Volume III - Annexes 33-89

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON
THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
THE GAMBIA
v.
MYANMAR
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR
Annexes 33-89
20 JANUARY 2021

i
TABLE OF ANNEXES
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
Annex 33 UN, ECOSOC, resolution 47 (IV), Crime of genocide,
Resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council
during its Fourth Session from 28 February to 29 March 1947,
UN doc. E/325, 28 March 1947 339
Annex 34 UNSG, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN doc.
E/447, 26 June 1947 [extract] 343
Annex 35 UN, Draft Convention on Genocide, Communications received
by the Secretary-General, Communication received from the
United States of America, UN doc. A/401/Add.2, 30 September
1947 [extract] 363
Annex 36 UNGA, resolution 180 (II), Draft convention on genocide, UN
doc. A/RES/180(II), 21 November 1947 369
Annex 37 UN, Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention
prepared by the Secretariat, Communications from nongovernmental
organizations, UN doc. E/623, 30 January 1948,
in H. Abtahi and P. Webb, The Genocide Convention: The
Travaux Préparatoires, vol. I (2008) [extract] 373
Annex 38 UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the
Eighth Meeting (13 April 1948), UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.8,
17 April 1948 [extract] 381
Annex 39 UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the
Ninth Meeting (14 April 1948), UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.9,
21 April 1948 [extract] 389
Annex 40 UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Draft Articles for the
inclusion in the Convention on Genocide proposed by the
delegation of China on 16 April 1948, UN doc. E/AC.25/9 395
Annex 41 UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the
Twentieth Meeting (26 April 1948), UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.20,
with corrigendum, UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.20/Corr.1, 4 May 1948
[extracts] 397
Annex 42 UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Draft Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN doc.
E/AC.25/12, 19 May 1948 [extract] 403
Annex 43 UN, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 5 April to
10 May 1948, UN doc. E/794, 24 May 1948 [extract] 407
ii
Annex 44 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics: Amendments to the draft convention
(E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1, 9 October 1948 415
Annex 45 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council, United Kingdom:
Further amendments to the Draft Convention (E/794), UN doc.
A/C.6/236, 16 October 1948 421
Annex 46 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council, United Kingdom:
Further amendments to the Draft Convention (E/794),
Corrigendum, UN doc. A/C.6/236/Corr.1, 19 October 1948 425
Annex 47 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council, Belgium:
Amendment to the United Kingdom Amendments to Articles V
and VII (A/C.6/236 & 236 Corr.1), UN doc. A/C.6/252,
6 November 1948 427
Annex 48 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council, Belgium and
United Kingdom: Joint Amendment to article X of the draft
Convention (E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/258, 10 November 1948 429
Annex 49 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and First Meeting,
Continuation of the consideration of the draft convention on
genocide [E/794]: report to the Economic and Social Council
[A/633] (11 November 1948), UN doc. A/C.6/SR.101 431
Annex 50 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Second Meeting,
Continuation of the consideration of the draft convention on
genocide [E/794] : report to the Economic and Social Council
[A/633] (12 November 1948), UN doc. A/C.6/SR.102 [extract] 443
Annex 51 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Third Meeting,
Continuation of the consideration of the draft convention on
genocide [E/794]: report to the Economic and Social Council
[A/633] (12 November 1948), UN doc. A/C.6/SR.103 [extract] 457
Annex 52 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Fourth Meeting,
Continuation of the consideration of the draft convention on
genocide [E/794]: report to the Economic and Social Council
[A/633] (13 November 1948), UN doc. A/C.6/SR.104 463
Annex 53 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Fifth Meeting,
Continuation of the consideration of the draft convention on
genocide [E/794]: report to the Economic and Social Council
[A/633] (13 November 1948), UN doc. A/C.6/SR.105 [extract] 473
iii
Annex 54 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council, Text as adopted by
the Sixth Committee for articles VII to XIII of the draft
Convention (E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/269, 15 November 1948 479
Annex 55 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and
Report of the Economic and Social Council (E/794), Draft
resolutions proposed by the Drafting Committee, UN doc.
A/C.6/289, 23 November 1948 483
Annex 56 UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Thirty-Third Meeting,
Continuation of the consideration of the draft convention on
genocide [E/794]: report to the Economic and Social Council
[A/633] (2 December 1948), UN doc. A/C.6/SR.133 [extract] 489
Annex 57 UNGA, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sixth Committee,
UN doc. A/760, 3 December 1948 [extract] 495
Annex 58 UNSC, resolution 819 (1993), UN doc. S/RES/819 (1993),
16 April 1993 499
Annex 59 UNSC, resolution 838 (1993), UN doc. S/RES/838 (1993),
10 June 1993 503
Annex 60 UNGA, resolution 48/88, The situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, UN doc. A/RES/48/88, 20 December 1993 507
Annex 61 UNSC, resolution 1004 (1995), UN doc. S/RES/1004 (1995),
22 July 1995 511
Annex 62 UNGA, resolution 50/193, Situation of human rights in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), UN doc. A/RES/50/193, 22 December 1995 515
Annex 63 UNSG, Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on
matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage
reached in their consideration, UN doc. S/1998/44/Add.28,
24 July 1998 521
Annex 64 ILC, State responsibility, Draft articles provisionally adopted by
the Drafting Committee on second reading, UN doc.
A/CN.4/L.600, 21 August 2000 [extract] 527
Annex 65 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work
of its fifty-second session (2000), UN doc. A/CN.4/513,
15 February 2001 [extract] 531
Annex 66 ILC, Fourth report on State responsibility by Mr. James
Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/517, 2 April
2001 [extract] 537
Annex 67 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol.
I [extract] 545
iv
Annex 68 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol.
II, Part One [extract] 549
Annex 69 ILC, Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts, with commentaries, 2001 [extract] 555
Annex 70 UNSG, Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on
matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage
reached in their consideration, UN doc. S/2002/30/Add.49,
20 December 2002 [extract] 571
Annex 71 ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international
organizations, adopted by the International Law Commission at
its sixty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two [extract] 577
Annex 72 ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Three,
UN doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 3) [extract] 587
Annex 73 UNSC, 8333rd meeting (28 August 2018), UN doc. S/PV.8333
[extract] 597
Annex 74 UNGA, Third Committee, Official Records, Seventy-third
session, Summary record of the 30th meeting (23 October
2018), UN doc. A/C.3/73/SR.30 [extract] 603
Annex 75 UNSC, 8381st meeting (24 October 2018), UN doc. S/PV.8381
[extract] 607
Annex 76 UNGA, Official Records, Seventy-third session, 27th plenary
meeting (29 October 2018), UN doc. A/73/PV.27 [extract] 611
Annex 77 UNGA, Official Records, Seventy-third session, 28th plenary
meeting (29 October 2018), UN doc. A/73/PV.28 [extract] 615
Annex 78 UNGA, Third Committee, Official Records, Seventy-third
session, Summary record of the 50th meeting (16 November
2018), UN doc. A/C.3/73/SR.50 [extract] 621
Annex 79 UNSC, 8477th meeting (28 February 2019), UN doc.
S/PV.8477 [extract] 627
Annex 80 UN, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Oral
Update to 41st Session of the Human Rights Council by the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar [10 July 2019] 631
Annex 81 ILC, Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Humanity, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2019, vol. II, Part Two [extract] 635
Annex 82 UNGA, resolution 74/166, Situation of human rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN doc.
A/RES/74/166, 18 December 2019 639
v
Annex 83 Voting record on UNGA resolution 74/166 651
Annex 84 UNGA, resolution 74/169, Situation of human rights in the
Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/RES/74/169, 18 December
2019 655
Annex 85 Voting record on UNGA resolution 74/169 671
Annex 86 UNGA, resolution 74/246, Situation of human rights of
Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, UN doc.
A/RES/74/246, 27 December 2019 677
Annex 87 Voting record on UNGA resolution 74/246 687
Annex 88 UN News, “Top UN court orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya
from genocide”, 23 January 2020 695
Annex 89 ONU Info, “La CIJ ordonne au Myanmar de prendre des
mesures d’urgence pour protéger les Rohingya”, 23 January
2020 701

UNITED NATIONS
DOCUMENTS
337
338
Annex 33
UN, ECOSOC, resolution 47 (IV), Crime of genocide, Resolutions adopted by
the Economic and Social Council during its Fourth Session from 28 February to
29 March 1947, UN doc. E/325, 28 March 1947
339
Annex 33
340
Annex 33
341
Annex 33
342
Annex 34
UNSG, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN doc. E/447, 26 June
1947 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/e/447
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/e/447
343
Annex 34
344
Annex 34
345
Annex 34
346
Annex 34
347
Annex 34
348
Annex 34
349
Annex 34
350
Annex 34
351
Annex 34
352
Annex 34
353
Annex 34
354
Annex 34
355
Annex 34
356
Annex 34
357
Annex 34
358
Annex 34
359
Annex 34
360
Annex 34
361
362
Annex 35
UN, Draft Convention on Genocide, Communications received by the
Secretary-General, Communication received from the United States of America,
UN doc. A/401/Add.2, 30 September 1947 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/401/Add.2
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/401/Add.2
363
Annex 35
364
Annex 35
365
Annex 35
366
Annex 35
367
368
Annex 36
UNGA, resolution 180 (II), Draft convention on genocide, UN doc.
A/RES/180(II), 21 November 1947
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/RES/180(II)
369
Annex 36
370
Annex 36
371
372
Annex 37
UN, Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention prepared by the
Secretariat, Communications from non-governmental organizations, UN doc.
E/623, 30 January 1948, in H. Abtahi and P. Webb, The Genocide Convention:
The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. I (2008) [extract]
373
Annex 37
374
Annex 37
375
Annex 37
376
Annex 37
377
Annex 37
378
Annex 37
379
Annex 37
380
Annex 38
UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting
(13 April 1948), UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, 17 April 1948 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/E/AC.25/SR.8
381
Annex 38
382
Annex 38
383
Annex 38
384
Annex 38
385
Annex 38
386
Annex 38
387
388
Annex 39
UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting
(14 April 1948), UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, 21 April 1948 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/E/AC.25/SR.9
389
Annex 39
390
Annex 39
391
Annex 39
392
Annex 39
393
Annex 39
394
Annex 40
UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Draft Articles for the inclusion in the
Convention on Genocide proposed by the delegation of China on 16 April 1948,
UN doc. E/AC.25/9
Available at:
http://undocs.org/E/AC.25/9
395
Annex 40
396
Annex 41
UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the Twentieth
Meeting (26 April 1948), UN doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, with corrigendum, UN doc.
E/AC.25/SR.20/Corr.1, 4 May 1948 [extracts]
Respectively available at:
http://undocs.org/E/AC.25/SR.20 and http://undocs.org/E/AC.25/SR.20/Corr.1
397
Annex 41
398
Annex 41
399
Annex 41
400
Annex 41
401
402
Annex 42
UN, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Draft Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN doc. E/AC.25/12, 19 May 1948
[extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/E/AC.25/12
403
Annex 42
404
Annex 42
405
406
Annex 43
UN, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 5 April to 10 May 1948,
UN doc. E/794, 24 May 1948 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/E/794
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/E/794
407
Annex 43
408
Annex 43
409
Annex 43
410
Annex 43
411
Annex 43
412
Annex 43
413
414
Annex 44
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Amendments to the draft convention (E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1,
9 October 1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/215/Rev.1
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/215/Rev.1
415
Annex 44
416
Annex 44
417
Annex 44
418
Annex 44
419
420
Annex 45
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, United Kingdom: Further amendments to the
Draft Convention (E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/236, 16 October 1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/236
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/236
421
Annex 45
422
Annex 45
423
424
Annex 46
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, United Kingdom: Further amendments to the
Draft Convention (E/794), Corrigendum, UN doc. A/C.6/236/Corr.1,
19 October 1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/236/Corr.1
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/236/Corr.1
425
Annex 46
426
Annex 47
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, Belgium: Amendment to the United Kingdom
Amendments to Articles V and VII (A/C.6/236 & 236 Corr.1), UN doc.
A/C.6/252, 6 November 1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/252
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/252
427
Annex 47
428
Annex 48
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, Belgium and United Kingdom: Joint Amendment
to article X of the draft Convention (E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/258, 10 November
1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/258
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/258
429
Annex 48
430
Annex 49
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and First Meeting, Continuation of the
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report to the
Economic and Social Council [A/633] (11 November 1948), UN doc.
A/C.6/SR.101
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/SR.101
431
Annex 49
432
Annex 49
433
Annex 49
434
Annex 49
435
Annex 49
436
Annex 49
437
Annex 49
438
Annex 49
439
Annex 49
440
Annex 49
441
442
Annex 50
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Second Meeting, Continuation of the
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794] : report to the
Economic and Social Council [A/633] (12 November 1948), UN doc.
A/C.6/SR.102 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/SR.102
443
Annex 50
444
Annex 50
445
Annex 50
446
Annex 50
447
Annex 50
448
Annex 50
449
Annex 50
450
Annex 50
451
Annex 50
452
Annex 50
453
Annex 50
454
Annex 50
455
456
Annex 51
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Third Meeting, Continuation of the
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report to the
Economic and Social Council [A/633] (12 November 1948), UN doc.
A/C.6/SR.103 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/SR.103
457
Annex 51
458
Annex 51
459
Annex 51
460
Annex 51
461
462
Annex 52
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Fourth Meeting, Continuation of the
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report to the
Economic and Social Council [A/633] (13 November 1948), UN doc.
A/C.6/SR.104
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/SR.104
463
Annex 52
464
Annex 52
465
Annex 52
466
Annex 52
467
Annex 52
468
Annex 52
469
Annex 52
470
Annex 52
471
Annex 52
472
Annex 53
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Fifth Meeting, Continuation of the
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report to the
Economic and Social Council [A/633] (13 November 1948), UN doc.
A/C.6/SR.105 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/SR.105
473
Annex 53
474
Annex 53
475
Annex 53
476
Annex 53
477
478
Annex 54
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council, Text as adopted by the Sixth Committee for
articles VII to XIII of the draft Convention (E/794), UN doc. A/C.6/269,
15 November 1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/269
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/269
479
Annex 54
480
Annex 54
481
482
Annex 55
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the
Economic and Social Council (E/794), Draft resolutions proposed by the
Drafting Committee, UN doc. A/C.6/289, 23 November 1948
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/289
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.6/289
483
Annex 55
484
Annex 55
485
Annex 55
486
Annex 55
487
Annex 55
488
Annex 56
UNGA, Sixth Committee, Hundred and Thirty-Third Meeting, Continuation of
the consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report to the
Economic and Social Council [A/633] (2 December 1948), UN doc.
A/C.6/SR.133 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.6/SR.133
489
Annex 56
490
Annex 56
491
Annex 56
492
Annex 56
493
494
Annex 57
UNGA, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social
Council, Report of the Sixth Committee, UN doc. A/760, 3 December 1948
[extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/760
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/760
495
Annex 57
496
Annex 57
497
498
Annex 58
UNSC, resolution 819 (1993), UN doc. S/RES/819 (1993), 16 April 1993
Alternative format available at:
http://undocs.org/S/RES/819(1993)
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/RES/819(1993)
499
Annex 58
500
Annex 58
501
502
Annex 59
UNSC, resolution 838 (1993), UN doc. S/RES/838 (1993), 10 June 1993
Alternative format available at:
http://undocs.org/S/RES/838(1993)
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/RES/838(1993)
503
Annex 59
504
Annex 59
505
506
Annex 60
UNGA, resolution 48/88, The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN doc.
A/RES/48/88, 20 December 1993
Alternative format available at:
http://undocs.org/A/RES/48/88
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/48/88
507
Annex 60
508
Annex 60
509
Annex 60
510
Annex 61
UNSC, resolution 1004 (1995), UN doc. S/RES/1004 (1995), 22 July 1995
Available at:
http://undocs.org/S/RES/1004(1995)
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/RES/1004(1995)
511
Annex 61
512
Annex 61
513
514
Annex 62
UNGA, resolution 50/193, Situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), UN doc. A/RES/50/193, 22 December
1995
Alternative format available at:
http://undocs.org/A/RES/50/193
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/50/193
515
Annex 62
516
Annex 62
517
Annex 62
518
Annex 62
519
520
Annex 63
UNSG, Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the
Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration, UN
doc. S/1998/44/Add.28, 24 July 1998
Available at:
http://undocs.org/S/1998/44/Add.28
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/1998/44/Add.28
521
Annex 63
522
Annex 63
523
Annex 63
524
Annex 63
525
Annex 63
526
Annex 64
ILC, State responsibility, Draft articles provisionally adopted by the Drafting
Committee on second reading, UN doc. A/CN.4/L.600, 21 August 2000
[extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/CN.4/L.600
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/CN.4/L.600
527
UNITED
NATIONS A
General Assembly
Distr.
LIMITED
A/CN.4/L.600*
21 August 2000
Original: ENGLISH
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
Fifty-second session
Geneva, 1 May-9 June and 10 July-18 August 2000
State responsibility
Draft articles provisionally adopted by the
Drafting Committee on second reading**
PART ONE
THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF A STATE
CHAPTER I
General principles
Article 1
Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of
that State.
* Re-issued for technical reasons in English, French and Spanish only.
** Incorporating the reports of the Drafting Committee at its fiftieth and its fifty-first sessions
contained in documents A/CN.4/L.569 and A/CN.4/L.574 and Corrs.1 (English only), 2 (French
only), 3 and 4 (Spanish only).
GE.00-63225
Annex 64
528
A/CN.4/L.600
page 15
Article 53 [48]
Conditions relating to resort to countermeasures
1. Before taking countermeasures, the injured State shall call on the responsible State, in
accordance with article 44, to fulfil its obligations under Part Two.
2. The injured State shall notify the responsible State of any decision to take
countermeasures, and offer to negotiate with that State.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, the injured State may take such provisional and urgent
countermeasures as may be necessary to preserve its rights.
4. Countermeasures other than those in paragraph 3 may not be taken while the negotiations
are being pursued in good faith and have not been unduly delayed.
5. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken must be suspended within a
reasonable time if:
(a) The internationally wrongful act has ceased, and
(b) The dispute is submitted to a court or tribunal which has the authority to
make decisions binding on the parties.
6. Paragraph 5 does not apply if the responsible State fails to implement the dispute
settlement procedures in good faith.
Article 54
Countermeasures by States other than the injured State
1. Any State entitled under article 49, paragraph 1 to invoke the responsibility of a State
may take countermeasures at the request and on behalf of any State injured by the breach, to the
extent that that State may itself take countermeasures under this Chapter.
2. In the cases referred to in article 41, any State may take countermeasures, in accordance
with the present Chapter in the interest of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
3. Where more than one State takes countermeasures, the States concerned shall cooperate
in order to ensure that the conditions laid down by this Chapter for the taking of countermeasures
are fulfilled.
Article 55 [48]
Termination of countermeasures
Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has complied
with its obligations under Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful act.
Annex 64
529
530
Annex 65
ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second
session (2000), UN doc. A/CN.4/513, 15 February 2001 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/CN.4/513
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/CN.4/513
531
United Nations A/CN.4/513
General Assembly Distr.: General
15 February 2001
Original: English
01-25122 (E) 160301
*0125122*
International Law Commission
Fifty-third session
Geneva, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
its fifty-second session (2000)
Topical summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly during its fifty-fifth session prepared by
the Secretariat
Contents
Paragraphs Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Topical summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. State responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. General remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) The draft articles provisionally adopted by the Drafting
Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(i) Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9
(ii) Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9
(iii) Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9
(b) Primary versus secondary rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10
(c) Codification versus progressive development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(d) Obligations erga omnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10
(e) Dispute settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(f) Final form of the draft articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Part One. The internationally wrongful act of a State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 12
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than negotiation, such as mediation or conciliation,
which could also cause the suspension or postponement
of countermeasures.
168. The view was also expressed that the approach in
paragraphs 2 to 5 was misconceived. The alleged duty
to offer to negotiate before taking countermeasures,
and to suspend countermeasures while negotiations
were pursued, did not reflect the position under general
international law, as stated in the Air Services
Agreement case. It was impossible to lay down a rule
prohibiting the use of countermeasures during
negotiations. Nor would such a rule be either practical
or desirable de lege ferenda. It would force the victim
State to have recourse to one particular method of
dispute settlement; it might be inconsistent with Article
33 of the Charter of the United Nations; and it might
encourage States to break their obligations in order to
force another State to negotiate. Moreover, there was
little room to negotiate when genocide, for example,
was being committed.
Paragraph 3
169. It was pointed out that if a State needed to take
countermeasures, it could easily resort to provisional
measures, thus making formal countermeasures a
hollow procedure. Furthermore, there was no
countermeasures, and no special rules were provided
for their application. It was suggested that paragraph 3
should be deleted, since countermeasures were by
nature provisional and injured States must not be given
occasion to neglect their obligation of notification and
rules of international law, particularly the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations.
Paragraph 4
170. It was suggested that the relationship between
countermeasures and ongoing negotiations should be
considered further; it was an issue that could be
revisited in connection with dispute-settlement
provisions. The view was expressed that international
jurisprudence had not established that countermeasures
could not be resorted to until every effort had been
made to achieve a negotiated solution; thus there was
nothing to prevent States from taking immediate
countermeasures in emergency situations. According to
another view, paragraph 4 should be made applicable in
all cases.
Paragraph 5
connecting subparagraphs (a) and (b), should be
fulfilled jointly.
172. Concerning subparagraph (b), the view was
expressed that the requirement that countermeasures
should be suspended if the dispute was submitted to
arbitration or judicial settlement was consistent with
the understanding that countermeasures must remain an
instrument of last resort. It was observed that there was
no room for countermeasures in cases where a
mandatory dispute-settlement procedure existed, except
where that procedure was obstructed by the other party
and where countermeasures were urgent and necessary
to protect the rights of the injured State, in the event
that the dispute had not yet been submitted to an
institution with the authority to make decisions that
could protect such rights. As such, subparagraph (b)
warranted being moved to a separate article
immediately following draft article 50 (and making
draft article 51, paragraph 2, redundant). It was also
suggested that when countermeasures were suspended,
those which were necessary for preserving the rights of
the injured State could be maintained until the court or
tribunal imposed provisional measures.
173. Others maintained that the duty not to take or to
suspend countermeasures had no support under general
international law, since it could discourage recourse to
third-party dispute settlement and it failed to take
account of the possibility that jurisdiction might be
disputed.
Article 54
Countermeasures by States other than the
injured State
174. The view was expressed that while draft article
54 was not without pertinence, since unlawful
situations would not be left unresolved in cases where
an injured State was not able to take countermeasures
on its own, the risk of abuse could outweigh the
benefits. It was also pointed out, however, that, as the
draft stood, States other than the injured State were not
entitled to take countermeasures, unless requested to do
so by the injured State, for non-serious breaches of
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erga omnes obligations. They might call for cessation
and non-repetition under article 49, paragraph 2, but
could do nothing to induce compliance. Doubt was
expressed that that was the desired result.
article 54 as going beyond existing law. It was
observed that the draft article, and particularly the
of State responsibility. Such a development would run
counter to the basic principle that countermeasures
should and could be taken only by a country injured by
an internationally wrongful act. Furthermore,
pretext for power politics in international relations. It
was also pointed out that the scope of the provision
was too wide since an interested State, even if not
injured itself, might take countermeasures without even
consulting the affected States.
176. It was further pointed out that there were cases
where such relations between States might also fall
under the jurisdiction of international organizations
responsible for security matters. Some speakers
expressed difficulty in accepting the idea that the right
to react could be delegated to a group of countries
acting outside any institutional framework. It was
suggested that collective countermeasures could be
legitimate only in the context of intervention by the
competent international or regional institutions, and
that the situations envisaged in draft article 54 were
adequately dealt with under Articles 39 to 41 of the
Charter of the United Nations. Caution was also
advised since draft article 54 could lead to the taking of
multilateral or collective countermeasures
simultaneously with other measures taken by the
competent United Nations bodies. It was emphasized
that the draft articles must not be allowed to create
overlapping legal regimes that could weaken the
Organization as a whole or marginalize the Security
Council.
177. It was further queried how the principle of
proportionality would operate in the situation
State was authorized to take countermeasures, as it
of proportionality enunciated in draft article 52, for
they would become tougher when non-injured States
joined in, with the undesirable consequence that
countermeasures might greatly outweigh the extent of
the injury. According to a further view, it was
necessary to clarify whether the concept of
proportionality applied to the measures employed by
each State separately against the violator, or to all the
countermeasures taken together. It was proposed that a
provision should be added to article 53 requiring all
States intending to take countermeasures to mutually
agree on them before taking them.
Paragraph 1
178. It was suggested that countermeasures adopted by
third (indirectly injured) States should be aimed
primarily at the cessation of the internationally
wrongful act rather than at obtaining reparation for the
directly injured State.
Paragraph 2
179. In support of this paragraph, the view was
expressed that while it would be unacceptable for any
State to take countermeasures at the request of any
injured State, the only exception concerned the acts
referred to in article 41.
180. Others, while supporting the paragraph, pointed
out that its consequences remained largely imprecise.
State to take countermeasures against the author of a
serious breach of the essential obligations owed to the
international community needed to be studied further.
possible countermeasures, then paragraph 2 had to be
interpreted cautiously. It was also proposed that
paragraph 2 should be placed in a separate article,
which would make it clear that countermeasures taken
in response to a serious breach of an essential
obligation owed to the international community should
be coordinated by the United Nations.
181. Still others were of the view that the alleged right
of any State to take countermeasures in the interest of
the beneficiaries of the obligation breached went well
beyond the progressive development of international
law, and suggested that paragraph 2 should be deleted.
It was remarked that determining whether a serious
breach had occurred was a matter to be dealt with
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under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
It was not appropriate to alter the principles of the
Charter by allowing for collective countermeasures,
undertaken unilaterally, without the involvement of the
central body of the international community, leaving it
up to the individual State to decide whether there had
been a serious breach, what sort of countermeasure
should be applied and under what circumstances they
should be lifted. There was also a danger that
disproportionate unilateral acts, which in reality were
not justified by the interest they sought to protect,
might be disguised as countermeasures, which would
threaten the credibility of the concept. It was further
pointed out that even accepting the proposition, on the
basis of the Barcelona Traction case, that States at
large had a legal interest in respect of violations of
certain obligations, it did not necessarily follow that all
States could vindicate those interests in the same way
as directly injured States. As they stood, the proposals
were potentially highly destabilizing of treaty relations.
It was questioned whether a State should really be able
to contravene any of its treaties, including, for
example, those of a technical nature, in response to any
serious breach by another State of any erga omnes
obligations. The view was also expressed that draft
article 54, paragraph 2, created the impression that in
case of a breach under article 41, any State could take
countermeasures without first having made requests in
accordance with article 49, paragraph 2 (b). While such
an interpretation could be excluded by article 53,
paragraph 1, the connection needed to be made
explicit.
Paragraph 3
182. While paragraph 3 was described as being
sufficiently flexible in the light of the rapid
developments in international law and in the interests
of proportionality, others observed that the obligation
to cooperate was poorly defined and would cast doubt
on the legality of the actions of States and fail to
contain countermeasures within their legal framework.
Part Four. General provisions
183. There was support for including all the general
provisions in Part Four and for the non-inclusion of the
saving clause on diplomatic immunity, pending a
consensus on its wording. There was also support for
excluding proposed draft article B (A/CN.4/507/Add.4,
para. 429) since the content of international obligations
of a State was a complex issue which could not be
covered in so brief a provision.
184. Noting the close relationship between the law of
treaties, especially articles 60 and 73 of the 1969
Vienna Convention, and the law on State responsibility
as well as the need to avoid blurring the distinction
between them with regard to breaches of contractual
obligations, it was suggested that a reference to the
parallelism between the Convention and the draft
Article 56 [37]
Lex specialis
185. There was support for the saving clause as a
restatement of a well-established principle of
international law. However, it was also remarked that
draft article 56 did not provide a sufficient safeguard
with respect to draft articles 49 and 54.
186. There were also several suggestions, as follows: it
would be helpful to state explicitly that the draft
articles were residual in character and would come into
play only if and to the extent that the primary rule or
special regime agreed to by the State concerned had not
specified the consequences of a breach of obligations;
the article should be clarified because it appeared to
preclude even residual application of the draft articles
in cases where the special rules of international law
proved inadequate and such a position would
excessively restrict implementation of the new
instrument; the article should be drafted in positive
the application of other special rules of international
law and should also contain a saving clause to the
effect that specific regimes should not take precedence
over peremptory norms of international law; the term
lex specialis should be replaced by the concept of
international law, since the article dealt not with norms
or acts, but specifically with a body of norms which
constituted a regime of responsibility; and the words
article 56.
Annex 65
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536
Annex 66
ILC, Fourth report on State responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special
Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/517, 2 April 2001 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/CN.4/517
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/CN.4/517
537
United Nations A/CN.4/517
General Assembly Distr.: General
2 April 2001
Original: English
01-31656 (E) 190401
*0131656*
International Law Commission
Fifty-third session
Geneva, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001
Fourth report on State responsibility
by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Remaining general issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Settlement of disputes concerning State responsibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The form of the draft articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. . . . . .
IV.
Part Two, Chapter III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Countermeasures: Part Two bis, Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annex
Specific amendments to the draft articles in the light of comments received
(see A/CN.4/517/Add.1)
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38. The remaining issue concerns article 43 (b) (ii), which deals with so-called
49 Although the term is sometimes used to cover obligations
in the general interest (e.g., human rights obligations), the Special Rapporteur
understands it to refer to obligations which operate in an all-or-nothing fashion.
Under article 60 (2) (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the breach of an integral
obligation entitles any other party to suspend the performance of the treaty not
merely vis-à-vis the State in breach but vis-à-vis all States. In other words, a breach
of such an obligation threatens the treaty structure as a whole. Fortunately this is not
true of human rights treaties; rather the reverse, since one State cannot disregard
proliferation and disarmament treaties, or others requiring complete collective
restraint if they are to work (as with the central obligations of States parties to the
Outer Space Treaty or the Antarctic Treaty), are integral in this sense. The category
may be narrow but it is an important one. Moreover it has as much relevance for
State responsibility as it has for treaty suspension. The other parties to an integral
obligation which has been breached may have no interest in its suspension and
should be able to insist, vis-à-vis the responsible State, on cessation and restitution.
For these reasons the Special Rapporteur believes that article 43 (b) (ii) should be
retained. The Drafting Committee might, however, usefully consider its wording, in
accordance with several suggestions which have been made.50
Other States entitled to invoke responsibility: article 49
embody, and it was of course expressly accepted by the International Court in 1970.
But a number of questions have been raised as to the formulation and intended
function of the article.
article 49 (1) (a). After all, which international obligations (beyond the purely
bilateral obligations are at a deeper level established for the protection of a
collective interest. For example, it is usually thought that diplomatic relations
between two States pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations are
would hardly be considered as raising issues for the other States which are parties to
it. But at some level of seriousness a breach of the Convention might well raise
questions about the institution of diplomatic relations which would be of legitimate
concern to third States.51 It may be that article 49 (a) should be further qualified so
__________________
49
Report, A/CN.4/507, para. 91.
50
phrase.
51 Cf. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 43 (para. 92).
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as to limit it to breaches which in themselves are such as to impair the collective
interest of the States parties to the obligation.52
41. Indeed it has been suggested that a similar restriction should be applied to
article 49 (1) (b). France suggests that the paragraph should be limited to the serious
breaches covered by Part Two, Chapter II. This suggestion has greater force in
respect of claims for reparation as envisaged by article 49 (2) (b) than it has for
claims to cessation. It does not seem disproportionate to allow all States to insist
upon the cessation of a breach of an obligation owed to the international community
Barcelona Traction
is, perhaps, less clear. In particular, this is something the injured State, if one exists,
might reasonably be expected to do for itself.
42. These are matters which the Commission may wish to revisit, and the Drafting
Committee should certainly consider whether article 49 (1) (a) might be more tightly
drawn. On the other hand, the Special Rapporteur believes that article 49 in general
achieves a certain balance, de lege ferenda, between the collective interest in
compliance with basic community values and the countervailing interest in not
encouraging the proliferation of disputes. In his view a case for the fundamental
reconsideration of article 49 has not been made.
__________________
52 Such a suggestion would still allow for the paradigm case intended to be covered by
obligations as mandatory of South West Africa Second South West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Reports
1966, p. 6. See Third Report, A/CN.4/507, paras. 85, 92.
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(c) Countermeasures should be suspended in the event that the dispute is
submitted in good faith to third-party settlement, and provided the breach is not a
continuing one.99
This is, broadly speaking, the system adopted by the Drafting Committee in what is
now article 53. But it must be conceded at once that the distinction between urgent
and definitive countermeasures does not correspond with existing international
law.100 It was developed in the course of the first reading by way of a compromise
between sharply opposed positions on the suspensive effect of negotiations.101 The
distinction is more a guide to the application of principles of necessity and
proportionality in the given case than it is a distinct requirement. Quite apart from
questions of definition, there are also practical difficulties with it. For example, it
has been pointed out that the mere agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration
cannot require any suspension of countermeasures, since until the tribunal has been
constituted and is in a position to deal with the dispute, even a power to order
binding provisional measures will not help.102 Thus even if the distinction between
provisional and other measures is retained, there is a good case for reconsidering
this aspect of article 53 (5).
Article 54
Countermeasures by States other than the injured State
70. Article 54 deals with the taking of countermeasures by the States referred to in
article 49, i.e. States other than the injured State. It deals rather succinctly with two
different situations. The first concerns countermeasures taken by an article 49 State
second concerns countermeasures taken in response to serious breaches covered by
Chapter II, Part Three (para. 2). Paragraph 3 deals with the coordination of
countermeasures taken by more than one State. Evidently the effect is as follows:
Within the general limits of Chapter II, an article 49 State can take countermeasures
in support of an injured State, or independently in the case of a serious breach.
Otherwise such States are limited to the invocation of responsibility under article
49 (2). By contrast, under former article [40], any State could take countermeasures
certain collective obligations, irrespective of the position of any other State,
including the State directly injured by the breach.
71. General international law on this subject is still rather embryonic, but that fact
points both ways.103
the law while it is in a process of development. For others, article 54 raises highly
controversial issues about the balance between law enforcement and intervention, in
a field already controversial enough. It also reopens the questions of the linkage
__________________
99 Third Report, A/CN.4/507/Add.3, para. 360.
100 As noted, e.g., by Italy, A/C.6/55/SR.16, para. 27; and the United Kingdom, A/C.6/55/SR.14,
para. 36. The United Kingdom makes the point that such a requirement may deter a State from
agreeing to third-party settlement ibid.
101 See , vol. I, pp. 171-176.
102 See United States, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 69; Costa Rica, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para. 65. This is the
basis for the provisional measures jurisdiction of the International Tribunal of the Law of the
Sea in the period prior to the constitution of an arbitral tribunal see UNCLOS, art. 290 (5).
103 For a review of the practice, see Third Report, A/CN.4/507/Add.4, paras. 391-394.
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between individual State action and collective measures under the Charter or under
regional arrangements.
72. The thrust of Government comments is that article 54, and especially
paragraph 2, has no basis in international law and would be destabilizing.104 This is
stressed both by those Governments which are generally worried about the
105 and
by those who are more supportive of countermeasures as a vehicle for resolving
disputes about responsibility.106
73. Besides this general concern, Governments have called for a clearer link
between article 54 and the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Some argue that
countermeasures in response to violations of community obligations should be taken
through the United Nations,107 or that at least there should be a reference to Security
Council action.108 There is a difficulty in that action taken pursuant to the Charter
falls outside the scope of the articles (see article 59), while action duly taken as
between the parties to regional arrangements is covered either by article 20
(consent) or article 56 (lex specialis). It would no doubt be possible to subordinate
action under article 54 (2) to action duly taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, but this would not deal with all situations. More generally, it is
unclear how the articles (whether or not they were to take the form of a treaty) could
resolve the issue of the interface between individual and genuinely collective action.
This can be seen by reference to the comments of Governments concerning the duty
of cooperation postulated in article 54 (3). Governments have doubted that it can
have any real effect, given its vagueness and generality. Some have called for a
more explicit formulation of article 54 (3),109 and also for clarification as to the
relation between article 54 (2) and article 42 (2) (c).110 But at the normative level it
is difficult to see what more can be said.
__________________
104 E.g., Israel, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para. 25.
105 Botswana, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para. 63; China, A/C.6/55/SR.14, paras. 40-41; Cuba,
A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 59; Germany, A/C.6/55/SR.14, para. 54; Japan, A/C.6/55/SR.14, para. 67;
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, A/C.6/55/SR.22, para. 52. Other Governments called for the problem
to be studied further e.g., Algeria, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 5; Jordan, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 17;
(A/CN.4/515).
106 E.g., United Kingdom, A/C.6/55/SR.14, paras. 31-32.
107 E.g., Mexico, A/C.6/55/SR.20, paras. 35-36; Islamic Republic of Iran, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para. 17.
108 E.g., Cameroon, A/C.6/55/SR.24, paras. 63-64; Greece, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para. 85.
109 E.g., Austria, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para. 79; Chile, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para. 48; Jordan,
A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 17. Some other Governments supported the flexibility of paragraph 3
e.g. Italy, A/C.6/55/SR.16, para. 28.
110 Austria, A/C.6/55/SR.17, paras. 77-78.
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74. There is a further difficulty, in that the mere deletion of article 54 will carry
the implication that countermeasures can only be taken by injured States, narrowly
defined. The current state of international law on measures taken in the general or
common interest is no doubt uncertain. But it cannot be the case, in the Special
are limited to breaches affecting the individual interests of powerful States or their
allies.111 Obligations towards the international community, or otherwise in the
obligations under bilateral treaties. While it can be hoped that international
organizations will be able to resolve the humanitarian or other crises that often arise
from serious breaches of international law, States have not abdicated their powers of
individual action. Thus if article 54 were to be deleted, there would at least be a
need for some form of saving clause.112
Article 55
Termination of countermeasures
75. As noted, article 55 has been generally welcomed.
General conclusion on Part Two bis, Chapter II
76. The Special Rapporteur regards it as a matter of general policy for the
Commission to decide as between the available options on countermeasures set out
in paragraph 60 above. His personal view is that, while there are still problems in
the drafting of the articles (especially article 51), the essential balance struck in
Chapter II is a reasonable one de lege ferenda. As to article 53, the existence of
certain minimum procedural standards under international law for taking and
maintaining countermeasures can hardly be denied, even if the articles go beyond
54, it can hardly be argued in the light of recent practice that countermeasures are
not available to article 49 States in any circumstances. But the apparent paradox of
nothing more than a saving clause is appropriate at the present time. In the light of
the debate in plenary and of the conclusions reached on issues such as dispute
settlement and the form of the draft articles, it will be necessary to examine the
possibilities for a balanced and generally acceptable text.
__________________
111 A number of Governments suggested that countermeasures could be taken by article 49 States,
but only to ensure cessation of the breach e.g., Austria, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para. 76; Cuba,
A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 59; Poland, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 48. Others would limit article 54 to
A/C.6/55/SR.16, para. 28; Russian Federation, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para. 51; Spain,
A/C.6/55/SR.16, para. 13.
112 An idea suggested by the United Kingdom A/C.6/55/SR.14, para. 32.
Annex 66
543
544
Annex 67
ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. I [extract]
Available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc 2001 v1.pdf
French version available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/french/ilc 2001 v1.pdf
545
Annex 67
546
Annex 67
547
548
Annex 68
ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part One
[extract]
Available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc 2001 v2 p1.pdf
French version available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/french/ilc 2001 v2 p1.pdf
549
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 1)
YEARBOOK
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION
2001
Volume II
UNITED NATIONS
New York and Geneva, 2010
Annex 68
550
Annex 68
551
Annex 68
552
CHAPTER II. COUNTERMEASURES
Annex 68
553
554
Annex 69
ILC, Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
with commentaries, 2001 [extract]*
Available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6 2001.pdf
French version available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/french/commentaries/9 6 2001.pdf
* Pp. 88-90, 96-98, 117-119, 126-128 of this document are at MG, vol. II, Annex 15.
555
Draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with commentaries
2001
Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in
2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report
covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The report, which also contains
commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected.
Copyright © United Nations
2008
Annex 69
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112 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
obligations towards the international community as a
whole640 all concern obligations which, it is generally accepted,
arise under peremptory norms of general international
law. Likewise the examples of peremptory norms
given by the Commission in its commentary to what became
article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention641 involve
obligations to the international community as a whole. But
there is at least a difference in emphasis. While peremptory
norms of general international law focus on the scope
and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental
obligations, the focus of obligations to the international
community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest
of all States in compliance—i.e. in terms of the present articles,
in being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any
State in breach. Consistently with the difference in their
focus, it is appropriate to reflect the consequences of the
two concepts in two distinct ways. First, serious breaches
of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general
international law can attract additional consequences, not
only for the responsible State but for all other States. Secondly,
all States are entitled to invoke responsibility for
breaches of obligations to the international community as
a whole. The first of these propositions is the concern of
the present chapter; the second is dealt with in article 48.
Article 40. Application of this chapter
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility
which is entailed by a serious breach by
a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law.
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves
a gross or systematic failure by the responsible
State to fulfil the obligation.
Commentary
(1) Article 40 serves to define the scope of the breaches
covered by the chapter. It establishes two criteria in order
to distinguish “serious breaches of obligations under peremptory
norms of general international law” from other
types of breaches. The first relates to the character of the
obligation breached, which must derive from a peremptory
norm of general international law. The second qualifies
640 According to ICJ, obligations erga omnes “derive, for example, in
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression,
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination”: Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above),
at p. 32, para. 34. See also East Timor (footnote 54 above); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ibid.); and Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Preliminary Objections (ibid.).
641 The Commission gave the following examples of treaties which
would violate the article due to conflict with a peremptory norm of
general international law, or a rule of jus cogens: “(a) a treaty contemplating
an unlawful use of force contrary to the principles of the
Charter, (b) a treaty contemplating the performance of any other act
criminal under international law, and (c) a treaty contemplating or
conniving at the commission of such acts, such as trade in slaves, piracy
or genocide, in the suppression of which every State is called upon to
co-operate … treaties violating human rights, the equality of States or
the principle of self-determination were mentioned as other possible
examples”, Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, p. 248.
the intensity of the breach, which must have been serious
in nature. Chapter III only applies to those violations of
international law that fulfil both criteria.
(2) The first criterion relates to the character of the obligation
breached. In order to give rise to the application of
this chapter, a breach must concern an obligation arising
under a peremptory norm of general international law. In
accordance with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is
one which is:
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
The concept of peremptory norms of general international
law is recognized in international practice, in the jurisprudence
of international and national courts and tribunals
and in legal doctrine.642
(3) It is not appropriate to set out examples of the peremptory
norms referred to in the text of article 40 itself,
any more than it was in the text of article 53 of the 1969
Vienna Convention. The obligations referred to in article
40 arise from those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit
what has come to be seen as intolerable because of
the threat it presents to the survival of States and their
peoples and the most basic human values.
(4) Among these prohibitions, it is generally agreed that
the prohibition of aggression is to be regarded as peremptory.
This is supported, for example, by the Commission’s
commentary to what was to become article 53,643 uncontradicted
statements by Governments in the course of the
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,644 the submissions
of both parties in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua case and the Court’s
own position in that case.645 There also seems to be widespread
agreement with other examples listed in the Commission’s
commentary to article 53: viz. the prohibitions
against slavery and the slave trade, genocide, and racial
discrimination and apartheid. These practices have been
prohibited in widely ratified international treaties and
conventions admitting of no exception. There was general
agreement among Governments as to the peremptory
character of these prohibitions at the Vienna Conference.
As to the peremptory character of the prohibition against
642 For further discussion of the requirements for identification of a
norm as peremptory, see paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 26,
with selected references to the case law and literature.
643 Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, pp. 247–249.
644 In the course of the conference, a number of Governments
characterized as peremptory the prohibitions against aggression and
the illegal use of force: see Official Records of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, 26 March to
24 May 1968, summary records of the plenary meeting and of the meetings
of the Committee of the Whole (United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.68.V.7), 52nd meeting, paras. 3, 31 and 43; 53rd meeting,
paras. 4, 9, 15, 16, 35, 48, 59 and 69; 54th meeting, paras. 9, 41, 46
and 55; 55th meeting, paras. 31 and 42; and 56th meeting, paras. 6, 20,
29 and 51.
645 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), pp. 100–101, para. 190; see also the separate
opinion of magistrate Nagendra Singh (president), p. 153.
Annex 69
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State responsibility 113
genocide, this is supported by a number of decisions by
national and international courts.646
(5) Although not specifically listed in the Commission’s
commentary to article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
the peremptory character of certain other norms
seems also to be generally accepted. This applies to the
prohibition against torture as defined in article 1 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The peremptory
character of this prohibition has been confirmed by decisions
of international and national bodies.647 In the light
of the description by ICJ of the basic rules of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict as “intransgressible”
in character, it would also seem justified to treat
these as peremptory.648 Finally, the obligation to respect
the right of self-determination deserves to be mentioned.
As the Court noted in the East Timor case, “[t]he principle
of self-determination ... is one of the essential principles
of contemporary international law”, which gives rise to an
obligation to the international community as a whole to
permit and respect its exercise.649
(6) It should be stressed that the examples given above
may not be exhaustive. In addition, article 64 of the 1969
Vienna Convention contemplates that new peremptory
norms of general international law may come into existence
through the processes of acceptance and recognition
by the international community of States as a whole,
as referred to in article 53. The examples given here are
thus without prejudice to existing or developing rules of
international law which fulfil the criteria for peremptory
norms under article 53.
(7) Apart from its limited scope in terms of the comparatively
small number of norms which qualify as peremptory,
article 40 applies a further limitation for the
purposes of the chapter, viz. that the breach should itself
have been “serious”. A “serious” breach is defined in
paragraph 2 as one which involves “a gross or systematic
failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation”
in question. The word “serious” signifies that a certain
order of magnitude of violation is necessary in order not
to trivialize the breach and it is not intended to suggest
that any violation of these obligations is not serious or is
somehow excusable. But relatively less serious cases of
646 See, for example, ICJ in Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional
Measures (footnote 412 above), pp. 439–440; Counter-Claims (footnote
413 above), p. 243; and the District Court of Jerusalem in the
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann case,
ILR, vol. 36, p. 5 (1961).
647 Cf. the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Siderman
de Blake and Others v. The Republic of Argentina and Others, ILR,
vol. 103, p. 455, at p. 471 (1992); the United Kingdom Court of Appeal
in Al Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others, ILR, vol. 107,
p. 536, at pp. 540–541 (1996); and the United Kingdom House of Lords
in Pinochet (footnote 415 above), pp. 841 and 881. Cf. the United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, ILR,
vol. 77, p. 169, at pp. 177–179 (1980).
648 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (see footnote
54 above), p. 257, para. 79.
649 East Timor (ibid.). See Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly
resolution 2625 (XXV), annex, fifth principle.
breach of peremptory norms can be envisaged, and it is
necessary to limit the scope of this chapter to the more
serious or systematic breaches. Some such limitation is
supported by State practice. For example, when reacting
against breaches of international law, States have often
stressed their systematic, gross or egregious nature. Similarly,
international complaint procedures, for example in
the field of human rights, attach different consequences to
systematic breaches, e.g. in terms of the non-applicability
of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies.650
(8) To be regarded as systematic, a violation would have
to be carried out in an organized and deliberate way. In
contrast, the term “gross” refers to the intensity of the
violation or its effects; it denotes violations of a flagrant
nature, amounting to a direct and outright assault on the
values protected by the rule. The terms are not of course
mutually exclusive; serious breaches will usually be both
systematic and gross. Factors which may establish the seriousness
of a violation would include the intent to violate
the norm; the scope and number of individual violations;
and the gravity of their consequences for the victims.
It must also be borne in mind that some of the peremptory
norms in question, most notably the prohibitions of
aggression and genocide, by their very nature require an
intentional violation on a large scale.651
(9) Article 40 does not lay down any procedure for determining
whether or not a serious breach has been committed.
It is not the function of the articles to establish
new institutional procedures for dealing with individual
cases, whether they arise under chapter III of Part Two or
otherwise. Moreover, the serious breaches dealt with in
this chapter are likely to be addressed by the competent
international organizations, including the Security Council
and the General Assembly. In the case of aggression,
the Security Council is given a specific role by the Charter
of the United Nations.
Article 41. Particular consequences of a serious breach
of an obligation under this chapter
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through
lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of
article 40.
650 See the Ireland v. the United Kingdom case (footnote 236 above),
para. 159; cf., e.g., the procedure established under Economic and
Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII), which requires a “consistent
pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights”.
651 At its twenty-second session, the Commission proposed the
following examples as cases denominated as “international crimes”:
“(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the maintenance of international peace and security,
such as that prohibiting aggression;
“(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples,
such as that prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by
force of colonial domination;
“(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international
obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being,
such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;
“(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human
environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the
atmosphere or of the seas.”
Yearbook … 1976, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 95–96.
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114 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation
created by a serious breach within the meaning of article
40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining
that situation.
3. This article is without prejudice to the other
consequences referred to in this Part and to such further
consequences that a breach to which this chapter
applies may entail under international law.
Commentary
(1) Article 41 sets out the particular consequences of
breaches of the kind and gravity referred to in article 40. It
consists of three paragraphs. The first two prescribe special
legal obligations of States faced with the commission
of “serious breaches” in the sense of article 40, the third
takes the form of a saving clause.
(2) Pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 41, States are under
a positive duty to cooperate in order to bring to an
end serious breaches in the sense of article 40. Because
of the diversity of circumstances which could possibly be
involved, the provision does not prescribe in detail what
form this cooperation should take. Cooperation could be
organized in the framework of a competent international
organization, in particular the United Nations. However,
paragraph 1 also envisages the possibility of non-institutionalized
cooperation.
(3) Neither does paragraph 1 prescribe what measures
States should take in order to bring to an end serious
breaches in the sense of article 40. Such cooperation must
be through lawful means, the choice of which will depend
on the circumstances of the given situation. It is, however,
made clear that the obligation to cooperate applies to
States whether or not they are individually affected by the
serious breach. What is called for in the face of serious
breaches is a joint and coordinated effort by all States to
counteract the effects of these breaches. It may be open
to question whether general international law at present
prescribes a positive duty of cooperation, and paragraph 1
in that respect may reflect the progressive development of
international law. But in fact such cooperation, especially
in the framework of international organizations, is carried
out already in response to the gravest breaches of international
law and it is often the only way of providing an
effective remedy. Paragraph 1 seeks to strengthen existing
mechanisms of cooperation, on the basis that all States are
called upon to make an appropriate response to the serious
breaches referred to in article 40.
(4) Pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 41, States are under
a duty of abstention, which comprises two obligations,
first, not to recognize as lawful situations created by serious
breaches in the sense of article 40 and, secondly, not
to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
(5) The first of these two obligations refers to the obligation
of collective non-recognition by the international
community as a whole of the legality of situations
resulting directly from serious breaches in the sense of
article 40.652 The obligation applies to “situations” created
by these breaches, such as, for example, attempted acquisition
of sovereignty over territory through the denial of
the right of self-determination of peoples. It not only refers
to the formal recognition of these situations, but also
prohibits acts which would imply such recognition.
(6) The existence of an obligation of non-recognition in
response to serious breaches of obligations arising under
peremptory norms already finds support in international
practice and in decisions of ICJ. The principle that territorial
acquisitions brought about by the use of force are not
valid and must not be recognized found a clear expression
during the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1932, when
the Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, declared that the
United States of America—joined by a large majority of
members of the League of Nations—would not:
admit the legality of any situation de facto nor ... recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof,
which may impair the ... sovereignty, the independence or the territorial
and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, ... [nor] recognize
any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by
means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of
August 27, 1928.653
The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations affirms
this principle by stating unequivocally that States
shall not recognize as legal any acquisition of territory
brought about by the use of force.654 As ICJ held in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
the unanimous consent of States to this declaration
“may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of
the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves”.
655
(7) An example of the practice of non-recognition of
acts in breach of peremptory norms is provided by the
reaction of the Security Council to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990. Following the Iraqi declaration of a
“comprehensive and eternal merger” with Kuwait, the Security
Council, in resolution 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990,
decided that the annexation had “no legal validity, and is
considered null and void”, and called upon all States, international
organizations and specialized agencies not to
recognize that annexation and to refrain from any action
or dealing that might be interpreted as a recognition of it,
whether direct or indirect. In fact, no State recognized the
652 This has been described as “an essential legal weapon in the
fight against grave breaches of the basic rules of international law”
(C. Tomuschat, “International crimes by States: an endangered
species?”, International Law Theory and Practice — Essays in Honour
of Eric Suy, K. Wellens, ed. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998),
p. 253, at p. 259.
653 Secretary of State’s note to the Chinese and Japanese Governments,
in Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1940), vol. I, p. 334;
endorsed by Assembly resolutions of 11 March 1932, League of
Nations Official Journal, March 1932, Special Supplement No. 101,
p. 87. For a review of earlier practice relating to collective nonrecognition,
see J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations
(Cambridge, Grotius, 1987), pp. 24–27.
654 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), annex, first
principle.
655 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), at p. 100, para. 188.
Annex 69
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State responsibility 115
legality of the purported annexation, the effects of which
were subsequently reversed.
(8) As regards the denial by a State of the right of selfdetermination
of peoples, the advisory opinion of ICJ in
the Namibia case is similarly clear in calling for a nonrecognition
of the situation.656 The same obligations are
reflected in the resolutions of the Security Council and
General Assembly concerning the situation in Rhodesia657
and the Bantustans in South Africa.658 These examples
reflect the principle that where a serious breach
in the sense of article 40 has resulted in a situation that
might otherwise call for recognition, this has nonetheless
to be withheld. Collective non-recognition would seem to
be a prerequisite for any concerted community response
against such breaches and marks the minimum necessary
response by States to the serious breaches referred to in
article 40.
(9) Under article 41, paragraph 2, no State shall recognize
the situation created by the serious breach as lawful.
This obligation applies to all States, including the responsible
State. There have been cases where the responsible
State has sought to consolidate the situation it has created
by its own “recognition”. Evidently, the responsible
State is under an obligation not to recognize or sustain
the unlawful situation arising from the breach. Similar
considerations apply even to the injured State: since the
breach by definition concerns the international community
as a whole, waiver or recognition induced from the
injured State by the responsible State cannot preclude the
international community interest in ensuring a just and
appropriate settlement. These conclusions are consistent
with article 30 on cessation and are reinforced by the peremptory
character of the norms in question.659
(10) The consequences of the obligation of non-recognition
are, however, not unqualified. In the Namibia advisory
opinion the Court, despite holding that the illegality
of the situation was opposable erga omnes and could not
be recognized as lawful even by States not members of the
United Nations, said that:
the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages
derived from international cooperation. In particular, while official acts
performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning
Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid,
this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the
registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be
ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.660
656 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), where the Court held that
“the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of
South Africa’s presence in Namibia are opposable to all States in the
sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is maintained
in violation of international law” (p. 56, para. 126).
657 Cf. Security Council resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November
1965.
658 See, e.g., General Assembly resolution 31/6 A of 26 October
1976, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 402 (1976) of
22 December 1976; Assembly resolutions 32/105 N of 14 December
1977 and 34/93 G of 12 December 1979; see also the statements of
21 September 1979 and 15 December 1981 issued by the respective
presidents of the Security Council in reaction to the “creation” of Venda
and Ciskei (S/13549 and S/14794).
659 See also paragraph (7) of the commentary to article 20 and
paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 45.
660 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), p. 56, para. 125.
Both the principle of non-recognition and this qualification
to it have been applied, for example, by the European
Court of Human Rights.661
(11) The second obligation contained in paragraph 2
prohibits States from rendering aid or assistance in
maintaining the situation created by a serious breach in
the sense of article 40. This goes beyond the provisions
dealing with aid or assistance in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act, which are covered by article
16. It deals with conduct “after the fact” which assists the
responsible State in maintaining a situation “opposable to
all States in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality
of a situation which is maintained in violation of international
law”.662 It extends beyond the commission of the
serious breach itself to the maintenance of the situation
created by that breach, and it applies whether or not the
breach itself is a continuing one. As to the elements of
“aid or assistance”, article 41 is to be read in connection
with article 16. In particular, the concept of aid or assistance
in article 16 presupposes that the State has “knowledge
of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act”. There is no need to mention such a requirement in
article 41, paragraph 2, as it is hardly conceivable that a
State would not have notice of the commission of a serious
breach by another State.
(12) In some respects, the prohibition contained in paragraph
2 may be seen as a logical extension of the duty
of non-recognition. However, it has a separate scope of
application insofar as actions are concerned which would
not imply recognition of the situation created by serious
breaches in the sense of article 40. This separate existence
is confirmed, for example, in the resolutions of the Security
Council prohibiting any aid or assistance in maintaining
the illegal apartheid regime in South Africa or Portuguese
colonial rule.663 Just as in the case of the duty of
non-recognition, these resolutions would seem to express
a general idea applicable to all situations created by serious
breaches in the sense of article 40.
(13) Pursuant to paragraph 3, article 41 is without
prejudice to the other consequences elaborated in Part
Two and to possible further consequences that a serious
breach in the sense of article 40 may entail. The purpose
of this paragraph is twofold. First, it makes it clear that
a serious breach in the sense of article 40 entails the legal
consequences stipulated for all breaches in chapters I
and II of Part Two. Consequently, a serious breach in the
sense of article 40 gives rise to an obligation, on behalf of
the responsible State, to cease the wrongful act, to continue
performance and, if appropriate, to give guarantees
and assurances of non-repetition. By the same token, it
entails a duty to make reparation in conformity with the
rules set out in chapter II of this Part. The incidence of
these obligations will no doubt be affected by the gravity
of the breach in question, but this is allowed for in the
actual language of the relevant articles.
661 Loizidou, Merits (see footnote 160 above), p. 2216; Cyprus
v. Turkey (see footnote 247 above), paras. 89–98.
662 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), p. 56, para. 126.
663 See, e.g., Security Council resolutions 218 (1965) of 23 November
1965 on the Portuguese colonies, and 418 (1977) of
4 November 1977 and 569 (1985) of 26 July 1985 on South Africa.
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116 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(14) Secondly, paragraph 3 allows for such further consequences
of a serious breach as may be provided for by
international law. This may be done by the individual primary
rule, as in the case of the prohibition of aggression.
Paragraph 3 accordingly allows that international law may
recognize additional legal consequences flowing from the
commission of a serious breach in the sense of article 40.
The fact that such further consequences are not expressly
referred to in chapter III does not prejudice their recognition
in present-day international law, or their further development.
In addition, paragraph 3 reflects the conviction
that the legal regime of serious breaches is itself in
a state of development. By setting out certain basic legal
consequences of serious breaches in the sense of article
40, article 41 does not intend to preclude the future development
of a more elaborate regime of consequences
entailed by such breaches.
PART THREE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE
Part Three deals with the implementation of State responsibility,
i.e. with giving effect to the obligations of
cessation and reparation which arise for a responsible State
under Part Two by virtue of its commission of an internationally
wrongful act. Although State responsibility arises
under international law independently of its invocation by
another State, it is still necessary to specify what other
States faced with a breach of an international obligation
may do, what action they may take in order to secure the
performance of the obligations of cessation and reparation
on the part of the responsible State. This, sometimes
referred to as the mise-en-oeuvre of State responsibility,
is the subject matter of Part Three. Part Three consists of
two chapters. Chapter I deals with the invocation of State
responsibility by other States and with certain associated
questions. Chapter II deals with countermeasures taken in
order to induce the responsible State to cease the conduct
in question and to provide reparation.
CHAPTER I
INVOCATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF A STATE
Commentary
(1) Part One of the articles identifies the internationally
wrongful act of a State generally in terms of the breach
of any international obligation of that State. Part Two defines
the consequences of internationally wrongful acts in
the field of responsibility as obligations of the responsible
State, not as rights of any other State, person or entity.
Part Three is concerned with the implementation of State
responsibility, i.e. with the entitlement of other States to
invoke the international responsibility of the responsible
State and with certain modalities of such invocation. The
rights that other persons or entities may have arising from
a breach of an international obligation are preserved by
article 33, paragraph 2.
(2) Central to the invocation of responsibility is the concept
of the injured State. This is the State whose individual
right has been denied or impaired by the internationally
wrongful act or which has otherwise been particularly
affected by that act. This concept is introduced in article
42 and various consequences are drawn from it in
other articles of this chapter. In keeping with the broad
range of international obligations covered by the articles,
it is necessary to recognize that a broader range of States
may have a legal interest in invoking responsibility and
ensuring compliance with the obligation in question. Indeed,
in certain situations, all States may have such an
interest, even though none of them is individually or
specially affected by the breach.664 This possibility is recognized
in article 48. Articles 42 and 48 are couched in
terms of the entitlement of States to invoke the responsibility
of another State. They seek to avoid problems
arising from the use of possibly misleading terms such
as “direct” versus “indirect” injury or “objective” versus
“subjective” rights.
(3) Although article 42 is drafted in the singular (“an
injured State”), more than one State may be injured by
an internationally wrongful act and be entitled to invoke
responsibility as an injured State. This is made clear by
article 46. Nor are articles 42 and 48 mutually exclusive.
Situations may well arise in which one State is “injured”
in the sense of article 42, and other States are entitled to
invoke responsibility under article 48.
(4) Chapter I also deals with a number of related questions:
the requirement of notice if a State wishes to invoke
the responsibility of another (art. 43), certain aspects of
the admissibility of claims (art. 44), loss of the right to invoke
responsibility (art. 45), and cases where the responsibility
of more than one State may be invoked in relation
to the same internationally wrongful act (art. 47).
(5) Reference must also be made to article 55, which
makes clear the residual character of the articles. In addition
to giving rise to international obligations for States, special
rules may also determine which other State or States are
entitled to invoke the international responsibility arising
from their breach, and what remedies they may seek. This
was true, for example, of article 396 of the Treaty of Versailles,
which was the subject of the decision in the S.S.
“Wimbledon” case.665 It is also true of article 33 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. It will be a matter
of interpretation in each case whether such provisions are
intended to be exclusive, i.e. to apply as a lex specialis.
664 Cf. the statement by ICJ that “all States can be held to have a legal
interest” as concerns breaches of obligations erga omnes, Barcelona
Traction (footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33, cited in paragraph (2) of
the commentary to chapter III of Part Two.
665 Four States there invoked the responsibility of Germany, at least
one of which, Japan, had no specific interest in the voyage of the S.S.
“Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above).
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State responsibility 121
that responsibility by another State or States. Thus, it is
not the function of the articles to deal with such questions
as the requirement for exhausting other means of peaceful
settlement before commencing proceedings, or such
doctrines as litispendence or election as they may affect
the jurisdiction of one international tribunal vis-à-vis another.
681 By contrast, certain questions which would be
classified as questions of admissibility when raised before
an international court are of a more fundamental character.
They are conditions for invoking the responsibility of
a State in the first place. Two such matters are dealt with
in article 44: the requirements of nationality of claims and
exhaustion of local remedies.
(2) Subparagraph (a) provides that the responsibility of
a State may not be invoked other than in accordance with
any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims.
As PCIJ said in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions
case:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled
to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international
law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to
obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels.682
Subparagraph (a) does not attempt a detailed elaboration
of the nationality of claims rule or of the exceptions to
it. Rather, it makes it clear that the nationality of claims
rule is not only relevant to questions of jurisdiction or the
admissibility of claims before judicial bodies, but is also
a general condition for the invocation of responsibility in
those cases where it is applicable.683
(3) Subparagraph (b) provides that when the claim is
one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies,
the claim is inadmissible if any available and effective
local remedy has not been exhausted. The paragraph
is formulated in general terms in order to cover any case
to which the exhaustion of local remedies rule applies,
whether under treaty or general international law, and in
spheres not necessarily limited to diplomatic protection.
(4) The local remedies rule was described by a Chamber
of the Court in the ELSI case as “an important principle of
customary international law”.684 In the context of a claim
681 For discussion of the range of considerations affecting jurisdiction
and admissibility of international claims before courts, see G.
Abi-Saab, Les exceptions préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour
internationale (Paris, Pedone, 1967); Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Cambridge,
Grotius, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 427–575; and S. Rosenne, The Law and
Practice of the International Court, 1920–1996, 3rd ed. (The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), vol. II, Jurisdiction.
682 Mavrommatis (see footnote 236 above), p. 12.
683 Questions of nationality of claims will be dealt with in detail in
the work of the Commission on diplomatic protection. See first report
of the Special Rapporteur for the topic “Diplomatic protection” in
Yearbook … 2000, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/506 and
Add.1.
684 ELSI (see footnote 85 above), p. 42, para. 50. See also Interhandel,
Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, at p. 27. On the
exhaustion of local remedies rule generally, see, e.g., C. F. Amerasinghe,
Local Remedies in International Law (Cambridge, Grotius, 1990);
J. Chappez, La règle de l’épuisement des voies de recours internes
(Paris, Pedone, 1972); K. Doehring, “Local remedies, exhaustion of ”,
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, R. Bernhardt, ed. (footnote
409 above), vol. 3, pp. 238–242; and G. Perrin, “La naissance de la responsabilité
internationale et l’épuisement des voies de recours internes
brought on behalf of a corporation of the claimant State,
the Chamber defined the rule succinctly in the following
terms:
for an international claim [sc. on behalf of individual nationals or corporations]
to be admissible, it is sufficient if the essence of the claim
has been brought before the competent tribunals and pursued as far as
permitted by local law and procedures, and without success.685
The Chamber thus treated the exhaustion of local remedies
as being distinct, in principle, from “the merits of
the case”.686
(5) Only those local remedies which are “available and
effective” have to be exhausted before invoking the responsibility
of a State. The mere existence on paper of
remedies under the internal law of a State does not impose
a requirement to make use of those remedies in
every case. In particular, there is no requirement to use a
remedy which offers no possibility of redressing the situation,
for instance, where it is clear from the outset that
the law which the local court would have to apply can lead
only to the rejection of any appeal. Beyond this, article
44, subparagraph (b), does not attempt to spell out comprehensively
the scope and content of the exhaustion of
local remedies rule, leaving this to the applicable rules of
international law.687
Article 45. Loss of the right to invoke responsibility
The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if:
(a) the injured State has validly waived the claim;
(b) the injured State is to be considered as having,
by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the lapse
of the claim.
Commentary
(1) Article 45 is analogous to article 45 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention concerning loss of the right to invoke a
ground for invalidating or terminating a treaty. The article
deals with two situations in which the right of an injured
State or other States concerned to invoke the responsibility
of a wrongdoing State may be lost: waiver and acquiescence
in the lapse of the claim. In this regard, the position
of an injured State as referred to in article 42 and other
States concerned with a breach needs to be distinguished.
A valid waiver or settlement of the responsibility dispute
dans le projet d’articles de la Commission du droit international”,
Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler (Bern, Stämpfli, 1980), p. 271.
On the exhaustion of local remedies rule in relation to violations of
human rights obligations, see, e.g., A. A. Cançado Trindade, The Application
of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International
Law Its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual Rights
(Cambridge University Press, 1983); and E. Wyler, L’illicite et la condition
des personnes privées (Paris, Pedone, 1995), pp. 65–89.
685 ELSI (see footnote 85 above), p. 46, para. 59.
686 Ibid., p. 48, para. 63.
687 The topic will be dealt with in detail in the work of the Commission
on diplomatic protection. See second report of the Special Rapporteur
on diplomatic protection in Yearbook … 2001, vol. II (Part One),
document A/CN.4/514.
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122 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
between the responsible State and the injured State, or,
if there is more than one, all the injured States, may preclude
any claim for reparation. Positions taken by individual
States referred to in article 48 will not have such
an effect.
(2) Subparagraph (a) deals with the case where an injured
State has waived either the breach itself, or its consequences
in terms of responsibility. This is a manifestation
of the general principle of consent in relation to rights or
obligations within the dispensation of a particular State.
(3) In some cases, the waiver may apply only to one aspect
of the legal relationship between the injured State and
the responsible State. For example, in the Russian Indemnity
case, the Russian embassy had repeatedly demanded
from Turkey a certain sum corresponding to the capital
amount of a loan, without any reference to interest or
damages for delay. Turkey having paid the sum demanded,
the tribunal held that this conduct amounted to the abandonment
of any other claim arising from the loan.688
(4) A waiver is only effective if it is validly given. As
with other manifestations of State consent, questions of
validity can arise with respect to a waiver, for example,
possible coercion of the State or its representative, or a
material error as to the facts of the matter, arising perhaps
from a misrepresentation of those facts by the responsible
State. The use of the term “valid waiver” is intended to
leave to the general law the question of what amounts to
a valid waiver in the circumstances.689 Of particular significance
in this respect is the question of consent given
by an injured State following a breach of an obligation
arising from a peremptory norm of general international
law, especially one to which article 40 applies. Since such
a breach engages the interest of the international community
as a whole, even the consent or acquiescence of the
injured State does not preclude that interest from being
expressed in order to ensure a settlement in conformity
with international law.
(5) Although it may be possible to infer a waiver from
the conduct of the States concerned or from a unilateral
statement, the conduct or statement must be unequivocal.
In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case, it was
argued that the Nauruan authorities before independence
had waived the rehabilitation claim by concluding an
agreement relating to the future of the phosphate industry
as well as by statements made at the time of independence.
As to the former, the record of negotiations showed
that the question of waiving the rehabilitation claim had
been raised and not accepted, and the Agreement itself
was silent on the point. As to the latter, the relevant statements
were unclear and equivocal. The Court held there
had been no waiver, since the conduct in question “did
not at any time effect a clear and unequivocal waiver of
their claims”.690 In particular, the statements relied on
“[n]otwithstanding some ambiguity in the wording …
did not imply any departure from the point of view ex-
688 Russian Indemnity (see footnote 354 above), p. 446.
689 Cf. the position with respect to valid consent under article 20: see
paragraphs (4) to (8) of the commentary to article 20.
690 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections (see
footnote 230 above), p. 247, para. 13.
pressed clearly and repeatedly by the representatives of
the Nauruan people before various organs of the United
Nations”.691
(6) Just as it may explicitly waive the right to invoke
responsibility, so an injured State may acquiesce in the
loss of that right. Subparagraph (b) deals with the case
where an injured State is to be considered as having, by
reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the lapse of
the claim. The article emphasizes conduct of the State,
which could include, where applicable, unreasonable delay,
as the determining criterion for the lapse of the claim.
Mere lapse of time without a claim being resolved is not,
as such, enough to amount to acquiescence, in particular
where the injured State does everything it can reasonably
do to maintain its claim.
(7) The principle that a State may by acquiescence lose
its right to invoke responsibility was endorsed by ICJ in
the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case, in the following
passage:
The Court recognizes that, even in the absence of any applicable treaty
provision, delay on the part of a claimant State may render an application
inadmissible. It notes, however, that international law does not lay
down any specific time limit in that regard. It is therefore for the Court
to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the
passage of time renders an application inadmissible.692
In the LaGrand case, the Court held the German application
admissible even though Germany had taken legal
action some years after the breach had become known
to it.693
(8) One concern of the rules relating to delay is that additional
difficulties may be caused to the respondent State
due to the lapse of time, e.g. as concerns the collection
and presentation of evidence. Thus, in the Stevenson case
and the Gentini case, considerations of procedural fairness
to the respondent State were advanced.694 In contrast, the
plea of delay has been rejected if, in the circumstances of
a case, the respondent State could not establish the existence
of any prejudice on its part, as where it has always
had notice of the claim and was in a position to collect and
preserve evidence relating to it.695
(9) Moreover, contrary to what may be suggested by
the expression “delay”, international courts have not engaged
simply in measuring the lapse of time and applying
clear-cut time limits. No generally accepted time limit,
691 Ibid., p. 250, para. 20.
692 Ibid., pp. 253–254, para. 32. The Court went on to hold that,
in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the history of
the matter, Nauru’s application was not inadmissible on this ground
(para. 36). It reserved for the merits any question of prejudice to the
respondent State by reason of the delay. See further paragraph (8) of the
commentary to article 13.
693 LaGrand, Provisional Measures (see footnote 91 above)
and LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), at pp. 486–487,
paras. 53–57.
694 See Stevenson, UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 385
(1903); and Gentini, ibid., vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4), p. 551 (1903).
695 See, e.g., Tagliaferro, UNRIAA, vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4),
p. 592, at p. 593 (1903); see also the actual decision in Stevenson
(footnote 694 above), pp. 386–387.
Annex 69
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State responsibility 123
expressed in terms of years, has been laid down.696 The
Swiss Federal Department in 1970 suggested a period
of 20 to 30 years since the coming into existence of the
claim.697 Others have stated that the requirements were
more exacting for contractual claims than for non-contractual
claims.698 None of the attempts to establish any
precise or finite time limit for international claims in general
has achieved acceptance.699 It would be very difficult
to establish any single limit, given the variety of situations,
obligations and conduct that may be involved.
(10) Once a claim has been notified to the respondent
State, delay in its prosecution (e.g. before an international
tribunal) will not usually be regarded as rendering it inadmissible.
700 Thus, in the Certain Phosphate Lands in
Nauru case, ICJ held it to be sufficient that Nauru had referred
to its claims in bilateral negotiations with Australia
in the period preceding the formal institution of legal
proceedings in 1989.701 In the Tagliaferro case, Umpire
Ralston likewise held that, despite the lapse of 31 years
since the infliction of damage, the claim was admissible
as it had been notified immediately after the injury had
occurred.702
(11) To summarize, a claim will not be inadmissible on
grounds of delay unless the circumstances are such that
the injured State should be considered as having acquiesced
in the lapse of the claim or the respondent State
has been seriously disadvantaged. International courts
generally engage in a flexible weighing of relevant circumstances
in the given case, taking into account such
matters as the conduct of the respondent State and the
importance of the rights involved. The decisive factor is
whether the respondent State has suffered any prejudice
as a result of the delay in the sense that the respondent
could have reasonably expected that the claim would no
longer be pursued. Even if there has been some prejudice,
it may be able to be taken into account in determining the
form or extent of reparation.703
696 In some cases time limits are laid down for specific categories of
claims arising under specific treaties (e.g. the six-month time limit for
individual applications under article 35, paragraph 1, of the European
Convention on Human Rights) notably in the area of private law (e.g.
in the field of commercial transactions and international transport). See
the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, as amended by the Protocol to the Convention. By contrast, it is
highly unusual for treaty provisions dealing with inter-State claims to
be subject to any express time limits.
697 Communiqué of 29 December 1970, in Annuaire suisse de droit
international, vol. 32 (1976), p. 153.
698 C.-A. Fleischhauer, “Prescription”, Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (see footnote 409 above), vol. 3, p. 1105, at p. 1107.
699 A large number of international decisions stress the absence of
general rules, and in particular of any specific limitation period measured
in years. Rather, the principle of delay is a matter of appreciation
having regard to the facts of the given case. Besides Certain Phosphate
Lands in Nauru (footnotes 230 and 232 above), see, e.g. Gentini (footnote
694 above), p. 561; and the Ambatielos arbitration, ILR, vol. 23,
p. 306, at pp. 314–317 (1956).
700 For statements of the distinction between notice of claim and
commencement of proceedings, see, e.g. R. Jennings and A. Watts, eds.,
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (Harlow, Longman, 1992),
vol. I, Peace, p. 527; and C. Rousseau, Droit international public (Paris,
Sirey, 1983), vol. V, p. 182.
701 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections
(see footnote 230 above), p. 250, para. 20.
702 Tagliaferro (see footnote 695 above), p. 593.
703 See article 39 and commentary.
Article 46. Plurality of injured States
Where several States are injured by the same internationally
wrongful act, each injured State may separately
invoke the responsibility of the State which has
committed the internationally wrongful act.
Commentary
(1) Article 46 deals with the situation of a plurality of
injured States, in the sense defined in article 42. It states
the principle that where there are several injured States,
each of them may separately invoke the responsibility for
the internationally wrongful act on its own account.
(2) Several States may qualify as “injured” States under
article 42. For example, all the States to which an interdependent
obligation is owed within the meaning of article
42, subparagraph (b) (ii), are injured by its breach. In a
situation of a plurality of injured States, each may seek
cessation of the wrongful act if it is continuing, and claim
reparation in respect of the injury to itself. This conclusion
has never been doubted, and is implicit in the terms
of article 42 itself.
(3) It is by no means unusual for claims arising from
the same internationally wrongful act to be brought by
several States. For example, in the S.S. “Wimbledon”
case, four States brought proceedings before PCIJ under
article 386, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Versailles,
which allowed “any interested Power” to apply in the
event of a violation of the provisions of the Treaty concerning
transit through the Kiel Canal. The Court noted
that “each of the four Applicant Powers has a clear interest
in the execution of the provisions relating to the Kiel
Canal, since they all possess fleets and merchant vessels
flying their respective flags”. It held they were each covered
by article 386, paragraph 1, “even though they may
be unable to adduce a prejudice to any pecuniary interest”.
704 In fact, only France, representing the operator of
the vessel, claimed and was awarded compensation. In
the cases concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955,
proceedings were commenced by the United States, the
United Kingdom and Israel against Bulgaria concerning
the destruction of an Israeli civil aircraft and the loss of
lives involved.705 In the Nuclear Tests cases, Australia
and New Zealand each claimed to be injured in various
ways by the French conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests
at Mururoa Atoll.706
(4) Where the States concerned do not claim compensation
on their own account as distinct from a declaration
704 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 20.
705 ICJ held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Israeli claim: Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1959, p. 131, after which the United Kingdom and United States claims
were withdrawn. In its Memorial, Israel noted that there had been active
coordination of the claims between the various claimant Governments,
and added: “One of the primary reasons for establishing coordination
of this character from the earliest stages was to prevent, so far as was
possible, the Bulgarian Government being faced with double claims
leading to the possibility of double damages” (see footnote 363 above),
p. 106.
706 See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) and (New Zealand
v. France) (footnote 196 above), pp. 256 and 460, respectively.
Annex 69
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State responsibility 129
obligation but justified as a necessary and proportionate
response to an internationally wrongful act of the State
against which they are taken. They are essentially temporary
measures, taken to achieve a specified end, whose
justification terminates once the end is achieved.
(5) This chapter does not draw any distinction between
what are sometimes called “reciprocal countermeasures”
and other measures. That term refers to countermeasures
which involve suspension of performance of obligations
towards the responsible State “if such obligations correspond
to, or are directly connected with, the obligation
breached”.739 There is no requirement that States taking
countermeasures should be limited to suspension of performance
of the same or a closely related obligation.740 A
number of considerations support this conclusion. First,
for some obligations, for example those concerning the
protection of human rights, reciprocal countermeasures
are inconceivable. The obligations in question have a nonreciprocal
character and are not only due to other States
but to the individuals themselves.741 Secondly, a limitation
to reciprocal countermeasures assumes that the injured
State will be in a position to impose the same or related
measures as the responsible State, which may not be so.
The obligation may be a unilateral one or the injured State
may already have performed its side of the bargain. Above
all, considerations of good order and humanity preclude
many measures of a reciprocal nature. This conclusion
does not, however, end the matter. Countermeasures are
more likely to satisfy the requirements of necessity and
proportionality if they are taken in relation to the same or
a closely related obligation, as in the Air Service Agreement
arbitration.742
(6) This conclusion reinforces the need to ensure that
countermeasures are strictly limited to the requirements
of the situation and that there are adequate safeguards
against abuse. Chapter II seeks to do this in a variety of
ways. First, as already noted, it concerns only non-forcible
countermeasures (art. 50, para. 1 (a)). Secondly, countermeasures
are limited by the requirement that they be
directed at the responsible State and not at third parties
(art. 49, paras. 1 and 2). Thirdly, since countermeasures
are intended as instrumental—in other words, since they
are taken with a view to procuring cessation of and reparation
for the internationally wrongful act and not by way
of punishment—they are temporary in character and must
be as far as possible reversible in their effects in terms
of future legal relations between the two States (arts. 49,
paras. 2 and 3, and 53). Fourthly, countermeasures must
be proportionate (art. 51). Fifthly, they must not involve
any departure from certain basic obligations (art. 50,
para. 1), in particular those under peremptory norms of
general international law.
739 See the sixth report of the Special Rapporteur on State responsibility,
William Riphagen, article 8 of Part Two of the draft articles,
Yearbook … 1985, vol. II (Part One), p. 10, document A/CN.4/389.
740 Contrast the exception of non-performance in the law of treaties,
which is so limited: see paragraph (9) of the introductory commentary
to chapter V of Part One.
741 Cf. Ireland v. the United Kingdom (footnote 236 above).
742 See footnote 28 above.
(7) This chapter also deals to some extent with the conditions
of the implementation of countermeasures. In particular,
countermeasures cannot affect any dispute settlement
procedure which is in force between the two States
and applicable to the dispute (art. 50, para. 2 (a)). Nor
can they be taken in such a way as to impair diplomatic or
consular inviolability (art. 50, para. 2 (b)). Countermeasures
must be preceded by a demand by the injured State
that the responsible State comply with its obligations under
Part Two, must be accompanied by an offer to negotiate,
and must be suspended if the internationally wrongful
act has ceased and the dispute is submitted in good faith
to a court or tribunal with the authority to make decisions
binding on the parties (art. 52, para. 3).
(8) The focus of the chapter is on countermeasures taken
by injured States as defined in article 42. Occasions
have arisen in practice of countermeasures being taken by
other States, in particular those identified in article 48,
where no State is injured or else on behalf of and at the request
of an injured State. Such cases are controversial and
the practice is embryonic. This chapter does not purport
to regulate the taking of countermeasures by States other
than the injured State. It is, however, without prejudice to
the right of any State identified in article 48, paragraph 1,
to take lawful measures against a responsible State to ensure
cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest
of the injured State or the beneficiaries of the obligation
breached (art. 54).
(9) In common with other chapters of these articles,
the provisions on countermeasures are residual and may
be excluded or modified by a special rule to the contrary
(see article 55). Thus, a treaty provision precluding the
suspension of performance of an obligation under any circumstances
will exclude countermeasures with respect to
the performance of the obligation. Likewise, a regime for
dispute resolution to which States must resort in the event
of a dispute, especially if (as with the WTO dispute settlement
system) it requires an authorization to take measures
in the nature of countermeasures in response to a proven
breach.743
Article 49. Object and limits of countermeasures
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures
against a State which is responsible for an internationally
wrongful act in order to induce that State to
comply with its obligations under Part Two.
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance
for the time being of international obligations
of the State taking the measures towards the
responsible State.
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be
taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of
performance of the obligations in question.
743 See Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization,
annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the
Settlement of Disputes), arts. 1, 3, para. 7, and 22.
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130 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Commentary
(1) Article 49 describes the permissible object of countermeasures
taken by an injured State against the responsible
State and places certain limits on their scope.
Countermeasures may only be taken by an injured State
in order to induce the responsible State to comply with its
obligations under Part Two, namely, to cease the internationally
wrongful conduct, if it is continuing, and to provide
reparation to the injured State.744 Countermeasures
are not intended as a form of punishment for wrongful
conduct, but as an instrument for achieving compliance
with the obligations of the responsible State under Part
Two. The limited object and exceptional nature of countermeasures
are indicated by the use of the word “only” in
paragraph 1 of article 49.
(2) A fundamental prerequisite for any lawful countermeasure
is the existence of an internationally wrongful act
which injured the State taking the countermeasure. This
point was clearly made by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo Nagymaros
Project case, in the following passage:
In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain conditions
…
In the first place it must be taken in response to a previous international
wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that
State.745
(3) Paragraph 1 of article 49 presupposes an objective
standard for the taking of countermeasures, and in particular
requires that the countermeasure be taken against a
State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful
act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations
of cessation and reparation. A State taking countermeasures
acts at its peril, if its view of the question of
wrongfulness turns out not to be well founded. A State
which resorts to countermeasures based on its unilateral
assessment of the situation does so at its own risk and
may incur responsibility for its own wrongful conduct in
the event of an incorrect assessment.746 In this respect,
there is no difference between countermeasures and other
circumstances precluding wrongfulness.747
744 For these obligations, see articles 30 and 31 and commentaries.
745 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 55,
para. 83. See also “Naulilaa” (footnote 337 above), p. 1027; “Cysne”
(footnote 338 above), p. 1057. At the 1930 Hague Conference, all
States which responded on this point took the view that a prior wrongful
act was an indispensable prerequisite for the adoption of reprisals;
see League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (footnote 88 above), p. 128.
746 The tribunal’s remark in the Air Service Agreement case (see footnote
28 above), to the effect that “each State establishes for itself its
legal situation vis-à-vis other States” (p. 443, para. 81) should not be
interpreted in the sense that the United States would have been justified
in taking countermeasures whether or not France was in breach of the
Agreement. In that case the tribunal went on to hold that the United
States was actually responding to a breach of the Agreement by France,
and that its response met the requirements for countermeasures under
international law, in particular in terms of purpose and proportionality.
The tribunal did not decide that an unjustified belief by the United
States as to the existence of a breach would have been sufficient.
747 See paragraph (8) of the introductory commentary to chapter V
of Part One.
(4) A second essential element of countermeasures is
that they “must be directed against”748 a State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act, and which has
not complied with its obligations of cessation and reparation
under Part Two of the present articles.749 The word
“only” in paragraph 1 applies equally to the target of the
countermeasures as to their purpose and is intended to
convey that countermeasures may only be adopted against
a State which is the author of the internationally wrongful
act. Countermeasures may not be directed against States
other than the responsible State. In a situation where a
third State is owed an international obligation by the State
taking countermeasures and that obligation is breached by
the countermeasure, the wrongfulness of the measure is
not precluded as against the third State. In that sense the
effect of countermeasures in precluding wrongfulness is
relative. It concerns the legal relations between the injured
State and the responsible State.750
(5) This does not mean that countermeasures may not
incidentally affect the position of third States or indeed
other third parties. For example, if the injured State suspends
transit rights with the responsible State in accordance
with this chapter, other parties, including third States,
may be affected thereby. If they have no individual rights
in the matter they cannot complain. The same is true if, as
a consequence of suspension of a trade agreement, trade
with the responsible State is affected and one or more
companies lose business or even go bankrupt. Such indirect
or collateral effects cannot be entirely avoided.
(6) In taking countermeasures, the injured State effectively
withholds performance for the time being of one or
more international obligations owed by it to the responsible
State, and paragraph 2 of article 49 reflects this element.
Although countermeasures will normally take the
form of the non-performance of a single obligation, it is
possible that a particular measure may affect the performance
of several obligations simultaneously. For this reason,
paragraph 2 refers to “obligations” in the plural. For
example, freezing of the assets of a State might involve
what would otherwise be the breach of several obligations
to that State under different agreements or arrangements.
Different and coexisting obligations might be affected by
the same act. The test is always that of proportionality, and
a State which has committed an internationally wrongful
act does not thereby make itself the target for any form
or combination of countermeasures, irrespective of their
severity or consequences.751
(7) The phrase “for the time being” in paragraph 2 indicates
the temporary or provisional character of countermeasures.
Their aim is the restoration of a condition of
legality as between the injured State and the responsible
748 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), pp. 55–
56, para. 83.
749 In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case ICJ held that the
requirement had been satisfied, in that Hungary was in continuing
breach of its obligations under a bilateral treaty, and Czechoslovakia’s
response was directed against it on that ground.
750 On the specific question of human rights obligations, see
article 50, paragraph (1) (b), and commentary.
751 See article 51 and commentary. In addition, the performance of
certain obligations may not be withheld by way of countermeasures in
any circumstances: see article 50 and commentary.
Annex 69
566
State responsibility 131
State, and not the creation of new situations which cannot
be rectified whatever the response of the latter State to the
claims against it.752 Countermeasures are taken as a form
of inducement, not punishment: if they are effective in inducing
the responsible State to comply with its obligations
of cessation and reparation, they should be discontinued
and performance of the obligation resumed.
(8) Paragraph 1 of article 49 refers to the obligations of
the responsible State “under Part Two”. It is to ensuring
the performance of these obligations that countermeasures
are directed. In many cases the main focus of countermeasures
will be to ensure cessation of a continuing
wrongful act, but they may also be taken to ensure reparation,
provided the other conditions laid down in chapter II
are satisfied. Any other conclusion would immunize from
countermeasures a State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act if the act had ceased, irrespective of the seriousness
of the breach or its consequences, or of the State’s
refusal to make reparation for it. In this context an issue
arises whether countermeasures should be available where
there is a failure to provide satisfaction as demanded by
the injured State, given the subsidiary role this remedy
plays in the spectrum of reparation.753 In normal situations,
satisfaction will be symbolic or supplementary and
it would be highly unlikely that a State which had ceased
the wrongful act and tendered compensation to the injured
State could properly be made the target of countermeasures
for failing to provide satisfaction as well. This concern
may be adequately addressed by the application of
the notion of proportionality set out in article 51.754
(9) Paragraph 3 of article 49 is inspired by article 72,
paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which provides
that when a State suspends a treaty it must not, during
the suspension, do anything to preclude the treaty
from being brought back into force. By analogy, States
should as far as possible choose countermeasures that are
reversible. In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the
existence of this condition was recognized by the Court,
although it found that it was not necessary to pronounce
on the matter. After concluding that “the diversion of the
Danube carried out by Czechoslovakia was not a lawful
countermeasure because it was not proportionate”, the
Court said:
It is therefore not required to pass upon one other condition for the lawfulness
of a countermeasure, namely that its purpose must be to induce
the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international
law, and that the measure must therefore be reversible.755
However, the duty to choose measures that are reversible
is not absolute. It may not be possible in all cases to reverse
all of the effects of countermeasures after the occasion
for taking them has ceased. For example, a requirement
of notification of some activity is of no value after
the activity has been undertaken. By contrast, inflicting
irreparable damage on the responsible State could amount
752 This notion is further emphasized by articles 49, paragraph 3,
and 53 (termination of countermeasures).
753 See paragraph (1) of the commentary to article 37.
754 Similar considerations apply to assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition.
See article 30, subparagraph (b), and commentary.
755 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), pp. 56–
57, para. 87.
to punishment or a sanction for non-compliance, not a
countermeasure as conceived in the articles. The phrase
“as far as possible” in paragraph 3 indicates that if the
injured State has a choice between a number of lawful
and effective countermeasures, it should select one which
permits the resumption of performance of the obligations
suspended as a result of countermeasures.
Article 50. Obligations not affected
by countermeasures
1. Countermeasures shall not affect:
(a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use
of force as embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations;
(b) obligations for the protection of fundamental
human rights;
(c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting
reprisals;
(d) other obligations under peremptory norms of
general international law.
2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved
from fulfilling its obligations:
(a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable
between it and the responsible State;
(b) to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular
agents, premises, archives and documents.
Commentary
(1) Article 50 specifies certain obligations the performance
of which may not be impaired by countermeasures.
An injured State is required to continue to respect these
obligations in its relations with the responsible State, and
may not rely on a breach by the responsible State of its
obligations under Part Two to preclude the wrongfulness
of any non-compliance with these obligations. So far as
the law of countermeasures is concerned, they are sacrosanct.
(2) The obligations dealt with in article 50 fall into two
basic categories. Paragraph 1 deals with certain obligations
which, by reason of their character, must not be
the subject of countermeasures at all. Paragraph 2 deals
with certain obligations relating in particular to the maintenance
of channels of communication between the two
States concerned, including machinery for the resolution
of their disputes.
(3) Paragraph 1 of article 50 identifies four categories
of fundamental substantive obligations which may not be
affected by countermeasures: (a) the obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations; (b) obligations for the protection
of fundamental human rights; (c) obligations of a humanitarian
character prohibiting reprisals; and (d) other obligations
under peremptory norms of general international
law.
Annex 69
567
State responsibility 137
make countermeasures unnecessary pending the decision
of the tribunal. The reference to a “court or tribunal” is
intended to refer to any third party dispute settlement procedure,
whatever its designation. It does not, however, refer
to political organs such as the Security Council. Nor
does it refer to a tribunal with jurisdiction between a private
party and the responsible State, even if the dispute
between them has given rise to the controversy between
the injured State and the responsible State. In such cases,
however, the fact that the underlying dispute has been
submitted to arbitration will be relevant for the purposes
of articles 49 and 51, and only in exceptional cases will
countermeasures be justified.791
(9) Paragraph 4 of article 52 provides a further condition
for the suspension of countermeasures under paragraph
3. It comprehends various possibilities, ranging from an
initial refusal to cooperate in the procedure, for example
by non-appearance, through non-compliance with a provisional
measures order, whether or not it is formally binding,
through to refusal to accept the final decision of the
court or tribunal. This paragraph also applies to situations
where a State party fails to cooperate in the establishment
of the relevant tribunal or fails to appear before the tribunal
once it is established. Under the circumstances of
paragraph 4, the limitations to the taking of countermeasures
under paragraph 3 do not apply.
Article 53. Termination of countermeasures
Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the
responsible State has complied with its obligations under
Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful
act.
Commentary
(1) Article 53 deals with the situation where the responsible
State has complied with its obligations of cessation
and reparation under Part Two in response to countermeasures
taken by the injured State. Once the responsible
State has complied with its obligations under Part Two, no
ground is left for maintaining countermeasures, and they
must be terminated forthwith.
(2) The notion that countermeasures must be terminated
as soon as the conditions which justified them have ceased
is implicit in the other articles in this chapter. In view of
its importance, however, article 53 makes this clear. It underlines
the specific character of countermeasures under
article 49.
791 Under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States, the State of nationality
may not bring an international claim on behalf of a claimant individual
or company “in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting
State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award
rendered in such dispute” (art. 27, para. 1); see C. H. Schreuer, The
ICSID Convention A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2001)
pp. 397–414. This excludes all forms of invocation of responsibility
by the State of nationality, including the taking of countermeasures.
See paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 42.
Article 54. Measures taken by States other
than an injured State
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any
State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke
the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures
against that State to ensure cessation of the breach
and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of
the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
Commentary
(1) Chapter II deals with the right of an injured State
to take countermeasures against a responsible State in
order to induce that State to comply with its obligations
of cessation and reparation. However, “injured” States, as
defined in article 42, are not the only States entitled to
invoke the responsibility of a State for an internationally
wrongful act under chapter I of this Part. Article 48 allows
such invocation by any State, in the case of the breach of
an obligation to the international community as a whole,
or by any member of a group of States, in the case of
other obligations established for the protection of the collective
interest of the group. By virtue of article 48, paragraph
2, such States may also demand cessation and
performance in the interests of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached. Thus, with respect to the obligations
referred to in article 48, such States are recognized as having
a legal interest in compliance. The question is to what
extent these States may legitimately assert a right to react
against unremedied breaches.792
(2) It is vital for this purpose to distinguish between
individual measures, whether taken by one State or by a
group of States each acting in its individual capacity and
through its own organs on the one hand, and institutional
reactions in the framework of international organizations
on the other. The latter situation, for example where it
occurs under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, is not covered by the articles.793 More
generally, the articles do not cover the case where action
is taken by an international organization, even though the
member States may direct or control its conduct.794
(3) Practice on this subject is limited and rather embryonic.
In a number of instances, States have reacted against
what were alleged to be breaches of the obligations
referred to in article 48 without claiming to be individually
injured. Reactions have taken such forms as economic
sanctions or other measures (e.g. breaking off air links or
other contacts). Examples include the following:
792 See, e.g., M. Akehurst, “Reprisals by third States”, BYBIL,
1970, vol. 44, p. 1; J. I. Charney, “Third State remedies in international
law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 10, No. 1 (1989),
p. 57; Hutchinson, loc. cit. (footnote 672 above); Sicilianos, op. cit.
(footnote 735 above), pp. 110–175; B. Simma, “From bilateralism
to community interest in international law”, Collected Courses ...,
1994–VI (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), vol. 250, p. 217; and J.
A. Frowein, “Reactions by not directly affected States to breaches of
public international law”, Collected Courses ..., 1994–IV (Dordrecht,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), vol. 248, p. 345.
793 See article 59 and commentary.
794 See article 57 and commentary.
Annex 69
568
138 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
United States-Uganda (1978). In October 1978, the
United States Congress adopted legislation prohibiting
exports of goods and technology to, and all imports
from, Uganda.795 The legislation recited that “[t]he
Government of Uganda … has committed genocide
against Ugandans” and that the “United States should
take steps to dissociate itself from any foreign government
which engages in the international crime of genocide”.
796
Certain Western countries-Poland and the Soviet
Union (1981). On 13 December 1981, the Polish
Government imposed martial law and subsequently
suppressed demonstrations and detained many dissidents.
797 The United States and other Western countries
took action against both Poland and the Soviet Union.
The measures included the suspension, with immediate
effect, of treaties providing for landing rights of Aeroflot
in the United States and LOT in the United States,
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and Austria.798 The suspension procedures provided
for in the respective treaties were disregarded.799
Collective measures against Argentina (1982). In
April 1982, when Argentina took control over part of the
Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the Security Council called
for an immediate withdrawal.800 Following a request by
the United Kingdom, European Community members,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand adopted trade sanctions.
These included a temporary prohibition on all imports
of Argentine products, which ran contrary to article
XI:1 and possibly article III of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. It was disputed whether the
measures could be justified under the national security
exception provided for in article XXI (b) (iii) of the
Agreement.801 The embargo adopted by the European
countries also constituted a suspension of Argentina’s
rights under two sectoral agreements on trade in textiles
and trade in mutton and lamb,802 for which security
exceptions of the Agreement did not apply.
795 Uganda Embargo Act, Public Law 95-435 of 10 October 1978,
United States Statutes at Large 1978, vol. 92, part 1 (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 1051–
1053.
796 Ibid., sects. 5(a) and (b).
797 RGDIP, vol. 86 (1982), pp. 603–604.
798 Ibid., p. 606.
799 See, e.g., article 15 of the Air Transport Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Polish People’s Republic of 1972 (United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements, vol. 23, part 4 (1972), p. 4269); and article
17 of the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Civil Air
Transport Agreement of 1966, ILM, vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1967), p. 82
and vol. 7, No. 3 (May 1968), p. 571.
800 Security Council resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982.
801 Western States’ reliance on this provision was disputed by other
GATT members; cf. communiqué of Western countries, GATT document
L. 5319/Rev.1 and the statements by Spain and Brazil, GATT
document C/M/157, pp. 5–6. For an analysis, see M. J. Hahn,
Die einseitige Aussetzung von GATT-Verpflichtungen als Repressalie
(Unilateral Suspension of GATT Obligations as Reprisal (English
summary)) (Berlin, Springer, 1996), pp. 328–334.
802 The treaties are reproduced in Official Journal of the European
Communities, No. L 298 of 26 November 1979, p. 2; and No. L 275 of
18 October 1980, p. 14.
•
•
•
United States-South Africa (1986). When in 1985,
the Government of South Africa declared a state of
emergency in large parts of the country, the Security
Council recommended the adoption of sectoral economic
boycotts and the freezing of cultural and sports
relations.803 Subsequently, some countries introduced
measures which went beyond those recommended
by the Security Council. The United States Congress
adopted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act which
suspended landing rights of South African Airlines on
United States territory.804 This immediate suspension
was contrary to the terms of the 1947 United States of
America and Union of South Africa Agreement relating
to air services between their respective territories805
and was justified as a measure which should encourage
the Government of South Africa “to adopt reforms
leading to the establishment of a non-racial democracy”.
806
Collective measures against Iraq (1990). On 2 August
1990, Iraqi troops invaded and occupied Kuwait.
The Security Council immediately condemned the invasion.
European Community member States and the
United States adopted trade embargoes and decided to
freeze Iraqi assets.807 This action was taken in direct
response to the Iraqi invasion with the consent of the
Government of Kuwait.
Collective measures against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (1998). In response to the humanitarian
crisis in Kosovo, the member States of the European
Community adopted legislation providing for the freezing
of Yugoslav funds and an immediate flight ban.808
For a number of countries, such as France, Germany
and the United Kingdom, the latter measure implied
the non-performance of bilateral aviation agreements.809
Because of doubts about the legitimacy of the action,
the British Government initially was prepared to follow
the one-year denunciation procedure provided for
in article 17 of its agreement with Yugoslavia. However,
it later changed its position and denounced flights
with immediate effect. Justifying the measure, it stated
that “President Milosevic’s ... worsening record on human
rights means that, on moral and political grounds,
he has forfeited the right of his Government to insist
upon the 12 months notice which would normally ap-
803 Security Council resolution 569 (1985) of 26 July 1985.
For further references, see Sicilianos, op. cit. (footnote 735 above),
p. 165.
804 For the text of this provision, see ILM, vol. 26, No. 1 (January
1987), p. 79 (sect. 306).
805 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 66, p. 239 (art. VI).
806 For the implementation order, see ILM (footnote 804 above),
p. 105.
807 See, e.g., President Bush’s Executive Orders of 2 August 1990,
reproduced in AJIL, vol. 84, No. 4 (October 1990), pp. 903–905.
808 Common positions of 7 May and 29 June 1998, Official Journal
of the European Communities, No. L 143 of 14 May 1998, p. 1 and
No. L 190 of 4 July 1998, p. 3; implemented through Council Regulations
1295/98, ibid., No. L 178 of 23 June 1998, p. 33 and 1901/98,
ibid., No. L 248 of 8 September 1998, p. 1.
809 See, e.g., United Kingdom, Treaty Series No. 10 (1960) (London,
HM Stationery Office, 1960); and Recueil des Traités et Accords de la
France, 1967, No. 69.
•
•
•
Annex 69
569
State responsibility 139
ply”.810 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia protested
these measures as “unlawful, unilateral and an example
of the policy of discrimination”.811
(4) In some other cases, certain States similarly suspended
treaty rights in order to exercise pressure on States
violating collective obligations. However, they did not rely
on a right to take countermeasures, but asserted a right to
suspend the treaty because of a fundamental change of
circumstances. Two examples may be given:
Netherlands-Suriname (1982). In 1980, a military
Government seized power in Suriname. In response
to a crackdown by the new Government on opposition
movements in December 1982, the Dutch Government
suspended a bilateral treaty on development assistance
under which Suriname was entitled to financial subsidies.
812 While the treaty itself did not contain any suspension
or termination clauses, the Dutch Government
stated that the human rights violations in Suriname
constituted a fundamental change of circumstances
which gave rise to a right of suspension.813
European Community member States-the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (1991). In the autumn of 1991,
in response to resumption of fighting within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, European Community
members suspended and later denounced the 1983
Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia.814 This led
to a general repeal of trade preferences on imports
and thus went beyond the weapons embargo ordered
by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991) of 25
September 1991. The reaction was incompatible with
the terms of the Cooperation Agreement, which did
not provide for the immediate suspension but only for
denunciation upon six months’ notice. Justifying the
suspension, European Community member States explicitly
mentioned the threat to peace and security in
the region. But as in the case of Suriname, they relied
on fundamental change of circumstances, rather than
asserting a right to take countermeasures.815
(5) In some cases, there has been an apparent willingness
on the part of some States to respond to violations of
obligations involving some general interest, where those
810 BYBIL, 1998, vol. 69, p. 581; see also BYBIL, 1999, vol. 70,
pp. 555–556.
811 Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on the suspension of flights of Yugoslav Airlines of
10 October 1998. See M. Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999
(Cambridge, Documents & Analysis Publishing, 1999), p. 227.
812 Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, No. 140
(1975). See H.-H. Lindemann, “The repercussions resulting from the
violation of human rights in Surinam on the contractual relations between
the Netherlands and Surinam”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 44 (1984), p. 64, at pp. 68–69.
813 R. C. R. Siekmann, “Netherlands State practice for the parliamentary
year 1982–1983”, NYIL, 1984, vol. 15, p. 321.
814 Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 41 of
14 February 1983, p. 1; No. L 315 of 15 November 1991, p. 1, for
the suspension; and No. L 325 of 27 November 1991, p. 23, for the
denunciation.
815 See also the decision of the European Court of Justice in A. Racke
GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, case C-162/96, Reports of cases
before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, 1998-6,
p. I–3655, at pp. 3706–3708, paras. 53–59.
•
•
States could not be considered “injured States” in the
sense of article 42. It should be noted that in those cases
where there was, identifiably, a State primarily injured
by the breach in question, other States have acted at the
request and on behalf of that State.816
(6) As this review demonstrates, the current state of international
law on countermeasures taken in the general
or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse
and involves a limited number of States. At present, there
appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States
referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the
collective interest. Consequently, it is not appropriate to
include in the present articles a provision concerning the
question whether other States, identified in article 48, are
permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce a
responsible State to comply with its obligations. Instead,
chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position
and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further
development of international law.
(7) Article 54 accordingly provides that the chapter
on countermeasures does not prejudice the right of any
State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the
responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures
against the responsible State to ensure cessation of the
breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State
or the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. The article
speaks of “lawful measures” rather than “countermeasures”
so as not to prejudice any position concerning
measures taken by States other than the injured State in
response to breaches of obligations for the protection of
the collective interest or those owed to the international
community as a whole.
PART FOUR
GENERAL PROVISIONS
This Part contains a number of general provisions applicable
to the articles as a whole, specifying either their
scope or certain matters not dealt with. First, article 55
makes it clear by reference to the lex specialis principle
that the articles have a residual character. Where some
matter otherwise dealt with in the articles is governed by
a special rule of international law, the latter will prevail to
the extent of any inconsistency. Correlatively, article 56
makes it clear that the articles are not exhaustive, and that
they do not affect other applicable rules of international
law on matters not dealt with. There follow three saving
clauses. Article 57 excludes from the scope of the articles
questions concerning the responsibility of international
organizations and of States for the acts of international
organizations. The articles are without prejudice to any
question of the individual responsibility under international
law of any person acting on behalf of a State, and
this is made clear by article 58. Finally, article 59 reserves
the effects of the Charter of the United Nations itself.
816 Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(footnote 36 above) where ICJ noted that action by way of collective selfdefence
could not be taken by a third State except at the request of the
State subjected to the armed attack (p. 105, para. 199).
Annex 69
570
Annex 70
UNSG, Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the
Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration, UN
doc. S/2002/30/Add.49, 20 December 2002 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/S/2002/30/Add.49
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/2002/30/Add.49
571
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀜
Security Council 􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀀑􀀝 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏
􀀕􀀓 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕
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Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of
which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached
in their consideration
Addendum
􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀔􀀔 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁌􀁖 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁌􀁖 􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑
􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓 􀁒􀁉 􀀔􀀘 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔 􀁒􀁉 􀀕􀀕 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕 􀁒􀁉 􀀕􀀘 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖 􀁒􀁉 􀀕􀀙 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘 􀁒􀁉 􀀔 􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀖 􀁒􀁉 􀀜 􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀖 􀁒􀁉 􀀕􀀔 􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀚 􀁒􀁉 􀀔􀀜 􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀙 􀁒􀁉 􀀕􀀓 􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀕 􀁒􀁉 􀀔 􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀛 􀁒􀁉 􀀔􀀖 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀑
􀀧􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁎 􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀔􀀗 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀝
The situation in Angola 􀀋see 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀛􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏
􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏
􀀔􀀘􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀖􀀜 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀖􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀛􀀏 􀀘􀀔
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀕􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀏 􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀘 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀀕􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀙 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀔􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏
􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀔􀀞 see also 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀏
􀀕􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀖􀀏 􀀗􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀔􀀌
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀚􀁗􀁋
􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁒􀁑 􀀜 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑
􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁒􀁉
􀀤􀁑􀁊􀁒􀁏􀁄􀀏 􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁚 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁒 􀁄 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀋􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀌 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁑 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁗
􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁜 􀁄􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀛 􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀌 􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀏 􀁖􀁈􀁈 􀀶􀀒􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀛 􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀌􀀞 􀁗􀁒 􀁅􀁈
􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 Official Records of the Security Council, Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council, 1 August 2002-31 July 2003􀀌􀀑
Annex 70
572
2
S/2002/30/Add.49
The situation in the Central African Republic 􀀋see 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀔 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀗􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀏 􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀖􀀜􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀔􀀌
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀛􀁗􀁋
􀀋􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀌 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁒􀁑 􀀜 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀤􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀛􀁗􀁋 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀘􀀘 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁰 􀁚􀁄􀁖 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁇
􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁌􀁑 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁄 􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁐 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀝
􀂳􀀤􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀛􀁗􀁋 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁑 􀀜 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇 􀂵􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀀤􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑
􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀂶􀀑
􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇
􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈 􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀀤􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀏 􀀫􀁌􀁖 􀀨􀁛􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜􀀏 􀀰􀁕􀀑 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑
􀀽􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁈􀁏􀁈􀀏 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀏 􀁌􀁑
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀖􀀚 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑
􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈 􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏
􀀤􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆 􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁄 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴
Letter dated 29 November 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/2002/1317) 􀀋see also 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀔 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀗􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀀗􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀏 􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀖􀀜􀀞
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀔􀀌
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁐􀁈􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀜􀁗􀁋 􀀋􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀌 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏
􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁒􀁑 􀀜 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀤􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀜􀁗􀁋 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀘􀀘 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁰 􀁚􀁄􀁖 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁇
􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁌􀁑 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁄 􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁐 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀝
􀂳􀀤􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀘􀀜􀁗􀁋 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁑 􀀜 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇 􀂵􀀯􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀕􀀜 􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀀋􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀌􀂶􀀑
􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀏 􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀖􀀚 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑
􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁄
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴
Annex 70
573
3
S/2002/30/Add.49
Protection of civilians in armed conflict 􀀋see 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀖􀀙􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀚􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀌
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀓􀁗􀁋
􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁒􀁑 􀀔􀀓 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇
􀁌􀁑 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈 􀁌􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗 􀀋􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁚􀁄􀁖 􀁒􀁑􀁈 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁒􀁑􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉
􀀤􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀏 􀀤􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀏 􀀥􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁋􀀏 􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁄 􀀩􀁄􀁖􀁒􀀏 􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀏 􀀦􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁇􀁄􀀏 􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀏 􀀧􀁈􀁑􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀀏
􀀨􀁊􀁜􀁓􀁗􀀏 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀏 􀀬􀁖􀁕􀁄􀁈􀁏􀀏 􀀭􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁑􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆 􀁒􀁉 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀏 􀀶􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏 􀀷􀁌􀁐􀁒􀁕􀀐􀀯􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀏 􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁗􀁒
􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀬􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀖􀀜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀀮􀁈􀁑􀁝􀁒 􀀲􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁐􀁄􀀏
􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀐􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑 􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀨􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜 􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁉
􀀦􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀀤􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁏􀁒 􀀪􀁑􀁄􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀏 􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀵􀁈􀁇 􀀦􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁚􀁄􀁖 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀑
􀀸􀁓􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁄
􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀔􀀓 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀲􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀀳􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀀋􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀗􀀙􀀌􀀏
􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁌􀁑
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀲􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀀳􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 􀀋see 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀏 􀀗􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀘􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀏 􀀚􀀐􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀏 􀀔􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁕􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀖􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀀗􀀘􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀗􀀐􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀘􀀐􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀚􀀐􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀕􀀛􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀘􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀘 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀛
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀕􀀞 see also 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀘􀀏 􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀙􀀏 􀀗􀀜 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀖􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁕􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀖􀀜􀀐􀀗􀀕􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀘 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏
􀀖􀀜􀀏 􀀗􀀗􀀏 􀀗􀀙􀀏 􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀏 􀀙􀀐􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀜􀀏
􀀗􀀘􀀏 􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀏 􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀗􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀙􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀏 􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀕􀀏
􀀕􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀙 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀚􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀏 􀀙􀀏
􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀛 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀛􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀖􀀌
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀔􀁖􀁗
􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁒􀁑 􀀔􀀕 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇
􀁌􀁑 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈 􀁌􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀰􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑 􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄 􀀋􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀑
Annex 70
574
4
S/2002/30/Add.49
􀀬􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀖􀀚 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀀰􀁌􀁕􀁎􀁒 􀃢􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀃼􀀏
􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀏 􀀶􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁍􀁐􀁄􀁑 􀀷􀁌􀁋􀁌􀃼􀀏
􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀏 􀀧􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀀦􀁒􀁙􀁌􀃼􀀏 􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀁒􀁉
􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀧􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀀰􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀃼􀀏 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈 􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕
􀁒􀁉 􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀑
􀀬􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇 􀁄􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀖􀀜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀀭􀁄􀁆􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁘􀁏 􀀮􀁏􀁈􀁌􀁑􀀏
􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀦􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁋􀁈 􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈 􀁄 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁑 􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁉 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇 􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀏 􀁖􀁈􀁈 􀀶􀀒􀀳􀀵􀀶􀀷􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀞 􀁗􀁒 􀁅􀁈 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 Official Records of the
Security Council, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1 August 2002-
31 July 2003􀀌􀀑
The situation in Croatia 􀀋see 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀚􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏
􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀜􀀏 􀀗􀀙 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀏 􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀘 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀏 􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀗􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀕􀀚􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀕􀀚􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀕􀀛􀀞
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀓􀀞 see also 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏
􀀘􀀏 􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀘􀀐􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀖􀀏 􀀗􀀘􀀏 􀀗􀀙􀀏 􀀗􀀜 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀓􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀏 􀀚􀀐􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀏 􀀔􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁕􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀛􀀐􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀜􀀐
􀀗􀀕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀘􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀗􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀗􀀐
􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀓 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀘􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀙􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀗􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀀗􀀚􀀐􀀘􀀓􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀏 􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀖􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀖􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀜􀀏 􀀗􀀓􀀏 􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀏
􀀔􀀓􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀗􀀏 􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀛􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀖􀀗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀙􀀞
􀀶􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀕􀀏 􀀖􀀏 􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀕􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀖􀀓􀀏 􀀖􀀔􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀐􀀗􀀘 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀘􀀔􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀛􀀏 􀀔􀀔􀀏
􀀔􀀛􀀏 􀀕􀀔􀀏 􀀕􀀖􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀚􀀏 􀀖􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀕􀀏 􀀗􀀘􀀐􀀗􀀚 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀖􀀏 􀀙􀀏 􀀔􀀕􀀏 􀀔􀀚􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀀖􀀛􀀏 􀀗􀀛
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀜􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀏 􀀜􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀏 􀀕􀀗􀀏 􀀕􀀙􀀏 􀀕􀀜􀀏 􀀗􀀕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀗􀀖􀀌
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀕􀁑􀁇
􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇 􀁒􀁑 􀀔􀀕 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇
􀁌􀁑 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈 􀁌􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀰􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀀲􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁏􀁄􀁎􀁄 􀀋􀀶􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀗􀀔􀀌􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁒􀁉
􀀦􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁄􀀏 􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀬􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇 􀁄􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈 􀀖􀀜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂶􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀀭􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀐􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈
􀀪􀁘􀁰􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁒􀀏 􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀐􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀏 􀁋􀁈 􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈 􀁄 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁒􀁑 􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁉 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇 􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀏 􀁖􀁈􀁈 􀀶􀀒􀀳􀀵􀀶􀀷􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀞 􀁗􀁒 􀁅􀁈 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 Official Records of the
Security Council, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1 August 2002-
31 July 2003􀀌􀀑
Annex 70
575
576
Annex 71
ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, adopted
by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two [extract]
Available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc 2011 v2 p2.pdf
French version available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/french/ilc 2011 v2 p2.pdf
577
Annex 71
578
40 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session
(a) to take note of the draft articles on the respon-
(b
convention on the basis of the draft articles.
D. Tribute to the Special Rapporteur
-
“The International Law Commission,
“ the draft articles on the responsibility of inter-
“Expresses
-
his tireless efforts and devoted work, and for the results achieved in
the elaboration of draft articles on the responsibility of international
E. Text of the draft articles on the
responsibility of international organizations
1. TEXT OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES
87. The text of the draft articles adopted by the Comreproduced
below.
RESPONSIBILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. The present draft articles apply to the international responsibility
of an international organization for an internationally
wrongful act.
2. The present draft articles also apply to the international
responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act in
connection with the conduct of an international organization.
For the purposes of the present draft articles:
(a) “international organization” means an organization established
by a treaty or other instrument governed by international
law and possessing its own international legal personality.
International organizations may include as members, in addition
to States, other entities;
( ) “rules of the organization” means, in particular, the
constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and other acts of
the international organization adopted in accordance with those
instruments, and established practice of the organization;
(c) “organ of an international organization” means any
person or entity which has that status in accordance with the rules
of the organization;
(d
or other person or entity, other than an organ, who is charged by
the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of
its functions, and thus through whom the organization acts.
PART TWO
THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT
OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization
entails the international responsibility of that organization.
There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization
when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to that organization under international
law; and
( ) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that
organization.
The characterization of an act of an international organization
as internationally wrongful is governed by international law.
CHAPTER II
ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT TO AN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
1. The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization
in the performance of functions of that organ or agent
shall be considered an act of that organization under international
law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the
organization.
2. The rules of the organization apply in the determination of
the functions of its organs and agents.
-
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another
international organization shall be considered under international
law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises
effective control over that conduct.
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization
shall be considered an act of that organization under interwithin
the overall functions of that organization, even if the conduct
exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or contravenes
instructions.
Conduct which is not attributable to an international organization
under articles 6 to 8 shall nevertheless be considered an act of
that organization under international law if and to the extent that
the organization acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question
as its own.
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Responsibility of international organizations 41
CHAPTER III
BREACH OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
1. There is a breach of an international obligation by an international
organization when an act of that international organization
is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation,
regardless of the origin or character of the obligation concerned.
2. Paragraph 1 includes the breach of any international obligation
that may arise for an international organization towards its
members under the rules of the organization.
An act of an international organization does not constitute a
breach of an international obligation unless the organization is
bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.
1. The breach of an international obligation by an act of an
international organization not having a continuing character
occurs at the moment when the act is performed, even if its effects
continue.
2. The breach of an international obligation by an act of an
international organization having a continuing character extends
over the entire period during which the act continues and remains
not in conformity with that obligation.
3. The breach of an international obligation requiring an international
organization to prevent a given event occurs when the
event occurs and extends over the entire period during which the
event continues and remains not in conformity with that obligation.
1. The breach of an international obligation by an internain
aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or omission occurs
constitute the wrongful act.
2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period
lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are repeated and
remain not in conformity with the international obligation.
CHAPTER IV
RESPONSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACT OF A STATE OR
ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
An international organization which aids or assists a State or
another international organization in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the State or the latter organization is
internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances
of the internationally wrongful act; and
( ) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that organization.
An international organization which directs and controls a
State or another international organization in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organization
is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances
of the internationally wrongful act; and
( ) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that organization.
An international organization which coerces a State or another
international organization to commit an act is internationally
responsible for that act if:
(a) the act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally
wrongful act of the coerced State or international organization; and
( ) the coercing international organization does so with knowledge
of the circumstances of the act.
1. An international organization incurs international responsibility
if it circumvents one of its international obligations
by adopting a decision binding member States or international
organizations to commit an act that would be internationally
wrongful if committed by the former organization.
2. An international organization incurs international responsibility
if it circumvents one of its international obligations
by authorizing member States or international organizations to
commit an act that would be internationally wrongful if committed
by the former organization and the act in question is committed
because of that authorization.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply whether or not the act in question
is internationally wrongful for the member States or international
organizations to which the decision or authorization is addressed.
Without prejudice to articles 14 to 17, the international responsibility
of an international organization that is a member of another
international organization also arises in relation to an act of the
latter under the conditions set out in articles 61 and 62 for States
that are members of an international organization.
This chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibility
of the State or international organization which
commits the act in question, or of any other State or international
organization.
CHAPTER V
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS
Valid consent by a State or an international organization to the
commission of a given act by another international organization
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to that State or
the former organization to the extent that the act remains within
the limits of that consent.
The wrongfulness of an act of an international organization
is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a lawful
measure of self-defence under international law.
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the wrongfulness of an
act of an international organization not in conformity with an
international obligation towards a State or another international
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42 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session
organization is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes
a countermeasure taken in accordance with the substantive and
procedural conditions required by international law, including
those set forth in chapter II of Part Four for countermeasures taken
against another international organization.
2. Subject to paragraph 3, an international organization may
not take countermeasures against a responsible member State or
international organization unless:
(a) the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met;
( ) the countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of
the organization; and
(c) no appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing
compliance with the obligations of the responsible State or international
organization concerning cessation of the breach and
reparation.
3. Countermeasures may not be taken by an international organization
against a member State or international organization in
response to a breach of an international obligation under the rules
of the organization unless such countermeasures are provided for
by those rules.
Force majeure
1. The wrongfulness of an act of an international organization
not in conformity with an international obligation of that organization
is precluded if the act is due to , that is,
the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event,
beyond the control of the organization, making it materially impossible
in the circumstances to perform the obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the situation of is due, either alone or in
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the organization
invoking it; or
( ) the organization has assumed the risk of that situation
occurring.
1. The wrongfulness of an act of an international organization
not in conformity with an international obligation of that organization
is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other
reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life
or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the situation of distress is due, either alone or in
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the organization
invoking it; or
( ) the act in question is likely to create a comparable or
greater peril.
1. Necessity may not be invoked by an international organization
as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not
in conformity with an international obligation of that organization
unless the act:
(a) is the only means for the organization to safeguard against
a grave and imminent peril an essential interest of its member
States or of the international community as a whole, when the organization
has, in accordance with international law, the function
to protect the interest in question; and
( ) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States towards which the international obligation exists, or of the
international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by an international
organization as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility
of invoking necessity; or
( ) the organization has contributed to the situation of
necessity.
Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act
of an international organization which is not in conformity with
an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international
law.
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in
accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to:
(a) compliance with the obligation in question, if and to the
extent that the circumstance precluding wrongfulness no longer
exists;
( ) the question of compensation for any material loss caused
by the act in question.
PART THREE
CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The international responsibility of an international organization
which is entailed by an internationally wrongful act in accordance
with the provisions of Part Two involves legal consequences as
set out in this Part.
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act under
this Part do not affect the continued duty of the responsible international
organization to perform the obligation breached.
The international organization responsible for the internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation:
(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing;
( ) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition,
if circumstances so require.
1. The responsible international organization is under an obligation
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral,
caused by the internationally wrongful act of an international
organization.
1. The responsible international organization may not rely on
under this Part.
2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the applicability of the
rules of an international organization to the relations between the
organization and its member States and organizations.
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Responsibility of international organizations 43
1. The obligations of the responsible international organization
set out in this Part may be owed to one or more States, to one
or more other organizations, or to the international community as
a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of
the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach.
2. This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the
international responsibility of an international organization, which
may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State or an
international organization.
CHAPTER II
REPARATION FOR INJURY
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and
satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter.
An international organization responsible for an internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to
re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was
committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:
(a) is not materially impossible;
( ) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the
1. The international organization responsible for an internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the
damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good
by restitution.
1. The international organization responsible for an internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for
the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by
restitution or compensation.
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the
breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate
modality.
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and
may not take a form humiliating to the responsible international
organization.
1. Interest on any principal sum due under this chapter shall
be payable when necessary in order to ensure full reparation. The
interest rate and mode of calculation shall be set so as to achieve
that result.
2. Interest runs from the date when the principal sum should
In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the
contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission
of the injured State or international organization or of any person
or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought.
1. The responsible international organization shall take all
appropriate measures in accordance with its rules to ensure that
obligations under this chapter.
2. The members of a responsible international organization
shall take all the appropriate measures that may be required by the
its obligations under this chapter.
CHAPTER III
SERIOUS BREACHES OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER PEREMPTORY
NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility
which is entailed by a serious breach by an international organization
of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law.
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross
or systematic failure by the responsible international organization
1. States and international organizations shall cooperate to
bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within
the meaning of article 41.
2. No State or international organization shall recognize as
lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of
article 41, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences
referred to in this Part and to such further consequences that a
breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international
law.
PART FOUR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER I
INVOCATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
A State or an international organization is entitled as an injured
State or an injured international organization to invoke the responsibility
of another international organization if the obligation
breached is owed to:
(a) that State or the former international organization
individually;
( ) a group of States or international organizations including
that State or the former international organization, or the international
community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation:
(i) specially affects that State or that international
organization; or
(ii) is of such a character as radically to change the position
of all the other States and international organizations to
which the obligation is owed with respect to the further
performance of the obligation.
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44 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session
1. An injured State or international organization which
invokes the responsibility of another international organization
shall give notice of its claim to that organization.
2. The injured State or international organization may specify
in particular:
(a) the conduct that the responsible international organization
should take in order to cease the wrongful act, if it is continuing;
( ) what form reparation should take in accordance with the
provisions of Part Three.
1. An injured State may not invoke the responsibility of an international
organization if the claim is not brought in accordance
with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims.
2. When the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies to
a claim, an injured State or international organization may not
invoke the responsibility of another international organization if
any available and effective remedy has not been exhausted.
The responsibility of an international organization may not be
invoked if:
(a) the injured State or international organization has validly
waived the claim;
( ) the injured State or international organization is to be considered
as having, by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the
lapse of the claim.
Where several States or international organizations are injured
by the same internationally wrongful act of an international organization,
each injured State or international organization may separately
invoke the responsibility of the international organization
for the internationally wrongful act.
1. Where an international organization and one or more
States or other international organizations are responsible for the
same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State
or organization may be invoked in relation to that act.
2. Subsidiary responsibility may be invoked insofar as the
invocation of the primary responsibility has not led to reparation.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2:
(a) do not permit any injured State or international organization
to recover, by way of compensation, more than the damage it
has suffered;
( ) are without prejudice to any right of recourse that the
State or international organization providing reparation may have
against the other responsible States or international organizations.
-
1. A State or an international organization other than an injured
State or international organization is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another international organization in accordance
with paragraph 4 if the obligation breached is owed to a group of
States or international organizations, including the State or organization
that invokes responsibility, and is established for the protection
of a collective interest of the group.
2. A State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of an international organization in accordance with
paragraph 4 if the obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole.
3. An international organization other than an injured international
organization is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another
international organization in accordance with paragraph 4
if the obligation breached is owed to the international community
as a whole and safeguarding the interest of the international community
as a whole underlying the obligation breached is within the
functions of the international organization invoking responsibility.
4. A State or an international organization entitled to invoke
responsibility under paragraphs 1 to 3 may claim from the
responsible international organization:
(a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with
draft article 30; and
( ) performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance
with Part Three, in the interest of the injured State or international
5. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an
injured State or international organization under draft articles 44,
45, paragraph 2, and 46 apply to an invocation of responsibility by
a State or international organization entitled to do so under paragraphs
1 to 4.
This chapter is without prejudice to the entitlement that a
person or entity other than a State or an international organization
may have to invoke the international responsibility of an international
organization.
CHAPTER II
COUNTERMEASURES
1. An injured State or an injured international organization
may only take countermeasures against an international organization
which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in
order to induce that organization to comply with its obligations
under Part Three.
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for
the time being of international obligations of the State or international
organization taking the measures towards the responsible
international organization.
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a
way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations
in question.
4. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a
way as to limit their effects on the exercise by the responsible international
organization of its functions.
1. Subject to paragraph 2, an injured State or international
organization which is a member of a responsible international organization
may not take countermeasures against that organization
unless:
(a) the conditions referred to in article 51 are met;
( ) the countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of
the organization; and
(c) no appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing
compliance with the obligations of the responsible international organization
concerning cessation of the breach and reparation.
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Responsibility of international organizations 45
2. Countermeasures may not be taken by an injured State
or international organization which is a member of a responsible
international organization against that organization in response
to a breach of an international obligation under the rules of the
organization unless such countermeasures are provided for by
those rules.
1. Countermeasures shall not affect:
(a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
( ) obligations for the protection of human rights;
(c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting
reprisals;
(d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general international
law.
2. An injured State or international organization taking coun-
(a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between
it and the responsible international organization;
( ) to respect any inviolability of organs or agents of the
responsible international organization and of the premises, archives
and documents of that organization.
Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury
suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally
wrongful act and the rights in question.
1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured State or international
organization shall:
(a) call upon the responsible international organization, in
Part Three;
( ) notify the responsible international organization of any
decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with that
organization.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 ( ), the injured State or international
organization may take such urgent countermeasures as
are necessary to preserve its rights.
3. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken
must be suspended without undue delay if:
(a) the internationally wrongful act has ceased; and
( ) the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has
the authority to make decisions binding on the parties.
4. Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible international
organization fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures
in good faith.
Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible
international organization has complied with its obligations under
Part Three in relation to the internationally wrongful act.
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State or international
organization, entitled under article 49, paragraphs 1 to 3, to
invoke the responsibility of another international organization, to
take lawful measures against that organization to ensure cessation
of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or
PART FIVE
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CONDUCT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
1. A State which aids or assists an international organization
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is
internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) the State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of
the internationally wrongful act; and
( ) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that State.
2. An act by a State member of an international organization
done in accordance with the rules of the organization does not as
such engage the international responsibility of that State under the
terms of this article.
-
1. A State which directs and controls an international organization
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the
latter is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) the State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of
the internationally wrongful act; and
( ) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that State.
2. An act by a State member of an international organization
done in accordance with the rules of the organization does not as
such engage the international responsibility of that State under the
terms of this draft article.
A State which coerces an international organization to commit
an act is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) the act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally
wrongful act of the coerced international organization; and
( ) the coercing State does so with knowledge of the circumstances
of the act.
1. A State member of an international organization incurs international
responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that
the organization has competence in relation to the subject matter
of one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that
obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if
committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the
obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether or not the act in question is
internationally wrongful for the international organization.
1. A State member of an international organization is responsible
for an internationally wrongful act of that organization if:
(a) it has accepted responsibility for that act towards the injured
party; or
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46 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session
( ) it has led the injured party to rely on its responsibility.
2. Any international responsibility of a State under paragraph
1 is presumed to be subsidiary.
This Part is without prejudice to the international responsibility
of the international organization which commits the act in question,
or of any State or other international organization.
PART SIX
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Lex specialis
These draft articles do not apply where and to the extent that
the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act
or the content or implementation of the international responsibility
of an international organization, or of a State in connection with the
conduct of an international organization, are governed by special
rules of international law. Such special rules of international law
may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable to the
relations between an international organization and its members.
The applicable rules of international law continue to govern
questions concerning the responsibility of an international organization
or a State for an internationally wrongful act to the extent
that they are not regulated by these draft articles.
These draft articles are without prejudice to any question of
the individual responsibility under international law of any person
acting on behalf of an international organization or a State.
These draft articles are without prejudice to the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. TEXT OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES WITH
COMMENTARIES THERETO
88. The text of the draft articles with commentaries
sixty-third session is reproduced below.
RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
General commentary
(1) In 2001, the International Law Commission adopted
a set of articles on responsibility of States for internation-
48 As stated in those articles, they “are
-
49 -
these issues appeared to be of particular importance. Thus
the Commission decided in 2002 to pursue its work for the
48 Yearbook … 2001
49 Ibid., p. 141.
responsibility. The present draft articles represent the result
-
(2) The scope of application of the present draft articles
-
icles on State responsibility. Most of the present draft art-
-
few draft articles, mainly those contained in Part Five,
consider the second issue: the responsibility of a State for
-
concerned. However, under certain circumstances that are
considered in articles 60 and 61 and the related commen-
-
-
sibility. The draft articles thus rely on the basic distinction
between primary rules of international law, which
secondary rules, which consider the existence of a breach
on State responsibility, the present draft articles express
-
(4) While the present draft articles are in many respects
similar to the articles on State responsibility, they represent
an autonomous text. Each issue has been considered from
-
clusion is reached that an identical or similar solution to
the one expressed in the articles on State responsibility
presumption that the same principles apply.
-
is the limited availability of pertinent practice. The main
relatively recent period. One further reason is the limited
use of procedures for third-party settlement of disputes
-
correspondence may not be always easy to locate, nor
disclose it. The fact that several of the present draft articles
are based on limited practice moves the border between
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Responsibility of international organizations 57
􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈 􀁌􀁗
􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈
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􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁄 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑􀁜
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈 􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑-
􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑
(4) The criterion for attribution of conduct either to the
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕-
􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁖 􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀏 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀀚􀀏 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇 􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑 􀁅􀁜
􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁇 􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁖
disposal. As was noted in a comment by one State,
account needs to be taken of the “full factual circum-
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀂴􀀑110 Article 6 of the articles
􀁒􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜 􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁉􀁘􀁏
acts111 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖 􀁄 􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀏 􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁌􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜
􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀑 􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀏 􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁌􀁖
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀁌􀁖 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁄􀁗 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁄􀁏 􀁌􀁗
􀁌􀁖 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁇􀂴􀀑 􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀀙 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜 􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁉􀁘􀁏 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁅􀁈 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊
State, it must be “under its exclusive direction and control,
􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑 􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂴􀀑112 In
􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀀙 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁅􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇
here, because the reference to “the exercise of elements
􀁒􀁉 􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂴 􀁌􀁖 􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀋􀀘􀀌 􀀺􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏 􀁋􀁄􀁖
been mainly discussed in relation to the question whether
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜
􀁌􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀁌􀁖 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁄 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑113 In the
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁄􀁏
􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁖 􀁄 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗
role. It does not concern the issue whether a certain conduct
is attributable at all to a State or an international or-
􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁅􀁘􀁗 􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁒 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂲􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂲􀁆􀁒􀁑-
duct has to be attributed.
(6) The United Nations assumes that in principle it
has exclusive control of the deployment of national
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀁄 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈 􀁏􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏 􀁗􀁒 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗
􀀾􀁄􀁀􀁖 􀁄 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁄􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁄 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈 􀁌􀁖􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁌􀁉 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑
􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑-
􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁌􀁑 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑114
􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁖 􀁘􀁓 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁒􀀏115 the
110 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁇􀁒􀁐 􀀋􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀏
􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋 􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁋 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏 􀀔􀀙􀁗􀁋 􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀗􀀒􀀶􀀵􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀏
para. 23).
111 Yearbook … 2001􀀏 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑 􀀬􀀬 􀀋􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗 􀀷􀁚􀁒􀀌 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀏 􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀗􀀖􀃭􀀗􀀘􀀑
112 Ibid.􀀏 􀁓􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀏 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋 􀀋􀀕􀀌 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀀙􀀑
113 See article 8 of the draft articles on responsibility of States for
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜 􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁉􀁘􀁏 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁒 􀀋ibid., pp. 47–49).
114 􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐 􀁒􀁉 􀀖 􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀧􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀀼􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎 􀂫 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗,
vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/545, p. 28.
115 􀀶􀁈􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑-
􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁊􀁌􀁘􀁐 􀀋􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 Treaty
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀀦􀁜􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁖116 and later
􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑117 In a recent comment, the United
Nations Secretariat observed that “[f]or a number of rea-
􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜 􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀂴􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁋􀁄􀁇 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀂳􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄-
tions responsibility 􀁙􀁌􀁖􀀐􀁪􀀐􀁙􀁌􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴 􀁌􀁑 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑118
􀀋􀀚􀀌 􀀳􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁒 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀁌􀁖 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘-
􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜
and criminal matters.119 This may have consequences with
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀑 􀀩􀁒􀁕 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇
􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖 􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀖 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇
􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁇 􀁉􀁄􀁘􀁑􀁄 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀃀􀁒􀁕􀁄􀀝
􀀶􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁌􀁗􀁖
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁓􀀐􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖
􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋
􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁓􀀐􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋 􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑120
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁌􀁖 􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜
linked with the retention of some powers by that State
􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗
the State possesses in the relevant respect.
(8) As has been held by several scholars,121 when an
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁇 􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏
Series, vol. 535, No. 7779, p. 191), Greece (ibid , vol. 565, No. 8230,
p. 3), Italy (ibid􀀑􀀏 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑 􀀘􀀛􀀛􀀏 􀀱􀁒􀀑 􀀛􀀘􀀕􀀘􀀏 􀁓􀀑 􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀌􀀏 􀀯􀁘􀁛􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁊 􀀋ibid.,
􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑 􀀘􀀛􀀘􀀏 􀀱􀁒􀀑 􀀛􀀗􀀛􀀚􀀏 􀁓􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚􀀌 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀶􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀋ibid., vol. 564, No. 621,
p. 193).
116 United Nations, Juridical Yearbook 1980 (Sales No. E.83.V.1),
pp. 184–185.
117 􀀶􀁈􀁈 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁑 􀂿􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁉 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀘􀀔􀀒􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀌􀀏 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑 􀀚􀃭􀀛􀀑
118 A/CN.4/637 and Add.1 (under the section entitled “Draft art-
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀀙 􀂫 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀌􀀏 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑 􀀙􀀑
119 􀀶􀁈􀁈 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀏 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋 􀀋􀀔􀀌 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗
article and footnote 107.
120 United Nations, 􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏 􀀼􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗 (Sales No. E.00.V.8),
p. 450.
121 􀀶􀁈􀁈 􀀭􀀑􀀐􀀳􀀑 􀀵􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏 􀂳􀀯􀁄 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈 􀁪 􀁏􀂶􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇 􀁇􀂶􀁘􀁑􀁈
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀂴􀀏 􀀤􀀩􀀧􀀬􀀏 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑 􀀛 􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀕􀀌􀀏 􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀗􀀕􀀚 et seq., at
􀁓􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀞 􀀵􀀑 􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏 Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations
Military Operations in the Congo􀀏 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀏 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁖 􀀱􀁌􀁍􀁋􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀛􀀏
􀁓􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀞 􀀥􀀑 􀀤􀁐􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁋􀀏 􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇 􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁅􀁜 􀀸 􀀱􀀑 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀐􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀏 􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁘􀁈
􀁰􀁊􀁜􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈 􀁇􀁈 􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏, vol. 32 (1976), pp. 57 et seq., at
􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀙􀀕􀂱􀀙􀀖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀚􀀖􀂱􀀚􀀜􀀞 􀀨􀀑 􀀥􀁘􀁗􀁎􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁌􀁆􀁝􀀏 􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀐􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀏 Polish Yearbook of
International Law, vol. 11 (1981–1982), pp. 117 et seq., at pp. 123–125
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀔􀀖􀀗􀂱􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀞 􀀰􀀑 􀀳􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁝 􀀪􀁒􀁑􀁝􀁩􀁏􀁈􀁝􀀏 􀂳􀀯􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁈􀁗 􀁏􀁈 􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗 􀁇􀁈 􀁏􀁄 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀂴􀀏 􀀵􀀪􀀧􀀬􀀳􀀏 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑 􀀜􀀕 􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀌􀀏 􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀙􀀖 et seq.,
􀁄􀁗 􀁓􀀑 􀀛􀀖􀀞 􀀰􀀑 􀀫􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁆􀁋􀀏 The Responsibility of International Organizations
toward Third Parties􀀏 􀀧􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁗􀀏 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁖 􀀱􀁌􀁍􀁋􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀏 􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀙􀀗􀂱􀀙􀀚􀀞
􀀦􀀑 􀀩􀀑 􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁋􀁈􀀏 Principles of the Institutional Law of International
Organizations􀀏 􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁊􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀏 􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀕􀀗􀀔􀂱􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀞
P. Klein, 􀀯􀁄 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰 􀁇􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖 􀁏􀁈􀁖
ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens, Brussels, Bruylant/
􀀨􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁇􀁈 􀁏􀂶􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁰 􀁇􀁈 􀀥􀁕􀁘􀁛􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀏 􀁓􀁓􀀑 􀀖􀀚􀀜􀂱􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀞 􀀬􀀑 􀀶􀁆􀁒􀁅􀁅􀁌􀁈􀀏
􀂳􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀀵􀀑􀀐􀀭􀀑 􀀧􀁘􀁓􀁘􀁜
(ed.), A Handbook of International Organizations, 2nd ed., Dordrecht,
􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁖 􀀱􀁌􀁍􀁋􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀏 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀏 􀁓􀀑 􀀛􀀜􀀔􀀞 􀀦􀀑 􀀳􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀏 􀀧􀁌􀁈 􀁙􀁼􀁏􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁗􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁋􀁈
Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihrer
Mitgliedstaaten􀀏 􀀥􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁌􀁑􀀏 􀀧􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁒􀁗􀀏 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀏 􀁓􀀑 􀀘􀀔􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀀭􀀑􀀐􀀰􀀑
􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁏􀀏 􀂳􀀯􀁄 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰 􀁇􀁈􀁖 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖 􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁇􀁈
(Continued on next page.)
Annex 71
586
Annex 72
ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Three, UN doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 3) [extract]
Available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc 2011 v2 p3.pdf
French version available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/french/ilc 2011 v2 p3.pdf
587
Annex 72
588
23
Chapter IV
RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES (concluded)*
F. Text of the Guide to Practice on Reservations to
Treaties, adopted by the Commission at its sixtythird
session
1. TEXT OF THE GUIDELINES CONSTITUTING THE GUIDE TO
PRACTICE, FOLLOWED BY AN ANNEX ON THE RESERVATIONS
DIALOGUE
Practice on Reservations to Treaties adopted by the Commission
at its sixty-third session, followed by an annex on
GUIDE TO PRACTICE ON
RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES
1.
1.1
1. “Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State or an international organapproving
or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a
-
ization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that
international organization.
2. Paragraph 1 is to be interpreted as including reservations
which purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of a treaty, or of the treaty as a whole with respect to
international organization which formulates the reservation.
1.1.1
A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international
organization at the time when that State or that organization expresses
its consent to be bound by a treaty, by which its author
purports to limit the obligations imposed on it by the treaty,
constitutes a reservation.
1.1.2
A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international
organization at the time when that State or that organization expresses
its consent to be bound by a treaty, by which that State or
that organization purports to discharge an obligation pursuant to
the treaty in a manner different from, but considered by the author
of the statement to be equivalent to that imposed by the treaty,
constitutes a reservation.
1.1.3
A unilateral statement by which a State purports to exclude the
application of some provisions of a treaty, or of the treaty as a whole
would be applicable in the absence of such a statement constitutes
a reservation.
1.1.4 -
A unilateral statement by which a State, when extending the application
of a treaty to a territory, purports to exclude or to modify
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in relation to that
territory constitutes a reservation.
1.1.5
The joint formulation of a reservation by several States or international
organizations does not affect the unilateral character of
that reservation.
1.1.6
A unilateral statement made by a State or an international
organization when that State or organization expresses its consent
to be bound by a treaty, in accordance with a clause expressly
authorizing the parties or some of them to exclude or to modify
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty with regard to
the party that has made the statement, constitutes a reservation
expressly authorized by the treaty.
1.2
“Interpretative declaration” means a unilateral statement,
however phrased or named, made by a State or an international
organization, whereby that State or that organization purports to
specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of certain of
its provisions.
1.2.1
The joint formulation of an interpretative declaration by several
States or international organizations does not affect the unilateral
character of that interpretative declaration.
1.3
The character of a unilateral statement as a reservation or as an
interpretative declaration is determined by the legal effect that its
author purports to produce.
1.3.1
To determine whether a unilateral statement formulated by a
State or an international organization in respect of a treaty is a reservation
or an interpretative declaration, the statement should be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to its terms, with a view to identifying therefrom the
intention of its author, in light of the treaty to which it refers.
1.3.2
The phrasing or name of a unilateral statement provides an
indication of the purported legal effect.
1.3.3
When a treaty prohibits reservations to all or certain of its provisions,
a unilateral statement formulated in respect of those provisions
* See sections A–E and F 1 of this chapter in Yearbook … 2011, vol II (Part Two), paras 51–75
Annex 72
589
62 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session (Addendum)
formulates both reservations and interpretative declara-
-
eral position taken by writers that “there is a potential
-
ervation are … imposed over the other parties to the
treaty … It would be unfortunate in such circumstances
-
vation … While this is a matter of interpretation rather
treaty relations of States.”224
225 it would seem
-
sible to remain indifferent to the nominalism implied by
the expression “however phrased or named”. This is the
irrebuttable presumption.
(11) This indication, while still rebuttable, is reinforced
when a State simultaneously formulates reservations and
-
ively as such.
1.3.3
When a treaty prohibits reservations to all or certain
of its provisions, a unilateral statement formulated
in respect of those provisions by a State or an
international organization shall be presumed not to
constitute a reservation. Such a statement nevertheless
constitutes a reservation if it purports to exclude
or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty, or of the treaty as a whole with respect to cer-
Commentary
(1) Guideline 1.3.3 has been worded in the same spirit
easier to say whether a unilateral statement formulated in
as an interpretative declaration when the treaty prohibits
226 or to certain of its provisions.227
224
225
226 As, for example, in the case of article 309 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
227 As, for example, in the case of article 12 of the Convention on
the Continental Shelf, which deals with reservations to articles 1–3
See the arbitral decision of 30 June 1977 (footnote 24 above) handed
(2) It seems to the Commission that, in such situations,
statements made in respect of provisions to which any
reservation is prohibited must be deemed to constitute
interpretative declarations. “This would comply with
the presumption that a State would intend to perform an
act permitted, rather than one prohibited, by a treaty and
protect the State from the possibility that the impermissible
act of acceptance of the treaty to which the declaration was
attached.”228
-
eral principle of law that bad faith is not presumed”.229
if the statement actually purports to exclude or modify
simply to interpret them, then it must be considered to be
a reservation and the consequence of article 19, subparaa)
and (b), of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions
is that such a reservation is impermissible and must
be treated as such. This is consistent with the principle of
unilateral statements formulated in respect of a treaty, as
-
tive declarations.230
whether unilateral declarations formulated in the circumstances
in question constitute interpretative declarations
or unilateral statements other than reservations or in-
-
ciple that there can be no presumption that a declaration
made in respect of treaty provisions to which a reservation
is prohibited is a reservation.
(5) If this is not the case, it is for the interpreter of the
declaration in question, which may be either an interpretative
declaration or a declaration under section 1.5, to
1.5.1–1.5.3.
1.4
1. A conditional interpretative declaration is a
unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international
organization when signing, ratifying, forsuccession
to a treaty, whereby the State or international
organization subjects its consent to be bound by
certain provisions thereof.
down in the
(see footnote 24 above), pp 32–33,
ibid.,
p 123)
228
note 28 above), 1995, p 25
229 Arbitral decision of 16 November 1957, case, Reports
of International Arbitral Awards, vol XII (United Nations
publication, Sales No 63 V3), p 305
230
Annex 72
590
Reservations to treaties (concluded) 63
2. Conditional interpretative declarations are
subject to the rules applicable to reservations.
Commentary
endeavour to broaden their scope, so that they come
one. This is what happens when a State or international
makes its interpretation a condition of its consent to be
bound by the treaty.
doctrine until relatively recently,231
a declaration, to state expressly that its interpretation
constitutes the sine qua non to which its consent to be
bound is subordinate. For example, France attached to
232 of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and
the Caribbean (“Treaty of Tlatelolco”) a four-point inter-
In the event that the interpretative declaration thus made by the
French Government should be contested wholly or in part by one or
-
ments shall be null and void in relations between the French Republic
231 The distinction between these two types of interpretative declaration
was clearly and authoritatively drawn by McRae in an important
-
where a State attaches to its instrument of acceptance a statement that
simply purports to offer an interpretation of the treaty or part of it This
Essays on the Law of
Treaties, 1967, pp 51–52] The second situation is where a State makes
a particular interpretation of the whole or part of the treaty This may be
State has simply indicated its view of the interpretation of the treaty,
which may or may not be the one that will be accepted in any arbitral
the possibility that its interpretation will be rejected … If, on the other
inconsistent interpretation of the treaty, a different result should follow
acceptance of the treaty subject to or conditional upon acquiescence
-
larations” (see footnote 129 above), pp 160–161) The expression
-
ample, see Cameron and Horn, “Reservations to the European Convention
…” (footnote 205 above), p 77, or Sapienza,
interpretative unilaterali … (see footnote 129 above), pp 205–206, or
Heymann, Einseitige Interpretationserklärungen … (see footnote 147
above), pp 70–87
232
Treaty Series, vol 936, p 419
The conditional nature of the French declaration here
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and
the Caribbean, the Latin American States requested the
French Government to withdraw the part of the French
interpretative declaration that referred to the possibility
Those States were of the opinion that such an interpretation
did not comply with the requirements of necessity
and proportionality inherent in the notion of self-defence
under international law. France has not yet withdrawn this
part of its interpretative declaration, but has repeatedly
expressed its intention to remain a State party to the Additional
Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
-
233
(5) In other cases, the conditional nature of the dec-
-
of 17 December 1979 should be considered a conditional
interpretative declaration:
extradited pursuant to article 8 of this Convention or the relevant provisions
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or their Additional Protocols,
without any exception whatsoever 234
(6) The same holds true for the interpretative declaration
made by Turkey in respect of the 1976 Convention
on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of
In the opinion of the Turkish Government the terms “widespread”,
Government of Turkey will be compelled to interpret itself the terms
required 235
(7) Conversely, a declaration such as the one made by the
interpretative declaration:
The Government of the United States of America understands that
236
233 Multilateral Treaties … (footnote 37 above), chap XXI 6
234 Ibid., chap XVIII 5
235 Ibid., chap XXVI 1
236 Ibid., chap XXVII 1 c
Annex 72
591
64 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session (Addendum)
(8) It is in fact only rarely that the conditional nature of
an interpretative declaration is clearly apparent from the
237 In such situations the distinction between
“simple” and “conditional” interpretative declarations
poses problems similar to those posed by the distinction
between reservations and interpretative declarations, and
these problems must be solved in accordance with the
same principles.238
(9) Moreover, it is not uncommon for the true nature
of interpretative declarations to become clear when they
examples, such as the declaration that India attached to
-
tion (IMCO), subsequently the International Maritime
239 or the declaration of Cambodia
237
simply says that it “considers that …” (for examples (of which there
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (ibid., chap XXI 6),
the third declaration made by the European Community when
in a transboundary context (ibid., chap XXVII 4), or those made by
(ibid., chap III 6) or to the 1974 Convention on a Code of Conduct
for Liner Conferences (ibid., chap XII 6)), “considers that …” (see the
-
ibid., chap XII 1)), or “declares that …”
(ibid.
the 1989 Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements
of hazardous wastes and their disposal (ibid., chap XXVII 3), or that
it “interprets” a particular provision in a particular way (see the decibid.,
chap IV3),
the declaration made by Ireland in respect of article 31 of the 1954 Conibid.,
chap V3) or
ibid.
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate
effects of 10 October 1980 (ibid., chap XXVI 2) or those made
by Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu in respect of the
ibid.,
chap XXVII 7)) or that it “understands that …” (see the declarations
Law of the Sea (ibid., chap XXI 6))
238
239 The text of the declaration appears in Multilateral Treaties …
(footnote 37 above), chap XII 1 India summed up this episode in its
response to the questionnaire on reservations (see footnote 39 above):
-
the matter should be put before the IMCO Assembly The Assembly
resolved to have the declaration circulated to all IMCO members but
until the matter had been decided, India was to participate in IMCO
that would be contrary to the Convention
“In resolution 1452 (XIV) adopted on 7 December 1959, the General
the Indian declaration on IMCO was a declaration of policy and that it
240 These precedents
-
-
tion of the treaty, and others in which the authors seek to
Unlike reservations, simple interpretative declarations
place no conditions on the expression by a State or internathe
interpretation of the treaty. The declarant “sets a date”,
interpretation will be such, but it does not make that point
a condition for its participation in the treaty. Conversely,
conditional declarations are closer to reservations in that
provisions of the treaty, which the State or international
conditional interpretative declarations:
Belilos case, the European Court of Human
-
laration of Switzerland “from the standpoint of” the rules
241
the above-mentioned statement of India an appropriate solution may be
“By a resolution adopted on 1March 1960, the Council of the Inter-
-
-
Horn, (footnote 25
unilaterali … (footnote 129 above), pp 108–113
240 The text appears in Multilateral Treaties … (footnote 37 above),
chap XII 1 Several Governments stated “that they assumed that it was
-
General on 31 January 1962, the Government of Cambodia stated that
which it made at the time of the acceptance of the Convention is of a
--
ibid.)
-
fect of interpretative declarations” (footnote 129 above), pp 165–166,
and Sapienza, (footnote 129
above), pp 177–178
241 -
tion of Switzerland in issue as a reservation, the Court examined “the
validity of the interpretative declaration in question,
(see
footnote 192 above), p 24, para 49) In the case, the Euro-
-
pretative declarations” (footnote 129 above), p 160), it “assimilated”
Annex 72
592
Reservations to treaties (concluded) 65
the Arbitral Tribunal that settled the dispute between
Case
-
considered that the third
Convention on the Continental Shelf constituted “a spe-
-
242 This would
seem to establish a that it could have been a
conditional interpretative declaration and not a reservation
in the strict sense of the term.
(12) The fact remains that, even if it cannot be entirely
“assimilated” to a reservation, a conditional interpretative
declaration does come quite close, for as Reuter
has written: “
une condition
-
” (“the
: the
State will commit itself only on condition that certain
243
There is support for this position in doctrine.244
detailed consideration of the matter, while conditional inas
reservations, they are subject to the same rules of form
-
quently, it is unnecessary to mention conditional interpretative
declarations in the remainder of this Guide: the
(14) The Commission considered whether, instead of
(and, by extension, a conditional interpretative declaraas
“at the time of expression of consent to be bound”. It
does not seem possible to adopt this solution, however,
since interpretative declarations, like reservations, may
the notions of conditional interpretative declarations and reservations
(Decision of 5 May 1982, (see footnote 24
above), paras 72–73)
242 Arbitral decision of 30 June 1977,
(see footnote 24 above), p 40, para 55
243 Reuter, (footnote 28 above),
p 71 The inherent conditional character of reservations is stressed
School (Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School,
“Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties”, AJIL, 1935, Supplement
-
larations … (footnote 25 above), p 35, and the examples cited) The
-
stances that are not clear
244
(footnote 129 above), p 172
of treaties in solemn form. In this case, however, and just
as for reservations, conditional interpretative declara-
-
reason for a different solution as between reservations
and conditional interpretative declarations to which the
a position to react where necessary. Moreover, it will be
-
of expression of consent to be bound, when it has been
245
1.5
Unilateral statements formulated in relation to a
treaty which are not reservations nor interpretative
declarations (including conditional interpretative declarations)
are outside the scope of the present Guide
to Practice.
Commentary
the Guide to Practice to reservations, on the one hand,
and to interpretative declarations (whether
“simple” or “conditional”246), to the exclusion of other
unilateral statements of any kind which are formulated in
close a relationship with the treaty.
(2) As practice indicates, States and international orstatements
which relate to the treaty but seek neither to
-
visions (or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain
to interpret the treaty, and which are thus neither reservations
nor interpretative declarations, whether “simple”
or conditional.
(3) The United Nations online publication Multilateral
contains
245
1989 Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements
of hazardous wastes and their disposal (see Multilateral Treaties …
-
ibid.
Treaty Series, vol 788, p 240)
-
mental impact assessment in a transboundary context (Multilateral
Treaties … (footnote 37 above), chap XXVII 4) See also the declaraibid.,
chap XXVII 8)
246
Annex 72
593
Reservations to treaties (concluded) 275
(8) As Roberto Baratta has pointed out:
da esso riservata rispetto al soggetto non autore della riserva. Resta
2155
provision to which the reservation relates by a subject which is not the
all subjects which have not formulated the reservation to apply in all
model clause on reciprocity adopted by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1980:
A Party which has made a reservation in respect of a provision of
-
or conditional, claim the application of that provision insofar as it has
itself accepted it 2156
application of reservations: a situation when “reciprocal
application is not possible because of the content of the
reservation”.
(11) This situation arises, for example, in the case of
of a treaty. Reciprocal application of such a reservation
is quite simply not possible in practice.2157 Similarly,
reciprocal application of the effects of the reservation is
2158 Thus, the reservation
formulated by Canada to the Convention on
peyote2159 from the application of the Convention, formulated
solely because of the presence in Canadian territory
certain psychotropic substances that would normally fall
2160 could not be invoked in
its own favour by another party to the Convention unless
it was confronted with the same situation.
2155 Baratta, Gli effetti delle riserve … (footnote 698 above),
(footnote 28 above), p 140
2156
within the Council of Europe (article e
(footnote 388 above), p 90, and Horn, Reservations and Interpretative
(footnote 25 above), pp 146–147
2157 See Imbert, Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux (footnote 25
above), p 258, and Simma, (footnote 2134
above), p 61
2158 See Horn,
Les réserves aux traités
multilatéraux (footnote 25 above), pp 258–260 See, however, the
2159
psychotropic effects
2160 Multilateral Treaties … (footnote 37 above), chap VI 16
(12) The principle of reciprocal application of reservations
may also be limited by reservation clauses contained
in the treaty itself. An example is the Convention con-
-
tion provides:
exclude the application of the principle of reciprocity,
have been made by the United States of America in relaand
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the dispute
settlement mechanism provided for in article 21 of that
Convention.2161
4.2.6
A reservation is to be interpreted in good faith,
taking into account the intention of its author as reas
the object and purpose of the treaty and the circumstances
in which the reservation was formulated.
Commentary
reservation2162 or to what extent the effect of the principle
of reciprocal application is excluded or limited,2163 or even
to determine whether a unilateral declaration presented as
(2) Since reservations are unilateral acts, the Commiswhich
it adopted in 2006.2164
however, that reservations are acts attached to a treaty, the
Consequently, the treaty is the context that should be taken
-
tion. Guideline 4.2.6 combines these two ideas.
transposition of the rules for the interpretation of treaties
to unilateral acts should be borne in mind:
The Court observes that the provisions of that Convention may
sui generis
2165
2161 Ibid., chap XI A 6 and A 7 See Riquelme Cortado, Las reservas
a los tratados … (footnote 150 above), p 212 (footnote 44)
2162
treaty relations) and commentary thereto
2163
-
mentary thereto
2164 See footnote 249 above
2165 ,
Canada) (see footnote 199 above), p 453, para 46
Annex 72
594
276 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session (Addendum)
(4) It was in this spirit that the Commission elaborated
-
stances in which it was formulated 2166
mutatis
mutandis
case law of the International Court of Justice, places
emphasis on the intention of the author as one of the
main elements on which interpretation of the reservation
should be based:
At the same time, since a declaration under Article 36, parahas
not hesitated to place a certain emphasis on the intention of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.,
Iran at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Anglo-lranian Oil Co., , ,
], p 107)
The Court will thus interpret the relevant words of a declaration
time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court The
the relevant clause, but also from the context in which the clause is to
its preparation and the purposes intended to be served 2167
-
terpretation of a unilateral act aims to establish the
intention of the author of the act. The text of the reservation
is the primary indicator of intention.2168 This
approach is especially relevant in the case of reservapurports
to attain.2169
actual text of the reservation. The predominance of the
et al. v. Barbados, the Inter-American Court of Human
the reservation to the American Convention on Human
2170 The reservation
reads as follows:
2166 -
mentary to this principle, ibid., pp 164–165
2167 , (see
footnote 199 above), p 454, paras 48–49
2168
(footnote 249 above)
2169
2170 Pre-
, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C, No 169,
paras 13–17
a reservation on this point inasmuch as treason in certain circumstances
section 4(4)
sentence of death should be carried out, persons of 16 years and over or
2171
(8) Barbados maintained, inter alia, that its reservation
issues of capital punishment, or on how such punishment
and 1983,2172 the Court recalled:
rely on a strictly textual analysis 2173
the text of the reservation does not explicitly state whether a sentence of
death is mandatory for the crime of murder, nor does it address whether
other possible methods of execution or sentences are available under
textual interpretation of the reservation entered by Barbados at the
this reservation was not intended to exclude from the jurisdiction of
this Court neither the mandatory nature of the death penalty nor the
itself of this reservation to that effect 2174
The Court also pointed out that it
has previously considered that “a State reserves no more than what is
contained in the text of the reservation itself” 2175
(9) Other elements should be taken into considera-
-
reservation,2176 and possibly circumstances of its formulation
(or, in the words of the International Court of Justice,
“circumstances of its preparation”)2177 that may clarify the
the , the
Court based itself on:
b
exposé des motifs 2178
2171 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1298, p 441
2172 Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 24 September 1982,
Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, (see
footnote 197 above), paras 60–66
2173 (see footnote 2170 above), para 15
2174 Ibid., para 17
2175 Ibid. See also Advisory Opinion OC-3/83,
Death Penalty (footnote 197 above), para 69
2176
2177 -
tion
2178 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (see footnote 210 above), p 28,
para 68
Annex 72
595
Reservations to treaties (concluded) 277
travaux préparatoires 2179
-
2180
2181
-
2182 which corresponds to the
circumstances, in the broad sense of the term, in which the
reservation was made.
Government at the time when it deposited its instrument
of accession to the General Act”.2183
elements to consider in the interpretation of the reservation
should include the object and purpose of the treaty,
since the reservation is a non-autonomous unilateral act,
which only produces an effect within the framework of
the treaty. It is also important to recall that this is one of
the criteria for the permissibility of the reservation: it is
because a reservation has passed the test of permissibility
effects intended by its author. The reservation can only
produce these effects precisely to the extent that it is
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
of reservations the compatibility of which with the object
and purpose of the treaty is questionable and may depend
the permissibility of the reservation is to be preserved,
must be presumed, it can only be preserved at the cost
and purpose of the treaty. This interdependence was
-
vation with the object and purpose of the Convention It must clearly be
be absent, it is quite clear that the Convention itself would be impaired
both in its principle and in its application 2184
(12) The criterion of the object and purpose of the treaty
reservations, whether by a body established by the treaty
itself, a dispute settlement body, or other States or con-
2179 Ibid., p 26, para 63
2180 Ibid., pp 26–27, paras 63–64
2181 Ibid., p 27, para 65
2182 Ibid., p 29, para 70
2183 Ibid., p 29, para 69
2184 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
(see footnote 604 above), pp 26–27
rule, reservations should be interpreted restrictively.2185
-
ferred to a restrictive interpretation in its interpretation of
reservations.2186
bodies is, however, the opposite. Thus, the Inter-American
Barbados referred to above, held that the realization of
the object and purpose of the treaty required the Court to
consider in a restrictive manner any limitation on those
and purpose of the relevant treaty which, in the case of the American
-
cordance with Article 29 of the Convention, which implies that a reservation
may not be interpreted so as to limit the enjoyment and exercise
extent than is provided for in the reservation itself 2187
The question therefore arises of whether, by their nature,
the answer to this question far exceeds the scope of the
present Guide to Practice.
(15) One last indication demonstrates the substantive
interdependence between the reservation and the treaty to
which it relates: the International Court of Justice has, on
occasion, applied the principle of dynamic interpretation
of the latter evolves over time, that evolution also affects
intention of the author of the reservation, as manifested at
the time the reservation was formulated:
Once it is established that the expression “the territorial status of
the concept of
hardly seems conceivable that in such a convention terms like “domestic
2188
2185 (footnote 199
above), p 453, para 45
2186 The Court explicitly rejected the principle of restrictive in-
Article 36 of the Statute: “There is thus no reason to interpret them
restrictively” (International Court of Justice,
Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf case (footnote 210 above), p 31, para 74
2187 (see footnote 2170 above), para 15
Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago,
Series C, No 81, para 70
2188 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (footnote 210 above), p 32,
para 77 See also the , Dispute regarding Navi-
(footnote 1600
above), para 65
Annex 72
596
Annex 73
UNSC, 8333rd meeting (28 August 2018), UN doc. S/PV.8333 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/S/PV.8333
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/PV.8333
597
United Nations S/PV.8333
Security Council
Seventy-third year
8333rd meeting
Tuesday, 28 August 2018, 3 p m.
New York
Provisional
President: Lord Ahmad/Ms. Pierce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland)
Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Cordova Soria
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Wu Haitao
Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Ipo
Equatorial Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Mele Colifa
Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ms. Guadey
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Gueguen
Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Umarov
Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Alotaibi
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren
Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Meza-Cuadra
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ms. Wronecka
Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Nebenzia
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Orrenius Skau
United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Haley
Agenda
The situation in Myanmar
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
18-26924 (E)
*1826924*
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1992, another wave of violence forced 250,000 stateless
Rohingya refugees to seek safety in neighbouring
Bangladesh. Once again, Gul Zahar was among those
who fled. There are today 900,000 stateless Rohingya
refugees in Bangladesh. Gul Zahar, now 90-years-old,
is sadly among them. Four decades following her initial
flight, Gul lives in abject poverty in Bangladesh with
the sole wish that her great grandchildren will have a
better future. The need for such a future to transpire
inside Myanmar has never been more urgent. If we
fail to act now, Gul’s grandchildren, like thousands of
others, will be unable to escape the relentless cycle that
generations of Rohingya have experienced.
Bangladesh’s recent response — receiving more
than 700,000 refugees in a matter of months and
providing them safety — is one of the most visible
and significant gestures of humanity in our time, but
the needs are vast and the suffering acute. Much more
international support is needed. Thanks to the efforts
of the Bangladeshi Government, the host communities,
relevant United Nations agencies, non-governmental
organizations and the refugees themselves, lifesaving
efforts have ensured that the Rohingya refugees have
endured the monsoons largely unscathed. Yet, as
Council members saw for themselves, they continue
to live in squalid conditions. With only 33 per cent of
the refugee operation funded — amounting to less than
70 cents per person per day — that is not surprising.
Rather, it is quite embarrassing. Many Bangladeshi
villagers living nearby, with very little to call their
own, have been helping the Rohingya refugees over the
past year. If people with so little can step up, why can
we not do better? Refugees need to feed their families.
They need clean water and sanitation facilities to wash,
cook and clean. They need a secure shelter to weather
the monsoons and the heat. Their children need an
education. Their grandparents need to be cared for.
But they need more than just food and water, informal
schools and temporary shelter. They need a future.
In the refugee settlements of Bangladesh today,
women who were raped in Myanmar are now giving
birth to children. Those children, already burdened
by statelessness, are likely to carry that stigma for
the rest of their lives. Many women like Laila, along
with their children, continue to be vulnerable to abuse
and exploitation. Many continue to battle the scars
of trauma and injury, which they received before and
during their flight to Bangladesh. It is imperative that
Governments, development and humanitarian agencies,
the private sector and individuals work in solidarity
to find innovative ways to help the refugees and the
Bangladeshi host communities.
The focus of our efforts must be to provide muchneeded
support inside Bangladesh, while working to
ensure that conditions in Myanmar are conducive to
returns. The many refugees with whom I spoke consider
Myanmar their home, but they have real, deep fears
about returning there. The denial of their right to move,
their right to marry, their right to work and their right to
health care and education renders them among the most
vulnerable people on the planet. Refugees move back
home when it is safe and secure to do so. The Rohingya
cannot return to the very conditions they were forced
to flee. They cannot settle for half solutions. They
must know that they belong. A clear pathway to full
citizenship is essential. This is not a luxury. This is not
a privilege. This is a basic right that all of us here enjoy,
which the Rohingya do not.
I implore the Council not to forget this imperative,
support all efforts to make it a reality and, in the
meantime, encourage more robust international support
needed to meet urgent and pressing needs within
Bangladesh. My mind often returns to Laila and her
neighbours. Did she find out what happened to her
husband? Did her shared temporary shelter survive
the monsoons? Did she manage to celebrate Eid al-Fitr
last week? Will her young son Yousuf be able to return
home to Myanmar and go to school one day? Or, like
Gul Zahar, will he too suffer an endless cycle of fear
and forced displacement?
Together, we need to change the future of Laila,
Yousuf, Gul Zahar and of the Rohingya living in
Myanmar, Bangladesh and beyond. There are no short
cuts. There are no alternatives. We have failed the
Rohingya before. Please, let us not fail them again.
The President: I thank Ms. Blanchett for her very
poignant and moving briefing.
I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the
Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United
Nations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
The plight of the Rohingya community is one of
the largest refugee crises in recent history, and it is
one of the most pressing humanitarian and human
rights crises facing the Security Council today. One
year since the Rohingya population of Rakhine state
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was subjected to a campaign of the most truly horrific
violence, resulting in grave violations of their human
rights and expulsion and deportation from their homes,
the Council has a duty to ensure that they receive
justice and the prospect of a peaceful future. The
report of the Independent International Fact-finding
Mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/39/64) issued yesterday
by the Human Rights Council is the most authoritative
account to date of the crimes committed against the
Rohingya community. The report details widespread
rape and murder committed by the Burmese military,
the systemic oppression and persecution they have
suffered for many years, and the patterns of violence
and violations committed elsewhere in the country.
The Council is charged by the international
community with the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Crimes against humanity, such as those detailed in the
Fact-Finding Mission’s report, threaten international
peace. They threaten international security. Forced
deportations across borders, such as those that the
Rohingya suffered crossing into Bangladesh, are
unfriendly acts, but they also threaten international
peace and security. It is therefore incumbent upon the
Council that it consider the report in depth, once the
Fact-Finding Mission has made its final presentation to
the Human Rights Council in September.
But let us be clear: those most affected by the crisis
now reside in Bangladesh. As we already heard, with
more than 700,000 Rohingya refugees joining more
than 300,000 displaced people in previous rounds of
violence, Bangladesh, together with the United Nations
and other humanitarian organizations, has saved many
thousands of lives. Bangladesh, working together with
the United Nations and international non-governmental
organizations, has taken significant steps to mitigate
the worst effects of the monsoon season in recent
months. And as we already heard — indeed, so
movingly from Ms. Blanchett — the Rohingya need
our continued support. Their needs range from food,
shelter and clean water, to education, livelihoods and
specialized assistance, We must not forget that they
need specialized support and assistance for the victims
of sexual violence. The United Nations joint response
plan remains desperately underfunded, and it is
imperative that we all step up and play our part.
But the solution to the crisis — let us be clear — lies
in Burma. The Rohingya community deserves justice.
The Fact-Finding Mission has concluded that what
happened in Rakhine last year warrants
“the investigation and prosecution of senior
officials in the Tatmadaw chain of command, so
that a competent court can determine their liability
for genocide in relation to the situation in Rakhine
State.” (A/HRC/39/64, para. 87)
With so much at stake, it is the Council that has a duty
to ensure that there is no impunity for such acts.
As Prime Minister Teresa May’s Special
Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in
Conflict, let me assure the Council, let me assure
Rohingya community: this is a key priority for our
Government, for our Prime Minister and for myself.
The Rohingya must be able to return home to Rakhine
safely, voluntarily and, importantly, with dignity. That
means more than returning to internally displaced
persons camps on the Burmese side of the border, but
real progress towards a more just long-term solution
and state of affairs in Rakhine.
As a result of the Council’s concerted action,
though, we have seen some steps forward. The Burmese
Government has engaged with the Special Envoy of the
Secretary-General, Ms. Christine Schraner Burgener,
whose diplomatic work we support. It has signed a
memorandum of understanding with the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). It has established a commission of
inquiry to look into reports of human rights violations.
Those steps are welcome. They have not been easy
for the civilian Government, whose action remains
constrained by the military, but more needs to be done.
The steps taken are not enough. The Burmese authorities
need to provide UNHCR and UNDP unconditional and
unqualified access to northern Rakhine. Until those
United Nations agencies can operate effectively, it is
impossible to argue that conditions in Rakhine are
anywhere near what is required for the safe, voluntary
and dignified repatriation that the Council has called for.
There is an urgent need for domestic acceptance
and accountability in Burma. It is essential that the
Burmese Government set out how its commission of
inquiry will be able to investigate those crimes with
full impartiality, how it will access United Nations
information and how it will be linked to a judicial
process to hold accountable those responsible — and
let us be clear: particularly those in the military. It is
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far from clear that any mechanism established by the
Burmese authorities can do that, which is why the
United Kingdom supports keeping open the option of
justice delivered through international mechanisms.
We need to see practical progress on
implementing the Rakhine Advisory Commission’s
recommendations. That includes recommendations on
economic development, which are part of the solution,
but it also includes those related to the rights of the
Rohingya, including a pathway to citizenship. Those
recommendations taken comprehensively, as they were
set out by the revered and respected late Kofi Annan,
remain the best blueprint for a long-term solution
in Rakhine.
What does it mean for us? What does it mean for
the Security Council? It means, in our view, that the
Council should do three things. First, it should continue
to assist Bangladesh and the United Nations in providing
protection and assistance to the Rohingya population
and their host communities. Secondly, it should take
concerted action to push for justice and the prospect
of a peaceful future, which the Rohingya community
deserves. That includes holding a serious discussion on
the conclusions of the Fact-Finding Mission’s report.
Thirdly, it should support those in Burma who are
pushing for progress. But we should also be prepared
to use the full range of tools at the Council’s disposal
to apply pressure against those, including the Burmese
military, who obstruct it. The United Kingdom has
done that within the European Union, where we have
sanctioned seven senior Burmese military officials.
But we all accept that this crisis is complex and
has deep roots. It will not be solved overnight. But let
us also be clear: it will not be solved without continued
engagement and action from the Council. As we mark
one year on from the violence of August 2017, therefore,
the Council should shoulder its responsibility and do
justice to the gravity of the attacks on the Rohingya
community. We should not be just discussing and
debating. We need to be acting, acting to bring an
end to the appalling ethnic cleansing, to help those
suffering refugees and bring justice for the victims of
those appalling crimes.
I appeal to all fellow members. Let us put aside our
differences. Let us act on the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and on our obligations in front of
us. Let us act in the interests of Leila, in the interests of
Yousef and in the interests of tens of thousands of Leilas
and Yousefs. Let us act for the sake of humankind.
I now resume my functions as President of
the Council.
Mrs. Gueguen (France) (spoke in French): Allow
me, first of all, to warmly thank you, Mr. President, for
having taken the initiative of convening this meeting
almost a year to the day after the beginning of the
crisis in Rakhine state. I would also like to commend
the personal commitment of the Secretary-General
in drawing attention to and mobilizing international
action to be taken on behalf of this tragedy. I would also
like to warmly thank the Goodwill Ambassador for the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Ms. Cate Blanchett, and Assistant Secretary-
General Tegegnework Gettu for their briefings on this
situation, which deserves the continued and resolute
attention of the Security Council.
Almost a year ago, before the General Assembly,
the President of France denounced the ethnic cleansing
suffered by the Rohingya (see A/72/PV.4). Since then,
France has consistently stressed its concern about the
serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed in an organized,
coordinated and systematic manner in Rakhine state. I
would like to make three observations today.
First, commitments have been made by the Burmese
authorities and must now be fully implemented. While
those are first steps that should be encouraged, the
progress seen on the ground remains very limited
and is not commensurate with the scale and gravity
of the violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law that have been committed. In that
regard, France is very concerned by the conclusions of
the advance version of the report of the Human Rights
Council’s Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission in Myanmar (A/HRC/39/64), according to
which the Burmese army could be accused of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, which fall
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court. France calls on the international community
to undertake determined action to collect and protect
evidence, and to ensure that those responsible for the
crimes committed against the Rohingya population be
brought to justice.
France also reiterates its call on the Burmese
authorities to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur
and the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission. We have
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taken note of Burma’s establishment of a commission
of inquiry on human rights violations. However, at
this stage, we have no information guaranteeing the
independence or the impartiality of that mechanism,
or on the protection provided to witnesses. We also
condemn the serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed against
children. We hope that the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,
Mrs. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter, who recently visited
the country, will soon be able to brief the Council on
her mission and provide it with an update.
We also welcome the conclusion in June of a
memorandum of understanding with the United Nations
Development Programme and the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which is an
essential step to enable the voluntary, safe, dignified
and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees when
the time comes. Nonetheless, we are concerned about
ongoing restrictions of access. Only unimpeded access
to all affected villages and communities will allow us
to determine whether the conditions for such returns
have been met.
With regard to the recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Rakhine State, led by the late Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, figures are regularly put forward
by the Burmese authorities, but we have very little
concrete information on how the measures are actually
being implemented. France reiterates in particular the
importance of the recommendations related to the issue
of citizenship, revising the 1982 law and ensuring equal
rights for all members of the Rohingya community.
We also support the recommendations concerning the
freedom of movement, media access and socioeconomic
development in Rakhine state.
Secondly, I would like to focus briefly on the
humanitarian dimension of the crisis. France, both
in its national capacity and within the European
Union, is providing support to Bangladesh, which
continues to host on its territory, with admirable
generosity, almost 1 million Rohingya refugees living
in particularly precarious conditions. The Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and all of the humanitarian organizations and United
Nations agencies concerned have done outstanding
work. The international community must continue
to support Bangladesh and humanitarian agencies in
accordance with three priorities: first, by increasing
its contributions to the United Nations humanitarian
response plan, which is currently funded at only 33 per
cent; secondly, by continuing to take the measures
necessary to protect the Rohingya people from security
and health risks in camps; and, thirdly, by continuing
to support Bangladesh, humanitarian actors and
local host populations to make the living conditions
of the Rohingya refugees as sustainable as possible,
while preserving Bangladesh’s national prospects
for economic development. Special attention must be
paid to the needs of children, particularly with regard
to education, and to the needs of women who have
suffered untold violence. I still think about the images
and testimonies of the women whom we met during our
visit last spring to Cox’s Bazar.
My final point is that the Security Council and the
international community must remain fully committed
to ensuring close monitoring of the full implementation
of November’s presidential statement (S/PRST/2017/22)
and of the tripartite agreement concluded among
Burma’s civilian Government, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the
United Nations Development Programme regarding the
return of refugees.
The response to the tragedy of the Rohingya
requires addressing the root causes of the crisis. It
also requires justice to be done. The Council had an
opportunity several weeks ago to thoroughly exchange
views with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General,
Ms. Christine Schraner Burgener, and to express
to her its full support in the discharge of her duties.
We encourage the Burmese authorities to continue to
collaborate closely with the Special Envoy in order
to arrive at a lasting solution. The week of high-level
general debate of the General Assembly, to be held
next month, will also be an opportunity to pursue
mobilization. In the absence of tangible progress on
the ground over the coming weeks, we will need to
carefully consider what new steps the Council could
take to respond to the Rohingya refugee crisis.
Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): Halabja 1988,
Srebrenica 1995, Darfur 2003. The list of examples in
modem history where violence has triumphed is long,
too long. Regrettably, it seems a new name will now be
added to that tragic list: Rakhine 2017. The reports of
systematic and widespread human rights violations and
abuses against the Rohingya community in Rakhine
state, as well as other gross violations of international
law committed in Kachin and Shan states, cannot be
neglected. We have seen clear indications of crimes
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UNGA, Third Committee, Official Records, Seventy-third session, Summary
record of the 30th meeting (23 October 2018), UN doc. A/C.3/73/SR.30
[extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.3/73/SR.30
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UNSC, 8381st meeting (24 October 2018), UN doc. S/PV.8381 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/S/PV.8381
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/PV.8381
607
United Nations S/PV.8381
Security Council
Seventy-third year
8381st meeting
Wednesday, 24 October 2018, 3 p.m.
New York
Provisional
President: Mr. Llorentty Solíz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Bolivia (Plurinational State of ))
Members: China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu
Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Adom
Equatorial Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Ndong Mba
Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Amde
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Delattre
Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Tumysh
Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Almunayekh
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren
Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Meza-Cuadra
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ms. Wronecka
Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Nebenzia
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Skoog
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . Ms. Pierce
United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mrs. Haley
Agenda
The situation in Myanmar
Letter dated 16 October 2018 from the representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, France,
Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/926)
Letter dated 18 October 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Bolivia
(Plurinational State of ), China, Equatorial Guinea and the Russian Federation
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/2018/938)
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http //documents.un.org).
18-33774 (E)
*1833774*
.
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we want to avoid the duplication of the efforts of the
principal organs of the United Nations in deeds rather
than words. We also believe that discussing the report in
the Council could cast doubt on the remit of the Human
Rights Council, to which the Mission is accountable.
We would once again like to stress that the key
to resolving the problem of the Rohingya refugees
is in bilateral cooperation between Myanmar and
Bangladesh. The role of the international community
consists in providing assistance to Naypyidaw and
Dhaka in implementing the existing agreements.
In the light of this, we will vote against holding
the proposed briefing to discuss the conclusions of the
fact-finding mission on Myanmar, and we call on other
delegations to do the same.
Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I would like to
make a statement on behalf of the United Kingdom,
Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru,
Poland, Sweden and the United States of America.
Mr. President, we have read carefully the letter
that you and other colleagues sent on 18 October
(S/2018/938). We have requested the Chair of the
United Nations fact-finding mission on Myanmar
to brief us today. The report produced by the
Mission (A/HRC/39/64) is the most authoritative and
comprehensive account of the human rights violations
that have occurred in the country since 2011. It details
in particular the events that took place in Rakhine state
on and around 25 August 2017 and led to the forcible
displacement of more than 725,000 refugees across an
international border into Bangladesh.
As we will hear, the Fact-Finding Mission’s
findings are of the gravest nature. The report concludes
that “gross human rights violations” and “serious
violations of international humanitarian law” have
been committed in Myanmar since 2011 and that many
of these violations “undoubtedly amount to the gravest
crimes under international law”.
It makes a specific recommendation to the Security
Council to ensure accountability for crimes under
international law committed in Myanmar. Ensuring
the prevention of such crimes — genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity — is one of the reasons
why the United Nations and the Security Council
were established in the first place. As members of the
Security Council, we are today faced with a situation
that clearly endangers international peace and security,
and also a specific request for the Council to act.
It is therefore absolutely without doubt the Security
Council’s responsibility to hear the allegations
concerning the gravest crimes under international
law related to the situation and to deliberate on how
to proceed, and so we vote in favour of holding
this meeting.
The President (spoke in Spanish): I wish to draw the
attention of Council members to document S/2018/926,
which contains a letter dated 16 October 2018 from
the Representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait,
the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, and
document S/2018/938, which contains a letter dated
18 October 2018 from the Permanent Representatives
of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, China, Equatorial
Guinea and the Russian Federation to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council.
In the light of the views expressed in documents
S/2018/926 and S/2018/938 and the comments made by
members of the Security Council, I intend to put the
provisional agenda to the vote.
Accordingly, I shall put it to the vote now.
A vote was taken by show of hands.
In favour:
Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru,
Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America
Against:
Plurinational State of Bolivia, China, Russian
Federation
Abstaining:
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan
The President (spoke in Spanish): The provisional
agenda received 9 votes in favour, 3 votes against and 3
abstentions. The provisional agenda has been adopted.
I now give the f loor to members wishing to make
statements following the voting.
I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the
representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
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(29 October 2018), UN doc. A/73/PV.27 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/73/PV.27
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/73/PV.27
611
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches
delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only.
They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
Document System of the United Nations (http //documents.un.org).
United Nations A/73/PV.27
General Assembly
Seventy-third session
27th plenary meeting
Monday, 29 October 2018, 10 a.m.
New York
Official Records
President: Ms. Espinosa Garcés. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Ecuador)
In the absence of the President, Mr. Korneliou
(Cyprus), Vice-President, took the Chair.
The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.
Agenda item 77
Report of the International Criminal Court
Note by the Secretary-General (A/73/334)
Reports of the Secretary-General (A/73/333 and
A/73/335)
Draft resolution (A/73/L.8)
The Acting President: I shall now make a statement
on behalf of the President of the General Assembly.
“This year’s debate on the report of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) (see A/73/334)
coincides with the twentieth anniversary of the
Rome Statute. This is therefore an important
opportunity for the international community to
assess the progress enabled by the adoption of the
Rome Statute and to ref lect on the commitment to
putting an end to impunity for the most serious and
most heinous crimes.
“The Rome Statute delivered a message: it
expressed to the people of the world that we will
support victims, that we will fight impunity, that
we will respond to acts of genocide and crimes
against humanity and that we will not tolerate war
crimes or crimes of aggression. Twenty years later,
we would be wise to recall the united stance of
the international community in standing up for all
people, everywhere.
“While the primary duty to exercise criminal
justice remains with States, the ICC has become an
indispensable part of the overall architecture. For
many around the world, the very existence of the
Court is indicative of humankind’s will to protect
people, pursue those who would do us harm and
protect and promote human rights. In that regard,
it is important to recognize that the Court is
much more than an instrument of prosecution. Its
existence also serves as a deterrent and a tool for
the prevention of international crimes.
“By extension, the Court thereby helps to
maintain stable societies that are able to protect
human rights and pursue sustainable development.
As acknowledged by the General Assembly in its
resolution 68/305, the Court is a core element of
‘a multilateral system that aims to end
impunity, promote the rule of law, promote and
encourage respect for human rights, achieve
sustainable peace and further the development
of nations’.
“If the wars and atrocities of our history have
taught us anything, it is that our shared peace
and prosperity depend on multilateral efforts and
institutions such as the ICC. If we are to protect,
defend and stand up on behalf of those most
vulnerable in their time of need, we must stand
behind and in support of those very institutions and
the principles that guide them.”
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Mr. Petersen (Denmark): I have the honour to speak
on behalf of the five Nordic countries, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden and my own country, Denmark.
Let me start by thanking the International Criminal
Court (ICC) for its annual report to the United Nations
(see A/73/334). I would also like to thank Judge Chile
Eboe-Osuji, President of the ICC, for his thorough
briefing on the main issues of the report and for putting
the work of the ICC into a broader context. We fully
subscribe to his final assertion that it is both necessary
and possible to strengthen the ICC.
At its twentieth anniversary, the ICC remains an
essential institution, not only for promoting respect for
international criminal justice but also for advancing
post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. The
Court is a fundamental part of a rules-based international
order and the centrepiece for accountability for the most
serious crimes in international law. As we recognize its
importance as a permanent, independent and impartial
criminal court, we also stress that this is a crucial
moment for all of us to speak up for the Court and its
mandate to provide justice to victims of international
crimes.
The desire to hold perpetrators of the most serious
crimes to account is shared by States all over the world.
The success of the Court depends on cooperation with
other stakeholders, and many States and international
organizations provide important contributions to the
Court. However, it is a continued cause for concern
that the number of outstanding arrest warrants remains
high. We strongly urge all States to cooperate fully
and effectively with the Court, in line with the Rome
Statute and all applicable Security Council resolutions.
The Court’s promise of justice for victims
corresponds with the reach of its jurisdiction. The
Nordic countries continue to support and work
diligently for universal membership of the ICC. The
ICC needs more States parties, not fewer. We stand
ready for a constructive discussion about concerns that
some States parties may have and encourage and invite
States parties with these concerns about the Court to
seek solutions within the framework and fundamental
principles of the Rome Statute. Continued dialogue is
of key importance.
Let me in this forum make particular note of the
ongoing cooperation between the United Nations
and the ICC as described in the report. We share the
Court’s strong appreciation of the crucial support
and cooperation of the senior leadership of the
United Nations. We welcome the ongoing high-level
consultations between the principals of the Court and
senior United Nations officials. This dialogue also
sets a course for more concrete areas of cooperation,
including a stronger cooperation at the field level and
supportive policy statements from relevant United
Nations bodies.
Enhanced cooperation between the Court and
the Security Council is still called for. This is true in
particular in cases of non-cooperation with the ICC
as well as for strengthened follow-up of situations
referred to it by the Security Council. We also note
with great concern that the Security Council has been
unable to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC, and
we strongly urge members of the Council to continue
efforts in this regard. Specifically, with respect to the
situation in Syria, the Nordic countries will continue
to support the work of the International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation
and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed
in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. We
encourage others to do the same.
The situation in Myanmar, and in particular the
reported gross violations of international human rights
law and international humanitarian law that have taken
place in Rakhine state, is a cause for great concern.
Earlier this autumn, as an important step towards
accountability, the Human Rights Council decided
to establish an independent mechanism to collect,
consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of some of
the most serious international crimes and violations of
international law that have been perpetrated since 2011
in Myanmar, and to prepare files in order to facilitate
and expedite future fair and independent criminal
proceedings. However, a referral by the Security
Council remains the most robust means of achieving
accountability in Myanmar.
The full realization of the rights of victims is an
important aspect of the continued success and relevance
of the Court. We commend the important work of the
ICC Trust Fund for Victims. We note with appreciation
its work in providing support and rehabilitation to
victims of sexual and gender-based crimes. The Nordic
countries have consistently supported the Trust Fund,
and we encourage States and other entities to contribute
to it as well.
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UNGA, Official Records, Seventy-third session, 28th plenary meeting
(29 October 2018), UN doc. A/73/PV.28 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/73/PV.28
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/73/PV.28
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United Nations A/73/PV.28
General Assembly
Seventy-third session
28th plenary meeting
Monday, 29 October 2018, 3 p.m.
New York
Official Records
President: Ms. Espinosa Garcés. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Ecuador)
In the absence of the President, Ms. Al-Thani
(Qatar), Vice-President, took the Chair.
The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.
Agenda item 77 (continued)
Report of the International Criminal Court
Note by the Secretary-General (A/73/334)
Reports of the Secretary-General (A/73/333 and
A/73/335)
Draft resolution (A/73/L.8)
Ms. Brink (Australia): This year we celebrate
the twentieth anniversary of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC). That treaty is a
remarkable achievement. It is the product of a common
resolve, forged by the horrors of the previous century,
to create a permanent international court to prosecute
and punish those responsible for the most egregious
international crimes.
We also mark another milestone this year, the
activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression. The Court is now empowered to
exercise jurisdiction over the four core international
crimes — war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide and aggression. It is worth emphasizing that
the ICC does not operate in isolation. It is part of an
international criminal justice system, the Rome Statute
system. The ICC’s role is to step in only where national
jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to act.
As a strong supporter of accountability and a longstanding
supporter of the ICC, Australia will continue
to work with all States parties to ensure that the Court
mandate. We encourage Member States not yet party to
the Rome Statute to consider ratifying it, particularly
At their core, the ICC and the United Nations
are striving to achieve the same goals. One of the
primary purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations — the maintenance of international peace
and security — aligns with those of the Rome Statute.
History has demonstrated clearly that sustainable peace
and impunity for serious international crimes rarely go
hand in hand. All too often, impunity catalyses conf lict.
The interrelationship between the mandates of
the United Nations and the ICC makes the Court a
key partner for the United Nations, particularly as the
United Nations pivots to focus more on prevention. As
its key partner, it is critical to ensure that the United
Nations provides the ICC with the support it needs to
deliver on its mandate.
We welcome the efforts of the United Nations so
far and encourage the Secretary-General to continue to
enhance cooperation under the Relationship Agreement.
We have heard the Prosecutor’s repeated requests for
effective Security Council follow-up and support
with respect to situations referred to the Court by the
Council. It is essential that the Council not approach
ICC referrals in a set-and-forget frame of mind. Its
ongoing political support for the work of the ICC is
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches
delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only.
They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
Document System of the United Nations (http //documents.un.org).
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the report by its President and today’s debate on the
agenda item.
In its remarkable activity since the presentation
of the previous report (see A/72/PV.36), the Court has
once again demonstrated that it is in fact a fundamental
tool in the fight against impunity, the promotion of
human rights and the consolidation of the rule of law at
the international level.
Within the framework of the twentieth anniversary
of the Rome Statute, Argentina renews its ongoing
commitment to the Court by remaining actively
involved in the mechanisms envisaged by the Assembly
of States Parties and through its support for the goal of
achieving the universality of the Statute.
Argentina has demonstrated its support in various
ways, but we are particularly proud to have been the
first State party to conclude the four cooperation
agreements suggested by the Court. Similarly,
Argentina has also ratified the Kampala amendments
on the crime of aggression and therefore welcomes the
activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over that crime.
That activation completes the legal edifice that is the
Court, reaffirming the prevalence of law and justice
over the use of force in international relations.
I would now like to discuss the relationship between
the Court and the United Nations. The relationship
between our Organization and the Court is crucial, while
it must always respect the judicial independence of the
Court. In that context, we reiterate some of the concerns
that Argentina has regarding the referral of situations
by the Security Council to the Court, particularly in
terms of their financial cost. That cost has so far been
borne exclusively by States parties to the Statute of the
Court, despite the clear rules contained in the Rome
Statute and the Relationship Agreement between the
International Criminal Court and the United Nations,
which state that the costs of such referrals must be
borne by the United Nations.
The fight against impunity is an objective shared
by the States parties to the Rome Statute and the United
Nations, but that objective must be accompanied by a
commitment to providing the Court with the resources
necessary to fulfil its functions. Lack of action in
that regard could jeopardize the sustainability of the
Court’s investigations and damage the Organization’s
credibility. We also believe that there is scope for a
closer and better relationship between the Court and
the Security Council, especially with regard to the
work of its subsidiary bodies, such as the Sanctions
Committees and the Working Group on Children and
Armed Conf lict.
In conclusion, Argentina wants to emphasize the
International Criminal Court’s contribution to the
objectives of this Organization in its fight against
impunity for the most serious crimes of international
concern. Indeed, the Court’s contribution to the
configuration of a multilateral system that aims to
promote respect for human rights and achieve a lasting
peace, in accordance with international law and the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, is unquestionable.
The suffering of the victims of the most atrocious
crimes is humankind’s greatest shame. We cannot
allow this century to pass without providing concrete
responses to those violations. That will enable us to
work together to build a more just world under the
primacy of international law.
Mr. Islam (Bangladesh): Bangladesh thanks
the President of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) for his comprehensive report with its valuable
insights (see A/73/334). We commend his observations
concerning the standing of the ICC vis-à-vis national
sovereignty, a relationship worthy of the attention of all
Member States.
Bangladesh is pleased once again to be a sponsor
of draft resolution A/73/L.8, entitled “Report of the
International Criminal Court”. We have taken due
note of the updates on the judicial and prosecutorial
activities of the Court, as well as on the status of
preliminary examinations.
During the reporting period, we followed the ruling
by the Pre-trial Chamber of the ICC on the issue of the
forced deportation of the Rohingya population from
Myanmar’s Rakhine state to Bangladesh with particular
interest, in our capacity as a State party to the Rome
Statute. We acknowledge the sua moto initiative by the
Office of the Prosecutor to seek the Pre-trial Chamber’s
ruling in that regard, especially at a time when the Court
itself faces challenges on multiple fronts. Bangladesh
considered it a solemn responsibility as a State party
to respond to the letter sent by the Pre-trial Chamber
within the set deadline. Against the backdrop of our
bilateral efforts with Myanmar to ensure the safe,
dignified and sustainable return of the Rohingya people
to Rakhine state, we consider the Pre-trial Chamber’s
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ruling concerning the possible denial of their right to
return to be an important development.
Bangladesh will continue to cooperate with the
Court in the wake of the Pre-trial Chamber’s ruling,
while we want to underscore the need for ensuring
accountability for the entire spectrum of atrocity crimes
committed against the Rohingya by the Myanmar
security forces and the non-State actors concerned. In
that context, we recall the responsibility of the Security
Council in the face of the authoritative evidence of
the gravest crimes under international law committed
against the Rohingya, which has been furnished by the
United Nations Independent International Fact-finding
Mission on Myanmar. We acknowledge the Human
Rights Council’s decision to act on the Fact-finding
Mission’s report (A/HRC/39/64) and to establish an
ongoing independent mechanism to collate, analyse and
preserve evidence for facilitating the prosecution of
crimes through the appropriate national or international
judicial mechanisms. It is crucial to the restoration of
confidence among the forcibly displaced Rohingya
with regard to the prospects for their voluntary return
that the atrocity crimes that they have been subjected
to are duly accounted for and the perpetrators brought
to justice.
Bangladesh welcomes the decision by the Assembly
of State Parties to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression as of 17 July. We also support
the three amendments to article 8 of the Rome Statute
and take note of further proposals brought before the
Working Group on Amendments.
We stress that the cooperation, assistance and
support of State parties to the Rome Statute, as well as
other States, remain critical to ensuring that the mandate
of the ICC is discharged in a sustained and meaningful
manner. We reiterate the importance of recognizing
the Court’s mandate and competence throughout the
United Nations system with a view to acknowledging
its valuable contribution to international peace and
security, the rule of law and the creation of peaceful,
just and inclusive societies. We take positive note of
the collaboration pursued between UNESCO and the
Office of the Prosecutor to protect cultural heritage
from attack during armed conf licts.
We underscore the need for the Security Council’s
continued support for the effective functioning of
the Court, including in the cases referred to it by the
Council. There is clear merit in the suggestion for
a structured dialogue between the Council and the
Court on issues of mutual interest, notably in relation
to States’ non-cooperation, sanctions, travel bans and
asset freezes. For our part, we shall continue to extend
all necessary cooperation to the Court in mission
areas where our peacekeepers and military observers
are deployed.
Bangladesh reaffirms the primary responsibility of
national jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute the
crimes defined in the Rome Statute. We fully endorse
the recommendation for the possible inclusion of issues
related to the Rome Statute in legal and judicial reform
programmes supported by the United Nations in the
context of development assistance for the rule of law.
That would be particularly crucial for States that are
not party to the Rome Statute.
As a State party, Bangladesh remains committed
to promoting the universality and full implementation
of the Rome Statute. We would hope that the twentieth
anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute,
which was observed last year, will help create the
necessary impetus for the eventual universalization
of the Statute. ICC cooperation seminars and other
cooperation arrangements with relevant international
and regional organizations should also contribute to the
universalization agenda.
Bangladesh underscores the need for appropriate
capacity-building support for the national jurisdictions
of States parties, pursuant to the principle of
complementarity. In that context, we reiterate the
importance of considering budgetary support for
internships and visiting professional programmes
for applicants from States parties representing the
developing and least-developed countries. We have
circulated a working paper on that subject for favourable
consideration by all States parties and the Court. We
reiterate that due attention must be given to ensuring
the equitable geographical representation of the staff at
the Court, especially at the professional level.
We consider it important to enhance voluntary
contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims so that
the Court can deliver on its reparations and assistance
mandates. As the designated facilitator, Bangladesh
is making efforts to engage with the States parties
concerned to settle their outstanding arrears. We
also look forward to discharging our responsibilities
as a member of the ICC Bureau during the next twoyear
period.
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22/31 18-34919
In conclusion, we want to emphasize the importance
of upholding solidarity among States parties, as well as
the integrity and credibility of the ICC as a court of last
resort, in the overarching interest of fighting impunity
for the gravest crimes under international law that are
under its jurisdiction.
Ms. Roopnarine (Trinidad and Tobago): Trinidad
and Tobago is grateful to the Secretary-General for
the annual report of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) contained in document A/73/334 and supporting
documents on the activities of the Court in 2017
and 2018. We view those documents as important
instruments that convey essential information on the
activities of the Court to the wider membership of the
United Nations as well as States parties. We also want
to take this opportunity to congratulate the President of
the ICC, Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, on his presentation
of the report.
Trinidad and Tobago was a participant in the
trenches during the genesis of the Rome Statute,
through the work of our late former Prime Minister
and subsequent President of the Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago. We are therefore pleased to join others in
celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the founding
document of the ICC. The praise of the international
community is well placed and well merited.
We submit that the ICC is both an international
guardian and guarantor of the rule of law. Indeed,
Trinidad and Tobago’s unwavering commitment to the
ICC is informed by its recognition of the importance
of ending impunity for perpetrators of the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as
outlined in article 5 of the Rome Statute, that is, the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and crimes of aggression.
We welcome the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression as of 17 July. Trinidad and
Tobago ratified the amendments concerning the crime
of aggression in November 2012, following the Review
Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala in 2010.
We view that development as a means to ensure that the
Court is able to exercise wider jurisdiction, including
over crimes of aggression, thereby preventing impunity.
Notwithstanding the many challenges facing the
Court, it cannot be denied that the ICC continues to be
a beacon of hope to the victims of grave crimes within
its jurisdiction who are seeking justice. They include
the most vulnerable, such as thousands of women and
children, who are often the ones most affected by the
actions of criminals who show blatant disregard for
the sanctity of human life by violating international
humanitarian and human rights law.
We nonetheless remain deeply concerned about
the recent withdrawals and notifications of withdrawal
from the Rome Statute, as highlighted in the current
report. While respecting the sovereign right of States to
act as they deem appropriate, Trinidad and Tobago is of
the view that engagement, not disengagement, should
be the prevailing approach to the ICC.
We recognize that the ICC has been perceived by
some as a threat to national sovereignty. However, we
want to demystify that notion and remind Member States
that consistent with the principle of complementarity as
enshrined in the Rome Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction
is invoked only when States are unable or unwilling to
prosecute those alleged to have committed grave crimes.
No individual or State need fear the ICC, therefore, as it
is a court of last resort.
Trinidad and Tobago reaffirms that the success of
the Court is fundamentally linked to the universality
of the Rome Statute. To that end, we reiterate our
commitment to promoting the universality of the Rome
Statute, and we urge all States that have not yet done so
to ratify and fully implement it.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Relationship
Agreement, which provides for close cooperation
between the Court and the United Nations in discharging
their respective responsibilities, we are satisfied that
during the current reporting period, the United Nations
cooperated extensively with the Court with a view to
further strengthening the relationship and ensuring
the effective implementation of the Agreement. In
accordance with the report of the Secretary-General on
this item, we would like to recall that the capacity of
the Security Council to refer a situation to the Court
is crucial to our efforts to promote accountability, but
active follow-up on referrals, ensuring that there will
be cooperation, is necessary in order to ensure that
justice is delivered. We therefore welcome the dialogue
on 6 July between the States parties to the Court that
are members of the Council through the convening of
an Arria Formula meeting, the first of that nature.
Finally, Trinidad and Tobago commends the efforts
of the Court to ensure that justice can prevail and that
criminals are not allowed to continue their actions
with impunity. We remain satisfied with the steadfast
Annex 77
619
620
Annex 78
UNGA, Third Committee, Official Records, Seventy-third session, Summary
record of the 50th meeting (16 November 2018), UN doc. A/C.3/73/SR.50
[extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/C.3/73/SR.50
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/C.3/73/SR.50
621
18-19624 (E)
*1819624*
Annex 78
622
A/C.3/73/SR.50
10/17 18-19624
Annex 78
623
A/C.3/73/SR.50
14/17 18-19624
Annex 78
624
A/C.3/73/SR.50
18-19624 15/17
Annex 78
625
626
Annex 79
UNSC, 8477th meeting (28 February 2019), UN doc. S/PV.8477 [extract]
Available at:
http://undocs.org/S/PV.8477
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/S/PV.8477
627
United Nations S/PV.8477
Security Council
Seventy-fourth year
8477th meeting
Thursday, 28 February 2019, 4.30 p.m.
New York
Provisional
President: Mr. Ndong Mba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Equatorial Guinea)
Members: Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Pecsteen de Buytswerve
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Wu Haitao
Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Ipo
Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Singer Weisinger
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Delattre
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Heusgen
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Djani
Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Alotaibi
Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Duclos
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ms. Wronecka
Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Polyanskiy
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Van Shalkwyk
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . Ms.Pierce
United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Cohen
Agenda
The situation in Myanmar
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http //documents.un.org).
19-05868 (E)
*1905868*
.
Annex 79
628
28/02/2019 The situation in Myanmar S/PV.8477
19-05868 9/22
In conclusion, I would like to express to you,
Mr. President, and your team, our most heartfelt thanks
and congratulations on your excellent presidency
throughout the month of February.
Mr. Singer Weisinger (Dominican Republic)
(spoke in Spanish): Since this is the last public meeting
of your country’s presidency of the Security Council,
Sir, my delegation wishes to thank your delegation. It
was an honour to have your Foreign Minister participate
throughout the month. The debates that you organized
had a great impact. I truly congratulate you. It was
the second Council presidency in 2019 that was led
in Spanish. As a result, many ambassadors have now
learned the language.
Burgener for her detailed briefing on the situation in
Myanmar and the latest developments on the ground.
The Rohingya crisis continues to affect nearly
1 million refugees in Bangladesh and the remaining
Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine state, who suffer from
segregation and limited access to essential services.
Ethnic conflicts are on the rise, the peace process is
on the verge of collapse and insecurity has intensified,
creating opportunities for armed groups to engage
in illicit drug production and human trafficking.
This human catastrophe on both sides of the border
represents a threat to international peace and security
and has generated numerous situations that require the
immediate attention of the international community.
In that regard, the Dominican Republic reiterates
its strong condemnation of the serious human rights
violations and horrendous crimes that have affected
the Rohingya community in Myanmar and recognizes
the Council’s responsibility to address the crisis and
respond appropriately to it. The Council to date has
addressed this issue on several occasions and in different
formats. However, there are no clear indications of a
sustainable and lasting solution that would allow the
Rohingyas a dignified, secure and voluntary return to
their territories.
According to published data, the current displaced
and refugee population totals nearly 1 million people.
The displacement has been generated by what is
described as ethnic cleansing, genocide and atrocity
crimes. Such strong and regrettable descriptions
require action commensurate with their severity. The
Security Council seems paralysed and inert, but the
time has come for us to mobilize and act to prevent
further atrocities, protect vulnerable populations and
ensure that perpetrators are held accountable for their
actions. However, collective responsibility begins with
individual responsibility.
It is also time for the Government of Myanmar
to assume its responsibility to protect its citizens on
its territory. We urgently call upon the Government
to implement the recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Rakhine State, which include,
among other issues, the implementation of strategies
for socioeconomic development, citizenship,
freedom of movement, community participation and
representation, intercommunal cohesion and the
security of all communities.
It is also essential to fully comply with the
memorandum of understanding, which will allow
Rohingya communities a dignified and sustainable
return that adheres to human rights standards and will
ensure unrestricted access of humanitarian assistance
to all displaced people. That will enable us to effectively
mitigate the impact of this regrettable human and
humanitarian crisis. The responsibility to ensure the
dignified return of refugees lies with the Government of
Myanmar, which must create the necessary conditions
for the return of refugees with the cooperation of
the international community, particularly United
Nations agencies. We must remember that a solution is
possible and that we must prevent a repetition of the
failures of the past. Human rights and humanitarian
principles cannot be applied selectively, watered down
or disregarded.
I would now like to refer to another aspect of
this crisis — the attribution of responsibilities for
perpetrators of atrocities committed against the
Rohingya population. There has been no type of
investigation to date or access allowed for fact-finding.
Access for the Special Rapporteur has been rescinded
and journalists have been arrested for investigating and
verifying crimes committed. In short, there has been no
process of accountability.
Above all, we are concerned about the victims of
gender-based violence, the degrading and cruel acts of
sexual assault that have been committed against women
and girls. Those levels of brutality and violence indicate
a clear trend of using those crimes as a strategy to
intimidate and punish the civil population. We urgently
call for the launching of relevant investigations to
identify those responsible for those horrendous acts,
Annex 79
629
630
Annex 80
UN, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Oral Update to 41st
Session of the Human Rights Council by the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Myanmar [10 July 2019]
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24782…
E
631
􀀀􀀀 






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Annex 80
632
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Annex 80
633
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Annex 80
634
Annex 81
ILC, Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2019, vol. II, Part Two
[extract]
Available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft articles/7 7 2019.pdf
French version available at:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/french/draft articles/7 7 2019.pdf
635
Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Humanity
2019
􀀦􀁒􀁓􀁜􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀂋 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀜
􀀤􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀀯􀁄􀁚 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗 􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀜􀀏
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜 􀁄􀁖 􀁄 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀚􀀗􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕 􀁌􀁑 Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2019􀀏 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑 􀀬􀀬􀀏 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗 􀀷􀁚􀁒􀀑
Annex 81
636
􀀜
􀀋􀁅􀀌 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁕 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁅􀁜 􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀞
􀀋􀁆􀀌 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀞
􀀋􀁇􀀌 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁝􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀞
􀀋􀁈􀀌 􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁅􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁆 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀞
􀀋􀁉􀀌 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗 􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀞
􀀋􀁊􀀌 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇 􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀞
􀀋􀁋􀀌 􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕 􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏
􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀞
􀀋􀁌􀀌 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀞
􀁒􀁕
􀀋􀁍􀀌 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁄􀁚 􀁒􀁉
􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀗􀀑 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀁒􀁉 􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁎 􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁜􀀑
􀀘􀀑 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏 􀁄􀁖 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁅􀁈 􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏
􀁒􀁕 􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉􀀏 􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁒􀀏 􀁒􀁕 􀁈􀁑􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀑
􀀙􀀑 􀀺􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁄 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀏
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁗 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁒 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁗􀁒 􀁄
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁌􀁑 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗 􀁌􀁑 􀁄 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀚􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁄􀁑􀁜
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏 􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁕 􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏 􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈 􀁒􀁕 􀁌􀁑 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏
􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀛􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜 􀁗􀁒 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀁌􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁄 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏
􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑 􀀬􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋 􀁄 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀏 􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛
􀁌􀁑 􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀑 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛 􀁌􀁉 􀁌􀁗 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀜􀀑 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏 􀁄􀁖 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁕 􀁅􀁜 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈 􀁄 􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁒
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑
Article 15
Settlement of disputes
􀀔􀀑 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁘􀁕 􀁗􀁒 􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀕􀀑 􀀤􀁑􀁜 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑 􀁗􀁚􀁒 􀁒􀁕 􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁖 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏 􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁒􀁑􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀁅􀁈 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏 􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖
􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
Annex 81
637
􀀔􀀓
􀀖􀀑 􀀨􀁄􀁆􀁋 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁌􀁗 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉 􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋 􀀕 􀁒􀁉
􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁑􀁒􀁗 􀁅􀁈 􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋 􀀕 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁄􀁖 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋 􀁄 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀗􀀑 􀀤􀁑􀁜 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁋􀁄􀁖 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈 􀁄 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋 􀀖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁄􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
Annex
􀀔􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈 􀀔􀀗􀀏 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋 􀀛􀀑
Designation of a central authority
􀀕􀀑 􀀨􀁄􀁆􀁋 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁄 􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜
􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁒 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕 􀁗􀁒 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐 􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁒
􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑 􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁄 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁋􀁄􀁖 􀁄 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁄 􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀁒􀁉 􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏 􀁌􀁗 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁄
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗 􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈 􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀑
􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁜 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀑 􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁗􀁒 􀁄 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁌􀁗 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁜 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗
􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁅􀁈 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇
􀁅􀁜 􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀑 􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏
􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁒 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁅􀁈 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁅􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁒􀁉 􀁄 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁅􀁈 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇 􀁗􀁒 􀁌􀁗
􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁘􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀏
􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁌􀁉 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀑
Procedures for making a request
􀀖􀀑 􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁅􀁈 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈 􀁌􀁑 􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁒􀁕􀀏 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀏 􀁅􀁜 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖 􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁒􀁉
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁄 􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀏 􀁌􀁑 􀁄 􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁗􀁒 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁅􀁈 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈 􀁒􀁕 􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀁗􀁒
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑 􀀬􀁑 􀁘􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇 􀁅􀁜 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁅􀁈 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈
􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏 􀁅􀁘􀁗 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁅􀁈 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁌􀁑 􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀑
􀀗􀀑 􀀤 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁐􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀝
􀀋􀁄􀀌 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀞
􀀋􀁅􀀌 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕
􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁒 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀞
􀀋􀁆􀀌 􀁄 􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏 􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗 􀁌􀁑 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁗􀁒 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀁒􀁉 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀞
􀀋􀁇􀀌 􀁄 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁗 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁖 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖 􀁗􀁒 􀁅􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀞
􀀋􀁈􀀌 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀏 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏 􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁄􀁑􀁇 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀁒􀁉 􀁄􀁑􀁜 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀞 􀁄􀁑􀁇
􀀋􀁉􀀌 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁕 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁌􀁖 􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀑
􀀘􀀑 􀀷􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁐􀁄􀁜 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑 􀁌􀁗 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖
􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜 􀁉􀁒􀁕 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗 􀁌􀁑 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀁏􀁄􀁚 􀁒􀁕 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑 􀁌􀁗
􀁆􀁄􀁑 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
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UNGA, resolution 74/166, Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, UN doc. A/RES/74/166, 18 December 2019
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/RES/74/166
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/74/166
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Voting record on UNGA resolution 74/166
Available at:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3849187
651
Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea :
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3849187?ln=en[05/12/2020 11:40:15]
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2019
Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea :
resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
Title Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea : resolution /
adopted by the General Assembly
Agenda A/74/251 70c Human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and
representatives. HUMAN RIGHTS--REPORTS
A/74/251 70c[4] HUMAN RIGHTS--DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Resolution A/RES/74/166
Meeting record A/74/PV.50
Draft resolution A/C.3/74/L.26
Committee report A/74/399/Add.3
Note ADOPTED WITHOUT VOTE
Annex 83
652
Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea :
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3849187?ln=en[05/12/2020 11:40:15]
Vote date 2019-12-18
Collections Resource Type > Voting Data
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Annex 84
UNGA, resolution 74/169, Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab
Republic, UN doc. A/RES/74/169, 18 December 2019
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/RES/74/169
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/74/169
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A/RES/74/169 Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic
6/14 19-22312
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8/14 19-22312
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Annex 84
664
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Annex 85
Voting record on UNGA resolution 74/169
Available at:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3840118
671
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Annex 85
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Annex 85
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Annex 85
676
Annex 86
UNGA, resolution 74/246, Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and
other minorities in Myanmar, UN doc. A/RES/74/246, 27 December 2019
Available at:
http://undocs.org/A/RES/74/246
French version available at:
http://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/74/246
677
*1922672*
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A/RES/74/246
Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and
other minorities in Myanmar
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other minorities in Myanmar A/RES/74/246
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other minorities in Myanmar
4/8 19-22672
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other minorities in Myanmar A/RES/74/246
19-22672 5/8
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other minorities in Myanmar
6/8 19-22672
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other minorities in Myanmar A/RES/74/246
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other minorities in Myanmar
8/8 19-22672
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Annex 87
Voting record on UNGA resolution 74/246
Available at:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021
687
Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar :
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021?ln=en[05/12/2020 10:10:19]
Formats Add to List
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2019
Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in
Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
Title Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar :
resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
Agenda A/74/251 70c Human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and
representatives. HUMAN RIGHTS--REPORTS
A/74/251 70c[5] HUMAN RIGHTS--MYANMAR
Resolution A/RES/74/246
Meeting record A/74/PV.52
Draft resolution A/C.3/74/L.29
Committee report A/74/399/Add.3
Note RECORDED - No machine generated vote
Annex 87
688
Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar :
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021?ln=en[05/12/2020 10:10:19]
Vote summary Voting Summary
Yes: 134 | No: 9 | Abstentions: 28 | Non-Voting: 22 | Total voting membership: 193
Vote date 2019-12-27
Vote Y AFGHANISTAN
Y ALBANIA
Y ALGERIA
Y ANDORRA
ANGOLA
Y ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Y ARGENTINA
Y ARMENIA
Y AUSTRALIA
Y AUSTRIA
Y AZERBAIJAN
Y BAHAMAS
Y BAHRAIN
Y BANGLADESH
Y BARBADOS
N BELARUS
Y BELGIUM
Y BELIZE
Y BENIN
A BHUTAN
Y BOLIVIA (PLURINATIONAL STATE OF)
Y BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Y BOTSWANA
Y BRAZIL
Y BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
Y BULGARIA
Y BURKINA FASO
A BURUNDI
Y CABO VERDE
N CAMBODIA
A CAMEROON
Y CANADA
A CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Y CHAD
Y CHILE
N CHINA
Y COLOMBIA
COMOROS
CONGO
Y COSTA RICA
Y COTE D'IVOIRE
Y CROATIA
CUBA
Y CYPRUS
Annex 87
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https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021?ln=en[05/12/2020 10:10:19]
Y CZECHIA
A DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Y DENMARK
Y DJIBOUTI
DOMINICA
Y DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Y ECUADOR
Y EGYPT
Y EL SALVADOR
A EQUATORIAL GUINEA
A ERITREA
Y ESTONIA
ESWATINI
Y ETHIOPIA
FIJI
Y FINLAND
Y FRANCE
Y GABON
Y GAMBIA
Y GEORGIA
Y GERMANY
Y GHANA
Y GREECE
GRENADA
Y GUATEMALA
Y GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
Y GUYANA
Y HAITI
Y HONDURAS
Y HUNGARY
Y ICELAND
A INDIA
Y INDONESIA
Y IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)
Y IRAQ
Y IRELAND
Y ISRAEL
Y ITALY
Y JAMAICA
A JAPAN
Y JORDAN
Y KAZAKHSTAN
A KENYA
KIRIBATI
Y KUWAIT
Y KYRGYZSTAN
Annex 87
690
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https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021?ln=en[05/12/2020 10:10:19]
N LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Y LATVIA
Y LEBANON
A LESOTHO
Y LIBERIA
Y LIBYA
Y LIECHTENSTEIN
Y LITHUANIA
Y LUXEMBOURG
Y MADAGASCAR
Y MALAWI
Y MALAYSIA
Y MALDIVES
Y MALI
Y MALTA
Y MARSHALL ISLANDS
Y MAURITANIA
Y MAURITIUS
Y MEXICO
Y MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
Y MONACO
A MONGOLIA
Y MONTENEGRO
Y MOROCCO
A MOZAMBIQUE
N MYANMAR
A NAMIBIA
A NAURU
A NEPAL
Y NETHERLANDS
Y NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA
NIGER
Y NIGERIA
Y NORTH MACEDONIA
Y NORWAY
Y OMAN
Y PAKISTAN
A PALAU
Y PANAMA
Y PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Y PARAGUAY
Y PERU
N PHILIPPINES
Y POLAND
Y PORTUGAL
Y QATAR
Y REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Annex 87
691
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https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021?ln=en[05/12/2020 10:10:19]
Y REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Y ROMANIA
N RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Y RWANDA
Y SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
Y SAINT LUCIA
A SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
SAMOA
Y SAN MARINO
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
Y SAUDI ARABIA
Y SENEGAL
A SERBIA
SEYCHELLES
Y SIERRA LEONE
A SINGAPORE
Y SLOVAKIA
Y SLOVENIA
Y SOLOMON ISLANDS
SOMALIA
Y SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH SUDAN
Y SPAIN
A SRI LANKA
Y SUDAN
Y SURINAME
Y SWEDEN
Y SWITZERLAND
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
Y TAJIKISTAN
A THAILAND
A TIMOR-LESTE
Y TOGO
A TONGA
A TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Y TUNISIA
Y TURKEY
TURKMENISTAN
Y TUVALU
Y UGANDA
UKRAINE
Y UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Y UNITED KINGDOM
A UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Y UNITED STATES
Y URUGUAY
UZBEKISTAN
Y VANUATU
Annex 87
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https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3841021?ln=en[05/12/2020 10:10:19]
A VENEZUELA (BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF)
N VIET NAM
Y YEMEN
A ZAMBIA
N ZIMBABWE
Collections Resource Type > Voting Data
Annex 87
693
694
Annex 88
UN News, “Top UN court orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya from
genocide”, 23 January 2020
Available at:
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1055841
695
1/3/2021 Top UN court orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya from genocide | | UN News
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1055841 1/6
UN News (/en/)
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ICJ-CIJ/Wendy van Bree Judges at the International Court of Justice in The Hague consider the case against
Myanmar.
    
Top UN court orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya
from genocide
23 January 2020 Human Rights (/en/news/topic/human-rights)
Myanmar must take steps to protect its minority Rohingya population, the top UN
court unanimously ruled (https://www.icj-cij.org/