 in the direction of the checkpoint parallel to
the road, a crater was found that is 18 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),
with a depth of approximately 110 cm;
No. 88: at a distance of 46 meters from crater No. 87 in the direction of the checkpoint at an angle
of 15° to the conventional boundary of the parallel road, a crater was found that is 22 x 25 cm wide
(diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm;
During this investigative act a diagram (map) of sites was drawn up where craters were found that
were named in the record, which is attached to this record as addendum No. 1.
While conducting this review a “Sony-Cyber Shot” camera was used with a 2 GB “Transcend”
memory card with automatic settings, the photos of which will be attached to this record after they are
produced in the form of a photo board (addendum No. 2).
Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency
of the investigations department of the Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region
Lt. Colonel of Justice [signature] O.V. Martyniuk
19
100
RECORD
of review
Mariupol January 16, 2015
Review started at: 11:00 AM
Review ended at: 12:40 PM
Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine in the Donetsk region Lieutenant of Justice D.F. Chernenko, in connection with the conduct of
pre-trial investigations in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, on the
premises of the Mariupol Central Office of the Directorate of the Security Service in the Donetsk region,
in accordance with articles 100, 104-107, 223, 237 of the CPC of Ukraine, conducted a review of the disk
provided by employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region during implementation of the resolution of the investigator for
the performance of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal proceedings.
The review conducted established:
The “X Digital” disk, with the handwritten label “BP,” obtained during implementation by the
employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Security Service in the Donetsk region of
the resolution of the investigator on the conduct of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal
proceeding, contains a video file with the name “1_02_N_150113140000.avi” with a size of 858,627
bytes. The video recording lasts 1 hour. In the video recording the numbers and letters of the label and the
date itself (01-13-2015) time (indicated in hours, minutes and seconds) and number of the video recording
method (SAM02) are visible. In the video recording lasting 24 hours and 57 seconds there is a depiction
of the site in which the roads are visible in opposite directions along which transportation is travelling.
There are strips of forest along the roads and buildings and farm fields are also visible.
At 24 minutes and 58 seconds of the video recording it is evident that in the fields, on the roads
and in the strips of forest there are explosions taking place at the same time, after which smoke rises. For
the entire hour explosions take place lasting from 24 minutes and 58 seconds through 25 minutes and 15
seconds. During this time there were approximately 25 explosions in different places on the territory
being videotaped. Also on the video recording it is evident that at 25 minutes and 10 seconds on the right
side smoke is rising. After 25 minutes and 15 seconds the explosions stop and the video recording of the
territory on which the explosions occurred continues. After the explosions only spots that are dark colored
and a round shape remain on the ground.
At 51 minutes and 56 seconds of the video recording the device which is recording the video
turns to the right and visible in the right lower corner of the video recording is a yellow buss on the right
of which can be seen a dark colored spot that is characteristics for explosions which was visible earlier
during review of the video recording. There are unknown persons near the bus. Also one of these persons
with the help of ladder is climbing up to the glass window on the side of the bus.
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101
2
Then the device that is recording the video turns to the right and videotapes the territory. In this
territory visible are dark colored spots that are characteristic of the explosions seen earlier when
reviewing the video recording.
The device which performed the video recording completed a full rotation which videotaping the
territory. During review of the video recording a total number of explosions that occurred during the
video recording was counted at 39 explosions.
During review of the disk which contains a video recording using the “prtsc” key, screen shots
were made and attached to the review record.
Performed the review and composed the record:
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
21
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
22
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
23
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
24
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
25
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
26
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
27
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice Signature D.F. Chernenko
109
PHOTO
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
28
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice Signature D.F. Chernenko
110
PHOTO
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
29
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
30
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
31
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
32
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
33
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
34
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
35
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
36
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
37
96
RECORD
of review of things
Mariupol January 16, 2015
Review started at: 10:00 AM
Review ended at: 10:40 AM
Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine in the Donetsk region Senior Lieutenant of Justice D.F. Chernenko, in connection with the
conduct of pre-trial investigations in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015,
on the premises of the Mariupol Central Office of the Directorate of the Security Service in the Donetsk
region, in accordance with articles 100, 104-107, 223, 237 of the CPC of Ukraine, conducted a review of
the disk provided by employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region on January 14, 2015 during implementation of the
resolution of the investigator for the performance of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal
proceedings.
The review conducted established:
The “Axent DVD+R” disk, with the handwritten label “Checkpoint,” obtained during
implementation by the employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Security Service
in the Donetsk region of the resolution of the investigator on the conduct of investigative (exploratory)
actions in the criminal proceeding, contains a video file with the name “Videorecorder captured attach on
the Volnovakha checkpoint” with a size of 2.17 MB (2,277,376 bytes). The video recording lasts 1
minutes and 26 seconds. In the video recording for 1 minute and 12 seconds there is a depiction of the
transport vehicles which are located on the right side of the road travelling one after another in the
direction of the buildings located on the left side of the road. The last vehicle located on the right side and
which is closest of all to the buildings is seen to be yellow. At 1 minute and 9 seconds of the video
recording sounds like explosions are heard with a frequency of 0.5 seconds (lasting until 1 minute and 22
seconds of the video recording), and at 1 minute and 14 seconds of the video recording it is apparent that
at a distance of about 100 meters from the device performing the video recording and opposite the yellow
vehicle on the right side of the road by a strip of forest there is a flash of orange-yellow color and at the
same time there can be seen flashes and smoke near the building in the form of a tower on the left side of
the buildings located on the left side of the road.
During review of the disk which contains the video recording screen shots were made using the
“prtsc” button and attached to the record of review.
Performed the review and composed the record:
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
38
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
Yellow Vehicle
39
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
Flashes and smoke around
yellow vehicle
40
Senior investigator of the investigations department
of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in the Donetsk region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] D.F. Chernenko
Flashes and smoke
Building in the form of a tower
41
V.V . Romanenko
[illegible]
To the Chief of the Investigations Department of the
[signature] 01/15/15 Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the
Donetsk area
Lt. Colonel of Justice
I.V. Ivanchenko
In the performance of the resolution on the order to conduct investigative (exploratory) actions in
criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, for commission of a crime as
stipulated by article 25, part 3 of the CC of Ukraine, we are sending you a video recording of January 13,
2015 from a surveillance camera at the checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine where the crime in the
criminal proceedings took place.
Addendum: optic disk X-Digital with label BP
Respectfully,
Chief of the Volnovakha Passport Authority of the
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the
Donetsk region
Lt. Colonel [signature] I.V. Mykytiuk
56/29-11 nt
01/14/15
SV
Ref. 111 nt
01/14/15

Annex 88
Expert Opinion No. 63, drafted by Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special
Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (18
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment
and Forensic Expert Examinations
EXPERT OPINION
01/18/2015 City of Mariupol No. 63
Copy No. 1
I, Vitaly Petrovych Stasyuk, an expert consultant with Section 6 of the 4th Center (Center
for Forensic and Special Expert Examinations) of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for
Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine, with
an advanced technical degree, special expert training and experience working as an expert since
2012, holding the qualification of a forensic expert with the right to conduct explosives research
with specializations in "Researching Explosive Devices and the Traces and Circumstances of
Explosions" (registration certificate No. 477 issued by the Expert Qualification Commission of
the Security Service of Ukraine on 03/13/2012) and "Forecasting the Possible Effects of the Use
of Explosive Devices and the Traces and Circumstances of Explosions (registration certificate
No. 478 issued by the Expert Qualification Commission of the Security Service of Ukraine on
03/13/2012), pursuant to an order calling for an expert explosives examination, issued by
Colonel of Justice Ye.L. Kosyak, Deputy Head of the Investigations Department of the Donetsk
Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, conducted an expert explosives
examination based on the files of criminal proceeding No. 22015050000000021.
I am aware of the facts of the case from the investigator's order calling for an expert
examination.
Together with cover letter No. 56/13-170 nt of 01/14/2015, the Donetsk Regional
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine provided for expert examination 7 packs bound
with white thread and sealed with paper glue, containing an explanatory note and the signatures
of the investigator and the participants in the investigative action, and two envelopes.
The expert has been warned of potential liability for presenting knowingly false findings
and refusing without a valid excuse to perform his duties under Articles 384 and 385 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine:
[signature]
The expert was asked to answer the following questions:
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the
submitted video recordings, what was the cause of the explosion(s)?
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the
submitted video recordings, is it possible to identify the specific type and sort of munitions that
produced the explosion(s) and the type and sort of weaponry (artillery system or other type of
weapon) that fired the munitions whose fragments and explosive traces were found during the
examination of the incident scene and on
51
2
[signature]
the video recordings submitted for expert examination; if it is possible, then what type and sort
of munitions produced the explosion, and what type and sort of weapon fired them?
• Do the objects removed during the examination of the incident site and submitted for
expert examination bear any markings that would help identify the type and sort of munitions, or
do the munitions that produced the explosion have any other identifying features?
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the
submitted video recordings, where was (were) the epicenter(s) of the explosion(s)?
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the
submitted video recordings, was the explosion produced by munitions fired from an artillery
system or by stationary mines or explosive devices (in the latter case, which type and sort of
stationary mines or explosive devices)?
• How many munitions (explosive devices) were detonated, based on the results of an
examination of the incident site, the explosive traces described in the incident site examination
report, the objects removed during the examination of the incident site, and the submitted video
recordings (in general, based on the submitted video recordings, and specifically in relation to
the site of the explosion that occurred next to the bus)?
• What was the force of the munitions (explosive device, explosive shell), in explosives
equivalent, the detonation (initiation) of which led to the explosion that caused damage to the bus
and left traces on the ground and on the tree, which were found during the examination of the
incident site?
• Exactly which fragments removed during the examination of the incident site are
fragments of munitions (explosive devices), and what is the purpose of each component of the
munitions (explosive devices) whose fragments were removed during the examination of the
incident site?
• Is it possible, based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the objects
removed during the examination of the incident site, and the video recordings submitted for
examination, to draw any conclusions as to the direction(s) from which the munitions whose
explosion was documented during the incident site examination and captured on the submitted
video recordings were fired, as well as the distance from which the said munitions were fired; if
it is possible, then from which direction(s) and distance were the munitions fired?
• Is it possible, based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the objects
removed during the examination of the incident site, and the video recordings submitted for
examination, to draw any conclusions as to the angle of incidence of the munitions whose
explosion was documented during the incident site examination; if so, then what was the angle of
incidence of the munitions whose explosion was documented during the incident site
examination and captured on the video recordings submitted for expert examinations, and what
firing distance of the munitions is consistent with their established angle of incidence?
• Based on the video recordings submitted for expert examination, how many salvos of the
shelling were there, is the image on the video recordings submitted for expert examination
consistent with one or multiple salvos, and on what criteria is this conclusion based?
3
[signature]
The following information sources were used in conducting the research:
- Methods of Complex Analysis of Explosive Devices, Explosive Substances and Traces of
Explosions (H.V. Prokhorov-Lukin, V.I. Pashchenko, V.I. Bykov, et al – Kyiv: Elite Print LLC,
2011. – p 216: il.);
- Mass-Produced Explosive Devices and the Criminalistic Analysis Thereof (Yu.M.
Dildin, V.V. Martynov, Expert Criminalistics Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
Russian Federation. Moscow. 1991);
- Explosives Expert Book: a Study Guide and Methodological Handbook (Moscow 2001);
- "Tables of Fire from M-21-OF High-Explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells
(Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow 1975).
The following were used in conducting the research:
- caliper ShTs-1 GOST 166-89;
- metal ruler GOST 427-75;
- magnifying glass with 4x magnification;
- OLYMPUS x-775 camera;
- map marking stencil;
- protractor;
- SARTORIUS electronic scales.
- bubble level
- WILTON 5m tape measure
The air temperature in the room was +20°C.
RESEARCH
The objects submitted for examination were packed in accordance with the criminalistic
procedure rules for the storage and transportation of physical evidence. The packing precludes
access to the contents and is undamaged.
Upon being opened, the packs were found to contain:
Pack No. 1, made of green plastic material (Illustration No. 1):
- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 605 x 4 x 125 mm (Object No. 1,
Illustration No. 2)
Pack No. 2, made of black plastic material (Illustration No. 3):
- grey, deformed cylindrical metal object measuring 260 mm in length, 4 mm in
thickness and 200 mm in width (Object No. 2, Illustration No. 4)
Pack No. 1, made of black plastic material (Illustration No. 7):
- grey, semi-spherical metal object measuring 99 x 4 x 57 mm (Object No. 3, Illustration
No. 8);
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4
[signature]
- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 380 mm in length, 45-115 mm in width
and 3-6.6 mm in thickness (Object No. 4, Illustration No. 8).
Pack No. 4, made of black plastic material (Illustration No. 9):
- grey, cylindrical metal object measuring 250 mm in length, ~116 mm in diameter and 3
mm in thickness (Object No. 5, Illustrations Nos. 10-11)
Pack No. 5, made of green plastic material (Illustration No. 12):
- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 220 x 8 x 59 mm (Object No. 6,
Illustration No. 13);
- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 185 x 3 x 77 mm (Object No. 7,
Illustration No. 13)
- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 600 x 3.6 x 350 mm (Object No. 8,
Illustration No. 13)
Pack No. 3, made of white plastic material (Illustration No. 14):
- grey, cylindrical metal object measuring 735 mm in length, ~127 mm in diameter and 4
mm in thickness (Object No. 9, Illustration No. 15).
Pack No. 3, transparent plastic pack (Illustration No. 16):
- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 65 x 4.7 x 19 mm (Object No. 10,
Illustration No. 17);
- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 17 x 2.6 x 14 mm (Object No. 11,
Illustration No. 17);
- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 19 x 2.5 x 23 mm (Object No. 12,
Illustration No. 17);
- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 13 x 2.5 x 15 mm (Object No. 13,
Illustration No. 17);
- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 14 x 2.5 x 15 mm (Object No. 14,
Illustration No. 17);
- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 14 x 2.5 x 14 mm (Object No. 15,
Illustration No. 17);
Envelope with "xDigital" optical disk labeled "BP", which contains video recording
"1_02_H_150113140000.avi".
Envelope with "Axent DVD+R" optical disk (serial number MOGXPR-801), which
contains a video recording labeled "Video recorder captured shelling of Volnovakha
checkpoint.flv".
5
[signature]
All of the metal objects (Objects Nos. 1-15) submitted for examination are made of
magnetic metal and show signs of deformation.
The examination of Objects Nos. 1-9 revealed:
- longitudinal grooves in the form of threads (Objects Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 (on the
interior));
- markings in the form of letters and figures:
a) T 91 V S I (Object No. 7, Illustration No. 20);
b) 60 V I I, 881 (Object No. 5, Illustrations Nos. 21-22);
c) ..-12-G (Object No. 4, Illustration No. 23);
d) 559-76-6 KZh 1237 (Object No. 2, Illustrations Nos. 5-6), where
599 is the factory lot and assembly number;
76 is the year of manufacture;
6 KZh is the number of the powder factory.
Attached to Object No. 5 are two metal rods measuring 4.2 mm in diameter and ~70 mm
in length, around which metal wire measuring 1.7 mm in diameter is coiled in the form of a
spring. On one side there is a plate (deformed), which has a hole measuring ~15 mm in diameter,
and on the other side can be seen traces of thermal influence in the form of chaotically spaced
cavities of irregular shape with fire-damaged edges and black stratification (which appears to be
soot).
In order to answer the questions that were posed, a comparative analysis was conducted
of Object No. 5, which was submitted for examination, with the same parameters specified in the
technical standard documentation. The results of this analysis are shown in Table No. 1
Comparative Table No. 1
Indicators of main
components
Comparable item Analyzed object
shell propulsion motor Objects similar in
appearance to a propulsion
motor (Object No. 5)
Material of construction grey metal grey metal
Number of blades 5 5 apertures for attaching
blades
Diameter, mm 122 ~116
Based on a comparison of the object with the drawing in the reference literature, as well
as the dimensions, it is the propulsion motor of a rocket-propelled shell (Illustrations Nos. 18 and
19).
In order to answer the questions that were posed, a comparative analysis was conducted
of Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15, which were submitted for examination, with the same parameters
specified in the technical standard documentation. The results of this analysis are shown in Table
No. 2
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6
[signature]
Comparative Table No. 2
Indicators of main
components
Comparable item Analyzed object
pre-formed fragmentation
element of unguided M-21
OF rocket-propelled highexplosive
fragmentation shell
Shrapnel-like elements
(Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15)
Material of construction grey metal grey metal
Weight (g) 2.4 2.25-2.48
Geometric shape rhombus rhombus
The comparative analysis established that in terms of outward appearance, material of
construction and structural features, the submitted Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15 are standard
fragmentation elements of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive
fragmentation shell (item 9M22U).
According to the standard literature, Explosives Expert Book: a Study Guide and
Methodological Handbook (Moscow 2001), nearly all rocket-propelled shells contain the
explosive substance A-IX-2. In this case, according to the technical specifications of the 122-mm
unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), the
weight of the explosive substance is 6.6 kg.
The power of a munition is calculated according to the formula Q=Mex x Cex, where:
Mex = mass of the explosive substance with which the munition (explosive device) is loaded (in
kg)
Cex = the coefficient, which depends on the heat or energy of the explosion; for the explosive
substance A-IX-2 it is 1.55.
Q=6.6x1.55=10.23 kg in TNT equivalent.
Based on the video recordings submitted for expert examination, the shelling of the
checkpoint began at 2:24:58 PM and ended at 2:25:13. The question of how many munitions
were fired falls outside the expert's area of expertise. According to the examination report dated
01/16/15, a total of 88 shells were fired, which corresponds to at least three simultaneous salvos.
The total firing time of one round of ammunition (40 shots) is 20 seconds, i.e., it takes one
second for two shells to fly out of one unit, so one BM 21 GRAD vehicle could not have
produced 88 shots in approximately 15 seconds. This suggests that the shots were fired from at
least three BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers simultaneously.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of the examination of the incident site, the removed objects and the
submitted video recordings, the blast was caused by the explosion (or explosions) of a shell (or
shells).
7
[signature]
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the
submitted video recordings, it is possible to identify the specific type and sort of munitions as
122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shells (item
9M22U). These shells were fired from BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers.
• Object No. 2, which was removed during the examination of the incident site and
submitted for expert examination, bears the marking "559 76 6 KZh" and, below that, "1237",
where:
559 is the factory lot and assembly number;
76 is the year of manufacture;
6 KZh is the number of the powder factory. These markings are consistent with the
markings of rocket-propelled shells.
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site and the removed objects, the
epicenter of the explosion was 12 meters from the bus.
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects and the
submitted video recordings, the explosions were caused by munitions fired from BM-21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers.
• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the explosive traces described
in the incident site examination report, the objects removed during the examination of the
incident site, and the submitted video recordings, there were 88 shots from BM-21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers (as for the blast next to the bus, there was an explosion of one 122-mm
unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U)).
• The power of the 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive
fragmentation shell (item 9M22U) responsible for the blast that caused the damage to the bus
and traces on the ground and on the tree found during the examination of the incident site is
10.23 kg in TNT equivalent.
• Objects Nos. 1-4 and 6-9 comprise the standard body of a propulsion motor of a 122-mm
unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed
to hold two sections of the propulsion motor's powder charge and capable of producing
fragmentation elements upon the detonation of the main explosive charge.
Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15 are standard fragmentation elements of a 122-mm unguided
M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to inflict
losses on enemy personnel and unarmored equipment.
Object No. 10 is a fragment of the body of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocketpropelled
high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to inflict losses on enemy
personnel and unarmored equipment.
Object No. 5 is a propulsion motor of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled
high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to deliver the warhead to its target.
• Based on the results of the examination report dated 01/16/15, the angles of incidence of
the shells were 52-55 degrees. According to the firing table for M-21-OF rocket-propelled highexplosive
fragmentation shells, the firing distance of the munitions
54
8
[signature]
corresponds to 19,000 meters. According to the information contained in the incident site
examination report, the shots were probably fired from a location in the northeastern outskirts of
the city of Dokuchaievsk.
• Based on the video recordings submitted for expert examination, the question of how
many munitions were fired falls outside the expert's area of expertise. According to the
information contained in the examination report dated 01/16/15, a total of 88 shells were fired.
This suggests that the shots were fired from at least three BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket
launchers simultaneously (see the research section).
Exhibit: illustrations table (6 pages)
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
56/21-154 nt
01/19/15
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO EXPERT OPINION No. 63 of 01/18/2015
Illustration No. 1, packing of research objects Illustration No. 2, research object
Illustration No. 3, packing of research objects Illustration No. 4, research object
Illustration No. 5, markings on research
object
Illustration No. 6, markings on research
object
55
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO EXPERT OPINION No. 63 of 01/18/2015
Illustration No. 7, packing of research objects Illustration No. 8, research objects
Illustration No. 9, packing of research objects Illustration No. 10, research object
Illustration No. 11, research object
56
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO EXPERT OPINION No. 63 of 01/18/2015
Illustration No. 12, packing of research objects Illustration No. 13, research objects
Illustration No. 14, packing of research objects
Illustration No. 15, research object
57
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO EXPERT OPINION No. 63 of 01/18/2015
Illustration No. 16, packing of research objects
Illustration No. 17, research objects
58
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO EXPERT OPINION No. 63 of 01/18/2015
M-21OF SHELL
Body of
propulsion
motor
Propulsion
motor
Illustration No. 18 Illustration No. 19,
schematic drawing
59
Expert: [signature] V. Stasyuk
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO EXPERT OPINION No. 63 of 01/18/2015
Illustration No. 20, markings on research
object
Illustration No. 21, markings on research object
Illustration No. 22, markings on research object
Illustration No. 23, markings on research object
60
Annex 89
Map showing shell craters around the Buhas roadblock, which were marked by
investigators after inspecting the crime scene (dated 20 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

Annex 90
Record of crime scene inspection conducted by T.A. Belobokova, Lieutenant of the
Police and Senior Criminal Investigator with the Ordzhonikidze District Office of the
Mariupol City Department of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

CRIME SCENE
INSPECTION RECORD
City of Mariupol January 24, 2015
Inspection commenced at 11:30 a.m.
Inspection ended at 12:00 p.m.
Police Senior Lieutenant T.A. Belobokova, Investigator with the Investigative
Office of the Ordzhonikidze District Office of the Mariupol City Directorate of the
Central Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk
Oblast, [conducted a crime scene inspection] in the context of Criminal Case
No. 22015050000000047
(Specify the ruling of the investigating judge if the inspection is conducted at the residence or other
property of an individual; if the inspection is conducted prior to initiation of criminal proceedings, state the
details of the crime or incident report)
pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, and 223 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine:
In the presence of attesting witnesses:
1) Oleh Hryhorovych Tiplev, born in 1989, 37/42 Kievskaya Street, Mariupol
(First name, patronymic, last name, date of birth, address of residence)
2) Serhiy Oleksandrovych Sayanin, born in 1981, Mariupol
(First name, patronymic, last name, date of birth, address of residence)
who had their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine explained to them.
[…]
Findings of the inspection: (state the address of residence or other property
of the individual)
The site of inspection is the area in front of building No. 45/2 at Kievskaya
Street. It is a nine-story building with three entrances. It is linked with another
section of the building by an arch with a balcony above it. The area in front of
this building is located right behind the “Destkiy Mir” [Toy Store] store and the
“Virus” computer club. There are many glass fragments on the ground.
Virtually every window of this building shows visible damage to window panes:
glazing is either missing or cracked or half-broken. Entrance doors are made of
metal and do no show visible signs of damage. The roof of the building is intact
and shows no visible signs of damage. The building shows some damage
caused by fragments (with pockmarks dotting virtually the entire surface of the
building in the front and in the back). Upper stories of the building beginning
with the 5th story are more damaged. Balconies above the arch of the building
in question also show visible signs of damage.
No corpses were found in the area in front of this building.
The inspection then proceeded to the second part of the nine-story building at
45/1 Kievskaya Street. This building shows visible signs of damage: window
panes are missing in many apartments and the building surface is damaged by
shell fragments. The building roof shows no visible signs of damage. Other than
glass fragments, no extraneous objects were found in the area in front of this
building.
The inspection then proceeded to the area behind building No. 45/2 and
building No. 45/1. There is a kindergarten behind these buildings. The
kindergarten is ringed with a metal fence. Glass fragments were found on the
grounds of the kindergarten. No other signs of damage were found.
No corpses were found in the area inspected.
[…]
The inspection detected: [blank] (Specify evidence, items detected during
the inspection).
The items detected during the inspection were seized: [blank] (Specify
what items were detected in what order and how they were sealed)
The following equipment was used during the inspection: Canon camera
(Specify the use of photo or video equipment, other devices and specialpurpose
equipment and their specifications)
The inspection was conducted: In the daytime, not at dusk, without
precipitation, under natural lighting.
The record has been read, written down [blank] (comments from inspection
participants)
Participants:
1. Investigator Yu.I. Stilkin [Signature]
(First name, patronymic, last name) (Signature)
Attesting witnesses:
1. O.H. Tiplev [Signature]
(First name, patronymic, last name) (Signature)
2. S.O. Sayanin [Signature]
(First name, patronymic, last name) (Signature)
Inspection conducted by:
Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Ordzhonikidze District Office
[Signature] T.A. Belobokova
Annex 91
Donetsk Region Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, All
Necessary Measures Being Taken to Deal with the Consequences of Militants’
Shelling of Mariupol (25 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[state emblem of Ukraine]
NATIONAL DONESTK Back to main page
POLICE REGION www.npu.gov.ua
86 Prospekt Nakhimova, Mariupol, 87517 Ukraine
Tel +380 62 951 98 01, fax +380 62 947 48 15
e-mail: [email protected]
press enquiries: [email protected]
freedom of information requests: [email protected]
public enquiries: [email protected]
[…]
About the main directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs| Key agency sites | Citizens advice | Your
local officer | Contacts 05. 12.2018 UA RU EN
site menu, calendar, adverts: recruitment to police, hiring trainers]
[…]
Main/News archive
ALL NECESSARY MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MILITANTS’ SHELLING OF MARIUPOL
01.25.2015| 14:15 | Mariupol
Mariupol is slowly recovering after the city’s brutal shelling by the militants. The lawenforcement
agencies, municipal services, urban development companies and medical
institutions are devoting all their efforts to dealing with the horrific consequences and providing
assistance to those affected. It is already known that the shelling came from the occupied
territory of Sakhanka and the Lebedinsky Novoazovsky district.
Thirty people died in the shelling: 17 women, 12 men and one child: the 4-5 years old Stanislav
Kashin. The boy was found dead in a destroyed building.
Ninety-five people were wounded: 49 women, 37 men and 9 children. Doctors amputated 3-year-old
Milana’s leg.
Seventy-nine sites were damaged: 37 detached houses, 22 apartment blocks, 2 markets, 8 stores, a
post office, 2 bank branches, a pharmacy, a cafe and a service station.
Last night already, power supply was restored in Vostochny neighbourhood. Repair works continue.
According to the head of the Ministry of Internal affairs main regional directorate, Vyacheslav
Ambroskin, the affected area is being patrolled by 300 policemen, 6 motor patrol teams of the Sokil
special unit and 2 patrols from the Azov regiment. This is done to avoid adverse escalation and to
provide security for the public.
The general also praised the work of the hundreds of rescue workers from the Ministry of
Emergencies, who had put out 10 fires.
The Security Service of Ukraine Donetsk Regional directorate is conducting a pre-trial investigation
into the shelling. Criminal proceedings have been launched under Article 258 Pt 3 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (a terrorist act causing the loss of human life).
Public relations department,
Donetsk Region main directorate
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
When citing this article a hyperlink to npu.gov.ua is mandatory

Annex 92
Inspection Report, drafted by Mykhaylo Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at
the Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service
of Ukraine (25 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

13
INSPECTION REPORT
City of Donetsk January 25, 2015
Inspection started: 11:10 A.M.
Inspection completed: 04:55 P.M.
Major of Justice Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the
Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine,
having reviewed the evidence in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000047, entered in the
Unified Registry of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, based on the elements of crime
under part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, acting in compliance with Articles
104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, performed an on-site
inspection of the area (territory) located in Skhidnyi Mikroraion of the City of Mariupol, marked
as Sector No. 4 (delimited by Marshala Zhukova Street on the east, 9 Travnya Street on the
north, Olimpiyska Street on the west, and Nova Street on the south), for the purpose of
identifying shell impact points (craters) following the artillery shelling of Skhidnyi Mikroraion
on January 24, 2015.
The inspection was conducted in natural daylight conditions with photography performed
using an Olympus SP–510 UZ camera with automatic settings and a 1 GB Fujifilm memory card.
The inspection has produced the following findings:
The inspection began in the southern portion of Kyivska Street in Ordzhonikidzevskyi Raion
of the City of Mariupol. The inspection has produced the following findings (craters are
discussed below in relation to specific addresses):
(1) Number 32 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the middle of the roadway on
Kyivska Street at a distance of 12 meters from number 32 and at a distance of 20 meters
from the right side of number 3 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape
with a maximum size of 15 × 45 cm. Mangled metal fragments with ragged edges are
situated in the center of the crater. One of the fragments is cylindrical and shows the
remains of an external thread. The surface of the object is marked with the letters “KV”
in black paint and with a stamped number “1091.” The asphalt paving near the crater
has suffered damage in the shape of furrows sized at 130 cm × 120 cm × 150 cm and
running in the eastern direction. After the shell fragments were recovered, the depth
was measured at approximately 50 cm; when a wooden bar was inserted in the center of
the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate
direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 45° to 50°. The
metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with
thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend “Package No. __” and the
signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
14
(2) Number 44 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the middle of an asphalt road, in the
vicinity of the intersection of Kyivska Street and Stanislavska Street at a distance of 23
meters from the left side of number 5 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 13 meters
from number 44 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum
size of 39 × 50 cm. In the center of the crater, cylindrical metal fragments were found,
appearing deformed and coated with soot both on the surface and inside. The tail piece
of the cylindrical object is pointed toward the side of the building at number 5 Kyivska
Street, facing east. The maximum diameter of the cylindrical portion of the object is
140 cm. The asphalt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape of furrows
sized at approximately 120 cm × 115 cm × 160 cm and running in the eastern direction.
After the shell fragments were recovered, the depth was measured at approximately 60
cm; when a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the
probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern,
with an angle of entry at about 45°. The metal objects were recovered and packaged in
a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying
the legend “Package No. __” and the signature and an explanatory note of the
investigating officer.
(3) Number 34 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the asphalt pavement in the middle
of the roadway in Kyivska Street at a distance of 13 meters from number 34 Kyivska
Street, at a distance of 22 meters from number 44 Kyivska Street, and at a distance of 9
meters from crater No. 1. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size
of 45 cm × 45 cm. Four (4) broken metal pieces with a maximum size of 12 cm × 4 cm
and a minimum size of 107 cm × 5 cm [sic] were found in the center of the crater. The
asphalt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape of furrows sized at 125
cm × 115 cm × 160 cm and running in the eastern direction. The crater is partially filled
with asphalt debris and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure the depth. The
metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with
thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend “Package No. __” and the
signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
(4) Number 30 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in a dirt road at a distance of 7 meters
from number 30 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 27 meters from number 3 Kyivska
Street, and at a distance of 4.5 meters from high-voltage transmission tower No. 17.
The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 23 cm × 18 cm; when a
wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis
of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle
of entry at approximately 40° and the crater depth at approximately 120 cm. The dirt
paving near the crater has damage in the shape of furrows sized at 137 cm × 124 cm ×
143 cm.
15
(5) Number 3 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in an asphalt pedestrian footpath at a
distance of 7 meters from number 3 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 22 meters from
number 32 Kyivska Street, and at a distance of 9 meters from crater No.1. The crater
has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 53x54 cm. The asphalt paving near
the crater has damage in the shape of furrows sized at 155 cm × 150 cm × 180 cm and
running in the eastern direction. The crater is partially filled with asphalt debris and dirt
and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure the depth.
(6) Number 1a Kyivska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 35 meters from the
service station located at number 1a Kyivska Street and at a distance of 120 meters
from number 3 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum
size of 33 cm × 27 cm. The dirt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape
of furrows sized at 155 cm × 150 cm × 180 cm. When a wooden bar was inserted in the
center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the
approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 40°.
The approximate depth of the crater is 120 cm.
(7) Number 44 Kyivska Street: A crater is located near the intersection of Kyivska Street
and Stanislavska Street at a distance of 6 meters from number 44 Kyivska Street and at
a distance of 16 meters from number 45 Stanislavska Street. The crater has an irregular
oval shape with a maximum size of 65 cm × 60 cm. The sidewalk pavement near the
crater is damaged, with both the sidewalk slabs and the ground appearing broken. When
a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable
axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an
angle of entry at about 40°. The approximate depth of the crater is 50 cm.
(8) Number 5 Kyivska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 15 meters from the first
entrance door of the building at number 7 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 17 meters
from the 4th entrance door of the building at number 5 Kyivska Street. The crater has an
irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 35 cm × 19 cm. When a wooden bar was
inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell
penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry
at about 40°. The approximate depth of the crater is 150 cm. The ground around the
crater is damaged within an area of approximately 150 cm × 146 cm × 170 cm.
(9) Number 46 Kyivska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 10 meters from the rear
of the building at number 46 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 24 meters from the rear
of the building at number 7 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with
a maximum size of 75 cm × 100 cm. The curbstones near the crater are damaged and
partially shattered within the crater. The crater is partially filled with dirt and curbstone
debris and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure its depth.
16
(10) Number 33а Kyivska Street: A cone-shaped metal object was found on a lawn at a
distance of 10 meters from Tyhrenya toy store located in the building at number 33a
Kyivska Street and 43 meters from number 66 Kyivska Street. The object has a
truncated top and is about 10.8 cm long. The maximum diameter is 5 cm; the minimum
diameter is 1.8 cm. There is a hole with a diameter of 22 mm on the inside. The surface
of the lower portion is clearly marked with the stamped lettering “MRV–U; 42–M; 46–
83.” The metal object was recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn
together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend “Package No.
__” and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
(11) Number 7 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of 32 meters
from the right side of the building at number 7 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 27
meters from the right side of the building at number 11 Kyivska Street near the building
occupied by Pryvatbank. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size
of 90 cm × 140 cm. The crater is partially filled with dirt and, for that reason, it was
impossible to measure its depth.
(12) Number 7а Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the ground and partially on a
walkway paved with slabs at a distance of 5 meters from the central entrance to
Nakhodka toy store located in the building at number 7а Kyivska Street and at a
distance of 60 meters from number 50 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval
shape with the maximum size of 43 cm × 90 cm and about 70 cm deep. When a wooden
bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell
penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry
at about 35° to 40°.
(13) Kyivska Street in the vicinity of the Church of St. Volodymyr the Great: A crater is
located in the ground at a distance of 15 meters from the central entrance to Nakhodka
toy store located in the building at number 7а Kyivska Street and at a distance of 30
meters from number 48b Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the
maximum size of 43 cm × 51 cm. The curbstone near the crater was found to be
damaged and partially shattered within the crater. The crater is partially filled with dirt
and curbstone debris and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure its depth.
(14) Number 240 Stanyslavska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it is
damaged, namely, the hallway roof is completely wrecked and the walls of the rooms
situated on the first and second floors are damaged. At the time of inspection, no crater
caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building.
(15) Number 127 Olimpiyska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 7 meters from
number 127 Olimpiyska Street and at a distance of 23 meters from number 238
Olimpiyska Street, near a public transit stop shelter hit by an electric line bar. The
crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 80 cm × 100 cm and is about
17
20 cm deep. The curbstone at the location is partially damaged and shifted from its
original position approximately along the shell's trajectory.
(16) Number 137/2 Olimpiyska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it
was damaged, namely, the roof of the building was completely destroyed and the
building’s interior room burned down. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a
shell impact was found in the area around the building.
(17) Number 3 Rivnynna Street: A crater is located at a distance of 3 meters from number
3 Rivnynna Street and at a distance of 8 meters from number 4 Rivnynna Street. The
crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 33 cm × 23 cm and is
approximately 80 cm deep. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater
in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was
established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 35°.
(18) Number 25 Rivnynna Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it was
damaged, namely, one of the walls was partially damaged with bricks loosened and
fallen out and windows broken. A crater caused by shell impact was found in the
ground immediately in front of the foundation under the damaged wall; the crater was
almost completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
(19) Number 31 Rivnynna Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it was
damaged, namely, the roof was partially wrecked with open gaps in the wall and the
floor in one of the rooms. A crater caused by an artillery shell was located under the
floor in the room; the crater was completely filled with construction debris at the time
of inspection.
(20) Number 32 Landshaftna Street: A crater is located in the area surrounding the
building, paved with sidewalk slabs, at a distance of 6 meters from number 32
Landshaftna Street and at a distance of 17 meters from the rear of the building at
number 48/2 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular conical shape with the
maximum size of 180 cm × 175 cm and the depth of about 130 cm. When a wooden bar
was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell
penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry
at about 35°. The curbstone and the sidewalk slabs near the crater were damaged and
partially wrecked within the crater.
(21) Number 32 Landshaftna Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it
was damaged, namely, the wall near the entrance to the building was damaged and
partially collapsed. A crater caused by an artillery shell was located at a distance of 1
meter from the building’s wall facing Landshaftna Street; the crater was completely
filled with wall bricks at the time of inspection.
(22) Number 48/2 Kyivska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that a tworoom
apartment, number 39, was located on the 9th floor; one of the apartment rooms,
18
designated as bedroom for purposes of this document, had a damaged ceiling that was
partially wrecked; the building’s roof was also damaged. The ceiling in the room had an
irregularly shaped gap, sized approximately at 35 cm × 44 cm. There was no glass pane
in the window frame; a piece of polyethylene film was covering the window. The floor
in the room was covered with construction debris; on the floor, at a distance of 80 cm
from the window wall and 110 cm from the wall on the left of the entrance to the room,
three metal fragments were found, sized from 10.5 cm × 2.5 cm to 18.8 cm × 7.5 cm.
The largest fragment was marked with a stamp, “96 VNK 3.” The metal objects were
recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed
with a paper label carrying the legend “Package No. __” and the signature and an
explanatory note of the investigating officer.
(23) Number 48/2 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of 6
meters from the rear of the building at number 48/2 Kyivska Street and at a distance of
17 meters from number 32 Landshaftna Street. The crater has an irregular conical shape
with the maximum size of 24 cm × 38 cm; the crater was partially filled with dirt at the
time of inspection. When drawing a thrust line, it was found that the crater was most
likely caused by an artillery shell that damaged the roof and a portion of apartment
number 39 at 48/2 Kyivska Street.
(24) Number 216 Stanislavskoho Street: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of
13 meters from number 216 Stanislavskoho Street and at a distance of 6 meters from
number 214 Stanislavskoho Street. The crater has an irregular conical shape, with a
maximum size of 20 cm × 27 cm and a crater depth of approximately 110 cm; when a
wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis
of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle
of entry at about 40°.
(25) Number 1 Provulok Yasnyi Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it
was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and partially wrecked and the chimney
was ruined. It was impossible to find the crater or any shell parts at the time of
inspection.
(26) Number 48 Landshaftna Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it
was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and partially wrecked and a wall and a
window were damaged (at the side of the entrance to the courtyard where the building
is located) and partially wrecked. It was also found that a portion of the fence was
ruined within the area of the damaged building wall. In addition, a portion of the right
side of the garage, located immediately under the roof on the left of the building, was
found to be wrecked too. It was impossible to find the crater or any shell parts at the
time of inspection.
19
(27) Number 48/3 Kyivska Street (48b on the map), at a distance of 16 meters from the
building located at number 48/3 Kyivska Street, 38 meters from the building located at
number 46 Kyivska Street, and 1.5 meters from the garage, there was a crater in the
ground, sized approximately at 18 cm × 20 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and
about 50 cm deep; when a white plastic bar was inserted in the center of the crater in
the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was
established as eastern.
(28) Number 48/3 Kyivska Street (48b on the map), at a distance of 41 meters from the
building located at number 48/3 Kyivska Street and 43 meters from the building located
at number 46 Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the soccer field, filled with dirt, with
the maximum size of 57 cm × 73 cm. The percussive force of the explosive resulted in
black traces, about 2 meters long, on the synthetic covering of the soccer field, from the
eastern direction. At a distance of 15 meters to the north-east of the crater, 8 metal
objects were found, each about 2 cm in size. The metal objects were recovered and
packaged in a plastic bag with an opening sewn together with thread and sealed with a
paper label carrying the legend “Package No. ___” and the signature and an
explanatory note of the investigating officer.
(29) Number 241 Stanislavskoho Street: At a distance of 6 meters from the building
located at number 241 Stanislavskoho Street and 56 meters from the Kyivska Street
roadway, a crater approximately 40 cm × 36 cm (crosswise diameter measurements)
and about 30 cm deep was found in the ground.
(30) Number 237 Stanislavskoho Street: A visual inspection of said building showed that
it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and broken through. At the time of
inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around said
building.
(31) Number 239 Stanislavskoho Street: At a distance of 12 meters from the building
located at number 239 Stanislavskoho Street and 87 meters from the Kyivska Street
roadway, there was a crater in the roadway between numbers 239 and 237,
approximately 20 cm × 25 cm in size (crosswise diameter measurements). The
percussive force of the explosive resulted in damage to the asphalt road pavement,
toward the east, about 1 meter long. When a white plastic bar was inserted in the center
of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate
direction was established as eastern.
(32) Number 28 Landshaftna Street (number 231 Stanislavskoho Street): A visual
inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged
and broken through; a wall collapsed; and the windows were shattered. At the time of
inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the
building.
20
(33) Number 22 Landshaftna Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it
was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and broken through; a wall collapsed; and
the windows were shattered. At a distance of 1 meter from the building wall facing
Landshaftna Street, there was a crater caused by an artillery shell; the crater was
completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
(34) Number 43 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 6 meters from the building located at
number 43 Landshaftna Street, 9 meters from the Landshaftna Street roadway, and 9.5
meters from the building located at number 37 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater
about 26 cm × 25 cm (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in
the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the
approximate direction was established as eastern.
(35) Number 43 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 3.5 meters from the right corner of
the building located at number 43 Landshaftna Street, farthermost from the roadway,
there was a crater that was completely filled with construction debris at the time of
inspection.
(36) Number 43 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 6 meters from the rear wall of the
building located at number 43 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater that was
completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
(37) Number Landshaftna 21 Street: At a distance of 6.5 meters from the building located
at number Landshaftna Street 21 and 7 meters from the building located at number 12
Landshaftna Street, there was a crater in the roadway, sized at approximately 26 cm ×
25 cm (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the
crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate
direction was established as eastern.
(38) Number 13 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 29 meters from the Landshaftna
Street roadway, near the left wall of the building at number 13, there was a crater in the
ground, sized at approximately 14 cm × 22 cm (crosswise diameter measurements).
When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis
of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
(39) Number 11 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 6 meters from the building located at
number 11 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater in the roadway that appeared as
crushed asphalt paving at the time of inspection.
(40) Number 1а Kyivska Street: A visual inspection of the building established that the
building was damaged, namely, a wall was damaged and broken through. At the time of
inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the
building.
(41) Number 1а Kyivska Street: At a distance of 24 meters from the building located at
number 1a Kyivska Street and 20 meters from the Peyzazhna Street roadway, there was
a crater in the ground sized at approximately 38 cm × 28 cm (crosswise diameter
measurements).
21
(42) Number 1а Kyivska Street: At a distance of 10 meters from the building located at
number 1a Kyivska Street and 47 meters from the Peyzazhna Street roadway, there was
a crater in the ground, its shape was irregular and no measurements could be taken
during the inspection.
(43) Number 17 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street: At a distance of 1.5 meters from the
building located at number 17 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street and 14 meters from the
roadway, there was a crater sized at approximately 22 cm × 28 cm (crosswise diameter
measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of
the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as
eastern.
(44) Number 15 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street: At a distance of 3 meters from the rear
wall of the building, there was a crater in the ground, caused by an artillery shell, that
was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to
take measurements.
(45) Number 44 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street: At a distance of 5 meters from number
44, there was a crater, caused by an artillery shell, that was completely filled with dirt at
the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
(46) Number 21 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street: A visual inspection of the building
established that the building was damaged, namely, a wall and the roof were damaged
and broken through and the window panes were shattered. At the time of inspection, no
crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building,
(47) Number 32 Peyzazhna Street: A visual inspection of the building established that the
building was damaged, namely, the bricks in the side wall of the building collapsed. At
the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around
the building.
(48) Number 32 Kyivska Street: At a distance of 11 meters from the building located at
number 32 Kyivska Street and 3 meters from the roadway, there was a crater that was
completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take
measurements.
(49) Number 32 Kyivska Street: At a distance of 17 meters from the building located at
number 32 Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the roadway that was completely filled
with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements. The
percussive force of the explosive resulted in black traces in the asphalt road pavement,
about 1 meter to 1.5 meters long, toward the east.
(50) Number 32 Kyivska Street: At a distance of 14 meters north of an earlier crater, there
was a crater in the roadway that was completely filled with dirt at the time of
inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements. The percussive force of the
explosive resulted in black traces in the asphalt road pavement, about 1 meter to 1.5
meters long, toward the east.
22
(51) Number 19v 9 Travnya Street: A visual inspection of the building established that the
building was damaged, namely, the side wall of the attic located above the 9th floor
destroyed.
(52) Number 5 9 Travnya Street: A visual inspection of the building established that the
building was damaged, namely, the side wall next to the window located on the 9th
floor destroyed after being hit by an artillery shell.
(53) Number 17 9 Travnya Street: A visual inspection of the building established that the
building was damaged, namely, the attic destroyed after being hit by an artillery shell.
(54) Number 3а Kyivska Street: At a distance of 20 meters from the building located at
number 3a Kyivska Street and 10 meters from the roadway, there was a crater in the
sidewalk sized at approximately 28 cm × 30 cm (crosswise diameter measurements).
When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis
of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
(55) Number 3а Kyivska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it was
damaged, namely, the side wall of the first entrance lobby was wrecked next to the
window of the 2nd floor flight of stairs as a result of a hit by an artillery shell.
(56) Number 3b Kyivska Street: At a distance of 1 meter from the building, on the
courtyard side, there was a crater in the ground that was completely filled with dirt at
the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
(57) Number 40b Peyzazhna Street: At a distance of 30 meters from the building located
at number 40b Peyzazhna Street and 35 meters from the building located at number 3a
Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the sports playground sized at approximately 23
cm × 18 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and 75 cm deep. When a bar was
inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell
penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
(58) Number 40b Peyzazhna Street: At a distance of 38 meters from the building located
eastward of number Peyzazhna Street 40b, there was a crater in the ground, sized at
approximately 15 cm × 16 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and 75 cm deep.
When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis
of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
(59) Number 3v Kyivska Street: At a distance of 20 meters from the building located
eastward of number 3v Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the ground that was
completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take
measurements.
(60) Number 7а Kyivska Street: At a distance of 20 meters from “Nakhodka” store located
eastward of number 7а Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the ground sized at
approximately 23 cm × 20 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and 80 cm deep.
23
When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis
of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
(61) Number 147 Olimpiyska Street: In the building courtyard, at a distance of 4 meters
from the left side of the building and 3 meters from the fence separating the courtyard
from the premises of number 3 Provulok Yasnyi Street, there is a crater in the ground
that has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 23 cm × 35 cm. At the time
of inspection the crater was partially filled with construction debris, which made it
impossible to measure its depth.
(62) Number 145 Olimpiyska Street: At a distance of 4 meters from the entrance to the
building located at number 147 Olimpiyska Street and 1 meter from the rear of the
building located at number 145 Olimpiyska Street, there is a crater in the ground that
has an irregular oval shape and is sized at approximately 65 cm × 70 cm. At the time of
inspection the crater was partially filled with construction debris, which made it
impossible to measure its depth.
(63) Number 25 Rivnynna Street: A crater is located at a distance of 4.5 meters from
number 25 Rivnynna Street and at a distance of 12 meters from number 23 Rivnynna
Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 40 cm × 60 cm
and is approximately 30 cm deep. The crater was partially filled with dirt.
A diagram (map) showing the locations of the craters referred to in this Report was plotted
during the investigative operation, which is attached to this Record as Appendix 1.
The inspection was conducted with photography performed using an Olympus SP–510 UZ
camera with automatic settings and a 1 GB Fujifilm memory card; the resulting photos will be
attached to this Record, when ready, in the form of a photo table (Appendix 2).
(Inspection of craters located on privately-owned premises was performed subject to consent
by owners.)
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department,
the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [signature] M.M. Onyshchenko

Annex 93
Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015 09:00 a.m.).
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
at 09:00 a.m. January 25, 2015
1. Operational situation.
[redacted]
1.2. Strengthening and comprehensive support of the Russian Armed Forces group
and illegal armed formations (IAF) in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176
USREOU [Unified State Register of
Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine]
code 22990919
01.25.2015 ref No 222/3D/9010203
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 2
2
[redacted]
On January 23-24 of this year, the following was brought in from the territory of the Russian
Federation:
through the town of Izvaryne in the direction of Krasnodon-Luhansk – five
columns of military equipment, comprising: 128 tented trucks (with property and
ammunition), 11 refuelers, four Pantsir-S1 surface–to-air and anti-aircraft artillery missile
systems, one Tor missile system and two charge loaders. A column of 40 empty cargo trucks
has set off from Ukraine for the Russian Federation via Izvaryne;
through the town of Dmytrivka in the direction of Snizhne – two columns
comprising: 15 assault fighting vehicles, 48 cargo trucks, 40 cars and 26 traction units;
through the town of Kuznetsi in the direction of Novoazovsk (partly moving
towards Telmanove through Guselshchikovo) – a column of military equipment comprising
35 tanks, 35 armored fighting vehicles, 40 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and 40
Ural trucks.
[redacted]
1.3 Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory
The following have been engaged in air surveillance and airborne control in the
eastern regions of Ukraine:
two tactical unmanned aerial vehicles – in the vicinity of Shchastya (Luhansk
Region) and Mariupol (Donetsk Region)
Su-24MR reconnaissance plane (Marinovka) in the air space of Volgograd and
Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov;
two A-50U long-range target detection and guidance aircraft (Taganrog) – in the
air space of Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory. On completion of their missions, the
planes landed at Yeysk airfield.
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 3
3
[redacted]
_
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 4
4
[redacted]
__________________________________________________________________________
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 94
Record of area inspection conducted by V.V. Romanenko, Captain of Justice and
Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of
the SSU (25 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[signature]
INSPECTION REPORT
City of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast January 25, 2015
Inspection started: 10:30 AM
Inspection completed: 07:05 PM
Captain of Justice V. V. Romanenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations
Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having reviewed
the evidence in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000047 under part 3 of Article 258 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine and acting in compliance with Articles 104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, with the participation of the following specialist:
1. Serhiy Volodymyrovych Dmitriyev, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rocket Artillery Battalion,
Military Unit A2167, date of birth: September 30, 1981, residing in Military Unit A2167
at Konovaltsya Street, Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast and serving in the armed forces since
1999, who has been advised of his rights and duties under Article 71 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of Ukraine,
[signature]
performed an area inspection in Skhidnyi Mikroraion, Ordzhonikidzevskyi Raion [administrative
district] of the City of Mariupol, which was subjected to artillery shelling on January 24, 2015.
Before launching the inspection, the aforesaid individuals were advised of the content of
Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which provides that a person may not be held liable for
refusing to give testimony or explanations concerning himself, members of his family or close
relatives, as identified by law.
[signature]
Before launching the inspection, the aforesaid individuals were advised of their right to be
present at all events performed in the process of inspection and to make comments that must be
entered in the report. The individuals participating in the inspection were also advised of the
requirements of part 3 of Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine as to their duty
to refrain from disclosure of any information related to the procedural action and notified of the
use of recording equipment, i.e., Canon А480 digital camera with an XD memory card and of the
terms of its application using automatic settings.
[signature]
The inspection has produced the following findings:
The object of the inspection is an area situated in Skhidnyi Mikroraion, Ordzhonikidzevskyi
Raion of the City of Mariupol that was subjected to artillery shelling on January 24, 2015, in
particular, individual craters located within that area and possibly resulting from impacts of
artillery shells.
16
2
No. 1
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 1
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by O. V. Martynyuk, Senior
Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, under number 2). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator
(serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 1 is located
at the following coordinates: x = 5221718, у = 7399958. On the ground, the crater is located on a
separate traffic lane on Olimpiyska Street at a distance of 13 meters eastward of the building
located at number 324 Olimpiyska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 1 and determined that the angle was 14–20 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 1 and
found that it equaled 44 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 17,400 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a 1979 topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the
crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 1 was most likely fired from the area
marked on the map as grid square 5223 7417.
No. 2
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 2
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko,
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, Directorate of the Donetsk
Regional Security Service of Ukraine, under number 2). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS
navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 2
is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221169, y = 740315. On the ground, the crater is
located on the Kyivska Street roadway at a distance of 20 meters westward of the building
located at number 5 Kyivska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
3
[signature]
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 2 and determined that the angle was 14–30 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit the aforesaid crater
No. 2 and found that it equaled 46 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry
of Defense Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a
rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 17,800
meters from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 2 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5222 7418.
No. 3
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 3
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by D. O. Naumov, Senior
Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, under number 8). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator
(serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 3 is located
at the following coordinates: x = 5221719, у = 7400299. On the ground, the crater is located in
the area of a children’s playground in front of a multi-storey building located at number 68
Kyivska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, at a distance of 20 meters westward of the building.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 3 and determined that the angle was 13–17 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit the aforesaid crater
No. 3 and found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry
18
4
of Defense Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a
rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800
meters from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 3 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5224 7417.
No. 4
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 4
(referred to in the inspection record executed on January 25, 2015 by D. O. Naumov, Senior
Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, under number 18). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator
(serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 4 is located
at the following coordinates: x = 5221842, у = 7400143. On the ground, the crater is located in
the area of a children’s playground of Dzhereltse [Little Spring] Preschool No. 160 located at
number 171 Olimpiyska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast at a distance of 20 meters eastward of
the building.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 4 and determined that the angle was 13–00 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 4 and
found that it equaled 46 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 17,800 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 4 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5224 7418.
No. 5
5
[signature]
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 5
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko,
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 6). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS
navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 5
is located at the following coordinates: x = 5220891, у = 7400285. On the ground, the crater is
located at a distance of 6 meters south of the intersection of Kyivska Street and Peyzazhna Street
in Ordzhonikidzevskyi Raion of the City of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 5 and determined that the angle was 13–98 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 5 and
found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 5 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5222 7417.
No. 6
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 6
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko,
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 12). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS
navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 6
is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221362, y = 7400332. On the ground, the crater is
located on the shoulder of the Kyivska Street roadway at a distance of 6 meters westward of
Znakhidka [Discovery] store.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
20
6
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 6 and determined that the angle was 13–35 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 6 and
found that it equaled 40 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,400 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 6 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5224 7416.
No. 7
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 7
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by O. V. Martynyuk, Senior
Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, under number 10). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator
(serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 7 is located
at the following coordinates: x = 5221925, у = 7399668. On the ground, the crater is located at a
distance of 1.5 meters eastward of the residential building located at number 3 1st Nizhynskyi
Proyizd, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 7 and determined that the angle was 13–83 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 7 and
found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
7
[signature]
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 7 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5224 7416.
No. 8
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 8
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko,
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 17). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS
navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 8
is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221332, у = 7399977. On the ground, the crater is
located on the Rivnynna Street roadway at a distance of 6 meters north of the building located at
number 3 Rivnynna Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 8 and determined that the angle was 14–26 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 8 and
found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 8 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5222 7416.
No. 9
The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 9
(referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko,
22
8
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 27). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS
navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 9,
is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221349, у = 7400451. On the ground, the crater is
located at a distance of 42 meters north of the building located at number 13 Kyivska Street,
Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic
aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a
measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell
that hit crater No. 9 and determined that the angle was 14–33 mils.
In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR–1 level gage, a bar
inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the “basic bar”), and two other bars positioned
horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and
applied the following formula: α = arccos × ((b2 + c2 – a2) / 2bc), where α is the shell's angle of
fall; b is the hypotenuse; c is the horizontal cathetus, and a is the vertical cathetus of the
reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 9 and
found that it equaled 41 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense
Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocketpropelled
shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,600 meters
from the crater.
Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated
aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory
length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and
found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 9 was most likely fired from the area marked
on the map as grid square 5222 7417.
Thus, given the aforesaid data obtained as a result of the investigative operation in question,
specialist S. V. Dmitriyev stated that the artillery shells that caused the craters in the area of
Skhidnyi Mikroraion, Ordzhonikidzevskyi Raion of the City of Mariupol, were most likely
fired from the following two areas:
− Area 1 (according to the data obtained from craters Nos. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9): a field located
3 km to the north-east of the village of Sakhanka, Novoazovskyi Raion, Donetsk Oblast,
[grid squares] 5222 7416, 5222 7417, 5223 7417, and 5222 7418 on the topographic map
with a scale of 1:50000.
− Area 2 (according to the data obtained from craters Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7): a field located 3
km to the north-east of the village of Leninske, Novoazovskyi Raion, Donetsk Oblast,
namely, in grid squares 5224 7416, 5224 7417, and 5224 7418 on the topographic map
with a scale of 1:50000.
The above area map with a scale of 1:50000 (dated 1979 and showing the city of Mariupol,
Ukraine as the city of Zhdanov, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), on which the specialist
9
[signature]
plotted the flight trajectory of the shells, is attached to the Report as an appendix.
This investigative operation used photography and all participants of the investigative
operation were notified to this effect before the operation commenced. When the photos are
ready, they will be attached to this Report as a photo table.
All participants of the investigative operation have been advised of the method of familiarizing
themselves with the contents of the records, i.e., by providing a written report for personal
review.
[signature]
All participants in the action in proceedings have familiarized themselves with this report by
way of personal review. Statements, notes, or additions: None
Participants:
[signature:] S. V. Dmitriyev
[signature]
Captain of Justice V. Romanenko
Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department
The Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine

Annex 95
Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/0373 (11 February 2015 09:00 a.m.).
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
at 09:00 a.m. February 11, 2015
1. Operational situation.
1.1. Concentrations of troops, arms and military equipment in the Russian regions
adjacent to the Ukrainian border
[redacted]
The following concentrations have been confirmed:
[redacted]
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176
USREOU [Unified State Register
of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine]
code 22990919
02.11.2015 ref No 222/3D/90/0373
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 2
2
In the field camp near the village of Dolotynka, 5 km west of Millerovo – arms and
equipment (including four 300 m Smerch multiple rocket launchers not previously
registered). Numbers decreased: armored fighting vehicles – by 2; 122 mm Grad multiple
rocket launchers – by 18, trucks – by 23 units.
Assessment: Changes in the number of arms and equipment concentrated near
Millerovo are caused by their concentration and further movement to the temporarily
occupied territory of Ukraine to strengthen the military capability of the Russian armed
forces group and illegal armed formations.
[redacted]
1.2. Confirmation of artillery reconnaissance resources present in the temporarily
occupied territories of Ukraine.
[redacted] in the vicinity of Krasnyi Luch (Luhansk Region) there are concentrations
of artillery reconnaissance units operating ground surveillance radars SNAR-10
“Leopard” and SNAR-10M “Pantera.”
Assessment: Using means of artillery reconnaissance provides the enemy with greater
efficiency in detecting ATO forces and correcting artillery fire. We can expect this technology
to be moved to active combat locations in Debaltseve area.
1.3. Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory
The following have been engaged in air surveillance and airborne control in the
eastern regions of Ukraine:
Nine tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, in the following areas: Horlivka (two),
Horlivka-Debaltseve (two), Amvrosiyivka – Debaltseve, Komsomolske – Novoazovsk,
Artemivsk – Kramatorsk, Sartana – Kominternove, Pavlopil – Sakhanka (Donetsk Region);
Two long-range target detection and guidance aircraft, A-50 (Krymsk) and A-50U
(Armavir, two missions per plane) – in the air space of Rostov Region and Krasnodar
Territory. On completion of their missions, the aircraft landed at Yeysk (A-50) and Taganrog
(A-50U).
Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft (Kursk) – in the air space of Kursk, Belgorod and
Bryansk Regions;
Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft (Buturlinovka) in the air space of Voronezh,
Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk Regions;
Assessment: The flying missions of Su-24MR and Il-20 are part of the Russian
command’s measures to monitor the air waves in the northeastern areas of Ukraine so as to
get a more accurate idea of changes in the operational structure
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 3
3
of the Ukrainian security forces involved in the anti-terrorist operation.
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 4
4
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 5
5
[redacted]
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Annex 96
Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Martyniuk, Lieutenant Colonel
of Justice and Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast
Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
INSPECTION REPORT
City of Donetsk January 25, 2015
Inspection commenced: 11:10 AM
Inspection ended: 4:55 PM
Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martynyuk, a special senior investigator
with the Investigations Department at the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine, having examined the files of Criminal Proceeding No. 22015050000000047, entered into
the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations on 01/24/2015, based on elements of the crime
provided for by Article 258(3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, pursuant to Articles 104, 105,
106, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, conducted an inspection of the
locality (area) located in the Skhidnyy microdistrict of Mariupol, provisionally designated as
Sector No. 2 (bound by vul. Olimpiyska (to the east), vul. Tahanrozka (to the north), vul. Ternova
and vul. 130-y Tahanrohskoy Dyvyziyi (to the west), and vul. Nezhynska and provulok
Zvenihorodskyy (to the south), in order to identify shell craters following the artillery shelling of
the Skhidnyy microdistrict that took place on 01/24/15.
The inspection was carried out in natural daylight with the use of photography on a Sony-
Cyber Shot camera with a Transcend 2 GB memory card and automatic settings.
The inspection found the following:
The inspection began on the southern part of vul. Olimpiyska and established the following
(shell craters were examined in relation to specific property addresses):
1) 316 vul. Olimpiyska: at a distance of 5 m from the building and 8 meters from the
roadway, on the sidewalk alongside the building there is a shell crater measuring
approximately 35x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 60
cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of
the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the
angle of entry is approximately 40°.
2. 324 vul. Olimpiyska: at a distance of 15 m from the building, to the left of the direction
of road traffic near the median on vul. Olimpiyska, there is a shell crater measuring
approximately 50x35 cm (damage to the asphalt) with a cylindrical metal object
(probably a shell fragment), the visible section of which is 20 cm long, protruding at
an angle of 45°-50°. Around the shell there are also metal elements of the shell casing.
Upon removing these object from the shell crater, it was determined that the cylindrical
object (probably the tail of the shell) has a length of 24 cm, while the casing element,
also cylindrical in shape with jagged edges, has an approximate length of 70 cm.
3) 326 vul. Olimpiyska: on the grounds of the property to the right of the building
(standing with one’s back to vul. Olimpiyska), at a distance of
1
2.5 meters from the building and 21 m from the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska at a height
of approximately 30-40 cm there is damage to the foundation (chipping) measuring
50x60 cm, under which, to the right, in an approximately east-to-west direction, there
is damage to the concrete in the form of a crater measuring approximately 50x50 cm
(cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 5 cm. Two metal objects
(fragments were found and removed from this crater: one measuring 45x10 cm and
bearing the numbers “18T-86-179-SV" and “V-49”, and other measuring 20x10 and
bearing the number “4 18 V I N".
4) 19 prov. Nizhynskyy: in the far right corner from the entrance from the lane to the
property at a distance of 1.5 m from the fence of the property located at 91 vul.
Kuzbaska there is a crater in the earth measuring approximately 15x25 cm (cross
section diameter), with a depth of approximately 90 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust
into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the shell’s probable axis of entry;
the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is
approximately 35-40°.
5) 21 prov. Nizhynskyy: to the left of the building (standing with one’s back to vul.
Olimpiyska) there are traces of the impact of a shell on the shed, which was completely
destroyed by the blast. At the time of inspection, it was not possible to identify a crater
or remnants of the shell.
6. 404 vul. Olimpiyska: at a distance of 4 m from the iron gate and 5 meters from the
southern corner of the building, on the sidewalk alongside the gate between the building
and the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska, and at a distance of 9 m from the roadway, there
is a shell crater measuring approximately 40 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the
center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate
direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 40°.
7. 404 vul. Olimpiyska: at a distance of 2.5 m from the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska,
opposite the right edge of the building (standing with one’s back to vul. Olimpiyska),
there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25-22 cm (cross section
diameter), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into
the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the
approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately
45°.
8. 131a and 125a Kuzbaska (a lane between properties): at a distance of 16 m from the
roadway of vul. Kuzbaska, in the center of the lane between the property fences, there
is a shell crater in the earth and the asphalt measuring approximately 35x35 cm (cross
section diameter), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust
into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the
approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately
35-45°.
2
9. 137 Kuzbaska: in the center of the garden behind the main building opposite vul.
Kuzbaska, at a distance of 3 m from an outbuilding that was half-destroyed by the blast,
there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 35x25 cm (cross section
diameter), with a depth of approximately 170 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into
the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the
approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately
45°.
10. 3 Proyizd 1-y Nizhynskyy: at a distance of 5 m from the entrance gate and 1.5 m from
the building in the leveling concrete there is a shell crater in the earth and asphalt
measuring approximately 20x30 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of
approximately 110 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater
in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be
easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 35-45°.
11) 4 per. Nizhynskyy: in the garden of the property at a distance of 3 m from the fence to
the left and 10 m from the fence on the far side of the entrance to the property there is
a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x25 cm (cross section diameter),
with a depth of approximately 110 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of
the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction
appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45-50°.
12) 75 vul. Zoryana: opposite the entrance to the property behind the building at a distance
of 7 m from house No. 73 and 5 meters from house No. 75, as well as 3 m from the
root cellar in the garden, there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately
25x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, with a white
plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis
of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is
approximately 45-50°.
13) 68 vul. Zoryana: at a distance of 4 m to the east of the building and 7 meters to the left
side of the building (standing with one’s bank vul. Olimpiyska) there is a shell crater
in the earth measuring approximately 25x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth
of approximately 40 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater
in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be
easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 50°. To the east of the crater there is
a hollow in the earth in the shape of an ellipsis with an area of approximately 1.5 m2.
A metal fragment measuring 18x7 cm with the inscription “Sh 47 V N I * 4” in the
metal was found at the crater site and removed according to the report on the scene
inspection conducted at the specified address on 01/25/15 by an investigative agency
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
14) 73 vul. Zoryana: opposite the gate to the property at a distance of 3 m from the gate
leading in from the street and 4 m from the roadway there is a shell crater in the earth
measuring approximately 20x25 cm (cross section diameter),
3
with a depth of approximately 120 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of
the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction
appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 50°.
15) 50 Kuzbaska: there are traces of the impact of a shell (or shells) on the building, which
was destroyed by the blast and fire. At the time of inspection, it was not possible to
identify a crater or remnants of the shells. Two metal fragments were found at the site
of the destroyed building and were removed according to the report on the scene
inspection conducted at the specified address on 01/25/15 by an investigative agency
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
16) 97 Kuzbaska: at a distance of 10 m from the entrance to the property under the wall
of the adjacent building to the right of the building at the specified address (if one stand
on the street facing the building) there is a shell crater in the concrete with a depth of
10 cm and a perimeter measuring 50x50, as well as hollow spots in the wall of the
adjacent building at a height of approximately 40 cm from the shell crater.
17) 75 Kuzbaska: on the grounds of the property, at a distance of 5 meters from the garage
gate and 5 meters from the building, there is damage to the concrete surface with
features of shell crater in the concrete with a depth of approximately 25 cm, the
probable direction of which could not be determined.
18) 109 per. Poletayeva: on the roadway near the building, at a distance of 1 m from the
curb and 8 m from the building, a buried crater was found in the asphalt with a damage
area of approximately 1.5 x 2 meters. An inspection of the crater revealed a metal piece
(fragment) of irregular shape measuring 20x10 cm with the number “F 79 V I N", which
was removed from the inspection site;
19) 104 vul. Zvenyhorodska: behind the building at this address, in the lower left part of
the fence, at a distance of 15 meters from the building and 120 cm from a tree that was
felled (probably by the shell), there is a shell crater in the earth measuring
approximately 30x40 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 40
cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of
the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the
angle of entry is approximately 45°. A metal fragment measuring 15x5 cm with the
inscription “GpI-56d” in the metal was found at the crater site and removed according
to the report on the scene inspection conducted at the specified address on 01/25/15 by
an investigative agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
20) 124 vul. Zvenyhorodska: at a distance of 5 meters from the gate leading in from the
street and 6 meters from the building there is damage to the concrete surface, measuring
around 1 meter in length. Around 1 m from said damage, a metal cylindrical object was
found completely embedded in the earth at an angle of approximately 90°, around
which there is a shell crater
4
5
6
measuring approximately 35x40 cm (cross section diameter). At time of inspection,
this object could not be identified.
21) 120 vul. Zvenyhorodska: behind the building at this address, at a distance of 5 meters
from the building, there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x30
cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, with a white plastic
rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry;
the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is
approximately 50°.
22) 86 vul. Lyutneva: the H-shaped building of High School No. 57 was inspected. Below
the eastern right wing of the school (standing with one’s back to vul. Lyutneva), at the
location of the foundation, in the center of the external (side) wall of the wing, there is
damage measuring approximately 15 cm in depth, probably from a shall with an
epicenter at a height of approximately 45 cm, with an area of 50x30 cm and extensive
fragmentation damage to the wall around the epicenter, as well as on the asphalt
underneath. The total perimeter length of the damage on the wall is around 3.5 m.
23) 86 vul. Lyutneva: at a distance of 13 meters to the east and 24 meters to the south of
the eastern left wing of School No. 57 (standing with one’s back to vul. Lyutneva), and
at a distance of 10 meters from the school’s concrete perimeter fence, there is a shell
crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x25 cm (cross section diameter), with a
depth of approximately 80 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell
crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears
to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45-50°.
24) 49 vul. Kuzbaska: in the eastern wall of the building at this address there is a round
hole (size of aperture in the wall: 1.5x1.9 m), behind which, on the floor in the middle
of the building, there is a through hole to the basement, probably from a shell,
measuring approximately 40x35 cm.
25) 24 vul. Nizhynska: at a distance of 4 meters from the property fence, deep into the
grounds, and 2 meters from the right side of the building (if one stands facing the
building from the street) there are traces of a buried shell crater in the earth, the size of
which could not be determined, nor could the approximate angle of entry of the shell.
26) intersection of vul. Olimpiyska and vul. Marshrutna: at a distance of 20 meters to
the north along vul. Olimpiyska on the median and at a distance of 1 m from the inner
curb there are traces of a buried shell crater, the size of which could not be determined,
nor could the approximate angle of entry of the shell.
In the course of this investigative action, a diagram (map) was drawn up to show the
location of the discovered shell craters mentioned in the report, which is attached to this report as
Exhibit No. 1.
Photographs were taken during the inspection using a Sony-Cyber Shot camera with a 2
GB Transcend memory card with
automatic settings. The photographs will be attached to this report after they are prepared in the
form of a table of photographs (Exhibit No. 2).
(The inspection of shell craters on the grounds of properties was conducted on the condition
that consent for such an inspection was obtained from the owners).
Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martynyuk [signature]
Special Senior Investigator with the Investigations Department
at the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
7
Exhibit No. 2
to the Inspection Report
dated 01/25/15
(Sector No. 2)
TABLE OF PHOTOGRAPHS
to the inspection report
Photos 1, 2: Shell crated discovered near the building at 316 vul. Olimpiyska (No. 1)
8
Photos 3, 4: Shell crater discovered on the roadway on vul. Olimpiyska (No. 2)
9
Photo 5: Metal fragments of a shell casing removed from a shall crater on the roadway of vul.
Olimpiyska (No. 2)
Photo 6: Shell crater discovered on the grounds of the property located at 3 Proyizd 1-y
Nizhynskyy (No. 10)
10
Photo 7: Shell crater discovered on the grounds of the property located at 3 Proyizd 1-y
Nizhynskyy (No. 10)
Photo 8. Shell crater discovered on the grounds of the property located at 68 vul. Zoryanka (No.
13)
11
Photo 9. Shell crater discovered on the territory of the property located at 68 vul. Zoryana (No.
13)
Photo 10. Shell crater discovered on the territory of the property located at 109 vul. Poletayeva
(No. 18)
12
Photo 11: Metal piece (fragment) removed from the shell crater on the grounds near the property
located at 109 vul. Poletayeva (No. 18)
Photo 12: Shell crater discovered on the grounds of School No. 57 located at 86 vul. Lyutneva
(No. 22)
Photographs prepared by:
Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martynyuk [signature]
Special Senior Investigator with the Investigations Department
at the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Annex 97
Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Starostenko, Senior Lieutenant
of Justice and Senior Criminal Investigator with the Investigative Office of the
Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

[two signatures]
INSPECTION REPORT
City of Donetsk January 25, 2015
Inspection started: 12:10 PM
Inspection completed: 04:30 PM
Senior Lieutenant of Justice O. V. Starostenko, Senior Criminal Investigator at the
Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine,
having reviewed the evidence in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000047, entered in the
Unified Registry of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, based on the elements of crime
under part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and acting in compliance with
Articles 104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, with the
participation of:
1. Dmytro Volodymyrovych Velychko, Investigator for the Investigations Department, the
Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, date of birth: February
28, 1992, residing at the following address: 77 Heorhiyevska Street, Mariupol,
and the following specialist:
2. Vitaliy Petrovych Stasyuk, Consultant/Expert for Department 6, Center 4, Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination of
the Security Service of Ukraine, date of birth May 08, 1977, residing at the following
address: 77 Heorhiyevska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, with practical work
experience in the field since 2012, who has been advised of his rights and duties under
Article 71 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine,
[signature]
performed an area (territory) inspection in Eastern Residential Complex [Skhidnyi Mikroraion]
of the City of Mariupol designated, for purposes of this report, as Sector No. 3 (delimited by
Olimpiyska Street on the east, Nezhynska Street and Zvenyhorodskyi Provulok Street on the
north, 130th Tahanrohskoyi Dyvyzii Street on the west, and Lyutnevyi Provulok Street on the
south), in order to locate shell craters caused by the artillery shelling of Skhidnyi Mikroraion on
January 24, 2015.
The inspection was conducted in natural daylight conditions with photography performed
using a Canon digital camera with automatic settings and a 2 GB Transcend memory card.
The inspection has produced the following findings:
The inspection began to the south of the eastern side of Nezhynska Street. The inspection has
produced the following findings (craters are discussed below in relation to specific addresses):
(1) Number 17 Nezhynska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed it was
damaged, namely, there was no roof; the walls were charred; and the window panes were
shattered. At the time of the inspection, no shell crater was found in the area around the
building.
(2) Number 252a Olimpiyska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it was
damaged, namely, the roof was crashed through. At the time of the inspection, no shell
crater was found in the area around the building.
(3) Number 35 Zoryana Street: At a distance of 5.5 meters from the building located at
number 35 Zoryana Street, 7 meters from the building located at number 34 Zoryana
Street, and 10 meters from the building located at number 41 Zoryana Street, there was a
crater on the Zoryana Street roadway, flanked by the aforesaid buildings, with a size of
surface damage of approximately 35 cm × 45 cm and about 30 cm deep (it was
impossible to take measurements of the initial crater dimensions due to the fact that at the
time of the inspection the crater had collapsed as a result of vehicle traffic in the area of
the street roadway). At a distance of 2 meters from the crater, toward the building located
at number 35, a metal object, 22 cm wide by 19 cm long, was found on the ground. The
metal object was recovered and packaged in a plastic bag, with its opening sewn with
thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend “Package No. 1” and the
signature and an explanatory note by the investigating officer. In addition, another metal
object, 9 cm long and a maximum of 1 cm wide, was found on the ground at a distance of
8 meters from the crater toward the building located at number 41. The metal object was
retrieved and packaged in a plastic bag, with its opening sewn with thread and sealed
with a paper label carrying the legend “Package No. 2” and the signature and an
explanatory note by the investigating officer.
In the course of this investigative operation, a map of the area subject to inspection was
drawn and the shell impact points were subsequently plotted on the map. The map is attached to
the Record as Appendix 1.
This inspection used photography performed using a Canon digital camera with automatic
settings and a 2 GB Transcend memory card. When the photos are ready, they will be attached to
this Record as a photo table (Appendix 2).
Participants:
1. [signature] ([handwritten:] D. V. Velychko)
2. [signature] ([handwritten:] V. P. Stasyuk)
[signature]
Senior Lieutenant of Justice O. V. Starostenko
Senior Criminal Investigator at the Investigations Department
The Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Photo Table: Attachment to the January 25, 2015 Inspection Report
Photo No. 1: Damaged building located at number 17 Nezhynska Street:
no roof, charred walls, shattered window panes
Photo No. 2: Damaged building located at number 252a Olimpiyska Street:
roof crashed through
Photo Table: Attachment to the January 25, 2015 Inspection Report
(continued)
Photo No. 3: Crater, with a size of surface damage of approximately 35 cm × 45 cm and about 30 cm
deep, located at a distance of 5.5 meters from the building located at number 35 Zoryana Street, 7 meters
from the building located at number 34 Zoryana Street, and 10 meters from the building located at
number 41 Zoryana Street, on the Zoryana Street roadway, flanked by the aforesaid buildings
Photo No. 4: Crater, with a size of surface damage of approximately 35 cm × 45 cm and about 30 cm
deep, located at a distance of 5.5 meters from the building located at number 35 Zoryana Street, 7 meters
from the building located at number 34 Zoryana Street, and 10 meters from the building located at
number 41 Zoryana Street, on the Zoryana Street roadway, flanked by the aforesaid buildings
Photo Table: Attachment to the January 25, 2015 Inspection Report
(continued)
Photo No. 5: metal object, 9 cm long and a maximum of 1 cm wide, found on the ground
at a distance of 8 meters from the crater toward the building located at number 41
Photo No. : Metal object, 22 cm wide by 19 cm long, found on the ground at a distance
of 2 meters from the crater in question, toward the building located at number 35
[signature]
Senior Lieutenant of Justice O. V. Starostenko
Senior Criminal Investigator at the Investigations Department
The Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine

Annex 98
Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
[redacted]
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
at 09:00 a.m. January 25, 2015
1. Operational situation.
[redacted]
1.2. Strengthening and comprehensive support of the Russian Armed Forces group
and illegal armed formations (IAF) in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176
USREOU [Unified State Register of
Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine]
code 22990919
01.25.2015 ref No 222/3D/9010203
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 2
2
[redacted]
On January 23-24 of this year, the following was brought in from the territory of the Russian
Federation:
through the town of Izvaryne in the direction of Krasnodon-Luhansk – five
columns of military equipment, comprising: 128 tented trucks (with property and
ammunition), 11 refuelers, four Pantsir-S1 surface–to-air and anti-aircraft artillery missile
systems, one Tor missile system and two charge loaders. A column of 40 empty cargo trucks
has set off from Ukraine for the Russian Federation via Izvaryne;
through the town of Dmytrivka in the direction of Snizhne – two columns
comprising: 15 assault fighting vehicles, 48 cargo trucks, 40 cars and 26 traction units;
through the town of Kuznetsi in the direction of Novoazovsk (partly moving
towards Telmanove through Guselshchikovo) – a column of military equipment comprising
35 tanks, 35 armored fighting vehicles, 40 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and 40
Ural trucks.
[redacted]
1.3 Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory
The following have been engaged in air surveillance and airborne control in the
eastern regions of Ukraine:
two tactical unmanned aerial vehicles – in the vicinity of Shchastya (Luhansk
Region) and Mariupol (Donetsk Region)
Su-24MR reconnaissance plane (Marinovka) in the air space of Volgograd and
Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov;
two A-50U long-range target detection and guidance aircraft (Taganrog) – in the
air space of Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory. On completion of their missions, the
planes landed at Yeysk airfield.
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 3
3
[redacted]
_
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Page 4
4
[redacted]
__________________________________________________________________________
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 99
Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/576 (6 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
GENERAL STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE
6 Povitroflotsky Prospect, Kyiv-168, Ukraine
Phone: (044) 234-01-92. Fax: (044) 226-26-56
Administrative Directorate of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
No. 300/1/C/576 of February 6, 2015
2:47:01 PM Page: 1/3
Foreign Ministry of Ukraine
In pursuance of Instruction No. 02-01/2948 of October 15, 2014 issued by the Ukrainian
Presidential Chief of Staff, presented herewith are informational reference materials
pertaining to the body of evidence for the presence of foreign military groups in Ukrainian
territory, to be used in raising the awareness of Ukrainian society and international
partners more actively and in the future lawsuits to be filed by Ukraine with the relevant
international courts.
Attachment: above-mentioned information on 3 pages, unclassified, for the specified
recipient only
Acting First Deputy Chief
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Major General [Signature] V.M. NAZAROV
D.S. Pasko, 454-40-78
000460* Order 210-2014
FOREIGN MINISTRY OF UKRAINE
DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL
SECRETARIAT
Incoming Ref. No. 12021
February 13, 2015
2
Attachment
INFORMATIONAL REFERENCE MATERIALS
pertaining to the body of evidence for the direct invasion by foreign military groups into
Ukrainian territory
І. Regarding the involvement of Russian citizens in illegal paramilitary groups
operating in Eastern Ukraine
No documented facts of the involvement of Russian citizens in illegal paramilitary
groups operating in Eastern Ukraine were recorded last week.
II. Regarding the chronology of the crossing of the state border of Ukraine by
personnel, weapons, and military vehicles of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation
No. Date Border crossing point
crossed
Point of destination
(crossing)
Number of
convoys Number of vehicles (personnel)
1 Februar
y 04
CHERVONOPARTYZ
ANSK (Luhansk
Oblast)
SVERDLOVSK 1
5 tanks, 2 armored fighting
vehicles, and two Ural trucks
(with personnel – 40 persons);
2 Februar
y 04
LYSYCHE,
Amvrosiyivka District,
Donetsk Oblast
in the direction of
TELMANOVE
(Donetsk Oblast)
2 21 T-72 tanks, 30 KamAZ
trucks, and 10 tanker trucks.
3 Februar
y 04 NOVOAZOVSK Donetsk 1 50 trucks (carrying personnel,
munitions, and ammo).
4 Februar
y 3
DMYTRIVKA
(Donetsk Oblast)
STEPANIVKA
(Shakhtarsk
District)
1 20 KamAZ military trucks and
10 tanker trucks
5 Februar
y 3
DMYTRIVKA
(Donetsk Oblast) SNIZHNE 1
10 KamAZ military trucks and
10
tanker trucks (40 tons)
6 Februar
y 3
IZVARYNE (Luhansk
Oblast)
KRASNODON,
LUHANSK 1 21 military trucks with munitions
and ammo
7 Februar
y 2
railway station of
PANTELEYMONIVKA
(15 km south of
Horlivka)
1 over 20 rail tank cars with fuel
8 Februar
y 2
DONETSK border
crossing point 1
15 buses and 5 tarpaulin trucks
with personnel in military
uniforms, some of them wearing
characteristic headgear of the
Cossacks;
9 Februar
y 2 GUKOVO SVERDLOVSK 1
12 KamAZ trucks with
ammunition. It is possible that
they will be transported further
in the direction of LUHANSK;
3
10 Februar
y 2 DMYTRIVKA STEPANIVKA 1 Ten T-72 tanks, 20 KamAZ
tarpaulin trucks;
11 Februar
y 2 DMYTRIVKA SNIZHNE (Donetsk
Oblast) 1 10 220-mm Uragan multiple
rocket launchers
12 Februar
y 2
CHERVONOPARTYZ
ANSK SVERDLOVSK 1 29 tanks, 18 trucks with
ammunition
13 Februar
y 2 IZVARYNE KRASNODONLUHANSK
1
Two T-72 tanks, seven BMP
infantry fighting vehicles, one
armored vehicle (armored
fighting vehicle, possibly the
TOS-1 Buratino heavy rocket
launcher), 49 trucks (7 with
personnel, the remaining trucks
with munitions and ammo);
14 Februar
y 01 IZVARYNE KRASNODONLUHANSK
36 trucks (with munitions and
ammo) and 11 tanker trucks.
15 January
31
DONETSK (Russia) –
IZVARYNE
(Ukraine)
LUHANSK
“Humanita
rian
Convoy”
175 trucks (including 119 trucks,
40 tanker trucks (20 with
gasoline and 20 with diesel),
and 16 escort vehicles, as well
as 336 personnel).
16 January
31
MATVEYEV
KURHAN (Russia) -
USPENKA (Ukraine)
DONETSK
“Humanita
rian
Convoy”
17 January
31 through DMYTRIVKA in the direction of
SNIZHNE 1 10 BMD tracked infantry fighting
vehicles, 10 motor vehicles;
18 January
31
through
DOVZHANSKY
in the direction of
ROVENKY 1 4 units, 3 motor vehicles with
ammunition;
19 January
31
through
DOVZHANSKY SVERDLOVSK 1 5 BTR armored personnel
carriers, 8 motor vehicles.
20 January
30 through DMYTRIVKA SNIZHNE 1
Ten T-80 tanks, 10 BMD
tracked infantry fighting
vehicles, 40 122-mm GRAD
multiple rocket launchers, 10
KamAZ trucks, and 10 buses
with personnel.
21 January
29 Through DYAKOVE DEBALTSEVE 1
5 self-propelled guns, 20 Ural
trucks carrying personnel, and a
tanker truck
4
22 January
29 IZVARYNE KRASNODONLUHANSK
1
6 tanks, 4 armored fighting
vehicles (presumably TOS-1
Buratino heavy rocket
launchers), twelve 12-mm Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 4
tanker trucks and 26 trucks
(with munitions and ammo).
23 January
28 DMYTRIVKA SNIZHNE 1
69 (including 14 tanks, 15 BMP
infantry fighting vehicles, 30
motor vehicles, 10 tanker
trucks)
24 January
28 IZVARYNE KRASNODONLUHANSK
1
a convoy of motor vehicles
(number to be updated),
presumably carrying
ammunition;
25
A convoy of Ural-4320 trucks
carrying military casualties left
Ukraine for the Russian
Federation through IZVARYNE.
26 January
28
CHERVONOPARTYZ
ANSK
in the direction of
LUHANSK
numbering 46 units (including:
14 tanks, 20 BMP infantry
fighting vehicles, 7 selfpropelled
guns, 4 BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, 1
Uragan multiple rocket
launcher);
27 January
2728 from Russian territory to the railway station of
Luhansk-Vantazhny
3
Trains
with armored vehicles, ammo,
and fuel (some 20 rail tank cars)
28 January
27 DMYTRIVKA SNIZHNE 1 20 trucks and 5 tanker trucks
29 January
27 DMYTRIVKA STEPANIVKA
(Shakhtarsk District) 1
15 BMD tracked infantry fighting
vehicles, 20 trucks and 5 tanker
trucks.
30 January
26 IZVARYNE KRASNODONLUHANSK
3
11 armored fighting vehicles, six
122-mm GRAD multiple rocket
launchers, and 44 trucks (with
munitions and ammo).
Acting Chief
of the Main Command Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Major General [Signature] B.V. BONDAR
Annex 100
Scene Inspection Report, drafted by A. Sorokina, Police Captain, Kramatorsk City
Department (10 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

SCENE INSPECTION REPORT
City of Kramatorsk
02/10/ 2015
Inspection commenced at 3:00 PM Inspection ended at 3:45 PM
Police Captain A.S. Sorokina, an investigator with the Investigations Section of the Kramatorsk
City Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, on the basis of an order issued by the on-duty operations officer , pursuant to Articles
104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:
In the presence of the following witnesses:
1. [illegible name] 18/05/1969
37/12 vul. [illegible]
2. Oleksandr Hryhorovych [illegible]
22/56 vul. [illegible]
who were advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of a representative of , who
was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 44(5), 58(4), and 59(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of specialist , who was advised of
his rights and obligations under Articles 71(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the owner (user) of the premises or other personal property.
----
Before the inspection began, the aforementioned individuals were advised of their right to
be present for all actions carried out in the process of the inspection, and to make objections that
must be entered into the record. The persons taking part in the inspection were also explained the
requirements of Article 66(3) regarding their duty not to disclose information about the procedural
action and were notified about the use of any technical recording devices and the procedures for
using them:
LG camera
The inspection established the following: Inspected the scene at the intersection of vul.
Parkova and bul. Kramatorsky. [illegible] on bul. Kramatorsky located [illegible] along which
there is a sidewalk. [illegible]
The following objects discovered during the inspection were removed: nothing was
[illegible]
The following technical devices were used during the inspection: camera, [text cut off]
The inspection was conducted: [illegible]
The record was read, recorded
Participants:
1. / /
2. / /
Witnesses:
1. [illegible name] / [signature] /
2. [illegible name] / [signature] /
Inspection conducted by:
Police Captain A.S. Sorokina [signature]
Investigator with the Investigations Section of the Kramatorsk City Department of the Main
Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Table of Photographs
to the scene inspection report dated 01/10/2015
for 21 bul. Kramatorsky
[identical seals throughout: Kramatorsk City Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, For packs, No. 1]
Photo 1. General view of the site and surface of bul. Kramatorsky and vul. Parkova from vul.
Parkova
Photo 2. General view of discovered metal section of shell
Photo 3. General view of the site at bul. Kramatorsk near house No. 21
Photo 4. General view of the site at vul. Parkova
02/10/2015
Table of Photographs prepared by: A.S. Sorokina, Investigator with the Investigations Section of
the Kramatorsk City Department [signature]
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS CENTER
25 vul. Shkadionova, Kramatorsk 84333
tel. (06264) 7-02-87
[email protected], [email protected]
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
to the scene inspection report dated 02/10/2015 for the address 21 bul. Kramatorsky, Kramatorsk
Illustration No. 1. General view of the site
Illustration No. 2. General view of the site
Illustration No. 3. General view of the site
Illustration No. 4. General view of the site
Illustration No. 5. General view of the site
Illustration No. 6. Munitions impact site
Illustration No. 7. Munitions impact site
Investigator with the Investigations Section
of the Kramatorsk City Department [signature] S.Yu. [illegible]
Annex 101
Scene Inspection Report, drafted by E. Abushov, Police Lieutenant, Kramatorsk City
Department (10 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

SCENE INSPECTION REPORT
City of Kramatorsk
02/10 2015
Inspection commenced at 6:15 PM
Inspection ended at 6:55 PM
Police Lieutenant E.E. Abushov, an investigator with the Investigative Unit of the Kramatorsk City Department,
Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on the basis of
an order issued by the duty officer
(indicate the ruling of the investigating judge if the inspection is being carried out on a residential building or
other personal property; if the scene inspection at vul. [illegible], Kramatorsk is being conducted prior to the
start of criminal proceedings, provide information about the statement or incident report), pursuant to
Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:
In the presence of the following witnesses:
1. Oleksandr Vitaliyovych Baturbayev, b. 06/24/1987
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
7/161 vul. Gv. [illegible], Kramatorsk [signature]
2. Pavlo Mykolayovych Bogush, b. 07/12/1985 [signature]
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
15/1 vul. Mayakovskoho, Kramatorsk
who were advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the victim
---
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 56(1) and (2) and Article 57 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the suspect
---
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 42(3), (5), (6), and (7) of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the defense counsel:
---
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 46 and 47 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine.
With the participation of the representative:
---
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 44(5), 58(4), and 59(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of specialist S.V. Nesterov, who was advised of his rights and obligations under
Article 71(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
With the participation of the owner (user) of the premises or other personal property.
----
(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)
Before the inspection began, the aforementioned individuals were advised of their right to be present
for all actions carried out in the process of the inspection, and to make objections that
must be entered into the record. The persons taking part in the inspection were also explained the
requirements of Article 66(3) regarding their duty not to disclose information about the procedural
action and were notified about the use of any technical recording devices and the procedures for
using them:
Canon A850 in auto mode
(features of technical recording devices and data media that were used)
The inspection established the following: The focus of the scene inspection (indicate the
address of the home or other personal property)
is an area measuring 2x2 meters. This area is located in the city of Kramatorsk, vul.
Mayakovskoho, in Pushkin Park. The area is located behind the [illegible] Wheel ride at a distance
of 11 meters. In this area there is a metal object embedded in the earth in the form of a pipe with
a white [illegible] . This object appears to be a fragment of a Smerch [illegible]. Next to [illegible]
there is a white [illegible] at a distance of 50 meters.
Another focus of the scene inspection is an area measuring 1x1 meter, which is located at
vul. Mayakovskoho, Kramatorsk, in Pushkin Park. This area is located 170 meters from the first
focus of the scene inspection [illegible]. Next to this area at a distance of 1.5 meters [illegible]
there is [illegible] in the ground, from which protrudes a metal object with a white [illegible]. In
terms of outward appearance, this object appears to be a fragment of a Smerch [illegible].
[illegible] white building at a distance of 30 meters. [illegible] was removed from this [illegible]
and packed in a [illegible] bag No. 0373430
[signatures]
The following was discovered during the inspection
(indicate traces and items found during the inspection)
The following objects discovered during the inspection were removed: [illegible]
(indicate what was removed and it what order and how it was sealed)
The following technical devices were used during the inspection: Canon A850 in auto mode
(indicate the use of photo, video or other technical and special devices and their technical
parameters)
The inspection was conducted: at [illegible] + -5°C
(specify the weather conditions, lighting, air temperature and other data as necessary)
The record was read, recorded and no objections were received
Participants:
1. S.V. Nesterov / [signature] /
(full name)
2. / /
(full name)
Witnesses:
1. [O.V. Baturbayev] / [signature] /
2. [P.M. Bogush] / [signature] /
Inspection conducted by:
Police Lieutenant E.E. Abushov
Investigator with the Investigative Unit of the Kramatorsk City Department, Main Donetsk
Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Table of Photographs
to the scene inspection report dated 02/10/2015
vul. Mayakovskoho, Kramatorsk
General photo of discovered object
General photo of metal object
Investigator with the Investigative Unit of the Kramatorsk City Dept [signature] E.E. Abushov
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS CENTER
25 vul. Shkadionova, Kramatorsk 84333
tel. (06264) 7-02-87
[email protected], [email protected]
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
to the scene inspection report dated 02/10/2015 for the address: Pushkin Park, vul. Lenina,
Kramatorsk
Illustration No. 1. General view of the site
Illustration No. 2. Munitions impact site
Illustration No. 3. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 4. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 5. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 6. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 7. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 8. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 9. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 10. General view of the site
Illustration No. 11. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 12. General view of the munitions
Illustration No. 13. View of the munitions
Illustration No. 14. View of the munitions
Investigator with the Investigative Section
of [text cut off] [signature] S.Yu. [illegible]
Annex 102
Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation Letter No. 1696 og (12 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

Mr. O.A. Pohorelov: [illegible] Copy No. 45
02/14/15 [signature]
Antiterrorist Center
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Headquarters
of the Antiterrorist Operation
on the Territory of the Donetsk
and Luhansk Regions
No. 1696 og
February 12, 2015
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Region
Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V. Panchenko
Head of the Office of Procedural Management
of Criminal Proceedings, Investigations
Section, Department for the Supervision of
Compliance with Laws on the Unified Forces
of the Antiterrorist Operation, Main Military
Prosecutor's Office
[illegible]
The headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation on the Territory of the Donetsk and
Luhansk Regions (hereinafter ATO) has reviewed your letter regarding the provision of
information concerning the military servicemen who were killed as a result of the terrorist act at
the ATO headquarters on 02/10/2015.
Having examined the question posed in your letter, I hereby provide you with the following
information:
No. Full name Date of birth Military rank Military unit Notes
1 Viktor Viktorovych
DEVYATKIN
05/03/1988 private A1604 Kherson
2 Ihor Stanislavovych
SHEVCHENKO
08/04/1981 mayor A1225 Kyiv
3 Volodymyr Leonidovych
DOVHANYUK
01/17/1967 colonel A1225 Kyiv
4 Serhiy Olehovych
KHAUSTOVYCH
04/08/1980 private 1st
class
A3258
5 Serhiy Vasylyovych
SHMERETSKYI
02/16/1974 sergeant A3808
6 Volodymyr Petrovych
HLUBOKOV
07/23/1978 captain A3808
7 Mykhaylo Mykolayovych
ILLYASHUK
07/10/1979 private 1st
class
A2099 Lutsk
8 Yevhen Valeriyovych
BUSHNIN
07/19/1976 private V4252
Acting Chief of Staff /First Deputy Chief of Staff
for the Antiterrorist Operation on the Territory
of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions
Colonel [signature] V.I. TERTICHNYY
Incoming Ref. No. 335

Annex 103
Incident Site Inspection Report of O.V. Kupriyanov, Police Lieutenant and
Investigator with the Investigations Department of the Kramatorsk Police
Department (12 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

56
Incident Site Inspection Report
Kramatorsk 02/12/ 2015
Inspection started at 12:34 PM
Inspection ended at 1:00 PM
Police Lieutenant O.V. Kupriyanov, Investigator with the Investigations Department of the
Kramatorsk Police Department
pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine [CrPCU]:
In the presence of the following witnesses:
1) [illegilible, possibly Maksym Olegovych Karamushka], 12/18/1953
46/26 vul. IXI Partzyizdu, Kramatorsk [signature]
2) Stanislav Andriyovych [illegible, possiblyBelinenko], 12/14/1995
[illegible, possibly 69/27] vul. Sotsialistychna, Kramatorsk [signature]
who were advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15 and 223 of the CrPCU.
With the participation of the victim:

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 56(1) and (2) and Article 57 of the CrPCU.
With the participation of the suspect:

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 42(3), (5), (6) and (7) of the CrPCU.
With the participation of the defense attorney:

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 46 and 47 of the CrPCU.
With the participation of the representative:

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 44(5), Article 58(4), and Article 59(2) of the CrPCU.
V.P. Korablin, explosives expert, NDEKU [signature]
(full name)
who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 71(4) and (5) of the CrPCU.
With the participation of the owner (or user) of the premises or other personal property 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
(full name, address)
Before the inspection began, the aforementioned persons were advised of their right to be present for all
actions carried out in the process of the inspection, and to raise objections, which shall be entered into the record.
The persons taking part in the inspection were also advised of the requirements of Article 66(3) of the CrPCU
concerning their obligations not to disclose information about the procedural action, and of the use of technical
recording devices and the terms and procedures for their use:
[initials]
57
[initials]
The inspection site is a parcel of land located near 12 vul. Dvirtseva, Kramatorsk, specifically
external side of Bldg #42, the windows of which open out onto vul. Yuvileyna, Kramatorsk, near
the first entrance. Under the windows there is a heap of broken glass, wooden window frames,
pieces of soil, remnants of concrete floor slabs [illegible] Among the aforesaid debris [illegible]
was recovered and placed in a special package of the Expert Service of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine with [illegible] marking 2586583 a grey metal fragment measuring 13x5 cm.
The metal fragment has a layer of black substance [illegible, possibly soot deposit]. On the 5th-floor
balcony in the first entrance there is damage to the balcony's floor slab between the 5th and 4th
floors, as well as the façade and the glazing of the 5th-floor balcony. On the 4th floor there is
[similar] damage, there is also damage on the 3rd floor. On the 2nd-floor balcony there is
damaged glass [illegible] wooden window frames and there is also [illegible] debris from the
higher floors. The inspection was completed [illegible].
58
[illegible]
During the inspection, the following was found:
[illegible] grey metal fragment with soot deposit
(list any traces or items found during the inspection)
The following was recovered during the inspection: grey metal fragment with soot
deposit,
(list what was found, in what order, and how it was sealed)
[illegible] packed in pack No. 2586583
During the inspection, the following technical devices were used:
Photographs were taken with a Cannon camera
The inspection was conducted:
in clear weather, under natural light, at a temperature of -1°C
I have read the report, and it is written
accurately, no objections raised
Participants:
1. V.P. Korablin / [signature] /
(full name) (signature)
1. / _________ /
(full name) (signature)
Witnesses:
1. M.O. Karamushka / [signature] /
(full name) (signature)
2. S. A. Belinenko / [signature] /
(full name) (signature)
Inspection carried out by:
Police Lieutenant O.V. Kupriyanov
Investigator with the Investigations Department of the
Kramatorsk Police Department
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Main Directorate for the Donetsk Region [signature] [signature]
59
[illegible]
Table of photographs to the incident site inspection report dated 02/12/2015
Photo 1. General view of damaged balconies
Photo 2. Close-up of 5th-floor balcony
60
Photo 3. Close-up of 3rd-floor balcony
Photo 4. Close-up of 2nd-floor balcony
61
Photo 5. Photograph of damaged façade
Photo 6. General view of all damaged balconies
62
Photo 7. General view of corner section of building
Photo 8. Shattered glass under damaged balconies
63
Photo 9. Shattered glass and wooden parts of damaged balconies
Table of photographs compiled by: Police Lieutenant O.V. Kupriyanov, Investigator with the
Investigations Department [signature]
Annex 104
Letter from the Mariupol City Council Healthcare Directorate of Donetsk Region No.
01/133-08-0 to the Deputy Head of the SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region (12
February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
Ukraine
Donetsk Region
MARIUPOL CITY COUNCIL
HEALTHCARE DIRECTORATE
70 Lenin Ave., Mariupol, 87500. Tel.: (0629) 54-17-42. Fax: (0629) 33-24-94
EDRPOU Code 02012591
Email: [email protected] Website: www.marsovet.org.ua
Ref. No. 01/133-08-o dated 02.12.2015
To: Deputy Head of the SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region
– Deputy Head of the Main Department in Mariupol
A.V. Usenko
Dear Anatoliy Volodymyrovych,
With reference to your enquiry No. 56/34-93n/t of 02.06.2015, the Healthcare Directorate of the Mariupol
City Council hereby provides information on persons who applied to medical institutions for medical aid due to
injuries sustained during the shelling of the Skhidnyi Microdistrict, Ordzhonikidzevskyi District, Mariupol since
01.24.2015 (attached). Please also find attached a list of persons who died due to said shelling (attached).
Yours truly,
Deputy Head of Directorate [signature] T.V. Yeliseyeva
[stamp:] SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region, Main
Department in Mariupol, filing No. 126 [text cut off]
151
152
2
List updated as of 02.12.2015
Information about deceased persons in medical institutions of the city
Item
No. Full name Year of birth Residential address
1. POLISHCHUK
Olga Dmitriyevna
04.29.1979 - Shrapnel wound of the ribcage on the right with
damage to internal organs due to blast injury.
2. KONSTANTINOVA
Tamara Konstantinovna
05.26.1945 Mariupol,
183-124 Olimpiyskaya St.
A/Shock BU/ Blast injury: multiple shrapnel
wounds of both lower limbs.
3. BUDNIK
Valeriy Valentinovich
11.16.1969 Mariupol,
45 Kievskaya St., bldg. 3,51
Blunt shrapnel wound of the chest with damage
to the left lung.
4. DEMCHENKO
Aleksandr Nikolayevich
08.25.1956 Mariupol,
92-57 Kievskaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wound of upper and lower [sic]
5. POPOVA
Larisa Aleksandrovna
11.18.1948 Mariupol,
42 Kievskaya St., bldg. 2-141
Blast trauma: injury of the left hip with damage
to blood vessels.
6. BOBYLEV
Nikolay Anatolyevich
10.18.1960 Mariupol,
48-103 Fevralskaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wound of the head with damage to
the temporal bone and brain matter.
7. BOBYLEVA
Lyubov Petrovna
07.31.1963 Mariupol,
48-103 Fevralskaya St.
Blast trauma: open craniocerebral trauma:
fracture of the calvarial and basilar bones, and
crushing of the brain matter.
8. KASHINA
Marina Nikolayevna
04.01.1986 Mariupol,
48-103 Fevralskaya St.
Blast trauma: fracture-amputation of both lower
limbs.
9. KASHIN
Stanislav Aleksandrovich
02.16.2011 Mariupol,
48-103 Fevralskaya St.
Multiple shrapnel wounds of the body and limbs
with blast injury.
10. BORISOV
Leonid Mikhaylovich
06.24.1954 Mariupol,
97-15 Kuzbasskaya St.
Multiple blunt shrapnel wounds of the face and
head with damage to the left eyeball and brain
matter.
11. SIROTENKO
Vitaliy Nikolayevich
05.13.1965 Mariupol,
17-2 130-y Taganrogskoy
Diviziii St.
Blast trauma: shrapnel wounds of the head and
neck with damage to major vessels.
12. AKATYEVA
Yelena Grigoryevna
02.16.1987 Mariupol,
185 Fevralskaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wound of the head with damage to
the brain matter.
13. SHURKHAYEVA
Valeriya Sergeyevna
06.18.1987 Mariupol,
62-a Marshala Zhukova St.
Blast trauma: open craniocerebral injury –
fracture of the calvarial and basilar bones with
damage to the brain matter.
153
3
14. YEFIMOV
Yuriy Sergeyevich
07.11.1950 Mariupol,
48-3 Kievskaya St.
Blast trauma: shrapnel wounds of the head and
neck with damage to major vessels and cervical
spine.
15. ABDURASHITOVA
Olga Viktorovna
10.27.1987 Mariupol,
161-106 Olimpiyskaya St.
Shrapnel wounds of the head with fracture of the
calvarial and basilar bones and damage to the
brain matter.
16. VERBITSKAYA
Lyubov Naumovna
12.27.1944 Mariupol,
48- Kievskaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wounds of both lower limbs with
damage to major vessels.
17. CHUMAK
Liliya Georgiyevna
03.28.1989 Mariupol,
48- Kievskaya St.
Perforating shrapnel wounds of the ribcage and
abdomen with damage to internal organs.
18. PAVLYUK
Yelena Aleksandrovna
05.03.1979 - Cause of death undetermined (incineration).
19. ANIKIYENKO
Galina Vladimirovna
11.18.1965 Mariupol,
187-114 Olimpiyskaya St.
A/ Shock B/ Traumatic amputation of lower
limbs.
20. LUTSENKO
Yelena Petrovna
12.22.1998 Mariupol,
48/2-65 Kievskaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wounds of the head with rough
destruction of skull bones and brain matter.
21. MAKAROV
Andrey Andreyevich
12.07.1965 Displaced from Novoazovsk Perforating shrapnel wound of the right hip with
damage to the femoral bone and femoral artery.
22. YEFREMOV
Stanislav Olegovich
05.19.1976 Mariupol,
17 Sycheva St.
Multiple blunt shrapnel wounds of the ribcage,
body, abdomen with rough destruction of internal
organs.
23. YEVGLEVSKAYA
Valentina Konstantinovna
09.07.1967 Mariupol,
80-38 Mashynostroitelnaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wounds of the head with rough
destruction of the brain matter.
24. BONDARENKO
Marina Stanislavovna
12.25.1994 Mariupol,
34 Vysokovoltnaya St.
Blunt shrapnel wounds of the chest on the right
side with damage to the right lung.
25. NIMENKO
Liliya Nikolayevna
09.20.1953 Mariupol,
33-69 Kievskaya St.
A/ Tamponade of the pericardium. B/ Rupture
of the ascending aorta.
Sudden death at the shelling site.
26. LOBOV
Sergey Vladimirovich
09.23.1977 Mariupol,
170-72 Azovstalskaya St.
Shrapnel wounds of the head and body with
damage to the brain matter.
27. LITVINENKO
Nadezhda Ivanovna
03.24.1947 Mariupol,
51-33 Kievskaya St.
Anemic infarction of the brain during CA.
Sudden death at the shelling site.
28. NAYDENOV
[text cut off]
10.24.1945 Mariupol,
61-95 Kievskaya St.
A/ Acute cardiovascular insufficiency B/ ABS.
[text cut off]
154
4
29. KIRICHEK
Yuriy Gennadiyevich
1961 Mariupol,
28-6 Vladimirskaya St.
Acute transmural myocardial infarction of the
anterior lateral wall of the left ventricle and the
left interatrial septum.
30. BUSHNEVA
Lyubov Stepanovna
12.26.1922 (registered) 22-a Semashko St.,
Mariupol
(resided) 68-53 Kievskaya St.
A/ Tamponade of the pericardium B/ Acute
transmural myocardial infarction.
Sudden death at the shelling site.
155
5
Information about persons with grievous wounds treated in medical institutions of the city
Item
No.
Date
admitted Full name Year of
birth Residential address Place of
employment Diagnosis
City Hospital No. 1
1. 01.24.2015 Baklagova,
Svetlana
Ivanovna
11.27.1966 102 Kasatkina Lane Unemployed Traumatic amputation of the lower third of both
shins. Shrapnel wound of the right shoulder, right
half of the pelvis.
2. 01.24.2015 Nikolayenko,
Yelizaveta
Aleksandrovna
07.27.1999 3 Kievskaya St., bldg.
2 apt. 38
Mariupol
technical
mining college
Open firearm multiple shrapnel displaced
fracture of the upper third of the left shoulder.
Gunshot wounds of the upper third of the left hip
with metal fragments. Blunt shrapnel wound of
the neck.
3. 01.24.2015 Ignatenko,
Natalya
Viktorovna
1966 63/80 Kievskaya St. Delta-Bank,
cashier
Extensive gunshot wound of the right scapular
region of the shoulder. Open firearm fracture of
the right blade bone upper third of the right
shoulder with displacement and metal fragments.
Gunshot wounds of the right hip with skin and
left shin defect. Traumatic hemorrhagic shock.
4. 01.24.2015 Demyanenko,
Andrey
Yevgenyevich
1966 68/99 M. Zhukova St. Employed Penetrating shrapnel wound of the abdominal
cavity with multiple wounds of the small
intestine. Intra-abdominal hemorrhage.
Hemorrhagic shock, 3rd degree. Shrapnel wound
of the upper third of the left hip and right foot.
Contusion of the chest on the left side. Contusion
of the left lung.
5. 01.24.2015 Nikitina, Raisa
Grigoryevna
1940 27/112 Rizhskiy Lane Retired Penetrating wound of the abdominal region with
damage to the descending section of the middle
intestine. Intra-abdominal hemorrhage.
6. 01.24.2015 Antonenko,
Yelena
Alekseyevna
12.02.1955 11/2 Kievskaya St. Retired Open fracture of the lower third of the shin.
External hemorrhage.
City Hospital No. 2
7. 01.24.2015 Lelekina,
Raisa Antonovna
04.17.1941 15-53 9 Maya St. Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the right hip. Open fracture
of the right brachium.
8. 01.24.2015 Ivashchenko,
[text cut off]
02.18.1942 47-[text cut off]
Kievskaya St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the right and left hip.
156
6
Territorial Medical Association
9. 01.24.2015 Abdurashitova,
Milana
Denisovna
01.13.2012 161-106
Olimpiyskaya St.
Pre-school Gunshot wound of the lower third of the left shin.
Traumatic amputation.
10. 01.24.2015 Demchenko,
Mariya
Dmitriyevna
04.03.2011 19/1-11 9 Maya St. Pre-school No.
47
Gunshot wound of left wrist joint. Foreign object
(fragment).
City Hospital No. 4
11. 01.24.2015 Kovalchuk,
Vitaliy
Vladimirovich
11.18.1969 48/2-101 Kievskaya
St.
Azovstal BOF,
crane operator
Shrapnel wound of the left lung.
12. 01.24.2015 Kalinkin,
Stepan
Leonidovich
05.03.1985 56 Mezhevaya St. Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the abdominal cavity.
13. 01.24.2015 Kapustina,
Lyudmila
Alekseyevna
10.30.1958 80-8 Kievskaya St. School No. 69,
cleaner
Shrapnel wound of the abdominal cavity.
14. 01.24.2015 Vidyushchenko,
Vitaliy
Mikhaylovich
06.20.1983 34 Zvezdnaya St. Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the spleen and intestinal tract.
15. 01.24.2015 Kosyy,
Sergey
Anatolyevich
08.22.1977 183-11 Olimpiyskaya
St.
Azovstal, Press
Shop, Sort
Loader
Ribcage wound.
16. 01.24.2015 Rashevskiy,
Viktor
Mikhaylovich
06.23.1952 255-41
Taganrogskaya St.
- Shrapnel wound of the ribcage on the left side,
wound of the right common carotid.
City Hospital No. 5
17. 01.24.2015 Reznik,
Marina Olegovna
09.29.2002 253-77
Taganrogskaya St.
School No. 48,
Grade 6
Shrapnel wound of the spinal column.
18. 01.24.2015 Tishchenko,
Yelena
Alekseyevna
01.01.1961 55-37 Kievskaya St. Unemployed Open craniocerebral trauma.
157
7
Information about persons with moderate wounds treated in medical institutions of the city
Item
No.
Date
admitted Full name Year of
birth Residential address Place of
employment Diagnosis
City Hospital No. 1
1. 01.24.2015 Baklagov,
Vasiliy Andreyevich
03.23.1989 102 Kasatkina
Lane
Azovstal BOF,
mixer operator
Open fracture of the lower third of the left
shinbone, wound of the left shin. Open
fracture of the left calcaneal tuber.
2. 01.24.2015 Golinko,
Natalya
Vladimirovna
09.18.1977 46/48 Kievskaya
St.
Vostochniy
Management
Company, Yard
Keeper
Shrapnel wound of the right shoulder
girdle.
3. 01.24.2015 Gabatel,
Lyudmila
Vladimirovna
12.31.1963 60/81 M. Zhukova
St.
K/I ITA, operator Perforating wound of the right shoulder,
contused wound of the right lacteal gland.
4. 01.24.2015 Chetyrkina,
Valentina
Nikolayevna
08.25.1927 235 Stanislavskogo
St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the right shoulder,
anterior surface of the ribcage, side
abdomen wall on the left.
5. 01.24.2015 Kulbaka,
Valentina Ivanovna
06.20.1960 48/2-89 Kievskaya
St.
Maternity Center
No. 2, junior nurse
Shrapnel wound of the left hip. Foreign
object in the left hip.
6. 01.24.2015 Maksimtseva,
Tatyana Ivanovna
08.27.1988 255 Taganrogskaya
St.
Maternity leave Shrapnel wound of the right buttock.
7. 01.24.2015 Poltorak,
Antonina Viktorovna
06.13.1958 191/111
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Contused wound of the left hip, right
supraorbital ridge.
8. 01.24.2015 Baranyuk,
Nikolay Valeryevich
04.02.1988 44/64 Kievskaya
St.
Intelcom LLC,
Service Engineer
Shrapnel wound of the upper external
quarter of the right buttock. Foreign object
in the right hip.
9. 01.24.2015 Skurenok,
Aleksey Anatolyevich
1984 47/18 Kievskaya
St.
Unemployed Avulsive wound of the head, right hip.
10. 01.24.2015 Kotik,
Olga Nikolayevna
02.24.1975 17/71 Rovenskiy
Lane
Unemployed Gunshot wound of the right hip joint and
hip with metal fragments. Blunt shrapnel
wound of the neck. Closed displaced
comminuted fracture of the upper third of
the left hip. First-degree traumatic shock.
158
8
12. 01.24.2015 Leonov,
Vasiliy Pavlovich
01.20.1936 162/89
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the left hip, right
shoulder. Degloving wound of the genitals.
13. 01.24.2015 Litvin,
Andrey Valeryevich
01.10.1986 78/4 M. Zhukova
St.
Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the left infraclavicular
region.
14. 01.24.2015 Smoroda,
Sergey Ivanovich
02.10.1961 84/134
M. Zhukova St.
Unemployed Contusion of the right eye. Degloving
wound of the upper eyelid.
15. 01.24.2015 Vasilenko,
Valentina Semenovna
1947 39 Landshaftnaya
St.
Retired Blunt shrapnel wound of the left gluteal
region with fragments.
City Hospital No. 2
16. 01.24.2015 Karyuta,
Vladimir
Grigoryevich
11.30.1947 19 Marshrutnaya
Sychova St.
Retired Open fracture of the left brachium.
Territorial Medical Association
17. 01.24.2015 Grishko,
Aleksey Olegovich
10.25.2000 78/138 Kievskaya
St.
OVK No. 14,
Grade 8
Avulsive wound of the left hip. Left
shoulder (fragments)
18. 01.24.2015 Bazyleva,
Darya Igorevna
09.17.2003 60-144
M. Zhukova St.
School No. 5,
Grade 5
Soft tissue bruise of the back, abrasion of
the head and limbs
19. 01.24.2015 Levochkina,
Polina Anatolyevna
04.18.2005 43-36 Kievskaya
St.
School No. 57,
Grade 3
Avulsive wound of the left foot.
20. 01.24.2015 Mishchenko,
Kirill Vadimovich
07.25.2004 50-77 M. Zhukova
St.
School No. 5,
Grade 5
Gunshot wounds, foreign object
(fragment) in the right shoulder blade.
City Hospital No. 4
21. 01.24.2015 Bogdanova,
Albina Sergeyevna
03.04.1993 13-85 9 Maya St. Magneto
Sportclub,
administrator
Shrapnel wound of the right side of the
ribcage. Penetrating shrapnel wound of the
otic and parotid region, shrapnel wound of
the right hip, right shin.
22. 01.24.2015 Shchurenko,
Irina Valeryevna
12.20.1984 10-48 9 Maya St. Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the right gluteal region,
upper third of the right shin.
23. 01.24.2015 Ternovaya,
Tatyana [illegible]
02.15.1958 53-112 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the upper third left
shin, left foot, multiple shrapnel firearm
fractures.
159
9
24. 01.24.2015 Atorvin,
Aleksandr
Fedorovich
10.30.1956 163-135
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the right foot. Open
fracture of the calcaneal tuber, right
calcaneus without displacement.
25. 01.24.2015 Goncharov,
Vladimir
Georgiyevich
08.04.1960 5/1-28 9 Maya St. Unemployed Shrapnel wounds of the mid third of the
right shin with displacement, shrapnel
wound of the right shinbone with
displacement, blunt shrapnel wound of the
right pelvis joint, blunt shrapnel wound of
mid third of the left hip.
26. 01.24.2015 Gabriyelyan,
Karen Leonidovich
03.20.1980 52 Oktyabrskaya
St.
Unemployed Firearm shrapnel wound of the lumbar
region and right buttock.
27. 01.24.2015 Gargayeva,
Natalya Petrovna
02.16.1954 39/1 Stalevarnaya
St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the upper lip, upper
third of the right hip, lower third of the left
brachium, mid third of the left hip,
multiple comminuted fractures of 1-5
instep bones of the left foot.
28. 01.24.2015 Ivanova,
Oksana
Aleksandrovna
12.03.1983 84-53 Zhukova
Ave.
Unemployed Gunshot wound, avulsive wounds of the
left shin, left wrist joint, left hip, right
buttock region
29. 01.24.2015 Ustimenko,
Lyudmila
Nikolayevna
10.20.1956 22-49 9 Maya St. Garant, Quality
Controller
Shrapnel wound of the right side of the
ribcage, anterior abdomen surface,
brachium, wrist joint.
30. 01.24.2015 Kuprikov,
Aleksey Sergeyevich
02.16.1966 120-13 Poletayeva
Lane
Ilyicha, Driver Shrapnel wound of the left buttock and
right hip.
31. 01.24.2015 Chizhikova,
Svetlana Anatolyevna
03.18.1978 100-38 Lenina
Ave.
Nadezhda Store,
Saleswoman
Multiple shrapnel wounds of the face and
forehead.
32. 01.24.2015 Barylo,
Eduard Nikolayevich
09.15.1965 5-32 Kievskaya St. Ilyicha UA, Driver Blunt gunshot wound of the right hip.
33. 01.24.2015 Shiman,
Dmitriy
Alekseyevich
02.18.1953 66-1 Kievskaya St. Retired Shrapnel wounds of the lumbar region.
34. 01.24.2015 Vakulenko,
Yelena Pavlovna
09.20.1976 120/32 Poletayeva
St.
Margas,
metalworker
Shrapnel wounds of the left hand, left half
of the buttock.
35. 01.24.2015 Stepchenko,
Igor Alekseyevich
04.29.1970 36-106
M. Sibiryaka St.
Kievskiy Market,
Salesman
Shrapnel wound of chest on the right side,
tight hip, left shoulder, and left cheek.
36. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
160
10
37. 01.24.2015 Pyshkin,
Viktor Sergeyevich
08.30.1949 18-98 9 Maya St. DK No. 42,
watchman
Shrapnel wounds of the lumbar region,
buttocks, and hips.
38. 01.24.2015 Mikhankov,
Sergey
Aleksandrovich
06.23.1988 2A-1 Peyzazhnaya
St.
Unemployed Firearm shrapnel wound of the mid third
of the right shin with fracture. Shrapnel
wound of the left shin.
39. 01.24.2015 Yudenkova,
Katerina
Grigoryevna
01.23.1972 3-24 Poltavskaya
St.
Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the buttocks region.
40. 01.24.2015 Poyda,
Katerina Sergeyevna
03.15.1983 170-14
Azovstalskaya St.
Unemployed Firearm shrapnel wound of the mid third
of the left hip, upper third of the right shin.
41. 01.24.2015 Matyash,
Yevgeniya
Viktorovna
07.16.1956 396 Olimpiyskaya
St.
Solnyshko Orphan
Home
Shrapnel wound of the porous bone of the
right hip.
42. 01.26.2015 Kilin,
Yevgeniy
Demyanovich
10.20.1939 11/3-48 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Right-sided pneumonia, right-sided
pleuritis, Compression fracture of D4 and
D5 body.
City Hospital No. 5
43. 01.24.2015 Kuzmenko,
Natalya
Aleksandrovna
07.04.1990 60-3-38 Zhukova
Ave.
Maternity leave Contused wound of the head. Wounded
foot.
44. 01.24.2015 Osichev,
Viktor Anatolyevich
01.09.1951 41-126 Kievskaya
St.
Mariupolteploset,
metalworker
Contused wound of the head. Splintered
head wound.
45. 01.24.2015 Yevseyeva,
Tamara Pavlovna
03.02.1954 183-10
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Contused wound of the head. Splintered
wound of the left frontal region.
46. 01.26.2015 Denisenko,
Anastasiya
Viktorovna
01.14.1999 94-4 Kievskaya St. Vocational
training center, 1st
year
Cerebral contusion.
47. 01.26.2015 Klimovich,
Nadezhda Vasilyevna
05.19.1954 169-18
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Closed craniocerebral injury. Cerebral
contusion.
48. 01.28.2015 Osicheva,
Galina Yakovlevna
11.15.1946 41-126 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Cerebral contusion.
49. 01.28.2015 Tokar,
Yelena [illegible]
04.20.1985 16 Leningradskiy
[illegible]
Maternity leave Cerebral contusion.
161
11
50. 01.24.2015 Balayev,
Oleg Yevgenyevich
1988 70 Kievskaya Str,
apt. 41
Ordzhonikidze
Interior Affairs
Dept.
Extensive avulsive wound of the left pelvis
joint, left gluteal region with traumatic
rhabdomyolysis.
Emergency Medical Service Team
51. 01.24.2015 Kopysova,
Nina Mikhaylovna
1938 11 Kievskaya St.,
bldg. 3 apt. 66
Retired Shrapnel wound of the ribcage on the right
side.
52. Pavlova,
Lidiya Antonovna
1940 17 9 Maya St., apt.
36
Retired Shrapnel wound of the ribcage, right
shoulder.
53. 01.24.2015 Ivanova,
Yelizaveta
Nikolayevna
1954 163 Olimpiyskaya
St., apt. 13
School No. 5,
counselor
Shrapnel wound of the right hip, right shin.
54. 01.24.2015 Zova,
Lidiya Vasilyevna
1958 7 Kievskaya St.,
apt. 13
Azovstal, Coke
and By-Product
Production,
engineer
Shrapnel Gunshot wound of the face.
55. 01.24.2015 Gavrilchenko,
Tatyana Viktorovna
1960 194 Shevchenko
St.
Disabled person of
Group III, not
employed
Avulsive wound of the neck on the left side.
Shrapnel wound of the left shoulder girdle.
56. 01.24.2015 Kuptsova,
Olga Aleksandrovna
1954 163 Ordzhonikidze
St., apt. 128
Retired Closed fracture of the left patella (fell down
during an explosion).
57. 01.24.2015 Vidolevich,
Mikhail
Mikhaylovich
1952 35-45 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Acute Q(+) posterior myocardial
infarction.
162
12
Information about persons with light wounds treated in medical institutions of the city
Ite
m
No.
Date
admitted Full name Year of
birth Residential address Place of
employment Diagnosis
City Hospital No. 1
1. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Dovgalets,
Rostislav
Sergeyevich
1940 165/17
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Contused wound of the right brachium.
Contused wound of the back, face.
2. 01.24.2015 Dovgalets,
Tatyana Grigoryevna
06.24.1967 165/17
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Abrasion of the face and neck.
3. 01.24.2015 Zhuravel,
Yekaterina
Mitrofanovna
08.17.1943 3/2-71 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Blunt shrapnel wound of the right knee-joint
with fragments of soft tissues. Perforating
gunshot wound of the left knee-joint.
4. 01.24.2015 Sarzhay,
Aleksandr
Rodionovich
1942 46/12 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Open comminuted fracture of the mid third of
the right ulnar bone. Avulsive wound of the
axillary region.
5. 01.24.2015 Matynga,
Zinaida Yegorovna
1933 91/111 Poletayeva
St.
Retired Closed comminuted fracture of the bones of
the left brachium. Mid and lower thirds with
displacement.
City Hospital No. 2
6. 01.24.2015 Nikolayeva,
Natalya
Mikhaylovna
09.12.1961 56-70 Zhukova
Ave.
City Hospital No.
2
Shrapnel wound of the left buttock.
7. 01.24.2015 Dontsov,
Sergey Pavlovich
09.18.1970 88 Rizhskiy Lane Satelit LLC,
machine operator
Shrapnel wound of the left brachium.
8. 01.24.2015 Miski-Oglu,
Oleg Federovich
01.19.1962 168-54
Azovstalskaya St.
Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the left brachium.
9. 01.24.2015 Kochegarova,
Tatyana Vasilyevna
11.12.1948 145-4
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the neck.
10. 01.26.2015 Laktionov,
Viktor Ivanovich
10.07.1954 11/3-55 Kievskaya
St.
SU-112 PJSC
Stalkonstruktsia,
assembly foreman
Shrapnel wound of the lower third of the right
hip
11. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Platonova,
Lidiya
Aleksandrovna
09.20.1991 252 Olimpiyskaya
St.
City Council Shrapnel wound of the right and left brachia.
Territorial Medical Association
163
13
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
City Hospital No. 4
13. 01.24.2015 Buzlyak,
Sofiya Sergeyevna
05.30.1990 19 Landshaftnaya
St.
Eva Beauty
Parlor, hairdresser
Shrapnel wound of the upper third of the right
shin.
14. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Dremukha,
Natalya
Mikhaylovna
1969 68-8 Zhukova St. - Shrapnel wound of the right hand.
15. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Kozlova,
Svetlana Yeliferovna
1980 76-5 Kievskaya St. - Shrapnel wound of the left shin.
16. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Reshetnyak,
Vitaliy
Vsevolodovich
1972 245 Sovetskaya St.,
Vinogradnoye
- Chopped wound of the parietal region of the
head.
17. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Golovacheva,
Lyubov Pavlovna
1953 68-81 Kievskaya
St.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the right hand fingers.
18. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Kundys,
Valentina
Yakovlevna
1939 4-34
Komsomolskiy
Blvd.
Retired Shrapnel wound of the right brachium.
19. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Malakutskiy,
Aleksandr
Aleksandrovich
1980 169-136
Olimpiyskaya St.
SU 112 PJSC,
Head of the Metal
Structures Shop
Chopped wound of the right brachium.
20. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Zhuravlev,
Nikolay Leonidovich
1968 45 Poletayeva St. Ilyicha, Shop No.
307, Electrician
Shrapnel wound of the upper third of the hip.
21. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Ryzhykova,
Valentina Kirillovna
1958 45/7-21
Azovstalskaya St.
- Shrapnel wound of the right hip.
22. 01.28.2015 Makhnevich,
Nadezhda
Vladimirovna
04.06.1982 48/3-29 Kievskaya
St.
Ilyicha, Cold
Reduction
Department, sorter
Diminished hearing.
23. 01.29.2015 Tolkachev,
Sergey Anatolyevich
03.17.1956 16 Volkova St.,
Sartana
Private Company Shrapnel wound of the right brachium.
City Hospital No. 5
24. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Borisov,
Mikhail
Afanasyevich
86 years old 97 Kuzbasskaya St. Retired Abrasion of the soft tissues of the face.
164
14
25. [illegible] [illegible]
Yefimovna
[illegible] 36-106
M. Sibiryaka St.
[illegible] [illegible]
26. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Burlachenko,
Tatyana Grigoryevna
02.18.1957 40-1-45
Peyzazhnaya St.
Retired Subcutaneous hemorrhage. Abrasion of the
frontal right part.
27. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Ovcharenko,
Anna Nikolayevna
2011 183-46
Olimpiyskaya St.
- Contused wound of the forehead, chin.
28. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Kuzmenko,
Sofiya Mikhalovna
05.07.2013 60/13-38 Marshala
Zhukova St.
Unorganized Face abrasion.
29. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Kuznetsova,
Marina Nikolayevna
06.28.1979 60/54 Kievskaya
St.
- Face abrasion. Situation neurosis.
City Hospital No. 9
30. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Florinskiy,
Nikolay
Aleksandrovich
1960 166-127
Azovstalskaya St.
Florinskiy Private
Company
Comminuted wound of the acromioclavicular
joint.
31. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Baluyeva,
Antonina Ivanovna
1961 48/1 Kievskaya St.,
apt. 8
Ilyich Iron and
Steel Works,
Charging Material
Preparation Shop
Stab and slash wound of the left shin.
Emergency Medical Service Team
32. 01.24.2015 Ivanov,
Maksim
Vyacheslavovich
1982 163 Olimpiyskaya
St., apt. 13
Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the soft tissues of the right
hip.
33. 01.24.2015 Sergeyev,
Sergey
Aleksandrovich
1969 33 Ravninnaya St. Azovstal, Oxygen
Converter Shop,
metalworker
Gunshot wound of the right shin.
34. 01.24.2015 Olekberov,
Asif Romanovich
1984 117 Goncharova
Sttr.
Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the right cubital fossa.
First-Aid Station
35. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Karpalov,
Oleg Viktorovich
1972 74 Karpinskogo
St., apt. 44
Unemployed Shrapnel wound of the left shin, left iliac
region.
165
15
36. 01.24.2015
(outpatient
treatment)
Boldyshor,
Vyacheslav
Sergeyevich
1986 96 Rizhskiy Lane Unemployed Contused wound of the right lumbar region
(during the explosion).
166
16
38. 01.28.2015 Koop,
Yelena Yevgenyevna
05.15.1985 Resides: 8-144
Kievskaya St.
Registered: 8-9
Kominterna St.
- Situation neurosis.
Primary Care Health Center No. 2
39. 01.26.2015
09:15
Kulbaka,
Oksana Valeryevna
09.15.1979 28-52 50 Let SSSR
St.
- Shrapnel wound of the posterial ribcage wall,
fingers on both hands.
Primary Care Health Center No. 5
40. 01.26.2015 Shalaginova,
Tatyana
Aleksandrovna
08.11.1981 112b Zvezdnaya
St.
Security Holding
LLC, controller
Contused wound of the left hip. Foreign object
in the soft tissues of the left hip.
41. 01.29.2015 Shchukina,
Lina Garifulovna
1934 185-44
Olimpiyskaya St.
Retired Infected body wounds of the lower blade
region (7 wounds). Foreign object in the soft
tissues of the suprascapular region. Brain
contusion.
42. 02.02.2015 Mytsyk,
Nikolay
Aleksandrovich
08.29.1941 15-38 Mezhevaya
St.
City Hospital No.
7, Department
No. 7, Head of
Department
Thermal burn of both feet and both hands, 2nd
– 3rd degree, burn area – 1%
LN AGU No. 954013 from 02.02.2015 to
present
Primary Care Health Center No. 6
43. 01.30.2015 Borisova,
Tatyana
Aleksandrovna
03.08.1971 13-41
Azovstalskaya St.
Private Company Shrapnel wound of the left leg.
Deceased: 30
Applied for medical aid: Total of 118 people including:
- with grievous wounds: 18
- with moderate wounds: 57
- with light wounds: 43
Annex 105
Record of Site Inspection Conducted by A.A. Kholin, Major of Justice and Senior
Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security
Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast (12 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document

1
RECORD OF SITE INSPECTION
Town of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast February 12, 2015
Inspection commenced at 6:10 p.m. on February 10, 2015
Inspection ended at 8:05 p.m. on February 11, 2015
This record was drawn up on February 12, 2015 between 10:40 a.m. and 6:50 p.m.
Major of Justice A.A. Kholin, Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the
Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast, having reviewed
the files of criminal case No. 22015050000000092 of February 10, 2015 into an alleged crime
falling under Article 258 (Part 3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as required by Articles 104,
105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
in the presence of attesting witnesses:
1) Ruslan Yuriyovych Smenov, born in 1976, residing at 28 Katerynycha Street, apartment
30, Kramatorsk;
2) Oleksiy Valeriyovych Pechenyi, born in 1987, residing at 20 Uralska Street,
Kramatorsk,
who had their rights and obligations explained to them pursuant to Articles 11, 13, 15, and
223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine;
with the participation of the following experts:
3) rocket artillery battery commander Captain H.O. Panchenko, d.o.b. February 5, 1984,
residing at 164 Truskavetska Street, Drohobych, Lviv Oblast on the premises of Military Unit
A1108, who has been serving in the military since 2001;
4) A.V. Lytvynenko, acting chief of the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the
Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast;
5) V.E. Holovko, deputy chief of the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the Forensic
Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in
Donetsk Oblast;
6) S.M. Tomnyuk, senior expert with the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the
Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast;
7) V.P. Korablin, explosives expert with the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the
Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast,
who had their rights and obligations explained to them pursuant to Parts 4 and 5 of Article
71 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine;
3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature] 7) [signature]
With the participation of other individuals:
8) Lieutenant S.S. Kovalov, investigator with the Investigative Department of the Donetsk
Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;
9) Lieutenant L.Yu. Zhurko, investigator with the Investigative Department of the Donetsk
Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;
10) Major of Justice P.O. Nykytenko, investigator with the Operative Unit of the
Investigative Department of Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;
11) Colonel of Justice V.V. Kharakhorin, senior investigator with the Operative Unit of the
Investigative Department of Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
2
inspected the territory of the town of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, to locate the shell
impact sites (shell holes) after the artillery shelling of the town of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, on
February 10, 2015.
The inspection was conducted under natural daylight conditions.
Before the inspection commenced, the above-mentioned individuals had the meaning of
Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine explained to them to the effect that a person shall not be
held accountable for refusing to offer testimony or explanations regarding themselves, their family
members or next of kin as defined by law.
Before the inspection commenced, it was explained to the above-mentioned persons that
they had the right to be present during all inspection formalities and make comments that must be
reflected in the record. The persons involved in the inspection also had the requirements of Article
66, Part 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine explained to them, under which they are
obligated not to disclose information about any procedural formalities completed, and also warned
about the use of photographic equipment (a Canon digital camera) with automatic settings.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
Inspection Findings
1. The inspection focused directly on an area located at the intersection of Dvirtseva Street
and Devyatnadstiatoho Partzyizdu Street in Kramatorsk. Block of flats No. 26 and block of flats
No. 34 are located on the right-hand side of Dvirtseva Street in the direction from the center of
Kramatorsk. The facades of these buildings face the roadway of Dvirtseva Street. Building No. 34
faces the roadway of Devyatnadstiatoho Partzyizdu Street in Kramatorsk. A visual inspection did
not reveal these buildings to be damaged. A sidewalk runs along the roadway of Dvirtseva Street.
There are trees planted between the sidewalk and the blocks of flats. An inspection of the area near
these buildings revealed a shell hole approximately 1 meter in diameter and 90 cm deep with
uneven edges on the ground surface. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell
hole. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located
approximately 3 meters from the edge of the sidewalk and 8 meters from the corner of building No.
34 in Parkova Street, Kramatorsk. Fragments of a concrete slab are scattered on the ground next to
the shell hole. There is a metal notice board next to the shell hole. At the time of this inspection,
there was no projectile in this shell hole. The projectile had been removed prior to the inspection
by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any
explosion hazards. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal
fragments of the shell approximately 8 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert
into security bag No. 2266425 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.
2. The inspection focused directly on an area located at the intersection of Marata Street
and Voznesenskoho Street in Kramatorsk.
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7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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Block of flats No. 17 in Marata Street is located on the left-hand side of Voznesenskoho
Street in the direction from the center of Kramatorsk. Its facade faces the roadway of
Voznesenskoho Street and adjoins Marata Street. A small park is located along the roadway of
Voznesenskoho Street. A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 17 in Marata Street
revealed pockmark damage to the facade. The ground floor of this block of flats houses Hair Salon
No. 2, Trust Bank, Zdravytsya Pharmacy, and Zateynik Toy Store. At the time of the inspection,
their windows were boarded up. The finishing material of the walls shows multiple pockmarks up
to 5 cm in size. The signs of the commercial properties are damaged. A sidewalk runs along the
roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell
fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative
to specific street addresses): Shell hole No. 1 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm
deep, located directly next to the stairs leading to the entrance to the Zdravytsya Pharmacy,
approximately 1 m from the building facade; Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter
and up to 5 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located
approximately 4 m from the building facade and 8 m from the corner of building No. 17 in Marata
Street; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark
damage to the ground radiating from it, located in bushes, approximately 40 cm from the roadway
of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 4 approximately 30
cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it,
located approximately 5 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik
Toy Store; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 7 cm deep with pockmark
damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 13 m from the roadway of
Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 6 approximately 30 cm in
diameter and up to 7 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located
approximately 5 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store;
Shell hole No. 7 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to
the ground radiating from it, located approximately 20 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho
Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 8 approximately 30 cm in diameter and
up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 10
m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store. No projectiles
were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert
extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The
fragments were then placed by the expert into security bag No. 2586569 and sealed it in the
presence of all inspection participants.
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7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell holes and
placed them into security bag No. 2266424 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection
participants.
3. The inspection focused directly on an area located at the intersection of Lenin Street and
Voznesenskoho Street in Kramatorsk. Block of flats No. 24 in Lenin Street is located on the
left-hand side of Voznesenskoho Street in the direction from the center of Kramatorsk. The
building is L-shaped and its facade faces the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street and adjoins Lenin
Street. A small park is located along the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. A sidewalk runs along
the roadway of Lenin Street. Trees are planted between the sidewalk and the roadway of Lenin
Street. A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street revealed pockmark
damage to the facade. The ground floor of this block of flats houses the Glamor store and the
Zdravytsya pharmacy. At the time of the inspection, their windows were boarded up with roller
blinds lowered. The finishing material of the walls shows multiple pockmarks up to 5 cm in size.
The signs and windows of the commercial properties are damaged. A sidewalk runs along the
roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. There are numerous fragments of broken glass on the
sidewalks on the side of Voznesenskoho Street and Lenin Street. The building facade on the side
of the backyard shows multiple pockmark damage spots. Some of the flats have broken window
panes. An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell
holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses):
Shell hole No. 1 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep, located directly next to the
stairs leading to the entrance to the Zdravytsya Pharmacy, approximately 1 m from the building
facade; Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark
damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 20 m from the building facade and
5 m from the corner of building No. 24 in Lenin Street; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 30 cm in
diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located
approximately 30 m from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street on the side of the backyard;
Shell hole No. 4 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to
the ground radiating from it, located approximately 30 m from the facade of building No. 24 in
Lenin Street on the side of the backyard; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up
to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 15 m
from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street on the side of the backyard; Shell hole No. 6
approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt
pavement radiating from it, located approximately 4 m from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin
Street on the side of the backyard. The roof of this building also sustained extensive damage.
However, repairs were already underway at the time of this inspection, making it impossible to
determine the extent of original damage.
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7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the
inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately
4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bag No. 2586571 and
sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert
extracted soil samples from said shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2586570 and
sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.
4. The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 49 in Lenin Street,
Kramatorsk, which is a two-story edifice. The facade of this building faces the roadway of Lenin
Street. Building No. 45 is located 10 m away from building No. 49. Building No. 45 is located at
the right angle to the roadway of Lenin Street and is also a two-story edifice. Asphalt-paved
roadways run past the buildings. Trees are planted next to the buildings. A visual inspection did
not reveal these buildings to be damaged. An inspection of the area near building No. 45 in Lenin
Street revealed a shell hole measuring 1 m x 3 m and 3 m deep with uneven edges on the ground
surface. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency
Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site,
making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size. There are
differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. At the time of the inspection, tail
fragments of the missile are lying next to the shell hole. The shell hole contains a missile fragment
3 to 3.5 m long, which is partly embedded in the ground. The shell hole (all shell holes were
inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located approximately 5 meters from the facade of
building No. 43 in Lenin Street and 11 m from the building corner. Projectile fragments were
removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management
to be inspected for any explosion hazards.
5. The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 16 in Sako Ivantseti Street,
Kramatorsk, which is a two-story edifice. The facade of this building faces the roadway of
Sotsialistychna Street in Kramatorsk. An asphalt-paved sidewalk runs along the building. Trees
are planted next to the building. A visual inspection of said building revealed the following
damage to the second section of the building: the roof deck was damaged – specifically there is a
50 cm hole with uneven edges in the roof deck; the flight of stairs between the first and second
stories was destroyed; there is a hole up to 1 m in diameter in the floor deck of the first story. At the
time of this inspection, there was no projectile in this shell hole. The projectile had been removed
prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be
inspected for any explosion hazards. The second story of the building was also damaged by the
falling missile. However, repairs were already underway at the time of this inspection, making it
impossible to determine the extent of original damage. No shell holes were discovered on the
ground surface during an inspection of the area next to building No. 6 in Sako Ivantseti Street.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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6. The inspection focused directly on an area located near the Culture and Technology
Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk. The facade of this building faces building No. 50 in
Sotsialistychna Street in Kramatorsk. An asphalt-paved sidewalk runs along the building. Trees
and bushes are planted next to the building. A visual inspection of the Culture and Technology
Palace did not reveal any damage to the building. An inspection of the area near the Culture and
Technology Palace revealed a shell hole approximately 0.5 m in diameter and 90 cm deep with
uneven edges on the asphalt-paved surface. There are differently sized fragments of soil and
asphalt next to the shell hole. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific
street addresses) is located approximately 4 meters from the right facade of the Culture and
Technology Palace and 11 meters from the rear right corner of the building and 32 m from building
No. 50 in Sotsialistychna Street. At the time of this inspection, there was no projectile in this shell
hole. The projectile had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State
Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. The projectile was
still lying next to the shell hole at the time of the inspection and was removed by the investigator to
the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell
approximately 10 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bags Nos.
2586599, 2266426 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the
inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell hole and placed them into security
bag No. 2586582 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.
7. The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, which is a multi-story edifice with 6 entrances (sections). The facade of this building
faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street. The L-shaped building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard is
located 20 meters from building No. 56. Block of flats No. 58 in Dvirtseva Street is located next to
the 6th entrance to building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street. There are asphalt-paved sidewalks along the
buildings on the side of Dvirtseva Street and on the side of the backyard. Trees are planted next to
the buildings. There is a backyard on the rear side of these buildings. A visual inspection of the
facade of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street revealed pockmark damage on the side of the
backyard next to the 6th entrance. There are broken windows on the first, second, and third stories
on the shorter side of the building near the 6th entrance. The shorter side of building No. 58 in
Dvirtseva Street, which faces building No. 56, shows extensive pockmark damage spots up to 5 cm
in size on the facade. There are broken windows on the first, second, and third stories. There are
many broken glass fragments under said windows. An inspection of the area near these buildings
revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were
inspected relative to specific street addresses):
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Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep with pockmark
damage to the asphalt radiating from it, located on the asphalt-paved sidewalk of the building’s
backyard approximately 10 m from the facade of building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard,
which faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 1 m from the corner
of said building; there are broken glass fragments next to the shell hole; Shell hole No. 2
approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground
radiating from it, located approximately 20 m from the facade of building No. 11 in Kramatorsky
Boulevard, which faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 10 m
from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 10
cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 15 m from
the facade of building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, which faces the roadway of Dvirtseva
Street, on the side of the backyard, and 10 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 4
approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 3 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt
pavement radiating from it, located approximately 10 m from the facade of the 6th section of
building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 2 m from the corner of said
building; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 50 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark
damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 8 m from the facade of the 6th
section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 2 m from the corner
of said building; Shell hole No. 6 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 2 cm deep with
pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 25 m from the
facade of the 6th section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the shorter side of the building,
and 2 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 7 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up
to 2 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located
approximately 25 m from the facade of the 6th section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the
shorter side of the building, and 1 m from the corner of said building. The roof of the 6th section of
building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street also sustained damage. However, repairs were already
underway at the time of this inspection, making it impossible to determine the extent of original
damage. No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the
inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately
4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bags Nos. 2586579,
0636364 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb
expert extracted soil samples from said shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2586580
and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.
8. The inspection focused directly on the premises of a four-story residential
building located at 28 Lenin Street. The facade of this building faces the roadway of Lenin Street.
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7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 28 in Lenin Street revealed no damage.
However, the roof of the first section shows damage from falling shell fragments. Specifically, the
roof deck is damaged. The owners of the damaged apartments (No. 14 on the fourth story and No.
10 on the third story), who were at home at the time of the inspection, verbally agreed to allow
entry into their housing for purposes of the inspection. A fragment of the projectile that damaged
the building had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for
Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards and was missing at the time of
the inspection. The inspection revealed that a fragment of the projectile made contact with the
building roof and penetrated the roof decks and reinforced concrete decks between the fourth and
third stories in the first section of said building. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a
circular missile fragment 30 cm in diameter, which was placed by the expert into a polyethylene
packet in the presence of all inspection participants and sealed with a paper seal bearing the
signatures of all inspection participants.
9. The inspection focused directly on an area located at 22-a Kramatorsky Boulevard. The
private firm Vladis is situated at this address. The administrative offices of the private firm Vladis
are located on one side. The premises of garage compartments of the private firm Vladis are
located in front of the building facade at a distance of approximately 15 m. A block of flats at 89
Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, is located 45 m from the shorter side of the building housing the
administrative offices of the private firm Vladis. A visual inspection did not reveal these premises
to be damaged. A shell hole approximately 1 m in diameter and 10 cm deep with uneven edges was
discovered during an inspection of the area at a distance of approximately 15 m from the shorter
side of the administrative premises of the private firm Vladis, some 30 m from the block of flats at
89 Parkova Street, and 15 m from the premises of the garage compartments. There are differently
sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. Projectile fragments were removed after the
inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to
the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
10. The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 21 in Kramatorsky
Boulevard, Kramatorsk, which is a nine-story residential building. A 9-story residential building at
97 Parkova Street is located at the right angle to the roadway of Kramatorsky Boulevard some 170
m from building No. 21 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk. A visual inspection did not reveal
these buildings to be damaged. An inspection of the area between building No. 21 in Kramatorsky
Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and building No. 97 in Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, revealed a shell hole
approximately 50 cm in diameter on the ground surface, which contained a missile fragment. The
shell hole depth could not be determined at the time of the inspection because the shell hole
contained the missile fragment that had not been removed from the ground and examined for
explosion hazards.
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7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located
approximately 100 meters from the facade of building No. 27 in Kramatorsky Boulevard and 70 m
from the facade of the building at 97 Parkova Street. Projectile fragments were removed after the
inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to
the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
11. The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 13 in Karpynskoho Street,
Kramatorsk, which is a two-story edifice. Building No. 9 is located 25 m away from building No.
13. Building No. 9 is also a two-story edifice. An asphalt-paved roadway runs past the buildings.
Trees are planted next to the buildings. A visual inspection did not reveal these buildings to be
damaged. An inspection of the area near building No. 13 in Karpynskoho Street revealed a shell
hole measuring 3 m x 2 m and 2 m deep with uneven edges on the ground surface. By the time of
the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used construction
machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site. There are differently sized
fragments of soil next to the shell hole. At the time of the inspection, tail fragments of the missile
are lying next to the shell hole. The shell hole contains a missile fragment 1.70 m long, which is
partly embedded in the ground. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific
street addresses) is located approximately 15 meters from building No. 19 in Karpynskoho Street
and 10 m from building No. 13 in Karpynskoho Street. Projectile fragments were removed after
the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected
for any explosion hazards.
12. The inspection focused directly on a cemetery in Lenin Street, Kramatorsk. A main
alley runs along the length of the cemetery, with graves located on either side of it. The grave of
F.V. Chyzhykov (1907-1977) is located approximately 200 m from the central entrance to the
cemetery, on the left-hand side, some 20 m from the main alley. An inspection of said grave
revealed partial damage to the burial chamber, with a missile fragment still embedded in it. The
shell hole depth could not be determined at the time of the inspection because the shell hole
contained the missile fragment that had not been removed from the ground and examined for
explosion hazards. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of
the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.
13. The inspection focused directly on the grounds of Boarding School No. 2 located at 15
Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk. The building of a 9-story block of flats at 16 Voznesenskoho
Street, Kramatorsk, is located approximately 140 meters from the facade of Boarding School No.
2. The building of a 9-story block of flats at 1 Karpynskoho Street, Kramatorsk, is located
approximately 200 meters from the shorter side of the building of Boarding School No. 2.
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Missile fragments extracted from the ground by representatives of the State Service for
Emergency Management are located on the boarding school grounds. Missile fragments (all
impact sites were inspected relative to specific street addresses) are located approximately 150 m
from the building at 1 Karpynskoho Street, some 70 m from the building of the boarding school at
15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, and some 70 m from the building at 16 Voznesenskoho
Street, Kramatorsk. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of
the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. The
inspection also discovered the impact site of the missile in question, specifically 70 m from the
building at 1 Karpynskoho Street, some 200 m from the building of the boarding school at 15
Sotsialistychna Street, and some 50 m from the building at 16 Voznesenskoho Street. By the time
of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used
construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site, making it impossible
to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size.
14. The inspection focused directly on the area located in the backyard of block of flats No.
99 in Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, which is L-shaped and has a facade facing the roadway of
Parkova Street. There are trees and a playground in this backyard. A visual inspection of the facade
of building No. 99 in Parkova Street revealed pockmark damage on the wall. Windows on the
ground floors were broken at the time of the inspection. Numerous broken glass fragments are
under the walls of building No. 99 in Parkova Street. An inspection of the area near this building
revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were
inspected relative to specific street addresses): Shell hole No. 1 measures 25 x 23 cm and is located
39 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 165 m from the
building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert
extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 0636365;
Shell hole No. 2 measures 25 x 25 cm and is located 7 m from the building section located at the
right angle to Parkova Street and 119 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova
Street.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed
and sealed them in security bag No. 2586605, and soil samples that were placed and sealed in
security bag No. 0636366; Shell hole No. 3 measures 24 x 26 cm and is located 4.5 m from the
building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 101 m from the building section
that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal
fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586606; Shell hole No. 4
measures 23 x 25 cm and is located 11 m from the building section located at the right angle to
Parkova Street and 78 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the
inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in
security bag No. 2586607; Shell hole No. 5 measures 25 x 25 cm and is located 38.5 m from the
building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 87 m from the building section that
runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of
the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586608; Shell hole No. 6 measures 27 x
24 cm and is located 46 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and
64 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb
expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No.
2586609; Shell hole No. 7 measures 27 x 25 cm and is located 51.5 m from the building section
located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 60 m from the building section that runs parallel to
Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile,
placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586610. No projectiles were present in said shell holes
at the time of the inspection.
15. The inspection focused directly on the area located in the backyard of block of flats No.
47 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, which is L-shaped and has a facade facing the roadway of
Dvirtseva Street. There are trees and a playground in this backyard. A visual inspection did not
reveal the building to be damaged. The inspection revealed a shell fragment impact site 25 m from
the section of building No. 47 located at the right angle to Dvirtseva Street and 20 m from the
section of building No. 47 that runs parallel to Dvirtseva Street. The impact site contained a metal
object embedded in the ground, which consisted of a cylindrical body 300 mm in diameter with an
apparent length of 160 cm. A cylindrical insert 270 m in diameter and 55 cm long is attached to the
body of the object. Six metal bent plates (fins) are attached to this cylindrical insert.
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7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
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The object is hollow. There are partly erased markings made in a black ink on its lateral
surface. The fins also bear mechanically applied (indented) markings: “СТ 10490961; СТ
10490071; СТ 10610861; СТ 10610561; СТ 10090571; СТ 10610231”. A projectile fragment
was removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency
Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.
16. The inspection focused directly on the area of a parking lot at 4 Hvardiytsiv
Kontemyrivtsiv, Kramatorsk. A visual inspection of the parking lot grounds did not reveal any
damage. The inspection of the area revealed shell a fragment impact site in the backyard. A metal
object with an apparent length of 110 cm was discovered 30 m from the front concrete wall and 8
m from the left wall. The object was embedded in the ground and was 270 mm in diameter at its
thickest. The object consists of a cylindrical pipe approximately 70 cm in diameter, to which a
circular plate 270 mm in diameter and 30 mm thick is attached by welding. Four same-sized metal
plates with multiple round holes 16 mm in diameter are attached to the cylindrical pipe by welding.
Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for
Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
17. The inspection focused directly on the area of the Venera Garage Cooperative that
adjoins Rybalko Street, specifically the 5th row of garages. A visual inspection of the 5th row of
garages at the Venera Garage Cooperative did not reveal any damage. A shell fragment impact site
was discovered in the middle of the 5th row of garages at the Venera Garage Cooperative during
the inspection of the area. A metal object embedded in the ground was discovered 3 m from
Garage No. 47 of the 5th row of the Venera Garage Cooperative and 190 m from Garage No. 190 of
the 5th row of the Venera Garage Cooperative. The object consists of a cylindrical body 300 mm in
diameter at its thickest, with an apparent length of 15 cm. Projectile fragments were removed after
the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported
to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
18. The inspection focused directly on the area next to a private residence at 10 Rybalko
Street, Kramatorsk, and the Veteran Garage Cooperative. A visual inspection of this area revealed
pockmark damage to the garages and the metal fence of the private residence at 10 Rybalko Street.
An inspection of this area revealed shell fragment impact sites, specifically a shell hole measuring
24 x 26 cm and located 5 m from Garage No. 40 of the Veteran Garage Cooperative, and 15 m
from the corner of the fence of the private residence at 10 Rybalko Street.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
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During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed
and sealed them in security bag No. 0636368.
19. The inspection focused directly on the area of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative that
adjoins Rybalko Street, specifically the 2nd row of garages. A visual inspection of the 2nd row of
garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative revealed damage to garages. A shell fragment impact
site was discovered in the middle of the 2nd row of garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative
during the inspection of the area. A shell hole measuring 25 x 24 m was discovered 4.5 m from
Garage No. 18 of the 2nd row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 4 m from Garage No. 2 of the
2nd row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative. A metal object embedded in the ground 210 mm long
and 300 mm in diameter at its thickest was discovered 12 m from the administrative offices of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 23 m from the 1st row of garages of the Sputnik Garage
Cooperative. The object consists of a cylindrical pipe approximately 70 cm in diameter, to which a
circular plate 270 mm in diameter and 30 mm thick is attached by welding. Four same-sized metal
plates with multiple round holes 16 mm in diameter are attached to the cylindrical pipe by welding.
The main part of the object contains a cylindrical metal part 300 mm in diameter and 42 cm long.
Multi-strand wires with connectors stick out on the shorter side of this part. During the inspection,
a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bags
Nos. 2266428 and 0636367. A cylindrical metal object 70 mm in diameter and 180 cm long was
also discovered 12 m from the administrative offices of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 23 m
from the first row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative. This object has multiple round holes 16 mm
in diameter. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State
Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk
Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
20. The inspection focused directly on the area of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative that
adjoins Rybalko Street, specifically the 1nd row of garages. A visual inspection of the 1nd row of
garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative revealed damage to garages. A shell fragment impact
site was discovered during the inspection of the area. A shell hole measuring 24 x 23 cm was
discovered 3.5 m from Garage No. 101 of the first row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 30
m from the fence of a gas filling station that was closed at the time of the inspection.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
14
During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed
and sealed them in security bag No. 2266431. A shell hole measuring 24 x 23 cm was discovered 8
m from Garage No. 103 of the first row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 26 m from the
fence of a gas filling station that was closed at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a
bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag
No. 2586567.
21. The inspection focused directly on an area located on the grounds of Novokramatorsky
Mechanical Engineering Plant (NKMZ). The premises of Shop No. 12 are located on one side. The
premises of the neutralization station of Shop No. 12 are located opposite said shop. There is a
roadway between them. A pipeline mounted on metal supports runs along the roadway some 5
meters above ground. An electrical substation is located to the right of Shop No. 12. A visual
inspection did not reveal these premises to be damaged. Trees are planted in this area of the plant
along the roadway. An inspection of the area near these buildings revealed shell fragment impact
sites. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency
Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site,
making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size. The missile
fragment itself was broken in half. The shell hole is located 74 m from Shop No. 12 of the NKMZ
Plant and 47 m from the electrical substation of the NKMZ Plant. The largest part of the missile is
marked with the lettering “Bandage” in white paint. The smaller part of the missile is marked with
the lettering “14-99-A 22 9D* two illegible symbols *.00.010” in blank paint. Projectile fragments
were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency
Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine.
22. The inspection focused directly on the premises of the nine-story residential building at
42 Dvirtseva Street, whose facade faces the roadway of Yubileyna Street. A visual inspection of
the facade of building No. 42 in Dvirtseva Street revealed considerable damage to apartments
between the second story and the fifth story in the first section of said building. The owners of the
damaged apartments (on the second and third stories), who were at home at the time of the
inspection, verbally agreed to allow entry into their housing for purposes of the inspection. A
fragment of the projectile that damaged the building had been removed prior to the inspection by
representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion
hazards. The inspection revealed that a part of the missile made contact with the building between
balconies on the fifth and fourth stories and got embedded in the floor of the third-story balcony.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
15
23. The inspection focused directly on the area in the backyard between buildings at 107
and 105 Parkova Street, the roof, and the 6th section of said building No. 107 in Parkova Street,
which were also hit by missile fragments. Missile fragments broke windows in many apartments in
said buildings. A KIA Cerato with the number plate AH0756HO and a Geely with the number
plate BB5203CH parked in the backyard sustained considerable damage to the body and windows.
An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes
are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses): Shell
hole No. 1 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 3 cm deep with pockmark damage to the
ground radiating from it, located approximately 11 m from the shorter side of building No. 105;
Shell hole No. 2 approximately 26 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep is located on an
asphalt-paved sidewalk with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located
approximately 4 m from the facade of building No. 105 and 11 m from the shell hole No. 1; Shell
hole No. 3 approximately 24 cm in diameter and up to 1 cm deep is located on an asphalt-paved
sidewalk with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately
6 m from the facade of building No. 105 and 7 m from the shell hole No. 2; Shell hole No. 4
approximately 24 cm in diameter and up to 3 cm deep in the ground with pockmark damage to the
ground radiating from it, located approximately 14 m from the facade of building No. 107 and 23
m from the left facade of building No. 105; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 17 cm in diameter is
located in the wall of building No. 107 near the window in the area of the flight of stairs between
the second and third stories of the 6th section. To allow said shell hole to be inspected, a
representative of the housing management company opened a stowaway space located on this
flight of stairs, and the damage to the premises was inspected. Damage to the ceiling and walls of
the stowaway space as well as the window frame was discovered; shell hole No. 6 approximately
33 cm in diameter with pockmark damage to the roofing bitumen felt radiating from it, located on
the roof in the area of the 7th section of building No. 107. No projectiles were present in said shell
holes at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently
shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed
by the expert into security bags Nos. 2586598, 2586604 and sealed it in the presence of all
inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said
shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2586581 and sealed it in the presence of all
inspection participants.
24. The inspection focused directly on the track and field grounds of Secondary School No.
9 at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard. The building facade faces the roadway. A visual inspection of the
track and field grounds revealed a shell hole approximately 50 cm in diameter. The shell hole is
located approximately 62 from the school building and 14 m from the rear wall of privately owned
garages. A fragment of the projectile that landed in the track and field grounds had been removed
prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be
inspected for any explosion hazards.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
16
During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a soil sample from said shell hole and
placed it into security bag No. 2586597 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.
25. The inspection focused directly on the area near building No. 67 in Lenin Street, which
is a single-story building bearing an advertisement for the LeaderStroy company that is housed in
this building. Building No. 65 is located 10 m away from building No. 67-a. Building No. 65 is
located at the right angle to the roadway of Lenin Street and is also a single-story edifice. A road
with trees planted alongside it runs past the buildings. A visual inspection did not reveal these
buildings to be damaged. The inspection of the area revealed a shell hole in the ground measuring
47 x 73 cm and approximately 120 cm deep with uneven edges at a distance of 6 m from building
No. 67-a in Lenin Street and 3 m away from the roadway. At the time of the inspection, the shell
hole contained an element of the 300 mm cluster of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system.
There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. Projectile fragments were
removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management
to be inspected for any explosion hazards. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a soil
sample from said shell hole and placed it into security bag No. 2586596 and sealed it in the
presence of all inspection participants. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by
representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the
Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
26. The inspection focused directly on an area at the soccer field of the Blooming Stadium
at the intersection of Mayakovskoho Street and Shkadinova Street. A shell hole measuring 29x86
cm by 3 m was discovered on the surface of the ground on the soccer field. At the time of the
inspection, the shell hole contained an element of the 300 mm cluster of the Smerch multiple
launch rocket system, was approximately 3 m deep and had uneven edges. There are differently
sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. Fragments of the tail end of the missile were lying
next to the shell hole at the time of the inspection. Projectile fragments were removed after the
inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for
any explosion hazards. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal
fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert
into security bag No. 2586595 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During
the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a soil sample from said shell hole and placed it into
security bag No. 2586594 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.
27. The inspection focused directly on an area near a residential building at 1 Kramatorsky
Boulevard.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
17
An inspection of the area 50 m from the building revealed a shell fragment impact site in
the ground under the fence of a car parking lot. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the
State Service for Emergency Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the
shell fragment impact site, making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and
shell hole size.
28. The inspection focused directly on the area located in a gully between the residential
neighborhoods of Kramatorsk: Lazurne and Damansky. A shell fragment impact site in the ground
was located during the inspection of this area 100 m from the road between said residential
neighborhoods. A cylindrical metal pipe approximately 170 cm long and 20 cm in diameter was
extracted from the shell hole. Ten equidistant end-to-end holes are located along the entire length
of the pipe. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State
Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk
Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
During the inspection, expert H.O. Panchenko used the TOPO application and a GPS
navigator installed on a Samsung tablet (Model SM-T110) determined the coordinates of “cluster”
explosion sites and missile fragment impact sites following the shelling of the territory of
Kramatorsk on February 10, 2015, specifically:
1. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 5 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5402433, Y=7396822;
2. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 4 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5401860, Y=7397223;
3. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 16 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5400538, Y=7397150;
4. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 9 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5400381, Y=7397436;
5. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 10 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5400079, Y=7397584;
6. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 21 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5403999, Y=7395326;
7. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 11 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5402249, Y=7397141;
8. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 13 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5402242, Y=7396884;
9. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 7 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5401266, Y=7396647;
10. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 6 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5401648, Y=7396169;
11. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 15 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5401094, Y=7397113;
12. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 22 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5400910, Y=7397069;
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
18
13. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 26 in this record is
located at the following coordinates: Х=5402640, Y=7396372;
14. The “cluster” explosion site that appears under number 7 in this record is located at
the following coordinates: Х=5400472, Y=7397892;
15. The “cluster” explosion site that appears under number 2 in this record is located at
the following coordinates: Х=5401938, Y=7396595;
16. The “cluster” explosion site that appears under number 8 in this record is located at
the following coordinates: Х=5401905, Y=7396748;
17. The “cluster” explosion site that appears under number 25 in this record is located
at the following coordinates: Х=5401270, Y=7397743;
The expert notes that 300 mm missiles of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system, which
are fitted with projectiles contained in “clusters”, are characterized by the fact that “clusters” fall at
the coordinates of the target site. After the cluster part separates from the missile engine, the
clusters continue flying to the target site; the remaining missile elements continue to fly
chaotically by inertia until they land entirely outside the cluster impact site. Any remaining
elements of the missile engine up to 4 m long rotate while flying. Upon making contact with the
ground, they become twisted and deformed. It is therefore impossible to determine the missile
angle simply by looking at the remaining elements of the missile engine.
Expert H.O. Panchenko also notes that “clusters”, which are elements of 300 mm missiles
of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system, carry small-sized projectiles. A “cluster” detonates
upon making contact with a hard surface. While inspecting the “cluster” explosion sites (shell
holes), the expert used an artillery compass to perform measurements and determined that when
the “clusters” exploded their projectiles exited them at an angle equivalent to 23-26 notches of the
angle meter, or at 138-156 degrees.
During the inspection, expert H.O. Panchenko drew missile fragment impact sites on the
map of Kramatorsk. The expert notes that “cluster” scatter pattern makes it safe to conclude that
the missiles were fired from different distances, and since the shelling happened during the same
period of time it is likely that more than one system was used in the shelling of the town.
Expert H.O. Panchenko went on to plot the coordinates of the missile fragment impact sites
and “cluster” explosion sites on the topographic map. The expert then drew an ellipsoid along the
outermost coordinates of missile fragments and located the center point. The expert then drew an
ellipsoid along the outermost coordinates of “cluster” explosion sites and located the center point.
He then positioned an AK-4 artillery aiming circle at the center point of the area where missile
fragments fell and used an MPL-50 scale aiming rule positioned at the center of the “cluster”
explosion area to determine the directional angle of 23-00, or 138 degrees. The line drawn at this
angle over the possible reach distance of missiles fired by the Smerch multiple launch rocket
system made it possible to determine that the missiles in question were most likely fired from the
area of the northeastern outskirts of the town of Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast.
The inspection revealed:
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
19
1. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 8 cm in size, which were
extracted at the intersection of Dvirtseva Street and Devyatnadstiatoho Partzyizdu Street,
Kramatorsk, and placed in security bag No. 2266425.
2. Soil samples recovered at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street,
Kramatorsk, and placed in security bag No. 2266424.
3. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 4 cm in size, which were
extracted at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, and placed in
security bag No. 2586571.
4. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 10 cm in size, which were
extracted near the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk and placed in
security bags Nos. 2586599, 2266426.
5. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole near the Culture and Technology Palace of the
NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk and placed in security bag No. 2586582.
6. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 4 cm in size, which were
extracted in an area near building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, and placed in security
bags Nos. 2586579, 0636364.
7. Soil samples recovered in an area near building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk,
and placed by the expert in security bag No. 2586580.
8. Circular metal part of a missile 30 cm in diameter extracted at 28 Lenin Street and placed
into polyethylene bag No. 1.
9. Missile fragment extracted at 22-a Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into
bag No. 2.
10. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into
bag No. 3.
11. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into
bag No. 4.
12. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into
bag No. 5.
13. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into
bag No. 6.
14. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 0636365.
15. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 2586605.
16. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 0636366.
17. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 2586606.
18. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No.2586607.
19. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 2586608.
20. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 2586609.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
20
21. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 2586610.
22. Missile fragment extracted at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, and
placed into bag No. 7.
23. Missile fragment extracted at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, and
placed into bag No. 8.
24. Missile fragment extracted at the Venera Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed
into bag No. 9.
25. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 0636368.
26. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative,
Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2266428.
27. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative,
Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 0636367.
28. Missile fragment extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed
into bag No. 10.
29. Missile fragment extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed
into bag No. 11.
30. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative,
Kramatorsk, and placed into expert security bag No. 2266431.
31. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative,
Kramatorsk, and placed into expert security bag No. 2586567.
32. Missile fragment extracted on the grounds of Novokramatorsky Mechanical
Engineering Plant (NKMZ) and placed into bag No. 12.
33. Differently-shaped metal parts of missile fragments extracted in the backyard area
between buildings Nos. 107 and 105 in Parkova Street and placed into security bag No. 2586598.
34. Differently-shaped metal parts of missile fragments extracted in the backyard area
between buildings Nos. 107 and 105 in Parkova Street and placed into security bag No. 2586604.
35. Soil samples recovered from shell holes in the backyard area between buildings Nos.
107 and 105 in Parkova Street and placed into security bag No. 2586598.
36. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk,
and placed into security bag No. 2586597.
37. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole at 67-a Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, and placed
into security bag No. 2586596.
38. Missile fragment extracted at 67-a Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No.
13.
39. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments extracted on the Blooming soccer
field in Kramatorsk and placed into security bag No. 2586595.
40. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole at the Blooming soccer stadium, Kramatorsk,
and placed into security bag No. 2586594.
41. Missile fragment extracted at Blooming soccer field, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag
No. 14.
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
21
42. Missile fragment extracted at Blooming soccer field, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag
No. 15.
43. Missile fragment extracted the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in
Kramatorsk and placed into bag No. 16.
44. Missile fragment extracted the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in
Kramatorsk and placed into bag No. 17.
45. Missile fragment extracted from a gully between the residential neighborhoods of
Lazurne and Damansky, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 18.
The objects detected were presented to attesting witnesses and other inspection participant
present during the inspection.
Diagrams showing the shell fragment impact sites were drawn in the course of this
inspection (Attachment No. 1).
Attached to this record is a map showing the missile and shell fragment impact sites
(Attachment No. 2) as well as maps filled out by the artillery expert to determine the missile
trajectory and the likely launch site (Attachment No. 3). The following equipment was used during
the inspection: Canon digital camera with a 1 GB memory card, with automatic settings. The
photos will be attached to this record after the tables of photos have been prepared (Attachment
No. 4).
The inspection was conducted in clear weather, at -4 degrees Celsius, under natural
daylight and artificial lighting conditions. This record was read by all participants of the
inspection. The participants offered no additional suggestions or critical comments.
Attesting witnesses: 1) [signature] R.Yu. Smenov
2) [signature] O.V. Pechenyi
Inspection participants:
3) [signature] H.O. Panchenko
4) [signature] A.V. Lytvynenko
5) [signature] V.E. Holovko
6) [signature] S.M. Tomnyuk
7) [signature] V.E. Korablin
8) [signature] S.S. Kovaliov
9) [signature] L.Yu. Zhurko
10) [signature] P.O. Nykytenko
11) [signature] V.V. Kharakhorin
Inspection conducted by:
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [signature] A.A.
Kholin
1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]
7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]
22
DIAGRAM
Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015
Attesting witnesses: 1. [signature] 2. [signature]
Participants: [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
[signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
Major of Justice [signature] A.A. Kholin
PARK
LENIN STREET
24 LENIN STREET
GLAMOR
SHOP
ZDRAVYTSYA
PHARMACY
SHELL HOLE
No. 1
X BROKEN
POCKMARKED GLASS
FACADE
ROOF
DAMAGE
X
SHELL HOLE
No. 3
X
SHELL HOLE
No. 4
X
GARAGES
SHELL HOLE
No. 5
SHELL HOLE
No. 6
X
X
SHELL HOLE
X No. 2
POCKMARKED
FACADE
BROKEN
GLASS
23
DIAGRAM
Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015
Attesting witnesses: 1. [signature] 2. [signature]
Participants: [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
[signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
Major of Justice [signature] A.A. Kholin
MARATA STREET
17 MARATA STREET
VOZNESENSKOHO STREET
HAIR
SALON
TRUST
BANK
ZDRAVITSA
PHARMACY
ZATEYNIK
TOY STORE
POCKMARKED
FACADE
POCKMARKED
SHELL HOLE FACADE
No. 1
X
SHELL HOLE
No. 2
X
SHELL HOLE
No. 3
SHELL HOLE
No. 4
SHELL HOLE
No. 5
SHELL HOLE
No. 6
SHELL HOLE
No. 8
SHELL HOLE
PARK No. 7
X
X
X
X
X
X
24
DIAGRAM
Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015
Attesting witnesses: 1. [signature] 2. [signature]
Participants: [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
[signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
Major of Justice [signature] A.A. Kholin
TRANSFORMER
ENCLOSURE
X SHELL HOLE No. 1
SHELL HOLE No. 5 X
SHELL HOLE No. 6
SHELL HOLE No. 7
X
X
X SHELL HOLE No. 4
SHELL HOLE No. 2
SHELL HOLE No. 3
X
X
99 PARKOVA
STREET
PARKOVA STREET
BACKYARD
ENTRANCE
BROKEN WINDOWS
POCKMARKED FACADE
BROKEN WINDOWS
POCKMARKED
ENTRANCE 1 ENTRANCE 2 ENTRANCE 3 ENTRANCE4 ENTRANCE 5
25
DIAGRAM
Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015
Attesting witnesses: 1. [signature] 2. [signature]
Participants: [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
[signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
Major of Justice [signature] A.A. Kholin
58 DVIRTSEVA
STREET
KRAMATORSKY BOULEVARD
DVIRTSEVA STREET
BACKYARD
ENTRANCE
BACKYARD
ENTRANCE
BACKYARD
ENTRANCE
11 KRAMATORSKY BOULEVARD
56 DVIRTSEVA STREET
BROKEN GLASS BROKEN WINDOWS
POCKMARKED
FACADE
SHELL HOLE No. 1
SHELL HOLE No. 2
KIOSK SHELL HOLE No. 3
SHELL HOLE No. 4
SHELL HOLE No. 5
DAMAGED ROOF
SHELL HOLE No. 6
SHELL HOLE No. 7
BROKEN WINDOWS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
26
ATTACHMENT
to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015
TABLE OF PHOTOS
PHOTO No. 1: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 34 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 2: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 34 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
27
=2=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 3: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 34 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 4: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
28
=3=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 5: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 6: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
29
=4=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 8: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
PHOTO No. 7: Detailed view of damage to the building facade caused by falling shell
fragments near Zateynik Toy Store at 17 Marata Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
30
=5=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 9: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
PHOTO No. 10: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
31
=6=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 11: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
PHOTO No. 12: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
32
=7=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 13: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
PHOTO No. 14: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
33
=8=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 15: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street)
PHOTO No. 16: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
34
=9=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 17: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata
Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)
PHOTO No. 18: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, Glamor Store)
35
=10=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 19: General view of damage to the building facade at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street)
PHOTO No. 20: General view of damage to the building facade at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)
36
=11=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 21: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)
PHOTO No. 22: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)
37
=12=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 23: General view of damage to the building facade at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)
PHOTO No. 24: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, in the backyard)
38
=13=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 25: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, in the backyard)
PHOTO No. 26: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, in the backyard)
39
=14=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 27: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin
Street, in the backyard)
PHOTO No. 28: General view of damage to the building facade caused by falling shell
fragments at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk,
Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, in the backyard)
40
=15=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 29: General view of damage to the building facade caused by falling shell
fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 30: General view of damage to the building caused by falling shell
fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
41
=16=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 31: General view of damage to the building caused by falling shell
fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 32: General view of damage to the building caused by falling shell
fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
42
=17=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 33: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 34: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
43
=18=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 35: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 36: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
44
=19=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 37: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 38: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
45
=20=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 39: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 40: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
46
=21=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 41: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 42: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
47
=22=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 43: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
48
=23=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 44: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 50 Sotsialistychna
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 45: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 50 Sotsialistychna
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
49
=24=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 46: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
NKMZ Plant, Kramatorsk
PHOTO No. 47: Missile fragment found on the premises of the NKMZ Plant,
Kramatorsk
50
=25=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 48: General view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments
at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 49: Detailed view of damage caused to a building by falling shell
fragments at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
51
=26=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 50: Detailed view of damage caused to a building by falling shell
fragments at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 51: General view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments
at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
52
=27=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 52: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 53: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
53
=28=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 54: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 55: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
54
=29=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 56: General view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments
at the level of the 3rd story near the 6th entrance at 107 Parkova Street
PHOTO No. 57: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the track and field
grounds of Secondary School No. 9 at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk,
Donetsk Oblast
55
=30=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 58: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the track and field
grounds of Secondary School No. 9 at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk,
Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 59: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 67-a Lenin Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
56
=31=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 60: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 67-a Lenin Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 61: View of a missile fragment that fell at 45 Lenin Street, Kramatorsk,
Donetsk Oblast
57
=32=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 62: View of a missile fragment that fell at 45 Lenin Street, Kramatorsk,
Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 63: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the soccer field of the
Blooming Stadium at the intersection of Mayakovskoho Street and Shkadinova Street,
Kramatorsk
58
=33=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 64: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the soccer field of the
Blooming Stadium at the intersection of Mayakovskoho Street and Shkadinova Street,
Kramatorsk
59
=35=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 65: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv
Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 66: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv
Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
60
=36=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 67: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv
Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 68: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv
Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
61
=37=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 69: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Yuvileyna Street and Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (in the backyard of
the building at 47 Dvirtseva Street)
PHOTO No. 70: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Yuvileyna Street and Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (in the backyard of
the building at 47 Dvirtseva Street)
62
=38=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 71: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of
Yuvileyna Street and Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (in the backyard of
the building at 47 Dvirtseva Street)
PHOTO No. 72: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
63
=39=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 73: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 74: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
64
=40=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 75: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 76: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
65
=41=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 77: General view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 78: Detailed view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
66
=42=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 79: Detailed view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 80: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
67
=43=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 81: General view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 82: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
68
=44=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 83: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 84: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
69
=45=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 85: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 86: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
70
=46=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 87: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 88: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the
building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
71
=47=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 89: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 90: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
72
=48=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 91: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 92: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
73
=49=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 93: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 94: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
74
=50=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 95: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 96: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
75
=51=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 97: General view of damage to garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 98: Detailed view of damage to garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative
76
=52=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 99: Detailed view of damage to garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 100: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
77
=53=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 101: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Venera Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 102: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Venera Garage Cooperative
78
=54=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 103: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Venera Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 104: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Venera Garage Cooperative
79
=55=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 105: General view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10
Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 106: General view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10
Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
80
=56=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 107: General view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10
Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 107: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10
Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
81
=57=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 108: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 109: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
82
=58=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 110: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
PHOTO No. 111: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the
Sputnik Garage Cooperative
83
=59=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 112: Detailed view of damage to garages at the Sputnik Garage
Cooperative
84
=60=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 113: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of
Boarding School No. 2 at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 114: View of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of Boarding
School No. 2 at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
85
=61=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 115: General view of a shell fragment impact site in a cemetery at Lenin
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 115: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in a cemetery at Lenin
Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
86
=62=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 116: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 22-a Kramatorsky
Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 117: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 22-a Kramatorsky
Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
87
=63=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 118: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 27 Kramatorsky
Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 119: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 27 Kramatorsky
Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
88
=64=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
PHOTO No. 120: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 13 Karpenka Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
PHOTO No. 121: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 13 Karpenka Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast
89
=65=
Continuation of the Table of Photos
Table of photos prepared by:
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
Major of Justice [signature] A.A. Kholin
PHOTO No. 122: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 13 Karpenka Street,
Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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166-20180612-wri-01-04-fr.pdf

Document Long Title

Volume IV - Annexes 52-105

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